Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Entry
Reference
Atomic Sentences Popper I 117
PopperVsWittgenstein/Tractatus: any "meaningful sentence" should be logically reducible to ’elementary propositions’. All meaningful sentences are "images of reality". His sense criterion thus coincides with the demarcation criterion of induction logic. This fails due to the problem of induction. The positivist radicalism destroyed metaphysics and natural science: the laws of nature are not logically reducible to elementary empirical propositions. >Protocol sentences, >Atomism, > Elementary Sentences, >Induction/Popper.
After Wittgenstein’s criterion of meaning even the laws of nature are meaningless, i.e. not true (legitimate) sentences. This is not a distinction but an identification with metaphysics.

Po I
Karl Popper
The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959
German Edition:
Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Atomism Atomism (philosophy, logic): the assumption that the facts can be represented by elementary sentences. Thus the question of the independence of facts is raised.

Complexes/Complexity Wittgenstein Tugendhat I 163
Complex/Wittgenstein: E.g. not: "red circle consists of redness and circularity".
Tetens VII 75
Complex/Image Theory/Tractatus: the complex characters "aRb" do not say that a stands in relation R to b, but that "a" stands in a relation to "b" (!(s) quotation marks) says that aRb. (Here no quotation marks) (3.1432) - ((s) resolution of the sign into its component parts: the relation on the level of signs says something about the relationship on the level of reality).
Hintikka I 53
Mean period/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: relations and properties to the objects. Philosophical Grammar (Philosophische Grammatik): "This is the root of the bad expression: the fact is a complex of objects. Example "Here it is said that an ill person is compared to the combination of two things."
Hintikka: such a far-reaching change of opinion is so unlikely that one should assume that the Tractatus rejects the equation of "objects" with individuals or individual things.
I 68
Tractatus: renounces all complex logical forms conceived in the sense of independent entities, there is nothing left but the forms of the objects (there are no forms corresponding to complex logical propositions).
I 68
Thing/complex object/Terminology/Wittgenstein: a complex object is just a thing. We know the complex objects from the point of view and know from the point of view that they are complex.
I 138 ff
Frege/Logic/Sentence/Hintikka: in the Tractatus there is a break with Frege's tradition: Frege's logic is regarded as the theory of complex sentences. Wittgenstein examines the simplest components of the world and their linguistic substitutes.
I 148 et seqq.
Truth Function/Tractatus/Hintikka: Main thesis of the Tractatus: (a.o.) "The proposition is a truth function of the elementary sentences". Wittgenstein/Hintikka: must therefore prove that truth-functional operations (to form complex sets of atoms) have no influence on the image character.
II 39
Complexity/Wittgenstein: since an infinite number of special cases belong to a general sentence, it does not make it more complex than if only three or four special cases were belonging to it. A sentence with four special cases is probably more complex than one with three, but in an infinite number of special cases it is a generality of a different logical kind.
II 314
Simple/Simplicity/Complex/Composite/Sense/meaningless/Wittgenstein: Suppose you are asked whether a drawn square is composed or simple, i.e. whether it consists of parts or not.
II 315
Example "Is this uniformly white object composed or simple?" The answer is "it depends."
III 139
Elementary Theorem/Wittgenstein/Flor: The term elementary theorem is important as an absolute term. Otherwise we deal with ambiguity. What occurs in one context as a simple theorem could be complex in another context. This would also mean that intentional connections between sentences could no longer be excluded.
III 142
There must be an absolute distinction between the simple and the complex.
IV 31
Complex/Tractatus: 3.3442 the sign of the complex does not dissolve arbitrarily even during analysis.
IV 86
Complex/Tractatus: 5.5423 perceiving a complex means perceiving that its components relate to each other in such or such a way. This explains why a drawn cube can be perceived as a cube in two ways.
Puzzle: here we really see two different facts.
W VII 75
Complex/Mapping theory/Image theory/Tractatus: not the complex sign "aRb" says that a is in relation R to b, but that "a" is in relation to "b" ((s) quotation marks!), says that aRb. (No quotes here!) (3.1432) - ((s) Resolution of the sign into its components: the relation on the level of signs says something about the relation on the level of reality). >Atomism, >Atomic Sentence.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Tetens I
H. Tetens
Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994

W VII
H. Tetens
Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Denotation Fodor II 117
Theory of denotation/Formal Languages​/Fodor: Theory of denotation of the formal semantics does not reflect denotation in the specific language properly. Therefore, the real problems do not appear in the formal languages​​. - Designation theory: in two parts: 1) a set of rules specifies the designates for the individual constants and predicates in the vocabulary. - 2) A second set determines the concept true in L for the sentences by a recursive. - In this second set there is usually a rule that defines a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of every elementary sentence. (Snow is white...). - Denotation/Fodor: cannot grasp the problems of denotation in natural languages. - E.g. - "I want to be Pope" does not refer to the Pope. - E.g. - "I would like to meet the Pope": refers to the Pope. - E.g. -the checkered dress: can refer to the darker dress.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Satisfaction Tarski K.Glüer Davidson zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 S 24ff
I 24
> href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/search.php?erweiterte_suche_1=recursion&erweiterte_suche_2=Tarski&x=0&y=0">Recursive Method: fails with quantifiers. E.g. "No tree is large and small" cannot be analyzed as two complete elementary propositions. - Most complex sentences formed with variables, connectives, predicates, must be interpreted as links of open sentences. But open sentences have no truth value. Therefore, Tarski introduces the term "fulfillment": Definition fulfillment: relation between (ordered) sequences of objects and open sentences. Here works the recursive method: for elementary sentences it is defined which objects 2 they satisfy, and there are rules specified for all compositions of open sentences by which can be determined which objects they satisfy.
Clause statements are determined as a special case of open sentences. Either they do not contain free variables, or they have been closed by means of quantifiers. - For true statements fulfillment is simple: because whether an ordered sequence of objects satisfies a sentence depends only on the free variables it contains.
E.g. "The moon is round" contains no free variables. Thus, the nature of the objects of the respective sequence is irrelevant and it can be determined by definition, whether such a proposition is true when it is satisfied by all the consequences - or by none. - It is slightly more complicated for quantified statements: E.g. "All stars are around" or "There is at least one star, which is round." Here, too, the fulfillment is defined such that either all sequences satisfy a sentence, or none. So it is clear that it would be absurd to associate truth of closed sentences with fulfillment by any sequence of objects. A sentence like "All stars are round" is true if there are certain objects that satisfy "X is round": all stars. Tarski: a statement is true if it is satisfied by all objects, otherwise false."
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Berka I 399
Part definition/satisfy/Tarski. E.g. Johann and Peter satisfy the propositional function "X and Y are brothers" if they are brothers.(1)
1. A.Tarski, „Grundlegung der wissenschaftlichen Semantik“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, Bd. III, ASI 390, Paris 1936, pp. 1-8
---
Horwich I 119
Fulfillment/Tarski: here we replace the free variables of propositional functions by the names of objects and see if we can get true statements - but that does not work when we use fulfillment to define truth - solution recursive procedure - Rules for the conditions under which objects satisfy a composite propositional function - for whole sentences, there is also fulfillment: then a sentence is either satisfied by no object or by all - fulfillment: has as a relation always one more spot - E.g. "is greater than": is a function between a relation and pairs of objects - therefore, there are many fulfillment terms - solution: "infinite sequence" - then fulfillment is a binary relation between functions and sequences of objects - the reason for this indirect truth definition is that compound sentences are composed of several propositional functions - not always of complete sentences - so there is no recursive definition
Horwich I 139
Fulfillment/antinomy/Tarski: for the fulfillment, we can also construct an antinomy: E.g. the statements function X does not satisfy X - now we look at the question of whether this term, which is surely a propositional function satisfied itself or not.(2)

2. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75
---
Skirbekk I 146
semantic: refers to statements - fulfillment, designation: refers to objects.
Skirbekk I 156
Truth/Tarski: we get the truth definition simply because of the definition of fulfillment: Definition fulfillment/Tarski: fulfillment is a relationship between any object and propositional functions - an object satisfies a function when the function becomes a true statement, when the free variables replace with the name of object - snow satisfies the propositional function "x is white" - Vs: that is circular, because "true" occurs in the definition of fulfillment - Solution: fulfillment itself must be defined recursively - if we have the fulfillemt, it relates by itself on the statements themselves - a statement is either satisfied by all objects, or by none.(3)

3. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in. G: Skirbekk (Hg.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996

Tarski I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983


Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Skirbekk I
G. Skirbekk (Hg)
Wahrheitstheorien
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977
Semantic Value Dummett III (b) 53
Def Semantic Value/Frege/Dummett: (for the elementary sentence) that of the characteristics whose possession is necessary and sufficient in order to determine each complex sentence according to its composition of elementary sentences as true or not true. - The semantic value of an elementary sentence is nothing but its truth value - semantic interpretation: direct allocation of the semantic values ​​of the different expressions to the scheme letters (not to the expressions themselves!). - Semantic value: = reference! - Semantic value of a predicate: extension- not the same as sense.
III (b) 54
Semantic value of a singular term: the particular.
III 225
Schulte: should avoid "nature" of the reference object.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982