Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 22 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Consciousness | Block | II 458 Consciousness/Block: is a mixed concept of "phenomenal consciousness" (p-consciousness/terminology) and "access-consciousness" (a-consciousness). Def a-consciousness/Terminology/Block: Being aware of a fact means that the information for rational inferring is available. (Functional concept) Consciousness/Burge: (VsBlock): p-consciousness Prerequisite for a-consciousness. Phenomenality is not the same as consciousness! Phenomenal states can also be unconscious. II 524 Blindsight/Block: Patients who cannot see in part of their visual field can still give true verbal descriptions upon request. This suggests that consciousness must have a function that is effective in survival, reporting, and behavioral control. II 530 Access-consciousness/Block: I call its basis the information-processing function of the phenomenal consciousness in >Schacter's model. ((s) Part or basis as a counterpart). II 531 Def p-consciousness/phenomenal consciousness/Block: experience. It cannot be described non-circularly! But that's no shortcoming! p-conscious properties are distinguished from any cognitive, intentional, or functional property. Although functionalism is wrong with respect to p-consciousness, functionalism can accept many of my points. II 535 Def a-consciousness/access consciousness/Block: a state is a-conscious if by virtue of being in the state a representation of its content 1) is inferentially unbound, i.e. is available as a premise for considering 2) is available for rational control of actions 3) is available for rational language control (not necessary, even chimpanzees can be p-conscious). p-consciousness and a-consciousness interact: Background can become foreground. E.g. feeling the shirt feels at the neck. Fallacy/Block: it is a mistake, however, to go unnoticed from one consciousness to the other. Mistake: To conclude from the example blindsight that it is the function of the P consciousness to enable rational control of action. p-consciousness/Block: p-consciousness is not functional! It is about sensations. a-consciousness/Block: functional. Typical: "propositional attitudes". >Propositional attitudes. Pain/Block: its representational content is too primitive to play a role in inferring. Pain is not conceptually mediated, after all, dogs can also feel pain. Summary: p-consciousness can be consciousness of and consciousness of does not need to be a-consciousness. II 555 Consciousness/Dennett: 1) Cultural construct! 2) You cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness. 3) Consciousness is a "cerebral celebrity": only those contents are conscious that are persistent, that monopolize the resources long enough to achieve certain typical and "symptomatic" effects. BlockVsDennett: Ad 1) this is a merging of several concepts of consciousness. 2) Consciousness cannot be a cultural product. Also probably not the a-consciousness: many lower creatures have it, even without such a concept. Ad 3) But that is a biological fact and not a cultural one. II 568 Fallacy/BlockVsSearle: Question: why the thirsty blindsight patient in the example does not reach for the water: he lacks both p-consciousness and a-consciousness. That's right. But it is a mistake to go from a function of the machinery of a-consciousness to any function of p-consciousness. Fallacy: to prematurely draw the conclusion that P consciousness has a certain function from the premise that "consciousness" is missing (without being clear what kind of consciousness). |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Content | Husserl | Chisholm II 141 Representational Content/Husserl: there is a third thing next to property act and factual act: certain acts provide the "smallest difference": the key to the "fulfillment" which alone can explain the temporal context of the act. >Representation/Husserl. The meaning conferring act has an open space, where another act may enter. >Meaning/Husserl. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Content | McDowell | I 27 Content/McDowell: there is a non-conceptual representational content - Content/Kant: Thoughts without content are empty - Concept/Kant: views without concepts are blind. I 157 ff Content/McDowell: there is a non-conceptual representational content (whether we agree with it or not). >Representation/McDowell. I 34 Content/McDowell: is not something that you put together yourself. The conceptual skills were already at work before you have a choice. >Spontaneity/McDowell, >Experience/McDowell. Content/Meaning/Quine/McDowell: therefore, "empirical meaning" is not the same as content. If you call content an attitude about how things of the empirical world are. (Quine: "conceptual sovereignty"). Content/Quine: Result of the freely acting spontaneity that is not controlled by the material of receptivity. --- Rorty VI 216 "Content"/McDowell/Rorty: the review of certain words proves that they have no empirical content: E.g. "witch", "phlogiston", "boche" (a French expression for German). These are pseudo-concepts. The more we learn about the world, the greater is the number of our real concepts. >Concept/McDowell, cf. >Conservativity. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Errors | Brandom | I 424ff Objectivity of conceptual standards: we cannot all individually (each of us) be wrong about them, but we can also be wrong about them all together! (electron, mass in outer space). Error about proper use. >Use, >Objectivity. I 102f Error: everyone individually and all together can be wrong about whether a conceptual content is appropriate in a particular situation. I 269 Objectivity/Error: it is claimed that social practices suffice to give allegations objectively representational content. These are then objective truth conditions. Even the entire community can be wrong with such an assessment. Universal error is only possible with standards, not with concepts, see above I 105). (VsDavidson). I 921 Error/Brandom: The words that community as a whole could not be mistaken were put into the mouths of Wittgenstein, Kripke and Wright - if that was true, practice would not have to orient itself on the accuracy of representations - BrandomVsKripke). >Correctness, >Representation. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Experience | Peacocke | I 5 Perception/experience/tradition/Peacocke: experience has a content. >Empirical content, >Content On the other hand: Feeling/sensations/tradition: sensation has no content. - E.g. sensation of smallness. It may nevertheless be a certain sensation. >Knowledge, >Thinking, >World/Thinking, >Distinctions. I 16f Experience/PeacockeVsPerception Theory/Tradition: more than just perception: emotional content, not merely representative content: e.g. tilted cube: jumps over, the network of lines looks completely different (perception). On the other hand: e.g. rabbit-duck-head: the line web does not change, therefore the perception theorist could claim that there are two representational components: a) the lines, b) Rabbit/duck >Rabbit-duck-head, >Perception theory/Peacocke. Perception theory: translation variant: the missing property must be introduced in suitable statements. PeacockeVs: this would only provide a priori knowledge, not empirical knowledge, since the postulated type of experience could not be missing. - Vs added terms: these do not have to be available to the clueless, so they do not change the truth or falsity. >Overdetermination of the representational content. Overdetermined: the angle could be changed by appropriate overlapping without changing the picture. I 199 Experience/Peacocke: also non-inferential experience is possible. Doubts: are inferential, always from conclusion. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Form and Content | Gadamer | I 98 Form and Content/Art/Gadamer: The so-called representational content is not at all material, which waits for subsequent shaping, but is always already bound to the unity of form and meaning in the work of art. The expression "motif", which is common in the language of painters, can illustrate this. It can be representational as well as abstract - as a motif it is in any case ontologically immaterial (aneu hylés). >Art, >Artworks, >Inside/Outside. But this does not mean at all that it is meaningless. Rather, something is a motif in that it has a convincing unity and that the artist has to perform this unity as a unity of meaning, just as the recipient understands it as unity. Kant/Gadamer: In this context, Kant speaks, as is well known, of "aesthetic ideas" to which "much that cannot be named" is added.(1) >Form, >Content, >Aesthetics/Kant. 1.Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, S. 197 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Information | Brandom | I 718 Information/Brandom = is representational content. >Content, >Representation. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Intentionality | Millikan | I 13 Intentionality/about/aboutness/MillikanVsTradition: Intentionality is not transparent: many processes that are "about" something are not aware for their users. E.g. von Frisch knew what a bee dance is about, the bees do not know. Bees react only appropriately to bee dances. Thought: requires that the referent is identified. >Reference, >Identification. I 93 Intentionality/Millikan: Thesis: Intentionality is based on external natural relations. Relation: these relations are normal relations or eigenrelations. Normality: is explained by evolution. "In the head": nothing that is in the head, shows "by itself" consciousness or intentionality. 1. Nothing which can be observed in a single person (dispositions or neural patterns) will contain the intentional nature, let alone representational content. 2. Therefore we have no a priori knowledge of what we mean. >a priori/Millikan. I 244 Intentionality/Millikan: thinking-of (thinking-about) requires an identification of the value. I 245 Intentionality/Millikan: three questions must be separated: 1. What is it for a thought to be about an object? 2. What is it for a person to grasp the object of the thought? 3. What kind of test is there to determine whether an object is the one for which it is held? I 250 Intentionality/MillikanVsRealism/Millikan: Solution: There can be simple thoughts of complex objects. Furthermore, my theory allows you to know what you think while you discover the complexity of your thinking. Intension/Millikan: my theory does not confuse intentionality with having distinctive intensions. That is, a concept can change with time without losing the trace of the thing it is about. (Conceptual change, > meaning change). |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Inverted Spectra | Stalnaker | I 222 Inverted spectra/Stalnaker: the recent discussion is about the relation between representational and qualitative content. E.g. we then have different experiences when we both look at a ripe tomato, but the tomato seems red to both of us. Representational content: the representational content is the same for both! ((s) Both have the experience red). ((s) So it is about language use) and not about a stimulus as something neutral). StalnakerVsSeparation of qualitative and representational content. >Representation. I 225 Inverted spectra/intra-personnel/language/Stalnaker: e.g. assuming Fred has reversed his spectrum over time, but his language use has adapted to it. Then the qualitative content (that stays changed) cannot be identified with the intentional content. Variant: through gradual change in small steps. Important argument: then you cannot say in the end that the whole semantics is changed abruptly. >Qualia/Stalnaker. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Necessity | Peacocke | II 313 Necessity/necessary/modification of predicates/Wiggins/Peacocke: Problem: 'big' cannot modify like 'nec' predicates of any fine degree. ((s) "nec" : Operator for necessary"). >Operators. That means, we get a finite axiomatized theory for 'big' but not for 'nec'. - There can only be an infinite number of modifications here. >Axioms, >Axiom systems, >Axiomatizability. Problem: 'nec' can be iterated in the object language, but Grandy's representational content cannot treat the iterations because the performance is not defined. Solution: 1. syntactical variabel 't>' is about series of terms of the form (t1 ... tn) 2. separate recursion for abstracts of the object language in the theory, that specifies inductively the conditions under which a sequence has the property correlated with the abstract('Corr'). II 316 Then the truth conditions turn the predications into sequences - so the theory is not entirely homophonic. >Homophony, >Truth conditions, >Predication. II 324 Necessity/satisfaction/language/Peacocke: the satisfaction and evaluation axioms not only express contingent truths about the language - necessarily in German each sequence fulfils x1 'is greater than Hesperus' in L, if their first element is greater than Hesperus. >Satisfaction. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Objectivity | Brandom | I 136f Objectivity/Brandom: naive: from the success of representations - Objectivity is a characteristic of assessment practices regarding the correctness of representation - representation in response to what is representation, not as what the represented is conceived to be - so the status goes beyond the attitude - therefore representation is not a basic semantic concept. >Representation. I 692 Objective: socially instituted, but not intersubjectively. Objectivity: depends on what is true from what assertions and concept applications actually represent or what they are about, and not about what somebody or everybody deems to be true. >Intersubjectivity. I 736 Objectivity consist of the distinction between attribution, acceptance and definition. I 822 ff What is objectively right and true is determined by the objects being talked about, not by what is said about them; not even by the attitudes of any or all members of the community. >Truthmakers. I 314 Objectivity/Brandom: an objective or naturalistic theory of cognitive authorization cannot be derived only from reliability considerations; not even a naturalistic theory of the proper use of the concept. >Reliability theory. I 823 Objectivity/Standards/Community/Language/Brandom: Vs I-We conception of social practices: Incorrect comparison of the views of the individual with those of the community (inter-subjectivity) - BrandomVsIntersubjectivity as a model for objectivity - Problem: the community as a whole loses the ability to distinguish - that is what the community assimilates to its individuals. I 824 Objectivity/Reality/World/Brandom: that our concepts are about an objective world is partly due to the fact that there is an objective sense of accuracy to which their application is subjected. >Reality, >World. I 825 A propositional or other content may only be specified from one point of view and this is subjective, not in a Cartesian sense, but in the very practical sense (account managing subject) - BrandomVsTradition: instead of non-perspective facts one must pay attention only to the structural characteristics of the accounting practices. I 826 Objectivity consists in the distinction between attribution, acceptance and definition. >Attribution. I 828 Difference between objective and subjective correct content is allocated between an assigned definition and one that is approved by the speaker - within each perspective there is a difference between status and attitude - objectivity is then a structural aspect of the social-perspective form of conceptual contents. >Conceptual content. I 829 Objective representational content: de-re allocation: he thinks of quinine that... - thereby specification of objects. >Identification, >Individuation. I 831 I-You style/account management/Brandom: the definitions are made by an individual (account holder), not by "the community" - BrandomVsInter-subjectivity (I-We style): cannot grant the possibility of error on the part of the privileged perspective. Cf. >I-You-relationship/Gadamer. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Observation Language | Peacocke | I 88 PeacockVsInstrumentalism. Peacocke per separation observation terms/theoretical terms. >Instrumentalism, >Observation terms, >Theoretical terms. If X-ray tubes and Geiger counters are distinguished, then in the representational content - then we have observation terms instead of theoretical terms. >Content, >Representational Content, >Empirical Content. I 94 Observation Terms/Instruments/Peacocke: E.g. Square: if presented at different angles, it is epistemically impossible that it is not a square. E.g. a pair of particles: here it is still epistemically possible that it is not the result of a collision. That always requires faith in observability, therefore circular if the belief exists and ineffective if the belief does not exist. >Circularity, >Belief, >Observability, >Unobservables. In contrast, none of both if it comes to understanding instead of truth. >Understanding, >Truth. I 104 Theoretical Terms/TT/Observation term/concept/theory/instrument/experiment/Peacocke: improved tools give us no new concepts. >Concepts. Peacocke Thesis: theoretical terms are always connected to observation terms - e.g. a blind, to whom a device writes information about spatial environment on the back: how should the blind test the device? >Knowledge, >World/Thinking, >Perception, >Certainty, >Confirmation, >Verification. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Overdetermination | Peacocke | I 16f Experience/PeacockeVsPerception Theory/PeacockeVsTradition: Experience is more than just perception: sensation-like content, not merely representational: E.g. tipping dice: jumps, the network of lines looks completely different. >Sensation. On the other hand: E.g. Rabbit-Duck-Head: the network of lines does not change, therefore the perception theorists might argue that there are two representational components: a) the lines, b) Rabbit Duck Head. >Rabbit Duck Head. Perception Theory: Translation variant: The missing properties must be introduced into appropriate statements. PeacockeVs: that would only provide a priori knowledge, not empirical, because the postulated experience type could not go wrong. Vs added terms: they do not have to be available to the naive person, so they do not change the truth; Overdetermination of the representational content. >Representational content. Overdetermination: the angle can be changed by appropriate overlapping without changing the picture. I 20 Perception/overdetermined/overdetermination/Peacocke: E.g. the angle could be changed without changing the representational content. Such problems arise when one tries to construct a sensation-like property (e.g.size) as a representational property. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Possibility | Peacocke | I 94 Epistemic Possibility/Peacocke: the naturally species term 'tomato' has not the same pattern of epistemic possibility as the observation term 'tomato-like'. >Concepts, >Predicates, >Observation, >Observation terms, >Observation language, >Natural kinds. It is epistemically possible that something that is tomato-like, is not a tomato. >Epistemic possibility. I 88 PeacockVsInstrumentalism. Peacocke per separation observation terms/theoretical terms. >Instrumentalism, >Observation terms, >Theoretical terms. If X-ray tubes and Geiger counters are distinguished, then in the representational content - then we have observation terms instead of theoretical terms. >Content, >Representational Content, >Empirical Content. I 94 Observation Terms/Instruments/Peacocke: E.g. Square: if presented at different angles, it is epistemically impossible that it is not a square. E.g. a pair of particles: here it is still epistemically possible that it is not the result of a collision. That always requires faith in observability, therefore circular if the belief exists and ineffective if the belief does not exist. >Circularity, >Belief, >Observability, >Unobservables. In contrast, none of both if it comes to understanding instead of truth. >Understanding, >Truth. I 104 Theoretical Terms/TT/Observation term/concept/theory/instrument/experiment/Peacocke: improved tools give us no new concepts. >Concepts. Peacocke Thesis: theoretical terms are always connected to observation terms - e.g. a blind, to whom a device writes information about spatial environment on the back: how should the blind test the device? >Knowledge, >World/Thinking, >Perception, >Certainty, >Confirmation, >Verification. Square: if presented at different angles, it is epistemically impossible that it is not a square. - E.g. Pair of particles: here it is epistemically still possible that it is not the result of a collision because the terms are differently linkable in the theory. - observation terms do not need a complex of epistemic possibilities. I 141 Weak Epistemic Possibility: that the man in front of someone is not the manager - but not that he is not the man who stands before someone. >Referential/attributive. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Propositional Content | Brandom | I 215 Propositional content/Brandom: from social structures that transmit it, fundamental representational contents - ((s) what is considered to be correct perception is socially regulated by standards.) I 217 Auxiliary hypotheses are different from person to person. I 218 Access: to pragmatics. Normativally - to semantics: inferentially - to the interaction between conceptual contents: social. I 236 Propositional content/Field/Brandom: two-staged: 1) belief in Mentalese, 2) meaning in public language. I 327 Maths propositional content: without empiricism. I 240 Propositional content/Brandom: (the believable) shall be distinguished by the pragmatic property of assertibility. I 254 Definition propositional content: that which is expressed by performances and which determines the specific characteristics of their significance within the genus of asserting. I 402 Propositional content: role as premises - starts with the concept of truth instead of inference - Definition action: make something true. I 473 Propositional content/Brandom: Thesis: cannot play a fundamental explanatory role - is parasitic to the expressive role! - It is about the act of asserting and not about what is asserted. I 873 Content/Brandom: propositional and other conceptual contents with which the behavior of the system is to be measured, cannot be justified with this behavior itself. >Justification. I 897 Propositional content/Brandom: what we mean depends on the actual circumstances, even if we do not know what they are. This is the perspective character of propositional content - hence the externalism begins at home: The contents of external definitions depend on their actions and of the truth of that which they make an assertion about. >Circumstances, >Meaning (intending), cf. >Externalism. --- II 207 Propositional content/Brandom: always also representational - propositional content can be reflected on in concepts of truth or reasons - "aboutness", "about" is not necessary in addition to representation - but propositional content must be able to be characterized non-representationally. II 263 Objectivity/Brandom: of the propositional content: the objectivity (fact) says nothing about who could reasonably assert something - and such facts would even exist without living beings - this objectivity is a characteristic that we can make understandable as a structure of the definitions and authorisations - every community that recognizes definition and authorization as a normative status can recognize propositional content that are objective in this sense. >Objectivity. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Psychology | Field | II 97 Psychology/Content/Field: it may be that Boolean structure for a psychological theory is sufficient. - >possible world/Field). But then belief must be more than indication (display). ((s) Then it just comes down to the cardinality the quantities of possible worlds. Then we do not need intrinsically representational content.) |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Representation | Brandom | I 155f Kant-Hegel representation: Experience: inferential activity. Representation > de re attribution. Other authors on attribution. I 900 Representational contents: linguistic through and through, but not purely linguistic. The representational dimension of propositional contents becomes explicit through the social perspective nature of accounting. >Content. --- Rorty VI 179 ff Representation/Brandom/Rorty: wants to save them from Davidson, who threw them out with the bathwater. The representationalist semantic theory contains an undeniable insight: whatever has a high propositional content necessarily has such a representational side; nothing which does not have this aspect would be seen as an expression of his proposition. BrandomVsDavidson. Rorty: With this he does not mean that truth is a property, it is in fact only about approval, not about description (>metaphysics). --- Bandom I 127 Representation/Brandom: problematic: there is no room for the concept of error: representation requires accuracy - statement truth - representation is not possible without practice: red dots, blue lines on the map. >Practise, >Experience, >Error, >Deception, >Correctness. VsDescartes: does not explain what it means to understand representation, namely understanding how we are responsible for them. I 126 Representation is not an expression. I 130 VsDescartes: it is about the correctness of the representation prior to understanding. Cf. >Understanding. I 145 BrandomVsRepresentation: unclear how to come to the concept of propositional content. I 923 Representation/SearleVsDavidson: content must be understood intrinsically and before analysis - but representation of signs, sounds not intrinsic, mere object of nature - derived intentionality comes from original intentionality of the mind. I 404f Representation/Brandom: from Descartes dualistic worldview of representation and the represented. four aspects: 1) Apart from "true", representation also needs "refers to" and "means" >Reference, >Meaning. 2) distinction between intensional and extensional contexts >Extension, >Intension. 3) "of" in de re-contexts: something true of Kant but not of Hegel >de re 4) Correctness of judgment and inference. >Judgment, >Inference, >Correctness. I 412 ~ BrandomVsRepresentation: instead expressive role. I 482 Representation/Brandom: Minority (Davidson): between propositionally rich intentional states and facts - Majority: no semantic priority is the result of the pragmatic prevalence of propositional - representation is initially representation of things, Reil and properties- Brandom: if this is true, allocation of intention and success cannot be explained at the level of propositional content. I 719 Representation/Brandom: E.g. McCarthy: propositional content as worldview depends on the facts in relation to the objects they represent - representation in this sense is fundamental intentionality. >Propositional content, >Intentionality. I 719f Representation/Brandom: a) pre-conceptual: does not require grasping the specific contents - e.g. orienting oneself with a map (also possible non-linguistically) E.g. interpreting a cloud as a sign of rain.Cf. >Map example, >Natural signs/Armstrong. b) as part of a discursive practice: E.g. infer from symbols that there is a river between two cities. I 722 Assertions and beliefs with a high propositional content are necessarily representationally substantial, because their inferential structure is essentially a social one. >Propositional content. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Representation | Husserl | I 36 Representational Content/Husserl: 1. sensation (perception) - 2. phantasm (ideas) - 3. character (conceptual, symbolic thought). >Content, >Content/Husserl. Tugendhat I 86f Representations: HusserlVsRepresentations: I am referring directly to the Cologne Cathedral and not to an image. Even Hegel states logically here: if you take away all certainty, the concept of being arises but not an image. TugendhatVsIdeas: we do not imagine objects before us, but we mean them. >Imagination, >Meaning (Intending). Tugendhat I 94 WittgensteinVsHusserl: Husserl wrongly assimilated statements about the inner to those about the outer world. >Inner world, >Outer world. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Representation | Peacocke | I 7 Representation/Content/Peacocke: representational content is the way how the experience presents the world as being. >Representational content, >Content. On the other hand: Informational content: contains the proposition that a bundle of light rays meets the eye. >Propositional content. Representational content: has nothing to do with this. Representational content: is opaque (because of the individual mode of presentation). >Opacity, >Propositions. Informational content: is transparent (for the causal explanation). >Causal explanation, >Causation. I 9 Representational content always seems to contain indexicals like 'here', 'I'. >Index Words, >Indexicality. I 20 Perception/overdetermined/overdetermination/Peacocke: E.g. the angle could be changed without changing the representational content. >Overdetermination. Such problems arise when one tries to construct a sensation-like property (e.g. size) as a representational property. >Properties, >Qualities, >Perception. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Sensations | Berkeley | Peacocke I 28 Perception/sensation/senses/seeing/vision/touching/Berkeley / Peacocke: Berkeley does not distinguish between sensational and representational content - because the distinction refers to something outside the subject. - On the other hand for Berkeley the ideas of sight and the sense of touch differ - (in relation sensation). >Experience, >Perception, >Content, >Representation. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Theoretical Terms | Peacocke | I 91f Observational terms/Theoretical Terms/TT/Peacocke: Square: has to be experienced as such - an X-ray tube not. >Observation terms, >Observation language. For scientists, the X-ray tube can be constructed entirely different, for lay persons not - different term. Sensitivity for the property: necessary but not sufficient condition. E.g. "tomato-like": appearance or taste, no theory is required. Square: a minimal theory of perspective is required. There is nothing "square-like" what would correspond to "tomato-like". >Properties, >Predicates, >Perception, >Seeing, >Knowledge, >Categorization, >Perspective, >Terms. Without square term no sensation of square, (not only no representation). A perspectively distorted square is perceived as a square, but not perceived as distorted. Higher order; >description levels. Not so with "tomato-like": something that is tomato-like cannot be known as a tomato. >Forgeries. "Tomato-like" is not a criterion, otherwise tomato is an observation term. - Representation: tomato, not "tomato-like" >Representation, >Criteria, >Knowledge. I 94ff Theoretical Terms/Peacocke: every perception has representational content - e.g. "The particle collision produced the track". >Representational content, >Conceptual content, >Content, >Perception, >Causality, cf. >Measurement. Problem: then the causality is in the representational content, then we have a priori knowledge. Solution: observational terms and perception must be characterized simultaneously - applying only for observed content (not for theoretical terms). - The experience must also be made if the object is not covered by these theoretical terms. I 100 Particle pair/observation terms/theoretical terms/Peacocke: here, not the same conditions apply for changing angle, etc. - one can imagine here that the track of the particle pair in the cloud chamber does not result from a particle collision. - Unlike e.g. square - but that does not mean that squareness would be a secondary quality in the sense of power to evoke a feeling. I 101 Theoretical Term: when a perceived object falls below a theoretical concept, then there must be a level of representational content on which the experience could be made, even if the object does not fall under this theoretical term - just thereby "track caused by a particle collision" turns into a theoretical term. >Description levels, >Levels/order, >Symmetry/Peacocke. I 154 'As'/seeing-as/perception/thinking/Peacocke: E.g. 'This acid burns the table': only liquid is seen, not 'as acid'. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Theories | Peacocke | I 105 Theory/Feyerabend: even possible without experience. "Sensation" ("sensation") is not necessary. >Theories/Feyerabend, >P. Feyerabend. PeacockeVsFeyerabend: this is true only if "sensation" means: "Experience without representational properties". >Representation. Feyerabend has nowhere claimed that representational content is negligible. >Representational content, cf. >Empirical content, >Content, >Experience, >Perception. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Berkeley, G. | Peacocke Vs Berkeley, G. | I 51 Meaning Space/Sensory Space/Perception Space/Peacocke: is undeniable, and it is neither just artificial nor derivative. It is obviously not populated by experience itself. Rather, there is a correlated space for each intrinsically spatial sense which is characterized by it. I 52 E.g. if we are touched at the neck, it is something else than if we see something in front of us. E.g. but it is the same sense of "closer" when we hear or see someone approaching. (Representational) and it refers to the same space. ((s) This is about a sense of the word, not perceptual sense). PeacockeVsBerkeley: wrongly inferred from the (correct) premise that vision and touch have no common ideas (ideas, notions) to the wrong conclusion: that a sense of dimension should have priority with respect to the philosophical explanation here. Asterisked Predicates/"Elliptical*"/"Red*"/Field of Vision/Asterisk/Peacocke: asterisked predicates are truly spatial in a way! They relate to size and shape in the visual field. There is no ambiguity here, because different spaces are affected. "Elliptical" makes sense for us in different arbitrary spaces. (Not only physical). If it was just about a single space, there would be problems: see above: Problems with the translation theory or additional representational content to explain "elliptical" only by public, physical space. Sensory Data/Peacocke: the sense data theory has characteristic spatial concepts such as square or elongated sensory data, etc. The insight consists in that these spatial predicates I 53 cannot be defined at the level of representational content. The space in which these additional spatial predicates are located, is the sensation space (non-representational). This distinction prevents us from committing the error of asking: "Are sensory data surfaces of physical objects?" "Can we perceive sensory data ?". |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Block, Ned | Stalnaker Vs Block, Ned | I 222 Inverted spectra/Stalnaker: the recent discussion is about the relation between representational and qualitative content. E.g. if their experience when they see a ripe tomato is (and always has been) as mine when I see unripe pepper and vice versa, then the same experience that will represent the tomato as red to them will represent the tomato as green to me. We have then different experiences if we look at a ripe tomato but the tomato appears as red to both of us. Representational content/inverted spectra/Stalnaker: but the representational content (of whose ones spectrum is reversed) for the two persons is the same! ((s) Both have the experience "red"). ((s) representational/(s): here: on the word "red". So the language use plays a role. One can, for example, not say that the stimulus represents something neutral.) ((s) Representation/Stalnaker: appearance! ((s) So something more indirect than the phenomal experience "how it is".) Inverted spectra/Stalnaker: if that is correct then we cannot explain the qualitative character of visual experiences in concepts of properties that the things seem to have. Def representationalism/terminology/Stalnaker: thesis: that appearance is the basic, not "how it is". Representation: how things appear to us. Representative: Block. Stalnaker: it is here for me not about to defend the representationalism. StalnakerVsRepresentationalism/StalnakerVsBlock: I do not quite understand how representational content is to fully grasp the phenomenal character of experience. However, I believe that the strategy to explain qualitative content that way is the right one. Thought experiment/th.e./Stalnaker: I am skeptical about th.e. as the reversed spectra that want to separate representational and qualitative content. Inverted qualia/StalnakerVscommon sense-view: the common sense does not speak with one voice on comparison of qualia over time and between people. It can also be interpreted in a way that it supports a conceptual link between qualitative character and appearances (representation). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Davidson, D. | Brandom Vs Davidson, D. | I 268 Objectivity/error: it is claimed that social practices suffice to impart objective representational content on allegations! These are then objective truth conditions. Even the entire community may be wrong with such an assessment! Universal error only possible with standards, not with concepts). (BrandomVsDavidson). I 931 Davidson: wants to derive all action from reasons. Therefore, irrational acts constitute a problem for him. I 932 BrandomVsDavidson: he confuses a global condition of intentions with a local one, because he makes no distinction between determination and authorization. I 383 VsDavidson: it may be that only the score keeper (not the actor) can demonstrate the practical justification. Even in such cases, the reasons would not act as causes. I 383 In addition, you can act on the grounds that you have or not. Davidson: intentions are comprehensive judgments in the light of all beliefs and desires. I 954 BrandomVsDavidson: unsatisfactory because desires and beliefs are treated as unanalyzed basic concepts. He did not explain the practices according to which those contents can be transferred. BrandomVsDavidson: Davidson does not distinguish between interpretations between languages and within a language. The interpretation at Davidson requires explanatory hypotheses and inferences from sounds which are emanated by another person. This was rightly countered with the argument that if you speak a common language, you do not hear sounds but meanings! This is about the necessary subcompetencies. I 692 Objectivity of conceptual standards: not only can we all individually (each of us) be wrong about it, but also all together! (electron, mass in the universe). Error about proper use. > BrandomVsDavidson: collectively false beliefs possible. I 957 Davidson: even if the powder had been wet, she would have managed to bend her finger. So there is something in every action that the actor intended and that he succeeded in doing. I 958 BrandomVsDavidson: our approach does not require such a theoretical definition. Citing RDRD is enough to solve the problem with the nervous mountain climbers (Davidson). This is a concrete alternative to Davidsons’ proposal of the "causation in the right way." I 729 Brandom: it does not matter whether the usually reliable ability fails in individual cases. If I spill the wine while reaching for the bread, there does not need to be anything that I intended to do and also succeeded in doing, according to our approach. I 747 Problem: the substitution in the field of "that" does not receive the truth value of the whole attribution. Solution: the sentence tokening in this field does not belong to the actual attribution! Davidson: reference and truth value changed with attribution. I 961 BrandomVsDavidson: he does not consider the possibility of considering the relationship between "that" and the following sentence tokening as an anaphoric one instead of a demonstrative one. II 48 BrandomVsDavidson: establishing prior request! Action/BrandomVsDavidson: we started elsewhere. Three distinctions: II 126 Acting intentionally: recognition of a practical definition b. Acting with reasons: be entitled to a definition. c. Acting for reasons: here, reasons are causes in cases where the recognition of a definition is triggered by suitable reflection. NS I 166 Reference/Brandom: is not a fundamental concept for him. But he has to explain it, because it is still a central concept. Solution/Brandom: formation of equivalence classes of sentences whose position in the network of inferences is preserved when terms are exchanged by co-referential terms. Truth/BrandomVsTarski/BrandomVsDavidson: he has to bend their definition in such a way that instead of truth characterizing the concept of inference ("from true premises to true conclusions"), conversely the concept of inference characterizes that of truth. To this end, Brandom considers the position of sentences beginning with "it is true that..." in our inference-networked language game. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Descartes, R. | Brandom Vs Descartes, R. | Brandom I 40 BrandomVsDescartes: failed to show what it means to grasp or understand such contents as representations. He does not explain what makes a rabbit thought to a thought, which is about rabbits or anything at all. He also does not explain what it means that someone understands a thought as a thought. I 131 BrandomVsDescartes: has burdened the tradition of representation: the privileging of knowledge and therefore the successful representation against the understanding and the intended representation. For Descartes representational intention is "as if about" intrinsic and characteristic property of thoughts. He does not explain the importance of understanding. II 13 Kant and Descartes: mind primary, secondary language - BrandomVsKant and BrandomVsDescartes. II 17 BrandomVsDescartes: expression rather than representation (Sellars ditto). II 69 Content / representation / BrandomVsDescartes: possession of representational content as unexplained explainer. II 213 Mind / Brandom: the conceptual ability to understand rules. KantVsDescartes: normative rather than descriptive. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 |
| Observation Language | Peacocke Vs Observation Language | I 88 Observational Concepts/Theoretical Concepts/Peacocke: the distinction can be defended. The attacks against it fall into two groups: 1) VsObservational Concepts/some authors: Vs allegedly too casual, arbitrary (permissive) way to make the distinction. E.g. one and the same device can be seen as an x-ray tube or a Geiger counter. These concepts enter the representational content. I.e. experience itself represents something as X-ray tube. So there is no conscious inference taking place! Theory Ladenness/Hanson/Peacocke: most provocative formulation: that theoretical concepts determine the content of experience; milder formulation: theoretical assumptions can determine some reasons to express a sentence typically classified as observation sentence. Theoretical Concept/Tradition: X-ray tube is one typically considered a theoretical concept. If it now enters the representational content, it meets certain standard conditions for observability. Observability: again depends on the ability (sophistication) of the observer. 2) VsDistinction Observational Concepts/Theoretical Concepts: the classical approach to observability is empty: nothing really fulfills the conditions. In reality, theoretical considerations do indeed play a role. Both criticisms can be represented together, although that means claiming that the distinction simultaneously goes too far and not far enough. |
Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Representation | Brandom Vs Representation | I40 VsRepresentations: here the mind is treated as an unexplained explainer. (Descartes). I125 BrandomVsRepresentation: very problematic: if it is understood as a term, it should make the grammatical difference between singular terms and sentences understandable through reference to the ontological difference between objects and facts. But it does not follow that it is possible to introduce the category of facts as what is in the same sense represented by and that-sentences. I 126 an ontological category of facts cannot be made understandable primarily and regardless of explaining the declarative sentences. Representation is not expression! I 132 Rebecca West: VsRepresentation: "Mind as a mirror of nature": we do not need an image of the world, "one copy of these damn things is enough." I 292 Belief: can be ambiguous: one can be convinced of something wrong. The distinction often refers to the objectivity of representations (BrandomVsRepresentationalism, instead social practice as a guarantee of objectivity.) I 404 BrandomVsRepresentationalism: four aspects: 1) in addition to "true", representations need "refers to" and "means". (Later Frege) I 405 2) distinction between intensional and extensional contexts. 3) the "of" in de-re attributions. The concept of intentional relatedness: something is true of Kant, but not of Hegel. 4) concept of objective representational accuracy of judgment and reasoning. Can be justified by direct observation, inferential determinations or reference to certificates. I 412 BrandomVsRepresentation: instead expressive role. I 690 Brandom pro representationalism: contains the indisputable insight: whatever has a propositional content, necessarily has a representational side. The objection only applies to treating the representation as fundamental. II 69 Content/Representation/BrandomVsDescartes: possession of representational content as unexplained explainer. Rorty VI 181 BrandomVsRepresentation/Rorty: instead: "making real inferential connections between claims". If we have succeeded in using a logical and semantic vocabulary, we do not additionally need to explain how they got their "psychic powers". Representation/McDowellVsBrandom: representation cannot be reconstructed from the concept of inference. "Inferentialistic" explanations of the concepts do not work. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Shoemaker, S. | Stalnaker Vs Shoemaker, S. | I 19 Qualia/inverted spectra/Shoemaker/Stalnaker: tries to reconcile the recognition of inverted spectra with a functionalist and materialist theory of the mind. It is about the relation between consciousness and representation - between the intentional and the qualitative content of an experience. StalnakerVsShoemaker: I defend the old-fashioned view that comparisons of the qualitative characteristics of the experience between persons are meaningless (meaningless) ((s) >Wittgenstein, bug example). Qualia/Stalnaker: it is not about to eliminate them (to "quinete") but to accept them as plausible and understandable part of a purely relational structure. Thesis: the comparability is possible because our concept of qualitative character is linked conceptually to the representational content. I 235 Shoemaker's paradox/Stalnaker: is the whole story coherent? Could α and β so be "combined differently"? Solution/Stalnaker: the contradiction could be avoided in two ways: one could a) to reject the identity statement 5 b) the identity statements 1-4. Ad a): leads away from functionalism to a purely physicalist approach for qualia, subjective distinguishability is then no longer a criterion. Phenomenal experiences can systematically look the same, while they are not. This view would make a decision necessary, on which general level you wish to define physical types. And it is not clear on what basis one should decide this. I 236 Problem: for that one would have to probably identify qualia with very fine-grained distinct physical properties. These may differ in details which are not perceptible to us. E.g. the physiological development of the brain during aging in a person would lead to other perceptions that would however subjectively remain the same perceptions of the person! ((s) distinction without difference). Ad b): (to reject identity statements 1-4): that is Shoemaker's position. Shoemaker: thesis: the addition of the backup system influences the qualitative character because it changes the memory mechanisms that are constitutive for the identity conditions for qualia. Then e.g. (see above) Alice's and Bertha's qualitative experiences differ. Stalnaker: does this correspond to the common sense view? StalnakerVsShoemaker: problem: subsequent changes in perception but also in the memory system of a person, but also counterfactual unrealized possibilities would change the qualitative character of the experiences of a person. E.g. assume that Bertha has a flexible brain, when a part is damaged another part takes over the work. Alice: her brain is less flexible, in case of damage to the qualitative character of her perceptions change. StalnakerVsShoemaker: problem: even if the central realizations are the same and even if the damages never occur, it would seem that Shoemaker's response implies that the qualia would be different because of the different connections with potential alternative implementations of the experiences. These differences may be purely intrapersonal: suppose Alice previously had an equally flexible brain like Bertha, but with age it lost its flexibility: Shoemaker seems to imply that the qualitative character of Alice's experiences of colors changes with changes in the potentiality of her brain, even if it is inaccessible to the introspection. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Tradition | Peacocke Vs Tradition | I 4 Perception/Peacocke: Thesis: sensation concepts (sensory perception, sensations) are indispensable for the description of any perception. VsTradition: against the view that sensations are not to be found in the main stream if the subject is to concentrate on its own perception, I 5 or when sensations occur as a byproduct of perception. Perception/Sensation/Tradition/Peacocke: historical distinction between perceptions (perceptual experience) that have a content, namely being propositionally (representational) about objects in the surroundings that appear in a certain way, and sensations: that have no such content, e.g. the sensation of smallness, which can be determined nonetheless. Content/Peacocke: I only use it for the representational content of perceptions. Never for sensations. PeacockeVsTradition: it used to be reversed and "object" or "meaning" were used for representational content. I 10 Extreme Theory of Perception/Peacocke: the adequacy thesis is obliged. Because if the adequacy thesis is wrong, there are intrinsic properties of visual perception that are not covered by the representational content. Representatives: Hintikka. Hintikka: the right way to speak about our spontaneous perceptions is to use the same vocabulary and the same syntax that we apply to the objects of perception. We just need to determine the information! Information/Hintikka: unlike here: no informational content, but information given by the perception system. I 11 extreme theory of perception: main motivation. If the adequacy thesis is false, then there are intrinsic properties of an experience that can never be known by the person who makes the experience! PeacockeVs: this may be strengthened by the following argument that superficially seems correct: we can tell what experiences someone makes if we know which are his desires or intentions. Or if he is so and so predisposed. Or his behavior: E.g. if he suddenly swerves, he may have perceived an obstacle. Point: this can only ever discover representational content! I.e. never the intrinsic (perhaps sensory) portion of the experience. Peacocke: there must be a gap here. Three counter-examples are to show this. (see below). Perception/Peacocke: is always more differentiated than the perception concepts! Qualia/Criterion/Goodman: identity conditions for qualia: >N. Goodman, The Structure of Appearance, 1951 p.290 Extreme Theory of Perception/Peacocke: claims that the intrinsic properties of a visual experience are exhausted in determining the representational content along with a further-reaching determination of the properties mentioned there. PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: Three counter-examples: 1) E.g. road straight to the horizon with two trees. We perceive the trees as different in size, but we know (or assume) that they are the same size and at different distances from us. Both versions are equally properties of the experience itself! For this we do not need concepts like perception field (visual field), which is more or less cut out by the tree. You simply have the experience. VsAdequacy Thesis: no true-making experience can represent one tree as larger and farther away or the other as a smaller and closer. Problem of additional characterization. Form of thought: added second or third. VsTheory of Perception: the challenge for the perception theorist is that has to hold on to the adequacy thesis (all intrinsic characterization given by "appears to the subject that...") even if he has to admit these facts about the size of trees. I 13 2) Additional characterization: can vary even if the representational content remains constant: E.g. seeing with one eye closed or with both eyes open: the difference in perception is independent of the double images of binocular perception. I 14 Depth Perception/Peacocke: a) It would be incompatible with our view to say that there is an additional way in which the depth is represented, with this additional feature being purely representational. b) The difference between monocular and binocular vision is both representational and sensory. (Peacocke pro). Vs a): here it would be unthinkable that there are cases where the alleged sensory property exists, but the representation of certain objects was not present behind others in the surroundings. pro b): according to this version that is conceivable. I 15 Peacocke: and it is also conceivable. E.g. TVSS: a system that "writes" information from a TV camera on the back of blind persons: idea of depth and spatial perception. Intrinsic! "Depth"/Peacocke: dangerous ambiguity: it is true that whenever the additional property is present that distinguishes monocular of binocular vision, then a sense of depth is present, but depth is a sensational property! I 16 I.e. the difference between monocular and binocular vision is precisely not purely representational! (Peacocke pro: in addition to representational there must be sensory content). Depth/Perception/Concepts/O'ShaughnessyVsPeacocke: depth is never a sensational property: concepts play a causal role in the creation of depth: 1) every depth perception depends on you considering your visual sensation of depth as a contribution to the color of physical objects at any distance. 2) monocular vision: two visual fields of sensations might be indistinguishable, and yet, thanks to different concepts and different beliefs of their owners, evoke different veridical visual "depth impressions". But: binocular vision: here the three-dimensional visual field properties cannot be compared with different sensations of depth, at least not with regard to the three-dimensional distribution of the actually viewed surface. PeacockeVsO'Shaughnessy: that is indeed confirmed by the optical facts, but he only considers the beams that fall into a single eye! In fact, monocular vision is insufficient for depth perception. Binocular vision not only explains the sensation of depth, but also why this property decreases at large distances. PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: 3) E.g. tipping aspect, wire cube, first seen with one eye, and then without any modification of the cube with reversed front and rear: Wittgenstein: "I see that it has not changed"! Peacocke: another example of non-representational similarities between experiences. The problem for the extreme perception theorist is to explain how these non-representational similarities came to pass without abandoning the adequacy thesis. He could simply introduce a new classification of visual experience, I 17 that refers to something before the event of experience, for example, the fact that the surroundings have not changed. PeacockeVs: but this is based on the character of successive experiences! Then we would still have to say on which properties of these experiences this "new property (classification)" is based. This does not work with memory loss or longer time spans between experienced: because this does not require the sensation that the scene has not changed. Nor does it explain the matching non-representational experiences of two different subjects who both see the other side of the cube as the front. Rabbit-Duck Head/Peacocke: why do I not use it as an example? Because there is nothing here that is first seen as a rabbit and then as a duck, but rather as a representation of a rabbit than as a representation of a duck, while nothing changes in the network of lines! So this example cannot explain that there may be non-representational similarities between experiences. Because someone who denies them can simply say that the component of the representational content that relates to the lines remains constant thus explaining the similarity. E.g. wire cube: here this explanation is not possible: because the network of lines looks quite different afterwards than it did before! I 17/18 Translation/Theory of PerceptionVsPeacocke: natural reaction: the statements which seem to be in conflict with the adequacy thesis could be translated into statements that add no properties incompatible with the adequacy thesis. E.g. "to cover the nearer tree, a larger area would have to be put between the tree and the viewer than for the more distant tree". PeacockeVsTheory of Perception/PeacockeVsAdequacy Thesis: it is not clear how this is supposed to work against the second type of example. But is it effective against the first one? What should the translation explain? 1) It could explain why we use the same spatial vocabulary for both three-dimensional objects and for the field of vision. That is also sufficient for "above" or "next to". But the adequacy thesis needs more than that! It needs an explanation for why something is bigger than something else in the field of vision. Therefore: 2) Problem: as approach which introduces meanings the approach of the adequacy thesis seems inadequate. E.g. disturbances in the visual field, curved beams ...+... counterfactual: problem: whether an object is bigger in the visual field of a subject is a property of its experience that in the real world counterfactual circumstances are what they want to be. One approach should therefore only take into account the properties of actual perception. I 19 Translation/Peacocke: a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable components can be made with Kripke's distinction between fixation of the reference and the meaning of an expression: Kripke: E.g. we could fix the reference of the name "Bright" by the fact that demanding that he should refer to the man who invented the wheel. ((s) Evans: E.g. Julius, the inventor of the zipper). Point: yet the statement is true: "it is possible that Bright never invented the wheel". Peacocke: analog: the experience of the type that the nearer tree in the field of vision is bigger is consistent with the fact that a larger area has to be covered to make it invisible. This condition fixes the type of experience. But it would be possible that the experience type does not satisfy the condition! Just like Bright would not have needed to be the inventor of the wheel. PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: Translation: provides no access that leaves open the possibility that the experience type that actually meets the conditions of the translation, might as well fail. I 22 Sensational Content/PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: these points refer to the first counter-example against the adequacy thesis, but they also apply to the second one: for that purpose, we introduce the asterisked predicate behind*: it refers in terms of physical conditions that normally produce this sensational quality binocular seeing of objects at different depths. ad 3): non-representational similarity of experiences should consist in sameness or equality of sensational properties. Reversible Figures: in all standard cases, successive experiences have the same asterisked sensational properties: namely, those that can be expressed by the presented interposed coverage area. E.g. suppose someone wakes up in unfamiliar surroundings: initially he has a minimal representational content: he perceives all objects as surfaces with different angles. I 23 Suddenly everything shifts into place and he has a rich representational content. But in the scene nothing has changed in the sense in which something changed in the wire cube. |
Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Various Authors | Peacocke Vs Various Authors | I 59 Representational Content/Peacocke: the acoustic experience itself could have a representational content, ((s) namely, the that-sentence that a sound comes from the left.) weaker: in conjunction with the other attitudes of the subject. But for that the subject needs spatial concepts. Bower: his problem is, what it means to have spatial concepts. Stimulus-Response Scheme/S-R System/SR Psychology/Peacocke: a distinction is made between mental states with content and those that can only be explained by the stimulus-response scheme. But stimulus-response systems have complex internal information processing. Nor os it about the distinction conscious/unconscious. A stimulus-response psychology can reduce reactions not only to physical stimuli, but also to sensations! And these can also have a primitive form of consciousness. This is about the problem of the attribution of propositional content. Not all sensations do indeed have representational content. Bower: appropriate spatial response confirms the attribution of spatial content. Peacocke: is that correct? Causality/Psychology: Problem: There are several levels of incoming causal chains and also several levels of outgoing causal chains (input/output). I 60 Some of these levels, apart from the external objects, have the ability to involve objects that can play a role in both inbound and outbound in causal chains. E.g. the retina. Proposition/Propositional Content/SR System/Peacocke: we must first assume propositional attitudes about objects and places in the vicinity of the subject, which do not yet constitute an stimulus-response scheme, and motor instructions that actually consist in spatial reactions acting over a distance to be able to ascribe spatial terms. PeacockeVsBower: of course it goes without saying that if the child intentionally puts out its hand, it then there sees the object. The problem is what constitutes the intention with the content: "reach out to the object"? A spatial response that is supposed to be caused by the spatial properties of the object is not an explanation for an intention. Nor is it an explanation for the intention that the subject is disappointed if the object is not located there. (!) Whether there are innate, half-wired or acquired connections, you just need not assume any spatial concepts to explain the disappointment . I 61 Content/Attribution/PeacockeVsBower: if you want to attribute content, you should always ask: could a stimulus-response system do that as well? If so, we do not need content. Or the conditions are not sufficient to attribute content. Def Registering/Bennett/Peacocke: ("Linguistic Behavior", Cambridge, 1976): Def "a registers that p": if a is in an environment that is similar in relevant respects with an environment where p is clearly the case, then a registers that p. Def Relevantly Similar: an environment that does not differ in any respect in which a is sensitive (of an environment in which p is present). There is also room for learning and curiosity: Trainable: such an organism will respond quickly. Curious: such an organism will try many different reactions. Perspective/Peacocke: there are also complementary characteristics to investigate in perspective sensitivity: E.g. when the subject as is familiar, e.g. with the types of objects in its environment, it requires less efferent information. Def Efferent: from inside, from the central nervous system. In our oversimplified model here we assume subjects with perfect memory and a single goal. I 70 But there is independent evidence for memory errors and assumed obstacles or multiple goals. Such assumptions do not empty the thesis of perspective sensitivity. Perspective sensitivity is necessary to attribute attitudes in the basic case. But that is a weaker necessity than we need. E.g. (see above) the animal that eats fruits: the food could be covered and after a period of training the animal manages to solve this problem. Namely, by the shortest route, regardless of the angle at which it had originally perceived the food. That would be a case of perspective sensitivity. Nevertheless, it is possible that this is merely a stimulus-response system! Therefore, we do not know fully what the requirement of perspective sensitivity is. We cannot exclude this possibility by referring to past experiences or beliefs of the subject. Proposal: that the behavior of the animal is not causally sensitive to past spatial experiences that are currently not perceived, Vs: but this condition would also be met if the animal turned its head on its way to the food without interrupting its way. So this cannot be the crucial difference for the attribution of spatial Concepts. I 71 We would like to say that a person's behavior with attitudes about objects depends on how these objects are arranged around him. PeacockeVsBower: but we have already seen above that this leads to nothing. I 76 Mental Map/Perspective/Peacocke: initially it is harmless to attribute spatial behavior to the existence of an "internal map". But from this do not follow two stronger assumptions that want to derive perspective sensitivity from this: 1) Ulrich Neisser: every living being that can anticipate an environment has cognitive maps. PeacockeVsNeisser: it is not plausible that "cognitive maps" should be a particular type of image. 2) even if someone has a real, physical, external map, it cannot be a general explanation of the perspective sensitivity of his behavior. To use the map, you have to be able to trace the trail of your own movements. But then you already have the perspective sensitivity that should be explained first. (Circular). |
Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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| Representation | Pro | Esfeld I 137 Content of belief states / Fodor: thesis: is derived from the original representational content. (Mental Representation originally). (Fodor and Lepore, 1992). |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Representation | Fodor, J. | Esfeld I 137 Content of belief states / Fodor: is derived from the original representational content. (Mental representation is the origin). (Fodor and Lepore, 1992). F / L IV 127 Representation / Fodor / Lepore: their semantics is atomistic. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Qualia | Stalnaker, R. | I 19 Qualia / Stalnaker: it s not about to eliminate them (to "quine" them), but to accept them as plausible and understandable part of a purely relational structure. The comparison is possible because our concept of qualitative character is linked conceptually with the representational content. |
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