Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adequacy | Field | II 10 Adequate translation/adequacy/T Theory/Field: the condition of the a.t. is not strictly speaking part of any truth theory and T-characterization Solution: it is part of the methodology, because Tarski needs it for translation into the metalanguage. >Convention T, >Metalanguage, >Tarski-scheme, >Truth definition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Context/Context Dependence | Field | II 247 Relativize/contextuality/context-dependent/Field: if the relativization is made explicit, the context dependence (context sensitivity, or dependency of the reference system) is lost. ((s)>complete thought: is Timeless). >Reference systems. E.g. a) "It would be good." b) "It would be good according to my standards." Disquotationally true: may then be a statement that is relativized to my standards. - But no non-relativized evaluative statement can be disquotationally true. >Disquotation, >Disquotationalism, >Tarski-scheme. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Correctness | Field | II 14 Truth theory/truth-definition/Field: Problem: the form of the sentence "x is true iff p" does not indicate whether the sentence is correct. >Truth definition, >Thruth theory, >Tarski-scheme, >Truth. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Correspondence Theory | Field | I 229 Correspondence Theory/Truth/Field: correspondence theory needs an additional concept of the truth theoretical content of psychological states. - And it is used in a way that it cannot occur in the disquotation scheme. >Psychological states, >Tarski-scheme, >Disquotationalism. I 250 Correspondence Theory/FieldVsCorrespondence Theory: even for an inconsistent theory it is consistent when the the correspondence theory is assumed that it is true, because the logical words in it could have been used differently. >Logical constants, >Language use. Therefore, the truth of the correspondence theory should not be applied to disquotational truth, because it is a logical concept itself and the instances of disquotation scheme must be regarded as logical truths. II 199 Correspondence Theory/ontological commitment/Quine/Field: the ontological commitment seems to exclude the correspondence theory. >Ontological commitment. FieldVsQuine: despite the uncertainty we should allow correspondence. - >Partial denotation. IV 416 VsCorrespondence: which one is the right one? Field: which one is relevant may depend on epistemic values, but not on which values are "correct. Field pro "epistemic relativism". IV 419 RelativismVsSkepticism: the question of the "real" justification does not make sense. >Relativism, >Skepticism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Deflationism | Wright | I 26ff Deflationism: is directed against the "inflation" by creating more truth predicates: legitimate assertibility next to truth (> redundancy theory). Thesis: truth is no property, only a means of disquotation. I 46 Deflation/Ramsey: was here first. (Recently: Horwich: "minimalism"): Truth assertorical - claiming, but not supported by adoption of metaphysical objects or situations. Tarski: disquotation is sufficient. Truth is no substantial property of sentences. True sentences like "snow is white" and "Grass is green" have nothing in common. Important: you can use the disquotation scheme without understanding the content. One can "truly" "approximate" the predicate. >Goldbach's conjecture. Deflationism thesis: the content of the truth predicate is the same as the claim, which makes its assertoric use. Deflationism: E.g. Goldbach's conjecture: the deflationism recognizes that there must be said more beyond Tarski. Also, cf. e.g. "Everything he said is true". VsDeflationism: not a theory but a "potpourri". There is no clear thesis. I 47 ff Inflationism: a) "true" is merely a means of affirming, only expresses attitudes towards sentences. It does not formulate a standard. b) The disquotation scheme contains a (nearly) complete explanation of the meaning of the word. ("True"). I 293 Deflationism: every meaningful sentence (i.e. a sentence with truth-condition) is suitable for deflationary truth or falsity. But if truth is not deflationary, "true" must to refer to a substantial property of statements. (Deflationism: truth is no property). --- I 27 Deflationism/Wright: truth is no substantial property. - Disquotation is enough. - "Snow is white" and "Grass is green" have nothing in common. The content of the truth-predicate is the same as the claim which raises its claiming use. Thesis: the truth predicate is prescriptive and descriptive normative. I 33ff Deflationism: the only standards of truth are the ones of legitimate assertibility. >Assertibility. I 51 WrightVsDeflation: "minimalist", > I 97 Vs (classical) Deflationism: no norm of truth-predicate may determine by itself that it is different from assertibility because the normative power of "true" and "assertible" coincides, but may diverge extensionally. - Then the disquotation scheme can play no central role. - >Tarski-scheme, >Disquotation. Therefore statements may be true in a certain discourse, without being super-asserting - then truthmakers must be independent of our standards of recognisability (>realism/Wright). --- Rorty I 38ff Disquotation/Wright: the deflationist thinks through the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely determined. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Denotation | Field | II 6 Primitive denotation/Field: a theory T1, based on primitive denotation, has compositionality - i.e. that the truth values of the sentences depend on the truth values of the non-logical parts. Primitive Denotation: Problem: E.g. - "He takes drugs": here only one token has a meaning, but not the type. ((s) Primitive denotation/(s): without descriptions) >Descriptions. II 6f T1/Field: with primitive denotation; each name denotes what it denotes, a predicate denotes what it applies to, etc. - No composite expression has a primitive denotation.Compositionality. Def truth/primitive denotation: when a speaker says something true - hence we have tokens on certain occasions, not types of expressions. Expressions like "John", "I", "You" are always only tokens. >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Indexicality. Advantage: diachronic theory of language. II 8 T1 uses semantic terms: "satisfy", "denote", "apply" (unlike Tarski). VsT1: "John", "I" or "You" - problems with expressions like T2: without semantic expressions (E.g. satisfy, denotate, apply). >Satisfaction, >true-of, >Tarski-scheme, >Truth/Tarski. II, 18f Denotation/T-Theory/Language/Field: for different languages at the same time: one could define "denote": E.g. E (English) to say the name N denotes an object a is the same as to demand that either a is France and N is "France" or "a" is Germany and "N" is "Germany" ... then for another language, e.g. German: corresponding "... a is France and N is "France"...". II 21 Problem: So one could define magic physically acceptable by simply setting up a list of pairs of magic/object. Names/Denotation/FieldVsTarski: Tarski's definition boils down to mere lists - and also lists for applying predicates and for satisfaction. >Lists, >Possible world semantics/Field, >Properties/Field. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Disquotationalism | Field | II 105 Purely disquotational true: 1. Generalization possible only like this - for example: not every axiom is true - (but one does not yet know which) 2. "True-like-I-understand-it" 3. The concept is use-independent E.g. to say "Snow is white" is true is the same as to call snow white - no property is attributed which would not have it if one uses the sentence differently - everyday language: here we seem to use a different truth-predicate. Use-independency of the truth-predicate: neccessary for the generalization for infinite conjunctions/disjunctions - contingently true: E.g. Euclidean geometry. The axioms could have been wrong - we do not want to say with this, that the speakers could have used their words differently. Ad II 105 Definition disquotational/(s): "literal". Field: heuristic: disquotation means "truth-like-he-understands-it". ((s) So referring to the speaker - this is not a definition of truth in terms of understanding - merely heuristic.) Deflationism: this leads to cognitive equivalence. >Deflationism. Disquotational true/Field: "true, as I understand it". Cf. >Principle of charity, >Understanding. II 123 Field: Disquotational true is unlike Tarski-true. >Tarski-scheme, >Truth definition/Tarski, >Thruth theory/Tarski, >Truth/Tarski. ad II 135 Deflationism/Field/(s): contrast: semantic/disquotational: semantic: not simply repeating something literal, but finding truth, depending on the situation E.g. for index words. Disquotational: only repeating literally; this does not work for indices and demonstratives.# >Index words, >Indexicality. II 152 Disquotational truth: Problem: untranslatable sentences are not disquotationally true. >Translation. II 164 Disquotational true/disquotational reference: corresponds to the thesis that Tarskian truth is not contingently empirical. Necessary: both "p" is true iff p" and "it is true that p iff p" because the equality between possible worlds is not defined. - Truth is here always related to the actual world. >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity, >Actual world, >Actualism, >Actuality. II 223 Radical deflationism/narrow: does not allow interpersonal synonymy - only purely disquotational truth - it is about how the listener understands the sentence, not the speaker. Cf. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. II 259 Definition disquotationalism/Field: the thesis that the question by which facts e.g. "entropy" refers to entropy, is meaningless. >Reference. II 261 Non-disquotational view/indeterminacy/VsDisquotationalism: the non-disquotational view must assume an indeterminacy of our concepts on a substantial level. >Indeterminacy. II 269 Disquotational view/truth/Reference/Semantics/Logic/Field: N.B.: Truth and reference are not really semantic concepts here, but logical ones. - Because they are applied primarily to our idiolect. >Logic, >Semantics, >Idiolect. Here they function as logical concepts. - (E.g. "true" for generalization) N.B.: that "rabbit" refers to rabbits is then a logical truth, not a semantic truth. - Then there is still indeterminacy in translation. II 272 Disquotational view/disquotationalism: for it, the relevant structure of a language is not to be understood in referential terms, but in terms of stimulus meaning, inferential role and indication relation. >Stimuli, >Stimulus meaning, >Pointing, >Ostension, >Inference, >Inferentialism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Nonfactualism | Wright | I 272ff Non-Factualism/Boghossian/Wright:> if we assume nonfactualism, no discourse can be more than >Correctness, >Correctness/Wright. (i) it is not the case that S has the truth condition that P has a truth condition. WrightVs: this can be reformulated with disquotation into (vi) it is not the case that it is not the case that S has the truth condition that P has a truth condition. >Disquotation, >Tarski scheme, >Truth conditions. But denying the truth is not inconsistent with correctness of the assertion. >Contradictions, >Negation, >Assertibility. But (i) is incorrect, if both truth and correctness are in the game, the matrix for the truth predicate must be non-conservative: i.e. the value of A is true in all cases, false or incorrect, except those where A has the truth value true. >truth transfer, >conservativeness. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Wright | Horwich I 110 Horwich: "Snow is white" is true because snow is white. WrightVsHorwich: this is not a sentence about truth, but a sentence about physical laws, laws of nature, and it does not help us here. Cf. >Tarski-scheme. Wright I 85 Tarski/Disquotation scheme/semantic definition of truth, disquotation: it is well known that it is incompatible with it, to accept a failure of bivalence (true/false). >Bivalence. E.g. if "P" is neither true nor false, then the assertion that "P" is true will be probably wrong and its biconditional probably incorrect. Disquotation scheme (DS): is the producer platitude for all other: thus correspondence, negation, distinction between truth and assertibility. >Correspondence, >Truth, >Assertibility, >Negation. It itself is neutral in terms of stability and absoluteness. Wright I 27ff Disquotation/Tarski/Wright: one does not need to understand the content. >Content, >Understanding. I 33 The disquotation scheme does not exclude that there will be a divergence in the extension: the aiming on an object with the property F does not need not be the aiming on a property with G - they only coincide normatively in relation to practice. >Practice, >Norms, >Language community, >Community, >Convention. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Reference | Wright | I 27 Deflationism/e.g. Goldbach’s conjecture: the deflationism recognizes, of course, that in addition to Tarski, something must be said, even e.g. "Everything he said is true." >Goldbach's conjecture, >Deflationism, >"Everything he said", >Truth/Tarski, >Definition of truth/Tarski, >Theory of truth/Tarski, >Tarski scheme, >Disquotation. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Tarski | Field | I 33f Tarski/Field: According to Tarski the following two sentences are a contradiction because he needs quantities for his definition of implication: a) "Snow is white" does not imply logically "grass is green". b) There are no mathematical entities like quantities. ((s) Therefore, Field must be independent of Tarski.) Solution Field: Implication as a basic concept. >Mathematical entities, >Ontology/Field, >Tarski-scheme. --- II 124 Tarski/Truth: Tarski's truth theory is unlike disquotational truth: only for a fragment. >Disquotationalism/Field. Unrestricted quantifiers and semantic concepts must be excluded. >Quantifiers. Problem: we cannot create infinite conjunctions and disjunctions with that. (Tarski-Truth is not suitable for generalization). >Generalization. DeflationsimVsTarski/QuineVsTarski. >Deflationism. Otherwise, we must give up an explicit definition. Deflationism: uses a generalized version of the truth-schema. TarskiVsDeflationism: pro compositionality. (Also Davidson) >Compositionality. Tarski: needs recursion to characterize e.g."or". >Logical constants. II 125 Composition principle/Field: E.g. A sentence consisting of a one-digit predicate and a referencing name is true, iff the predicate is true of what the name denotes. This goes beyond logical rules because it introduces reference and denotation. >Reference, >Denotation. Tarski: needs this for a satisfying Truth-concept. Deflationism: Reference and danotation is not important for it. >Compositionality). II 141 Truth-Theory/Tarski: Thesis: we do not get an adequate Truth-theory if we take only all instances of the schema as axioms. - This does not give us the generalizations we need, e.g. that the modus ponens receives the truth. II 142 Deflationism/Tarski/Field. Actually, Tarski's approach is also deflationistic. --- Soames I 477 FieldVsTarski/Soames: Tarski hides speech behavior. Field: Tarski introduces primitive reference, and so on. >language independence. SoamesVsField: his physicalist must reduce every single one of the semantic concepts. - For example, he cannot characterize negation as a symbol by truth, because that would be circular. E.g. he cannot take negation as the basic concept, because then there would be no facts about speakers (no semantic facts about use) that explain the semantic properties. FieldVsTarski: one would have to be able to replace the semantic terms by physical terms. >Semantics. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Tarski | Wright | Rorty I 38ff WrightVsTarski: he did not succeed to specify a standard. >Truth/Tarski, >Definition of truth/Tarski, >Theory of truth/Tarski. Wright: there are two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. >Truth, >Assertibility. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessary also a striving for the other, but a success in one is not necessarily a success with the other. --- Wright I 85 VsWright: Tarski requires bivalence, assertions can also be undecidable. (Vs Platitude: assertion = putting something forward as true). >Bivalence, >Tarski scheme, >Decidability. WrightVsVs: the deflationismus precisely does not accept the (disquotation scheme). >Deflationism, >Disquotation. There are no problems with indefinite truth values, but with additional ones or gaps. >Multivalued logic, >Truth value gaps. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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