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The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deontology | Wright | Berka I 173 Deontic modal logic/permission principle/Wright, G. H.: for any act applies: either it or its negation is allowed - deontic modalities are extensional. >Extensionality. Berka I 173 Deontology/tautology/deontic modal logic/Wright: problem in tautology: O (A v ~ A) or P (A & ~ A): if there really is an act A, which is such that P (A & A) expresses a true statement, then any action would be allowed - because of the extensionality principle that an act may presupposes the presence of another, e.g. ~ A & B. Wright: >moral nihilism. Solution: Principle: (tautology): doing what is permitted can never commit ourselves to do what is forbidden. Deontic modalities: have no analog connections with the truth and falsehood (facts) as the alethic, epistemic and existential modalities: i.e. from the act or omission follows nothing about the deontic status.(1) -> naturalistic fallacy. 1. G. H. von Wright, An Essay in Modal Logic, Amsterdam 1951 |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Extensionality | Extensionality, philosophy: (also extensionality principle, extensionality thesis) an attempt to make the language distinct by taking complete sets of denoted objects as the meaning of the referring words. See also extensions, intensions, extensional language, ambiguity, propositional attitudes. |
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| Extensionality | Russell | I XXXII (Note) Def Extensionality principle: no two different properties can belong to exactly the same thing ((s) but only intensional). E.g., "tall man"/"fat man" may be the same, they are just different intensions (therefore no properties)). >Extension, >Properties, >Ascription, >Predication. I XVI Def Intensionality principle: to different definitions belong different terms. >Definition, >Intension. Def vicious circle principle/Russell: no totality can contain members that can be defined only in terms of this totality, or members which comprise this totality or presuppose it. >Definability, >Wholes, >Vicious circle. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Extensions | Quine | Graeser I 60 Extension/Quine/Graeser: when bachelor/unmarried man are coextensive, then why are they not just randomly empirically (contingent) - not sure if it is a matter of meaning. Lauener XI 175 Reference/Extension/singular term/general term/Follesdal/Lauener: singular terms: have a reference - general terms and sentences have an extension. >Singular Terms/Quine, >General Terms/Quine. XII (c) 51 Predicate/co-extensive/extension-equal/coextensiveness/synonymy/Quine: coextensive predicates: e.g. equilateral/equivalent triangle E.g. featherless biped/rational creature: It was never clear when to say that the predicates had the same meaning. Extension: (here = reference) is safe. Meaning: the intension is uncertain. Translation indeterminacy: here: across to Extension/Intension. >Indeterminacy/Quine, >Intensions/Quine. VII (b) 21 Extension/meaning/Quine: e.g. "living creature with heart" - "living creature with kidneys": (general term): same extension, different meaning. VII (e) 89 Extensionality Principle/Quine: P1 ((x ‹ y ) › ((y ‹ x) › (x = y))) that is, a class is determined by its elements. ((s) If x and y are subsets of each other, then they are equal). VII (f) 115 General Term/predicate/Quine: Predicates are not names of classes. This does not mean that there are not often classes that are associated with predicates without being named by them. For example, if we are talking about the extension of a general term or predicate: The class of all things of which the predicate is true. Thus, the theory of validity appeals to classes but not to the individual statements represented by schemes of quantifier logic (quantificational theory). Example: (Ex)(x is a dog . x is white) it does not involve an appeal to an abstract extension of a predicate. >Predicates/Quine. VII (f) 116 Truth values/extension/Quine: even validity and the extension of predicates can be eliminated through truth value tables (truth tables). For an extensional treatment of nominalism see VII (f) 118 > Nominalism. IX 1 Extensionality law: Classes are identical if their elements are the same. This does not apply to attributes! >Classes/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 |
| Set Theory | Set Theory: set theory is the system of rules and axioms, which regulates the formation of sets. The elements are exclusively numbers. Sets contain individual objects, that is, numbers as elements. Furthermore, sets contain sub-sets, that is, again sets of elements. The set of all sub-sets of a set is called the power set. Each set contains the empty set as a subset, but not as an element. The size of sets is called the cardinality. Sets containing the same elements are identical. See also comprehension, comprehension axiom, selection axiom, infinity axiom, couple set axiom, extensionality principle. |
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| Sets | Cresswell | II 64 Quantity/Cresswell: in the case of a set it is always defined whether an element is in it or not in it - a set is not equal to a (partial) function. >Extensionality, >Extensionality principle, >Set theory. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Superposition | Simons | I 128 Def Superposition/Simons: when different individuals with identical parts are at the same time in the same place it is called superposition. SimonsVsQuine: instead of "content of one portion space time". >Spacetime, >Four-dimensionalism. Such occupiers must be continuants anyway. Events: among events the extensionality principle is fulfilled. Masses: masses need different meanings of "part". >Parts, >Mass terms. I 211f Superposition instead of coincidence: e.g. ring/gold, e.g. person/body. These are not two individuals, but relation one-many. They are not identical, but take the same space, e.g. ring/gold: have different stories. >Statue/Clay, >Person, >Individuals. I 223 Superposition/SimonsVsWiggins: that various objects can superimpose follows from the fact that a single piece of material can be in such a state that it simultaneously fulfills different existence conditions ((s) intensionally). Existence conditions: existence conditions are determined by the sortal term (linguistically). Different existence conditions: things can last for different times and still be red at the same time. E.g. (s) an astronaut in the orbit can become uncle. I 237 Superposition/Doepke/Simons: whenever a and b are superimposed, they must have a common part, they must be composed entirely of a third party, c. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Terminology | Russell | ad Putnam II 133 ~ Russell: Terminology: a statement corresponds to true facts. Basic constituents of each statement are logically proper names - singular term: all expressions are singular terms. Later self-criticism: not all statements can be reduced to sense data. I XXXII(Annotation) Def Extensionality principle: no two different properties can belong to exactly the same thing ((s) but only intensional). E.g., "tall man"/"fat man" may be the same, they are just different intensions (therefore no properties)). I XVI Def Intensionality principle: to different definitions belong different terms. Def vicious circle principle/Russell: no totality can contain members that can be defined only in terms of this totality, or members which comprise this totality or presuppose it. Hintikka I 180 Def apparent variable/Russell/Hintikka: = bound variable. >Bound variable. II 46 Def "space-like"/Russell: two events are space-like if it is impossible for a body to move fast enough to be present at both events - but it can be "halfway" and perceive both as happening at the same time. Def "time-like"/Russell: two events are time-like if it is possible for a physical body to be present at both events. Borderline case: E.g. two events as part of a light beam or - E.g. an event. perception of the other event: then distance 0. Def Distance/Russell: is a physical fact which is part of the events and does not depend on the circumstances of observer. II 20 Paradox of Tristram Shandy/Russell: The retention of the axiom (that there are infinitely many time points beween two time points) leads to other paradoxes of which I call one: the paradox of Tristram Shandy. It is the reversal of the Zenonian paradox and says that the turtle can get everywhere if you give it only enough time. Tristram Shandy needed two years to list the course of the first two days of his life and complained that the material accumulated faster than he could capture it. Russell: I assert now that if he had lived his life that way further on, he would not have missed any part of his biography. For the hundredth part is written in the thousandth year, and so on. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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