Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Coherence Millikan I 8
Coherence/Millikan: one will have to explain why coherence is good, how it helps us, not just what it is. Ultimately, this is only possible in a total theory about the world.
"New Empiricism"/Millikan: has so far only managed half of his task, it has not succeeded in overcoming the myth of the given, which is embedded in the theory of meaning.
Realism/Millikan: the arguments VsRealism are very simple:
VsRealism: "To find the meaning of a word, one must see what would justify its application, or what an application would cause. But the application is justified by earlier applications! And it was caused by past beliefs! ((s) also VsCausal theory, VsCorrespondence theory).
Correspondence: does not play any role in the justification or the causal explanation of an utterance. So correspondence has nothing to do with the meaning of "true".
MillikanVsVs: this can be turned around just as well:
Correspondence theory: pro: Correspondence is involved in the nature of truth, because for a sentence to be true means to correspond in a certain way to a part of the world. The fact that correspondence plays no role in the justification of an utterance can equally well be turned around: that the meaning has nothing to do with justification. (Millikan pro!).
Sentence Meaning/Meaning/Millikan: are the special mapping functions of the sentence. But since we reject correspondence as a test for truth, the mapping function cannot exist in rules in the head.
---
I 10
It cannot be the "user" who "assumes" that his sentences represent the world so and so. In addition, the "assumes" (the "should") that determines the meaning must be a different "assumes" ("should") than that of "assuming" from a person that it behaves in accordance with the expectation of others according to rules. ("Should behave"). Mapping function/image/meaning/Millikan: the questions become more and more difficult: What kind of things are that that map sentences? What kind of mapping functions are involved? What is the "should"?
Knowledge/Self/Meaning/Millikan: if something other than the way, as I justify my utterances, defines my meanings, how can I grasp what I think myself?
Thesis: We will have to give up that we know that a priori! We also do not know a priori what we mean.
Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of consistency (the essence of coherence) fits into nature. For this I need Fregean sense as the main concept.
As one can be mistaken in knowledge, so also in meaning.
---
I 324
Coherence/Millikan: coherence is essentially consistency (consistent, consistency). The lack of contradictions can be a test for the adequacy of terms. Namely, before the theories were developed at all. Perception judgement/repetition/Millikan: if a judgment can be repeated, it is a test in which no conclusion (inference) plays a role at all. Then it is only about coherence (of judgments, not of theories).
Coherence/Millikan: can therefore also be viewed as a test for truth, without necessitating a holism.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Concepts Locke Rorty IV 36
Myth of the Given / Locke/Rorty: imagines that if we invent "green" we simply translate from the mental thing into our language.
Danto I 110
Term/Locke/Danto: two ways: 1st analytically from the dictionary: shaping the understanding of the essence - 2nd e.g. data from experience "yellow", "good" - are different from experience to ecperience -> Good/Moore.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Consciousness Sellars Rorty I 203
"Psychological nominalism": Sellars: any consciousness of varieties, similarities, facts and abstract entities, is a linguistic matter. The acquisition of language does not even presuppose the awareness of the varieties, similarities and facts, related to the so-called immediate experience. Consciousness/Sellars (as Rorty) distinguishes between two types of consciousness:
a) distinguishing behavior,
b) consciousness as a movement in the logical space of reasons.
a) can also be found in rats, amoebas and computers.
---
Frank I 264
Consciousness/SellarsVsSartre/SellarsVsDescartes: the thesis of self-transparency and self-disclosure of consciousness is the "myth of the given".

Roderick M. Chisholm (1981): The First Person. An Essay on Reference
and Intentionality, Brighton 1981

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Given Given, philosophy: something in the outside world, which should correspond to what we perceive through the senses. It is problematic how to distinguish the constitution of external objects from what is determined by the construction of our sense organs. The presupposition of a given, also assumes that both this and the side of the perceiving subject are fixed in a certain way. This is doubted by many authors.See also reality, myth of the given, perception, world, world/thinking, thing in itself, perspective, nature, naturalism, epistemology.

Given Sellars Frank I 264
Consciousness/SellarsVsSartre/SellarsVsDescartes: the thesis of self-transparency and self-disclosure of consciousness is the "myth of the given". ---
Sellars I 4
Something that is given/Sellars: this is about factual knowledge, not about objects. - > Sense data theory/Sellars. ---
I 59
Myth of the Given Sellars: thesis that there is a level of individual facts - a) that presuppose no further knowledge - b) that this non-inferential knowledge is the final appeal body - SellarsVs: error: to assume that knowledge must be inferential. ---
I 67
Myth of the Given/Sellars: thesis that observation constructs authenticating, non-linguistic episodes by itself - whose authority is transferred to linguistic and quasi-linguistic executions - SellarsVs.

Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and
Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Given Millikan I 6
Given/Millikan: MillikanVsMyth of the given. Leads to a false "foundationalism" of epistemology.
VsCorrespondence theory: this also rejects the correspondence theory.
---
I 7
Not only as a "test for truth" but also as a "nature of truth". In any case, according to a popular point of view. But this is not without paradoxes.
Knowledge/Naturalism/Millikan: the abilities of a knowing person are a product of nature, as the knowing person himself. Knowledge must be something that one does in the world. It is a natural relation to the world.


Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Introspection Sellars Rorty I 242/43
Sellars: theory of immediate knowledge: introspection is an acquired skill, but it can then turn out that the subjects exactly recognize in themsselves what the experimenter wants. That we can teach others to recognize thoughts, nostalgia, blood pressure or alpha rhythms in themselves, is simply a function of the use of compounds within the organism as scientific instruments. Training does not guarantee that nothing treacherous is underway.
---
Rorty I 269
Sellars: myth of the given: at the introspection there is no presence of non-physical entities in front of a non-physical observer. However, this also averts the loss of "scientific objectivity". >Myth of the given.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Justification Davidson McDowell I 37
Justification/Davidson: nothing can justify a belief, which is not itself a belief. Experience cannot justify beliefs. It is outside the space of concepts. Thus we would fall for the myth (of the given). >Experience, >myth of the given.

I 95
DavidsonVsCarnap: Philosophy has made the mistake of assuming that any justification of empirical knowledge must be based on sensory experience.
I 96
If this is true, epistemology has no need for purely private subjective objects of consciousness. While sensory experience plays a major role in the causal process by which beliefs are connected to the world, it is a mistake to believe that it plays an epistemological role in determining the content of these beliefs.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Justification Esfeld I 146 ~
Justification/McDowell/Esfeld: thesis: the space of reasons (justifications) is further than that of the conceptual.
I 161 ~
I-you-relations/Brandom/Esfeld: I-you-relations show in contrast to relativistic I-we-relationships that the community as a whole can be wrong. I-we: I-we is the myth of the given. I-you: I-you replaces representationalism by inferentialism. There is no enforcement of consensus, the community has no privileged status.
I 191 ~
Justification/belief/Esfeld: justification is only possible by other beliefs because these have statement form - but circumstances are not sufficient, however inferential practices are. Ultimately, we need the coherence theory. Social holism: only beliefs are isolated from the world, nothing in the world is conceptual (VsMcDowell) but beliefs are bound to the world by not being epistemically self-sufficient. (Epistemically self-contained: the content of belief state is ontological dependent on physical texture.)

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

Knowledge Sellars I XII
Knowledge: has the form "this and that is so and so." Known is something about a single object, but not a single object itself. Sense data: Problem to make foundation for justification of them: the sense data of the empiricists are single objects, but only with respect to facts one can speak of a knowledge.
---
I 59
It is wrong to think that knowledge must be inferential at all. (> Myth of the Given). ---
I 65
Tradition: knowledge has episodic character and does not rely on pre-knowledge. - SellarsVs. ---
I 65
Knowledge/SellarsVsTradition: observational knowledge does not stand on its own feet. - It requires language acquisition. - At the point of time of previous perceptions one must not have had the term yet.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ostension Sellars I 74
The ostensive tie comes from the myth of the given. ---
I 102
Impressions/Sellars: not only by ostension - otherwise you might not agree on the content. - That would be the myth of the given.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Reality Sellars I 5
Given/givenness/reality: key point: that the empirical knowledge has its basis in a non-inferential knowledge of facts. (Non-inferentially: = immediately). Even when non-inferential knowledge is about facts, not about objects. It seems, therefore, that sensation cannot determine knowledge.
Rorty I 112
SellarsVs "myth of the given": we imagine incorrigibility simply as a function of social practice. Sellars: "It may turn out that there are no colored objects at all."
RortyVs: this holistic statements sound senseless and paradox because the questioned accuracy requires a theory of privileged representations. Pro: Justification is not a function of special relations between ideas (or words) and objects, but a function of social practice. The justification of a conversation is, so to speak, holistic by nature.
---
McDowell I 164
Given/Sellars: nothing is given what does not lie within the evolving system of beliefs. Myth: the supposedly rational reference of experiences on beliefs.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Sense Millikan I 6
Sense/Millikan: sense is the basic intentional or semantic feature, but it is not a reference and also not an intension. It is not even determined by intension! Therefore, there is an epistemological problem of intentionality:
Intentionality/Millikan: Thesis: we cannot a priori know what we think! Because the meaning is not defined by reference! This provides support for realism.
Given/Millikan: MillikanVsMyth of the given. Leads to a false "foundationalism" of epistemology.
VsCorrespondence theory: this also rejects the correspondence theory...
---
I 7
...not only as a "test for truth" but also as a "nature of truth". In any case, according to a popular point of view. But this is not without paradoxes.
Knowledge/Naturalism/Millikan: the abilities of a knowing person are a product of nature, as the knowing person itself. Knowledge must be something that one does in the world. It is a natural relation to the world.
---
I 11
Sense/Meaning/Millikan: sense is not "intension": and also not Quinean "meaning". Also not Fregean sense. Intension/Millikan: intension has to do with a network of concluding rules.
Sense: has taken over the task of "intension", but sense is not completely in contrast with "referent".
Reference: having a referent will be the same as having "sense".
Referents: are another thing.
---
I 111
Definition sense/sense/intentional icons/Fregean sense/Millikan: an intentional icon has sense and each of the variable and invariant mapping elements or aspects also have sense. Also every element of a family of such an element has sense. Having sense: corresponds to having normal conditions for the exercise of the direct eigenfunction.
Definition sense/sense/Fregean sense/short/Millikan: is the normal mapping rule. The sense of an icon are the rules according to which the icon maps something.
---
I 141
Sense/Intension/Summary/Millikan: 1. Neither stimulus meaning nor explicit intension (if any is present) determine the sense.
2. The sense determines neither the stimulus meaning nor the explicit intension (if there is one).
3. Expressions in the idiolect can therefore have different stimulus meanings and/or intensions, and still have the same meaning. Even the same stimulus meaning and/or intension and different senses.
4. Neither stimulus meaning nor intension are infallible. They do not need that because they are not "criteria". For the referent nothing depends on them.
5. Senses - also of thoughts - can be ambiguous and also empty.
6. A term in the idiolect can have multiple intensions and yet have a clear meaning.
7. Sense: an expression is not the same as the sense of one of the explicit intensions.
8. The sense of an expression can be ambiguous or empty, and yet its explicit intension can have a clear meaning.
9. If one can say that an empty term has a meaning (somehow related to intentionality), then only because it has an intension that makes sense on its part. Sense, not intension is the root of all intentionality, intension is only secondary "meaning".
10. It may be that one has two expressions in the idiolect but does not know that they have the same meaning, for example, Hesperus/Phosphorus. That is, knowledge of the synonymy in an idiolect is not knowledge a priori. Knowledge of the ambiguity of the Fregean sense is also no knowledge a priori.
---
I 235
Sense/Complex/Complexity/composed/Expression/Millikan/(s): to have sense, an expression must be composed ((s) in a predication).

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Signs Millikan I 6
Signs/Millikan: I will set up a general drawing theory based on the Fregean sense but in the sense of Peirce, so that conventional signs, but also thoughts are covered.
This has an important consequence:
Meaning/Sense/Millikan: sense is the basic intentional or semantic characteristic, but it is not reference and also not an intension. It is not even determined by intension! Therefore, there is an epistemological problem of intentionality:
Intentionality/Millikan: Thesis: we cannot a priori know what we think! Because the meaning is not defined by reference! This provides support for realism.
Given/Millikan: MillikanVsMyth of the given. Leads to a false "foundationalism" of knowledge theory.
VsCorrespondence theory: this also rejects the correspondence theory...
---
I 7
...not only as a "test for truth" but also as a "nature of truth". In any case, according to a popular point of view. But this is not without paradoxes.
Knowledge/Naturalism/Millikan: the abilities of a knowing person are a product nature, as the knowing person itself. Knowledge must be something that one does in the world. It is a natural relation to the world.
---
I 70
Signs/Conventional/Millikan: conventional signs are normally used without consideration. Convention: what makes conventional signs conventional is that they have an eigenfunction, which is independent of the particular use.
---
I 126
Sign/Millikan: each sign is either intentional or not intentional. Only if it is intentional, it is true/false. Intentionality/Millikan: intentionality allows gradations.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Brandom, R. McDowell Vs Brandom, R. Esfeld I 185
McDowell: (1996, S 31 32): we are held captive by an oscillation between two positions: 1. a coherentism, that only permits rational relations between convictions.
2. the myth of the given, which confuses a causal relationship with a rational one. That is, it gives us an excuse rather than a justification.
I 186
McDowellVstheory of coherence: lets revolve our convictions in the void, because no rational constraint on the part of the world is allowed. Solution:
Term/world/McDowell: thesis: the conceptual realm is to be perceived of as having no boundaries: it does not end there, where people and their interactions end, rather it includes the entire physical realm.
Content/McDowell: the facts themselves, which make up the world.
To draw a boundary between the conceptual and the non-conceptual would prevent that we could utilize wordly, rational constraints on our convictions.
Esfeld: that could be understood as meaning that this limit is only shifted so that the conceptual includes the experience, but then the relationship between world and experience would still be merely causal.
World/McDowell: is in itself conceptual!
McDowellVsBrandom: Vs inferential semantics.
McDowellVsQuine: Vs confirmation of holism.
I 187
McDowell/Esfeld: opens up the prospect of a comprehensive holism based on a holism philosophy of mind. The holism of persuasion refers to the whole conceptual realm. McDowell's unlimited conceptual realm thus expands the holism of persuasion.
The physical world itself is not outside the realm of intelligibility.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Coherence Theory McDowell Vs Coherence Theory Esfeld I 185
McDowell: (1996, S 31 32): we are held captive by an oscillation between two positions: 1. a coherentism, that only permits rational relations between convictions.
2. the myth of the given, which confuses a causal relationship with a rational one. That is, it gives us an excuse rather than a justification.
I 186
McDowellVstheory of coherence: lets revolve our convictions in the void, because no rational constraint on the part of the world is allowed. Solution:
Term/world/McDowell: thesis: the conceptual realm is to be perceived of as having no boundaries: it does not end there, where people and their interactions end, rather it includes the entire physical realm.
Content/McDowell: the facts themselves, which make up the world.
To draw a boundary between the conceptual and the non-conceptual would prevent that we could utilize wordly, rational constraints on our convictions.
Esfeld: that could be understood as meaning that this limit is only shifted so that the conceptual includes the experience, but then the relationship between world and experience would still be merely causal.
World/McDowell: is in itself conceptual!
McDowellVsBrandom: Vs inferential semantics.
McDowellVsQuine: Vs confirmation of holism.
I 187
McDowell/Esfeld: opens up the prospect of a comprehensive holism based on a holism philosophy of mind. The holism of persuasion refers to the whole conceptual realm. McDowell's unlimited conceptual realm thus expands the holism of persuasion.
The physical world itself is not outside the realm of intelligibility.

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Correspondence Theory Millikan Vs Correspondence Theory I 6
Sign/Millikan: I will lay out a general theory of signs based on Frege's senses, but in the sense of Peirce; it will cover conventional signs, but also thoughts.
This has an important consequence:
Sense/Millikan: is the basic intentional or semantic feature, but it is not reference nor intension. It is not even determined by intension! Therefore, there is an epistemological problem of intentionality:
Intentionality/Millikan: thesis: we can not know a priori what we think! Because the mind is not determined by reference! This provides an argument for realism.
The given/Millikan: MillikanVsMyth of the given. Leads to a false "foundationalism" of epistemology.
VsCorrespondence theory: hence the correspondence theory is rejected
I 7
not only as a "test of truth" but also as the "nature of truth". At least according to a popular perspective. But this is not without paradoxes.
Knowledge/Naturalism/Millikan: the skills of knowing are a product of nature, like the knower themselves. Knowledge must be something you do in the world.. It is a natural relation to the world.
I 8
Coherence/Millikan: you will have to explain what it is good for, how it helps us, not only what it is. Ultimately, this is only possible in an overall theory of the world. "New Empiricism"/Millikan: has so far only managed half of its task, it has not managed to overcome the myth of the given, which is embedded in the theory of meaning.
Realism/Millikan: the arguments VsRealismus are very simple:
VsRealism: "in order to find the meaning of a word, you have to see what would justify its use, or what would cause an application. But the application is justified by previous applications! And it was caused by previous convictions! ((S) also VsCausal theory).
Correspondence: therefore plays no role in the justification or causal explanation of an utterance. So correspondence has nothing to do with the meaning of "true".
MillikanVsVs: one can just as well turn that around:
Correspondence theory: pro: correspondence is involved in the nature of truth, because for a sentence to be true means to correspond to a part of the world in a certain way. Correspondence not playing a role in the justification of an utterance, might as well be turned into this: that the meaning has nothing to do with justification (!). (Millikan pro!).
Meaning of a sentence/meaning/Millikan: are the special projective functions of the sentence. But we reject correspondence as a test of truth, the projective function can not consist of rules in the mind.
I 10
It may not be the "user", that "assumes" that their sentences project the world as such and such. Also, the "assumed" ("should"), which defines the meaning, must differ from the "assumed" ("should") that denotes how we "asssume" of a person that they behave in accordance to the expectation of others according to rules. ("should behave"). Projecting function/projection/meaning/Millikan: the questions becomes more difficult: What kind of things project sentences?, What kind of projection functions are involved? What is a "should"?
Knowledge/self/meaning/Millikan: if something other than the way I myself justifying my statements, defines my meanings, how can I capture what I myself think then?
Thesis: We will have to give up, to know that a priori! We also do not know a priori what we mean.
Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of non-contradiction (the essence of consistency) fits into nature. For that I need Frege's sense as the main concept.
The same way we can be wrong about knowledge, we can also be wrong about meaning.

I 86
Intentionality/Millikan: is not a sharply limited phenomenon. It is not of one piece. It generally has to do with what is normal or what is an function of its own. Not so much with what is actual. Intentionality/Millikan: generally has to do with projecting rules between signs and things.
Correspondence/Millikan: therefore a pure correspondence theory is empty.
Def pure correspondence/correspondence theory/Millikan: would be one that would claim a correspondence would be true only because there is a projecting relation.
This does not work, because mathematically there can be infinite projecting relations.
On the other hand: Representations: are not as ubiquitous and varied.
I 87
Correspondence Theory/Millikan: to not be empty, it must explain what is so special about the projective relations that project representations onto what is represented. Projective Relation/Millikan: must have to do with real causality in real situations, not with logical order.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Davidson, D. McDowell Vs Davidson, D. I 42
McDowellVsDavidson: the myth has deeper roots: we can not understand how the pursuit of spontaneity could ever represent a world if spontaneity were not subject to any external control. (And Davidson denies this control.)
I 41
McDowellVsDavidson: refutes that thoughts and observations are connected in a rational way. McDowell: but then we do not come to an empirical content. (without concepts, observations are blind (Kant)).
I 168
Conviction/McDowellVsDavidson: he could also have said: nothing comes into consideration as a reason for conviction if it is not also located in the realm of reasons, e.g. the fact that it appears as such to a subject (!). Of course it is not the same, whether something seems to me to be this or that, or if I am convinced that it is so.
I 172
Davidson: spontaneity not subjected to external rational condition. McDowellVsDavidson: therefore his theory of coherence is without control.
I 86
Myth/Davidson: to escape it, one must deny that experience is epistemologically significant. (EvansVs, McDowellVs).
I 124
The idea that all things belong to nature does not help. (I 102ff) Spontaneity/Davidson: characterizes what are in fact the operations of the sentient nature, but it does not characteriz them as such.
McDowellVsDavidson: dilemma: either: these operations are still rationally related, or we must assume that they have no epistemological significance. Kant considers this choice to be unacceptable.
I 216
McDowellVsDavidson: if we turn off the background of tradition (and still only presume radical interpretations), we succumb to the myth of the given. Hegel: "lack of mediation." Objectivity/McDowellVsDavidson: Davidson speaks of "triangulation" (reciprocal corrigibility). McDowell: It's too late to take care of the configuration of the concept of objectivity when the subjects have already entered the stage. Objectivity and subjectivity emenate together from the inauguration in the space of reasons.

Rorty VI 205
McDowell/Rorty: Difference betweej "logical space of nature" ("realm of the law") "logical space of reasons". McDowellVsDavidson/McDowellVsSellars/Rorty: too impressed by the realm of law, such that they explain experience in a way that the tribunal of senses is no longer possible.
Conviction/justification/cause/Davidson/SellarsRorty: avoiding the confusion of justification and cause leads to the thesis: convictions can only be justified by convictions. (McDowellVsDavidson).
VI 206
McDowellVsDavidson/Rorty: if proceding in this manner (to eliminate experience), the old philosophical questions look still as if they were any good.
VI 207
There will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak in again through the back door. We still need something that lets us make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: human kind has no responsibility towards the world.

Rorty VI 213
There will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak in through the back door. We still need something that lets us make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: human kind has no responsibility for the world.

Rorty VI 213
Def Second Nature/McDowell: people acquire a second nature, e.g. by exploring conceptual skills whose interactions belong to the logical space of reasons. (E.g. initiation, access to the moral community, "Education").
To have one's eyes opened, gives one the ability to be rationally controlled by the world.
McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson/McDowellVsBrandom: all that becomes incomprehensible if we use the terms of Sellars, Davidson or Brandom.
Rorty VI 217
McDowellVsDavidson: a merely causal explanation carries the risk of emptiness. (With Kant: "spontaneity of thought") ("spontaneity: corresponds to rational truths, receptivity: truths of fact).

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Evans, G. McDowell Vs Evans, G. I 73
Judgment/McDowellVsEvans: but the judgment only introduces new types of content! It simply confirms the conceptual content that originates from experience! Justification/McDowell: does not exist in a derivation of one content from another. A typical perceptual judgment makes a selection from a richer content, which is provided by experience.
I 75
Experience/Evans: although it is non-conceptual (and therefore must be blind, according to Kant) he wants to protect it by claiming a "content." That is, the subject is to have an objective property of reality. Namely as an apparent view of the world. McDowellVsEvans: doesn't make sense without concepts. Evans: contrasts this with the demand: objects of perception must be supported by an "accompanying theory."
McDowell: just that is spontaneity.
Spontaneity/animal/McDowell: distinguishes us from animals that have no terms.
I 80/81
Experience/Evans: their richness of detail cannot be captured by concepts! Ex many more shades of color perceptible than terms available. (S) maybe the term difference suffices if samples are available. McDowellVsEvans: Ex colors: fine grain: we should not assume that there is always a proof-sample.
I 86
There must also be recognition involved. Thinking: certainly, there are thoughts that cannot necessarily put into words in a way that their content would thereby be completely determined. Concept/McDowellVsEvans: the tendency to apply a concept does not come out of the blue. If anyone makes a judgment, it is wrested from him by experience.
I 87
Experience/judgment/McDowell: the connection between the two is that experiences provide grounds for judgments. That is, the tendency to use concepts does not mysteriously hover independently of the situation as in Evans.
I 89
McDowellVsEvans: there is no reason for a disection into factors of similarity and difference. Instead, we can say that we possess something that animals possess too, namely the sensitivity of the perception of the characteristics of our surroundings. We are different from animals only in the sense that our sensitivity is incorporated into the realm of spontaneity.
I 91
Sensuality/concepts/McDowellVsEvans: Sensuality is conceptual. Without this assumption one lapses into the myth of the given if one tries to look at the rational control of empirical thinking.

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Holism Millikan Vs Holism I 10
Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of non-contradiction (the essence of consistency) fits into nature. For that I need Fregean meaning as the main concept. As one can err when it comes to knowledge, so one can err when it comes to meaning.
I 11
Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: we are trying to avoid it. Then we will understand why we still can know something of the world, despite everything. Realism/Millikan: I stay close to the Aristotelian realism.
properties/kind/Millikan: exists only in the actual world.
MillikanVsNominalismus.
I 13
MillikanVsHolismus: it is about understanding without holism and without the myth of the given how to test our apparent skills to recognize things and our apparent meanings. Observational concepts/Millikan: we have a lot more of then than is commonly supposed.
For them, there are good - albeit fallible - tests that are independent of our theories.
Convictions: insofar as our meanings and our ability to recognize things are correct and valid,
I 14
most of our Convictions and judgments are true. ((s) >Beliefs/Davidson). Appropriateness/Millikan: by bringing our judgments to interact iwth those of others in a community, we have additional evidence that they are reasonable. That's also how new concepts are developed which may be tested independently of theories, or not.

I 67
conviction/Millikan: (see chapter 18, 19): Thesis: if one believes something, then normally on grounds of observational judgments. Problem: Background information that could prevent one from the judgment is not necessarily information, the denial of which would normally be used to support the conviction!
I 68
I will use this principle MillikanVsQuine. Theory/observation/Quine: thesis: both are insolubly twisted with each other.
MillikanVsHolismus.
Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: should not be regarded as a mechanism. However:
Engine: may also be regarded as a hierarchy, where higher levels can stop the lower ones. And I as a user must know little about the functioning of the lower levels.

I 298
Test/Millikan: Ex the heart can only be tested together with the kidneys. Language/meaning/reference/world/reality/projection/Millikan: We're just trying to understand how there can be a test that can historically be applied to human concepts in this world of ours, and the results of which are correlated with the world for reasons we can specify.
Problem: we are here more handicapped than realism.
I 299
It is about the possibility of meaningfulness and intentionality at all ("How is it possible?"). Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: epistemic holism is wrong.
Instead, a test for non-contradiction, if it is applied only to a small group of concepts, would be a relatively effective test for the adequacy of concepts.
concepts/adequacy/Millikan: if they are adequate, concepts exercise their own function in accordance with a normal explanation. Their own function is to correspond to a variant of the world. An adequate concept produces correct acts of identification of the references of its tokens.

I 318
Holism/theory/observation/concept/dependency/MillikanVsHolismus/Millikan: the view that we observe most of the things we observe just by observing indirect effects is wrong. Anyway, we observe effects of things, namely, on our senses.
I 319
Difference: it is about the difference between information acquisition through knowledge of effects on other observed things and the acquisition of information without such an intermediary knowledge of other things. Problem: here arises a mistake very easily: this knowledge does not have to be used.

I 321
Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: our findings about the outside world are not individually brought before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body. Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction.
Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our convictions are never brought before the tribunal of experience.
I 322
Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other convictions. Affirmation: only affirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my preferences.
From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well.
Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Sellars, W. Verschiedene Vs Sellars, W. Rorty I 206
Language/Sellars/Rorty: the peculiarity of language is not that it "changes the quality of our experience" or "opens up new perspectives for consciousness". Rather, its acquisition gives us access to a community whose members justify their claims to each other.
I 207
Language/VsSellars: some opponents argue that this is a confusion of terms and words. That having a term and using of a word is one and the same fact in psychological nominalism.
I 208
SellarsVsVs: could answer here: either you admit to everything and everyone (e.g. record players) that you are able to react distinctively to certain kinds of objects, or you give an explanation why you want to draw the line between conceptual thinking and its primitive precursor in a place other than between the acquired language and the learning process still in progress. This makes it clear that the:
Tradition: (Myth of the Given): has thrown two things together: sensations and differentiation abilities.
Sellars I 34
Logical Atomism: VsSellars: he could reply that Sellars 1. overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sensory content.
2. the concepts of sense contents show that logical independence from each other which is characteristic for traditional empiricism.
I 34/25
3. Terms for theoretical entities such as molecules have the interdependence that Sellars may rightly have attributed to terms for physical facts, but: the theoretical terms have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space! Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of a more fundamental logical space than that of physical objects in space and time.
Sense Data TheoryVsSellars:( > I 103) the individual objects are found in the cosmos of everyday language. Physical redness can be analyzed on the basis of red glow, but red glow must be analyzed on the basis of red sensory content. (SellarsVs). But why should the properties of physical objects not be broken down directly into the properties and phenomenal relationships of sensory content?
Sellars: admitted.
I 35
SellarsVsSense Data Theory: how does the sensory data theorist get to the system of sensory content? Even if red glow does not play a role in the analysis of physical redness, he hopes to convince us of this system by asking us to think about the experience of red glow of something. But so far my analysis has not even brought to light such things as sensory content!
I 36
Glowing/Appear/Sense Data/Sellars: there can be no dispositional analysis of physical redness on the basis of red glow. We have to distinguish between qualitative and existential glowing.





Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Given Sellars, W. I 59
Myth of the Given/Sellars: Thesis that there is a level of individual facts: a) each fact associated here cannot only be known in a non-inferential way, it also does not require any further knowledge.
b) this non-inferential knowledge forms the last instance of appeal. Sellars: it's already wrong to believe, knowledge must be inferential at all!
I 65
Myth of the Given/Sellars: Thesis: that observation is constructed by self-certifying, non-linguistic episodes whose authority is transferred to linguistic and quasi-linguistic executions.
Self-consciousness Sellars, W. Fra I 264
Consciousness / SellarsVsSartre / SellarsVsDescartes: the thesis of self-transparency of consciousness is the "myth of the given".

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994