Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brains in a Vat | Rorty | VI 165 Brain / Davidson / Rorty: can not lose contact with the outside world. It is irrelevant whether it is a brain in a vat! This is also true for the mind: it must always be connected to something. That can not be negated by a mentalist redescription. >Intentionality, >Reference, >Thinking. VI 230 Brains in a Vat/BIV / Davidson: are right in most cases - they are not in a position to wonder if they sit by the fireplace - because they are not causally related to fireplaces. >Beliefs/Davidson. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Metaphors | Black | Ricoeur II 66 Metaphor/Max Black/Ricoeur: The theory of metaphor can (...) be extended in a third way in the direction of the most specific traits of symbols. Numerous authors have remarked upon the kinship between metaphors and models. This kinship plays a decisive role, for example, in the work of Max Black, which is even entitled Models and Metaphors.(1) And from his side, the English theologian Ian Ramsey has attempted to elucidate the function of religious language by revising Max Black's theory in an appropriate fashion.(2) Such a rapprochement between models and metaphors allows us to develop the theory of metaphor in a direction (...) of the referential dimension. Now Max Black says that a model has the same structure of sense as a metaphor, but it constitutes the referential dimension of a metaphor. What is this referential value? It is a part of the heuristic function, that is, the aspect of discovery, of a metaphor and a model, of a metaphor as a model. In scientific language, a model is essentially a heuristic procedure that serves to overthrow an inadequate interpretation and to open the way to a new and more adequate one. In Mary Hesse's terms, it is an instrument of redescription, an expression that I will use in the remainder of this analysis.(3) But it is important to understand that this term is to be taken in its strictly epistemological use. Models: The redescriptive power of a model can only be understood if, following Max Black, we carefully distinguish between three sorts of models: scale models, as, for example, a model boat; analogical models, which deal with structural identity, as, for example, a schematic diagram in electronics; and finally, theoretical models, which from an epistemological Ricoeur II 67 point of view, are the real models and which consist of construing an imaginary object more accessible to description as a more complex domain of reality whose properties correspond to the properties of the object. As Max Black puts it, to describe a domain of reality in terms of an imaginary theoretical model is a way of seeing things differently by changing our language about the subject of our investigation. This change of language proceeds from the construction of a heuristic fiction and through the transposition of the characteristics of this heuristic fiction to reality itself. >Metaphor/Ricoeur. 1. Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy, 1962. Cornell University Press. 2. lan Ramsey, Models and Mystery (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); Models for Divine Activity (London: S.C.M. Press, 1973); Religious Language (London: S.C.M. Press, 1957). 3. Mary B. Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966). |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Metaphors | Ricoeur | II 46 Metaphor/Ricoeur: (...) the relation between the literal meaning and the figurative meaning in a metaphor is like an abridged version within a single sentence of the complex interplay of significations that characterize the literary work as a whole. >Connotation/Ricoeur. II 47 The theory of metaphor comes down to us from the ancient rhetoricians, but this theory will not fulfill the role we expect of it without one important revision. This revision, briefly stated, shifts the problem of metaphor from the semantics of the word to the semantics of the sentence. >Rhetoric/Ricoeur. II 49 Metaphor/Tradition: (1) Metaphor is a trope, a figure of discourse that concerns denomination. (2) It represents the extension of the meaning of a name through deviation from the literal meaning of words. (3) The reason for this deviation is resemblance. (4) The function of resemblance is to ground the substitution of the figurative meaning of a word in place of the literal meaning, which could have been used in the same place. (5) Hence the substituted signification does not represent any semantic innovation. We can translate a metaphor, i.e., replace the literal meaning for which the figurative word is a substitute. In effect, substitution plus restitution equals zero. (6) Since it does not represent a semantic innovation, a metaphor does not furnish any new information about reality. This is why it can be counted as one of the emotive functions of discourse. I.A. RichardsVsTradition/Ricoeur: The first presupposition [that no new information is involved] to be rejected is that a metaphor is simply an accident of denomination, a displacement in the signification of words. With this presupposition classical rhetoric limited itself to the description of an effect of meaning that is really the result of the impact on the word of a production of meaning that takes place at the level of a complete utterance or sentence. II 50 Ricoeur: The metaphor is the result of the tension between two terms in a metaphorical utterance. (...) [this] tension in a metaphorical utterance is really not something that occurs between two terms in the utterance, but rather between two opposed interpretations of the utterance. The metaphorical interpretation presupposes a literal interpretation which self-destructs in a significant contradiction. It is this process of self-destruction or transformation which imposes a sort of twist on the words, an extension of meaning thanks to which we can make sense where a literal interpretation would be literally nonsensical. II 51 Resemblence/Tradition: It is now possible to return to the third presupposition of the classical rhetorical conception of metaphor, the role of resemblance. This has often been misunderstood. Often it has been reduced to the role of images in poetic discourse, so that for many critics, especially the older ones, studying an author‘s metaphors meant discussing the nomenclature of the images used to illustrate his ideas. RicoeurVsTradition: But if metaphor does not consist in clothing an idea in an image, if it consists instead in reducing the shock engendered by two incompatible ideas, then it is in the reduction of this gap or difference that resemblance plays a role. What is at stake in a metaphorical utterance, in other words, is the appearance of kinship where ordinary vision does not perceive any relationship. Trope/Tradition: For classical rhetoric (...) a trope was the simple substitution of one word for another. But substitution is a sterile operation, whereas in a live metaphor the tension [is] between the words (...). II 52 RicoeurVsTradition: within a tension theory of metaphor, however, such as we are here opposing to a substitution theory, a new signification emerges, which embraces the whole sentence. In this sense, a metaphor is an instantaneous creation, a semantic innovation which has no status in already established language and which only exists because of the attribution of an unusual or an unexpected predicate. Metaphor therefore is more like the resolution of an enigma than a simple association based on resemblance; it is constituted by the resolution of a semantic dissonance. Two conclusions: 1. Real metaphors are not translatable. 2. A metaphor is not anornament of discourse. It has more than an emotive value because II 53 it offers new information. >Symbol/Ricoeur. II 66 Metaphor/model/Max Black/Ricoeur: The theory of metaphor can (...) be extended in a third way in the direction of the most specific traits of symbols. Numerous authors have remarked upon the kinship between metaphors and models. This kinship plays a decisive role, for example, in the work of Max Black, which is even entitled Models and Metaphors .(1) And from his side, the English theologian Ian Ramsey has attempted to elucidate the function of religious language by revising Max Black's theory in an appropriate fashion.(2) Such a rapprochement between models and metaphors allows us to develop the theory of metaphor in a direction (...) of the referential dimension. II 67 Ricoeur: Let us apply this concept of model to metaphor. The guideline here is the relation between the two notions of a heuristic fiction and the redescription that occurs through the transference of this fiction to reality. It is this double movement that we also find in metaphor, for "a memorable metaphor has the power to bring two separate domains into cognitive and emotional relation by using language directly appropriate for the one as a lens for seeing the other. . . Thanks to this detour through the heuristic fiction we perceive new connections among things. The basis of this transfer is the presumed isomorphism between the model and its domain of application. It is this isomorphism that legitimates the "analogical transfer of a vocabulary" and that allows a metaphor to function like a model and "reveal new relationships“.(3) II 68 In the case of metaphor, [the] redescription is guided by the interplay between differences and resemblances that gives rise to the tension at the level of the utterance. It is precisely from this tensive apprehension that a new vision of reality springs forth, which ordinary vision resists because it is attached to the ordinary use of words. The eclipse of the objective, manipulable world thus makes way for the revelation of a new dimension of reality and truth. Copula/metaphor/Ricoeur: [in the metaphor] „is" signifies both is and is not. The literal "is" is overturned by the absurdity and surmounted by a metaphorical "is" equivaThus poetic language does not tell how things literally are, but what they are like. ((s) DavidsonVsRicoeur: cf. Metaphor/Davidson). Symbol/metaphor/Ricoeur: (...) we must accept two contrary propositions concerning the relationship between metaphors and symbols. On one side, there is more in the metaphor than in the symbol; on the other side, there is more in the symbol than in the metaphor. >Symbol/Ricoeur. 1. Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy, 1962. Cornell University Press. 2. lan Ramsey, Models and Mystery (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); Models for Divine Activity (London: S.C.M. Press, 1973); Religious Language (London: S.C.M. Press, 1957). 3. Max Black op. cit. P. 238. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Metaphysics | Rorty | III 127 ff Metaphysicisit: E.g. Hegel: despite historical realization of the truth still approaching something fixed. III Introduction Metaphysics: questions about the unchanging, possibly hidden things that underlie the phenomena. Typical: Socrates’ questions. ("Immanent nature"). (HeideggerVs). In this respect, coupled with common sense! He gives no redescription, but analyzes old descriptions with the help of other old descriptions. The metaphysicist calls everything else "relativistic". He assumes that our tradition cannot provide problems that it is unable to solve. Metaphysics: thinks that there is a connection between redescription and power, and the right redescription could liberate us. IV (c) 77ff Metaphysics/Heidegger/Rorty: Heidegger thought he might escape metaphysics - (the idea of a single truth) - by understanding being and truth historically. >Being/Heidegger, >Truth/Heidegger. VI 154ff Metaphysics: wants to see our desire to be friendly supported by an argument that contains a self-description. It is supposed to throw a highlight on a thing common to all humans Transcendence: the assumption that there is something with which we may not be connected. RortyVs: it does not exist! Our beliefs themselves are secular objects in constant causal interaction with others. Rorty: the fact that we keep open whether we describe the world differently later has nothing to do with transcendence. VI 480 Transcendence/DavidsonVsKant/Rorty: not needed |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Models | Black | Ricoeur II 66 Model/Max Black/Ricoeur: Numerous authors have remarked upon the kinship between metaphors and models. This kinship plays a decisive role, for example, in the work of Max Black, which is even entitled Models and Metaphors.(1) Black says that a model has the same structure of sense as a metaphor, but it constitutes the referential dimension of a metaphor. What is this referential value? It is a part of the heuristic function, that is, the aspect of discovery, of a metaphor and a model, of a metaphor as a model. In scientific language, a model is essentially a heuristic procedure that serves to overthrow an inadequate interpretation and to open the way to a new and more adequate one. In Mary Hesse's terms, it is an instrument of redescription, an expression that I will use in the remainder of this analysis.(2) But it is important to understand that this term is to be taken in its strictly epistemological use. Models: The redescriptive power of a model can only be understood if, following Max Black, we carefully distinguish between three sorts of models: scale models, as, for example, a model boat; analogical models, which deal with structural identity, as, for example, a schematic diagram in electronics; and finally, theoretical models, which from an epistemological Ricoeur II 67 point of view, are the real models and which consist of construing an imaginary object more accessible to description as a more complex domain of reality whose properties correspond to the properties of the object. As Max Black puts it, to describe a domain of reality in terms of an imaginary theoretical model is a way of seeing things differently by changing our language about the subject of our investigation. This change of language proceeds from the construction of a heuristic fiction and through the transposition of the characteristics of this heuristic fiction to reality itself. >Metaphor/Ricoeur. 1. Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy, 1962. Cornell University Press. 2. Mary B. Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966). |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Nature | Davidson | Rorty VI 165 Brain/Davidson/Rorty: cannot lose contact with the outside world. It is irrelevant whether it is a brain in a vat! This is also true for the mind: it must always be connected to something. That cannot be negated by a mentalist redescription. >Brains in a vat. Davidson I 8 Def externalism: events and objects that create a conviction determine at the same time the content of this conviction. This is not the thought that nature ensures that our simple judgments are always correct, but that the causal history of such judgments provides a constitutive characteristic of their content. >Externalism. I 84 ff Mind/subjective/objective/objectivity/subjectivity/world/reality/Davidson: old theme: the relations between the human mind and the rest of nature, between the subjective and the objective. Consciousness/Davidson: exists in the plural; nature only in the singular. That everyone has his point of view in the world is a harmless relativism, because it refers to a coordinate system, just the one nature. >Objectivity, >Subjectivity. I 85 Concept relativism/Davidson: has it harder because the common coordinate system is not so easy to identify. >Reference systems. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Philosophy | Rorty | III 102 Philosophy/Hegel/Rorty: Philosophy paints grey in grey: i.e. Story is old. - Rorty: Newton did not know that his purpose was the advanced technology. - Operating theory: Problem: the purpose of the language is not fixed yet - unlike tools. --- VI 355 History of Philosophy/interpretation/reconstruction/past/Meaning Change/Conceptual Change/Rorty: dilemma: either a) We impose on the dead in anachronistic fashion enough problems and vocabulary of our time b) We let them appear less foolish by putting them in their own historical context. >Vocabulary, >Meaning change, >Theory change, cf. >Incommensurability. Rorty Thesis: We can do both, if we separate it consciously. --- VI 376f Rorty: Philosophy is not a natural kind - that means, it does not always give the same answers to the same questions. - We should not present us as if we respond to the same stimuli as our ancestors. >Natural kinds. We have created new stimuli - therefore we also ask better questions. N.B.: philosophy still has nothing to do with "meta-questions". >Metaphysics. III passim Philosophy/Hegel/Dewey/Rorty: no approach to fixed things but self-creation. The future is more productive than the past. >New description/redescription. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Qualia | Rorty | VI 153 Qualia/Wittgenstein/Sellars/Rorty: the awareness of qualia is nothing more than to learn how to formulate judgments about qualia - that presupposes a relationship between qualia and non-qualia. >Judgments, >Experience, >Perception, >Sensory impression. VI 405f Robert Adams: only the existence of God could explain the correlation between brain and qualia. Qualia/Robert Adams: cannot be analyzed, therefore not traceable to elementary particles. Reductionism "can be refuted by the fact that one sees red or tastes onions". RortyVsAdams: this refutation is a typical "citing of the unspeakable". A reference to a kind of knowledge that cannot be questioned by any new description. For this is not knowledge by description, but knowledge by direct acquaintance. ((s) It cannot be transferred.) >Knowledge by acquaintance, >Redescription/Rorty. RortyVsAdams: a lot must be provided in the language before a plausible reference to the taste of onions is possible at all. See also Sellars: Rorty I 206 Language/Sellars/Rorty: the peculiarity of language is not that it "changes the quality of our experience" or "opens up new perspectives for consciousness". Rather, its acquisition gives us access to a community whose members justify their assertions to each other. >Wilfrid Sellars, >Robert Adams. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Four-Dimensionalism | Chisholm Vs Four-Dimensionalism | Simons I 120 Object/Thing/Chisholm: Thesis: "mereological constance objects in the original sense: entia per se: cannot change. Objects in the derived sense: Entia per alio: are subject to flux, but only in the sense that they are successively constituted by different entia per se, which differ in their parts. Continuants/Chisholm: he does not deny them! Rather ChisholmVsFour-Dimensionalism (because of his ontology of temporal objects). Simons I 124 Event/occurrents/Ontology/Chisholm/Simons: Chisholm disproves three arguments for the ontology of events (occurrences): (Chisholm 1976, Appendix A) 1. Argument of spatial analogy: there is a great disanalogy between space and time: a thing cannot be in two different places at the same time, but a thing can be in the same place at two different times. ChisholmVs: this is not conclusive, a defender of temporal parts can argue against it. But then he can use this argument to argue for his thesis without circularity. 2. Argument of change (change): for example, how can Philip be drunk once and sober once? For him, both are contradictory together. ChisholmVsFour-Dimensionalism/Solution: instead of saying a time stage of Philip is (timelessly) drunk, we simply say in everyday language: he was drunk last night and is now sober. Either we use grammatical times as in everyday language, or we relativize our predicates to the time ((s) "have-at-t", "be-at-t"). 3. Argument of the river (not "flux-argument"): Example River/QuineVsHeraclitus: Quine uses the temporal extension of the river on the same level as the spatial extension. ChisholmVsQuine: not every sum of river stages is a river process. I 125 Solution/Chisholm: we have to say what conditions a sum has to meet to be a river process. ChisholmVsQuine: Problem: this again requires continuants: (river banks, human observers) or a theory of absolute space or the introduction of a technical term ((s) predicate) "is cofluvial with"). Problem: this can only be understood in terms of "is the same flux as". So circular. VsFour-Dimensionalism/VsProcess-Ontology: he did not succeed in eliminating all singular or general terms that denote continuants. Process-Ontology/Four-Dimensionalism/SimonsVsProcess-Ontology: all representatives except Whitehead speak with a "split tongue" when it comes to concrete examples. Continuants/Quine: says he can "reconstruct them four-dimensionally". "Describe them as new". Reconstruction/Redescription/SimonsVsQuine: when something is rewritten, it gets a new description. Reconstruction is strictly speaking a discarding. So continuants must then disappear from our ontology and something else must take their place. Problem: thus, it is misleading to speak of river stages or cat stages. E.g. not one Philip stage is drunk, but the whole person is. For example, one does not bathe in one river stage, but in the whole river. Error: it cannot be right to change the subject and leave the predicate unchanged, and think you still have a true sentence! Similarly: Four-Dimensionalism/Cartwright: (1975,p. 167) "four dimensional objects have different careers". SimonsVsCartwright: only continuants like generals or opera singers have careers. Four-dimensional objects have no career, they are at best a career. Problem: if continuants are to disappear from ontology, then there is nothing that can be a career. That is talking with a "split tongue": you cannot enjoy the advantages of the old entities if you abolish them. Four-Dimensionalism needs a whole new way of speaking (unfamiliar, contrary to everyday language). Whitehead/Simons: is the only one who can do this and it is literally obscure. I 126 Process-Ontology/Simons: all this does not show their impossibility, only their alien nature. We must not only adopt continuants, but also events that involve them, especially changes of continuants. SimonsVsProcess-Ontology/SimonsVsVsFour-Dimensionalism: that the space-time requires the task of continuants is not so sure and rather depends on the circumstances. Certainly, Minkowski diagrams simply represent time as another (equal) dimension. I 127 Argument/Simons: it is not a conclusive argument to derive an ontology from a convenient representation. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Mundy, B. | Field Vs Mundy, B. | I 199 Representation Theorem/VsRelationism: Relationism cannot take over the representation theorems from substantivalism either, because these depend on structural regularities (regularity of spacetime structure). And this regularity of spacetime is lost in relationalism. ((s) because there should be no empty sp.t., the sp.t. itself is bound to (empirically irregularly) occurring matter). Wrong Solution/Mundy: (1983): has proven a "representation theorem" which is not based on structural regularities. But that does not help heavy duty Platonism, because it generates numerical functors only from other numerical functors. That means he does not take predicates which put matter particles (point particles) in relation to each other, but a functor k: that refers particles to real numbers. E.g. For every three-point particle a real number that represents the inner product of two vectors which have one of these points as a common starting point, and the other two as endpoints. From this he extracts (several) coordinate systems, so that we have a representation theorem of species. FieldVsMundy: this does not serve the purposes for which representation theorems were originally developed, because it does not depart from a non-numeric base. Mundy: also sees that the R should not use any functions of point particles to real numbers as the basis for its formulation of physics. Therefore, he reformulates the equation: old: k(p,q,r) = a (where a is a real number) new: ka(p,q,r) so that we have an uncountable, infinite set of 3-digit space relations, one for every real number. (Mundy, 1983, p 212, 223.) FieldVsMundy: this does not solve any problem, because it’s only a notational trick. ((s) notation, orthography, paraphrasing, renaming >Rorty: "redescription" not a mere renaming, because description (language) necessitates stronger revision than replacing individual predicates with others. Potentially different number of digits). FieldVsMundy: if you really wanted to interpreted the ka’s as 3-digit spatial relations, the a’s would have to be considered as unquantifiable indices. Then we would have uncountably many primitive predicates, and thus no theory would be possible. Index/Quantification/(s): it is impossible to quantify on indices. Indices are not quantifiable. Mundy: of course, does not treat the indices as unquantifiable, but he re-writes them: k(p,q,r) = a if he wants to quantify on a. FieldVsMundy: but a quantifiable index is simply a variable that appears in a different place. And with the re-naming we do not change the fact that we have a 4-digit relation of which one term is a real number. Conclusion: With that you cannot take advantage of the difference between moderate Platonism and heavy duty Platonism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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