Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstractness | Dennett | I 497 f Abstraction/Explanation/Dennett: Dan Sperber(1): You must not proceed too abstract intentionally. Abstract objects do not enter directly into the causal relationships. E.g. the excitement of a child is not caused by the abstract story of Little Peter's Journey to the Moon, but by the fact that he understands his mother's words. Dennett: this is no obstacle for science, on the contrary: it can cut the Gordian knot of tangled causal relationships by using an abstract formulation and ignoring all those complications. (>Intentional stance), >Propositional attitudes. I 498 E.g. the excitement of the child does not result from the abstract story, but from the understanding of the words of its mother. 1. Sperber, Dan 1985."Anthropology and Psychology: Towards an Epidemiology of Representations." Man, vol. 20, pp. 73-99. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Causal Explanation | Schurz | I 227 Causal explanation/Schurz: exists only if there is a natural law connection. No causal explanation: e.g. "All apples in this bag are red, therefore this apple is red". I.e. That this apple is (naturally) red is not an explanation why it is red. ((s) >Dennett: Wrong question: "Why is this car green?"). >Explanation/Dennett, >Why-questions, >Causality, >Laws of nature. Prediction/justification/Schurz: here law-likeness is not required. I 228 Ex "All apples in the bag are red": is a completely sufficient prediction or reason (just not an explanation). Causality/Explanation/Schurz: the majority of authors first tried to explicate the concept of explanation independently of causality. Vs: this does not meet the narrower concept of explanation. Schurz: supplying real reasons ((s) here: = cause) belongs to the core of the concept of event explanation. >Prediction. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Evolution | Gould | Dennett I 412 Evolution/Gould theory: the key difference in evolution is not simple adaptation but speciation. (DennettVs). Gould: thesis: species are fragile but have unalterable structures. There are no improvements in species, only closed discarding. Correct level: the correct level are not the genes but entire species or clades. Species/Gould/(s): species are not going to be improved, but discarded. Level/explanation/Dennett: as software/hardware: some is better explained on one level, others is better explained on a different level. >Explanation, >Darwinism. Gould I 88ff Evolution/Darwinism/individual/Gould: individuals do not develop evolutionary, they can only grow, reproduce and die. Evolutionary changes occur in groups of interacting organisms. Species are the units of evolution. Orthodox Darwinism/Gould: thesis: gene mutate, individuals are subject to selection and species evolve evolutionary. I 131 Evolution/Gould: Thesis: I do not imagine evolution as a ladder, but rather in the form of a shrub with many branches. Therefore: the more species the better. I 133 The importance of this point can be seen in the development of molecules. The number of differences between amino acids clearly correlates with the time since the diversion of development lines. The longer the separation, the greater the differences. This is how a molecular clock was developed. The Darwinians were generally surprised by the regularity of this clock. After all, the selection should proceed at a noticeably different speed for the different development lines at different times. I 134 VsDarwinism: the Darwinists are actually forced to contemplate that the regular molecular clock represents an evolution that is not subject to selection, but to the random fixation of neutral mutations. We have never been able to separate ourselves from the concept of the evolution of the human being, which puts the brain in the centre of attention. The Australopithecus afarensis disproved what had been predicted by astute evolutionary theorists such as Ernst Haeckel and Friedrich Engels. Tradition: general view: that the upright gait represented an easily attainable gradual development, and the increase in brain volume represented a surprisingly rapid leap. I 136 GouldVs: I would like to take the opposite view: in my opinion, the upright gait is a surprise, a difficult event to achieve, a rapid and fundamental transformation of our anatomy. In anatomical terms, the subsequent enlargement of our brain is a secondary epiphenomenon, a simple transition embedded in the general pattern of human evolution. Bipedality is not an easy achievement, it represents a fundamental transformation of our anatomy, especially of the feet and pelvis. I 191 Evolution/Gould: evolution essentially proceeds in two ways: a) Definition phyletic transformation: an entire population changes from one state to another. If all evolutionary changes were to occur in this way, life would not last long. This is because a phyletic transformation does not lead to an increase in diversity and variety, only to a transformation from one state to another. Now that extinction (by eradication) is so widespread, everything that does not have the ability to adapt would soon be destroyed. b) Definition speciation: new species branch off from existing ones. All speciation theories assume that splits occur quickly in very small populations. With the "sympatric" speciation, new forms appear within the distribution area of the previous form. Large stable central populations have a strong homogenizing influence. New mutations are impaired by the strong previous forms: they may slowly increase in frequency, but a changed environment usually reduces their selective value long before they can assert themselves. Thus, a phyletic transformation of the large populations should be very rare, as the fossil finds prove. It looks different in the periphery: isolated small populations here are much more exposed to the selection pressure, because the periphery marks the limit of the ecological tolerance of the previous living beings. I 266 Evolution/Biology/Gould: evolution proceeds by replacing the nucleotides. II 243 Evolution/Gould: thesis: evolution has no tendency. II 331 Evolution/Gould: official definition of evolution/Gould: evolution is the "change of gene frequencies in populations". (The process of random increase or decrease of the gene frequency is called definition "genetic drift".) The new theory of neutralism suggests that many, if not most, genes in individual populations owe their frequency primarily to chance. IV 199 Evolution/species richness: the change from a few species and many groups to a few groups and many species would occur even in the case of purely coincidental extinction if every speciation process at the beginning of life's history had been accompanied by average major changes. IV 221 Evolution/Gould: pre-evolutionary theory: a pre-evolutionary theory is "the chain of being": it is the old idea that every organism is a link. It confuses evolution with higher development and has been misinterpreted as a primitive form of evolution, but has nothing to do with it! The thesis is emphatically antievolutionary. Problem: there are no links between vertebrates and invertebrates IV 223 Intermediate form: the theory assumed asbestos as an intermediate form between minerals and plants due to the fibrous structure. Hydra and corals were seen as an intermediate form between plants and animals. (Today: both are animals of course.) Absurd: it is absurd to assume a similarity between plants and baboons, because plants lose their leaves and baboon babies lose their hair. IV 346 Evolution/Gould: evolution is not developing in the direction of complexity, why should it? |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Explanation | Dennett | Rorty VI 144 Explanation/Dennett/Rorty: it is sufficient to explain why there seems to be something phenomenological. This is why it seems to be the case that there is a difference between thinking that something seems to be pink, and that something really seems to be pink. I 137 Explanation/Model/Dennett: models must be neither too difficult nor oversimplified. E.g. it is not about following all the electrons in a calculator. Model/pattern/explanation/Dennett: why are we considering this model and not a different one? In order to justify that we must not only take the real into consideration but also the possible. I 335 We need to develop an idealization of degrees of possibility. Explaining evolution: > Properties: E.g. you ordered a green car and it comes on time: the question is not why this car is green, but: why is this (green) car here. ((s) consider the car as a whole, the green car would otherwise be elsewhere). > "wrong question". Just-about-stories: E.g. Lake Victoria. Unusually many species of perch. Only (conventional) explanation: Too many ponds dried out. But besides the properties of the animals you have no evidence for that. I 416 Dennett: all these stories are "too good to be true". But Gould does not adopt the Pangloss principle when he considers them to be true until the opposite is proven. Coincidence/Evidence/Dennett: e.g. a geyser suddenly erupts on average every 65 minutes. The form of the suddenness is no evidence of coincidence. I 424 Cambrian Explosion/DennettVsGould: here again suddenness is no evidence of coincidence. I 102 Explanation/Justification/Evolution/Dennett: e.g. the advantages of sexuality cannot be taken as a reason for why they are there. The evolution cannot foresee its path. Consequence: the sexuality must have survived as a side effect (>epiphenomenon). |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Introspection | Chalmers | I 13 Introspection/Psychology/Phenomenology/Behavior/Consciousness/Wundt/Chalmers: if one were to use introspection like e.g. Wilhelm Wundt, in order to explain behavior, one would behave 1. Cartesian, and 2. one makes phenomenology the referee on psychology. >Phenomenology/Chalmers. I 26 Introspection/Chalmers: introspection is the way we become clear about the content of our inner states. This is an important component of our everyday concept of consciousness. Introspection can be analyzed in terms of a rational process of open-mindedness for information about inner states and the ability to apply this information meaningfully. Cf. >Awareness/Chalmers, >Content/Chalmers. Status reports: require additional language control. >First person, >Incorrigibility. I 189 Introspection/Consciousness/Explanation/Dennett/Chalmers: (Dennett, 1979 (1)) ... there are public reports about our consciousness and episodes of our propositional awareness, our judgments and - as far as introspection is concerned - darkness (1979, p.95). ChalmersVsDennett: then Dennett's introspection is very different from mine. I find sensations, feelings, pain, etc., although they are accompanied by judgments, they themselves are not merely judgments. I 190 Introspection/Chalmers: Dennett's approach is better described than extrospection. He starts from the outside to explore his inner being. Dennett/Chalmers: (in Dennett, 1991 (2), pp 363-364): what is the point is to explain why things appear to us as they do. And that would explain everything that needs to be explained. Appearing/ChalmersVsDnett: There are two meanings of apparition: a) phenomenal ("how it is ...") b) psychologically (as disposition for judgments). Dennett's theory explains only b). >Psychology, >Disposition, >Judgments, >Behavior, >Explanation. 1. D. Dennett, On the absence of phenomenology,. In: D. Gustafson and B Tapscott, (Eds) Body, Mind, and Method, Dordrecht 1979. 2. D. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, Boston, 1991 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Models | Dennett | I 265 Model/explanation/Dennett: Every model of a temporal process must begin in a arbitrarily chosen moment. >Simulation. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Reality | Rorty | II (b) 40 RortyVsHabermas: we linguistic historicists believe that dependency relations can only be uncovered when someone proposes concrete alternatives. There is no "humanity" that would have to be guided from an era of "distorted communication" (relative term) to a new era. - We reject the notion that people have a "Interior" that resists "external conditioning". II (e) 101 ff Description/Rorty: the nature described will always have some sort of order. Thing itself/Rorty: just nature which is not described by any human language. II (e) 106f Freud/Rorty: has no interest in a distinction between reality and appearance! It’s about new description. IV 49 World: "Non-sentences". - Rorty characterizes Davidson's thesis of the non-existence of a relationship of "truthmakers" ((s) quotation marks by Rorty) to the world as the denial of a relationship between non-sentences and sentences. ((s) Everything that is not a sentence - because sentences are about the world. Otherwise circular). VI 169 Reality/statements/Wittgenstein/Rorty: we are unable to move back and forth between our statements about electrons and the electrons themselves - not even between our attributions of beliefs and the beliefs themselves - E.g. (Wittgenstein) that would be like trying to confirm what s in the newspaper by comparing what is in another copy of the same newspaper. VI 170 Success/explanation/reality/RortyVsDennett: Success as an explanation helps us to waive "reality" - the success depends on the usefulness. >Explanation/Dennett, >Benefit, >Success. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adaptionism | Dennett Vs Adaptionism | I 382 DennettVsAdaptionism / mimicry: there is a temptation to say, when the forest floor looked different, the butterfly had a different color. But that is not justified. It does not have to be true too! (Dennett otherwise pro) The Adaptionist would ask: why do all the doors in this village have the hinges on the left? Answer: there is no reason for it, it s just a historical accident. (Dennett pro). Theory /Dennett: adaptionism and mentalism are not theories in the traditional sense! They are attitudes and strategies to organize data to explain relationships and nature to ask questions. Münch III 375ff DennettVsAdaptionism: is in danger to construe the entire building out of nothing, like mentalism does. III 376 Pangloss/Dennett: you can use this position to open up the completeness of a list of conditions. DobzhanskyVsAdaptionism: 1956 (in the spirit of Gould and Lewontin): The usefulness of a feature cannot be taken for granted. CainVsDobzhansky: 1964. Also, the uselessness cannot be taken for granted. III 379 Explanation/DennettVsPutnam: an explanation on a micro-physical level is not inconsistent with an explanation on rational grounds. Adaptionism/Dennett: the more complex the condition, the less likely appears the rational reason. But the truth of a non-adaptionist story does not require the falsehood of all adaptationist stories. We should accept Pangloss’ assumption. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Davidson, D. | Newen Vs Davidson, D. | Newen I 201 Behavior/DennettVsCausal Explanation/Explanation/Explanation of Behavior/Dennett/DennettVsDavidson/Ryle/Newen: Dennett (like Ryle): behavior cannot be explained causally, but by desires and beliefs as intentional attitudes, not causes. (DennettVsDavidson). I 205 Belief/Intentionality/Intentional Explanation/Dennett/Newen: Dennett's explanation does not include the thesis that desires and beliefs even exist. DennettVsDavidson/VsCausal Explanation/Dennett/Newen: Thesis: the levels (intentional, physical, functional) are isolated and must not be linked. Mental Phenomena/Dennett/Newen: can only be detected by the attribution of intentional attitudes. I 206 VsDennett: E.g. toothaches are a mental state. Then Dennett has to assert that the state depends on whether it is useful for someone to attribute toothache to this person. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Dennett, D. | Nagel Vs Dennett, D. | Rorty VI 144 Explanation/Dennett/Rorty: it is sufficient to explain why there seems to be something phenomenological, i.e. why it seems to be true "that there is a difference between thinking... that something seems to be pink, and the fact that something really appears to be pink. (!) VsDennett: his critics believe that his book is merely good for explaining away consciousness. Belief/Existence/Dennett/Rorty: should reply that it is a good thing to explain something away, i.e. to declare that we do not have to make room for this something in our image, but only for the belief in that something. NagelVsDennett/Rorty: Procrustes-like adaptation to objectivity. Instead, we should seek an objectivity which connects the position of the first person with that of the third person. First Person/Nagel/Searle/Rorty: (inter alia): knowledge of intrinsic, non-relational properties of mental events. RortyVsNagel/VsSearle: if they accept the maxim: "if all the relational properties are explained (all causes and effects), then the thing itself is explained", they will realize that they lose out here. I 145/146 Nagel: (according to Rorty) therefore he must insist that non-relational properties are impossible reduce to relational ones. Consciousness/Nagel/Rorty: that a human has consciousness is not merely a belief, but a conclusion from evidence. I.e. there is a gap (according to Rorty) between the evidence and the conclusion from the evidence, the gap between the totality of the relations between the consciousness and the rest of the world, and the intrinsic nature of consciousness on the other ahnd. VI 147 NagelVsDennett/Rorty: his "hetero-phenomenology" is not sufficient. Nagel Thesis: the sources of philosophy are pre-linguistic, their problems are not dependent on culture. VI 149 Hetero-Phenomenalism/DennettVsNagel: he should accept the "hetero-phenomenalism" as a neutral description. RortyVsDennett, RortyVsNagel: both missed! Hetero-phenomenalism claims to speak that which Nagel thinks unspeakable. Nagel is right here in accusing him of a petitio principii, because this anticipates the decision about all the interesting questions. DennettVsNagel: perhaps we are only now unable to describe certain things and later we will be! NagelVsDennett: something "else, describable" does not interest me! The indescribable should not be replaced with something describable. VI 150 That would be like trying to ask Kant to recognize the thing as such after the reception of Hegel. VI 151/152 Def Hetero-Phenomenology/Rorty: claims for himself to tell the other what "he actually spoke about". VsQualia, VsUnrecognizable Nature, VsKnowledge that cannot be influenced by way of speaking, (reductionism). (RortyVsDennett: he falsely believes he is neutral). |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Putnam, H. | Dennett Vs Putnam, H. | I 571/572 Meaning/Function/Evolution/Dennett: the meaning is like the function at the moment of their creation still nothing definite. Twin Earth/t.e./Putnam/DennettVsPutnam: it requires a leap in the reference, a jump in the intentionality. Dennett: you could now tend to think that inner intentionality has a certain "inertia". I 573 Twin Earth/Dennett/VsPutnam: you cannot tell a story assuming that tables are no tables, even though they look like tables and are used like tables. Something else would be a "living being that looks like Fury" (But is not Fury). But if there are "twin earth horses" on the Twin Earth which are much like our horses, then twin earth horses are horses, a non-terrestrial kind of horse though, but after all horses. ((s), therefore, in Putnam the Twin Earth water has a different chemical formula: YXZ.) Dennett: of course you can also represent a more stringent opinion according to which the non-terrestrial horses are a separate species. Both are possible. I 575 Indeterminacy/Twin Earth/Dennett: Their idea of what "horse" for really means suffers under the same indeterminacy like the frog’s idea of the fly as a "little flying edible object". Indeterminacy/DennettVsPutnam: E.g. "cat", "Siamese cat": Perhaps you simply find one day that you must make a distinction that was just not necessary previously, because the subject did not come up for discussion. This indeterminacy undermines Putnam’s argument of the t.e. Münch III 379 Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: he tries to close the gap by saying that we are referring to natural types, whether we know it or not. Dennett: But what types are natural? Races are as natural as species or classes! ((s) VsDennett: There is also the view that only the species are natural). DennettVsEssentialism: E.g. Vending Machine has dissolved into nothingness. Equally: E.g. Frog: he would have caught food pellets in the wild just the same if they had come in his way. Disjunction: in a way "flies or pellets" are a natural type for frogs. They do not distinguish between the two naturally. On the other hand, the disjunction is not a natural type: it does not occur in nature!. Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: "natural type" twin earth horse/horses/disjunction: E.g. Assuming someone had brought twin earth horse to the Earth unnoticed, we would have readily referred to them as horses. Meaning/Dennett: Vending machine and the information of the frog’s eye derive their meaning from the function. Where the function does not provide a response, there is nothing to investigate. The meanings of the people are just as derived as those of a venidng machine. This proves the t.e. Otherwise you have to postulate essentialism. Explanation/DennettVsPutnam: an explanation on microphysical level is not inconsistent with an explanation on rational grounds. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 Putnam III 31 DennettVsPutnam: according to Putnam’s conception the mind something chaotic. Dennett and Fodor: Both authors have an unspoken premise in mind, and this is reductionist. There is also cognition without reductionism. |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
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