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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mimesis | Aristotle | Gadamer I 119 Mimesis/imitation/Aristotle/Gadamer: By imitating, the little child begins to play by confirming what he or she knows and thereby confirming him- or herself. Even the children's joy of disguise, to which Aristotle already refers, does not want to be a concealment, a pretence in order to be exposed and recognized behind it, but on the contrary a representation in such a way that only what is represented "is". The child does not want to be exposed behind its disguise at all costs. What it represents should be, and if something is to be guessed, then it is just that. It should be recognized what "is".(1) >Presentation, >Imitation/Psychology. 1. Aristoteles. Poet. 4, insbes. 1448 b 16. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Mimesis | Gadamer | I 118 Mimesis/Imitation/Art/Gadamer: The term imitation can (...) only describe the game of art if one keeps in mind the sense of knowledge that lies in imitation. The represented is there - that is the mimic primal relationship. ((s) (The object or archetype of the representation does not disappear in the represented). Gadamer: Someone who imitates something leaves what he or she knows and how he or she knows it there. I 119 By imitating, the little child starts to play by confirming what he or she knows and thereby confirming him- or herself. Even the children's pleasure in dressing up, to which Aristotle already refers, does not want to be a hiding, a pretence in order to be guessed and recognized behind it, but on the contrary a representation in such a way that only what is represented "is". The child does not want to be exposed in its disguise at all costs. What it represents should be, and if something is to be guessed, then it is just that. It is to be recognized what "is".(1) >Recognition/Gadamer. I 120 The mimic primal relationship that we are discussing thus not only contains the fact that what is depicted is there, but also that it has actually come into the there. Imitation and representation are not merely reproductive repetition, but rather knowledge of the essence. Because they are not merely repetition but "retrieval", they also include the spectator. They contain in themselves the reference of the essence to everyone for whom the representation is. Yes, one can say even more: the representation of the being is so little mere imitation that it is necessarily showing. Whoever imitates must omit and emphasize. Because someone shows, the person must, whether he or she wants to or not, exaggerate (aphhairein and synhoran also belong together in the Platonic theory of ideas). In this respect, there is an irrevocable distance of being between the being that "is like" and the one that it wants to be like. I 122 Representation/Presentation/Acting: What the player plays and the spectator recognizes are the characters and the plot itself, as they are designed by the poet. What we have here is a double mimesis: the poet represents and the player represents. But this double mimesisis, one that comes into existence in one and in the other, is the same. To be more precise: the mimic representation of the performance brings to existence what the poetry actually demands. The double distinction between poetry and its subject matter and between poetry and performance corresponds to a double non-differentiation as the unity of truth that can be seen in the play of art. >Truth of Art/Gadamer, >Play/Gadamer, >PResentation/Gadamer. 1. Aristoteles. Poet. 4, insbes. 1448 b 16. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Mimesis | Plato | Gadamer I 120 Mimesis/imitation/Plato/Gadamer: Those who imitate must omit and emphasize. Because he or she shows, the person must, whether he or she wants to or not, exaggerate (aphairein and synhoran also belong together in the Platonic theory of ideas). In this respect, there is an irrevocable distance of being between the being that "is like" and the one it wants to be like. Plato: As is well known, Plato insisted on this ontological distance, on the greater or lesser retention of the image in relation to the archetype, and from then on he relegated imitation and representation to the third place in the game of art as an imitation of imitation(1). In truth, in the representation of art, recognition is at work, which has the character of genuine recognition of essence, and this has been objectively established precisely because Plato understands all recognition of essence (German: "Wesenserkenntnis") as recognition (German: "Wiedererkenntnis"): Aristotle could call poetry more philosophical than history. Cf. >Imitation/Plato, >Recognition/Plato. 1. Plato, Rep. X. (Vgl. Plato und die Dichter« (1934); jetzt Ges. Werke Bd. 5.1 2. Aristot. Poet. 9, 1451 b 6. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reality | Bolz, N. | Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006 S 406ff Reality / truth / Bolz: thesis: on the other side of the true reality, two term series have built that are much more definite than that of truth and reality: a) mimesis; Imitation, imitation, fiction, "factual fictions" for art. b) phenomenon, as-if, necessary illusion, transcendental illusion, (self-) deception, lying, cheating for science and philosophy. |
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