Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 43 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Acquaintance | Hintikka | II 22 Description/recognition/identification/individuation/Hintikka: the difference is often represented as: A) assign a name to a face, B) assign a face to a name, A) answer a what-question & B) answer a where-question. Model Theory/Hintikka: the model-theoretical situation is, however, not completely reproduced with this. Therefore, "acquaintance" and "description" should only be taken with some limitations. >Identification, >Individuation, >Model theory, >Description. II 23 Acquaintance/description/Hintikka: acquaintance corresponds to psychology/psychological: a) semantic memory and b) episodic memory. II 144 Acquaintance/reduction/reducibility/Russell/Hintikka: Russell only regarded the quantum of acquaintance as irreducible. This corresponds to the fact that he only regards logical names "this", etc. as real names. II 149 Acquaintance/description/cross-world identification/cross-world identity/Hintikka: (7) Acquaintance can thus be paraphrased: (7) I know who the man is over there. (11) (Ex) Kl (the man there = x) (12) (∃x) Kl (Sir Norman Brook = x) The unexpected parallelism between the everyday translations for (11) and (12) shows that the uniqueness conditions mutatis mutandis work in the same way for both ways of identification (acquaintance/description). World lines: world lines must not change during the course. Cf. >Four-dimensionalism. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| All | Russell | I 80 "All properties of" is illegitimate! -> Reducibility axiom: only "property 2nd order of ..." - of the whole of predicates, not of Napoleon! - Reducibility-axioms are necessary for identity (GoedelVs). I 81f All properties of a great emperor/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell: Solution: (j): f (! j ^ z) implies j! (Example of Napoleon) - because the reference to a set of predicates is not itself a predicate of Napoleon. I 143f Principia Mathematica, 2nd Edition: "Napoleon had all the properties": New: variable function! 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Beliefs | Schiffer | I 273 Def subdoxastic/Stich: (1978): a subdoxastic state is not a religious state, but an information-bearing state. You are unconscious and inferentially insulated from beliefs. >Unconsious, >Belief state, >Beliefs, >Inference. E.g. if there is a transformational grammar, then the states they would represent would be subdoxastic. Schiffer thesis: language processing is done through a series of internal subdoxastic states. 1. Stephen P. Stich (1978). Beliefs and subdoxastic states. In: Philosophy of Science 45 (December):499-518 --- I 26 Belief/Schiffer: problem: such a psychological theory does not create the meaning of beliefs. - Solution: functionalist reduction. >Psycho functionalism. Ultimately: "Bel = def 1st element of an ordered pair of functions that satisfies T (f,g) "... ((s) from which the theory says that it is belief) ...) - ((s) "Loar-style"). >Meaning theory/Loar. I 28 Schiffer: It is already presupposed that one forms beliefs and desires as functions of propositions on (sets of) internal Z-types. >Functional role/Schiffer. The criterion that a Z-token is n a belief, that p is, that n is a token of a Z-type which has the functional role, that correlates the definition of bel T with p. I 150 Belief property/SchifferVs: if belief properties existed, they would not be irreducible (absurd). - ((s) It is already proven for Schiffer that there is a neural proposition for E.g. stepping back from a car.) This is the cause - then we have a mental proposition in addition. This is then not supported by any counterfactual conditional. Counterfactual conditional/(s): indicates whether something is superfluous - or whether it is then sufficient as an explanation. >Counterfactual conditionals. I 155 Belief properties/Schiffer: presumed they existed (language-independent), then they should be simple (non-assembled), i.e. no function of other things. Vs: E.g. the proposition, to love Thatcher is composed of love and Thatcher - but belief is no such relation (see above). Problem: if belief properties are semantically simple, then there is an infinite number of them. - Then language learning is impossible. >Language acquisition, >Learning. I 163 Belief predicates: less problematic than belief properties: irreducibility out of conceptual role. >Conceptual role. E.g. Ava would not have stepped back if she did not have the belief property that a car is coming. Conceptually and ontologically independent of the singular term "The EC of the belief that a car comes" This is a benign predicate-dualism (in terms of conceptual roles). It has no causal power. Pleonastic: Ava stepped back because she had the belief property... I 164 Belief/(s): Where, Ava believes that a car is coming, she believes this in every possible world that is physically indistinguishable from the actual world. Problem: that cannot be proven - but is probably true. Then ultimately, she stepped back, because she was in the neural state... SchifferVsEliminativism/SchifferVsChurchland: the eliminativism should then have the result that nobody believes anything. >Eliminativism, >Reductionism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Causation | Chalmers | I 86 Irreducibility/Reduction/Reductionism/Consciousness/Causation/Chalmers: apart from consciousness, causation is the only irreducible. This raises questions about their metaphysical nature. >Reduction, >Reducibility, >Irreducibility, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Reductionism, Cf. >Intentionality/Brentano. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Concepts | Jackson | Black I 234 Conceptual analysis/Lewis/Schwarz: While for most authors the conceptual analysis is separated from philosophy, it is connected to it for Lewis and also for Jackson. SchwarzVs: Vs both positions: as, for example, Panprotopychism and the world as it is show, there are indeed metaphysical supervenience relations which are not associated with analytic reducibility. N.B.: this shows that they do not deserve the philosophical status: panprotopsychism is not a real physical position, the supervenience of all truths in the "world as it is" is an irrelevant formal curiosity. >Panprotopsychism, >Conceptual analysis, >Supervenience. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Constructivism | Russell | I XX Constructivist attitude/Constructivism/Russell/Gödel: was abandoned in the first edition, since the reducibility axiom for higher types makes it necessary that basic predicates of an infinitely high type exist - of constructivism only remains: 1) Classes as facon de parler 2) The definition of ~, v, etc. as valid for propositions that contain quantifiers 3) Gradual construction of functions of orders higher than 1 (superfluous of course, because of the reducibility-axiom) 4) Interpretation of definitions as mere typographical shortcuts. GoedelVs: because of reducibility axiom: there always exist real objects in the form of basic predicates corresponding to each defined symbol. >Reducibility axiom, >Classes, >Logical connectives, >Quantifiers, >Proposition. > I XX Constructivist attitude/Constructivism/Principia Mathematica(1)/Gödel: is taken in again in the second edition and the reducibility axiom is dropped. - It is determined that all basic predicates belong to the lowest type. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.(First edition). |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Elimination | Churchland | Schiffer I 159 Eliminativism/Churchland/Schiffer: (Paul Churchland 1981)(1): his eliminativism is quite different from that of Quine: Here the irreducibility of intentional vocabulary is denied. Folk Psychology/Churchland: is a functional theory. Belief is a functional state, with a functional role but future neuroscience will show that no inner states have these roles and therefore the folk psychology is wrong. Schiffer: this is a completely different route to eliminativism than that belief cannot be realized physically because our intentional vocabulary was irreducible. I 164 ... SchifferVsChurchland: his eliminativism would then have the consequence that no one believes anything. 1. Churchland, Paul (1981). "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes". Journal of Philosophy. 78 (2, February): 67–90. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Elimination | Quine | I 319 Elimination of singular descriptions: through no more truth-value gaps, but now all are false: "..y..und exclusively y" instead of "y=(ix)(..x..)" when not applicable to anything. I 323 Elimination of singular term: trough the fusion of "=" with a piece of text. "=" remains together with variables in a predicative position - "=" predicative general term (> Equal sign). II 206 Eliminate: one can eliminate attached variables, relative clauses, then predication - > predicate functor logic. ("padding", "homogenize"). >Predication/Quine. V 156 Definition/eliminability/Quine: Problem: E.g. Definition of substitutional quantification by truth conditions: does not allow elimination - i.e. we have already assumed irreducibility. (Vs). >Substitutional Quantification. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Epiphenomenalism | Chalmers | I 150 Epiphenomenalism/Consciousness/Chalmers: Question: when consciousness only supervenes naturally (but not logically) on the physical, there is apparently no causality involved. Then consciousness would only be a side effect and would not exist at all. (Huxley (1874) (1)) argues thus. >Supervenience, >Consciousness/Chalmers. ChalmersVs: the causal unity of our physical world looks only like epiphenomenalism. I 151 VsEpiphenomenalism/Chalmers: a strategy against it would be to deny the causal unity of the physical world. We should not do that. There are better ways that assume more appropriate assumptions of metaphysics and causation. 1. Regularity-Based Causation/Chalmers: Instead of causality, we could assume regularity with Hume. Then one could argue that the behavior itself would have been the same without phenomenological consciousness. >Regularity, >Consciousness, >Behavior, >Causation. ChalmersVs: there are many systematic regularities between conscious experiences and later physical events, each of which leads us to conclude a causal link. >Causality. I 152 2. Causal overdetermination: one might assume that a physical and a phenomenal state, although completely separated, might cause a later physical state. Problem: causal redundancy. Solution: Tooley (1987) (2): we could assume an irreducible causal connection between two physical and one separate irreducible causal connection between a phenomenal and a physical state. This is a non-reducible view of causation. >Reducibility, >Irreducibility. ChalmersVsTooley: it is not easy to show that there is something wrong with it. I do not pursue this, but it has to be taken seriously. 3. Non-supervenience of the causation: facts about consciousness and those about causation are the only facts which do not logically supervene on certain physical facts. Chalmers: it is quite natural to speculate as to whether these two kinds of non-supervenience have a common root. Rosenberg: (1966) (3) has developed this. Rosenberg Thesis: Experience recognizes causation or some aspects of it. After that, causation needs recognition by someone or something. ChalmersVsRosenberg: this is, of course, very speculative, and leads among other things to panpsychism. >Panpsychism, >Aspects. I 153 In addition, the zombie problem would persist. >Zombies. 4. The intrinsic nature of the physical: thesis: a physical theory characterizes above all the relations of its entities, i.e. its propensities to interact with other elements. >Propensity, >Intrinsic. Problem: what is it that causes all these relations of causation and combinations? Russell (1927) (4): This is what the physical theory is silent about. Solution: to adopt an intrinsic nature of the physical elements. Chalmers: the only class of such intrinsic properties would be the class of phenomenal properties. >Phenomena. I 154 There must be no panpsychism following from this. Instead, we can assume proto-phanomenal properties. >Proto-phanomenal. I 159 VsEpiphenomenalism/Chalmers: Arguments against it fall into three classes: 1. Those which concern the relations of experience to normal behavior, 2. Those which concern the relations of experience to judgments about normal behavior, 3. Those which concern the overall picture of the world, which provokes the acceptance of epiphenomenalism. Ad 1. VsEpiphenomenalism: For example, the intuitions about why I withdraw my hand from a flame are strong, on the other hand, we can clarify these intuitions by assuming regularities. We simply perceive experiences more directly than the corresponding brain states. Ad 2. VsEpiphenomenalism: It seems to be extremely counterintuitive that our experiences could be irrelevant to the explanation of our behavior. >Behavior, >Explanation, >Experience, cf. >Subjectivity. I 160 Ad. 3. VsEpiphenomenalism: the image of the world which is drawn by it is implausible because there should be nomological appendages which are not integrated into the system of other natural laws. Epiphenomenalism/Chalmers: I do not describe my own position as epiphenomenalism. The question of the causal relevance of experience remains unanswered. >Relevance. 1. T. Huxley, On the hypothesis that animals are automata. In: Collected Essays, London 1987, pp. 1893-94. 2. M. Tooley, Causation: A Realist Approach, Oxford 1987 3. G. H. Rosenberg, Consciousness and causation: Clues toward a double-aspect theory, Ms Indiana Universwity, 1996. 4. B. Russell, The Analysis of Matter, London 1927 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Explanation | Goodman | IV 165 Explanation: a basic term is not defined, but explained by means of its different varieties. >Definitions. --- II 67 Reduction sentences/Carnap: if we want to construct a language of science, we must take some descriptive (i.e. not logical) expressions as basic expressions. Other expressions can then be introduced by means of reduction sentences. >Reduction, >Reducibility, >Reductionism. II 68 GoodmanVsCarnap/reduction sentences: [the whole thing is] pretty absurd (...) in my opinion. Philosophy has the task of explaining the science (and the everyday language), but not describing it. The explanation must refer to the pre-systematic use of the terms under consideration, but does not have to adhere to the ordering. It is all about economy and unification. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Holism | Devitt | Fodor I 131 Holism/Devitt: irreducible functional and therefore perhaps holistic concepts are common in nonintentional sciences. Question/Devitt: why should psychologists be concerned when belief turns out to be holistic? Fodor/Lepore: Answer: one can have a functionalism of X without having a definition of X! For example, one can have a metaphysical doctrine about the supervenience base of X. >Reduction, >Irreducibility, >Intentionality, >Psychology, >Beliefs, >Semantic Holism, >Functionalism, >Metaphysics, >Supervenience. |
Devi I M. Devitt Realism and Truth Princeton 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Holism | Fodor | IV 41/42 Holism/science/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: if the network metaphor is correct, then there is nothing transtheoretical. Vs: but this is needed for the public nature of the observation. IV 49 Conceptual holism/Fodor/Lepore: assumptions about the necessary relationships between concepts have no psychological consequences, e.g. cat/animal requires nothing for the actual use or for learning (VsConceptual Holism). >Semantic holism. IV 127f Holism/Fodor/Lepore: a functional analysis of the belief can make it holistic but that does not imply conceptual holism, because belief is not a basic concept, but a representation. Thesis: belief holism is secured, conceptual holism is not! IV 129/130 Holism/Fodor/Lepore: intentionality: does not lead to holism (propositional attitudes are not holistic qua intentionality, their semantic properties depend on things which only God knows). Functionalism: leads to holism. >Intentionality. Fodor/LeporeVs: no, because there is no analytic-synthetic distinction. >Analyticity/syntheticity. IV 179 Inferential role/Fodor/Lepore: originally, the attractiveness of the inferenctial role as a causal role consisted in providing a basis for the solution of Brentano's problem of irreducibility to neurophysiology. (>Computation). IV 180 Fodor/Lepore: either one represents the semantics of the conceptual role or one is a holist. >Conceptual role semantics. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Idealism | Materialism | Adorno XIII 245 Materialism/MaterialismVsIdealism/Adorno: the anti-idealistic element of materialism is to assert the conceptual indissolubles to the outermost solely by the extreme nominalism. >Idealism, >VsIdealism, >Concepts, >Nominalism, >Irreducibility, >Reductionism. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Identity Theory | Churchland | Pauen I 188 Explanation gap/Identity Theory/Consciousness/Ontology/Pauen: The gap was basically already recognized by Leibniz. Then Dubois Reymond, Nagel, Joseph Levine. Explanation gap/Levine/Pauen: between scientific and psychological theories. Chalmers: "Hard Problem of Consiousness": I 189 Forces us to make enormous interventions in previously accepted conceptions and methods. >Consciousness/Chalmers. Identity theory: refers to the ontology. Explanation gap argument: refers epistemically to our knowledge. Context: if we accept identity theory we must expect that our respective knowledge can relate to each other. I 191 Churchland: it would be a fallacy that we wanted to conclude from today's ignorance to the insolubility of the problem. ("Argument of ignorance") VsChurchland: in the case of the explanation gap this must not be plausible. Representatives do not rely on their own ignorance, nor do they lead the failure of previous research. They assume a fundamental difference between entities such as water and heat on the one hand and mental processes on the other. Therefore, our methods must fail. >Irreducibility, >Reduction, >Reductionism, >Materialism. I 192 Causal characteristics play an important role in this difference. In this way the representatives of the explanation gap arguments must be able to characterize our natural phenomena, which are characterized by everyday concepts, by such causal properties. >Causality, >Causal role. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Imagination | Davidson | Glüer II 145 Interesting are those cases which imply token identity, but not reducibility. E.g. I try to fall asleep and count sheep, but the 3rd, 9th, 10th and 11th of 12 animals are not sheep, but goats. (> elms/beeches) Glüer II 171ff But these classifications do not help if I want to formulate interesting laws or hypotheses that go beyond the observed cases. E.g. that the goats have horns. I can pick out every single sheep and goat of my imagination, but because of "conceptual poverty" I cannot generally seperate the sheep from the goats. ... one can neither have the idea of one's own self nor anything else before one has the idea of other subjects and a common world. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Indeterminacy | Rorty | I 231 Indeterminacy of translation: Rorty: irreducibility is always mere irreducibility and never sign of an "ontological difference." There are countless vocabularies in the language. >Vocabulary/Rorty. VI 63 Indeterminacy of translation/translation vagueness/Putnam/Rorty: we should see it as "interest relativity of translation". This is not contrary to >Objectivity, but to >Absoluteness. VI 209 Indeterminacy of translation/Quine: is something quite different from the vagueness of the theory: the differences between various psychological explanations - as opposed to the differences between various biological explanations - are inconsequential in terms of the movement of elementary particles! |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Inferential Role | Fodor | IV 179 Inferential Role/Fodor/Lepore: originally their appeal consisted in providing a causal role as a basis for solving Brentano's problem of irreducibility to the neurophysiological. (> Computation), >Intentionality/Brentano. IV 180 Fodor/Lepore: either you adopt the semantics of the conceptual role or you are a holist. >Conceptual role semantics. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Interpretation | Brentano | Fodor IV 128 Brentano/Quine: Brentano was right with his thesis about the irreducibility of the intentional to physical states or properties. (Davidson provides an a priori argument for this (in Mental Events)). But this cannot be mentioned here ((s) in relation to the question of holism) because it has the holism of the intentional as a premise. Vs: 1. it does not seem that the realism of the intentional is compatible with the Brentano thesis. But if the intentional is not real, it appears to not matter if content is holistic. 2. If the bearers of meaning are, in the first instance, representations, then the theory of interpretation has no interesting relation to the theory of content. For, in fact, representations are never the subject of anybody's interpretation. Interpretation: their actual objects are propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc., not representations. >Representation, >Content. |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Irreducibility | |||
| Irreducibility | Chalmers | I 86 Irreducibility/Reduction/Reductionism/Consciousness/Causation/Chalmers: apart from consciousness, causation is the only irreducible. This raises questions about their metaphysical nature. >Reduction, >Reductionism, >Consciousness, >Causation, >Metaphysics. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Irreducibility | Wolfram | Brockman I 282 Irreducibility/Wolfram: One of the things that might be true about our world is that maybe we go through all this history and biology and civilization, and at the end of the day the answer is “42,” or something. Nothing like that will happen, because of computational irreducibility. There are computational processes that you can go through in which there is no way to shortcut that process. Much of science has been about shortcutting computation done by nature. Brockman I 283 But even with a smart enough machine and smart enough mathematics, we can’t get to the endpoint without going through the steps. Some details are irreducible. We have to irreducibly follow those steps. That’s why history means something. If we could get to the endpoint without going through the steps, history would be, in some sense, pointless. ((s) The results without the calculations would be meaningless signs for us.) Wolfram: So it’s not the case that we’re intelligent and everything else in the world is not. There’s no enormous abstract difference between us and the clouds or us and the cellular automata. We cannot say that this brainlike neural network is qualitatively different from this cellular-automaton system. The difference is a detailed difference. This brainlike neural network was produced by the long history of civilization, whereas the cellular automaton was created by my computer in the last microsecond. >Purposes/Wolfram, >Artificial intelligence/Wolfram, >Understanding/Wolfram. Wolfram, Stephen (2015) „Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Civilization” (edited live interview), in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Knowledge | McGinn | I 52ff How it is/know how to/scope/McGinn: what logical scope have questions like E.g. How is it to be a bat? >"What is it like to be a bat?" "How-be": We are not quantified here about a single thing, but a type. Bat: range of all bats. The "how" of being for the bat is identical with the How-be of the world for the bat. How does it happen that we know anything at all? >Knowing how. I 177 Knowledge/Transcendental Naturalism/TN/McGinn: the transcendental naturalism claims that the gaps are ultimately gaps in our understanding ability. Their origin is of epistemological, not ontological kind. >Terminology/McGinn. I 230 Knowledge/representation/consciousness/McGinn: "be in the know" does neither require consciousness nor *belief, but only an effective representation. >Representation, >Consciousness, >Belief. --- II 35 Bat/Nagel/mind/brain/McGinn: the sonar perception in humans has no counterpart. But this lack of understanding is not a lack of understanding about the bat brain. We might even know everything about the brain of the bat, without knowing how it feels to be a bat. II 49 E.g. assuming, we can easily imagine a universe in which the vast majority of stars emit no light. In this universe there is much less knowledge. We would have no knowledge of any distances. So the world must be so that the mind can include its properties in itself. And there is never a guarantee that the right knowledge mediating relationship really exists. Knowledge is not a matter of course. I 180 Irreducibility/I/McGinn: irreducibility of knowledge: there is only one neurosis of the skeptic. The word "know" has an established use, which meets the conditions of justified assertibility. I simply know that I have two hands. (> Moore's hands). And that is good. (> DIME - domesticated irreducible mystic elimination: see Terminology/McGinn). |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Laws | Brentano | Fodor IV 236 Note 10. Brentano/Fodor: His thesis (the intentional cannot be reduced to neurophysiology) does not imply that there can be no intentional laws. It only tells us that if there are any, they must be irreducible. 11. If they exist, they must surely be ceteris paribus laws. These are special laws in science in general. Cf. >Anomalous monism, >Irreducibility, >Reduction, >Reductionism. |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Meaning (Intending) | Kripke | Nagel I 63 ff Meaning/Kripke/Nagel: problem: there is a gap between the normative and non-normative. Meaning implies the difference between right and wrong answers. Behavior, beliefs, dispositional or experience-based facts imply no such consequences. Therefore, these cannot consist in those. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Speaker reference, >Reference/Kripke, >Semantic facts, >Norm, >Experience. --- McGinn I 117 ff McGinn: irreducibility theory: Kripke: intended sense should be an undefined fundamental part of the world while the semantic expressions in analytical terms are considered to be as fundamental as the basic concepts of geometry. Words and concepts are in a representational relationship to the world but it is impossible that an explanation would indicate what the relationship is and on what it depends on. It is a simple fact that we mean things as we do because we digest and kick them. --- II 210 Meaning/Russell/KripkeVsDonnellan: it is about the fact that something is the only thing that fulfils the designation "the φ-er "ψ-s: ""φ(x) ∧ (y)(φ(y) > y = x)". --- Stegmüller IV 50 Kripke’s Wittgenstein: not a fact: even an "omniscient" being could not know what we mean - there is no fact of meaning -> Non-factualism. Important argument: the skeptical problem is not epistemic, it is ontologic. Vs "best explanation": it would also falsely recognize the problem as epistemic. >Kripke's Wittgenstein, >Rule following, >Private language. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| NP-Completeness | Norvig | Norvig I 8 NP-Completeness/Russell/Norvig: How can one recognize an intractable problem? The theory of NP-completeness, pioneered by Steven Cook (1971)(1) and Richard Karp (1972(2)), provides a method. Cook and Karp showed the existence of large classes of canonical combinatorial search and reasoning problems that are NP-complete. Any problem class to which the class of NP-complete problems can be reduced is likely to be intractable. (Although it has not been proved that NP-complete Norvig I 9 problems are necessarily intractable, most theoreticians believe it.) These results contrast with the optimism with which the popular press greeted the first computers (…). 1. Cook, S. A. (1971). The complexity of theorem proving procedures. In STOC-71, pp. 151–158. 2. Karp, R. M. (1972). Reducibility among combinatorial problems. In Miller, R. E. and Thatcher, J. W. (Eds.), Complexity of Computer Computations, pp. 85–103. Plenum. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| NP-Completeness | Russell | Norvig I 8 NP-Completeness/Russell/Norvig: How can one recognize an intractable problem? The theory of NP-completeness, pioneered by Steven Cook (1971)(1) and Richard Karp (1972(2)), provides a method. Cook and Karp showed the existence of large classes of canonical combinatorial search and reasoning problems that are NP-complete. Any problem class to which the class of NP-complete problems can be reduced is likely to be intractable. (Although it has not been proved that NP-complete Norvig I 9 problems are necessarily intractable, most theoreticians believe it.) These results contrast with the optimism with which the popular press greeted the first computers (…). >Completeness. 1. Cook, S. A. (1971). The complexity of theorem proving procedures. In STOC-71, pp. 151–158. 2. Karp, R. M. (1972). Reducibility among combinatorial problems. In Miller, R. E. and Thatcher, J. W. (Eds.), Complexity of Computer Computations, pp. 85–103. Plenum. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Ontology | Searle | I 33 In epistemological terms, it is laudable to say that the whole of reality is objective, neurobiologically it is simply wrong. >Constructivism. I 40 Ontology/Searle: wrong question: what kinds of things are there in the world? Correct: what must be the case that our empiricism is true? >Empiricism/Searle, >Existence/Searle. I 78f Reducibility is in any case a strange requirement of ontology, because in the past it was considered a classical proof of the non-existence of an entity if one traced it back to something else. >Reduction, >Reductionism. I 118 The ontology of observation, in contrast to its epistemology, is precisely the ontology of subjectivity. I 182 The ontology of unconscious states of mind consists solely in the existence of purely neurophysiological phenomena. I 183 This seems to be a contradiction: the ontology of unconscious intentionality consists entirely of objective, neurophysiological third person phenomena, and yet these states have an aspect shape! This contradiction dissolves when we consider the following: The concept of an unconscious intentional state is the concept of a state that is a possible conscious thought. The ontology of the unconscious consists in objective features of the brain that are capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts. >Object of thought, >Object of belief, >Intensional object. II 68 Representation: there is no ontology tied to representation. >Representation. V 163 Ontology: main question: are there criteria for ontological prerequisites? >Criteria. V 164 Existence/Quine: to accept something as an entity means to consider it as the value of a variable. Existence/SearleVsQuine: this criterion (value of a variable for existence) is confusing and meaningless. Alternative criterion: a theory presupposes and only the entities that it says exist. (This does not have to be done explicitly.) V 165 Ontology/Searle: one notation is as good as another, ontological conclusions should not be derived from it. It is also possible that there is no translation procedure to determine which statement is the simpler or better one. SearleVsQuine: according to Quine's criterion, two statements that actually include the same prerequisites would include different prerequisites! (This argument was put forward by William AlstonVsQuine). >Ontology/Quine. Stalnaker I 181 Ontology/language/metaphysics/Searle: one may not draw ontological conclusions from linguistic theories. >Identification principle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Physicalism | Rorty | Horwich I 447 Physicalism/correspondence/Rorty: physicalism requires a correspondence relation. >Correspondence. Horwich I 452 Physicalism/Rorty: is not reductionist. >Reductionism, >Reduction, >Reducibility, cf. >Identity theory, >Materialism. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Proofs | Chalmers | 93/94 Proof/Argument/Chalmers: to argue against something, one can proceed on three levels: 1. The Unimaginability 2. The lack of recognizability (epistemic) 3. The conceptual analysis. For the irreducibility of conscious experience, I will argue on all three levels. >Experience, >Conceivability, >Knowledge, >Certainty, >Concepts, >Analysis/Chalmers. This will be about an a priori version of the logical necessity with regard to primary intensions. >Intensions. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Reduction | Chalmers | I 43 Reduction/explanation/Chalmers: a reductive explanation of a phenomenon does not imply the reduction of this phenomenon to something else. >Phenomena, >Experience. Explanation: it does not mean identification with something else, especially not with something on a lower level. >Levels/order, >Description Levels. Chalmers I 264 Reduceability: The fact that multiple realizability is possible is regarded by some authors as a counter-argument to a reducibility. But: BrooksVs: (Brooks 1994)(1): explains this as irrelevant. Likewise, Wilson (1985)(2) and Churchland (1986)(3); paradigmatic reducible cases such as e.g. temperature are indeed mutiple possible. Reduction: reduction should not be equated with a reduction towards a higher-level theory. Sometimes there is no such theory. >Theories. I 46 Consciousness/explanation/reduction/Chalmers: we need something like a cognitive model, that is, a model of the abstract causal organization, without having to specify the physicochemical substrates. >Models. This is very good for psychological aspects, but not for the phenomenal side. >Psychology/Chalmers, >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 47 Explanation gap: an explanation gap exists between the psychological and the phenomenal side of consciousness (Levine 1983)(4). I 48 Reductive explanation: reductive explanation is always possible when the explanatory (for example, the natural phenomenon) supervenes globally logically on the explanatory (e.g., the physical). If supervenience is not global, the question always remains: why is this process accompanied by this phenomenon? >Supervenience. I 49 Reduction: reduction does not always eliminate a "mystery" at the resulting level, but perhaps eliminates the assumption that there must be something extra that has precedence. I 50 Consciousness/Chalmers: here logical supervenience fails in the explanation. >Explanation. I 104 Reduction/Consciousness/Chalmers: from the arguments of the inverted spectra, the bat example, the color researcher Mary does not necessarily follow that there is no reductive explanation of the consciousness. (This would be equivalent to the fact that consciousness does not logically supervene on physical facts). >Exchanged spectra, >To be a bat. Analysis/Analyzability/Consciousness/Chalmers: One last argument for the irreducibility is that no analysis of consciousness is available from physical facts. I 105 Problem: Arguments that rely on better distinctions or better information in the future must fail. In turn, they do not have what is important: the conscious experience! Even if conscious states can play certain causal roles, they are not defined by their causal roles. For example, distinguishing ability can also be explained without consciousness. >Thermostat, >Fuel gauge, >Reliability. 1. D. H. M. Brooks, How to perform a reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 1994: pp. 803-14. 2. M . Wilson, What is the ting called "pain"? The philosophical science behind the contemporary debate. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66, 1985: pp.227-67. 3. P. S. Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Scinece of the Mind-Brain. Cambridge 1986. 4. Levine,J. 1983. Materialism and Qualia: The explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64:345-61. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Reduction | Hintikka | II 144 Acquaintance/reduction/reducibility/Russell/Hintikka: Russell only considered the quantifier of acquaintance as irreducible. This corresponds to the fact that he only considers logical names like "this", etc. as real names. >Logical proper names, >Acquaintance, >Demonstratives. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Reduction | Schiffer | I 158 Reduction/Schiffer: ... no more should be required than that theoretical terms are physically realized. >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities. But realization does not imply reducibility. Schiffer pro Brentano: in favour of irreducibility of the intentional vocabulary. >Intentionality, >Intentions. I 159 Eliminativism/Churchland: is quite different: intentional vocabulary is not reducible - but folk psychology (functional theory) will turn out to be wrong. >Folk psychology. SchifferVsChurchland: why should irreducibility imply unrealizability? >Patricia Churchland, >Paul Churchland. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Reduction | Searle | I 133 ff Reduction/Searle: There are different types of reduction: a) property reduction: is nothing but average kinetic energy, b) theoretical reduction: is reduction between theories, e.g. recycling the gas laws to the laws of statistical thermodynamics, c) logical or ontological reduction: concerns laws of numbers on laws of quantities and... I 135 ...d) causal reduction, causal powers of an entity to causal forces of another phenomenon: is the vibration in molecular lattice instead of solid bodies. I 136 Consciousness/Searle: even a perfect science of the brain would not lead to an ontological reduction of the kind that our contemporary science can provide for heat, firmness, color and sound. I 137 SearleVsReductionism: that changes nothing for our scientific world view. >Reductionism. I 139f From the irreducibility of consciousness arises nothing important. >Consciousness/Searle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Reduction | Vollmer | II 170 Reduction/Vollmer: Def Entropy: the number of microstates that could realize the present macrostate. Def Pressure: average pulse to transfer the moving molecules on a wall. >Reducibility, >Reductionism, >Entropy. Reduction: e.g. the terms of the phenomenological thermodynamics are defined by concepts of molecular mechanics and thus reduced to this. VsReductionism: in simple language contradictions can still be formulated - then why reduction? II 228 Reduction/Vollmer: if system S2 is developed from system S1, then would theory T2, logically imply theory T1 - but if T1 or T2 are still faulty, it is unlikely that there is an entailment relation between them. >Implication, >Consequences, >Theories. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Russell’s Paradox | Frege | Thiel I 335 Logic/Frege/Thiel: Frege's concept of logic, on which he wanted to trace back the entire non-geometric mathematics, was a more broadly formulated one than that of today. For Frege, the formation of sets is a logical process, so that the transition from the statement that exactly the same objects fall under two terms A and B to the statement of equality of the conceptual scopes of A and B, is a law of logic for Frege. >Term scope. I 335/336 Today's view: conceptual scopes are nothing more than sets, therefore the law does not belong to logic, but to set theory. In traditional logic, the doctrine of conceptual extents was part of logic. Today it is part of set theory, while the doctrine of "conceptual content" remains in logic. This is quite weird. Russell's Antinomy/5th Basic Law/Frege: blamed the fifth of his "Basic Laws" (i. e. axioms) for inconsistency, according to which two concepts have the same extent if and only if each object falling under one of them also falls under the others. And, more generally, two functions have the same >"value progression" (artificial word coined by him), if and only if they result in exactly the same value for each argument. In his first analysis of the accident, Frege concluded that only the replacement of the arguments in the function terms by names for the equivalent conceptual scopes or value progressions themselves led to the contradiction. He changed his Basic Law V accordingly by demanding the diversity of all arguments that can be used from these special conceptual scopes or value progressions through an antecedent preceding the expression. He did not experience any more that this attempt ("Frege's way out") turned out to be unsuitable. Thiel I 337 Russell and Whitehead felt compelled to bury the logistical program again with their ramified type theory. The existence of an infinite domain of individuals had to be postulated by a separate axiom (since it could not be proven in the system itself), and an equally ad hoc introduced and otherwise unjustifiable "reduction axis" enabled type-independent general statements, e.g. about real numbers. When the second edition of Principia Mathematica appeared, it was obvious that the regression of mathematics to logic had failed. Thus, Russell's antinomy marks the unfortunate end of logicism. >Reducibility axiom, >Type theory. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Semantic Facts | Soames | I 474 Semantic facts/language dependency/Soames: Ex "b" refers (in L) to Boston. Ex "C" refers to cities. Ex "Cb" is true in L gdw. Boston is a city. These statements are speaker dependent. No semantic fact is: Ex "b" = "b" and Boston = Boston. Ex For all objects o, "C" = "C" and o is a city gdw. o is a city. These are speaker-independent. One cannot simply identify the two types. Semantic properties have expressions only by virtue of their use by speakers of the language. Non-semantic (speaker-independent) facts are not physicalistically reducible. >Reduction, >Reducibility. I 475 Language independence/Field: with primitive reference and true, if the logical constants and syntax are held constant, we obtain a language-independent W term. >Logical constants, >Syntax, >Language dependence. ((s) Semantic property/(s): not negation itself, but that the negation of a particular expression is true or applies in a situation). |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Set Theory | Thiel | Thiel I 308 Set Theory: Bourbaki never talks about logicism, only about set theory. Sets are genuinely mathematical objects, not reducible to others (logic: classes). The set concept is an essential tool for the unification of mathematics. >Unification, >Generalization, >Generality. I 308/309 Set Theory: as a fundamental discipline of mathematics: Basic concepts such as relation and function are traced back to the concept of set by explicit definition. Relation as symmetrical or asymmetrical pair formation. Two-digit relation. >Relations. Sometimes we need means to express the order. Ordered pairs. Def I 310. Functions: Def: right unambiguous relations. If one presupposes the traceability of all higher types of numbers to the natural numbers once, one can also win these still set-theoretically. >Reduction, >Reducibility, >Numbers, >Real numbers. I 311 The real question is a philosophical one and concerns the justification of the reductionist program behind everything. Thiel: whether even numbers as mathematical entities turn out to be sets still appears today to be one of the most important philosophical questions, despite all the logical dead ends into which the classical logizistic approach has fallen. >Mathematical entities, >Logic, >Ontology, >Platonism, cf. >Hartry Field. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Space Time | Stalnaker | I 97 Spatiotemporal Relations/Stalnaker: spatiotemporal relations are irreducible. They play a vital role in metaphysical theories because they are the ones with which we individuate possible worlds. >Reduction, >Reductionism, >Irreducibility, >Time, >Space, >Space time. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Synonymy | Rorty | IV 51 Synonymy/Davidson: if we fail to establish a synonymy between micro/macro structure (between sentences of neurophysiological and psychological language), it says nothing about "irreducibility" (cf. >Reducibility). >Microstructure/Rorty. The failure of synonymy is irrelevant to the truth of >Physicalism. Cf. >Identity theory, >Materialism, >Reduction, >Reductionism. I 109 Synonymy/Rorty: eliminates the problem without solving it ((s) "synonym" is not a term, no explanation is simply used ad hoc). >Comparisons, >Comparability. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Teleology | Braithwaite | Wright I 28 Teleology/Balance/Homeostasis/Feedback/Cybernetics/Nagel/Braithwaite/Wright, G. H.: Example: Regulation of the temperature of a system by a thermostat. In this case, the rise or fall of the temperature is considered to be a "defect" or "correction" of a subsystem. The effect factor of the second system gives the effect of the cause factor of the first system an "appearance of teleology". However, both systems work according to causal laws. >Effect, >Cause, >Causality, >Causal relation, >Causal laws, >Systems. Rosenblueth/Wiener/Bigelow: Thesis: purposefulnes can generally be explained with the help of such a chain of causal systems. Wright I 29 Braithwaite(1): Thesis: Teleological explanations, both of intentional target-oriented activities and of target-oriented behaviour in general can be reduced to (forms of) causal explanations. Ernest Nagel(2): E. Nagel is more cautious than Braithwaite: Thesis: Nagel sees teleological explanations in biology as "reducible" to causal explanations. (Wright: this is a careful reproduction of Nagel's view.) >Reduction, >Reducibility, >Reductionism, >Causal explanation. 1. R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation, Cambridge, 1953 Kap X. 2. E. Nagel, The Structure of Science, 1961, Kap XII. |
Braith I R. B. Braithwaite Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1968 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Understanding | Wolfram | Brockman I 282 Understanding/extraterrestrials/Wolfram: If we were to observe a sequence of primes being generated from a pulsar, we’d ask what generated them. Would it mean that a whole civilization grew up and discovered primes and invented computers and radio transmitters and did this? Or is there just some physical process making primes? There’s a little cellular automaton that makes primes. You can see how it works if you take it apart. It has a little thing bouncing inside it, and out comes a sequence of primes. It didn’t need the whole history of civilization and biology and so on to get to that point. >Irreducibility/Wolfram. Wolfram, Stephen (2015) „Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Civilization” (edited live interview), in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Unity | Vollmer | II 173 Unity of science/Vollmer: the differential equations, which are used in a variety of disciplines, do not yet provide the unity - Similarity and Isomorphism provide no identity. >Similarity, >Isomorphism, >Identity. E.g. gravitational, electrostatic forces and magnetic forces obey the same formulas: they are inversely proportional to the square of the distance - but that makes these forces by no means identical. Although it could point to a deep relationship. Compatibility is not sufficient for unity - that the laws must be derived from each other. >Compatibility Real reduction: Optics are reducibla to electrodynamics - because light rays are electromagnetic waves - not because they are isomorphic. >Reduction, >Reductionism, >Reducibility. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Vitalism | Gould | IV 301 Vitalism/Gould: Definition "vitalists": thesis: life will always be beyond scientific exploration. Definition "mechanists": life is nothing but physics and chemistry ("reductionism"). IV 303 Gould: middle course: life as a result of structural and functional complexity cannot be broken down into its chemical components and cannot be explained in its entirety by laws. But neither does this irreducibility imply a mystical component. Function: e.g. the cell membrane controls many processes in the cell. How can we interpret the functions of cells by breaking them down into molecular components? >Evolution, >Explanation, >Darwinism. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analyticity | Fodor Vs Analyticity | IV 185 Analytic/synthetic/gradual analyticity/Block/Fodor/Lepore: some authors have concluded from "Two Dogmas" that a certain "gradual analyticity" is not excluded. IV 185 Fodor/LeporeVs: this then presupposes equality of meaning rather than identity of meaning. But we have already seen that for inferences analyticity and compositionality are the same. Then one must live with gradual compositionality as well. Question: is this also possible together with systematicity (systematics: believing related attitudes), isomorphism (see above), and productivity? Would gradual compositionality not only include a finite acquaintance with (infinite) language? So that you only "kind of" understand new concepts? E.g. if you understand aRb, then you "kind of" understand bRa. E.g. the constituents of the sentence S "kind of" express the constituents of the proposition P?. E.g. "John loves Mary" "kind of" expresses that John loves Mary, but only because "John" refers "approximately" to John? 29 IV 185 Analytic/synthetic/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: you may wonder how we agree with Quine about the a/s distinction (group), but still stick to compositionality including analyticity and that languages are compositional. This is not a paradox: compositionality licenses structurally determined analyticity: IV 245 E.g. "brown cow", "brown" but not "cow" >Animal. Quine: "Logic is chasing truth up the tree of grammar". IV 178 Fodor/Lepore/QuineVsKant/QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsCompositionality of Inference: (external): it must be possible for conclusions to turn out to be wrong. IV 178/179 VsFodor/Lepore: then one might have a reformulated CRT (conceptual role theory): this one has compositional meaning, but the inferential role is not compositional, only within analytical conclusions? Fodor/LeporeVsVs: there is a risk of circularity: if you assume analyticity at all, compositionality, analyticity and meaning spend their lives doing the work of the others. Quine would say: "I told you!". Inferential Role/Fodor/Lepore: the present proposal also threatens their naturalisability ((s) that they are ultimately explained in physiological categories): originally, their attractiveness was to provide a causal role as a basis for the solution of Brentano’s problem of irreducibility to the neurophysiological (>Computation). |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Brentano, Fr. | Putnam Vs Brentano, Fr. | VII 435 "Companions in guilt"-Argument/Justification/Putnam: (Thesis: the question of what is a good explanation or not, what is a good interpretation or not, and what is justified and what is not, are in the same boat). ((s) "Companions in guilt"-Argument/(s): that interpretation, justification and explanation are in the same boat). E.g. Suppose we took the concepts "competence", or "best explanation" or "justification" as undefined basic concepts. Since these are not physicalist concepts, our realism would be no longer of the kind that Harman wants to defend. Why then not say that Brentano's right and there are irreducible semantic properties? >Irreducibility. PutnamVsBrentano: if there is nothing wrong about it, then the question why one is not an ethical non-cognitivist becomes a serious question. Harman/Putnam: would still say, however, that it makes a difference whether one asks if the earth might have emerged only a few thousand years ago, VII 436 or whether one asks something moral, because there are no physical facts that decide about it. PutnamVsHarman: if >moral realism has to break with Harman (and with Mackie), then the whole justification of the distinction facts/values is damaged. Interpretation/Explanation/Putnam: our ideas of interpretation, explanation, etc. come as deeply from human needs as ethical values. Putnam: then a critic of me might say (even if he remains moral realist): "All right, then explanation, interpretation and ethics are in the same boat" ("Companions in Guilt" argument). Putnam: and this is where I wanted him! That was my main concern in "Vernunft Wahrheit und Geschichte". (Putnam Thesis: explanation, interpretation and ethics are often not in the same boat" (companions in guilt" argument, cling together, swing together argument: in case of partial relativism total relativism threatens to ensue. PutnamVsHarman) Relativism/Putnam: There is no rational reason to support ethical relativism and not total relativism at the same time. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Compositionality | Fodor Vs Compositionality | IV 64/65 Truth Conditions/tr.cond./holism/Fodor/Lepore: (Fodor/LeporeVsCompositionality as a solution:) "Snow is white", has the truth condition it has, because it belongs to a language that contains "This is snow" and "This is snow", and an indefinite number of other sentences with "is white" and "snow". Semantic Holism/SH: Now, of course, it would be a good argument for semantic holism if only compositionality were really necessary to exclude sentences such as W. Problem: if it is really only because of the structural similarity between "snow is white" and "This is snow" that the former means that snow is white (and not that grass is green), then it would look like an a priori argument against the possibility of non-compositional language, i.e. the expressions of such a language could not have truth conditions! But: Non-Compositional Language/non-recursive/recursive/Fodor/Lepore: e.g. suppose a child has mastered the entire non-recursive apparatus of German. It can say things like: "It’s raining, snow is white, grass is green, that’s snow, that is frozen, everybody hates me, I hate spinach etc.", but not: "Snow is white and grass is green" or "Everyone hates frozen spinach", etc. We assume that the dispositions of the child towards the sentences that it has mastered are exactly the same as those of a normal adult who uses these sentences. It is very plausible that this child, when it says "snow is white", it actually says that snow is white. So far, the compositionality principle of holism is not in danger if we assume that the child has "snow is white" and "this is snow" in its repertoire (idiolect). IV 66 E.g. suppose a second child who uses the unstructured expression "Alfred" instead of "Snow is white". For "This is snow": "Sam", and for "This is cold": "Mary". 1st child: infers from "this is snow" to "this is cold" 2nd child: infers from "Sam" to "Mary". We assume that the translated verbalizations of child two do not differ from the verbalizations of child 1. Nevertheless, if compositionality were a necessary condition for content, then there would be an a priori argument that child 2 could not mean anything specific with his/her statements. Meaning/Vs: what someone means with their statements depends on their intentions! ((s) and not on the sound clusters.) Which a priori argument could show that the child could not make its statement "Sam" with the intention to express that snow is cold? T-sentence: perhaps the T-sentence: "Alfred" is true iff. snow is white is to be preferred over the T-sentence "Alfred" is true iff. grass is green. Important argument: but this cannot be a consequence of the compositional structure of "Alfred", because it has none. It can also be doubted that compositionality is sufficient for the solution of the extensionality problem: IV 178 QuineVsKant/QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsCompositionality of Inference: (external): it must be possible for inferences to turn out to be wrong. IV 178/179 VsFodor/Lepore: then one might do with a reformulated CRT (conceptual role theory): the compositional meaning, but not the inferential role is compositional, only within analytical conclusions? Fodor/LeporeVsVs: there is a risk of circularity: if you assume analyticity at all, compositionality, analyticity and meaning spend their lives doing the work of the others. Quine would say: "I told you!" Inferential Role/Fodor/Lepore: the present proposal also threatens their naturalisability ((s) that they are ultimately explained in physiological categories): originally, their attractiveness was to provide a causal role as a basis for the solution of Brentano’s problem of irreducibility to the neurophysiological (>Computation). |
Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor IV Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992 |
| Conceptualism | Quine Vs Conceptualism | VII (f) 126 Classes/Conceptualism/Quine: does not require classes to exist beyond expressible conditions of membership of elements. ((s) VsPlatonism: Quasi requires that there should also be classes without such conditions, as classes should be independent of speakers.) Cantor's proof: would lead to something else: He namely appeals to a class h of those members of the class k that are not elements of the subclasses of k to which they refer. VII (f) 127 But thus the class h is specified impredicatively! h is in fact itself part of the subclass of k. Thus a theorem of classical mathematics goes overboard in conceptualism. The same fate also applies to Cantor's proof of the existence of hyper-countable infinities. QuineVsConceptualism: which is indeed a welcome relief, but there are problems with much more fundamental and desirable theorems of mathematics: Ex proof that every limited sequence of numbers has an upper limit. ConceptualismVsReducibility Axiom: because it reintroduces the entire Platonist class logic. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Constructivism | Russell Vs Constructivism | Quine IX 184 VsConstructivism/Construction/QuineVsRussell: we have seen how Russell's constructivist access to the real numbers failed (least upper bound (Kos), see above). He gave up the constructivism and took refuge in the reducibility axiom (RA). --- IX 184/185 The way he gave it up, had something perverse in it: Reducibility axiom/QuineVsRussell: the reducibility axiom implies that all the distinctions that gave rise to its creation, are superfluous. When Russell's system is consistent with reducibility axioms, then no contradictions will arise if we ignore all orders except the predicative. We can determine that the order of each attribute is always the next highest in comparison to the order of things that have this attribute, according to intensional relations. If somehow an attribute of the order n + k is referred to, which is an attribute of objects of the order n, so we need this name only as such, which is based on a systematic reinterpretation that refers to an attribute of the order n + 1 with the same extension. According to intensional relations. Reducibility Axiom: tells us that an equal-extensional attribute or equal-extensional intensional relation of the desired order, and namely in predicative execution, always exists. Is the axiom planned from the outset, so you should avoid its necessity in that we speak in the beginning only of types of attributes instead of orders of any distinctive sense. Orders are only excusable if one wants to maintain a weak constructive theory without reducibility axiom. ((s)Axiom/Quine/(s): should not be taken as necessary) |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Descartes, R. | Davidson Vs Descartes, R. | Frank I 629 Mental/Physical/DavidsonVsDescartes: from the nomological irreducibility follows no ontological separation of two areas. I 632 Token physicalism/Davidson: (pro) receives the authority of the first person, but he cannot guarantee that the content of thought as it is identified externalistically is conscious. Solution/DavidsonVsDescartes: this residual doubt is merely rest of the untenable Cartesian theory of consciousness as a place where the mind sees special objects. I 633 If the identity of consciousness objects were determined only through relations with objects outside of the consciousness, then it would be possible that one is not aware of the contents of consciousness. But that’s just the "myth of the subjective". I 634 DavidsonVsDescartes: Error: not considering the conditions that allow the substantial thoughts. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), 101-111 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Principia Mathematica | Gödel Vs Principia Mathematica | Russell I XIV Circular Error Principle/VsPrincipia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Gödel: thus seems to apply only to constructivist assumptions: when a term is understood as a symbol, together with a rule to translate sentences containing the symbol into sentences not containing it. Classes/concepts/Gödel: can also be understood as real objects, namely as "multiplicities of things" and concepts as properties or relations of things that exist independently of our definitions and constructions! This is just as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies. They are also necessary for mathematics, as they are for physics. Concept/Terminology/Gödel: I will use "concept" from now on exclusively in this objective sense. A formal difference between these two conceptions of concepts would be: that of two different definitions of the form α(x) = φ(x) it can be assumed that they define two different concepts α in the constructivist sense. (Nominalistic: since two such definitions give different translations for propositions containing α.) For concepts (terms) this is by no means the case, because the same thing can be described in different ways. For example, "Two is the term under which all pairs fall and nothing else. There is certainly more than one term in the constructivist sense that satisfies this condition, but there could be a common "form" or "nature" of all pairs. All/Carnap: the proposal to understand "all" as a necessity would not help if "provability" were introduced in a constructivist manner (..+...). Def Intensionality Axiom/Russell/Gödel: different terms belong to different definitions. This axiom holds for terms in the circular error principle: constructivist sense. Concepts/Russell/Gödel: (unequal terms!) should exist objectively. (So not constructed). (Realistic point of view). When only talking about concepts, the question gets a completely different meaning: then there seems to be no objection to talking about all of them, nor to describing some of them with reference to all of them. Properties/GödelVsRussell: one could surely speak of the totality of all properties (or all of a certain type) without this leading to an "absurdity"! ((s) > Example "All properties of a great commander". Gödel: this simply makes it impossible to construe their meaning (i.e. as an assertion about sense perception or any other non-conceptual entities), which is not an objection to someone taking the realistic point of view. Part/whole/Mereology/GödelVsRussell: neither is it contradictory that a part should be identical (not just the same) with the whole, as can be seen in the case of structures in the abstract sense. Example: the structure of the series of integers contains itself as a special part. I XVI/XVII Even within the realm of constructivist logic there are certain approximations to this self-reflectivity (self-reflexivity/today: self-similarity) of impredicative qualities, namely e.g. propositions, which as parts of their meaning do not contain themselves, but their own formal provability. There are also sentences that refer to a totality of sentences to which they themselves belong: Example: "Each sentence of a (given) language contains at least one relational word". This makes it necessary to look for other solutions to the paradoxes, according to which the fallacy does not consist in the assumption of certain self-reflectivities of the basic terms, but in other assumptions about them! The solution may have been found for the time being in simple type theory. Of course, all this refers only to concepts. Classes: one should think that they are also not created by their definitions, but only described! Then the circular error principle does not apply again. Zermelo splits classes into "levels", so that only sets of lower levels can be elements of sets of higher levels. Reducibility Axiom/Russell/Gödel: (later dropped) is now taken by the class axiom (Zermelo's "axiom of choice"): that for each level, for any propositional function φ(x) the set of those x of this level exists for which φ(x) is true. This seems to be implied by the concept of classes as multiplicities. I XVIII Extensionality/Classes: Russell: two reasons against the extensional view of classes: 1. the existence of the zero class, which cannot be well a collection, 2. the single classes, which should be identical with their only elements. GödelVsRussell: this could only prove that the zero classes and the single classes (as distinguished from their only element) are fictions to simplify the calculation, and do not prove that all classes are fictions! Russell: tries to get by as far as possible without assuming the objective existence of classes. According to this, classes are only a facon de parler. Gödel: but also "idealistic" propositions that contain universals could lead to the same paradoxes. Russell: creates rules of translation according to which sentences containing class names or the term "class" are translated into sentences not containing them. Class Name/Russell: eliminate by translation rules. Classes/Principia Mathematica/Russell/Gödel: the Principia Mathematica can do without classes, but only if you assume the existence of a concept whenever you want to construct a class. First, some of them, the basic predicates and relations like "red", "colder" must be apparently considered real objects. The higher terms then appear as something constructed (i.e. something that does not belong to the "inventory of the world"). I XIX Ramsey: said that one can form propositions of infinite length and considers the difference finite/infinite as not so decisive. Gödel: Like physics, logic and mathematics are based on real content and cannot be "explained away". Existence/Ontology/Gödel: it does not behave as if the universe of things is divided into orders and one is forbidden to speak of all orders, but on the contrary: it is possible to speak of all existing things. But classes and concepts are not among them. But when they are introduced as a facon de parler, it turns out that the extension of symbolism opens the possibility of introducing them in a more comprehensive way, and so on, to infinity. To maintain this scheme, however, one must presuppose arithmetics (or something equivalent), which only proves that not even this limited logic can be built on nothing. I XX Constructivist posture/constructivism/Russell/Gödel: was abandoned in the first edition, since the reducibility axiom for higher types makes it necessary that basic predicates of arbitrarily high type exist. From constructivism remains only 1. Classes as facon de parler 2. The definition of ~, v, etc. as valid for propositions containing quantifiers, 3. The stepwise construction of functions of orders higher than 1 (of course superfluous because of the R-Axiom) 4. the interpretation of definitions as mere typographical abbreviations (all incomplete symbols, not those that name an object described by the definition!). Reducibility Axiom/GödelVsRussell: this last point is an illusion, because of the reducibility axiom there are always real objects in the form of basic predicates or combinations of such according to each defined symbol. Constructivist posture/constructivism/Principia Mathematica/Gödel: is taken again in the second edition and the reducibility axiom is dropped. It is determined that all basic predicates belong to the lowest type. Variables/Russell/Gödel: their purpose is to enable the assertions of more complicated truth functions of atomistic propositions. (i.e. that the higher types are only a facon de parler.). The basis of the theory should therefore consist of truth functions of atomistic propositions. This is not a problem if the number of individuals and basic predicates is finite. Ramsey: Problem of the inability to form infinite propositions is a "mere secondary matter". I XXI Finite/infinite/Gödel: with this circumvention of the problem by disregarding the difference between finite and infinite a simpler and at the same time more far-reaching interpretation of set theory exists: Then Russell's Apercu that propositions about classes can be interpreted as propositions about their elements becomes literally true, provided n is the number of (finite) individuals in the world and provided we neglect the zero class. (..) + I XXI Theory of integers: the second edition claims that it can be achieved. Problem: that in the definition "those cardinals belonging to each class that contains 0 and contains x + 1 if it contains x" the phrase "each class" must refer to a given order. I XXII Thus whole numbers of different orders are obtained, and complete induction can be applied to whole numbers of order n only for properties of n! (...) The question of the theory of integers based on ramified type theory is still unsolved. I XXIII Theory of Order/Gödel: is more fruitful if it is considered from a mathematical point of view, not a philosophical one, i.e. independent of the question of whether impredicative definitions are permissible. (...) impredicative totalities are assumed by a function of order α and ω . Set/Class/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell/Type Theory/Gödel: the existence of a well-ordered set of the order type ω is sufficient for the theory of real numbers. Def Continuum Hypothesis/Gödel: (generalized): no cardinal number exists between the power of any arbitrary set and the power of the set of its subsets. Type Theory/VsType Theory/GödelVsRussell: mixed types (individuals together with predications about individuals etc.) obviously do not contradict the circular error principle at all! I XXIV Russell based his theory on quite different reasons, similar to those Frege had already adopted for the theory of simpler types for functions. Propositional functions/statement function/Russell/Gödel: always have something ambiguous because of the variables. (Frege: something unsaturated). Propositional function/p.f./Russell/Gödel: is so to speak a fragment of a proposition. It is only possible to combine them if they "fit together" i.e. are of a suitable type. GödelVsRussell: Concepts (terms) as real objects: then the theory of simple types is not plausible, because what one would expect (like "transitivity" or the number two) to be a concept would then seem to be something that stands behind all its different "realizations" on the different levels and therefore does not exist according to type theory. I XXV Paradoxes in the intensional form/Gödel: here type theory brings a new idea: namely to blame the paradoxes not on the axiom that every propositional function defines a concept or a class, but on the assumption that every concept results in a meaningful proposition if it is claimed for any object as an argument. The objection that any concept can be extended to all arguments by defining another one that gives a false proposition whenever the original one was meaningless can easily be invalidated by pointing out that the concept "meaningfully applicable" does not always have to be meaningfully applicable itself. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 |
| Principia Mathematica | Wittgenstein Vs Principia Mathematica | II 338 Identity/Relation/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell's notation triggers confusion, because it gives the impression that the identity is a relationship between two things. This use of the equal sign, we have to differentiate from its use in arithmetics, where we may think of it as part of a replacement rule. WittgensteinVsRussell: its spelling gives erroneously the impression that there is a sentence like x = y or x = x. But one can abolish the signs of identity. II 352 Definition number/Russell/Wittgenstein: Russell's definition of number as a property of a class is not unnecessary, because it states a method on how to find out if a set of objects had the same number as the paradigm. Now Russell has said, however, that they are associated with the paradigm, not that they can be assigned. II 353 The finding that two classes are associated with one another, means, that it makes sense to say so. WittgensteinVsRussell: But how do you know that they are associated with one another? One cannot know and hence, one cannot know, if they are assigned to the same number, unless you carry out the assignment, that is, to write it down. II 402 Acquaintance/description/WittgensteinVsRussell: misleading claim that, although we have no direct acquaintance with an infinite series, but knowledge by description. II 415 Number/definition/WittgensteinVsRussell: the definition of the number as the predicate of a predicate: there are all sorts of predicates, and two is not an attribute of a physical complex, but a predicate. What Russell says about the number, is inadequate because no criteria of identity are named in Principia and because the spelling of generality is confusing. The "x" in "(Ex)fx" stands for a thing, a substrate. Number/Russell/Wittgenstein: has claimed, 3 is the property that is common to all triads. WittgensteinVsRussell: what is meant by the claim that the number is a property of a class? II 416 It makes no sense to say that ABC was three; this is a tautology and says nothing when the class is given extensionally. By contrast, it makes sense to claim that in this room there are three people. Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: the number is an attribute of a function which defines a class, not a property of the extension. WittgensteinVsRussell: he wanted to get ,next to the list, another "entity", so he provided a function that uses the identity to define this entity. II 418 Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: a difficulty in Russell's definition is the concept of the clear correspondence. Equal sign/Russell/Wittgenstein: in Principia Mathematica(1), there are two meanings of identity. 1. by definition as 1 + 1 = 2 Df. ("Primary equations") 2. the formula "a = a" uses the "=" in a special way, because one would not say that a can be replaced by a. The use of "=" is limited to cases in which a bound variable occurs. WittgensteinVsRussell: instead of (Ex):fx . (y).fy > (x=y), one writes (Ex)fx: ~ (Ex,y).fx.fy, (sic) which states that there are no two things, but only one. --- IV 47/48 So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as primitive concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: one cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as primitive concepts, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers. IV 73 WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.452 in Principia Mathematica(1) definitions and basic laws occur in words. Why suddenly words here? There is no justification, and it is also forbidden. Logic/Tractatus: 5.453 All numbers in logic must be capable of justification. Or rather, it must prove that there are no numbers in logic. 5.454 In logic there is no side by side and there can be no classification. There can be nothing more universal and more special here. 5.4541 The solutions of logical problems must be simple, because they set the standard of simplicity. People have always guessed that there must be a field of questions whose answers are - a priori - symmetrical, and IV 74 lie combined in a closed, regular structure. In an area in which the following applies: simplex sigillum veri. ((s) Simplicity is the mark (seal) of the truth). Primitive signs/Tractatus: 5:46 the real primitive signs are not "pvq" or "(Ex).fx", etc. but the most general form of their combinations. IV 84 Axiom of infinity/Russell/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 5.534 would be expressed in the language by the fact that there are infinitely many names with different meanings. Apparant sentences/Tractatus: 5.5351 There are certain cases where there is a temptation to use expressions of the form "a = a" or "p > p": this happens when one wants to talk of archetype, sentence, or thing. WittgensteinVsRussell: (Principia Mathematica, PM) nonsense "p is a sentence" is to be reproduced in symbols by "p > p" and to put as a hypothesis before certain sentences, so that their places for arguments could only be occupied by sentences. That alone is enough nonsense, because it does not get wrong for a non-sentence as an argument, but nonsensical. 5.5352 identity/WittgensteinVsRussell: likewise, one wanted to express "there are no things" by "~ (Ex).x = x" But even if this was a sentence, it would not be true if there IV 85 would be things but these were not identical with themselves? IV 85/86 Judgment/sense/Tractatus: 5.5422 the correct explanation of the sentence "A judges p" must show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense. (WittgensteinVsRussell: his theory does not exclude this). IV 87 Relations/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.553 he said there were simple relations between different numbers of particulars (ED, individuals). But between what numbers? How should this be decided? Through the experience? There is no marked number. IV 98 Type theory/principle of contradiction/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 6.123 there is not for every "type" a special law of contradiction, but one is enough, since it is applied to itself. IV 99 Reducibility axiom/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: (61232) no logical sentence, if true, then only accidentally true. 6.1233 One can think of a possible world in which it does not apply. But the logic has nothing to do with that. (It is a condition of the world). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Russell Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Prior I 39 Ramified type theory/rTT/Prior: first edition Principia Mathematica(1): here it does not say yet that quantification on non-nouns (non nominal) is illegitimate, or that they are only apparently not nominal. (Not on names?) But only that you have to treat them carefully. I 40 The ramified type theory was incorporated in the first edition. (The "simple type theory" is, on the other hand, little more than a certain sensitivity to the syntax.) Predicate: makes a sentence out of a noun. E.g. "φ" is a verb that forms the phrase "φx". But it will not form a sentence when a verb is added to another verb. "φφ". Branch: comes into play when expressions form a sentence from a single name. Here we must distinguish whether quantified expressions of the same kind occur. E.g. "__ has all the characteristics of a great commander." logical form: "For all φ if (for all x, if x is a great commander, then φx) then φ__". ΠφΠxCψxφx" (C: conditional, ψ: commander, Π: for all applies). Easier example: "__ has the one or the other property" logical form: "For a φ, φ __" "Σφφ". (Σ: there is a) Order/Type: here one can say, although the predicate is of the same type, it is of a different order. Because this "φ" has an internal quantification of "φ's". Ramified type theory: not only different types, but also various "orders" should be represented by different symbols. That is, if we, for example, have introduced "F" for a predicative function on individuals" (i.e. as a one-digit predicate), we must not insert non-predicative functions for "f" in theorems. E.g. "If there are no facts about a particular individual ..." "If for all φ, not φx, then there is not this fact about x: that there are no facts about x that is, if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it cannot be true. I.e. if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it is wrong, that there is this fact. Symbolically: 1. CΠφNφxNψx. I 41 "If for all φ not φ, then not ψx" (whereby "ψ" can stand for any predicate). Therefore, by inserting "∏φφ" for "ψ": 2. CΠφNφxNΠφNφx Therefore, by inserting and reductio ad absurdum: CCpNpNp (what implies its own falsehood, is wrong) 3. CΠφNφx. The step of 1 to 2 is an impermissible substitution according to the ramified type theory. Sentence/ramified type theory/Prior: the same restriction must be made for phrases (i.e. "zero-digit predicates", propositions). Thus, the well-known old argument is prevented: E.g. if everything is wrong, then one of the wrong things would be this: that everything is wrong. Therefore, it may not be the case that everything is wrong. logical form: 1. CΠpNpNq by inserting: 2. CΠpNpNPpNp and so by CCpNpNp (reductio ad absurdum?) 3. NΠpNp, Ramified type theory: that is now blocked by the consideration that "ΠpNp" is no proposition of the "same order" as the "p" which exists in itself. And thus not of the same order as the "q" which follows from it by instantiation, so it cannot be used for "q" to go from 1 to 2. RussellVsQuine/Prior: here propositions and predicates of "higher order" are not entirely excluded, as with Quine. They are merely treated as of another "order". VsBranched type theory: there were problems with some basic mathematical forms that could not be formed anymore, and thus Russell and Whitehead introduce the reducibility axiom. By contrast, a simplified type theory was proposed in the 20s again. Type Theory/Ramsey: was one of the early advocates of a simplification. Wittgenstein/Tractatus/Ramsey: Thesis: universal quantification and existential quantification are both long conjunctions or disjunctions of individual sentences (singular statements). E.g. "For some p, p": Either grass is green or the sky is pink, or 2 + 2 = 4, etc.". (> Wessel: CNF, ANF, conjunctive and adjunctive normal form) Propositions/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: no matter of what "order" are always truth functions of indiviual sentences. Ramified Type TheoryVsRamsey/VsWittgenstein: such conjunctions and disjunctions would not only be infinitely long, but the ones of higher order would also need to contain themselves. E.g. "For some p.p" it must be written as a disjunction of which "for some p, p" is a part itself, which in turn would have to contain a part, ... etc. RamseyVsVs: the different levels that occur here, are only differences of character: not only between "for some p,p" and "for some φ, φ" but also between "p and p" and "p, or p", and even the simple "p" are only different characters. Therefore, the expressed proposition must not contain itself. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Reducibility Axiom | Berka Vs Reducibility Axiom | Berka I 373 Def Reduzibilitätsaxiom/Russell/Berka: besagt, daß es zu jeder Aussagenfunktion (AF) höherer Ordnung eine entsprechende AF erster Ordnung (d.h. eine prädikative AF) gibt, die mit ihr formal äquivalent ist. (> RA wird durch Forderung nach Prädikativität bedingt). VsReduzibilitätsaxiom: "Einfache Typentheorie" ( Chwistek, (1921) Ramsey (1926) |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Reductionism | Poundstone Vs Reductionism | I 393 Brain/Reductionism/PoundstoneVsReductionism: irreducibility of the brain: of nothing that is easier than you yourself can you expect that it behaves just like you. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Redundancy Theory | McGinn Vs Redundancy Theory | I 89 VsReductionism/McGinn: The concept of a person were not reducible. VsIrreducibility: not informative! VSVS: that's just the joke about the theory of irreducibility. The world is not obliged to appear interestingly. I 119 From not being able to make out a fact does not follow that that fact doesn't exist. Vagueness: it is not as if the meaning meant were objectively undetermined, but that whatever determines it is not part of our knowledge. Vagueness/blurriness/(S): Ex When one takes away the object that one sees blurred, it is not as if the blurriness remains. To mean sth./McGinn: Problem: different levels of description. The levels are clearly in systematic relations with each other, but we are unable to explain this relationship sufficiently. (Similar to consciousness). |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Russell, B. | Quine Vs Russell, B. | Chisholm II 75 Predicates/Denote/Russell: denoting expressions: proper names stand for individual things and general expressions for universals. (Probleme d. Phil. p. 82f). In every sentence, at least one word refers to a universal. QuineVsRussell: confusion! II 108 Theory of Descriptions/VsRussell/Brandl: thus the whole theory is suspected of neglecting the fact that material objects can never be part of propositions. QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use. Quine II 97 Pricipia mathematica, 1903: Here, Russell's ontology is rampant: every word refers to something. If a word is a proper name, then its object is a thing, otherwise it is a concept. He limits the term "existence" to things, but has a liberal conception of things which even includes times and points in empty space! Then there are, beyond the existent things, other entities: "numbers, the gods of Homer, relationships, fantasies, and four-dimensional space". The word "concept", used by Russell in this manner, has the connotation of "merely a concept". Caution: Gods and fantasies are as real as numbers for Russell! QuineVsRussell: this is an intolerably indiscriminate ontology. Example: Take impossible numbers, e.g. prime numbers that are divisible by 6. It must be wrong in a certain sense that they exist, and that is in a sense in which it is right that there are prime numbers! Do fantasies exist in this sense? II 101 Russell has a preference for the term "propositional function" against "class concept". In P.M. both expressions appear. Here: Def "Propositional Function": especially based on forms of notation, e.g. open sentences, while concepts are decidedly independent of notation. However, according to Meinong Russell's confidence is in concepts was diminished, and he prefers the more nominalistic sound of the expression "propositional function" which is now carries twice the load (later than Principia Mathematica.) Use/Mention/Quine: if we now tried to deal with the difference between use and mention as carelessly as Russell has managed to do sixty years ago, we can see how he might have felt that his theory of propositional functions was notation based, while a theory of types of real classes would be ontological. Quine: we who pay attention to use and mention can specify when Russell's so-called propositional functions as terms (more specific than properties and relations) must be construed as concepts, and when they may be construed as a mere open sentences or predicates: a) when he quantifies about them, he (unknowingly) reifies them as concepts. For this reason, nothing more be presumed for his elimination of classes than I have stated above: a derivation of the classes from properties or concepts by means of a context definition that is formulated such that it provides the missing extensionality. QuineVsRussell: thinks wrongly that his theory has eliminated classes more thoroughly from the world than in terms of a reduction to properties. II 102 RussellVsFrege: "~ the entire distinction between meaning and designating is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where are we to find the designating complex which supposedly designates C?" QuineVsRussell: Russell's position sometimes seems to stem from a confusion of the expression with its meaning, sometimes from the confusion of the expression with its mention. II 103/104 In other papers Russel used meaning usually in the sense of "referencing" (would correspond to Frege): "Napoleon" particular individual, "human" whole class of such individual things that have proper names. Russell rarely seems to look for an existing entity under any heading that would be such that we could call it the meaning that goes beyond the existing referent. Russell tends to let this entity melt into the expression itself, a tendency he has in general when it comes to existing entities. QuineVsRussell: for my taste, Russell is too wasteful with existing entities. Precisely because he does not differentiate enough, he lets insignificance and missed reference commingle. Theory of Descriptions: He cannot get rid of the "King of France" without first inventing the description theory: being meaningful would mean: have a meaning and the meaning is the reference. I.e. "King of France" without meaning, and "The King of France is bald" only had a meaning, because it is the short form of a sentence that does not contain the expression "King of France". Quine: actually unnecessary, but enlightening. Russell tends commingle existing entities and expressions. Also on the occasion of his remarks on Propositions: (P.M.): propositions are always expressions, but then he speaks in a manner that does not match this attitude of the "unity of the propositions" (p.50) and of the impossibility of infinite propositions (p.145) II 105 Russell: The proposition is nothing more than a symbol, even later, instead: Apparently, propositions are nothing..." the assumption that there are a huge number of false propositions running around in the real, natural world is outrageous." Quine: this revocation is astounding. What is now being offered to us instead of existence is nothingness. Basically Russell has ceased to speak of existence. What had once been regarded as existing is now accommodated in one of three ways a) equated with the expression, b) utterly rejected c) elevated to the status of proper existence. II 107 Russell/later: "All there is in the world I call a fact." QuineVsRussell: Russell's preference for an ontology of facts depends on his confusion of meaning with reference. Otherwise he would probably have finished the facts off quickly. What the reader of "Philosophy of logical atomism" notices would have deterred Russell himself, namely how much the analysis of facts is based on the analysis of language. Russell does not recognize the facts as fundamental in any case. Atomic facts are as atomic as facts can be. Atomic Facts/Quine: but they are composite objects! Russell's atoms are not atomic facts, but sense data! II 183 ff Russell: Pure mathematics is the class of all sentences of the form "p implies q" where p and q are sentences with one or more variables, and in both sets the same. "We never know what is being discussed, nor if what we say is true." II 184 This misinterpretation of mathematics was a response to non-Euclidean geometry. Numbers: how about elementary arithmetic? Pure numbers, etc. should be regarded as uninterpreted. Then the application to apples is an accumulation. Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I find this attitude completely wrong. The words "five" and "twelve" are nowhere uninterpreted, they are as much essential components of our interpreted language as apples. >Numbers. They denote two intangible objects, numbers that are the sizes of quantities of apples and the like. The "plus" in addition is also interpreted from start to finish, but it has nothing to do with the accumulation of things. Five plus twelve is: how many apples there are in two separate piles. However, without pouring them together. The numbers "five" and "twelve" differ from apples in that they do not denote a body, that has nothing to do with misinterpretation. The same could be said of "nation" or "species". The ordinary interpreted scientific speech is determined to abstract objects as it is determined to apples and bodies. All these things appear in our world system as values of variables. II 185 It even has nothing to do with purity (e.g. of the set theory). Purity is something other than uninterpretedness. XII 60 Expression/Numbers/Knowledge/Explication/Explanation/Quine: our knowledge of expressions is alone in their laws of interlinking. Therefore, every structure that fulfills these laws can be an explication. XII 61 Knowledge of numbers: consists alone in the laws of arithmetic. Then any lawful construction is an explication of the numbers. RussellVs: (early): Thesis: arithmetic laws are not sufficient for understanding numbers. We also need to know applications (use) or their embedding in the talk about other things. Number/Russell: is the key concept here: "there are n such and suches". Number/Definition/QuineVsRussell: we can define "there are n such and suches" without ever deciding what numbers are beyond their fulfillment of arithmetic addition. Application/Use/QuineVsRussell: wherever there is structure, the applications set in. E.g. expressions and Gödel numbers: even the mention of an inscription was no definitive proof that we are talking about expressions and not about Gödel numbers. We can always say that our ostension was shifted. VII (e) 80 Principia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Whitehead/Quine: shows that the whole of mathematics can be translated into logic. Only three concepts need to be clarified: Mathematics, translation and logic. VII (e) 81 QuineVsRussell: the concept of the propositional function is unclear and obscures the entire PM. VII (e) 93 QuineVsRussell: PM must be complemented by the axiom of infinity if certain mathematical principles are to be derived. VII (e) 93/94 Axiom of infinity: ensures the existence of a class with infinitely many elements. Quine: New Foundations instead makes do with the universal class: θ or x^ (x = x). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. VII (f) 122 Propositional Functions/QuineVsRussell: ambiguous: a) open sentences b) properties. Russell no classes theory uses propositional functions as properties as value-bound variables. IX 15 QuineVsRussell: inexact terminology. "Propositional function", he used this expression both when referring to attributes (real properties) and when referring to statements or predicates. In truth, he only reduced the theory of classes to an unreduced theory of attributes. IX 93 Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I differ in one point: for me, rational numbers are themselves real numbers, not so for Russell and Whitehead. Russell: rational numbers are pairwise disjoint for them like those of Peano. (See Chapter 17), while their real numbers are nested. ((s) pairwise disjoint, contrast: nested) Natural Numbers/Quine: for me as for most authors: no rational integers. Rational Numbers/Russell: accordingly, no rational real numbers. They are only "imitated" by the rational real numbers. Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: for me, however, the rational numbers are real numbers. This is because I have constructed the real numbers according to Russell's version b) without using the name and the designation of rational numbers. Therefore, I was able to retain name and designation for the rational real numbers IX 181 Type Theory/TT/QuineVsRussell: in the present form our theory is too weak to prove some sentences of classical mathematics. E.g. proof that every limited class of real numbers has a least upper boundary (LUB). IX 182 Suppose the real numbers were developed in Russell's theory similar to Section VI, however, attributes were now to take the place of classes and the alocation to attributes replaces the element relation to classes. LUB: (Capters 18, 19) of a limited class of real numbers: the class Uz or {x:Ey(x ε y ε z)}. Attribute: in parallel, we might thus expect that the LUB of a limited attribute φ of real numbers in Russell's system is equal to the Attribute Eψ(φψ u ψ^x). Problem: under Russell's order doctrine is this LUB ψ is of a higher order than that of the real numbers ψ which fall under the attribute φ whose LUB is sought. Boundary/LUB/QuineVsRussell: You need LUB for the entire classic technique of calculus, which is based on continuity. However, LUB have no value for these purposes if they are not available as values of the same variables whose value range already includes those numbers whose upper boundary is wanted. An upper boundary (i.e. LUB) of higher order cannot be the value of such variables, and thus misses its purpose. Solution/Russell: Axiom of Reducibility: Def Axiom of Reducibility/RA/Russell/Quine: every propositional function has the same extension as a certain predicative one. I.e. Ey∀x(ψ!x φx), Eψ∀x∀y[ψ!(x,y) φ(x,y)], etc. IX 184 VsConstruktivism/Construction/QuineVsRussell: we have seen Russell's constructivist approach to the real numbers fail (LUB, see above). He gave up on constructivism and took refuge in the RA. IX 184/185 The way he gave it up had something perverse to it: Axiom of Reducibility/QuineVsRussell: the RA implies that all the distinctions that gave rise to its creation are superfluous! (... + ...) IX 185 Propositional Function/PF/Attribute/Predicate/TT/QuineVsRussell: overlooked the following difference and its analogs: a) "propositional functions": as attributes (or intentional relations) and b) proposition functions: as expressions, i.e. predicates (and open statements: e.g. "x is mortal") Accordingly: a) attributes b) open statements As expressions they differ visibly in the order if the order is to be assessed on the basis of the indices of bound variables within the expression. For Russell everything is "AF". Since Russell failed to distinguish between formula and object (word/object, mention/use), he did not remember the trick of allowing that an expression of higher order refers straight to an attribute or a relation of lower order. X 95 Context Definition/Properties/Stage 2 Logic/Quine: if you prefer properties as sets, you can introduce quantification over properties, and then introduce quantification over sets through a schematic context definition. Russell: has taken this path. Quine: but the definition has to ensure that the principle of extensionality applies to sets, but not to properties. That is precisely the difference. Russell/QuineVsRussell: why did he want properties? X 96 He did not notice at which point the unproblematic talk of predicates capsized to speaking about properties. ((s) object language/meta language/mention/use). Propositional Function/PF: Russell took it over from Frege. QuineVsRussell: he sometimes used PF to refer to predicates, sometimes to properties. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Russell, B. | Hintikka Vs Russell, B. | II 165 On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: with phrases that stand for genuine constituents of propositions. Problem/Frege: failure of substitutivity of identity (SI) in intensional contexts. Informative Identity/Frege: the fact that identity can even sometimes be informative is connected to this. EG/Existential Generalization/Russell: it, too, may fail in in intensional contexts, (problem of empty terms). HintikkaVsRussell: he does not recognize the depth of the problem and rather circumvents the problems of denoting terms. E.g. The bald king of France/Russell: Problem: we cannot prove by existential generalization that there is a present king of France. HintikkaVsRussell: But there are also other problems. (see below for ambiguity of cross world identificaiton). Description/Russell/Hintikka: Def Primary Description: the substitutivity of identity applies to them (SI) Def secondary description: for them, substitutivity of identity (SI) fails. II 166 Existential Generalization/Russell: two readings: (1) George IV did not know whether Scott was the author of Waverley. Description/Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: "the author of Waverley": (ix)A(x) primarily: the description has the following power: (2) (Ex)[A(x) & (y) A(y) > y = x) & ~ George IV knew that (Scott = x)]. ((s) notation: quantifier here always normal existential quantifier, mirrored E). I.e. the quantifier has the maximum range in the primary identification. The second reading is more likely, however: Secondary: (3) ~George IV knew that (Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x & (Scott = x)]. ((s) narrow range): Range/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is also a third option for the range of a quantifier ((s) >"medium range"/Kripke). (4) ~(Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x ) & George IV knew that (Scott = x)]. II 166 Existential Generalization/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not see that there was a reason for the failure of the existential generalization, which is not caused by the non-existence of the object. E.g. (5) George IV knew that the author of Waverley is the author of Waverley. a) trivial interpretation: I 167 (6) George IV knew that (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x)) everyday language translation: he knew that one and only one person wrote Waverley. I 166 b) non-trivial interpretation: (7) (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x) & George IV knew that (A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x))). ((s) no quantifier after "knew that everyday language translation: George knew of the only person who actually wrote Waverley, that they did. Because knowledge implies truth, (7) is equivalent to (8) (Ex) George IV knew that (Ez)(A(z) & (y)(A(y) > y = z) & x = z). this is equivalent to. (9) (Ex) George IV knew that (the author of Waverley = x) Here, the description has secondary (narrow) range. Everyday language translation: George knew who the author of Waverley is. I 167 Knowledge/Who/What/Where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze structures of the form knows + W-sentence. General: (10) a knows, who (Ex x) is so that A(x) becomes (11) (Ex) a knows that A(x). Hintikka: this is only possible if we modify Russell’s approach: Problem: the existential generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be attributed to non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed by Russell’s Theory of Descriptions (ThoD). Problem: for every person, there are a lot of people whose names they know and of whose existence they know, but of who they do not know who they are. II 168 E.g. Charles Dodgson was for Queen Victoria someone of whom she had heard, but whom she did not know. Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10), the following applies. (12) ~(Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x) But that’s trivially false, even according to Russell. Because the following is certainly true: (13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson) Existential Generalization/EG: then yields (14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x) So exactly the negation of (12) contradiction. II 168 Descriptions/Hintikka: are not involved here. Therefore, Russell’s description theory cannot help here, either. E.g. we can also assume that Victoria knew of the existence of Dodgson. Empty Terms/Empty Names: are therefore not the problem, either. Ontology/Hintikka: so our problem gets an ontological aspect. Existential Generalization/EG/Being/Quine/Ontology/Hintikka: the question of whether existential generalization may be applied on a singular term "b", E.g. in a context "F(b)", is the same as whether b may be value of a bound variable. Existential Generalization/Hintikka: does not fail here because of non-existence. II 169 We are dealing with the following problems here: Manifestation used by a) no SI Frege, Russell b) no EG (i) due to non-existence Russell (ii) because of ambiguity Hintikka Ambiguity/Solution/Hintikka: possible worlds semantics. E.g. (12) - (14) the problem is not that Dodgson did not exist in the actual world or not in one of Victoria’s worlds of knowledge, but that the name Dodgson singles out different individuals in different possible worlds. Hence (14) does not follow from (13). II 170 Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Clarity/Russell/Hintikka: Which way would have been open to Russell?. Knowing-Who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself very often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge, who did something with the existence of another individual, which is known to have done... + ... II 173 Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: Important argument: an ingenious feature of Russell’s theory of denotation from 1905 is that it is the quantifiers that denote! Theory of Denotation/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") includes the reduction of descriptions to objects of acquaintance. II 174 Hintikka: this relation is amazing, it also seems to be circular to allow only objects of acquaintance. Solution: We need to see what successfully denoting expressions (phrases) actually denote: they precisely denote objects of acquaintance. Ambiguity/Clarity/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization. Existential Generalization/Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: his own example shows that only objects of acquaintance are allowed: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is in fact a primary incident i.e. his example (2). "Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "if" instead of "did not know". (secondary?). Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed like this: that George wanted to know of the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott. II 175 That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (in the distance) and had asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell select an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not usually deal with beings of flesh and blood whose identity is known to us, instead of only with objects of perception?. Knowing Who/Knowing What/Perception Object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely with perception objects it seems as if the kind of clarity that we need for a knowing-who, is not just given. Identifcation/Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in my approach Dodgson is a bona fide individual iff. he is one and the same individual in all worlds of knowledge of Victoria. I.e. identifiable iff. (15) (E.g.) in all relevant possible worlds it is true that (Dodgson = x). Problem: What are the relevant possible worlds?. II 178 Quantifier/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell systematically confuses two types of quantifiers. (a) of acquaintance, b) of description). Problem: Russell has not realized that the difference cannot be defined solely in terms of the actual world!. Solution/Hintikka: we need a relativization to sets of possible worlds that change with the different propositional attitudes. II 179 RussellVsHintikka: he would not have accepted my representation of his position like this. HintikkaVsRussell: but the reason for this merely lies in a further error of Russell’s: I have not attributed to him what he believed, but what he should have believed. Quantification/Russell/Hintikka: he should have reduced to objects of acquaintance. Russell believed, however, it was sufficient to eliminate expressions that seemingly denote objects that are not such of acquaintance. Important argument: in that his quantifiers do not enter any ontological commitment. Only denoting expressions do that. Variable/Russell/Hintikka: are only notational patterns in Russell. Ontological Commitment/Quine/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell did not recognize the ontological commitment that 1st order languages bring with them. Being/Ontology/Quine: "Being means being value of a bound variable". HintikkaVsRussell: he has realized that. II 180 Elimination/Eliminability/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in order to eliminate merely seemingly denoting descriptions one must assume that the quantifiers and bound variables go over individuals that are identified by way of description. ((s) Object of the >Description). Otherwise, the real Bismarck would not be a permissible value of the variables with which we express that there is an individual of a certain species. Problem: then these quantifiers may not be constituents of propositions, because their value ranges do not only consist of objects of acquaintance. Therefore, Russell’s mistake was twofold. Quantifier/Variable/Russell/Hintikka, 1905, he had already stopped thinking that quantifiers and bound variables are real constituents of propositions. Def Pseudo Variable/Russell/Hintikka: = bound variable. Acquaintance/Russell: values of the variable should only be objects of acquaintance. (HintikkaVsRussell). Quantifiers/HintikkaVsRussell: now we can see why Russell did not differentiate between different quantifiers (acquaintance/description): For him quantifiers were only notational patterns, and for them the range of possible interpretations need not be determined, therefore it makes no difference if the rage changes!. Quantification/Russell: for him, it was implicitly objectional (referential), and in any event not substitutional. Peacocke I 190 Possible Worlds/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: R. is unable to explain the cases in which we quantify in belief contexts (!) where (according to Hintikka) the quantifier over "publicly descriptively identified" particulars is sufficient. Hintikka: compares with a "roman à clef". Peacocke: it is not clear that (whether) this could not be explained by Russell as cases of general ideas, so that the person with such and such characteristics is so and so. Universals/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: we are familiar with universals and they are constituents of our thoughts. HintikkaVsRussell: this is a desperate remedy to save the principle of acquaintance. PeacockeVsRussell: his arguments are also very weak. Russell: E.g. we cannot understand the transitivity of "before" if we are not acquainted with "before", and even less what it means that one thing is before another. While the judgment depends on a consciousness of a complex, whose analysis we do not understand if we do not understand the terms used. I 191 PeacockeVsRussell: what kind of relationship should exist between subject and universal?. Solution: the reformulated PB: Here we can see to which conditions a term is subject, similar to the principle of sensitivity in relational givenness. I 192 HintikkaVsRussell: ("On denoting what?", 1981, p.167 ff): the elimination of objects with which the subject is not familiar from the singular term position is not sufficient for the irreducibility of acquaintance that Russell had in mind. Quantification/Hintikka: the quantifiers will still reach over objects with which the subject is not familiar. But such quantifiers cannot be constituents of propositions, if that is to be compatible with the PB. Because they would certainly occur through their value range Occur and these do not consist of particulars with which one is familiar. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Type Theory | Gödel Vs Type Theory | Russell I XXV Type Theory/Gödel: in the realistic (intensional) interpretation there is an additional assumption: "Whenever an object x can replace another object y in a meaningful proposition, it can do so in every meaningful proposition". The consequence of this is that the objects are divided into mutually exclusive areas of meaning. GödelVsRussell: suspect that his assumption itself makes his formulation as a meaningful principle impossible: because x and y then have to be narrowed down to definite realms of meaning that are either the same or different and in both cases the statement does not express the principle or even part of it. Other consequence: the fact that an object x is of a given type (or not) cannot be expressed by a meaningful proposition either. I XXVI A solution is not impossible. It might turn out that any concept is meaningful everywhere except for certain "singular points" or "boundary points" so that the paradoxes appeared as something like the "division by zero". I XXVI Axioms/Russell/Gödel: Question: are they analytical (as Russell claims here?). Analyticity/Gödel: can mean two things: 1. purely formal, eliminable. In this sense, even the theory of integers is non-analytical, provided one requires the elimination to be carried out in a finite number of steps. ((s) Otherwise e.g. for each number individually). But the whole of mathematics as applied to propositions of infinite length must be assumed to prove this analyticity, e.g. the axiom of choice can only prove that it is analytical if it is assumed to be true! I XXXIV Analyticity in the 2. sense: "Due to the sense of the terms occurring in it". Thereby this "sense" is perhaps indefinable (i.e. irreducible to something more fundamental). For example, if one defined "class" and "" as "the concepts (terms) which satisfy the axioms", one would not be able to prove their existence. "Concept" could perhaps be defined in terms of "proposition", but then certain axioms about propositions become necessary, which can only be justified by reference to the undefined sense of this term. This view of analyticity in turn makes it possible that perhaps any mathematical proposition could be reduced to a special case of a = a. I XXVII Russell: went the way of seeing both classes and concepts (except for the logically uninteresting basic predicates) as non-existent and replacing them with our own constructions. Russell/Gödel/(s): constructivist. Reducibility Axiom: is provably wrong in the case of infinitely many individuals, unless one assumes the existence of classes or infinitely many "qualitates occultae". The actual development of mathematical logic has gone the way of the existence of classes and concepts, and Russell himself was later forced to go that way. |
Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 |
| Various Authors | Hintikka Vs Various Authors | Hintikka II 136 Picture Theory/Image Theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka Thesis: Wittgenstein’s image concept is little more than a particularly vivid formulation of the same idea that underlies the usual truth-condition for atomic sentences. Hintikka: structural equality is a truth condition for elementary propositions. II 137 False: in the most comments it is assumed that the image theory is a complete theory of language understanding. The difference lies in the completeness thesis that is attributed to Wittgenstein. What needs to be presumed so that the isomorphic relation appears as a complete explanation of language understanding? 1) No separate explanation required 2) The domain of all permissible compounds of names must match the entire domain of possible configurations of their objects. Otherwise one has to decide first whether the connection really exists. Wittgenstein makes both conditions in the Tractatus. HintikkaVsOther Authors: it is unfortunate if all three ideas are mixed up with each other. If the three were made to resemble each other, as many commentators do, the question of whether Wittgenstein abandons the picture theory later would lose its charm. Wittgenstein II 131 Hypothesis/Wittgenstein: Whenever a hypothesis is "always true", so that there is no falsification or verification, this hypothesis is meaningless: Eddington said: every time a light beam falls upon an electron, it disappears. Then you could also say, there is a white rabbit sitting on the couch sits, and every time I look it’s gone. WittgensteinVsEddington. Hintikka II 59 HintikkaVsCopi: Wittgenstein’s remarks on Def Reducibility Axiom (Russell)/Hintikka: the axiom states: that for any given property or relation of a certain type (higher lever) there is an equivalent predicative property or relation. It is not about the absolute existence or non-existence, but by the configurations. Therefore, the reducibility axiom cannot belong to the logic! II 60ff Character/Relation/Denote/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: Not the complex sign "aRb" says that a is in a certain relationship to b, but the fact that "a" is in a certain relation to "b", says that aRb. (3.1432) quotation marks sic!) But Wittgenstein is getting at something else: The number of names that occur in the elementary proposition must be the same, according to the Tractatus, as that of the objects in the situation represented by the sentence. What situation that is, however, is not determined solely by the names a and b. Copi: thinks (falsely) that Wittgenstein basically abstracts from the relation sign by using the phrase "in certain respects" and undertakes an existential generalization. (HintikkaVsCopi). |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
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Reference |
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| Brentano: Irreducib. | Pro | Fodor / Lepore IV 128 Brentano: irreducibility of the menta l- Quine per Brentano! - Davidson ditto (because of holism). |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intension | Quine, W.V.O. | I 381 Brentano s thesis of the irreducibility of intensional expressions is fully in line with the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. - But you can understand Brentano s thesis shows the emptyness of a science of the intensions: Taking the intensional language at face value, ie, to postulate translation relations as objectively valid, although they are in principle indeterminate. But that will not do. |
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| Brentano | Quine, W.V.O. | Fod / Lep IV 128 Brentano / Quine: Brentano was right with his thesis in terms of the irreducibility of the intentional on the physical states or properties. |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 |
| Supervenience | Stalnaker, R. | I 87 Supervenience/Stalnaker: two types: a) Supervenience as a reductionist thesis, b) as a non-reductionist thesis. 1. Meteorology and geology supervene on physical processes. There are no cold fronts and tectonic plates beyond the physical conditions. 2. Example colours: it is controversial what they are - how they relate to physical properties of light, surfaces, physiology and perception. But it is not controversial that they supervene on some or all of these properties. There are no "other facts" about colors. Supervenience/Materialism/Stalnaker: can also be seen as a materialistic thesis beyond reductionism. Supervenience/Kim: Variant: can also be regarded as an irreducibility thesis, consistent with the irreducibility of supervenient properties to their basic properties. (1993, 140) Kim/Stalnaker: but he also argues against non-reductive materialism. Supervenience/non-reductive/Stalnaker: is then understood as metaphysical, not semantic theory: a relation between sets of properties or facts, not between theories. Thesis: each property of one set is determined by a property of the other set. I 91 Def Supervenience/Tradition/Stalnaker: it is always about two sets of properties A and B, all terms are modal, and a concept of necessity is assumed, respectively a set of all possible worlds. Rough idea: A supervenes on B if A necessarily depends on B. Def Weak Supervenience/Tradition/Stalnaker: individuals within any possible world can only differ with respect to an A property if they also differ with respect to a B property. Def Strong Supervenience/Tradition/Stalnaker: individuals within or in different possible worlds can only differ with respect to an A property if they also differ with respect to a B property. Def Global Supervenience/Tradition/Stalnaker: two possible worlds as a whole can only differ in the distribution of A properties of individuals if they I 92 also differ in the distribution of B properties. Def Strong Supervenience/Paull/Sider/Stalnaker: (1992, 834) ...iff for any two possible worlds w and z, for any two objects x and y, if x in w has the same B properties as y in z, then x in w has the same A properties as y in z. Def Weak Supervenience/Paull/Sider/Stalnaker: (1992, 834) ...iff for each ((s) single) possible world w and any individuals x and y in the range of w, if x has, in w has the same B properties as y in w, then x in w has the same A properties as y in w. Def Global Supervenience/Paull/Sider/Stalnaker: (1992, 834) ...iff any two possible worlds which are B indistinguishable, they are also A indistinguishable. I 104 Supervenience/Stalnaker: N.B.: with this they have separated semantic from metaphysical questions. Their argument is purely semantic: because supervenience assertion is the thesis that the facts about momentary states are all facts, the rest is a question of how to talk about these facts. I 10 Supervenience/Stalnaker: is a conceptual tool for the separation of the purely metaphysical part of a reductionist thesis. A set of facts or properties supervenes on another if possible worlds or possible individuals who are exactly the same in relation to one property are necessarily the same in relation to another property. I 11 Supervenience: should separate semantic from metaphysical questions. Property Space/Stalnaker: a most basic property space seems to have to be assumed. But if it is there, it is ultimately an empirical question as to what these properties and relations are. |
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