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The author or concept searched is found in the following 79 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analysis | Stalnaker | I 35 Analysis/Stalnaker: usually a more structured set of entities is analyzed in terms of a less structured set in order to explain the structure. >Explanations, >Structures, >Complexes/Complexity, >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Argumentation | Habermas | III 38 Argumentation/Habermas: We call argumentation the type of speech in which the participants thematize controversial claims of validity and try to redeem or criticize them with arguments. An argument contains reasons that are systematically linked with the claim to validity of a problematic statement. The "strength" of an argument is measured, in a given context, by the validity of the reasons; this is shown, among other things, by whether an argument can convince the participants of a discourse, i. e. can motivate them to accept the respective claim to validity. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Justification, >Reasons, >Persuasion. Rationality: against this background, can be judged according to how a subject behaves as a participant in argumentation. Rational statements can also be improved due to their critical nature. >Rationality. III 45 The logic of argumentation does not refer to the formal, consequent connections between semantic units (sentences) but to internal, also non-deductive relations between pragmatic units (speech acts) from which arguments are composed. III 47 Three aspects: 1. resembles an argumentation of a communication under ideal conditions, which represents a situation to be characterized as an ideal speech situation. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. General symmetry conditions must be reconstructed here, which every competent speaker must presume to be sufficiently fulfilled. III 48 2. The procedure is a specially regulated form of interaction of the division of labour between the proponent and the opponent. A claim of validity is discussed here in a situation that is relieved of the pressure of action and experience, in which claims are examined with reasons and only with reasons. Cf. >Dialogical logic. 3. Argumentation is designed to produce valid arguments. Definition Argument/Habermas: Arguments are those means by means of which intersubjective recognition for the initially hypothetically raised claim of validity of a proponent can be achieved and thus opinion can be transformed into knowledge. See Arguments/Toulmin, >Intersubjectivity. III 55 HabermasVsKlein, Wolfgang (1): Klein wants to draw up the logic of argumentation as a nomological theory and must therefore assimilate rules to causal regularities and reasons to causes. III 56 HabermasVs: on the other hand, with Toulmin we have to allow a plurality of claims of validity without at the same time denying the critical, space-time and social restrictions transcending sense of validity. >St. Toulmin. III 57 We cannot judge the strength of arguments (...) if we do not understand the meaning of the respective action. (2) III 339 Argumentation/Reason/Justification/Habermas: Arguments or reasons have at least these in common that they, and only they, can unfold the power of rational motivation under the communicative prerequisites of a cooperative examination of hypothetical claims to validity. However, in typical forms of argumentation (depending on the claim to validity of propositional truth, normative correctness, truthfulness and authenticity). >Truthfulness. 1. W. Klein, Argumentation und Argument in. Z. f. Litwiss. u. Ling. H, 38/39, 1980, p. 49f. 2. St. Toulmin, R. Rieke, A. Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning, N.Y. 1979, p.15. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Argumentation | Minsky | I 190 Arguments/Strength of theories/Artificial Intelligence/Minsky: When people disagree, we often say that one side's position seems stronger than the other. But what has strength to do with reasoning? In logic, arguments are simply either right or wrong, since there is not the slightest room for matters of degree. But in real life, few arguments are ever absolutely sure, so we simply have to learn how various forms of reasoning are likely to go wrong. Then we can use different methods to make our chains of reasoning harder to break. a) [stronger]: Parallelism: One method is to use several different arguments to prove the same point — putting them in parallel. Then, though no one of these tricks is perfectly secure, the combination cannot fail unless [all] things go wrong at once. b) [weaker]: Chain: all those parts form a long and slender chain no stronger than its weakest link. I 191 Here are two different strategies for deciding whether one group of reasons should be considered stronger than another. 1. The first strategy tries to compare opposing arguments in terms of magnitudes, by analogy to how two physical forces interact: Strength from Magnitude: When two forces work together, they add to form a single larger force. But when two forces oppose each other directly, their strengths subtract. 2. Our second strategy is simply to count how many different reasons you can find for choosing each alternative: Strength from Multitude: The more reasons we can find in favor of a particular decision, the more confidence we can have in it. This is because if some of those reasons turn out to be wrong, other reasons may still remain. Strength: Whichever strategy we use, we tend to speak of the winning argument as the stronger one. But why do we use the same word strong for two such different strategies? It is because we use them both for the same purpose: to reduce the likelihood of failure. >Strength of theories, >Stronger/weaker, >Reasons, >Justification, >Ultimate justification. What makes us so prone to formulate our reasoning in terms of conflicting adversaries? Cf. >Dialogical Logic. It must be partly cultural, but some of it could also be based on inheritance. >Culture, >Cultural tradition. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Beliefs | Brandom | I 788 You can weakly believe of Pegasus that he had wings. But if you strongly believe in something, you have to be able to pick it out. Cf. >stronger/weaker. I 759f Belief de re/Quine/Brandom: aroused interest in de re by distinguishing between the conceptual and relational meanings of belief - you do not have relational beliefs about an object by simply knowing the singular word - definition of weak de re: someone who only believes that the smallest spy is a spy does not know much about spies - not yet de re of any objects - epistemically strong: Example of Rosa Kleb who believes that she is the smallest spy (de re). >de re, >de dicto. I 790 Definition strong/weak/belief/Brandom: you can weakly believe of Pegasus that he had wings - but if you strongly believe in something, you have to be able to pick it out. --- II 226 Belief/Brandom: 1. you only believe what you believe to believe - 2. and also everything that one is more or less tied to by hione's s believes - e.g. if I believe that Kant revered Hamann and I believe that Hamann was the Magus of the North, I also believe that Kant worshiped the Magus of the North. I 764 Belief/de dicto/Davidson/Brandom: Davidson only allows de dicto beliefs. I 962 Belief/Def weak relation/Dennett/Brandom: what is expressed by de re attributions. I 765 but strong de re convictions would have little meaning, if useful at all. Belief/cnviction/Dretske: (widely spread thesis): de re convictions are understandable regardless of de dicto convictions. I 765 Conviction/belief/Brandom: demonstrative, indexical de re convctions are conceptual, but not independent - they cannot stand alone - decisive are the weak ones - and not a special kind of contact with the object. I 965 Belief/Brandom: Each conviction, be it strong or weak, can be attributed de re or de dicto. II 48 Belief/BrandomVsDavidson: Definition via wish. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Beliefs | Nozick | II 174f Truth/Belief/Knowledge/Nozick: four conditions: (1) p is true (2) S believes that p (3) If p were not true, S would not believe p. (4) If p > S believes that p. Improvement: if p were true, S would believe it. - That excludes the following: someone happens to look into a book and therefore believes p, but would otherwise not believe it. - Problem: you can believe something according to one method, and not believe the same thing according to another method. >Knowledge, >Truth, >Method, >Certainty. II 180 Problem: Variant: truth or falsity of p affects the choice of method. II 178 Trace: = connection to the fact: is given when a person fulfils (3) and (4). - (3) ensures the trace. II 179ff Belief/Truth/Nozick: assuming, there are different methods, and the belief depends on the method. - E.g. The grandmother sees her grandson and believes that he is doing well. - If he were dead, you'd also tell her he was fine. - It does not follow that when she sees him, she does not know that he is doing well. - E.g. A father believes that his son is innocent a) out of love b) because of the evidence. Problem: if the choice of method depends on the truth/falsity - that a method fulfils conditions 1 - 4 is too strong, that it only fulfils one, too weak. >Stronger/weaker, >Conditions. II 236 Belief/Knowledge/Disjunction/Conjunction/Probability/Nozick: Conjunction: we can believe it with connection to only one - disjunction: here we need both. - Adjunction: from the premises p, q, we can conclude the conjunction p & q as conclusion. >Conjunction, >Disjunction, >Adjunction. Probability: here, adjunction may fail, because the conjunction of two premises has a lower probability than each one individually. >Probability. Universal Generalization/Existence Generalization: we can believe it without connection to a particular instance. >Universal Generalization, >Existential Generalization. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Biconditional | Wright | I 88 Biconditional, weak: A ≡ B is weak valid if no statement can be true without the other even when both are evaluated differently (assertibility, renunciation of bivalence). Strong: if A and B are always necessarily given the same evaluation. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Implication, >Equivalence, >Assertibility. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Brains in a Vat | Nozick | II 175 Brains in a vat/BIV/Nozick: although the belief that he is in the vat is correctly caused, the person is not susceptible to this fact. >Brains in vat/Putnam, >Reference/Putnam, >Meaning. Susceptibility would require covariance of belief and facts. >Counterfactual Conditional: if the brains were not in the vat, they would not believe it. II 210 Brains in a Vat/Nozick: we are not connected with the fact that we are not in the vat, even if we are not in the vat. Cf. >nonfactualism, >Facts. II 244 Brains in a vat/Skepticism/NozickVsSkepticism: Skepticism calls for something too strong: there is supposed to be a q ("We are in a vat"), such that it is incompatible with any p. >Skepticism. In contrast, the weaker is true: for each p there is something that is incompatible with it. - (Quantifiers interchanged). >Stronger/weaker. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Causality | Bigelow | I 264 Explanation/causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: because of impending circularity, we cannot explain causality by laws or counterfactual conditional or probability. >Circular reasoning, >Counterfactual conditionals, >Probability, >Laws, >Explanations, >Causal explanation. Counterfactual Conditional/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Conversely, counterfactual conditionals are analyzed in terms of causality. Just as necessary. >Necessity. Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Must be an unanalyzed basic concept. It is a structural universal. Fundamental forces play a major role. >Basic concepts, >Causation, >Universals, >Forces. Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are vectors. >Vectors. I 265 Causality/causation/explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: first we refute some common theories. Causation/Tradition/Bigelow/Pargetter: is often regarded as a kind of "necessary connection". Normally, this is expressed in such a way that either the cause is necessary for the effect or the effect is a necessary consequence of the cause. Then the cause is either a necessary or a sufficient condition or both. >Cause, >Effect. Weaker: some authors: it is only unlikely to find a cause without effect (or vice versa). (Probabilistic theories of causation, Lewis 1979(1), Tooley 1987)(2). >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. "Necessity Theories"/Bigelow/Pargetter: should explain on what kind of necessity they rely on. Cause/Effect/BigelowVsTradition/BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis that a cause does not have to be a sufficient or a necessary cause for an effect, the effect could have occurred without or by another cause, or without cause at all! One cannot always assume a high probability. A cause does not always have to increase the probability of an event. I 266 Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: that's what we learned from him. (HumeVsLewis). Causality/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: his conception of it has a theological background (from Descartes and Malebranche): Thesis: it could not be that God was bound by any restrictions. >Causality/Hume. Therefore, it could not be that God would be compelled to allow the effect to follow. It would always have to come out of God's free choice and be a miracle every time. Cf. >Causes/Nietzsche. Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: Hume's theory simply eliminates God. Hume simply asks us to imagine that the effect could not follow from the cause. Bigelow/Pargetter: he's right! It is not only logically possible, but also empirically possible. >Possibility, >Logical possibility, >Metaphysical possibility. Presentation/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: is for Hume the guide to the possibility. He thus swings from a theological to a psychological argument. Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: Causes are not sufficient conditions. They are not always necessary. >Sufficiency. I 267 Solution/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: inner expectations of regularities. Cause/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to Hume "sufficient" cannot be considered modal. That is, that "sufficient" must not be considered realistic. >Modalities, >Modal logic, >Realism. BigelowVsHume: Hume went too far in his rejection of necessity in laws. But not far enough in his rejection of the necessity approach of causality. 1. Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76 2. Tooley, M. (1987). Causation. A realist's approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Certainty | Cavell | I (a) 62 Certainty/skepticism/pain/knowledge/Cavell: it is not about the ability to recognize something is weaker than the ability to know something. On the contrary, if I acknowledge my delay, for example, it follows that I know about it, but not vice versa. >Knowledge, >stronger/weaker. I (a) 63 For example, if another person may have pain without recognizing it, then it follows that he knows about his pain? From this comes the (imagined?) fact that he now has certainty about his pain. Consequence: either we accept the analysis made by the anti-skeptic about the various statements of the skeptic or we keep to the facts that they take into account and conclude that the analysis offered cannot be correct that it did not follow the argument. >Skepticism. Skepticism/Cavell: the direct attempt to defeat it makes us believe we have arguments where we really have none. We are fighting in a too strong embrace with the skeptic. Thus, the anti-skeptic assumes the most important condition in the argument of the skeptics: according to which the problem of knowledge about the foreign psychological is the problem of certainty. >Other Minds. I (a) 64 At the same time, he neglects the central insight of the skeptic, trying to prove their non-existence by himself (that certainty is not enough). This leads the anti-skeptic to fix on the perspective of the first person and to neglect the third person. But one could say: the recognition of pain in the first person is not a recognition of certainty, but the recognition of pain! Showing the object. >First Person, >Pain. I (a) 65 Certainty/knowledge/first person/third person/pain/cook: the idea that I cannot know about the feelings of the other because I cannot have them, treats the difference as one of the circumstances. >Emotion/Cavell, >Circumstances. E.g. as I am not able to see the crocuses of my neighbor. WittgensteinVs: the difference is not in the circumstances but in the language game. >Language game. I (a) 66 Why is "incapable of having the feelings of another" no circumstance? Probably because you cannot imagine how it could be otherwise. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Colour | Wright | I 164 Color/Supervenience/Wright: Color supervenes other physical properties: E.g. there is a chaotic variety of physical conditions which is illustrated by scarlet things. >Supervenience. This conception is therefore weaker than that according to which color words have the semantics of concepts for natural kinds. >Stronger/weaker, >Natural kinds. It's the commitment to the idea that physically identical objects share their color, even if one of the objects offers the "best" conditions and the others don't. This supervenience is therefore, as it were, a force towards the uniqueness of color concepts. >Unabiguity, >Colour words. I 169 Color/Wright: However, I do not want to go so far as to assert that color predicates are semantically concepts for natural kinds. That would also be inconsistent with the thesis that the extension is partially determined by the best opinion. >Best explanation/Wright. Color/Wright: for our everyday understanding of color words there is no such risk (that there is nothing red): if it turned out that there are no interesting physical properties that red things have in common, then we learn by that that red things are, in fact, not a natural species, but that there are still indeed infinitely many red things. >Generality. This statement is, however, entirely consistent with the belief that red things do indeed have interesting physical properties in common! >Similarity, >Properties. The explanatory intuition does not have to be more than an epiphenomenon of the presumed accuracy of the conviction that something in which redness physically consists actually exists and that it is one of the reasons for the fact that there are best judgments about that which is red. >Euthyphro contrast/Wright, >Epiphenominology. --- II 247 Color Predicates/sorites/vagueness/Wright: a color word is not like "two meters long", but "less than two meters" (length ranges). Criterion: still measuring! But we can also say without measuring what the result would be. Solution/Wright: Actual distinction between cases where we can judge by eyesight, and cases where we cannot - then still observation predicates - which other base should this distinction provide? Crispin Wright: thesis: the methodological approach must be completely behavioristic and anti-reflexive. >Behaviorism, >Perception, >Sensory impressions, >Judgments. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Conditional | Jackson | Lewis V 153 Conditional/Grice/Lewis: if P (A > C) is high because P (A) is low (> ex falso quodlibet), what is then the meaning of "If A, then B"? Why should one not say the strongest: that it is almost as likely as not A? JacksonVsGrice/JacksonVsLewis: we often claim things that are much weaker than we could actually claim, and this for a good reason. I assume that your belief system is similar to mine, but not completely equal. E.g. Suppose you know something what seems to me very unlikely today, but I would like to say something useful anyway. So I say something weaker, so you can take me at any rate at the word. >Assertions, >Stronger/weaker. --- Lewis V 153 Definition robust/Jackson/Lewis: A is robust in relation to B, (with respect to one's subjective probability at a time) iff. the probability of A and the probability of A conditionally to B are close, and both are high,... >Probability, >Subjective probability, >Objective probability. --- V 154 ...so if one learns that B still considers A to be probable. Jackson: the weaker can then be more robust in terms of something that you think is more unlikely, but still do not want to ignore. If it is useless to say the weaker, how useless it is then to assert the weaker and the stronger together! And yet we do it! E.g. Lewis: "Bruce sleeps in the clothes box or elsewhere on the ground floor". Jackson: Explanation: it has the purpose to assert the stronger and the same purpose to assert the more robust. If both are different, we assert both. Robustness/indicative conditional/Lewis: an indicative conditional is a truth-functional conditional, which conventionally implies robustness with respect to the antecedent (conventional implicature). Therefore the probability P (A > C) and P (A > C) must both be high. This is the reason why the assertiveness of the indicative conditional is associated with the corresponding conditional probability. >Conditional probability, >Conditionals, >Truth functions. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Content | Schurz | I 23 Content/Schurz: A proposition is the more substantial, the more consequences it has. Probability and content of hypotheses are often opposite. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Theories, >Probability, >Truth. I 89 Content/stronger/weaker: The content strength decreases during the transition from all-phrases via singular phrases to existential phrases. E.g. A universal sentence (x)Fx is logically stronger than its singular Fa instances and these are stronger than the corresponding existential sentence (Ex)Fx). >Stronger/weaker, >Generalization/Schurz, >Falsification/Schurz. I 97 Def Logical Content/Schurz: the logical content of a proposition (or set of propositions) S is the set of all propositions or consequences logically following from S. Def Empirical Content/Schurz: only the set of empirical (and thus verifiable) propositions or consequences logically following from S, which are not already analytically true. Def Observational content/Schurz: is even narrower than empirical content: only the observational propositions that follow from S. This notion has very limited applicability: Only for purely universal law hypotheses. Observation proposition/Schurz: no observation propositions follow from an allexistence hypothesis Ex H:= (x)(Fx > (Ey)(Gxy). Schurz: From H follows by universal instantiation only Fa > Gay and this is no observation theorem, because (Ey)Gay is a spatiotemporally restricted existence theorem. Such allexistence hypotheses are therefore also not falsifiable. However, they are confirmable. But this is weaker than falsifiable. >Observation, >Observation sentences. Def Probabilistic content/statistics/probability/Schurz: Let S be a set of statistical hypotheses, this logically does not imply any observational propositions, but at best gives them a belief probability. Wrong: to assume that the content would be the set of propositions with a certain minimum probability. Because this set can be contradictory! Even if r is still so close to 1. Conjunction probability: the conjunction of many highly probable sentences can be very improbable on their part! Solution/Schurz: probabilistic content is the set of all probability propositions which follow from S according to the axioms of probability. >Probability, >Subjective propability. I 109 Def relevant content/relevance/logic/Schurz: (a) the relevant logical content of a proposition or set of propositions S is the set of its relevant consequence elements. Notation: Cr(S) b) the relevant empirical content of S is the set of those relevant consequence elements of S that are empirical and not analytic true propositions. Notation: Er(S). Each set of sentences is L equivalent to the set of its relevant consequence elements. >Relevance/Schurz. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Dialetheism | Priest | Field II 145 Dialethism/Priest/Paradoxa/Field: (Priest 1998): Thesis: the sentence of the liar as well as its negation are both assertable (and also their conjunction). The rules of the logic are weakened (> stronger/weaker; >strength of theories), so that not every assertion can be asserted by this. Most attractive variant: builds on Kleene's trivalent logic. Trivalent logic/Kleene/Priest/Field: Priest assumes here that the valid inferences are those that guarantee "correct assertion". But an assertion is only correct if it has one of the two highest truth values in the truth value table. Curry paradox: is thus excluded, since the only conditional in this language is the material conditional. Material conditional/Field: the material conditional is defined by ~ and v. It does not fully support the modus ponens in the logic of Kleene/Priest. Liar/KleeneVsPriest: (and other "deviant" sentences): have truth-value gaps. But there are no agglomerations of truth values. Deviating Sentence: E.g. Liar sentence, has no truth-value agglomerations but truth-value gaps. Liar/PriestVsKleene: (and other deviating sentences): have, conversely, truth-value agglomerations and no gaps. Problem/Kleene: here one cannot establish an equivalence between "p" and "p" is true! For to assert a truth-value gap in a sentence "A" would be to assert: "~ [true ("A") v true ("~A")]" and this should be equivalent to "~ (A v ~ A)". But one sentence of this form can never be legitimate in Kleene. Truth-value gap/logical form/Field: to assert a truth-value gap in a sentence "A" would mean to assert: "~ [true ("A") v true ("~ A")]" and this should be equivalent to "~ (A v ~ A)". Solution/Priest: if "A" is a deviating sentence, this is then a correct assertion in Priest. Also the assertion of the absence of a truth-value agglomeration in a sentence "A" would be the assertion "~ [(true ("A") u true ("A)"]" which should be equivalent to "~(a u ~A)". Kleene cannot claim this absence for deviant sentences, Priest can do this. |
Pries I G. Priest Beyond the Limits of Thought Oxford 2001 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Empirical Content | Vollmer | II 47 Empirical content/Vollmer: E.g. a causal assertion has more empirical content than a mere assertion of a consequence. - Therefore it is easier to refute. >Theories, >Strength of theories, >Stronger/weaker, >Falsification, >Causality, >Causal laws, >Causal explanation, >Content. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Equal Sign | Quine | IX 9 Equal Sign/Quine: "=" is a two-digit predicate. >Predicates/Quine. IX 10 Sign/Sign Set/Quine: each theory has introduced a basic vocabulary of primitive predicates, perhaps by definition. Mostly there are only finally many, then we do not need to add the equal sign "=". Because we can then define it with the help of the others. ((s) "primitive" does not mean "one-digit"). Equal Sign/Quine: suppose the only basic predicate of a theory is "φ". Then we can define "=" by the following explanation of "x = y": (1) ∀z[(φxz ‹› φyz) u (φzx ‹› φzy)]. For obviously "x= x" proves to be a simple example of a valid formula schema of quantifier logic. The same applies to all special cases of "(x = y u F) > Fy", as far as they are statements which contain no further predicate except "φ". This is seen in the following way: first, look at all results in which the statements made by "Fx" and "Fy" differ only in one place. The immediate context of this single occurrence must then be either "φxv" and "φyv" or "φvx" and "φvy", where "v" denotes any variable, (perhaps either x or y). IX 23 Individuals/Elemental Relation/Extensionality Axiom/Quine: Suggestion: "x ε y", if x is an individual, be true or false, depending on, b x = y or x unequal to y. Thus, the problem of applying the extensionality axiom to individuals disappears. "ε" of individuals has the property of "=". (Elemental relationship of individuals: equality! ("is element of", "is contained": becomes the equal sign before individuals). IX 26 Until then, the equal sign is only defined between class abstraction terms. Between variables we need further tools ...+.... X 88 Logical Truth/Structure/Definition/Quine: our definition of logical truth inevitably referred to the grammatical structure. Problem: this view is called into question when we introduce identity (identity predicate "=", equal sign). Identity/logical truth/Quine: the traceability of logical truth to grammatical structure is questioned when identity is introduced, because e.g. "x = x" or "x = y" may not be a logical truth, because not everything can be used. ((s) >Intension: because of it, not all theorems of identity are logical truths. Quine: it is about the fact that in one logical truth one predicate must be replaced by another, but the equal sign as a predicate cannot be replaced by another predicate. Identity/Logic/Quine: Truths of Identity Theory Example "x = x", "Ey((x = y)" or "~(x = y . ~(y = x))" ((s) symmetry of identity) are not suitable as logical truths according to our definitions of logical truth. >Logical Truth/Quine. Reason: they can be wrong if "=" is replaced by other predicates. Consequence: So should we not count identity to logic, but to mathematics? Together with ">" and "ε"? >Semantic Ascent. III 268 Two different names can stand for the same object, if the equal sign is inbetween, the equation is true. It is not claimed that the names are the same! III 271 Equal Sign/Quine: "=" is a common relative term. The equal sign is necessary because two variables can refer to the same or to different objects. From a logical point of view, the use of the equal sign between variables is fundamental, not that between singular terms. III 293 Equality Sign/expressiveness/stronger/weaker/Quine: we also gain expressiveness by making the equality sign obsolete ((s) when we introduce classes). Instead of "x = y" we say that x and y belong to exactly the same classes. I.e. (a)(x ε a. bik. y ε a) Identity/Quantities/Quine: the identity of classes can be explained in a way in reverse: "a = b" means that a and b have exactly the same elements. Then the equal sign is simply a convenient shortcut. Description/Equal Sign/Quine: if we have the equal sign, we can afford the luxury of introducing descriptions without having to calculate them as primitive basic concepts. Because with the equal sign we can eliminate a description from every sentence. >Descriptions/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Equality | Wessel | I 338 Meaning equality/equality of meaning/logic/Termini/Wessel: if two simple terms have the same meaning, they are also the same in sense, and vice versa, but the converse is not true for composite Termini. E.g. "rhombus", "equilateral rectangle": same meaning, but not the same sense if the second composed. >Stronger/weaker, >Asymmetry. Reason: the logical structure is not always coincident with the language. Morning star/Wessel: can be interpreted as a composite term: then, because morning and evening different meaning, the sense of compound Termini is different. >Morning Star/Evening Star, >Identity, >Intensions, >Extension. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Explanation | Chalmers | I 50 Explanation/Chalmers: a good explanation is often one that covers many cases. Problem: whether the individual case is satisfied. Cf. >Strength of theories, >Stronger/weaker. Solution: in biological phenomena it is often the case that similar cases have a related background. >Phenomena, >Similarity, >Conditions, >Causal explanation, >Initial conditions. I 84 Explanation/Explication/Chalmers/(s): Chalmers distinguishes between explication and explanation. The latter is used in the context of reduction as a reductive explanation, e.g., of phenomenal properties, while he reserves explication for conceptual explanations. >Concepts, >Reduction. E.g. The property of being Rolf Harris does not constitute a phenomenon that needs an explanation, as opposed to an explication. I 121 Explanation/Consciousness/Chalmers: even if we refined our explanations more and more, they would only provide more refined explanations of cognitive functions, but not explanations of our conscious experience. >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 122 The existence of consciousness will always be an additional fact to our structural and dynamic facts. But we do not have to give up any explanation of consciousness. We just have to say goodbye to the idea that this explanation should be reductive. Cf. >Reductionism. I 177 Explanation/Consciousness/Paradoxy/Chalmers: Problem: Consciousness cannot be explained reductively, judgments about consciousness and phenomenal judgments (about experiences) must be explained, however, because they are in the field of psychology. >Experience. Paradoxically, consciousness is ultimately irrelevant to the explanation of phenomenal judgments. (Avshalom Elitzur (1989) (1), Roger Shepard (Psychologist, 1993) (2). I 178 Solution/Chalmers: the content of my experiences cannot be explained reductively. >Content. Problem: if we treat the judgments ("experience reports") of the zombies deflationistically ((s) as simple quotes), they can be explained reductively. >Zombies/Chalmers. Solution: it is often possible to use higher-level properties in order to make lower-level properties superfluous (e.g. molecular motion instead of heat). >Levels/order, >Description Levels. Problem: the higher-level properties are still logically supervenient on the physical. That is, when an action is explained neurophysiologically, this does not render the appeal to memory (as a phenomenal property) irrelevant. >Supervenience. I 179 This relevance is inherited by the logical supervenience. For example, if a single man has a need for female accompaniment, which is explained by the fact that he is male and unmarried, that does not make the fact that he is a bachelor irrelevant. In general, if two sets of properties are conceptually connected, an explanation in terms of the one set does not render the existence of an explanation in terms of the other set irrelevant. Solution: in physical explanations: when logical supervenience is involved, there is no explanatory irrelevancy: a description of a higher level is logically related to one of a lower level. Problem: the consciousness is not logically supervenient on the physical. There is therefore no conceptual dependence of the levels. >Levels/order, >Description Levels, >Dependency. I 188 Explanation/Consciousness/Chalmers: unlike the explanation of religious belief, where the assumption of divine existence is demanded for the explanation of other phenomena, the explanation of consciousness is different: here consciousness is already given and does not have to be added for an assumption. Consciousness is also not explained by judgments about conscious experience ("This is a red object"). >Experience, >Phenomena, >Qualia. I 191 Explanation/Consciousness/Chalmers: There are three ways to argue against the alleged irrelevancy of consciousness for the explanation of behavior. >Behavior. I 192 1. The argument from the self-knowledge/Chalmers: we know that we have conscious experiences ourselves. But it is hard to argue with this. >Self-knowledge, >Self-awareness. Solution: if experiences were by explanation irrelevant, we could not know that we have some. I 193 1st Argument from the Causal Theory of Knowledge: Problem: if experience is causally irrelevant, I cannot argue with it. Then I have no knowledge about my experiences. Shoemaker (1975)(3) thus argues for a materialism of consciousness and for a reductive functionalism. >Causal theory of knowledge, >S. Shoemaker, >Materialism, >Functionalism. Zombie/Shoemaker: for Shoemaker Zombies are logically impossible. >Zombies. Knowledge/Consciousness/Chalmers: a property dualist must argue that knowledge about conscious experiences is a different kind of knowledge than the knowledge about which one is talking about in the context of causation by objects. >Property dualism. I 194 Reliability Theory/Chalmers: is not appropriate in the case of our knowledge about ourselves. However, the phenomenal judgments of my zombie twins are not reliable. Therefore, one could assume that reliability is a distinguishing feature between me and the zombie. But my self-knowledge about consciousness is of a different kind: it is reflected. We are sure that we have a consciousness, which can be doubted at most "philosophically". >Reliability theory. I 195 Reliability/Chalmers: where is reliability missing? E.g. in situations like those of the brains in a vat. Such examples do not endanger our certainty that we have an awareness since there is no causality involved. >Brains in a vat. I 196 Our approach to our consciousness is quite direct, it is not mediated. >Self-consciousness. I 197 Uncorrigibility/Chalmers: uncorrigibility is not meant with this direct access! >Incorrigibility. I 198 Causation/Consciousness/Chalmers: we do not need any causality to explain our conscious experiences: our knowledge of this is based on a much more direct relationship. It's about how I know about it, not how my brain knows about it, so it's not about a physical relation. Cf. >Causality. Problem: beliefs could also form without experiences. >Beliefs. ChalmersVsVs: but then I have certainty about my beliefs. Zombie: would say exactly the same. I 199 ChalmersVsVs: Of course, from a third-person perspective, we do not know whether others have a consciousness (conscious experiences) anyway. But we know it from ourselves. >First person, >Other minds. Beliefs/Zombies: in the end, the zombie could have the same beliefs as I do. ChalmersVsVs: yes, but the evidence for my beliefs is much simpler: it is the experiences. They are the primary. >Experience, >Evidence. Deflationist/inflationist/Chalmers: our argumentation is here deflationary anyway, i.e. about the purely functional role of beliefs. Cf. >Deflationism. Inflationistically, beliefs themselves would be a part of the phenomenal experience. 1. A. Elitzur, Consciousness and the incompleteness of the physical explanation of behavior. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10, 1989,: pp. 1-20. 2. R. N. Shepard, On the physical baisis, ölinguistic representation and conscious experiences of colors. In: G. Harman (Ed) Conceptions of the human Mind: Essays in Honor of George A. Miller, Hillsdale NJ 1993. 3. Sydney Shoemaker, Functionalism and qualia, Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315 (1975). |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Explanation | Vollmer | I 228 Explanation / Vollmer: misconception: each cognitive system would have to be more complex than the object that it explains. I 278 Explanation/"too much"/"too little"/Vollmer: a tautological explanation explains too little, an untestable explanation explains too much. >Theories, >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Strength of theories, >Stronger/weaker, >Verification. I 279 Questions/Science/Biology/Evolution/Vollmer: the question "Why?" is in biology always welcome - even if it does not always find an answer. II 58 Why-questions / Science / VollmerVsFeynman / Vollmer: why questions must always be asked - when they are unanswerable, they are therefore not illegitimate. - This shows the relational character of explanations. >Why-questions. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Forces | Bigelow | I 282 Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Lit: Bigelow, Ellis Pargetter 1988)(1) Thesis: forces are relations and a subspecies of causal relations. Here: stronger thesis all causes supervene on forces. Forces are higher-level relations between structures that involve individual events and their properties. Forces/tradition: intermediary between causes and effects. >Supervenience, >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Levels, >Events, >Forces/Tradition. Mediator between causes and effects. >Cause, >Effect. Mediation/middle position/intermediate position/BigelowVsTradition/ HumeVsTradition: Problem: Regress: if F is used as an intermediary between C and E, why is there not another mediator between F and E? Requirement for this argument is however: the assumption that C, E, and F are entities of the same type. Wrong solution: to assume that forces are "immediate causes". For this would again require immediate causes. >Regress. Wrong solution: to construct forces as dispositional properties: either dispositions of an object for changes or a field for any effects. Disposition/Bigelow/Pargetter: is not itself part of a causal chain. So we cannot close a gap in the chain with it. Therefore there is no threat of regression here. Nevertheless, dispositions simply do not have the right ontological category for forces. We can give a complete causal explanation without mentioning dispositions. For the causation is given by the physical basis of dispositions. >Ontology. I 283 Disposition/Bigelow/Pargetter: supervenes, but does not participate in the causal process. But they can be there if they are not active, while forces cannot do that. Forces: take part in the causal process. If they are not active, they do not exist - unlike dispositions. >Instantiation. Forces/Ellis/Bigelow/Pargetter (1988)(1): Thesis: they constitute causal relations. They are not themselves causes, but a relation between cause and effect. As a commonality between quite different phenomena. They should also show the commonality of laws, even if they are formulated very differently. Law/Forces/Ellis/Bigelow/Pargetter: inversely, similarly constructed laws may involve quite different forces, e.g. the proportion of the inversed square. New/Bigelow/Pargetter: recently, we no longer identify an instance of a causal relation with a single force (see below). New: different fundamental forces join forces to form fundamental causes. We keep the other arguments: Forces and fundamental causes must be relations of a higher level between events, for, as a relation of first level, they would make a Humean world impossible. Property complex/Bigelow/Pargetter: they are what is put into relation by forces. Each has as a constituent a number of properties and relations of 1st level. All will also be there in a Humean world. Only in the actual world there are the cohesive forces, and these are external relations. >Humean world. I 284 Actual world/Bigelow/Pargetter: even in our world there may be other instances of these property complexes which are not in these causal relations. This is due to the local nature of the causal relations. >Actual world. Camps: forces: realistic view: Bigelow/Pargetter, Ellis 1988(1): either the components or the resulting forces are real (not both, otherwise double causation). Vs: Cartwright 1980(3), 1983(4)) >N. Cartwright. Forces/Ellis/Bigelow/Pargetter: either, the components of forces are real or the resulting forces are real. For example, there may be a resultant force of 0, because forces neutralize if they deviate from 0. Problem: the components and the resulting forces cannot all be real, otherwise we would have overdetermination or double causation. >Overdetermination. Realistic view: must be decided from case to case whether it sees the components or the resulting forces as real. For example, we must sometimes assume different relative strengths of components to explain a resulting force. Reality/Bigelow/Pargetter: the reality of the components is sometimes forced upon us by our considerations. For example, three protons, shielded from interference from the outside, one in the middle of a line between the other two. The predicted movement of the outer towards the outside will involve forces that exist between the two outer as well as between them and that in the middle. Nevertheless, the principle of force and opposing force (here: action and reaction) demands that the middle proton is exposed to counter forces, which together cause it to remain at rest. I 285 On the other hand. For example, in a situation, a particle can only move perpendicular to a real force. Solution: we assume two fictitious forces, which are perpendicular to each other. This is imposed on us in the situation. The choice is arbitrary, as is orthogonality. And not all can be real, for otherwise we would have overdetermination. In this situation, the resulting force is real, not the components. Causal Relation/Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: since sometimes the resulting force must be assumed as real, sometimes the components (depending on the physical situation) the causal relation should be explained as a relation of higher level between aggregates of forces. >Causal relation. Forces/quantum mechanics/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the quantum mechanics one does not use forces. For example, one does not say that a photon exerts a force on an electron. >Quantum mechanics. Bigelow/Pargetter: however, we treat these cases as analogous because they appear to us to be similar enough. (See Heathcote 1989)(2). Field/Bigelow/Pargetter: also in the relation between field and particle, we allow ourselves to speak of forces and causation. >Fields. I 286 But we rather speak of interaction between two fields as between field and particle. Quantum mechanics/Bigelow/Pargetter: "Interactions" are the legitimate heirs of the traditional "forces". Field/VsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: there are also cases where a field does not interact with a particle, but is nevertheless produced. This seems to contradict our theory. If a field is formed from a particle, one cannot speak of forces. An electric particle exerts no force on its own electric field. Nevertheless, it precisely causes this field. BigelowVsVs: this is not a case of causation. The argument presupposes a separation of particle and field, which is not accepted by anybody. There is rather a unity. The field is part of the "essence" of the particle. This needs, however, to be examined in the light of further scientific development. >Essence, >Spacetime, >Space curvature. 1. Bigelow, J. Ellis, B., and Pargetter, R. (1988). Forces. Philosophy of Science 55. pp. 614-30. 2. Heathcote, A. (1989). A theory of causality: Causality = Interaction (as defined by quantum field theory). Erkenntnis 31 pp.77-108. 3. Cartwright, N. (1980). Do the laws of physics state facts? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61, pp.343-77. 4. Cartwright, N. (1983). How the laws of physics lie. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Formalism | Bigelow | I 176 Symbol/blackening/Bigelow/Pargetter: some authors say that symbols are mere blackening on paper (e.g. numbers) or mere noises. >Blackening of the paper. BigelowVsFormalism: Problem: on the one hand there are too many symbols then, on the other hand, too little. Too little: for very large numbers there is no corresponding blackening or noise. Too many: for smaller numbers there are too many different ways of representation, more than numbers are distinguished. E.g. "4", "four", "IV". >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Numbers, >Numerals, >Inscriptions, >Universals. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Generality | Bigelow | I 232 Natural Laws/Realism/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: a Humean theory of natural laws cannot be as realistic as ours. >Humean world. Generalisation/Regularity/Hume: the Humean can be realistic with regard to generalisations. >Laws of nature, >Regularities, >Generalization, >D. Hume, >Causality/Hume. I 233 "Total generality"/"pure" generality/Hume/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: may not contain a reference to an individual: It is too weak and too strong. a) too strong: for example, Kepler's laws refer to all planets but also to an individual, the sun. b) too weak: it is still not a law. For example, that everything moves towards the center of the earth. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Implicature | Grice | Graeser I 120 Implication/Grice: implication follows from what is said. Implicature: implicature does not follow from what was said - at least one conversational rule is violated. >Implication. Grice IV 248 Conversational implicature/Grice: the contribution should be informative, appropriate, true, justified, unambiguous and clearly structured - it must be possible to replace the conversational implicature by an argument, otherwise it would be a conventional implicature. >Information, >Communication. IV 264 1. If it is suspected, one must assume cooperation. 2) Conversational implicature is preserved at reformulation. 3) Conversational implicature presumes knowledge of the conventional role of the expression - therefore, conversational implicature is not part of the original specification of the conventional role. 4) Truth of what is said is not necessarily truth of the conversational implicature - bearer of the conversational implicature is therefore the act of saying, not what is said. 5) To get behind conversational implicature means to get behind what is necessary for adoption of maintenance of the cooperation principle. Cohen I 410 Conversational implicature/Grice: if it is not deleted, "if, then" is purely truth-functional. The assumption of non-truth-functional reasons is not transmitted here by the meaning, but by the implicature, e.g. if the government falls, there will be turmoil. >Truth functions. Cohen: here there is nothing stronger/Weaker. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Cohen I Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Some Remarks on Grice’s Views about the Logical Particals of Natural Languages", in: Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed), Pragmatics of Natural Languages, Dordrecht 1971, pp. 50-68 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen II Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Mr. Strawson’s Analysis of Truth", Analysis 10 (1950) pp. 136-140 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Impossible World | Cresswell | I 103 Impossible World/Stalnaker/Cresswell: Problem: the concept of possibility is itself defined in terms of possible worlds. >Possibility. Then impossible worlds permit merely an extra-strong concept of impossibility: truth in no world. >Stronger/weaker. Problem: then a logically impossible proposition can never be true. Contradiction: then there can only be as many propositions as possible worlds. >Possible worlds, >Propositions, >Contradictions. But there must be at the same time as many prepositions as sets of possible worlds. ((s) All this holds only if one accepts propositions as basic concepts or primitive entities). |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Individual Calculus | Simons | I 97 Individual Calculus/Clarke/Simons: the linguistic domain of thr classic individual calculus is a full Boolean algebra without a neutral element, i.e. there are no boundary elements (e.g. points). Clarke: there are two types of individuals: a) "soft" (open) individuals, that touch anything and b) "hard" individuals that are in contact with something. I 104 Individual Calculus/Leonard Goodman/stronger/weaker/Simons: advantage: the individual calculus is weaker than set theory: this prevents infinite ascending chains of new entities from old. There is "no discrimination without distinction of content". >Set theory, >Mereology, >Stronger/weaker. SimonsVs: problem: characteristics of the term "part". Weaker: a weaker theory provides more varied terms. >Concepts, >Parts. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Justification | Field | I 44 Justification/FieldVsWright: one can justify any belief by a stronger belief, from which it follows. >Stronger/weaker, >Beliefs. II 366f Rationality/justification/Field: pro a lower threshold: then good induction rules and perception rules count as a priori weak. >Rationality. Coherence theory/Field: Coherence theory has a higher threshold for rationality. >Coherence, >Coherence theory. Our rules are not considered reasonable before the user has not shown by a combination of deduction, induction and perception, where the combination varies from case to case, that these rules are reliable. >Covariance, >Reliability, >Reason, >Sense, >Senseless, >Rules, >Deduction, >Induction, >Perception. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Knowledge | Lycan | Chalmers I 141 Knowledge/Color researcher Mary/Frank Jackson/Qualia/LycanVsJackson/Lycan/Chalmers: (Lycan 1995)(1): there is a difference in intensionality between "This liquid is water" and "This liquid is H2O". In a way, both sentences express the same fact, but one sentence can be known without knowing the other. >Intensions, >Intensionality, >Twin Earth, >Implication, >Stronger/weaker. Chalmers: these gaps arise because of the difference between primary and secondary intensions (localized or non-localized in the actual or in a possible world). >Primary Intension, >Secondary Intension, >Possible Worlds, >Actual World. 1. William G. Lycan (1995). A limited defense of phenomenal information". In: Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic. pp. 243--58 (1995) |
Lyc I W. G. Lycan Modality and Meaning Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Language | Papineau | I 284 Purpose-means-thinking/language/animal/Papineau: (also as "Spandrille", side effect): Thesis: supposedly purpose-means-thinking emerged in a piggyback manner with language in the evolution. >Evolution, >Purposes, >Animals, >Animal language, >Thinking, >World/Thinking. PapineauVs: there is a danger of circularity: the primary biological purpose of language could be to increase the supply of information, but this would not help if the purpose-means-thinking had not already been developed. >Circular reasoning. Papineau: language could also have developed first as an instrument for passing on information. E.g. "A tiger approaches". >Information. I 285 Problem/Papineau: to explain the last step: what is the additional biological pressure that led to the language with which general information are reported? >Selection. A) If for the purpose of facilitating the purpose-means-thinking, then the purpose-means-thinking is not a side effect. It might have been language-dependent. B) If, on the other hand, language developed the ability to represent and process general information on an independent basis, there are further problems: 1. Why should language be selected for reporting and processing at all? 2. Fundamental: If language is independent of the purpose-means-thinking, then we need a story about how this independent ability is subsequently expanded as a side effect for the purpose-means-thinking. Cf. >Epiphenomenalism. The point is that the purpose-means-thinking must exercise a behavioral control. >Behavior, >Control mechanism, >Behavioral control, cf. >Self-regulation. I 286 The ability for general information processing must be able to add something to the set of dispositions: E.g.: "From now on only fish instead of meat", E.g. "At the next mailbox I will post the letter". Without this, the purpose-means-thinking makes no difference for our actions. >Information processing, cf. >Problem solving. I 286 Language/Purpose-Means-Thinking/Evolution/Papineau: Problem: how could a new way to change our behavior arise without a fundamental biological change? As a side effect? This is a pointless assumption. It must have brought the ability to develop new dispositions. >Evolution, >Dispositions. It is hard to imagine how this should have happened without biological selection. I 287 But this is not yet an argument for a wholly separate mechanism for the purpose-means-thinking in the human brain. Weaker: there could be some biological mechanism for the purpose-means-thinking, e.g. that the language has developed independently of the processing and reporting. Thereafter, further steps allow their outputs to influence the behavior. Cf. >Strength of theories, >Stronger/weaker. I 290 Language/Evolution/Generality/Papineau: previously I distinguished the language for special facts from one for general facts. >Generality/Papineau, >Generalization. Perhaps the former has developed for communication, and the latter for the purpose-means-thinking. >Communication. Or language for general facts has evolved under the co-evolutionary pressure of purpose-means-thinking and communication. Presentation/figurative/Papineau: how could the results of the figurative representation gain the power to influence the already existing structures of the control of the action? >Imagination, >Thinking without language. I 291 Perhaps from imitation of complex action sequences of others. >Imitation. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| Lawlikeness | Schurz | I 237 Laws of nature/natural laws/Schurz: Laws of nature do not refer to specific physical systems but express what is valid for any systems in all physically possible universes. E.g. Newton's nuclear axioms (E.g. total force = mass times acceleration, E.g. force = counterforce, E.g. gravitational force is proportional to the product of masses). Only if they are used system conditions, which explicitly list the present forces, we get a concretely solvable differential equation. There are only a few fundamental ones and they are found only in physics. However, most of the laws of physics are: Def system laws/Schurz: involve concrete contingent system conditions. Therefore they are not physically necessary but contingent. Example law of fall, example law of pendulum, example law of planets etc. Law-likeness/law-like/Schurz: a) in the broad sense: the law-like character of spatiotemporally limited general propositions is gradual. In this sense not only the laws of nature but also all system laws are law-like. Counterfactual conditionals: if we would agree to them are an indication of law-likeness. Problem: the counterfactual conditional also characterizes spatiotemporally bounded laws Ex "All ravens are black". Counterfactual conditionals/Schurz: on the other hand: we would not say Ex "If this apple had not been in the basket, it would not be green." >Counterfactual conditionals, >Laws of nature, >Laws. I 237 Similarity-metris/Possible Worlds/Counterfactual Conditional/RescherVsLewis/Schurz: (Lewis 1973b(1)): for philosophy of science, Lewis' logical semantics for counterfactual conditionals yields little, because the substantive interpretation of the similarity metric between Possible Worlds presupposes that we already know a distinction between laws and contingent facts. (Stegmüller 1969(2), 320-334). I 238 Law-like/law-like/Schurz: b) in the narrower sense: = physical necessity (to escape the vagueness resp. graduality of the broad term). Problem: Not all spatiotemporally unrestricted laws are law-like in the narrow sense. Universal but not physically necessary: Ex "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than one kilometer". Universality: is not a sufficient, but a necessary condition for law-likeness. E.g. the universal proposition "All apples in this basket are red" is not universal, even if one replaces it by its contraposition: Ex "All non-red objects are not apples in this basket". (Hempel 1965(3), 341). Strong Hume-thesis/Hume/Schurz: universality is a sufficient condition for law-likeness. SchurzVs: this is wrong Weak-Hume thesis/Schurz: universality is a necessary condition for law-likeness. >Causality/Hume. Stronger/weaker/(s): the claim that a condition is sufficient is stronger than that it is necessary. BhaskarVWeak Hume-thesis. Solution/Carnap/Hempel: Def Maxwell conditional/law-like: laws of nature or nomological predicates must not contain an analytic reference to particular individuals or spacetime points (spacetime points). This is much stronger than the universality condition. >Stronger/weaker. Ex "All emeralds are grue": is spatiotemporally universal, but does not satisfy Maxwell's condition. >Grueness. I 239 Laws of nature/Armstrong: Thesis: Laws of nature are implication relations between universals. Therefore no reference to individuals. >Laws of nature/Armstrong, >Causality/Armstrong. Maxwell-Conditioning/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979): represent a physical symmetry principle: i.e. laws of nature must be invariant under translation of their time coordinates and translation or rotation of their space coordinates. From this, conservation laws can be obtained. Symmetry principles/principles/Schurz: physical symmetry principles are not a priori, but depend on experience! >Symmetries/Feynman, >Symmetries/Kanitscheider. Maxwell-condition/Schurz: is too weak for law-like character: e.g. "no lump of gold has a diameter of more than 1 km" also this universal theorem fulfills it. Law-likeness/Mill/Ramsey/Lewis/Schurz: proposal: all those general propositions which follow from those theories which produce the best unification of the set of all true propositions. (Lewis 1973b(1), 73). Vs: problem: it remains unclear why one should not add the proposition Bsp "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than 1 km". Because many true singular propositions also follow from it. Solution/Schurz: we need a clear notion of physical possibility. Problem: we have no consistent demarcation of natural laws and system laws. 1. Lewis, D. (1973b). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 2. Stegmüller, W. (1969). Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie. Band I:Wissenschaftliche Erklärung und Begründung. Berlin: Springer. 3. Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, New York: Free Press. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Modal Operators | Modal Operators: modal operators are symbols for expressing possibility and necessity. These operators do not belong to classical logic, but fall into the field of modal logic. Their placement at the beginning or in the course of formulas determines the relative strength of statements that can be obtained from the interpretation of these formulas. See also range, stronger/weaker, modal logic, possible worlds. |
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| Multi-valued Logic | Field | II 144 Three-valued logic/Kleene/Field: Def correct/Kleene: an assertion is correct only if it has the highest of the three truth values. >Correctness. Field: Problem: not all of Tarski’s biconditionals remain correct. Even e.g. "If A, then A" is not generally assertible. Therefore, the Kleene logic is weak. >Stronger/weaker. "If A then A" is not generally assertible -> Restall: "n-fold jump" ... + ... II 145 Material conditional/Three-valued logic/Kleene/Field: the materal conditional is a conditional that has one of the two highest truth values. So the Curry paradox is impossible: "If this statement is true, then p". >Material conditional, >Curry paradox. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Necessity | Wessel | I 126 Necessary/Wessel: often: "~ p > p" interpreted as necessary - Problem: no way to differentiate between "p" and "p is necessary". >Logical necessity, >Logical possibility. "Logically impossible": "p> ~ p": then "~ p" and "p is impossible" equivalent. >Equivalence. I 344 Necessity/Wessel: when I designate a sentence as needed, I give a hint about my judgment reasons. >Judgments, >Reasoning, >Justification. Possibility: Speaker abstains from judgment. >Possibility, cf. >Score keeping. I 350 Logical/physically necessary/Wessel: 1. what is logically necessary is also factually necessary 2. What is factually possible is also logically possible 3. What is factually not necessary, is also not logically necessary 4. what is logically impossible , is also factually impossible. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. Logical modality sets limits on the factual modality - because logical modality alone from linguistic requirements, not ontologically. Logical truth is equivalent to logical demonstrability and logical necessity. >Provability, >Modalities, >Logical truth. Logical falsifiability is equivalent to logical falsehood and logical impossibility. >Contradictions, >Consistency. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Negation | Brandom | I 541 Negation/Brandom: task: formulating incompatibilities - everything that is incompatible with "Wulf is a mammal" is incompatible with "Wulf is a dog" but not vice versa. I 610 Definition negation/Brandom: negation of p: the minimum irreconcilable with the statement: the strongest inferential claim that follows from any proposition incompatible with p in a way that fixes a commitment. Cf. >Stronger/weaker. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Negation | Field | II 308 Vagueness/indeterminacy/logic/"reject"/Field: Def Rejecting: is not accepting the negation. Moderate non-classical logic/Field: should be defined without "reject": it does not accept any instances of the Law of the Excluded Middle, but also does not accept the negation of any instance. >Excluded middle, >Negation. Reject: the sense of rejecting should be less than the meaning of "accepting the negation". - But it must in turn be stronger than "not accept". >Stronger/Weaker. Def "reject p": "accept that it is not the case that determined p". "Low" acceptance should be more than "not high". If the threshold is >acceptance, then rejecting is stronger than non-accepting. Assumed, belief degrees in a sentence and its negation add up to less than 1, then: rejecting is weaker than accepting the negation. >Belief degrees. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Negation | Nozick | II 234 double negation: "not-(not-q)" is weaker than "q" - it is the same as "may" ("might") - not the same as "would". >Stronger/weaker, cf. >Strength of theories, >Double negation, >Multi-valued logic, >Truth values, >Truth. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Negation | Putnam | VI 404 Def Negation/"the" negation/Putnam: negation is the logically weakest statement that a given statement (proposition) is incompatible with. ((s) >stronger/weaker: Strength of Theories). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Nominalism | Field | I 132 Theory/Nominalism/strong/weak/stronger/weaker/(s): strong theory: has more consequences - if mathematical entities (mE) are to be dispensed with, a Platonist theory can have no (physical) consequences which a nominalistic (only physical entities entities) does not have. >Stronger/weaker, >Platonism, >Mathematical entities. l 159 Equivalence/Platonism/Nominalism/Field: Question: in what sense are Platonist (e.g. "direction 1 = direction 2") and nominalistic statement (c1 is parallel to c2) equivalent? Problem: if there are no directions, the second cannot be a consequence of the first. >Ontology. --- III 12 Nominalism/Field/N.B.: we will not claim N* (without mathematical entities), but the stronger N. III 34 Nominalism/Field: is compatible with the assumption of space-time points and empty regions. Nominalism pro substantivalism. >Substantivalism. III 36 Regions/Points/Field: Solution for the nominalists: Individual calculus/Goodman: Regions as sums of points. - But then there are no empty regions. - The region then does not need to be connected or measurable. >Individual calculus, cf. >Relationism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Objectivity | Vollmer | I XX Objective knowledge/Vollmer: Objective knowledge is possible, but as such not statable - we are often right, but can not be sure that we are. >Certainty, >Knowledge, >Confirmation, >Proofs, >Provability, >Experiments, >Method. I 16 Objectivity/Vollmer: invariance is the key. - Objectivity can never be definitively stated. >Invariance. I 91 Objectivity/Vollmer: independence of the method: the truth must not depend on the method. ((s) Putnam ditto). >Truth. I 291 Objectivity/Vollmer: intersubjectivity is not a sufficient criterion - invariance is not sufficient either, but sharper. >Intersubjectivity, >Sufficiency, >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Perspective | Hintikka | II 115 Knowing-who/seeing/visual perception/perspective identification/Hintikka: Def Seeing/Hintikka: seeing an object: people and bodies who occupy the same gap in John's perception field can be identified by him. He also knows that different objects can be at different times in the same place. N.B.: John does not have to know who this person is! Knowing-who/seeing-who/Hintikka: we also need an identification based on public (object-centered) criteria. Public/perspective/language/logical form/Hintikka: the difference between perspective and public identification is also expressed linguistically: E.g. public: an identification is successful if it is true that: (1) John sees who b is. (2) John remembers who b is. (3) John knows who b is. II 116 On the other hand: perspective: (4) John sees b. (5) John remembers b. (6) John knows b. Hintikka/(s): the perspective can be a mere regarding, letting the eyes rest on something without knowing who or what that is. Cross-World Identification/rigidity/HintikkaVsKripke: it is more about the way of identification (public/perspective) than about rigidity or non-rigidity. >Rigidity, >Possible worlds. The way of identification decides about what counts as one and the same individual. II 120 Def Identification/visual perception/perspective/private/Hintikka: to identify b in the perspective sense means, to find a gap for b among the visual objects. That is, to locate b visually. Logical form: visual identification corresponds to answering a question of where ((s) localization in the facial room). Perspective/Hintikka/(s): perspective does not correspond strictly to the private point of view but it stands in contrast to the public point of view. Def Identification/visual perception/public/t/Hintikka: identification is the ability to locate b on the map of abstract more-than-personal knowledge. That is, the ability to interpret what you see. Logical Form: a logical form is visual identification. Public: public means to answer a what-question or a who-question. Interpretation/seeing/perception/Hintikka: the interpretation here is to attribute a meaning to our senses. Analog: analog means to interpret abstract characters as letters (seeing-as). ((s) Stronger/weaker: to look at a printed page and noticing that it is printed is weak. Stronger: reading the printed page is stronger). Public/identification/Hintikka: it is dangerous to interpret our methods of public identification in this way. >Identification/Hintikka. Perspective/private/Hintikka: the perspective identification provides an independent conceptual system. Symmetry/asymmetry/identification/logical form/everyday language/identification/perspective/public/Hintikka: Symmetry: in logic (logical form) there is a symmetry between the expressions for public or perspective identification. Asymmetry/everyday language: in the normal language, this symmetry does not exist. Reason: for public identification, we have hidden quantifiers. Perspective: here we need a direct object construction. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Possibility | Dennett | I 140 Possible objects/Unrealized possibilities/Individuation/Identification/Quine/Dennett: Quine asks: The possible fat man in the entrance and the possible bald man in the entrance: are they the same possible man, or there are two different possible men? Would their similarity make them into one? Are no two possible things equal? >Possibilia. I 141 Possibility/Dennett: Degrees: from weak to strong: 1) logical , 2) physical, 3) biological, 4) historical - (>stronger/weaker: >strength of theories). - Problem: E.g. >time travel: how to distinguish logical and physical possibility? I 162 Possibility/Dennett: Lewis: pro graded possibility (Dennett dito). Problem: not the same as accessibility within the >Library of Babel (or Mendel ) - this is greater than the universe. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Possible Worlds | Adams | Stalnaker I 32 Possible worlds/Robert Adams: if there are true propositions that speak of the existence of nonactual possible worlds, they must be able to be reduced to sentences in which only things from the actual world are mentioned which are not identical with non-actual possibilities. >Possible worlds, >Actuality, >Actual world, >Possibility, >Counterfactuals. StalnakerVsAdams: I do not see why this should be necessary. Possible worlds/Stalnaker: Two questions: 1. Are they really so obscure? I 33 2. Does the belief in possible worlds and the indexical analysis of actuality oblige us to extreme realism? Certainly not. >Centered worlds. World stories/world-story/Possible worlds/Robert Adams: Thesis: a world-story is a maximally consistent set of propositions. The concept of a possible world can be given in a contextual analysis in terms of world stories. Proposition/Truth/Adams/Stalnaker: a proposition is true in some or all possible worlds if it is an element of some or all of the world-stories. StalnakerVsAdams: in his approach, there are three undefined terms: Proposition, consistent, and contradictory. >Propositions, >Consistency, >Contradiction. Proposals/Adams/Stalnaker: proposals can be presented as language-independent, abstract objects. They have truth values. >Truth value, >Abstract objects. Consistency/Adams/Stalnaker: consistency is a property of sets of propositions. >Consistency. One can define them in terms of possible worlds in which all propositions are true. I 34 Two conditions for consistency: (W1) The set of all true propositions is consistent (W2) Each subset of a consistent set is consistent. Contradiction/Adams/Stalnaker: contradiction could be defined in terms of consistency: A and B are contradictory, iff. {A, B} is not consistent And for each consistent set of propositions Γ is either Γ U {A} or Γ U {B} consistent. The theory presupposes: (W3) Each proposition has a contradiction. Proposition/Adams/Stalnaker: this is a minimal theory of propositions. It does not impose any structure on propositions, except for what is needed for compatibility, implication, and equivalence. And to ensure that e.g. the right kind of implication is present. E.g. implication: Definition Implication/Proposition/Stalnaker: (here): A implies B iff. a set consisting of A and a contradiction of B is not consistent. (W1) and (W2) ensure that our implication has the right properties. Stalnaker I 36 Proposition/Possible World/Stalnaker: an analysis of propositions as worlds provides definitions of consistency, etc., in concepts of set-theoretical relations between sets of worlds. World Story Theory/Adams/Stalnaker: the theory of world stories is weaker because it leaves open questions that clarify the analysis of propositions as worlds. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. The following two theses are consequences of the possible-worlds-theory but not of the world-story theory: (W5) Seclusion condition: For any set of propositions G there is a proposition A such that G implies A and A implies every element of G. Stalnaker: i.e. that for any set of propositions there is a proposition which says that every proposition in the set is true. Proposition/Seclusion/Stalnaker: whatever propositions are, if there are any, there are also sets of them. And for any set of propositions, it is definitely true or false that all their elements are true. And of course this is a proposition. So I assume that the world-story theorist wants to add (W5) to his theory. (W6) Equivalent propositions are identical. Problem: the problems of (W6) are known. ((s)> hyperintensionalism/hyperintentionality: sentences that are true in the same worlds are indistinguishable, equivalence of "snow is white" to "grass is green", etc.). >Hyperintensionality, >Semantics of Possible Worlds. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Proof of God’s Existence | Bolzano | Simons I 321 Cosmological proof of God/unconditioned existence/Bolzano/Simons: (circumvents the problem of being founded by referring to classes. >Classes. A) there is something real, e.g. my thoughts that it is like that. B) Suppose there is some thing A that is absolutely essential in its existence, then we already have it C) Suppose A is conditional. Then form the class of all conditional real things A, B, C, ... This is also possible if this class is infinite D) the class of all conditioned real things is itself real. Is it conditional or unconditional? If it is absolute, we already have it E) Suppose it is conditional: every conditioned presupposes the existence of something else, whose existence it determines. Thus even the class of all conditional things, if conditioned, presupposes the existence of something that determines it. F) This other thing must be unconditioned, for if it were conditioned, it would belong to the class of all conditioned things G) Therefore, there is something unconditional, e.g. a god. Simons: this makes no use of being founded: C) leaves the possibility of an infinite chain open. >Foundation, >Justification, >Reasons, >Ultimate justification, >Conditions. 1. RussellVsBolzano/Simons: one might have doubts about the "class of all unconditioned things". >Paradoxes, >Russell's paradox, >Sets, >Set theory. Solution/Bolzano: it's about the real things from which we can assume spatial-temporal localization. >Localization. 2. SimonsVsBolzano: Step F) I 322 Why should the class of all conditioned things not be conditioned by something within? This would be conditioned itself, etc. but any attempt to stop the recourse would again appeal to being founded. ((s) The thing that conditions would be within the class of conditioned things, it would be conditioned and conditional at the same time). >Regress. Solution/Simons: we need additionally a conditioning principle. Definition Conditioning Principle/Simons: if a class C is such that each dependent element of it has all the objects on which it depends within X, then X is not dependent. (Simons pro). Simons: this allows infinite chains of dependencies. A kind of infinite dependence already arises e.g. when two objects are mutually dependent. >Dependence, >Causal dependence, >Ontological dependence. If the conditioning principle applies, why should the class X be still externally conditioned? Ad Bolzano: Suppose we accept his argument until e). Then it can go on like this: H) if the class of all conditioned things is conditioned, then there is an element of it that is dependent on something that is not an element of that class. (Contraposition to the conditioning principle) >Contraposition. I) Then such an (unconditioned) object is not an element of the class of all conditioned things, and is thus unconditional. J) Therefore, there is in any case something unconditioned. SimonsVsAtomism: that is better than anything that an atomism achieves. >Atomism. Conditioning principle/Simons: is the best extension of the strong rigid dependency (//), i.e. (N) (a // x ↔ (Ey) [x ε a u a // x] u ~ x ε a) >Rigidity. SimonsVsBlack: with the strong instead of the weak dependency, we can counter Black. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. I 323 God/Mereology/Ontology/Simons: in any case, the strong rigid dependence does not prove the existence of God. Only the existence of an unconditional, which Bolzano cautiously calls "a God". >God, >Existence, >Ontology. Independence/Simons: does not include divinity. >Independence, >Existence statement. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Propositions | Stalnaker | I 35 Proposition/structure/possible world/Stalnaker: propositions are highly structured, possible worlds are not. >Possible worlds/Stalnaker. The structures that exist between propositions, do not exist like that between possible worlds. Propositions can be stronger or weaker - possible worlds cannot. >Stronger/weaker, >Content, >Situations, >World. A minimum theory of propositions and possible worlds needs only the structures of propositions, not of possible worlds. >Structures. I 37 Proposition/Stalnaker: a proposition is made up of individuals and properties. Sentence/Stalnaker: a sentence is made up of names and predicates. >Sentences, >Predication, >Truth. I 51 Understanding/Stalnaker: a proposition cannot be understood like a sentence, because it is already the content. >Understanding. I 61f Def Proposition/Stalnaker: a proposition is no more than a sub-region, or subset of possible worlds. Def assertion: asserting a proposition is nothing else than to locate the real world in this subset. >Assertions, >Logical space. Def true-relative-to-x: to say, a proposition is true relative to a possible world x means that the possible world x is in the subset (of possible worlds) that constitutes the proposition. Def true simpliciter: is to say that the real world is in this subset (of possible worlds that constitute the proposition). >Bare truth. Proposition: a proposition is identified with its truth conditions. >Truth conditions, >Individuation. I 191 Secondary proposition/two-dimensional semantics/Chalmers/Stalnaker: ("fx"): secondary propositions are based on the real world. >Intensions/Stalnaker. Primary proposition: ("fp"): primary propositions are based on the particular world in which the statement is made. Logical form: Def fp: logical Form: fx(y) = f(x,y) and fp(x) = f(x,x) or equivalent: fp(x) = fx(x). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Quantifiers | Hintikka | II 28 Branched Quantifiers/branching/stronger/weaker/Hintikka: Example branching: 1st branch: there is an x and b knows ... 2nd branch: b knows there is an x ... Quantification with branching quantifiers is extremely strong, almost as strong as 2nd level logic. Therefore, it cannot be completely axiomatized (quantified epistemic logic with unlimited independence). II 29 Variant: a variant would refer to simpler cases where the independence refers to ignorance, combined with a move with a single, un-negated, non-epistemic operator {b} K. Here, an explicit treatment is possible. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Quantifiers | Stechow | Stechow 85 Weak quantifier/Milsarik/Semantics/linguistics/Stechow: e.g. "one", "no" (without existence presupposition). E.g. Paula is a/no cat - but not - "Paula is every cat" (th A strong quantifier entails a presupposition. >Presuppositions, >Stronger/weaker, >Quantification, >Strength of theories, >Semantics. |
A. von Stechow I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006) |
| Quantum Mechanics | Genz | II 118 Quantum Mechanics/Genz: quantum mechanics denies the simultaneous possibility of these three principles: 1. location, 2. possibility of independent coincidences in separate areas and 3. induction. II 235 Observation/principle/formula/equation/Genz: at the beginning of quantum mechanics there were two purely mathematical observations which could not be traced back to any principle: 1. Planck's formula for heat radiation and 2. the formula for the hydrogen spectrum. Justification: justification consisted solely of delivering correct results. Quantum Mechanics/principles/Genz: 1. principle of quantum mechanics: the first principle is entanglement. Thesis: nearly everything is interwoven with anything. Even more profoundly: there are no localizable quantum states. II 236 Remote effect/QWM/message/information/Genz: due to the "remote effect" (from the interconnection) no messages can be transmitted. 2. Principle of quantum mechanics: no message can be transmitted instantaneously. The two principles together are very close to a contradiction. It follows from this that both together are very powerful. >Stronger/weaker. Derivation/principle/Genz: so far, it has not been possible to derive quantum mechanics as the only possible realization of its two principles. >Derivation, >Derivability. II 238 John Bell/quantum mechanics/Genz: John Bell has shown that quantum mechanics does not allow a choice of the frequencies that result in what is observed. The relative frequencies come out wrong. The predictions of quantum mechanics contradict what Bell derived from principles. Quantum mechanics, however, is the best confirmed theory that exists. >Bell's inequation. II 241 Effects/transmission/transfer of effects/energy/quantum mechanics/Genz: a special feature of the transfer of effects in quantum mechanics, through which no messages (information) can be transmitted, is that no energy is transmitted. >Information, >Energy. II 245 Effect/non-locality/Genz: in quantum mechanics, effects (no messages) can be transmitted instantaneously. II 246 Principles/quantum mechanics/Genz: quantum mechanics can be derived entirely from principles that contradict everyday experience. So far, we only know which principles cannot exist together. II 286 Quantum Mechanics/classical physics/Genz: it is mainly the variables describing the states that are different: In quantum mechanics it is the: wave function In classical physics it is: places and velocities. This is not about deterministic or non-deterministic. >Determinism, >Wave function. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Referential Quantification | Referential Quantification: is an expression for the form of quantification normally used in predicate logic ("There is at least one object x with the property ..." or "For all objects x applies...."). Here, something is said about objects, with their existence being presupposed. On the other hand, substitutional quantification is about linguistic expressions ("There is a true sentence that ..."). The decisive difference between the two types of quantification is that, in the case of the possible replacement of a linguistic expression by another expression, a so-called substitution class must be assumed which cannot exist in the case of objects since the everyday subject domain is not classified into classes is. E.g. you can replace a table by some box, but not the word table by an available word. See also substitutional quantification, quantification, substitution, inference, implication, stronger/weaker. |
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| S 4 / S 5 | S 4 / S 5, logic, philosophy: S 4 and S 5 are modal logical systems that differ in terms of what is expressible in them. The increase in expressiveness is achieved by adding axioms. S 5 results from S 4 by the added axiom Mp > NMp. "What is possible is necessarily possible". See also axioms, axiom systems, modal logic, modalities, stronger/weaker. |
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| S 4 / S 5 | Cresswell | Hughes I 39 S4/Hughes/Cresswell: T + Np> NNP - (weaker) - S5: T + M> NMP (stronger) - both are stronger than T. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Axiom systems. Hughes I 110 S4/Hughes/Cresswell: = T + (Lp> LLp). (s) What is necessary is necessary for logical reasons. Stronger than T, weaker than S5. S5: T + (Mp> LMp). ((s) what is possible, is necessarily possible.) Hughes I 69 Semantics/semantic models/Hughes/Cresswell: E.g. T, S4, S5 alone are insufficient to characterize the different meanings of necessity and possibility. Semantic graphs/Hughes/Cresswell: consider various worlds. >Accessibility. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Hughes I G.E. Hughes Maxwell J. Cresswell Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978 |
| Schematic Letters | Field | II 115 Fragment/stronger/weaker/Field/(s): weak fragment of substitutional quantification (sQ): without substitutional quantifiers: here we handle schematic letters as variables for sets. - Then the schemes themselves are part of the language - not only their instances. >Substitutional quantification, >Stronger/weaker. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Scope | Scope, range, logic, philosophy: range is a property of quantifiers or operators to be able to be applied to a larger or smaller range. For example, the necessity operator N may be at different points of a logical formula. Depending on the positioning, the resulting statement has a considerably changed meaning. E.g. great range "It is necessary that there is an object that ..." or small range "There is an object that is necessarily ....". See also quantifiers, operators, general invariability, stronger/weaker, necessity, Barcan Formula. |
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| Second Order Logic, HOL | Field | I 37 Second Order Logic/Second Order Logic/Higher Order Logic/HOL/Field: Here, the the quantifiers have no recursive method of evidence. >Quantifiction, >Quantifiers, >Logic, >Recursion. Quantification/Field: therefore it is vague and indeterminate, but even then applies: (A > logically true (A)) & (~ A > logically true (~ A)) is always true. The vagueness refers to the A. --- II 238 Referential indeterminacy/logical operators/2nd order Logic/Field: special case: Question: can complex logical operators - e.g., unrestricted 2nd order quantifiers ((s) via properties) have any particular truth conditions? No: e.g. everything that you express with them can be reformulated (reduced) with a more restricted quantification (via sets). It does not help to say e.g. "with "for all properties" I mean for all properties". >"Everything he said"). >Truth conditions, >Sets, >Extensions, >Extensionality. All/Field: the use of "all" without quotes is itself the subject of a reinterpretation. >All/Field. ((s) There could be a contradictory, still undiscovered property which should not be included under "all properties.") Field: E.g. Acceleration near speed of light - here the definitive operator would again help. VsDeflationism: Deflationism could simply say ".. all .. " is true iff all ... Vs: in addition one needs the definitive-operator (dft-operator), which demands conditions - but it does not specify them. Field: dito with Higher Order Quantification (HOL). --- III 39 First order Logic/2nd order/stronger/weaker/attenuation/Field: to weaken the second order logic to the 1st order, we can attenuate the second-order axioms to the axiom-schemata of first-order , namely the schema of separation. Problem: not many non-standard models come in. Namely, models in which quantities that are in reality infinite, satisfy the formula which usually defines straight finiteness. >unintended models. III 92 2nd Order Logic/Field: we have it at two places: 1. At the axiomatization of the geometry of the spacetime and at the scalar order of spacetime points we have III 93 The "complete logic of the part-whole relation", or the "complete logic of the Goodman sums". 2. The binary quantifier "less than". But we do not need this if we have Goodman's sums: Goodman's sum: it's logic is sufficient to give comparisons of powerfulness. For heuristic reasons, however, we want to keep an extra logic for powerfulness ("less than"). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Selection | Sober | Perler I 357 Selection/E. Sober: Difference:"Selection by" (stronger) - "Selection from" (weaker): can also be by-product of a selection "by". For example, a funnel only lets through balls smaller than 1 cm. These are all green by chance. But the selection through the funnel went only by size, not by color. >Stronger/weaker, >Evolution, >Properties, >Classification. |
Sober I E. Sober Evidence and Evolution: The Logic Behind The Science Cambridge 2008 Perler I Dominik Perler Markus Wild Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 |
| Similarity Metrics | Nozick | II 174 Similarity Metrics/Similarity/Possible Worlds/Nozick: the measure for the next world must be: what if the antecedent is true. - E.g. alphabetical order on the shelf: is an explanatory, not merely a representative order. - Why are the things there? >Order, >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity, >Explanation. Variant: content arranged, but coincidentally the same order - then the alphabetical order is not an explanation. - ((s) Then the neighborhood is no next world, but an irrelevant world.) II 241 Closure/Nearest World/Similarity Metrics/Nozick: when the condition (3) (believe nothing wrong) Condition (3) "If p would be false, S would not believe it" was to be completed, then, if p implies q, the non-q-situation must not be further away from the actual world than the nearest non-p-world. >Closure, >Omniscience/Nozick, >Real world, >Actuality. NozickVsClosure under known implication: we do not have to know or believe all the consequences of our knowledge. II 242 Closure/knowledge/Skepticism/Nozick: if our knowledge were closed under known implication, then if p implies q, the non-q-situation must not be further from the actual world than the nearest non possible world. >Brains in a vat, >Skepticism. Problem: when this is a "non-tank" world, then the statement would demand that the world of the skeptic does not exist, that the tank-world is not further away from the actual world, than any other non possible world. Problem: we would believe p, even if it is wrong, then we do not know that p. >Belief, >Knowledge. All conditionals, which say that we believe nothing wrong, would be wrong. >Conditional. Closed: would be the concept of knowledge only if the world of the skeptic might exist, if p were not true. So when our concept of knowledge would be so strong, skepticism would be right. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Concepts. Nozick: but we do not have to accept that. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Strength of Theories | Armstrong | III 77 Logical Necessity: is the strongest necessity. - Physical necessity: weaker because of contingency - still weaker: general quantification (mere uniformity). - N.B.: from a law we cannot conclude general quantification. - Law: physical necessity. >Laws. III 108 High/low/stronger/weaker/Armstrong: E.g. "N (F, G)" is logically stronger than "All Fs are Gs". The universal statement (general quantification, mere conjunction) is logically weaker than a law statement. >Law statements/Armstrong. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Strength of Theories | Avramides | I 66f stronger/weaker/theory/necessity/sufficiency/Bennett: E.g. we can strengthen a theory (analysis) in order to make the analysis sufficient. Then we can weaken it, to make it necessary. Stronger/weaker/Bennett/(s): extremely strong: logical truth, Weaker: empirical truth, which may prove to be wrong - Extremely weak: simultaneous truth of the conditional and its converse. Supervenience: much weaker than reductionism. >Supervenience, >Reductionism, >Conditional, >Necessity, >Logical truth. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Strength of Theories | Cresswell | I 154 Stronger/weaker/Cresswell: each sentence of first order, putting the (Ey) before (x) or (Ew) before (z) is too strong, so no sentence iv (iv) FφEψ(x)(z) (F(x, φ(x), z, ψ(z))) seems determined to be Level 1. (Existential quantifier before universal quantifier). >Existential quantification, >Universal quantification, >Quantification, >Logic, >Second order logic, >Stronger/weaker. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Strength of Theories | Davidson | Glüer II 18f Stronger/Weaker/Theory/Davidson: stronger: e.g. someone understands a sentence, who knows that it is true. - weaker: to know the verification process. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Strength of Theories | Field | I 36 Stronger/Weaker/Field/(s): higher order systems are stronger. I 121 E.g. "There is a proof of ~ A > ~ MA" - stronger: "There is a model of A > MA". I 132 Theory/nominalism/strong/weak/(s): a strong theory: has more consequences - if mathematical entities should be dispensable, a platonic theory must have no (physical) consequences, which a nominalistic (physical entities only) does not have. >Nominalism, >Platonism. I 172 Weaken/"too rich"/"too strong"/Field: E.g. a theory (or schema) asserts the existence of more entities (such as regions) than you ever need. - Then unsecured empirical consequences can occur. - (These are then unverifiable) Solution: Weakening of the theory. --- II 115 Fragment/stronger/weaker/Field/(s): weak fragment of substitutional quantification. (sQ): - without substitutional quantifiers: treating scheme characters as variables for sentences. - Then the schemata themselves are part of the language, not only their instances. >Substitutional quantification. II 123 Weak/Field/(s): Weaker: Scheme letters are weaker than substitutional allquantification - Modal operator: demands stronger expressions. Ad II ~ 290 Vagueness/logic/(s): gradations: strong: certain instances of the sentence of the excluded third are wrong. - weaker: some cannot be identified. "wrong"/strong: "has a true negation". Field: to express assertions and denials of determinacy e.g. D-A, D-A, -D-DA, D-D-A, etc. (A is atomic) - so we have reduced the problem considerably of explaining the determinateness. >Reduction. II 295 S4: there are the following possibilities: Positive limit: ~ DA u D ~ D ~ A u ~ D ~ DA. Negative limit: ~ D ~ A u D ~ DA u ~ D ~ D ~ A "Definitely indeterminate": D ~ DA u D ~ D ~ A - "hopelessly indeterminate": ~ D ~ DA u ~ D ~ D ~ A I.e. not even definite limit. Potential indeterminacy of the first order/Field: for an agent this means that if he treats A as potentially indeterminate, then he must have degree of believe in it and its negation, which adds up to less than one. II 361 Def Weak a priori sentence/Field: can be reasonably believed without empirical evidence. III 39 >Second order Logic. III 39 Stronger/Weaker: weaker theories have rather non-standard models (unintend models) - a higher order systems is stronger than a 1st order system. >Unintended models. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Strength of Theories | Fodor | a propos I 144 Stronger/weaker/evidence/theory/Fodor/(s): evidence for a strong theory is also evidence for a weaker theory, but not vice versa. >Evidence, >Conclusions. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Strength of Theories | Genz | II 13 Theory/stronger/weaker/Genz: assuming two theories make the same verifiable statements. Superior: the theory that makes weaker assumptions is superior. >Presuppositions, >Theories, >Conditions, >Sufficiency, >Necessity. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Strength of Theories | Grice | ad Meggle I 356 Stronger/weaker/Grice: one should only make a weaker assertion (e.g. "He is either here or there") if you have a good reason for this. E.g. "I have five Dollars," gives rise to the presumption that the speaker has only 5. >Presuppositions. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 |
| Strength of Theories | Hintikka | II 7 Standard Semantics/Kripke Semantics/Hintikka: what differences are there? The ditch between standard semantics and Kripke semantics is much deeper than it first appears. Cocchiarella: Cocchiarella has shown, however, that even in the simplest quantifying case of the monadic predicate logic, the standard logic is radically different from its Kripke cousin. Decidability: monadic predicate logic is, as Kripke has shown, decidable. Kripke semantics: Kripke semantics is undecidable. Decisibility: Decisibility implies axiomatizability. Stronger/weaker/Hintikka: as soon as we go beyond monadic predicate logic, we have a logic of considerable strength, complexity, and unruliness. Quantified standard modal logic of the 1. level/Hintikka: the quantified standard modal logic of the 1. level is in a sense more powerful than the 2. level logic (with standard semantics). The latter is, of course, already very strong, so that some of the most difficult unresolved logical and quantum-theoretical problems can be expressed in terms of logical truth (or fulfillment) in logical formulas of the second level. Def equally strong/stronger/weaker/Hintikka: (here): the terms "stronger" and "weaker" are used to show an equally difficult decision-making problem. Decision problem: the standard logic of the 2. level can be reduced to that for quantified standard modal logic of the 1. level. Reduction: this reduction is weaker than translatability. II 9 Quantified standard modal logic of the 1. level/Hintikka: this logic is very strong, comparable in strength with the 2. level logic. It follows that it is not axiomatizable (HintikkaVsKripke). The stronger a logic is, the less manageable it is. II 28 Branching Quantifiers/stronger/weaker/Hintikka: E.g. branching here: 1. Branch: there is an x and b knows... 2. Branch: b knows there is an x ... Quantification with branched quantifiers is extremely strong, almost as strong as 2. level logic. Therefore, it cannot be completely axiomatized (quantified epistemic logic with unlimited independence). II 29 Variant: variants are simpler cases where the independence refers to ignorance, combined with a move with a single, non-negated operator {b} K. Here, an explicit treatment is possible. II 118 Seeing/stronger/weaker/logical form/Hintikka: a) stronger: recognizing, recognizing as, seeing as. b) weaker: to look at, to keep a glance on, etc. Weaker/logical form/seeing/knowing/Hintikka: e.g. (Perspective, "Ex") (15) (Ex) ((x = b) & (Ey) John sees that (x = y)). (16) (Ex)(x = b & (Ey) John remembers that x = y)) (17) (Ex)(x = b & (Ey) KJohn (x = y)) Acquaintance/N.B.: in (17) b can be John's acquaintance even if John does not know b as b! ((S) because of y). II 123 Everyday Language/ambiguity/Hintikka: the following expression is ambiguous: (32) I see d Stronger: (33) (Ex) I see that (d = x) That says the same as (31) if the information is visual or weaker: (34) (Ex) (d = x & (Ey) I see that (x = y)) This is the most natural translation of (32). Weaker: for the truth of (34) it is enough that my eyes simply rest on the object d. I do not need to recognize it as d. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Strength of Theories | Mates | I 158 Stronger/weaker/statements/Mates: E.g. "Fa" is stronger than "(Ex) Fx". >Existential generalization, >Universal instantiation. The rule of "elimination of examples" then allows to make the conclusion dependent on the weaker statement. >Stronger/weaker, >Conclusion, >Dependence. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Strength of Theories | Minsky | I 190 Arguments/Strength of theories/Artificial Intelligence/Minsky: When people disagree, we often say that one side's position seems stronger than the other. But what has strength to do with reasoning? In logic, arguments are simply either right or wrong, since there is not the slightest room for matters of degree. But in real life, few arguments are ever absolutely sure, so we simply have to learn how various forms of reasoning are likely to go wrong. Then we can use different methods to make our chains of reasoning harder to break. a) [stronger]: Parallelism: One method is to use several different arguments to prove the same point — putting them in parallel. Then, though no one of these tricks is perfectly secure, the combination cannot fail unless [all] things go wrong at once. b) [weaker]: Chain: all those parts form a long and slender chain no stronger than its weakest link. >Stronger/weaker. I 191 Here are two different strategies for deciding whether one group of reasons should be considered stronger than another. 1. The first strategy tries to compare opposing arguments in terms of magnitudes, by analogy to how two physical forces interact: Strength from Magnitude: When two forces work together, they add to form a single larger force. But when two forces oppose each other directly, their strengths subtract. 2. Our second strategy is simply to count how many different reasons you can find for choosing each alternative: Strength from Multitude: The more reasons we can find in favor of a particular decision, the more confidence we can have in it. This is because if some of those reasons turn out to be wrong, other reasons may still remain. Strength: Whichever strategy we use, we tend to speak of the winning argument as the stronger one. But why do we use the same word strong for two such different strategies? It is because we use them both for the same purpose: to reduce the likelihood of failure. What makes us so prone to formulate our reasoning in terms of conflicting adversaries? Cf. >Dialogical Logic. It must be partly cultural, but some of it could also be based on inheritance. >Culture, >Cultural transmission. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Strength of Theories | Nozick | II 207 stronger/weaker/Nozick: the negation of the consequent is much stronger than the negation of the antecedent. >Stronger/weaker. II 270 Stronger/weaker: the weaker the hypothesis, the stronger the negation. >Hypotheses, >Negation. II 271 Strongest form of an assertion: at the same time the most neneral. ((s) i.e. that it covers most cases, but not that it ascribes the most predicates.) >Predication, >Ascription, >Identification, >Generality, >Generalization. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Strength of Theories | Quine | IX 237ff Stronger/weaker/theory/system/Quine: Problem: Comparability: it fails if both of the two systems have theorems that cannot be found in the other - it also depends on contingencies of interpretation and not on structure. >Comparisons, >Comparability. If we can interpret the primitive logic characters (only "ε" in set theory) new so that we can ensure that all theorems of this system are made to translations of the theorems of the other system, then the latter system is at least as strong as the other. >Systems. If this is not possible in the other direction, one system is stronger than the other one. Definition "ordinal strength"/set theory: numerical measure: the smallest transfinite ordinal number whose existence you cannot prove anymore in the system. The smallest transfinite number after blocking of the apparatus shows how strong the apparatus was. Relative strength/proof theory: Goedel incompleteness sentence: since the number theory can be developed in set theory, this means that the class of all theorems (in reality all Goedel numbers of theorems) of a present set theory can be defined in this same set theory, and different things can be proven about them. >Incompletenes/Goedel. One can produce an endless series of further based on a arbitrary set theory, of which each in the proof-theoretic sense is stronger than its predecessors, and which is consistent when its predecessors were. - One must only add via Goedel numbering a new arithmetic axiom of the content so that the previous axioms are consistent. Ordinal strength: is the richness of the universe. >Goedel numbers. --- X 71 Metalanguage/Set Theory/Quine: in the metalanguage a stronger set theory is possible than in the object language. In the metalanguage a set of z is possible so that satisfaction relation z applies. - ((s) A set that is the fulfillment relation (in form of a set of arranged pairs) - not in the object language, otherwise Grelling paradox. >Meta language, >Set theory, >Grelling's paradox, >Metalanguage. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Strength of Theories | Schiffer | I 44 Stronger/weaker/SchifferVsPsycho-Functionalism/SchifferVsBlock: it is unlikely that there is a theory that is weak enough to be true of all believers - and strong enough to apply to any individual belief - (to define the conditions). E.g. for sighted and visually impaired. Problem: there would have to be necessary conditions for belief defined. Strong/((s): determines the details weak/((s): applicable to many cases. >Psychofunctionalism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Strength of Theories | Simons | I 8 Stronger/weaker/mereology/Bostock/Simons: weaker: to accept a sum instead of a least upper bound is weaker (still relatively strong). This is needed for Bostocks analogy of parts and subsets. SimonsVsStrong classical mereology: there are sums that are too large or too heterogeneous. In the Hasse diagram, the lower parts are not part of the higher. This means, these do not "consist" of them. I 88 Even stronger: the rest principle is even stronger: if x is not part of a, then the difference x - y exists. The rest is the maximum supplement to the product x. y (y in x, and vice versa). Strength: strength is shown by the fact that the existence of appropriate binary sums and binary products is assured. SharvyVs: instead quasi-mereology (without the rest-principle), we assume e.g. that all sets of natural numbers that at least contain one even and one odd number, contain the quantity inclusion as part-relations. Then there is, although {1,2]} is a real part of the set {1,2,3,4}, no difference in the area, since {1,2} by any supplement {3,4}, {1,3,4} and { 2,3,4} can be extended to obtain {1,2,3,4}. Each of the three supplements is separated from {1,2}. That means, no average contains an even and an odd number. But because none is a clear maximum, the difference does not exist. Problem: actually {1,2} and {1,2,3,4} have the difference {3,4} (qua sets). Solution: there is no solution here because through the condition that an even and an odd element has to be present, {1,2} and {1,3,4} are separated. I 101 Problem: the systems of mereology which should avoid paradoxes of the (stronger) set theory were too strong themselves. >Set theory, >Mereology, >Paradoxes. I 324 Stronger/weaker/Simons: e.g. the equivalence of various formulations collapses when the principles of the theory are weakened. >Indistinguishability, >Stronger/weaker. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Strength of Theories | Stalnaker | I 105 Infinity/language/stronger/weaker/supervenience/Stalnaker: an assumed infinite language provides a supervenience that is too weak, because then you can define arbitrary properties. >Supervenience, >Definitions, >Definability. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Strength of Theories | Stechow | 9 f stronger/weaker/Stechow: a weaker significance is true in more situations. Information inquiry: what is less informative, applies to more situations. Conclusion: the proposition p logically implies the proposition q iff p is a subset of q. >Stronger/weaker, >Truth, >Satisfaction, >True-of, >Conclusion, >Implication, >Propositions. |
A. von Stechow I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006) |
| Strength of Theories | Tarski | Horwich I 134 Stronger/Weaker: weaker: e.g. a weaker system does not allow that of two contradictory sentences, any sentence can be deduced.(1) >Contradictions, >Derivation, >Derivability, >Deduction, >Deduction theorem. 1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Strength of Theories | Thiel | I 289 Def "Weaker"/Thiel: means less prerequisites in mathematics. >Stronger/weaker, >Conditions, >Sufficiency. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Strength of Theories | Wright | I 88 Biconditional, weak: A ≡ B is weakly valid if no statement can be true without the other. Even when both are perhaps evaluated differently (assertibility, abandonment of bivalence). Strong: when A and B are always necessarily getting the same evaluation. >Stronger/weaker, >Biconditional, >Bivalence, >Valuation, >Truth values. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Substitution | Brandom | I 454 Substitution/Substitutability/Identification/Meaning/Frege/Brandom: important: (t): "the man to which Hans referred with "such a hard head" and "the meaning of (t)" must be mutually substitutable. I 458 Not substitutable: demonstratives and pronouns. >Pronouns, >Demonstratives. I 523 Substitution/Brandom: three possible roles of expressions in the context of Substitution: 1) an expression can be substituted 2) an expression can be substituted into it 3) substitutional frame - Substitution: fundamental Frame: derived - frames are predicates - cannot be substituted themselves like singular terms - but can be exchanged. I 525 Frame: is itself a result of substitutions (derived). I 526 Substitution inference: connects two sentences as a premise and conclusion: "Franklin invented the bifocals"> "The Postmaster General ..."- the singular terms are material, but do not contain the predicate, because that can be replaced by "went for a walk". I 943 Substitution of singular terms: reversible - predicates: not reversible. >Singular terms, >Predicates. I 528 Substitution/Brandom: singular term: substitution inferences are always symmetrical (equi-classes). Predicate: substitution inference can be asymmetric. stronger/weaker: something is a dog/a mammal - (s) Singular Term/black: always predicates - from "Franklin .." to "American ...". No Substitution inference, because here we have one singular term, one general term. I 611 Anybody/everybody/someone/Brandom: Problems with substitution. >Generalization, >Generality, >Reference. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Supervenience | Stalnaker | I 10 Supervenience/Stalnaker: supervenience is a conceptual tool for the separation of the purely metaphysical part of a reductionist thesis. A set of facts or properties supervenes on another if possible worlds or possible individuals who are identical in relation to one property, are also necessarily identical in another property. >Equality. I 11 Supervenience is supposed to disconnect semantic from metaphysical questions. >Semantics, >Metaphysics. I 87 Supervenience: supervenience can be a) reductionist and b) non-reductionist. ((s) But in any case semantics is not a variant of reductionism.) I 98f Supervenience: ethics: in ethics supervenience is a relation of natural and judgmental properties. >Ethics. Moore: pro this distinction. Stalnaker: if supervenience distinguishes natural and judgmental properties, it is not a reduction because it does not isolate the metaphysical component of a theory. I 90 Supervenience is sometimes used instead of emergence. I 91 Def weak supervenience: supervenience is weak within a possible world. Def strong supervenience: supervenience is strong within one or in different possible worlds. Global supervenience: supervenience is global if any two possible worlds, which are B-indistinguishable, are also A-indistinguishable. Global supervenience must be improved - like this, it is not even sufficient for weak supervenience. I 93 Supervenience is indistinguishable in terms of a mapping function from one possible world to another. >Possible worlds. I 99 Supervenience: supervenience is contingent. E.g. Lewis: print image of black dots. If we add a few colored dots, two pictures can differ in the global properties without differing in the distribution of the (black) dots. Global property: e.g. symmetry: more general: the same global properties that supervene on the monochrome image on the distribution of dots (e.g. symmetry) are also applied to things other than monochrome print images, and because of this broader applicability, they can not be defined as a global property (e.g. symmetry) through the print image. Supervenience: the properties that we call supervenient are the abstract ones. I 101 SchifferVsSupervenience: as a metaphysical thesis supervenience is mysterious. >Supervenience/Schiffer. I 103 Humean Supervenience/HS/materialism: thesis: laws and causal powers supervene on regularities. Humean Supervenience: Humean supervenience needs criteria for cross world identity. >Cross world identity, >Humean World. I 104 Supervenience: thesis: all facts are facts about current states. The rest is a matter of speech. I 105 Infinite/language/stronger/weaker/supervenience/Stalnaker: an assumed infinite language provides a supervenience that is too weak, because then you can define arbitrary properties. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Systems | Quine | VII (e) 91 Abbreviations/Quine: defining abbreviations are always outside of a formal system - that's why we need to get an expression in simple notation before we examine it in relation to hierarchy. IX 190 System/Quine: a new system is not introduced by new definitions, but by new distinctions. ((s) Example (s): if I always have to note "n + 1" to mark the difference between real and rational numbers, I did not eliminate the real numbers, but kept the old difference. I only changed the notation, not the ontology.) IX 232 Theory/Enlargement/Extension/System/Quine: an enlargement is not an extension! Extension: addition of axioms, can create contradictions. Magnification/Quine: means to relativize an added scheme to already existing axioms of a system, e.g. to "Uϑ", (s) so if something exists in "Uϑ", it must be a set. Such a magnification never creates a contradiction. IX 237 Theory/stronger/weaker/Quine: if a deductive system is an extension of another in the sense that its theorems include all of the other and others, then in a certain way one is stronger than the other. But this basis of comparison is weak: 1. It fails if each of the two systems has theorems that are not found in the other. (Comparability). 2. It depends on randomness of interpretation and not simply on structural properties. Example: suppose we would have exactly "=" and "R" as primitive two-digit predicates with an ordinary identity axiom and transitivity. Now we extend the system by adding the reflexivity "x(xRx)". The extended system is only stronger if we equate its "R" with the original "R". But if we reinterpret its "xRy" as "x = y v x R y" using the original "R", then all its theorems are provable in the non-extended system. (>Löwenheim, >Provability), Example (less trivial): Russell's method ((1) to (4), Chapter 35) to ensure extensionality for classes without having to accept them for attributes. Given is a set theory without extensionality. We could extend it by adding this axiom, and yet we could show that all theorems of the extended system could be reinterpreted with Russell's method as theorems already provable in the non-extended system. Stronger/weaker/Quine: a better standard for the comparison of strength is the "comparison by reinterpretation": if we can reinterpret the primitive logical signs (i.e. in set theory only "e") in such a way that all theorems of this system become translations of the theorems of the other system, then the latter system is at least as strong as the first one. IX 238 If this is not possible in the other direction, one system is stronger than the other. Def "ordinal strength"/Quine: another meaningful sense of strength of a system is the following surprising numerical measure: the smallest transfinite ordinal number, whose existence can no longer be proven in the system. Any normal set theory can, of course, prove the existence of infinitely many transfinite numbers, but that does not mean that you get them all. Transfinite/Quine: what is so characteristic about it is that we then iterate the iteration further and iterate the iteration of iterations until our apparatus somehow blocks. The smallest transfinite number after blocking the apparatus then indicates how strong the apparatus was. An axiom that can be added to a system with the visible goal of increased ordinal strength is the axiom that there is an unattainable number beyond w (omega). (End of Chapter 30). An endless series of further axioms of this kind is possible. Strength of systems/Ordinal Numbers/Quine: another possibility to use ordinal numbers for strength: we can extend the theory of cumulative types to transfinite types by accrediting to the x-th type for each ordinal number x, all classes whose elements all have a type below x. So the universe of the theory of cumulative types in chapter 38, which lacks the transfinite types, is even the ω-th type. Def "Natural Model"/Montague/Vaught/Quine: this is what they call this type, if the axioms of set theory are fulfilled, if one takes their universe as such a type. So Zermelo's set theory without infinity axiom has the ω-th type as a natural model. (We have seen this in chapter 38). So the ordinal strength of this system is at most ω, obviously not smaller. With infinity axiom: ω + ω. Strength of the system of von Neumann-Bernays: one more than the first unattainable number after w. XII 33 Object/existence/system/Quine: systematic considerations can lead us to reject certain objects XII 34 or to declare certain terms as non-referring. Occurrence: also individual occurrences of terms. This is Frege's point of view: an event can refer to something on one occasion, not on another (referential position). Example "Thomas believes that Tullius wrote the Ars Magna". In reality he confuses Tullius with Lullus. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Theories | Kosslyn | Münch III 267 Linguistic theory/Kosslyn/Pomerantz: propositional (not figurative) theories may be too strong: too little restriction. >Strength of theories, >Stronger/weaker, >Propositions, >Theories, >Theory language. Stephen M. Kosslyn/James R. Pomerantz, Imagery, Propositions and the Form of Internal Representations”, Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76 |
Kosslyn I Stephen M. Kosslyn James R. Pomerantz "Imagery, Propositions, and the Form of Internal Representations", in: Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Truth | Habermas | Rorty II 35 Truth/Theory/Habermas/Rorty: Habermas asks why Heidegger and Derrida still defend those "strong" notions of theory, truth, and system that have been a thing of the past for more than 150 years. >Strength of theories, >Stronger/weaker, >Theories, >Concepts, >Truth, >J. Derrida, >M. Heidegger. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Vagueness | Field | II 227 Vagueness/revision of the logic/Field: some authors: to allow double negation, to prohibit explicit contradictions, thus also not to allow negations of the law of the excluded middle (l.e.m.). >Negation, >Double negation, >Contradictions, >Stronger/Weaker, >Excluded middle. Then old version: if Jones is a limiting case for "Jones is bald", we cannot claim either "bald" or "not-bald", so we can now. New: neither claim: E.g. "Jones is bald or not bald" nor "It is not the case that Jones is either bald or not bald." On the other hand: Field: with definite-operator (definite): "It is not the case that Jones is either definitely bald or definitely not bald". - Without law of the excluded middle: "neither bald nor not bald". II 228 Limiting case/vagueness/definite-Operator/Field: we need the definite-operator to avoid a limiting case of the a limiting case. >dft-operator, >Terminology/Field. II 228 Def Weakly true/vagueness/truth/truth-predicate/Field: to be able to say general things about borderline cases. Not only that somebody represents a certain limiting case. >Generalization. Def paradigmatic borderline case: definitely a borderline case. Not weakly true/deflationism: e.g. "Either bald or not-bald is true". Then the Truth-predicate itself inherits the vagueness. It is not definitely true whether or not. Def Strongly true/Field: assuming, Jones is a limiting case: then neither "bald" nor its negation (strongly) plus classical logic: then the disjunction "bald or not bald" should be true even in strong interpretation. Law of the excluded middle: if we give it up: a) weakly true: then the disjunction is not true b) strongly true: then the disjunction is without truth value. Strongly true: is less vague, does not inherit the vagueness. Correctness: which interpretation is the correct one is only dependent on utility. >Correctness. Per weak truth: allows infinite conjunction and disjunction. This corresponds more to the theory of validity. - Only the weak Truth-concept is supplied by the disquotation scheme. Deflationism: deflationism additionally requires the definite-operator to declare the predicate strongly true. >Deflationism. II 230 Inflationism/Vagueness/FieldVsInflationism: Problem: the I. needs a thing that is "neither bald nor not bald". Inflationism: explains e.g. "weakly true" compositional. >Inflationism. Supervaluation/Sorites/Inflationism: "candidate of an extension". >Supervaluation. Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. - Then the limiting case without definite-operator: "Jones is bald in some extensions but not in all". II 233 Vagueness/Ontology/Field: Thesis: vgueness is a deficiency of language, not of the world. >Language dependence. II 234 Vagueness/radical non-classical logic/Field: here we do not need a definite-operator or distinction between strong/weak truth: e.g. Jones is a limiting case iff it is not the case that he is either bald or not bald. Deflationism/Field: seems to save a lot of trouble, because there is no definite-operator, one would have to understand. Vs: that deceives: the trouble is only postponed: here the logical rules for "not", etc. are much more complicated. ... + ... II 228 Weakly true:...++... |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Block, Ned | Schiffer Vs Block, Ned | I 40 Psychofunctionalism/Block: (naming by Block 1980a): is supposed to be a scientific cognitive psychological theory (BlockVsFolk psychology. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism/SchifferVsBlock: 1. If there is such a scientific theory that identifies each belief characteristic of a functional property, then this theory is neither known nor formulated yet devised. So Block has to say that there must be a theory Ts that nobody ever thought of so that Bel = BelTs. This theory could not define belief, but discover its reference. The idea would be: Def belief that p/Ts: be a token of the Z-type, having the Ts correlated functional role of BelTs.(p). I.e. the role that will be indexed by (the proposition) p in Ts. Schiffer: this would be a necessary truth, but one that would be only a postieriori knowable after the theory Ts would be brought up. SchifferVsBlock: why on earth must the reference or extension of a belief E.g. that bugs are mortal, be revealed by a theory that no one knows? VsSchiffer: one could argue, in the same way, E.g. as it was eventually discovered that dogs have this and that genotype (set of genes). ((s) meaning empirically) SchifferVsVs: 1. scientists cannot discover this! Science/Philosophy/Schiffer: thesis: Scientists cannot discover that to be a dog = to be from a particular genotype (set of genes). Science: might only determine all phenotypic (appearancewise) and behavioral features of the past, present and future, with which we identify dogs, but to derive a property-identity with the genotype from this, we need a philosophical theory that a) contains a completion from to be a dog = to be from this and that genotype, if... and b) contains in connection with the scientific discovery that I 41 to be a dog = to be from this and that genotype. ((s) no additional condition). SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: if there were a philosophical theory of this strength, it is unknown to me. It could take the form of a meaning theory for "dog". Problem: the theories that have been developed by Kripke/Putnam for natural-.species terms, are unsuitable for belief predicates. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: has no more credibility than the credibility that there is a correct semantic theory of belief predicates that contains, along with a scientific psychological theory Ts Bel = BelTs. Problem: There is not the slightest reason to assume that such a semantic theory for belief predicates exists. 2. VsBlock: that a psychological theory can determine the extension for "believes", it has to be able to use the word! Problem: it is unlikely that the ultimately correct cognitive theory will work with folk psychological concepts! ((s) But it must be translatable into everyday language (> universalism of everyday language). The functional architecture may simply be too rich and fine. (Churchland 1981, Stich 1983, Dennett 1986). SchifferVsUniversalism of everyday language: the everyday language concepts may be too blunt. Some authors/Schiffer: might be inclined to say: "then there is just nothing, which corresponds to belief." SchifferVs: it misses the ultimate in our everyday language psychological terms. (see below 6.4). I 42 3. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: even if a scientific theory on functional states of belief has to quantify, we have to probably not construct it as a relation to propositions. Psychology / Schiffer: a scientific psychological theory (cognitive) is quantifying over functions of external indices for functional roles on internal physical states, external indices: do not have to be propositions but can also be phrases or formulas. Even uninterpreted formulas! (see below) 1. Thesis: if propositions are good indices for a functional theory, then phrases or interpreted formulas of a formal language could be it just as well. (Field, 1978, Loar 1981). 2. Content/cognitive psychology/attribution/belief/Schiffer: the psychological theory probably needs nothing more than uninterpreted formulas, not even sentences (not propositions anyway). ((s) belief or belief attribution could be explained scientifically without the use of content). Psychology/belief/Field: (1978, 102): if psychology describes the laws that lead from input to belief and from belief to action, then semantic characterizations of belief are superfluous. (see also Field 1986b, Fodor 1980, Loar 1981, Schiffer 1981a, Stich 1983). I 44 4. SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: it is absurd to assume that there is a single theory about beliefs and desires that is weak enough that is applicable to all kinds of believers, and at the same time strong enough to establish a functional property for each belief. Such a theory would have to uniformly explain the belief settings of such diverse people as normal adults, children, natives and disabled. Problem: for this a necessary condition to believe something would be needed ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): strong theory: defines details. Weak: is applicable to many). 5. SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: E.g. Twin earth, E.g. Arthritis: to explain these cases we need a sufficient condition to believe something. Twin Earth/TE/Arthritis/Schiffer: we need sufficient conditions for belief, so that the Ts-correlated functional roles are held by Ralph but not by Twin Earth Ralph and by Alfred in w but not in w’ where the use of "arthritis" is correct. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Bostock, D. | Simons Vs Bostock, D. | I 86 Part/mereology/Bostock/Simons: (Bostock 1979): his mereology should be a basis for his theory of extensive measurement, the rational and irrational numbers. Part-Relation/Bostock: thesis: there is more than one part-relation! SimonsVsBostock: (see below, Part II): Bostock's assumptions are still too strong to be as minimal as he assumes. System P/mereology/Bostock: there are no sets, "‹" is a basic concept. I 87 Least upper bound/l.u.b./sum/product/mereology/Bostock: mereology takes as duality for the product not the sums + and σ but the least upper bound (l.u.b.) +’ and σ’. Compact Set/Bostock: the second axiom (...) tells us that when F-s exist and they are limited above, they then have a sum (σ, not l.u.b. σ'). The resulting system is a little weaker than the classical mereology: it does not force us to assume the existence of a universe. SimonsVsBostock: with this, his system is still very strong. Bostock: his system only provides 6 nonisomorphic models ((s) interpretations) for the 7-element model (see above). A binary least upper bound exists when two objects have an upper bound at all. Bostock needs this relative strength in order to be able to express the analogy between parts and subsets. Simons: that is just not the case for the classical mereology. Bostock: thesis: it is the analogy between part and subset that explains why the concept of the part is at all important to us. SimonsVsBostock: which cannot be denied but will be undermined in part II for other cases. BostockVsMereology/stronger/weaker: one should avoid its strongest theses because there are classes of objects that are unlimited above, or they could exist. The strong classical mereology boils down to that there should be sums that are, in a certain sense, too large or too heterogeneous. Sum/Bostock: we need an additional condition: sums should be formed exclusively of their summands. This is intended to exclude unintended interpretations of P that are not mereologically. E.g. the Hasse diagrams from §1.4: higher points are obviously not formed from the lower points. "To consist of"/mereology/Simons: this is itself a mereological term. The lower points do not form the higher because they are not parts of them! Part/Bostock/Simons: Bostock's informal condition that we should really understand "part" as part is nothing other than that we do not want unintended models. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Compositionality | Schiffer Vs Compositionality | I 220 SchifferVsCompositionality: my rejection is based all the time on the rejection of the theory of relations for belief. Here it is difficult to speculate about what kind of conditional sentences for "believes" would require a meaning theory that would not be a truth-theoretic semantics. How could such m.th. look like at all?. E.g. Conceptual Role Semantics: (Schiffer Vs: see section 4.3). Bsp Game Theoretical Semantics/game theory/Hintikka/Schiffer: (Hintikka 1982): this is not an alternative to the conventional theory. PeacockeVsHintikka: (1978) has shown that game theoretical rules provide corresponding truth-theoretical or model theoretical axioms. I XV SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: natural languages do not have any compositional meaning theories (m.th.). I 137 Paul and Elmer/SchifferVsQuine: Quine: there are no countable belief objects. E.g. if John believes that snow is white, and Mary believes that snow is white, there must be something that both believe. Schiffer: this conditional is false: I 138 Either that or the alleged quantification through belief objects is not what it appears to be the Quine eye. I 144 SchifferVsQuine: harmless apparent quantification. SchifferVsCompositionality: we can now conclude that no natural language has a compositional truth-theoretic semantics (comp.tr.th.Sem.). Otherwise the theory of relations would be correct. In addition, it also has no compositional m.th. because then it has to be a compositional semantics. Understanding/SchifferVsFrege: So compositional semantics are not required to explain speech understanding! I 182 SchifferVsCompositional Semantics: it is false, even regardless of the falsity of the theory of relations of belief. ((s) Compositional Semantics/(s): does not consider the truth conditions but speaks only of the contributions of the meaning of words for the meaning of the proposition.) Schiffer. 1. t is not plausible that languages have a compositional truth-theoretic semantics unless it follows from the stronger assertion that they have compositional truth theories, which themselves are truth-theoretic. (> stronger/weaker; >Strength of Theories). I 192 SchifferVsCompositionality/public language/Mentalese/Schiffer: if I'm right, that no public language has a compositional semantics, I have to find a mistake in (U). It is not my goal to show that speech comprehension does not imply that the natural languages have compositional semantics, the explanation of our understanding would be an empirical task. I rather want to give a counter-E.g. VsCompositionality. E.g. (1) Harvey understands an indefinite number of new propositions of a language E1, which itself contains infinitely many propositions. (2) an explanation of his capabilities does not require compositional semantics. E1: is not a fully-developed natural language. I 193 Harvey: is in this considered possible world an information-processing machine that thinks in machine language: "M": Belief/conviction: Harvey has it if it is in a certain computational relation to an embodied (tokened) proposition of M. ((s) Mentalese: so there is still an internal relation to one's own thought language). B: is a box in Harveys head in which a proposition of M (tokened) exists exactly then when a token from the proposition occurs in B. (Assuming, Harvey has only a finite number of convictions). Belief: for each there is exactly one proposition in Mentalese whose occurrence in B realizes it. µ: is a formula in M so that Harvey believes that snow is white. Realisation/"meaning"/Schiffer: as propositions of M (machine language, Mentalese) realize belief, they also have ipso facto semantic or representational properties. Then it is fair to say that μ "means" that snow is white. And also, that a component of μ references as inner counterpart of the word to snow in the public language. I 195 Speech comprehension/Understanding/Schiffer: without compositionality: E.g. (Continuation: E1: spoken language (without ambiguity and indices) M: Mentalese for Harvey conceptual role: to explain the transition from (1) to (2). (and any others that correspond to it). Propositions in internal code: (or representations thereof: (3) Nemrac derettu "sum"-"sno"-"iz"-"pör-pol" ((s) English backward, [phonetic language], metalanguage (ML) and object language (OL) mixed) (4) Nemrac dias taht emons wons si elprup ((s) English backward, but explicit language, ML) and (5) Nemrac ecnarettu si eurt ffi emos wons si elprup ((s) ML and OL! "true" and "iff" in machine language, but without everyday linguistic meaning or "eurt" does not have to mean "true"! Conceptual role instead of meaning). I 196 Conceptual Role/c.r./SchifferVsCompositionality: we hereby show that "dias taht" and "eurt" can have conceptual roles that a) do not require any compositional semantics, b) explain the transition from one occurrence of (3) in Harveys B-Box to an occurence of (4) and (5) We do not need to specify the full meaning role! I simply assume that (4) and (5) have a role ("whichever"), which by virtue of their formula in Harvey triggers this belief. And none of this makes a compositional semantics necessary: Justification: E.g. you could just have a mapping relation for propositions between two different languages, with which a person who does not understand the other language, knows when a proposition of the other language is true. (…+…) I 200, 202f, 208. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Gestalt Theory | Schlick Vs Gestalt Theory | Simons I 290 Ontological Dependence/oD/mereology/Simons: VsMereology: criticizing the existence of arbitrary sums. Instead, an individual should only be something that has a certain inner connection. arbitrary sums/Simons: they are algebraically ok and do not lead to contradictions. Individuals / Simons: it is not clear what properties they hold on the "right side" of respectability (versus sums). Problem: connection is a gradual thing, but being individual is not! Gestalt/SimonsVsGestalt theory/VsWholeness/Simons: it has never clearly stated what this is to be. Individual/Frege/Simons: everything that is named by a name. SimonsVsFrege: of which one has recovered late. But there are also plural names (> plural designation, plural reference (> Black) see above). And also >empty names. Simons I 324 Wholeness/Gestalt/SchlickVsGestalt theory/SchlickVsDriesch/Simons: (Schlick 1935): There is no ontological difference between wholenesses and sums. These are only differences in the presentation (representation) of the same object. "Micro-Reductionism"/Schlick: (per): (Simons: for today's tastes too extreme). Schlick/Simons: yet never denies the usefulness of a holistic view. Sum/SimonsVsSchlick: has in any case a precisely defined meaning. stronger/weaker/Simons: e.g. the equivalence of various formulations collapses when the principles of the theory are weakened. ((s) >Strength of Theories). |
Schlick I Moritz Schlick "Facts and Propositions" Analysis 2 (1935) pp. 65-70 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich 1994 Schlick II M. Schlick General Theory of Knowledge 1985 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Glanzberg, M. | Stalnaker Vs Glanzberg, M. | I 105 Infinite language/infinite/Stalnaker: we assumed here one with infinite quantification-prefixes and infinite Boolean combinations. Michael GlanzbergVsStalnaker: (2001) showed that only finite quantifications are sufficient. In such a language one can express that there are infinitely many different to each other objects by saying that there are at least n objects for each n. I 106 Stronger/weaker/language/Glanzberg: problem: such a language is too strong to deliver the kind of supervenience that we need for our philosophical discussion. A supervenience basis due to an infinite language will be too weak because then one can define arbitrary properties. Relevance/Glanzberg: to build an interesting concept of supervenience we need restrictions that exclude arbitrary properties. Only then we will get a strong thesis. (> stronger/weaker: >Strength of theories). StalnakerVsGlanzberg: I think our thesis is as strong as we need it. Namely because the strong supervenience from A to B’ is equivalent to the global one from A to B. This is the converse of the main thesis that was proved in the appendix. This follows from the following three facts that apply to any three sets of properties X, Y and Z where X' is the set of properties that can be defined in concepts of X properties in the infinite language. 1. If X strongly supervenes on Y, then X supervenes globally on Y ((s) strong supervenience implies a global one). 2. if X supervenes globally on Y and Y globally on Z then X supervenes globally on Z ((s) transitivity of global supervenience). 3. X’ supervenes globally on X. Global supervenience/Stalnaker: is clearly never trivial. It is obviously not true for arbitrary sets of properties A and B that A supervenes globally on B and is therefore also not generally true that A globally or strongly supervenes on the infinite closure (infinitary closure) B'. How expressive the infinite language may be it is not give us the strength to define properties that distinguish between B-undistinguishable possible worlds (poss.w.). StalnakerVsGlanzberg: with him it only seems so because his formal argument assumes that a full B-description of a poss.w. completely describes it but that is only true if all the properties globally supervene on the B-properties. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Goodman, N. | Simons Vs Goodman, N. | I 108 Sum/extensional mereology/CEM/Simons: CEM, or extensional mereology, is based on a general existence of sums. This has found the most critics, including Rescher and Chisholm. ChisholmVsSum: it seems that it does not belong to the concept of part intrinsically or analytically, that there must be a sum that should otherwise contain all of these individuals and nothing else. I 109 Part: but somebody who refuses the sum-axioms does not refuse Lesniewski’s and Goodmans’ and others concept of "part". Individual: instead of it there is disagreement about the concept "individual". Individual/Goodman: an individual has a very technical sense for him: they must not be connected or causally connected as everyday things. They do not have to be "medium size dry". Any accumulation of individuals may be (subject to paradoxes) combined into an abstract quantity. Individual/Goodman: an individual is analogous to such abstract quantities and each cluster (collection) of individuals can be grouped to a sum-individual (here, however, without the threat of paradoxes!). The resulting thing does not have to be anything that can be found in the everyday world. SimonsVsGoodman: but that is only so far a good analogy as the existence of any desired composition is acceptable. We must distinguish: a) the existence of specific (not abstract) pluralities can be claimed, but not: b) the one of abstract pluralities which is just a mere reflection of the existence of a plural term, therefore merely a facon de parler. Goodman's sum-individuals seem merely correspond to the need for a reference for some arbitrary expressions. I 110 Sum/Goodman/Simons: Goodman could indicate that arbitrary sum individuals obey the extensional theory. They exist in which the identity in the equality of parts exists. Identity/SimonsVsGoodman: this general condition of the equality of all parts is itself questionable (see below). Sum/mereology/Simons: so far no one has been able to show that the acceptance of sums leads to contradictions (as Russell has shown it for certain sets). ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): stronger theories tend to lead to contradictions.) Simons: but even the strongest extensional mereology does not lead to contradictions. Theory/solution/Simons: not the theory is suspicious but its non-critical application to the world. Part relation/Simons: part relations may be different in different areas (for example, mathematics). One must not force them to a common denominator. Sum/Simons: what damage should they cause that does not already exist in the ontological assumption of corresponding "pluralisms"? I 111 Sum/mereology/Simons: suppose we looked at any portions of space-time as evidenced by any sums. Then it comes to the question whether the relevant predicates are cumulative. I 284 "Normal part"/mereology/Simons: philosophers often forget that there is a middle way between a simple part and an essential part: that something is a "normal part of a normal kind". There is no formal theory of "normal mereology". Here are some informal remarks: Normality/Simons: one could start from the idea of a well-shaped thing of a kind. Normality/Aristotle: Aristotle called an object mutilated when it is connected but a prominent part is missing. Shapeliness/music/Nicholas WolterstorffVsGoodman/Simons: (Wolterstorff 1980, 56): he applied the idea of a normal or shapely thing of a kind to music pieces: it is non-well-formed if one or more of the normal parts are missing or are in the wrong place. Thus, the term is a little wider than Aristotle defined it. It allows us to say that a performance with an incorrect note is still a performance of the same piece. GoodmanVsWolterstorff: (Goodman 1969, 186f): we must not allow this because of the transitivity of identity: if a performance with a wrong note is identical, then at the end all pieces identical. I 285 Metaphysics/Goodman/Simons: metaphysics represents here a hard metaphysical line and adheres to bivalence and strict identity conditions. SimonsVsGoodman: the price for it is a distance from the everyday language. Solution/Simons: musical performance has no strict identity conditions. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Hume, D. | Verschiedene Vs Hume, D. | Hacking I 68 Causality/W.C.BroadVsHume: VsRegularity: For example we can see that the siren of Manchester howls every day at the same time, whereupon the workers of Leeds let the work rest for one hour. But no causation. Hacking I 70 CartwrightVsHume: the regularities are characteristics of the procedures with which we establish theories. (>Putnam). Hume I 131 Def Atomism/Hume/Deleuze: is the thesis that relations are external to conceptions. (KantVs). VsHume: Critics accuse him of having "atomized" the given. Theory/DeleuzeVsVs: with this one believes to have pilloried a whole system. As if it were a quirk of Hume. What a philosopher says is presented as if it were done or wanted by him. I 132 What do you think you can explain? A theory must be understood from its conceptual basis. A philosophical theory is an unfolded question. Question and critique of the question are one. I 133 It is not about knowing whether things are one way or the other, but whether the question is a good question or not. Apron I 238 Lawlikeness/lawlike/Schurz: b) in the narrower sense: = physical necessity (to escape the vagueness or graduality of the broad term). Problem: not all laws unlimited in space-time are legal in the narrower sense. Universal, but not physically necessary: Example: "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than one kilometre". Universality: is therefore not a sufficient, but a necessary condition for lawfulness. For example, the universal statement "All apples in this basket are red" is not universal, even if it is replaced by its contraposition: For example "All non-red objects are not apples in this basket". (Hempel 1965, 341). Strong Hume-Thesis/Hume/Schurz: Universality is a sufficient condition for lawlikeness. SchurzVs: that is wrong. Weak Hume-Thesis/Schurz: Universality is a necessary condition for lawfulness. ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): the claim that a condition is sufficient is stronger than the claim that it is necessary.) BhaskarVsWeak Hume-Thesis. BhaskarVsHume. Solution/Carnap/Hempel: Def Maxwell Condition/lawlikeness: Natural laws or nomological predicates must not contain an analytical reference to certain individuals or spacetime points. This is much stronger than the universality condition. (stronger/weaker). Example "All emeralds are grue": is universal in space-time, but does not meet the Maxwell condition. ((s) Because observed emeralds are concrete individuals?). I 239 Natural Law/Law of Nature/Armstrong: are relations of implication between universals. Hence no reference to individuals. (1983) Maxwell condition/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979): it represents a physical principle of symmetry: i.e. laws of nature must be invariant under translation of their time coordinates and translation or rotation of their space coordinates. From this, conservation laws can be obtained. Symmetry Principles/Principle/Principles/Schurz: physical symmetry principles are not a priori, but depend on experience! Maxwell Condition/Schurz: is too weak for lawlikeness: Example "No lump of gold..." also this universal statement fulfills them. Stegmüller IV 243 StegmüllerVsHume: usually proceeds unsystematically and mixes contingent properties of the world with random properties of humans. Ethics/Morality/Hume: 1. In view of scarce resources, people must cooperate in order to survive. 2. HumeVsHobbes: all people have sympathy. If, of course, everything were available in abundance, respect for the property of others would be superfluous: IV 244 People would voluntarily satisfy the needs in the mutual interest according to their urgency. Moral/Ethics/Shaftesbury/ShaftesburyVsHume: wants to build all morality on human sympathy, altruism and charity. (>Positions). HumeVsShaftesbury: illusionary ideal. Ethics/Moral/Hume: 3. Human insight and willpower are limited, therefore sanctions are necessary. 4. Advantageous move: intelligence enables people to calculate long-term interests. IV 245 The decisive driving force is self-interest. It is pointless to ask whether the human is "good by nature" or "bad by nature". It is about the distinction between wisdom and foolishness. 5. The human is vulnerable. 6. Humans are approximately the same. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Identity Theory | Loar Vs Identity Theory | I 15 VsType-Identity Theory/Type Identity/Loar: has often been rejected by physicalism in recent years in favor of the weaker token identity. (stronger/weaker). Loar: but there are correlation theories that are even weaker and these are too weak. For example that each mental state corresponds to one or more physical states. Type Identity (see below chapter 4): relativized to an individual at a certain time, there can be such a thing. 1. Argument for psychophysical correlations/Loar: if there are token identities between propositional attitudes and physical states, then there are also type correlations. I.e. beliefs and desires are among the causes of movements and physical events have only physical causes. I 16 Systematic Role: but we need it in addition: B is of a type that has a certain position in the system of state types of subject z, which are connected to t by certain counterfactual condition relations. Qualities 2. level: are involved here, a) of the persons, b) of the tokens of belief. Problem: this is very cumbersome. Can we not accept a weaker theory? With qualities of the 1st level? Example B's systematic role then consists partly in its possible interactions with other attitudes. Problem: in order to characterize types of attitudes, we have to abstract from their systematic roles. Abstraction: but does not work with counterfactual properties of the 1st level. ((s) because they are always related to a certain individual). I 17 Problem: then one should already have the concept of belief (circular). This is exactly the problem of analytical behaviorism. Solution/Loar: we go one level higher: quantification over types of the 1st level. For example, there are state types from z to t, which are organized counterfactually in this and that way. Token-Identity: here the physical token B must fulfill the predicate: "x is a belief that p" i.e. Systematic Role: from B to t must correspond to the position of this predicate in the belief-desire theory. However, the sR must be identified with a property of the 2. level! I.e. a property. The one that results from type-type relations for a person at a time t. Property 2. Level/Loar: here "believe that p". Mental state: is then identical to state types of the 2. level. VsIdentity: a correlation, which is not an identity, between mental state types M1...Mn and physical state types 1. level P1...Pn can then have this logical form: z is in Mi power of a state of the 1. level with the systematic role involved in Mi and Pi is that state 1. level. On the other hand: State 1. level: can be described by "z's belief that p to t". This has for z this or that systematic role to t. Identity Theory/Loar: with this one can rightly say that mental states are identical with physical states of the 1. level. N.B.: but one also needs the former sense of "mental state" to be able to express that two living beings are in the same mental state. 2. Argument for psychophysical correlations/Loar: does not require token identities. Thesis: if belief and desire are causes of behavior, there must be psychophysical type correlations for individuals at certain times. N.B.: the argument is based on the consideration that no theory is immune to being irrelevant in terms of explanation. I 18 E.g. by future science. Question: what status should assumed beliefs and desires have to explain behaviour? Are they still relevant? Only justification: that the old theory makes some distinctions that make the new theory true. Loar: Thesis: in any case, we will still need psychophysical correlations, relativized to persons and times. Revisionism/Loar: for example, suppose one wanted to argue that no scientific finding could ever prove that we have no belief and no desires. I 19 Question: could anything at all falsify this attitude? Probably only knowledge about behaviour. Belief Desire Theory/Loar: for them there are two possibilities, which status they have as theory: a) its truth logically follows its systematization success (this is instrumentalism with its perverse use of "true"). b) it is to be interpreted realistically, i.e. that its truth does not logically follow from its systematization success. They are then empirical like physical theories. Problem: we have a dogmatic dualism in which the theory could not be refuted by any degree of success in scientific explanation of behavior. Worse: with the argument about the conditions for the characteristic(s) it is not clear at all that the theory has a coherent interpretation. Stronger/Reduction: the requirement that the states are permanent even if not unchangeable and similarly organized in other individuals. Weaker: only relativization for times. Advantage: we do not need to demand an a priori fitting of our theory to the structure of theoretical psychology. Reduction: not every theory that explains the success of another theory reduces it. I.e. Confirmation: a theory is not its elimination. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Kleene, St. C. | Priest Vs Kleene, St. C. | Field II 145 Dialethism/Priest/Paradoxes/Field: (Priest 1998): Thesis: the sentence of the liar and its negation are both assertible (and also their conjunction). The rules of logic are attenuated (>stronger/weaker; >strenght of theories), so that not every assertion is assertible. Most attractive variant: builds on Kleene's trivalent logic. Trivalent Logic/Kleene/Priest/Field: Priest assumes here that the valid inferences are those that guarantee "correct assertion". But an assertion is only correct if it has one of the two highest truth values in the truth value table. Curry Paradox: is thus precluded, because the only conditional in this language is the material conditional. Material Conditional/Field: defined by ~ and v. In the logic of Kleene/Priest it does not entirely support the modus ponens. Liar/KleeneVsPriest: (and other "deviating" sentences): have truth value gaps. But there are no truth value clusters. Deviating Sentence: E.g. liar-sentence has no truth value clusters, but truth value gaps. Liar/PriestVsKleene: (and other deviating sentences): conversely have truth value clusters and no gaps. Problem/Kleene: here you cannot establish an equivalence between "p" and ""p"is true"! Because to assert a truth value gap in a sentence "A" would be to say: "~[true ("A") v true ("~A")]" and that should be equivalent to "~(A v ~A)", but a sentence of this form can never be legitimate in Kleene. Truth Value Gap/Logical Form/Field: asserting a truth value gap in a sentence "A" would be to say: "~[true ("A") v true ("~A")]" and that should be equivalent to "~(A v ~A)". Solution/Priest: if "A" is a deviating sentence, then it is a correct assertion as by Priest. The assertion of the absence of a truth value cluster in a sentence "A" would be the assertion "~ [(true ("A") and true ("~A)"]" which should be equivalent to "~(a u ~A)". Kleene cannot assert this absence for deviating sentences, Priest can. |
Pries I G. Priest Beyond the Limits of Thought Oxford 2001 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Moore, G.E. | Verschiedene Vs Moore, G.E. | Grice I 266ff Hungerland Thesis Vs "inductive conception" of the paradigm of context implication: p claim to imply believing that p. Hungerland: instead: thesis Explanation model, if an assertion is normal, everything is implied that can be inferred from it. This depends on three different things: 1. Context of the assertion 2. Assumptions about what is considered normal 3. Rules for the correct use of expressions Example (Moore) "He went out, but I don't believe it." Hungerland: that is no contradiction! No logical isolation in the community. Brendel I 14 Term Analysis/Moore/Brendel: necessary condition: synonymy of the terms. Epistemological criterion/Synonymy/Moore: "Nobody can know, I 15 that the analytical standard applies to an object without knowing that the analytical standard applies to it. (Moore 1942, 663). Synonymy/Cooper LangfordVsMoore/Brendel: if the terms are then synonymous (i.e. the analysis is considered correct), it is trivial. ("Paradox of Analysis"). Synonymy/KünneVsMoore: is not at all a necessary condition for a correct conceptual analysis. I 16 Def Co-Implication/Künne/Brendel: Solution: "Co-Implication" = necessary extensional equality. (Künne 1990. 37). Logical form: "x is A" and "x is BC" imply each other in all possible worlds. Problem: this is not always obvious even for competent speakers. Intension Equality/Brendel: condition for it is necessary extension equality: if two expressions have the same intension, then they have the same extension in all possible world. Intension/Extension/some authors: but this does not apply vice versa. Example Kirkham: "2+2=4" and "36+7=29" and example "This object has a form" and "This object has a size" are extensionally equivalent by having the same truth value in all possible worlds, but they are not intensionally equivalent (not synonymous). I 17 Concept Analysis/Kirkham/Brendel: sometimes it is only about extension equality in the real world. Extension Equivalence/Equal Scope/stronger/weaker/Brendel: also in all possible worlds it is still somewhat weaker than synonymy. Putnam I 195 BurnyeatVsMoore: "he philosophises as if Kant never existed". (a propos "Moore's hands"). |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Pythagoras | Quine Vs Pythagoras | XII 75 Löwenheim/Skolem/Strong Form/Axiom of Choice/Ontology/Reduction/Ontological Relativity/Quine: (early form): Thesis: if a theory is true and has a hyper-countable object range, then everything except for a countable section is superfluous, in the sense that it can be eliminated from the range of the variables, without any sentence becoming false. I.e. all acceptable theories can be reduced to countable ontologies. And these, in turn, to a specific ontology of natural numbers. For that you take the list, as far as it is explicitly known, as SF. And even if the list is not known, it exists. Accordingly, we can interpret all our objects as natural numbers, even though the list number ((s) the name) is not always known. Ontology: could we not establish a Pythagorean multi-purpose ontology once and for all? Pythagorean Ontology/Terminology/Quine: consists either only of numbers or only of bodies, or of sets, etc. Problem: Suppose we had such an ontology and somebody offered us something that would have appeared as an ontological reduction prior to our decision for the Pythagorean ontology, namely a method by which all things of a certain type A are superfluous in future theories, while the remaining portion would still be infinite. XII 76 In the new Pythagorean framework his discovery would still retain its essential content, even though it could no longer be called a reduction; it would be only a maneuver in which some numbers - we do not even know which - would lose a number property corresponding to A. VsPythagoreism: it shows that an all-engulfing Pythagoreanism is not attractive, because it only offers new and more obscure versions of old methods and problems. Solution: Ontological relativity, relativistic theory. It's simply pointless to speak of the ontology of a theory in absolute terms. ((s) i.e. in this case to assert that everything is a number.) (>inside/outside). The relevant predicates, e.g. "number", "set", "body" or whatever, would be distinguishable in the frame theory, however, by the roles they play in the laws of this theory. Quine: an ontological reduction is only interesting if we can specify an SF. If we have the axiom of choice and even a sign for a general selection operator, can we then specify an SF that concretizes the Löwenheim theorem? 1) We divide the object range into a countable number of equivalence classes, each with indistinguishable objects. (Indistinguishability Classes). We can dispense with all members of every equivalence class, except one. 2) Then we'll make use of the axiom of choice to pick out a survivor from each equivalence class. XII 77 Quine: if this were possible, we could write down a representative function with Hilbert's selection operator. Löwenheim/Quine: but the proof of the theorem has a different structure: it does not seem to justify the assumption that a representative function could be formulated in any theory that maps a hyper-countable range in a countable one. At first glance, such an SF is of course impossible: it would have to be reversibly unique to provide different real numbers with different function values. And this contradicts the mapping of a hyper-countable into a countable range, because it cannot be reversibly unambiguous. ((s) Because it has to assign the same value to two arguments somehow.) Framework Theory/Stronger/Weaker/Theory/Ontology/Quine: there are three strength levels of requirements regarding what is said about the ontology of the object theory within the framework theory. 1) weakest requirement to the framework theory: is sufficient if we do not want any reduction, but only explain about what things the theory is. I.e. we translate the object theory into the framework theory. I.e. we make translation proposals, with which, however, the inscrutability of reference still is to be taken into account. The two theories may even be identical, e.g. if some terms are explained by definitions by other terms of the same language. XII 78 2) stronger: in case of reduction by an SF, here the frame theory must assume the non-reduced range. (see above, analogy to raa, reductio ad absurdum). 3) strongest requirements: in case of reductions according to Löwenheim: i.e. from a hyper-countable to a countable range: here, the SF must be from a truly stronger frame theory. I.e. we can no longer accept it in the spirit of the raa. Conclusion: this thwarts an argument from the Löwenheim theorem in favor of Pythagoreanism. Ontological Relativity/Finite Range/Quine: in a finite range, ontological relativity is trivial. Since instead of quantification you can assume finite conjunctions or disjunctions, the variables and thus also the question of their value range also disappear. Even the distinction between names and other signs is eliminated. Therefore, an ontology for a finite theory about named objects is pointless. That we have just talked about it is because we were moving in a broader context. Names/Quine: are distinguished by the fact that they may be used for variables. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Sellars, W. | Fraassen Vs Sellars, W. | I 32 Empirical Laws/Sellars: We don’t have them! E.g. that water boils at 100 ° applies only when the pressure is normal. (> Cartwright). Fraassen: that’s only methodically so far, because we have no confidence in the generalization of our everyday experiences. Problem: but we expect of a theory that postulates microstructure (theoretical entities) that it shows actual universal regularities. FraassenVsSellars/FraassenVsRealism: thus an unobservable reality is postulated behind the phenomena. E.g. Suppose at an early stage of chemistry it was discovered that different samples of gold dissolved at different speeds in aqua regia. But the samples were identical in terms of observation. I 33 Solution: (then): for the two samples a different microstructure was postulated. Then, the variation was explained with that the samples were mixtures of these two substances (which are identical in terms of observation). Thus, the laws have no observation-wise counterpart. Without that no explanation seems possible. And that is the goal of science, so we have to believe in an unobservable microstructure. This leads to three questions: 1) Does the postulation of the microstructure really have new consequences for the observable phenomena?. 2) Does science really always have to provide explanations?. 3) Could there be another rationale for the use of the image of the microstructure in the development of theories?. FraassenVsSellars: Ad 1): it seems that these hypothetical chemists very well postulated new observable regularities: Suppose two substances A and B with dissolution rates x and x+y. Every gold sample is a mixture of the two substances. Then it follows that every sample dissolves at a rate between x and x+y. And that is not implied by the fact that different samples have dissolved in this scope in the past. Thus Sellars is refuted in the first point. Suppose (for the sake of Sellars’ argument), there is still no way to predict the dissolution rates more accurately. Do we then need a categorical statement that is not based on the observable? (That was Reichenbach’s principle of the common cause, or the demand for the existence of hidden parameters). Sellars/Hidden Parameters: clearly recognizes that this would counter the current quantum mechanics, accordingly, he says that their mathematical models are incompatible with it. I 34 So he is limits himself to those cases where it is consistent to assume hidden variables. Consistency/Fraassen: is, of course, a logical hold point. FraassenVsHidden Variables/FraassenVsSellars: this does not prevent the disaster: although there is some evidence that hidden variables cannot be introduced in a classical deterministic theory, this evidence demands something much more stronger than consistency: E.g. the assumption that two different physical variables cannot have the same probability distribution in the measurement across all possible states. So if we are unable to specify differences in the forecast for the observable, there is no real difference. (No distinction without difference. Stronger demand than consistency stronger/weaker). Ad. 3) How can anti-realism make sense of that? Apart from the actually new empirical consequences (see above) he will cite methodological reasons. With the assumption of a particular microstructure we could come to new implications of empirical regularities. This is, of course, only a hope. But: Science/Fraassen: Thesis: it is not about explanation as such, but about new statements about observable regularities. I 30 FraassenVsHidden Parameters: if this is empirically equivalent to the orthodox quantum mechanics, it leads to non-logical correlation of non-classical nature, which would still violate the principle of the common cause. But this question is also academic, because modern physics does not need hidden parameters. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Skepticism | Nozick Vs Skepticism | II 197 Skepticism/Nozick: we do not try to refute the skeptic. VsSkepticism: other authors: 1) when he argues against knowledge, he already presupposes that it exists. 2) to accept it would be unreasonable, because it is more likely that his extreme conclusions are wrong than that all its premises are true. NozickVs. We do not have to convince the skeptic. We want to explain how knowledge is possible, therefore it is good to find hypotheses which we ourselves find acceptable! II 198 Skepticism/Nozick: Common Variant: claims that someone could believe something even though it is wrong. Perhaps caused by a demon or because he is dreaming or because he is a brain in a vat. But how do these possibilities adopted by the skeptic show that I do not know p? (3) if p were false, S would not believe that p (as above). If (3) is a necessary condition for knowledge that shows the possibility of the skeptic that there is no knowledge. Strong variant: R: Even if p were false, S would still believe that p II 199 This conditional with the same antecedent as (3) and contradictory consequent is incompatible with (3). If (3) is true, R is false. But R is stronger than skepticism requires. Because if (3) were wrong, S could still believe that p. The following conditional is weaker than R, it is merely the negation of (3): T: Not (not p > not (S believes that p)). ((s) >Range: weaker: negation of the entire conditional stronger: the same antecedent, opposite of the consequent ((s) not necessarily negation of consequent) Here: stronger: ".... would have to believe ..." - weaker.. "... could ...") Nozick: While R does not simply deny (3), it asserts its own conditional instead. The truth of (3) is not incompatible with a possible situation (here not possible world) where the person believes p, although p is false. (3) does not cover all possibilities: (3) not p > not (S believes p) That does not mean that in all situations where not p is true, S does not believe that p. Asserting this would mean to say that not p entails not (S believes p) (or logical implication) ((s) >Entailment). But subjunction (conditional) differs from entailment: So the existence of a possible situation in which p is wrong and S still believes p does not show that (3) is false. (? LL). (3) can be true even if there is a possible situation where not p and S believes that p. (3) speaks of the situation in which p is false. Not every possible situation where p is false is the situation that would prevail if p were false. Possible World: (3) speaks of the ~p world closest to our actual world. It speaks of the non-p neighborhood. Skepticism/SK/Terminology/Nozick: SK stands for the "possibilities of the skeptic": II 200 We could dream of being misled by an evil demon or being brains in a vat. These are attempts to refute (3): (3) if p were false, S would not believe that p. But these only attempts succeed if one of these possibilities(dream, vat, demon) prevails when p is false. I.e. only in the next non-p worlds. Even if we were in the vat, (3) could be true, i.e. although - as described by skeptics - p is false and S believes p. ((s) E.g. p: "I am in the Café": false, if I'm in the vat. But I would not believe to be the vat. That is what the skeptic means. If I do not believe the truth (that I am in the vat) and do not know, then my belief is wrong. But then p means "I'm not in the vat."). NozickVsSkepticism: when the skeptic describes a situation SK that would not prevail (sic), even if p were wrong, then this situation SK (vat) does not show that (3) is wrong and does not undermine our knowledge. (see below) ((s) i.e. from the perspective VsSkepticism: the skeptic asserts that all beliefs are wrong, but that is not yet the situation that we are all in the tank). This is just the preliminary consideration, the expected one follows in the next paragraph). Condition C: to exclude skeptical hypothesis: C: not-p > SK (vat situation) does not exist ((s) That is what the skeptic denies!). That excludes every skeptical situation that fulfills C. ((s) it is only about n-p cases). Skepticism: for a vat situation to show that we do not know that p, it must be a situation that could exist if p did not exist, and thus satisfies the negation of C: Negation of C: -not (not p > SK (vat situation) does not exist) Although the vat situations of the skeptic seem to show that (3) is wrong, they do not show it: they satisfy condition C and are therefore excluded! SkepticismVs: could ask why we know that if p were wrong, SK (vat) would not exist. But usually it asks something stronger: do we know that the vat situation does not exist? And if we do not know that, how can we know that p? ((s) reverse order). This brings us to the second way in which the vat situatios could show that we do not know that p: Skeptical results Knowledge/Nozick: according to our approach, S knows that the vat situation does not exist iff II 201 (1) vat situation does not exist (2) S believes that vat situation does not exist (3) If the vat situation existed, then S would not believe that the vat situation did not(!) exist. (4) If the vat situation did not exist, then S would believe that it does not exist. (3) is the necessary condition for knowledge! It follows from it that we do not know that we are not in the vat! Skepticism/Nozick: that is what the skeptic says. But is it not what we say ourselves? It is actually a feature of our approach that it provides this result! Vat/Demon/Descartes/Nozick: Descartes would say that proof of the existence of a good God would not allow us to be in the vat. Literature then focused on whether Descartes would succeed to obtain such evidence. II 202 Nozick: could a good God not have reasons to deceive us? According to Descartes his motives are unknowable for us. Cogito/Nozick: can "I think" only be produced by something existing? Not perhaps also by Hamlet, could we not be dreamed by someone who inspires "I think" in us? Descartes asked how we knew that we were not dreaming, he could also have asked whether we were dreamed about by someone. Def Doxastically Identical/Terminology/Nozick: is a possible situation for S with the current situation, if S believed exactly the same things (Doxa) in the situation. II 203 Skepticism: describes doxastically identical situations where nearly all the believed things are wrong. (Vat). Such possible worlds are possible, because we possess our knowledge through mediation, not directly. It's amazing how different doxastically identical worlds can be. What else could the skeptic hope for? Nozick pro skepticism: we agree that we do not know that "not-vat". II 204 But that does not keep me from knowing that I'm writing this! It is true, I believe it and I would not believe it if it were not true, and if it were true, I would believe it. I.e. our approach does not lead to general skepticism. However, we must ensure that it seems that the skeptic is right and that we do not know that we are not in the vat. VsSkepticism: we must examine its "short step" to the conclusion that we do not know these things, because either this step is wrong or our approach is incoherent. Not seclusion II 204 Completed/Incompleteness/Knowledge/Nozick: Skepticism: (wrongly) assumes that our knowledge is complete under known logical implication: if we progress from something known to something entailed, we allegedly do not leave the realm of knowledge. The skeptic tries the other way around, of course: if you do not know that q, and you know that p entails q, then it should follow that you do not know that p. E.g. ((s) If you do not know that you are not in the vat, and sitting here implies not being in the vat, then you do not know that you're sitting here, if you know that the implication exists. (contraposition).) Terminology: Contraposition: knowledge that p >>: entails Then the (skeptical) principle of closure under known implication is: P: K(p >> q) & Kp > Kq. II 205 Nozick: E.g. if you know that two sentences are incompatible, and you know that the first one is true, then you know that the negation of the second one is true. Contraposition: because you do not know the second one, you do not know the first. (FN 48) Vs: you could pick on the details and come to an iteration: the person might have forgotten inferences etc. Finally you would come to KK(p >> q) & KKp Kq: amplifies the antecedent and is therefore not favorable for the skeptics. II 206 NozickVsSkepticism: the whole principle P is false. Not only in detail. Knowledge is not closed under known logical implication. (FN 49) S knows that p if it has a true belief and fulfills (3) and (4). (3) and (4) are themselves not closed under known implication. (3) if p were false, S would not believe that p. If S knows that p, then the belief is that p contingent on the truth of p. And that is described by (3). Now it may be that p implies q (and S knows that), that he also believes that q, but this belief that q is not subjunktivically dependent on the truth of q. Then he does not fulfill (3') if q were wrong, S would not believe q. The situation where q is wrong could be quite different from the one where p is wrong. E.g. the fact that they were born in a certain city implies that they were born on the earth, but not vice versa. II 207 And pondering the respective situations would also be very different. Thus the belief would also be very different. Stronger/Weaker: if p implies q (and not vice versa), then not-q (negation of consequent) is much stronger than not-p (negation of the antecedent). Assuming various strengths there is no reason to assume that the belief would be the same in both situations. (Doxastically identical). Not even would the beliefs in one be a proper subset of the other! E.g. p = I'm awake and sitting on a chair in Jerusalem q = I'm not in the vat. The first entails the second. p entails q. And I know that. If p were wrong, I could be standing or lying in the same city or in a nearby one. ((s) There are more ways you can be outside of a vat than there are ways you can be inside). If q were wrong, I would have to be in a vat. These are clearly two different situations, which should make a big difference in what I believe. If p were wrong, I would not believe that p. If q were wrong, I would nevertheless still believe that q! Even though I know that p implies q. The reason is that (3) is not closed under known implication. It may be that (3) is true of one statement, but not of another, which is implied by it. If p entails q and we truthfully believe that p, then we do not have a false belief that q. II 208 Knowledge: if you know something, you cannot a have false belief about it. Nevertheless, although p implies q, we can have a false belief that q (not in vat)! "Would not falsely believe that" is in fact not completed under known implication either. If knowledge were merely true belief, it would be closed under implication. (Assuming that both statements are believed). Because knowledge is more than belief, we need additional conditions of which at least one must be open (not completed) under implication. Knowledge: a belief is only knowledge when it covaries with the fact. (see above). Problem: This does not yet ensure the correct type of connection. Anyway, it depends on what happens in situations where p is false. Truth: is what remains under implication. But a condition that does not mention the possible falseness, does not provide us covariance. Belief: a belief that covaries with the facts is not complete. II 209 Knowledge: and because knowledge involves such a belief, it is not completed, either. NozickVsSkepticism: he cannot simply deny this, because his argument that we do not know that we are not in the vat uses the fact that knowledge needs the covariance. But he is in contradiction, because another part of his argument uses the assumption that there is no covariance! According to this second part he concludes that you know nothing at all if you do not know that they are not in the vat. But this completion can only exist if the variation (covariance) does not exist. Knowledge/Nozick: is an actual relation that includes a connection (tracking, traceable track). And the track to p is different from that to q! Even if p implies q. NozickVsSkepticism: skepticism is right in that we have no connections to some certain truths (we are not in the vat), but he is wrong in that we are not in the correct relation to many other facts (truths). Including such that imply the former (unconnected) truth that we believe, but do not know. Skepticism/Nozick: many skeptics profess that they cannot maintain their position, except in situations where they rationally infer. E.g. Hume: II 210 Hume: after having spent three or four hours with my friends, my studies appear to me cold and ridiculous. Skepticism/Nozick: the arguments of the skeptic show (but they also show only) that we do not know that we are not in the vat. He is right in that we are not in connection with a fact here. NozickVsSkepticism: it does not show that we do not know other facts (including those that imply "not vat"). II 211 We have a connection to these other facts (e.g. I'm sittin here, reading). II 224f Method/Knowledge/Covariance/Nozick: I do not live in a world where pain behavior e is given and must be kept constant! - I.e. I can know h on the basis of e, which is variable! - And because it does not vary, it shows me that h ("he is in pain") is true. VsSkepticism: in reality it is not a question that is h not known, but "not (e and not h)" II 247 NozickVsSkepticism: there is a limit for the iteration of the knowledge operator K. "knowing knowledge" is sometimes interpreted as certainly knowing, but that is not meant here. Point: Suppose a person knows exactly that they are located on the 3rd level of knowledge: K³p (= KKKp), but not k4p. Suppose also that the person knows that they are not located on the 4th level. KK³p & not k4p. But KK³p is precisely k4p which has already been presumed as wrong! Therefore, it should be expected that if we are on a finite level Knp, we do not know exactly at what level we are. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Type Theory | Quine Vs Type Theory | III 315 Type Theory/TT/Quine: U1, U2 ... etc. logical types. Meaningless are expressions like "x e x", etc. "e2 may only stand between variables of successive type." III 316 With that we avoid confusion of constants. Example: we do not identify the number 12, which contains the class A of the Apostles, with the number 12, which contains a certain class consisting of a dozen classes. Because one is of the type U2, the other of type U3. Every type has a new number 12. ((s) Elsewhere: therefore VsType Theory: infinitely many numbers 1,2,3, etc.). Number/Existence/Ontology/Quine: that there are these numbers no longer depends on whether there are so many individuals. Type Theory/TT/Russell/Quine: Reason: we can derive an incorrect sentence without the separation of types: by simplifying the scheme (A) to (A'): (A’) (Ey)(x)(x ε y . ↔ Fx) If we then introduce the predicate «[1] ε [1]» for "F": we get the Russell antinomy/Russell paradoxy/logical form: (1) (Ey)(x)[x ε y . ↔ ~x ε x)] (2) (x)(x ε y . ↔ ~(x ε x)] (1) y (3) y ε y . ↔ ~(y ε y) (2) (4) (Ey)[y ε y . ↔ ~y ε y)]. Solution/Zermelo/VsType Theory/Quine: simpler: some predicates have classes as extension, others don't. (A') is thus considered as valid for some, but not all sentences. E.g. the predicate "[1] ε [1]" has no class as an extension. Zermelo: here (A') is assumed for the case in which the sentence has the form of a conjunction "x ε z. Gx" instead of "Fx". Then (A') becomes: (Ey)(x)( x ε y . ↔ . x ε z . Gx). Zermelo calls this the Def axiom schema of specification. To any given class z this law supplies other classes that are all sub-classes of z. But by itself it supplies at first no non-empty classes z. (...) III 318 Layers/Layered/Zermelo: (...) Sets/Classes/von Neumann/Quine: (...) Classes are not sets... III 319 Axioms/Stronger/Weaker/Quine: (...) you can seek strength or weakness. VII (e) 91 QuineVsType Theory: unnatural and uncomfortable disadvantages: 1) Universal class: because the TT only allows uniform types as members of a class, the universal class V leads to an infinite series of quasi universal classes, each for one type. 2) Negation: ~x ceases to comprise all non-elements of x, and only comprises those non-elements that do not belong to the next lower level! VII (e) 92 3) Zero class: even that accordingly leads to an infinite number of zero classes. ((s) for each level its own zero class). ((s) Absurd: we cannot distinguish different zero classes.) 4) Boolean class algebra: is no longer applicable to classes in general, but is reproduced at each level. 5) Relational calculus: accordingly. to be re-established at each level. 6) Arithmetic: the numbers cease to be uniform! at each level (type) appears a new 0, new 1, new 2, and so on! Quine: instead counterproposal: QuineVsType Theory: Solution: Instead: variables with unlimited range, the concept of hierarchical formulas only survives in one point where we write numbers for variables and, without any reference to type theory, we replace R3 by the weaker: R3' If φ is stratified and does not contain "x", then (Ex)(y) ((y ε x) ↔ φ) is a theorem. Negation: ~x then contains everything that is not part of x. Zero class: there is only one zero class. Universal class: there is similarly only one universal class that contains absolutely everything, including itself. Relation, arithmetic, numbers: everything works out again comes in this way. VII (e) 93 Only difference between R3 and R3': R3' lacks a guarantee for the existence of such classes as: y^ (y ε y), y^~(y ε y), etc. In the case of some non-hierarchical formulas the existence of appropriate classes is still to be demonstrated through absurd consequences: R3' results in: (Ex)(y) ((y ε x) ↔ ((z ε y) l (y ε w))) and by inserting this results in subsitution inference (1) (Ex)(y) ((y ε x) ↔ ((z ε y) l (y ε z))) through the other rules What asserts the existence of a class y^ ((z ε y) l (y ε z)) whose generating formula is not hierarchical. But probably we cannot prove its existence. (From these follows inter alia Russell's paradox). Within a system, we can explicitly use such contradictions to take their existence ad absurdum. That (1) can be demonstrated, in turn, shows that the derivation strength of our system "NF" (New Foundations, Quine) exceeds the Principia Mathematica(1). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Possible World | Stalnaker, R. | Field II 100 Possibility/stronger/weaker/real/epistemic/Stalnaker/Field: Stalnaker thinks that thesis worlds are possible in a stronger sense: in which not only denial of logical truths are impossible, but also denial of mathematical truth (pp. 73-7), and even denial of a posteriori identity between name and denial of certain "essentialist" assertions. Field: the assumption that these possible worlds are possible in a stronger sense aggravates the problem. But I do not see what should be solved with it either. In any case, it is essential for Stalnaker that logical falsities are absolutely impossible. That is the condition for not being able to believe them. Staln passim Possible world/Stalnaker: to know how the world could have been. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Possibility | Stalnaker, R. | Field II 100 Possibility/stronger/weaker/real/epistemic/Stalnaker/Field: Stalnaker thinks worlds are possible in a stronger sense: in which not only denial of logical truths are impossible, but also denial of mathematical truth (pp. 73-7), and even denial of a posteriori identity between name and denial of certain "essentialist" assertions. II 103 FieldVsStalnaker: Thesis: There is no plausible way to describe apparent cases of inconsistent beliefs (e.g. Cantor) so that they match Stalnaker's image. I 40 Possibility/Stalnaker: 1. Semantic Thesis: claims about what is possible and necessary should be analysed in terms of what is true in some or all parts of reality. 2. Metaphysical Thesis: about the existence of worlds. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 |
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