Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 22 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assertibility Conditions | Soames | I 468 T-Def/Logical Constants/Tarski/Soames: Tarski himself said that his concept of truth cannot be used to give the meanings of the logical constants. >Logical constants, >Meaning, >Tarski scheme, >Truth theory, >Truth definition. Circumstances: the T-Definition says nothing about the assertibility conditions under which a sentence can be claimed. >Assertions, >Assertibility, >Sentences, >Circumstances. |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Bare Truth | Dummett | II 94 "Simply true"/bare truth/Dummett: irreducible - If a sentence is not simply true, its truth sentence is non-trivial: i.e. the truth sentence for the sentence S does not have S itself on the right side. (Cf. >Truth definition). II 100 Important Argument: counterfactual conditionals (>counterfactual conditional) cannot be simply true means: we cannot imagine what the ability of identifying the truth would have to look like. II 95 "Barely true": model: observation, we know what it means for the tree to be taller than the other one. II 106 Simply true/Dummett: a sentence is simply true if there is no set of sentences out of which none is a trivial variant of the original sentence, and the truth of all of which defines the original sentence as true. - Then the trivial Tarski scheme fits: "snow is white" is true iff snow is white. "True because"/True/Dummett: Some sentences that cannot be simply true: E.g. conjunction: is the true because of both conjuncts - disjunction: true because of one of the disjuncts - universal quantification: true because of all instances. - This has led some philosophers to to say that there is no "disjunctive fact". - N.B.: this allows to characterize the concept of reduction of a class of sentences to another class. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Correspondence Theory | Tarski | Skirbekk I 168 TarskiVsCorrespondence theory: "according to reality" is intuitively incomprehensible. Instead, "it is snowing" is true when it snows.(1) >Correspondence, >Tarski scheme, >Truth definition/Tarski. 1. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
| Equivalence | Field | l 159 Equivalence/Platonism/Nominalism/Field: Question: in what sense are platonist (E.g. "Direction1 = direction2") and nominalistic statements (c1 is parallel to c2) equivalent? >Platonism, >Nominalism. Problem: if there are no directions, the second cannot be a consequence of the first. - They are only equivalent within a directional theory. Cf. >Definition/Frege, >Consequence. Solution/Field: one can regard the equivalences as important, even if the theories are wrong. Problem: for the meaning one should be able to accept truth. >Meaning. Solution: conservative extension (does not apply to the ontology) - this is harmless for consequences that do not mention directions. >Conservativity/Field, >Mention. I 228 Def cognitively equivalent/Field: equivalent by logic plus the meaning of "true". >Truth. Disquotational true/Deflationism: means that the propositions in the Tarski scheme should be cognitively equivalent. - ((s) Plus meaning of true here: the same understanding of true.) >Disquotationalism/Field, >Deflationism. --- II 16 Extensional equivalence/Field: Problem: if we assume extensional equivalence and abstract it from the size, there are infinitely many entities to which a simple theory, such as the chemical valences applies: For example, the number 3 not only applies to molecules but also to larger aggregates etc. >Reference classes. II 106 Redundancy theory/Field: an utterance u and the assertion that u is true (as the speaker understands it) are cognitively equivalent. >Redundancy theory, >Utterance. N.B.: the assertion that an utterance is true, has an existential obligation (ontological commitment): there must be something that is true. >Ontological commitment. While the utterance u itself does not provide an ontological obligation. Therefore, the two are not completely cognitively equivalent. Relatively cognitively equivalent: here: u and the assertion of the truth of u are cognitively equivalent relative to the existence of u. II 106 E.g. "Thatcher is so that she is self-identical and snow is white" is cognitively equivalent to "snow is white" relative to the existence of Thatcher - the verification conditions are the same. N.B.: we do not need any truth conditions. >Verification conditions, >Truth conditions. II 252 Material Equivalence/Field: means that A > B is equivalent to ~ A v B. Problem: most authors do not believe the conclusion of e.g. "Clinton will not die in office" on "When Clinton dies in office, Danny de Vito becomes President". Therefore equivalence does not seem to exist. Solution/Lewis: the truth conditions for indicative conditionals must be radically index-dependent to maintain the surface logic. >Conditionals. Lewis: thesis: the surface logic should not be respected. Lewis: thesis: E.g. Clinton/Vito: truth-maintaining despite absurdity. Solution: probability function: P (Vito I Clinton). >Probability function. II 253 In the case of the indicative conditional, the premise is always presupposed. Adams: intuitively, conclusions with conditionals are correct. >Conditional/Adams. Problem: then they will say less about the world. >Empiricism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Facts | Tarski | Rorty VI 193 Fact/Tarski/Davidson: Tarskis great merit is to have shown that we can do without the concept of fact. ((s) Just "if and only if ...", and not "because ..."). "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white not ...because snow is white. The latter would be a statement about physical properties; truth would not be defined with it.) >Tarski scheme, >Truth definition/Tarski, >Truth theory/Tarski, >Truth theory. |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Language | Loar | Avramides I 75 Def possible language/Loar: abstract entity, which must still be based on a speaker. Loar II 146 Language/Loar: Community based. - Therefore intensions are important -> quantification into the semantic content of sentences. >Language community, >Language use, >Intensions, >Content. Problem: the p-position in the Tarski scheme only allows extensions. >Tarski scheme. Loar thesis: the semantic properties of the sentence components are a function of the propositional attitudes of the speakers. >Propositional attitudes, >Semantic properties, >Sentences, >Compositionality. II 149 Language/Loar: maybe a function of sentences on sentence-like intentions (which in turn are functions of possible worlds on truth values). >Truth values, >Possible worlds, >Intentions. Loar: Language is always relative to a community - not reducible to logical and syntactic terms. - Factual use is decisive, so psychological terms come into play. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Meaning | Loar | II 144 Meaning/Loar: a sentence in a community is a function of psychological and social role. - Other sentences in other languages do not belong to the point. - (Davidson ditto). Whatever is important, it is not something that is generally available in translation relative to the sentence. >Translation, >Language community, >Language use, II 144 Meaningfulness/significance/Loar: regardless of language: e.g. unstructured signals have conventional meaning in a community. >Conventions. Problem: the equivalence of "Snow is white" and "Grass is green". >Tarski scheme, >Quote/Disoquotation, >Truth definition, >Equivalence, >Convention T. Accidental equivalences cannot be ruled out. II 149 Meaning/sentence meaning/Loar: what a sentence means is always relative to a language - ((s) it is not a language-independent proposition). >Propositions, >Sentences. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Meaning Theory | Loar | Avramides I 27 Meaning Theory/Loar: a meaning theory cannot be drawn as a purely extensional truth theory. >Extensionality, >Extensions. Problem: 1st The equivalence of "Snow is white" and "Grass is green" 2nd Hesperus is bright iff Phosphorus is bright, 3rd "Snow ist white and 2+ 2 = 4" is true iff snow is white. Solution/Fodor/Lepore :the right hand side must be a translation from the left. Cf. >Convention T. Meaning Theory/Avramides: Thesis: the problems disappear when it comes to the big picture: how sounds turn to speech acts? >Speech acts. Only then the truth conditions will come up, because the meaning theory must fit into a theory of power. Lewis: sounds have truth conditions only relative to a language. >Phonemes. Psychology comes into play only when it comes to favoring one language in a population. >Language community, >Conventions, >Language use. Loar II 139f Meaning Theory/Loar: a) extensional (Quine, Davidson ) b) Loar: intensional: semantic concepts are located within a larger framework of propositional attitudes. Davidson: intermediate position. >Intensionality, >Propositional attitudes. II 141 Meaning Theory/Davidson: main problem: how to avoid: "Snow is white " is true iff grass is green. If one accepts this as extensionally right hand side (correct), then there is not more than that in the idea of the meaning. II 142 Meaning Theory/Loar: a list does not work: "x is camel1 , or camel2 ... ": there is no understanding of a sentence. Wrong solution: simplicity: "x is a camel " is only satisfied by y, if y is a camel. Vs: this solution is too strong and too vague. For someone who knows nothing of a language that meaning theory does not work that way. The Tarski schema " S is true ... " ( equivalence scheme) does not give the meaning. >Tarski scheme. We also need at least "an expression x is S and ... " Problem: we then have a metametalanguage. >Metalanguage. II 143 Solution/Loar: when entities were meanings they could distinguish sentence meaning from anything else what is true in the sentence. >Sentence meaning, >Meaning. II 149 Meaning Theory/Loar: Thesis: a meaning theory is a theory of mind, not vice versa. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Nonfactualism | Wright | I 272ff Non-Factualism/Boghossian/Wright:> if we assume nonfactualism, no discourse can be more than >Correctness, >Correctness/Wright. (i) it is not the case that S has the truth condition that P has a truth condition. WrightVs: this can be reformulated with disquotation into (vi) it is not the case that it is not the case that S has the truth condition that P has a truth condition. >Disquotation, >Tarski scheme, >Truth conditions. But denying the truth is not inconsistent with correctness of the assertion. >Contradictions, >Negation, >Assertibility. But (i) is incorrect, if both truth and correctness are in the game, the matrix for the truth predicate must be non-conservative: i.e. the value of A is true in all cases, false or incorrect, except those where A has the truth value true. >truth transfer, >conservativeness. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Paradoxes | Tarski | Horwich I 114 Liar/Paradox/Tarski: this paradox arises when we assume that the language contains the names of the expressions, and semantic terms such as "true" - then the language is "semantically closed". >Semantic closeness. Horwich I 115 Such languages can be eliminated even in the sciences, in which semantic terms are essential.(1) 1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 Berka I 452 Berka I 452 Liar/paradox/Tarski scheme/Tarski: error: to use for the symbol "p" a term which itself contains the term "true statement". - Then it is no longer a partial the definition. Problem: no reason can be specified as to why such substitutions are prohibited in principle.(1) >Tarski scheme, cf. >Quasi-quotation. 1. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Reference | Wittgenstein | Putnam III 201ff Reference/Wittgenstein: e.g. "my brother in America" - a tendency to present a picture - we suggest that reference is not causal. We do imagine more than an experience of thinking. >Picture, >Picture theory. Putnam: refrencec is not causal: we can also refer to future things (then causal reference to a type "future generations"). Putnam III 205/6 Instead of knowledge by acquaintance/description there are just different ways of reference (causality is irrelevant). >Acquaintance, >Knowledge, >Descriptions. Tetens VII 81 Language/Border/Tractatus/Tetens: sentences about the language are on a "meta-level" tautology e.g. instances of the Tarski scheme. Tetens: in the end all we have left is to carry out the act of referring to facts. We cannot ensure this through ever more sentences and surpass them. We cannot leave our language. How the reference succeeds is shown in the execution of the statements. Saying/Pointing/Tractatus/Tetens: have a double face. >Ostension. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Reference | Wright | I 27 Deflationism/e.g. Goldbach’s conjecture: the deflationism recognizes, of course, that in addition to Tarski, something must be said, even e.g. "Everything he said is true." >Goldbach's conjecture, >Deflationism, >"Everything he said", >Truth/Tarski, >Definition of truth/Tarski, >Theory of truth/Tarski, >Tarski scheme, >Disquotation. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Rule Following | Tarski | Wright I 284 Tarski/rule-following/McDowell: When we say ""Diamonds are hard" is true if and only if diamonds are hard", then we are just as heavily involved in the right side, as alleged by the reflections on the rule-following. It is tempting to overlook that and to think that somehow the right side presents a merely possible fact which is presented as non-conceptualized configuration of "things-in-themselves". >Tarski scheme, cf. >Quasi-quotation, >Kripke's Wittgenstein. |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Tarski | Soames | I 481 VsTarski/Soames: two kinds of critique: 1st: FieldVsTarski: semantic properties should be dependent on speakers in a way that Tarski's are not. 2nd: Other authors VsTarski: Importance and truth conditions should be contingent, but analytically connected, characteristics of a sentence in a way that it is incompatible with Tarski. SoamesVsVs: both can be rejected. >Truth definition, >Quote/Disquotation, >Tarski scheme, >Truth theory, >Semantic properties, >Semantic facts, >Language dependence, >Speaker meaning, >Circumstances, >Logical constants/Soames. |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Tarski | Wright | Rorty I 38ff WrightVsTarski: he did not succeed to specify a standard. >Truth/Tarski, >Definition of truth/Tarski, >Theory of truth/Tarski. Wright: there are two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. >Truth, >Assertibility. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessary also a striving for the other, but a success in one is not necessarily a success with the other. --- Wright I 85 VsWright: Tarski requires bivalence, assertions can also be undecidable. (Vs Platitude: assertion = putting something forward as true). >Bivalence, >Tarski scheme, >Decidability. WrightVsVs: the deflationismus precisely does not accept the (disquotation scheme). >Deflationism, >Disquotation. There are no problems with indefinite truth values, but with additional ones or gaps. >Multivalued logic, >Truth value gaps. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Truth | Soames | I 470 Truth/Soames: truth is not a particular philosophical term, because it is accepted by many different camps. >Facts, >Science, >Psychology. Different: Reality. >Reality, >Situations, >Descriptions, >Correctness, >Predication, >Assertions, >Statements. Tarski: Truth is metaphysically neutral. >Tarski scheme, >Truth theory/Tarski, >Truth definition/Tarski. Truth/Tarski/Soames: truth must be physically or mathematically eliminatable. cf. >Truth/Quine. |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Truth | Tarski | Glüer II 22 Truth theory/Davidson: the defined T-predicate (truth predicate) in the metalanguage can be translated back into the object language and the state before the elimination of the true can be restored. >Truth predicate, >Object language, >Metalanguage. Object language and metalanguage should contain the predicate true. >Homophony. Davidson, however, can evade the dilemma by not giving a definition. He calls it a definition of truth in Tarski's style, hereafter referred to as T-theory. --- Rorty IV (a) 22 True/Tarski: the equivalences between the two sides of the T-sentences do not correspond to any causal relationship. >Tarski scheme, >Equivalence. Davidson: there is no way to subdivide the true sentences so that on the one hand they express "factual", while on the other side they do not express anything. Cf. >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory. --- Berka I 396 Truth/Tarski: we start from the classical correspondence theory. I 399 We interpret truth like this: we want to see all sentences as valid, which correspond to the Tarski scheme - these are partial definitions of the concept of truth. - Objectively applicable: is the truth definition, if we are able, to prove all the mentioned partial definitions on the basis of the meta language.(1) 1. A.Tarski, „Grundlegung der wissenschaftlichen Semantik“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, Vol. III, ASI 390, Paris 1936, pp. 1-8 --- Berka I 475 Truth-Definition/truth/Tarski: wrong: to assume that a true statement is nothing more than a provable sentence. - This is purely structural. Problem: No truth-definition must contradict the sentence definition. N.B.: but this has no validity in the field of provable sentences. - E.g. There may be two contradictory statements that are not provable. - All provable statements are indeed content-wise true. Nevertheless the truth definition must also contain the non-provable sentences. >Provability, >Definitions. Berka I 482 Definition true statement/Tarski: x is a true statement, notation x ε Wr iff. x ε AS (meaningful statement) and if every infinite sequence of classes satisfies x. >Satisfaction/Tarski. That does not deliver a truth criterion. >Truth criterion. No problem: nevertheless the sense of x ε Wr (x belongs to the class of true statements) gets understandable and unambiguous. I 486 Relative Truth/accuracy in the range/Tarski: plays a much greater role than the (Hilbertian) concept of absolute truth, which was previously mentioned - then we modify Definition 22 (recursive fulfillment) and 23 (truth). As derived terms we will introduce the term of the statement that a) in a domain of individuals with k elements is correct and b) of the statement that is true in every domain of individuals.(2) 2. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol. 1, Lemberg 1935 --- Horwich I 111 Truth/Tarski: is a property of sentences - but in the explanation we refer to "facts". - ((s) Quotation marks by Tarski). >Facts. Horwich I 124 Truth/true/eliminability/Tarski: truth cannot be eliminated with generalizations if we want to say that all true sentences have a certain property. E.g. All consequences of true sentences are true. Also not eliminable: in particular statements of the form "x is true": E.g. the first sentence that Plato wrote, is true. Because we do not have enough historical knowledge.(3) ((s) The designation "the first sentence..." is here the name of the sentence. This cannot be converted into the sentence itself. Eliminability: from definition is quite different from that of redundancy.) >Elimination, >Eliminability, cf. >Redundancy theory. 3. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 --- Skirbekk I 156 Definition Truth/Tarski: a statement is true when it is satisfied by all objects, otherwise false. Skirbekk I 158 Truth/Tarski: with our definition, we can prove the (semantic, not the logical) sentence of contradiction and the sentence definition. - The propositional logic does not include the term true at all. Truth almost never coincides with provability. All provable statements are true, but there are true statements that cannot be proved. - Such disciplines are consistent but incomplete. >Incompleteness/Gödel). There is even a pair of contradictory statements, neither of which is provable.(4) 4. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
| Truth Conditions | Schiffer | I 95ff Relation Theory/mentalese/solution/Schiffer: new thesis: Suppose we are thinking in public English. - Suppose we know the truth conditions for our mental representation: namely the homophone Tarski schema "s" iff s. >Homophony, >Tarski scheme. Then E.g. "Reagan is a Chinese" forms the phrase on Reagan's being Chinese. N.B.: we cannot say now what determines the truth conditions for mentalese, but we can find out empirically. - By the discovery of causal relations to things outside the head. >Language of thought. Problem: it cannot be accepted that any package of conceptual role/causal relation is appropriate for our own inner English. >Conceptual role, >Causal relations. I 98 Vs this solution: problem: the assumptions are wrong or unjustifiable. - One cannot assume that Mentalese is identical with public English. >Mentalese, >Relation theory. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Truth Conditions | Tarski | Horwich I 127 Facts/truth-definition/Tarski: the reference to facts is missing in the scheme on purpose, Because it is not about truth conditions. >Tarski scheme, >Facts, >Truth conditions, cf. >Correpondence theory. It is only about that we have to assert ""snow is white" is true" if we state "snow is white". So we can keep the respectivement epistemic attitude. We can remain realists, idealists, etc ... Different truth-concept: This would only exist if "snow is white" would be true iff. Snow is not white! - Otherwise it would be the same truth-concept. That would not be necessarily absurd.(1) 1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth Definition | Stalnaker | I 46 Truth/T-Def/Tarski/BenacerrafVsTarski/Reference/causal theory/Stalnaker: a Tarski-style truth definition is not sufficient to assert the fact that we are really talking about truth. Stalnaker ditto. ((s) Problem: homophony does not guarantee any causal connection to abstract or concrete objects). Solution/Stalnaker: the solution here is the connection to practice. >Practise, >Tarski scheme, >Abstractness, >Causal theory of knowledge, >Truth. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Truth Predicate | Soames | I 479 Truth predicate/T-predicate/Tarski/Soames: the T-predicate is purely quantitative theory. - There are no conditions for the meanings. E.g. ["Snow is white" is T] and "snow is white" are necessary equivalent in elemental modal logic. >Equivalence, >Tarski scheme, >Quote/Disquotation. I 480 T-predicate/Soames: it was a discovery that it applies exactly to the true sentences. >Discoveries, >Empiricism, >Truth. |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Truth Theory | Tarski | Skirbekk I 144 T-Schema/Tarski: left side: name of the statement (in quotes). This can also be marking or spelling. "p": any statement "x": replaces the name of this statement. Then we ask for the logical relationship between the statements "x is true" and "p". Skirbekk I 145 "p" will be replaced by a statement and "x" by the name of that statement. The schema itself is not the truth-definition.(1) >Tarski scheme, >Truth definition, >Disquotation scheme. 1. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Linguisticism | Field Vs Linguisticism | II 163 Vs Quasi-Translation/Truth Conditions/tr.cond./Truth/Linguistic View/Field: One could argue that you need additional premises to say that "snow is white" means that it is true that snow is white. But this will be trivial for our own sentence and it will not imply that our own sentence is only true if snow is white. Therefore, it could be argued that the linguistic point of view leaves out a key feature in the attribution of meanings: the truth conditions! Equally it can be said that the attribution of meaning to singular terms or predicates, which does not rely on the conditions under which he or it refers at all, leaves out something important. FieldVsVs: I do not see why the uncontested background assumption. II 164 That "snow is white" is true iff snow is white should not be sufficient. But even if not: Solution/Field: disquotational truth (+ disquotational reference, etc.): according to this view, the Tarski scheme expresses no contingent empirical truth. (accordingly for reference): E.g. "teacher of Alexander" only refers to something if the person was a teacher of Alexander. This is not an empirical coincidence. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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