Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ambiguity | Montague | Hintikka I 106 Quantification/quantifiers/ambiguity/any/HintikkaVsMontague: on the whole, the Montague semantics show how ambiguity arises through the interplay of quantifiers and intensional expressions. E.g. (12) A woman loves every man. (13) John is looking for a dog. >Intensions, >Quantifiers, >Quantification, cf. >Opacity, >Quantification into opaque contexts. HintikkaVsMontague: explains only why certain expressions can be ambiguous, but not which are actually ambiguous. He generally predicts too many ambiguities. For he is not concerned with the grammatical principles, which often resolve ambiguities with quantifiers. >Grammar. Scope/Hintikka: the scope determines the logical order. >Scope, >Narrow/wide scope. Quantifier/Quantification/everyone/he/Montague/Hintikka: E.g. (14) If he makes an effort, he will be happy. (15) If everyone makes an effort, he will be happy. Problem: in English, "if" has precedence with respect to "everyone" so that "everyone" in (15) cannot precede the "he" as a pronoun ("pronominalize"). >Pronouns, >Operators. I 107 HintikkaVsMontague: we need additional rules for the order of application of the rules. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Articles | Russell | Cresswell I 179 Definite Article/theory of descriptions/Russell: requiring that a sentence e.g. "the φ is ψ" provided that "the φ" has a wide range, entails that there exists a unique φ. >Scope, >Narrow scope, >Wide Scope. Russell I X Russell/Gödel: (K.Gödel, Preface to Principia Mathematica) Russell avoids any axioms about the particular articles "the", "the", "that". - Frege, on the other hand, must make an axiom about it! The advantage for Russell, however, remains only as long as he interprets definitions as mere typographical abbreviations, not as the introduction of names. >Proxy, >Names, >Logical proper names, >Axioms, Typographical abbreviation: >"blackening of the paper", >Formalism. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Descriptions | Prior | I 124 Theory of Descriptions/unicorn/Russell/Prior: a) "the so-and-so φ-s" b) "X thinks that the so-and-so φ-s" in a) and b) the marking has the same meaning whether the object exists or does not exist - in b) the sentence even has the same truth value. >Truth value, >Non-existence, >Thinking, >Thoughts. I 148 Theory of Descriptions/Russell: singular names: "The only thing that φ-s". >Names, >Singular Terms. Geach: this analysis has two parts: a) explicitly predicative use: "x is the only thing that φ-s" b) use as apparent subject: can be explained as an explication of an implicit predicative use: "the only thing that φ-s, ψ-s." >Predication, >"Exactly one". a) as "something that .." b) "If something ..." Prior: thie is a solution for the non-existing. Problem: different scope: a) as part of a complex predicate: "Something is both the only-thing- that-φ-s and not ψ-s.". b) as part of a complex sentence: "It is not the case that ..". Markings: useful: "the φ-re does not exist" not with logically proper name "this". >Scope, >Narrow/wide scope. I 152 Champagne-Example/PriorVsRussell: has overlooked that markings can be used differently : "the man over there," does not speak of something that it is "man" or that it is "over there". - If it is true that he is clever, then even if it is a disguised woman - attribution does not require proper identification - it is only required that it is "the only ...". >Descriptions/Russell. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Good | Nussbaum | Brocker I 895 Good/the Good/Nussbaum: "strong vague conception of the good": VsNussbaum: the critique of it essentially refers to its Aristotle interpretation and the question of the essentialism of its conception of the good (Sturma 2000)(1). >Essentialism, cf. >Aristotle, >The Good/Aristotle. 2. VsNussbaum: Furthermore, it is about an implicit tension between a vague theory of the good, which wants to know a wide scope of decision guaranteed for the actual exercise of the basic cabilities, and a certain conception richer in content, which orients itself at the actual functioning ("true human functioning").(2)(3)(4) 1. Dieter Sturma, »Universalismus und Neoaristotelismus. Amartya Sen und Martha C. Nussbaum über Ethik und soziale Gerechtigkeit«, in: Wolfgang Kersting (Hg.), Politische Philosophie des Sozialstaats, Weilerswist 2000, 257-292. 2. Anne Phillips »Feminism and Liberalism Revisited. Has Martha Nussbaum Got it Right?«, in: Constellations 8/2, 2001, 249-266. 3 . Nikita Dhawan »Zwischen Empire und Empower. Dekolonisierung und Demokratisierung«, in: Femina Politica 2, 2009, 52-63 4. Ian Carter, »Is the Capability Approach Paternalist?«, in: Economics and Philosophy 30/1, 2014, 75-98. Sandra Seubert, „Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2000)“, in:Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Market Economy | Boudreaux | Boudreaux II 34 Def Market economy/Boudreaux: By"market economy" I mean an economy in which there are no legal restraints on how far and in what direction prices can move; in which private property rights are secure; and in which people are largely free both to earn their incomes as they individually choose and to spend their incomes as they individually choose. A market economy, then, achieves two important goals simultaneously. Boudreaux II 35 1) First, a market economy permits self-interested people to prosper economically only by serving the interests of others. The greediest businessman can profit only by offering consumers deals that consumers value. Likewise, the greediest consumer can get what he or she wants only by paying suppliers arnounts that suppliers find attractive. Individual interest/egoism/market/Adam Smith: "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages."(1) >Invisible Hand/Adam Smith. 2) Second, prices set in market economies "tell" people just how they can best serve others' interests. Prices are the Single most important sources of information for producers and consumers on what they can expect from others in market economies. >Price/Hayek, >Information/Economic theories. Market economy/Boudreaux: A market economy, therefore, expands the ability of each of us to pursue our own goals by harnessing the cooperation of others. Boudreaux II 36 Unlike in a firm or other organization that pursues a single goal - such as “make as much profit as possible by producing and selling automobiles” - a market economy is not aimed at attaining one unitary goal to which everyone in society must subordinate her own desires and plans. Laws/rules: In a market economy only basic and abstract rules are enforced - chiefly, the laws of property, contract, and tort, along with criminal sanctions against the initiation of violence, theft, and fraud. >Tort law, >Property rights, >Contracts. Individualism: The result is that each individual has wide scope to formulate his or her own plans - and wide scope in choosing just how to pursue those plans - without having first to secure permission from some authority. >Society/Hayek. 1. Smith, Adam. (1776) The Wealth of Nations. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell. |
Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 |
| Paternalism | Nussbaum | Brocker I 909 Paternalism/VsNussbaum/Nussbaum: From a feminist perspective, but also in the context of development cooperation, a paternalistic, authoritarian potential of their theory is criticized (Phillips 2001(1); Dhawan 2009(2); Carter 2014(3)). The main issue here is an implicit tension between a vague theory of the good, which wants a wide scope for decision-making for the actual exercise of the basic capabilities to be guaranteed, and a certain, more content-rich conception, which is oriented towards the actual functioning ("true human functioning"). >Capabilities/Nussbaum 1. Anne Phillips »Feminism and Liberalism Revisited. Has Martha Nussbaum Got it Right?«, in: Constellations 8/2, 2001, 249-266. 2. Nikita Dhawan »Zwischen Empire und Empower. Dekolonisierung und Demokratisierung«, in: Femina Politica 2, 2009, 52-63 3. Ian Carter, »Is the Capability Approach Paternalist?«, in: Economics and Philosophy 30/1, 2014, 75-98. Sandra Seubert, „Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2000)“, in:Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Scope | Cresswell | I, 179f Scope/Cresswell: E.g. everyone loves someone: a) everyone is such that someone is so that the former loves the second b) someone - someone is so that everyone is so that he, the second named, loves him, the former - game theoretical semantics/CresswellVsHintikka: has brought nothing new, what Kamp/Heim did not already have - game theory: sequence of choice. >Hans Kamp, >Irene Heim, >File change semantics, >Game-theorical semantics. II 48 Scope/description/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: sentences about propositional attitudes can always give descriptions a wide range. That is, to make them rigid. >Narrow/Wide, >Rigidity. II 126 He*/scope/Cresswell: wide scope: then it can also be interpreted as "I". Narrow scope: allows "he", "she" or "it". Gods-example/solution/Cresswell:> - speaker index. >Two omniscient Gods/Cresswell, more authors on >"Two omniscient Gods". II 126 "Now"/scope/Cresswell: analog to the case of "I". Narrow scope: here "now" becomes "then". "Here"/Cresswell: Problem: that "people coordinates" could lead to an infinite list - because of the context dependency. CresswellVs: instead I use (Cresswell, 1973a(1), pp. 110-119.) properties of utterances. II 143 Hob/Cob/Nob-Example/Geach/Cresswell: (Geach 1957(2), 628): Cresswell: needs a quantifier, which is simultaneously inside and outside the scope of the attitude-verb. - Solution/Hill/Kraut: intensional objects as surrogates for individuals and a further quantifier. >Cob/Hob/Nob-case. II 150 Names/scope/Cresswell: normally names have a wider reach than modal operators - this is the "modal objection" VsKripke. KripkeVsVs: (Kripke, 1972(3), p. 279.) 1. Cresswell, M. J. (1973). Logics and Languages. London: Methuen. 2. Geach, P. (1957). Mental Acts. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 3. Kripke S. A. (1972). Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), 253-355 |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Scope | Geach | I 118 Range/scope: Tradition: Tmesis, logically indivisible operator: either or: E.g. either both: young and stupid or evil - or either young or stupid and evil. I 144 Range: problem with descriptions, not with names. Description, >Nmae. E.g. it is (logically) chronologically possible that Caesar was the father of Brutus. Description: Caesar = man who not begat Brutus. Then: narrow scope: logical impossibility; the whole sentence is wrong. Wide scope: someone who is described among other things as non-producer of Brutus ... This sentence remains true. >Narrow/wide. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Scope | Logic Texts | Read III 127f Improper names/Quine: (= descriptions). Only real names allow the substitution, which finds itself in the indistinguishability of the identical. >Name, >Description, >Rigidity, >Substitution. Improper names: they lead to more complex forms: e.g. "There is one greatest among the Roman orators, and he accused Catilina". - e.g. "Exactly one number counts the planets and it is bigger than seven." Russell: here, only 7 is a real name. Therefore, these sentences cannot be upper and lower sentence in a conclusion of the principle of the indistinguishability of the identical. >Indistinguishability, >Leibniz principle, >Identity. QuineVs: Problem: Scope: the descriptions must be eliminated in such a way that no new constituent will correspond to them in the new formulation. --- Strobach I 104 Indistinguishability/Strobach: requires Logic of the 2nd level: predicate logic 2nd level/PL2/Strobach: typical formula: Leibniz's Law: "x = y > (Fx ↔ Fy)". >Second order logic. --- Read III 133/134 Scope/Descriptions/Possible World/Read: Narrow scope: the description refers to different objects in different possible worlds - wide scope: the same object in different possible worlds - real names: always large scope. >Rigidity, >Descriptions, >Singular Terms, >Proper names. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Stro I N. Strobach Einführung in die Logik Darmstadt 2005 |
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