Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 54 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Animals Proust I 239
Animal/mind/consciousness/Proust: what about the ability of animals to form hypotheses that might point to a "theory of the mind"? >Theory of the mind.
This is only true for primates and large marine mammals, not for dogs and cats who have acquired their relatively comprehensive communication repertoire only through domestication and interaction with us.
E.g. shared attention: shared attention apparently implies a recognition of the fact that another has discovered an interesting object with its perception.
From this, however, the animal does not conceive the idea that its conspecific or the other has seen an object or knows a state of affairs.
I 240
Primates do not perform spontaneous pointing gestures! They can only be teached if they are promised food. >Pointing, cf. >Ostensive definition, >Gestures.
Culture/Animal/Proust: E.g. washing potatoes: here nothing points to a pedagogic concern. The slowness of appropriation suggests that the innovation is not acquired by either targeted education nor imitation, it is about "stimulus intensification": the simple spatial proximity of a group member to the target object arouses the interest of the conspecific for this type of object and leads to the testing of different possibilities of use.
Group behavior: also appeasement, etc. can be explained by simple social cooperation without mental representations. The animals do not need to know why they are doing the gestures.
>Group Behavior/Psychology.
Tactical deception maneuvers are often found in primates.
I 242
Instead of assuming that animals "lie", it is now acknowledged that these behaviors can be explained by the learning of effective actions in a particular situation. >Learning, >Behavior.

Proust I
Joelle Proust
"L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Appearance Locke Hacking I 238
Appearance / Locke: first we have the appearance, then we manufacture mental representations and at last we seek after the reality. >Perception/Locke, >World/thinking >Reality/Locke, >Reality, >Idea/Locke.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding


Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996
Assimilation Piaget Upton I 14
Assimilation/development/Piaget/Upton: According to Piaget, children construct their knowledge through the processes of assimilation, in which they evaluate and try to understand new information based on their existing knowledge of the world, and accommodation, in which they expand and modify their mental representations of the world based on new experiences. >Representation/Piaget.

Piag I
J. Piaget
The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969


Upton I
Penney Upton
Developmental Psychology 2011
Attachment Theory Bowlby Corr I 29 (XXIX)
Personality/attachment theory/Bowlby: Bowlby’s insight was that the child’s pattern of relationships with its primary care-giver affected adult personality; secure attachment to the care-giver promoted healthy adjustment in later life. The theory references many of the key themes of this review of personality. Attachment style may be measured by observation or questionnaire; a common distinction is between secure, anxious and avoidant styles (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall 1978)(1). It also corresponds to standard traits; for example, secure attachment correlates with Extraversion and Agreeableness (Carver 1997)(2). Attachment likely possesses biological aspects (evident in ethological studies of primates), social aspects (evident in data on adult relationships), and cognitive aspects (evident in studies of the mental representations supporting attachment style). >Relationships, >Social relations, >Extraversion, >Affectional bond.

1. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E. and Wall, S. 1978. Patterns of attachment: a psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
2. Carver, C. S. 1997. Adult attachment and personality: converging evidence and a new measure, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23: 865–83


Corr I 228
Attachment theory/Bowlby/Shaver/Mikulincer: Bowlby’s attachment theory (Bowlby 1973(1), 1980(2), 1982/1969(3)) was then elaborated and empirically tested by Mary Ainsworth and her colleagues (e.g., Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall 1978(4)). See also Attachment theory/Ainsworth.
Question: why separations from mother early in life causes so much psychological difficulty for children, adolescents and adults later in life (e.g., Bowlby 1951(5), 1958(6)).


1. Bowlby, J. 1973. Attachment and loss, vol. II, Separation: anxiety and anger. New York: Basic Books
2. Bowlby, J. 1980. Attachment and loss, vol. III, Sadness and depression. New York: Basic Books
3. Bowlby, J. 1982. Attachment and loss, vol. I, Attachment, 2nd edn. New York: Basic Books (original edn 1969)
4. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E. and Wall, S. 1978. Patterns of attachment: assessed in the Strange Situation and at home. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum
5. Bowlby, J. 1951. Maternal care and mental health. Geneva: World Health Organization
6. Bowlby, J. 1958. The nature of the child’s tie to his mother, International Journal of Psychoanalysis 39: 350–73


Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Behavioral System Bowlby Corr I 232
Behavioral System/attachment theory/Bowlby/Shaver/Mikulincer: According to Bowlby (1973)(1), the ability of a behavioural system to achieve its set-goal depends on a person’s transactions with the external world. Although behavioural systems are innate intrapsychic mechanisms, which presumably operate mainly at a subcortical level and in an automatic, reflexive manner, they are manifested in actual behaviour, guide people’s transactions with the social world, and can be affected or shaped by others’ responses. >Social relationships, >Social behaviour, >Socialization, >Relationships.
Over time, social encounters mould the parameters of a person’s behavioural systems in ways that produce fairly stable individual differences in strategies and behaviours; that is, a person’s neural and behavioural capacities become ‘programmed’ to fit with major close relationship partners, or attachment figures.
Representation/Bowlby: Bowlby (1973)(1) assumed that the residues of such social encounters are stored as mental representations of person-environment transactions, which he called working models of self and other, and that these representations shape the functioning of a person’s behavioural system and the way he or she behaves in particular social situations.
>Representation, >Situations.

1. Bowlby, J. 1973. Attachment and loss, vol. II, Separation: anxiety and anger. New York: Basic Books

Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Slater I 15
Behavioral System/Bowlby: Bowlby (1969(1)) formalized Harlow’s work into a theory of control systems that were activated and terminated by environmental conditions. Bowlby’s theory emphasized contextual factors that both activated and terminated behavioral systems. In infancy, he viewed the attachment, fear, and exploratory systems as each having set goals that needed to be maintained based on ongoing monitoring of and feedback from the environment.
Control systems theory in turn guided systematic observations of human infants in the village and home environment (Ainsworth, 1967)(2). It also led to the development of a laboratory paradigm that tested infants’ abilities to use their caregiver as a source of safety and base for exploration (Ainsworth, Blehar, Wall, & Waters, 1978)(3). The development of Ainsworth’s Strange Situation paradigm (>Situation/Ainsworth) – in which infants’ responses to separation from, and subsequent reunion with, their mother, and their reactions to an unfamiliar woman were recorded – in turn became a paradigm for assessing individual differences in the security of infants’ relationships with their primary caregiver.
Cf. >Control processes.

1. Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and loss: Vol. 1. Attachment. New York, NY: Basic Books.
2. Ainsworth, M. S. (1967). Infancy in Uganda. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
3. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of attachment: A psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018

Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Beliefs Loar Schiffer I 19
Belief/Loar: a belief is understood as a function that depicts propositions on internal physical states. >Brain/Brain state, >Mental states, >Physical/psychic, >Propositions, >Materialism.
These internal physical states have functional roles that are specified by these propositions.
>Functional role.
Schiffer I 286f
Belief/SchifferVsLoar: Problem: his realization of a theory of beliefs/desires (as a function of propositions on physical states), whose functional roles are defined by the theory. Problem: to find a theory that correlates each proposition with a single functional role rather than many roles.
>Mapping.
Schiffer: this will not work, therefore the Quine-Field argument is done in.

Quine-Field Argument/Schiffer:
. . .
Schiffer I 109
Def Conceptual Role/Field: (Field 1977)(1): the subjectively induced conditional probability function of an actor. Two mental representations s1 and s2 have the same conceptual role for one person iff. their (the person's) subjective conditional probability function is such that for each mental representation s the subjective probability of s1 given s is the same as that of s2 given s. SchifferVs: that never happens.
Field ditto - E.g. blind persons certainly have different conceptual roles of flounders - then there will be no correlation to the belief objects either.

1. Hartry Field (1977).Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role. Journal of Philosophy 74 (7):378-409

. . .
Schiffer I 286f
Belief/Beliefs/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine, beliefs are never true, although he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary. >Beliefs/Quine, >Intentionality/Brentano.
But:
QuineVsBrentano: ~ the canonical scheme includes no propositional attitudes, only physical constitution and behavior of organisms.
>Propositional attitudes.

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981

Loar II
Brian Loar
"Two Theories of Meaning"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976


Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Causal Relation Schiffer I 102
Causal relation/Schiffer/(s): Problem: There is no physical relation that connects general terms with the corresponding entities. >General terms, >Correspondence.
Otherwise: it would have to be a functional relation (multiple realization): problem: it should take "true of" or "refers" as basic concepts.
>Basic concepts/Schiffer.
A causal theory (for a theory of mental representations) (e.g. reliability theory) needs no semantic terms (true of, referenced) as basic concepts.
>Reliability theory.
Instead: substitutional quantification or translation of M-sentences into the metalanguage of the theory.
>Substitutional quantification, >Metalanguage.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Cognitive Dissonance Festinger Haslam I 43
Cognitive dissonance/Festinger: Festinger (1954)(1) had introduced his theory of social comparison processes. Social comparison theory identified the strong need people have to evaluate their own opinions and abilities by comparing them with the opinions and abilities of others. Festinger (1957)(2) introduced a new theory that would move beyond social comparison: it focused on the view of the social world unabashedly from the perspective of the individual.
Individuals/Festinger: individuals represent the social world as a set of mental cognitions. Any behaviour, attitude or emotion was considered a cognition – that is, a mental representation within a person’s mind. So, too, were the perceptions of the world around us. Our perceptions of other people, social groups and the physical world were all considered to be cognitive representations.
Problem: Those representations existed in relationship to each other – sometimes fitting together consistently and sometimes inconsistently in people’s minds.
People abhor inconsistency among their cognitions and so mental representations that are inconsistent with each other create psychological discomfort akin to an unpleasant drive. Like other drive states, such as hunger, they need to be reduced.
Haslam I 44
Cognitive dissonance/Festinger: e.g., after an unfulfilled doomsday prophecy, those who believed in it must reduce the dissonance between faith and reality, because they will experience this discrepancy as an unpleasant tension state. Solution: normally people can change a cognition to reduce the discrepancy.
Problem: if we are committed to our belief – for example, if we had taken a public stance advocating the belief – then we try to hold onto it, even in the face of a contradictory cognition indicating the accurate distance.
Haslam I 45
Solution: (Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter 1956)(3) made a bold and controversial prediction: the Seekers [those who believed in the doomsday prophecy] would not only persist in their belief but would actually become more ardent than they had been previously. They would hold tenaciously to their conviction that their prophecy had been correct all along. Of course, they would not be able to maintain that the world had ended, but they could reaffirm their general belief pattern. Perhaps the date was wrong or perhaps there was another reason for the lack of destruction. But they would hold on to their belief system with greater tenacity than ever before. ‘If more and more people can be persuaded that the system of beliefs is correct, then clearly it must, after all, be correct’ (Festinger et al., 1956(3): p. 28). The End of the world study: Festinger et al. (1956) tested this assumption in a real case of doomsday prophecy in 1955.
Haslam I 46
As predicted by the investigators, proselytizing became the major avenue for reducing the dissonance caused by the prophecy’s failure. The discrepant cognitions caused by the discordance of the prophecy from reality were changed into a more overarching message of how the small group of true believers had saved the world from destruction. (…) if everyone believed it was so, then it must have been so. >Method/Festinger.
Haslam I 48
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959)(4): The crux of Festinger’s second seminal experiment was to have a person make a statement that was at variance with his or her attitude, then measure the impact on the person’s attitude. The inconsistency should produce attitude change consistent with the person’s statement. Although there was no study in the psychology literature that had tested this prediction, it was consistent with what would have been predicted by several other balance theories that preceded dissonance theory. But what made dissonance unique among balance theories was the concept of dissonance as an energy model. And as a form of energy, it had a magnitude. Energy/measurement/Festinger: Suppose a man were paid to make a statement contrary to his attitude. Would that lower the dissonance?
Haslam I 49
FestingerVsLearning Theory: This prediction was a direct challenge to the existing zeitgeist in psychology. Rewards/Learning Theory: The dominant approach to psychology, including social psychology, in the late 1950s was based on learning theory. This suggested that people learned as a direct function of reward. People changed their behaviour because they are reinforced or rewarded. >Learning Theory.
FestingerVs: Thesis (Festinger and Carlsmith (1959)(4): the smaller the incentive, the more people would be influenced by their own discrepant statements and that large incentives would eliminate the impact of behaviour on attitudes.
This was a straightforward derivation from dissonance theory, but a challenge to the rule of reinforcement as a guiding principle of social psychology. >Experiment/Festinger, >Method/Festinger.


1. Festinger, L. (1954) ‘A theory of social comparison processes’, Human Relations, 1: 117–40.
2. Festinger, L. (1957) A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
3. Festinger, L., Riecken, H.W. and Schachter, S. (1956) When Prophecy Fails. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
4. Festinger, L. and Carlsmith, J.M. (1959) ‘Cognitive consequences of forced compliance’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58: 203–10.


Joel Cooper, “Cognitive Dissonance. Revisiting Festinger’s End of the World study”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Compositionality Schiffer I XVIII
SchifferVsCompositionality: we must reject it because we must also reject the theory of relation (without which we cannot have the compositionality). >Frege principle, >Relation theory/Schiffer.
Understanding/Schiffer: understanding must be explained otherwise:
Solution: Schiffer thesis: conceptual role in neuronal lingua mentis without compositionality.
>Conceptual role, >Lingua mentis, >Language of Thought.

I 183
SchifferVsCompositionality: verbs for propositional attitudes can hardly be put into a compositional semantics. In addition e.g. "is a picture of", "true", "big", "toy"(soldier) - adverbs, evaluative terms like "should", "good", pronouns and demonstrative pronouns "everyone", "all" are problematic.
Also counterfactual conditional and modal expressions represent a problem for compositional semantics.
>Counterfactual conditionals, >Adverbs, >Adjectives.

I 183
Compositional truth theoretical semantics/Schiffer: attributes truth conditions to sentences. >Truth conditions.
I 184
Compositionality/SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: natural language does not need any compositional semantics for understanding. >Understanding.
For new sentences, we are not confronted with new words and even only with known constructions.
Pro Frege: meaning theory must determine compositional mechanisms, but this does not lead to the fact that the meaning theory must be truth-theoretical (must determine truth conditions).
>Meaning theory, >Truth-conditional semantics.

I 208
SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: E.g. "and": the everyday linguistic meaning is not captured by the truth value table. >Truth table.
Compositional semantics would require that there is a non-logical axiom for each non-logical expression. - This is not possible.
Propositions by E. Harveys spoken language receive their representational character via the connection with mental representation.
>Mental representation.
Therefore Mentalese does not need compositional semantics.
>Mentalese, >Language of thought.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Conceptual Role Schiffer I 108f
Conceptual Role/Schiffer: the conceptual role tells us how to get from stimuli to beliefs. >Stimuli, >Beliefs.
The conceptual role of a mental representation is then the counterfactual role of the formula in the perceptual belief formation and in the reasoning.
>Counterfactuals, >Mental representation.
It is a counterfactual property. - A formal property of internal sentences. - It can be determined without reference to t-theoretical properties.
The conceptual role of a mental representation does not determine the truth conditions.
>Truth conditions.
Twin earth; E.g. twin earth H2O and XYZ have the same conceptual role - i.e. the conceptual role is used in addition to the truth conditions.
>Twin earth.

I 109
Def Conceptual Role/Field: (Field 1977)(1): the subjectively induced conditional probability function of an actor. Two mental representations s1 and s2 have the same conceptual role for one person iff. their (the person's) subjective conditional probability function is such that for each mental representation s the subjective probability of s1 given s is the same as that of s2 given s. SchifferVs: that never happens.
Field ditto - E.g. blind persons certainly have different conceptual roles of flounders - then there will be no correlation to the belief objects either.

1. Hartry Field (1977).Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role. Journal of Philosophy 74 (7):378-409

I 167
Conceptual Role/Schiffer: the conceptual role of an inner formula is then the complex counterfactual property of the formula, whose knowledge informs us about the conditions under which the formula occurs. Conceptual role instead of definition: with it, it is impossible to eliminate by paraphrase. - Then it is irreducible >controlled use!
Schiffer: Thesis: simply conceptual role instead of platonist irreducible property e.g. of being a dog: cute hairy barking quadrupeds.
Accordingly we need no primitive propositional attitude and no belief properties.
Language development: proto-humans: have beliefs and desires, but no concepts for them - later God gives simple concepts for them (increases the survival value) - they are recognized as irreducible.

I 169
Conceptual role: does not allow law-like generalization as e.g. x does A, because he wants P and believes that he achieves P if he does A - nevertheless there is reliability. >Intentionality, >Attribution, >Behavior, >Explanation, >Reliability theory.

I 186
Conceptual Role/Schiffer: must be determined without reference to the truth conditions. >Truth conditions.
It does not determine the truth conditions.
Twin Earth: water and twin earth water have the same conceptual role. Use is synonymous to possession of a conceptual role.
Internal language/Mentalese: here, the conceptual role is independent from reference. - Therefore no compositional semantics is assumed.
This is not about situations, speech acts or utterances.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Content Jackson Schwarz I 171
"Naturalization of content"/representation/Schwarz: the naturalization of content is, thesis: that mental representations are so far as to be clause-like, so that one can explain their content compositionally. (See Fodor 1990)(1). Cf. >Compositionality.
LewisVsFodor: fundamentally missed: only the causal role in everyday life (behavior) is relevant. Even if the desire for e.g. mushroom soup is beautifully composed of desire for soup and desire for mushroom. Because on the opposite it is a mushroom soup desire, if it plays exactly this causal role, no matter what it is composed of. (1994b(2), 320f).
>Causal roles.
One can equally well imagine beings who do not represent clause-like (see Armstrong 1973(3), Chap. 1, Braddon-Mitchell/Jackson 1996(4), chapter 10f).
Lewis's theory is also intended to be valid for these worlds, as well as to explain what determines the content.
>Possible worlds, >Representation.


1. Jerry A.Fodor [1990]: “A Theory of Content I & II”. In A Theory of Content and Other Essays,
Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 51–136
2. D. Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy
of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431
3. D. M. Armstrong [1973]: Belief, Truth, and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
4. David Braddon-Mitchell und Frank Jackson [1996]: Philosophy of Mind and Cognition.
Oxford: Blackwell

Jackson I
Frank C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Court Proceedings Social Psychology Parisi I 125
Court proceedings/juror decision-making/Social psychology/Nadler/Mueller: (...) each individual juror hears the evidence and arguments presented by lawyers, as well as the judge's instructions. Story model: According to the Story Model of Juror Decision-Making (Bennett, 1978(1); Pennington and Hastie, 1981(2)) jurors make sense of the evidence at trial by organizing it in a narrative fashion. Instead of passively absorbing verbatim the enormous amount of complex,
Parisi I 126
ambiguous information given in a trial, jurors actively process the information using the framework of their existing knowledge to fill in gaps and construct stories from the evidence. Jurors create a story narrative that explains the different pieces of reliable evidence, and then reach a decision by matching the best-fitting story to the verdict categories. Criteria/eveluation: In order to evaluate competing stories, jurors use several criteria. The most preferred story will account for the greatest amount of evidence, will be internally consistent and leave no gaps in the causal chain of events, and will be plausible in light of what the juror believes about the world (Pennington and Hastie, 1981)(2).
„Thinking aloud“: This model has been supported by "think aloud" observations of mock jurors (Pennington and Hastie, 1986)(3), as well as experiments examining judgments in mock criminal and civil trials (Huntley and Costanzo, 2003(4); Pennington and Hastie, 1992(5)).
Decision-making: More recent experimental research on coherence-based reasoning has stablished that the process of reaching a decision is often bi-directional (Holyoak and Simon, 1999)(6). The decision task faced by jurors is cognitively complex because it requires consideration of information that is voluminous, contradictory, and ambiguous (D. Simon, 2004)(7).
Information processing: To process the large amount of complex information presented in a trial, jurors reconstruct the information into simpler mental representations, upon which their cognitive system imposes coherence (D. Simon, 2004)(7).
Schemas/beliefs: (...) jurors bring with them into the courtroom commonsense notions of legal categories like insanity, self-defense, and intent, and those existing schemas influence how jurors evaluate evidence and make legal judgments (Finkel, 2005(8); Finkel and Groscup, 1997(9); Robinson and Darley, 1995(10)). Even after receiving instructions about the definitions of crimes like burglary or robbery, jurors import their commonsense notions of these offenses into their decisions.
Parisi I 127
Prediction: (...) (Kalven and Zeisel, 1966)(11) (...) found that a majority jury vote on the first ballot predicted the final verdict in over 90% of the cases, and they hypothesized that deliberation often focused on convincing the members of the minority to change their vote. Subsequent research set out to investigate more precisely the relationship between pre-deliberation preference and final verdict. In fact, immediate votes prior to deliberation seem to occur in only a small minority of cases (Devine et al., 2004(12); Diamond and Casper, 1992(13); Diamond et al., 2003(14); Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington, 1983(15); Sandys and Dillehay, 1995)(16). When the first ballot does occur, if each juror expresses their preference verbally, the early preferences can influence those voting subsequently (J. H. Davis et al., 1988)(17). Jurors' certainty and confidence in their views can be weak before deliberations begin, such that some do not begin leaning strongly toward one side until after substantial deliberations have taken place (Hannaford-Agor et al., 2002)(18). To understand the influence of the jury deliberation process, it is therefore important to measure pre-deliberation preferences of individual jurors prior to deliberation.
>Negotiation/Social psychology.

1. Bennett, W. L. (1978). "Storytelling in Criminal Trials: A Model of Social Judgment." Quarterly Journa1 ofSpeech 64(1): 1-22. doi:10.1080/0033563 7809383408.
2. Pennington, N. and R. Hastie (1981). "Juror Decision-making Models: The Generalization Gap." Psychological Bulletin doi: 10.103 7 3-2909.89.2.246.
3. Pennington, N. and R. Hastie (1986). "Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51 (2):242-258. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.2.242.
4. Huntley, J. E. and M. Costanzo (2003). "Sexual Harassment Stories: Testing a Story-me-
diated Model of Juror Decision-making in Civil Litigation." Law and Human Behavior 27(1): 29-51.
5. Pennington, N. and R. Hastie (1992). "Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 62(2): 189—206.
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.62.2.189.
6. Holyoak, K. J. and D. Simon (1999). "Bidirectional Reasoning in Decision Making by Constraint Satisfaction." Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 128(1): 3-31.
doi:10.1037/0096-3445.128.1.3.
7. Simon, D. (2004). "A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision
Making." University of Chicago Law Review 71(2): 511-586.
8. Finkel, N. J. (2005). Commonsense Justice: Jurors' Notions of the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
9. Finkel, N. J. and J. L. Groscup (1997). "Crime Prototypes, Objective versus Subjective Culpability, and a Commonsense Balance." Law and Human Behavior 21 (2):209-230.
10. Robinson, P. H. and J. M. Darley (199 5).Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
11.Kalven, Harry, jr. And Hans Zeisel (1967). „The American Jury“. In: 24 Wash. & LeeL. Rev. 158 (1967),https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol24/iss1/18
12. Devine, D. J., K. M. Olafson, L. L. Jarvis, J. P. Bott, L. D. Clayton, and J. M. T. Wolfe (2004).
"Explaining Jury Verdicts: Is Leniency Bias for Real?" Journal of Applied social Psychology 34(10): 2069-2098.
13. Diamond, S. S. andJ. D. Casper (1992). "Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury." Law and society Review 26(3): 513 - 563. doi:10.2307/3053737.
14. Diamond, S. S., N. Vidmar, M. Rose, and L. Ellis (2003). "Juror Discussions during Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation." Arizona Law Review 45: 1.
15. Hastie, R., S. Penrod, and N. Pennington (1983). Inside the Jury. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
16. Sandys, M. and C. Dillehay (1995). "First-ballot Votes, Predeliberation Dispositions, and Final Verdicts in Jury Trials." Law and Human Behavior 19(2): 175-195. doi:10.1007/ BF01499324.
17. Davis, J. H., M. F. Stasson, K. Ono, and S. Zimmerman (1988). "Effects of Straw Polls on Group Decision Making: Sequential Voting Pattern, Timing, and Local Majorities." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 5 5(6): 918—926. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.55.6.918.
18. Hannaford-Agor, P., V. Hans, N. Mott, and T. Munsterman (2002). "Are HungJuries a Problem National Center for State Courts, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdfilesl/
nij /grants/1993 72.pdf

Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press


Parisi I 131
Court Proceedings/racial bias/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: (...) many attorneys try to (...) select jurors based on their assumptions that Black jurors are less likely to find defendants, especially Black defendants, guilty (Bonazzoli, 1998(1); Kerr et al., 1995(2)). In fact, behavioral and neuroimaging research provide some support for these intuitions, suggesting that we may be more able to empathize or take the perspective of individuals who are similar to ourselves (Cialdini et al., 1997(3); M. H. Davis et al., 1996(4); N. Eisenberg and Mussen, 1989(5); J. P. Mitchell, Macrae, and Banaji, 2006(6); but see Batson et al., 2005(7) for an alternate behavioral mechanism). Black sheep effect: However, there is evidence that in some situations, people may want to distance themselves from ingroup members who have committed bad acts, that is, the "black sheep" effect (J. Marques et al., 1998(8); J. M. Marques, Yzerbyt, and Leyens, 1988)(9).
>Capital Punishment/Social Psychology.

1. Bonazzoli, M. J. (1998). "Jury selection and Bias: Debunking Invidious Stereotypes through Science." Quinnapiac Law Review 18:247.
2. Kerr, N. L., R. W. Hymes, A. B. Anderson, and J. E. Weathers (1995). "Defendant-Juror Similarity and Mock Juror Judgments" Law and Human Behavior 19(6):545-567. doi:10.1007/BF01499374.
3. Cialdini, R. B., S. L. Brown, B. P. Lewis, C. Luce, and S. L. Neuberg (1997). "Reinterpreting the
Empathy-Altruism Relationship: When One into One Equals Oneness." Journal of Personality and social Psychology 73(3): 481-494. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.73.3.481.
4. Davis, J. H. (1996). "Group Decision Making and Quantitative Judgments: A Consensus Model," in E. H. Witte andJ. H. Davis, eds., Understanding Group Behavior, Vol. 1: Consensual Action By Small Groups, 35—59. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
5. Eisenberg, N. and P. H. Mussen (1989). The Roots of Prosocial Behavior in Children. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Mitchell, J. P., C. N. Macrae, and M. R. Banaji (2006). "Dissociable Medial Prefrontal Contributions to Judgments of Similar and Dissimilar Others." Neuron 50(4): 655-663.
doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2006.03.040.
7. Batson, C. D., D. A. Lishner, J. Cook, and S. Sawyer (2005). "Similarity and Nurturance: Two Possible Sources of Empathy for Strangers." Basic and Applied social Psychology 2 15-25.
8. Marques, J., D. Abrams, D. Paez, and C. Martinez-Taboada (1998). " The Role of Categorization and In-group Norms in Judgments of Groups and their Members." Journal of Personality and social Psychology doi:10.1037/0022-3514.75.4.976.
9. Marques, J. M., V. Y. Yzerbyt, andJ.-P. Leyens (1988). "The 'Black Sheep Effect': Extremity of Judgments Towards Ingroup Members as a Function of Group Identification." European Journal of Social Psychology 18(1): 1—16. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420180102.

Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press


Parisi I
Francesco Parisi (Ed)
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Deep Structure Chomsky I 269f
Surface Structure/Chomsky: Determination of a hierarchy of parts of sentences that belong to specific categories: noun phrase, verb phrase, adjective phrase, etc. E.g. John is certain that Bill will leave. John is certain to leave: - similar surface structure, different deep structure. >Surface structure.
I 273
Surface Structure/Chomsky: Assumption: it contributes nothing to the meaning. The contribution an expression makes to the sentence is defined by the deep structure. >Compositionality.
ChomskyVsAnalytic Philosophy: if different intensions were to change their meaning after substitution, there would have to be a corresponding difference in the deep structure, which is unlikely.
>Substitution, >Meaning, >Intensions.
I 276f
Deep Structure/Chomsky: plays a role in the mental representation of sentences. >Representation.

Chomsky I
Noam Chomsky
"Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky II
Noam Chomsky
"Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky IV
N. Chomsky
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965
German Edition:
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Chomsky V
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Elm/Beech Example Putnam V 37
Elm-Beech Example/Putnam: the example shows reference without distinction. Reference: reference is social, not private. "Elm" in my language refers to the same as in any other: to elms! A term is not the same as reference. I just made no difference in the concept of a beech. >Reference/Putnam, >Concept/Putnam.
---
II 69
Elm/beech/Putnam: mental representations are floating descriptions, no meanings. Mental representation does not specify the reference -> twin earth. No synonymity: French and German have different representations: Baum/arbre. Representations have no intrinsic relation. >Synonymy, >Intrinsicness.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Events Gärdenfors I 65
Event/Semantic Domain/Language Acquisition/Semantics/Gärdenfors: Thesis: I am modeling events with two vectors: a force vector, which typically represents an action, and a result vector that describes a change of a physical movement or an object. ---
I 159
Events/Gärdenfors: there are principally three different approaches: (i) Metaphysical analyzes describing the ontology of events
(ii) Cognitive models that represent how humans (or animals) represent events mentally. See Langacker (1987, sec. 3.3)(1), Givón (2001)(2), Croft & Wood (2000) (3), Langacker, (2008, chap. 3) (4); Croft, (2012a, sec. 1.4)(5).
---
I 160
(iii) Linguistic studies describing the expressions with which events are constructed. E.g.
[[ACT ‹Manner› ] CAUSE [BECOME (Y ‹BROKEN› ]]].

Vectors/event/Gärdenfors: with vectors we can represent changes of objects and distinguish events from their linguistic expressions:
Definition State/Gärdenfors: is a set of points in a conceptual space.
Definition Change/Gärdenfors: a change of a state is represented by a vector.
Definition Path/Gärdenfors: is a continuous sequence of changes. (That is, there are no jumps).
---
I 161
Vectors: not all belong to the acting ones: e.g. opposing forces. Acting/Agent: is not necessarily part of the event.
Gärdenfors: this is about mental representation, not about a scientific representation of what is happening in an event, e.g. physically.
---
I 162
Vectors: an event contains at least two vectors and one object. 1. Result vector: represents the change, 2. Force vector: causes the change. ---
I 164
Event/intransitive/Gärdenfors: Problem: in intransitive constructions (e.g. "Susanna goes") the acting and the changed object (patiens) are identical. Then the conceptual space of the agent and of the object (patiens) coincide. ---
I 165
Partial events/decomposition/parts/Gärdenfors: two ways can be selected when dividing into sub-events: 1. Events can be divided as simultaneously occurring or parallel partial events in the dimensions of the object space (patient space).
2. They can be represented successively by parts of paths.
Agent/Patient/semantic roles/Gärdenfors: both can be represented as points in the category space. The domains of the space then define the properties of both.
---
I 166
Patient/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: can be animated or inanimated, concrete or abstract. It has its own patient space with domains for properties. In contrast to the object categories, the properties usually contain the localization. Agent: has accordingly its agent space, which has at least one force domain.
Dowty (1991): presents prototypical agents and prototypic patients. It is also about volitional involvement in an event.(6)
---
I 171
Event/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: there are three approaches for dealing with events in linguistics: 1. Localist Approach: (Jackendoff, 1976, 1983, 1990)(7)(8)(9): Thesis: all verbs can be constructed as verbs of movement and localization.
GärdenforsVsJackendoff: in his approach...
---
I 172
...force vectors cannot be represented appropriately. 2. Approach on aspects: (e.g. Vendler, 1957)(10): distinguishes between states, activities, achievements and accomplishments. See also Jackendoff, 1991, sec. 8.3; Levin & Rappaport Hovav, 2005, p. 90).
---
I 174
3. Causal Approach: e.g. Croft (2012a, 2012b)(13)(14) three-dimensional representation of causal and aspectual structures of events. Gärdenfors: that comes closest to my own approach. A geometric model is designed here. ---
I 175
The vectors in such models are not in a vacuum, but are always in relation to a domain and its information, e.g. temperature. GärdenforsVsCroft: his approach does not support force vectors.


1. Langacker, R. W. (1987). Foundations of cognitive grammar (Vol. 1). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
2. Givón, T. (2001). Syntax (Vol. 1). Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins.
3. Croft, W., & Wood, E. J. (2000). Construal operations in linguistics and artificial intelligence. In L. Albertazzi (Ed.), Meaning and cognition: A multidisciplinary approach (pp. 51–78). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
4. Langacker, R. W. (2008). Cognitive grammar: A basic introduction. Oxford.
5. Croft, W. (2012a). Verbs: Aspect and argument structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6. Dowty, D. (1991). Thematic proto-roles and argument selection. Language, 67, 547–619.
7. Jackendoff, R. (1976). Toward an explanatory semantic representation. Linguistic Inquiry, 7, 89–150.
8. Jackendoff, R. (1983). Semantics and cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
9. Jackendoff, R. (1990). Semantic structures. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
10. Vendler, Z. (1957). Verbs and times. Philosophical Review, 56, 97 – 121.
11. Jackendoff, R. (1991). Parts and boundaries. Cognition, 41, 9–45.
12. Levin, B., & Rappaport Hovav, M. (2005). Argument realization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13. Croft, W. (2012a). Verbs: Aspect and argument structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14. Croft, W. (2012b). Dimensional models of event structure and verbal semantics. Theoretical Linguistics, 38, 195–203.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Fixed Points Gärdenfors I 97
Fixed point/communication/Gärdenfors: a fixed point in a communication is reached when, for example, a person sees that the other person looks in the direction of the object they are referring to. ---
I 99
There should also be a consistency between the mental representations for the consistency of word meanings. Communication is also possible without this: e.g. children often have fewer domains in the representation of their terms or the domains are differently weighted. Equilibrium: Communication can work restrictedly before the equilibrium of the partners (the same level of information) is reached.
---
I 100
Signal game/Jäger/Rooij/Gärdenfors: (Jäger & van Rooij, 2007)(1): randomly selected color samples are ordered by a second person. The goal of the game is to achieve an equal division of the color space in regions. (Nash-equilibrium or fixed point). Gärdenfors: thesis: this is achieved if the conceptual spaces are convex and compact.
---
I 101
Equilibrium/Fixed point/Gärdenfors: further experiments have shown that repeated interactions lead to a stable communication system. (E.g. Hurford, 1999,(2) Kirby, 1999,(3) Steels, 1999,(4) Kaplan, 2000,(5) Steels & Belpaeme, 2005(6)). ---
I 102
Meanings: do not necessarily have to change when the composition of the communicators involved changes or new parties join or disappear. Fixed point/Dewey/Gärdenfors: (Dewey 1929, p. 178) (7): in order for V to understand A's moves, he must react to the thing from A's standpoint of view. So not I-centered and vice versa. Thus, something is literally made into a common.
---
I 104
Fixed point theorem/Gärdenfors: in order to achieve fixed points, it is not necessary for the conceptual spaces of the participants to be identical, nor that they divide the spaces equally. ----
I 105
We assume that the rooms are convex and compact. The following theorem from Warglien & Gärdenfors (2013)(8) is a consequence of Brouwer's fixed point theorem (Brouwer 1910)(9): Theorem: every semantic reaction function, which is a continuous mapping of a convex compact set on itself, has at least one fixed point.
That is, there will always be a fixed point representing a Meeting of Minds.
Conceptual spaces: that they are assumed to be convex makes the communication flowing and memory performance efficient.
---
I 106
Gärdenfors: I do not mean that convex spaces are a reliable representation of our world, but that, because they are effective, they will be widespread. Fixed points: the fixed point approach allows to consider a variety of types of communication such as color determinations and negotiations. The fixed-point theorem guarantees that the consciousness of the participants together (> Meeting of Minds) but it does not show how the semantic reaction function emerges from the communicative interaction.
---
I 109
Fixed Point/Communication/Gärdenfors: how do we know if a fixed point (balance, agreement) has been reached? ---
I 110
If the listener believes to understand, this is not a guarantee for a meeting of minds.


1. Jäger, G., & van Rooij, R. (2007). Language structure: Psychological and social constraints. Synthese, 159, 99–130.
2. Hurford, J. (1999). The evolution of language and languages. In R. Dunbar, C. Knight, & C. Power (Eds.), The evolution of culture (pp. 173–193). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
3. Kirby, S. (1999). Function, selection, and innateness: The emergence of language universals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Steels, L. (1999). The talking heads experiment. Antwerp: Laboratorium.
5. Kaplan, F. (2000). L’émergence d’un lexique dans une population d’agents autonomes. Paris: Laboratoire d’Informatique de Paris 6.
6. Steels, L., & Belpaeme, T. (2005). Coordinating perceptually grounded categories through language: A case study for colour. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 469–489.
7. Dewey, J. (1929). Experience and nature. New York: Dover.
8. Gärdenfors, P., & Warglien, M. (2013). The development of semantic space for pointing and verbal communication. In J. Hudson, U. Magnusson, & C. Paradis (Eds.), Conceptual spaces and the construal of spatial meaning: Empirical evidence from human communication (pp. 29–42). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9. Brouwer, L. E. J. (1910). Über ein eindeutige, stetige Transformation von Flächen in sich. Mathematische Annalen, 69, 176–180.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Imagination Kosslyn I 253
Pylyshyn: Problem: internal knowledge representation. Vs Visual ideas as a qualitatively independent or theoretically adequate form of mental representation. >Representation, >Knowledge representation.
Imagination, visual/Kosslyn: Question: do they differ from other conceptions in structure and function?
I 253
Interpretation: we are never aware of having to interpret imaginary images. There are no incomplete ideas, for example that half a sofa is missing.
But too much storage capacity would be necessary to store all the information from the retina.
I 256
Besides, there would be no practical access if all of them were stored. So there must be some interpretation.
>Interpretation.
Pictorial ideas are never necessarily true. (In contrast to some propositions).
>Necessity, >Logical truth, >Truth.
Visual imagination/Kosslyn: mere having does not imply that there is a causal role here.
>Causality, >Causal role.
I 260
Thesis: Our perception consists of parts assigned to objects. KosslynVsPylyshyn: we do have imaginary images. Even if they are not scanned internally.
If the images are saved uninterpreted, you do not need too much time to access them.
I 253
Imagination/visual imagination/image/picture/Kosslyn/Pomerantz: Interpretation: we are never aware of the need to interpret mental images. There are no incomplete ideas about e.g. that the half of a sofa is lacking. There would be no practical access, if all imaginations were saved. So there must be some interpretation.
I 257
Pylyshyn Thesis: there must be a third code between language and visual presentation - problem: that is uneconomical.

Stephen M. Kosslyn/James R. Pomerantz, Imagery, Propositions and the Form of Internal Representations”, Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76

Kosslyn I
Stephen M. Kosslyn
James R. Pomerantz
"Imagery, Propositions, and the Form of Internal Representations", in: Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Imagination Pomerantz I 253
Pylyshyn: Problem: internal knowledge representation. Vs. Visual ideas as a qualitatively independent or theoretically adequate form of mental representation. >Knowledge representation, >Knowledge, >Representation, >Presentation, >Information processing.
Imagination, visual/Kosslyn: Question: do visual imaginations differ from other conceptions in structure and function?
Interpretation: we are never aware of having to interpret imaginary images.
>Language, >Images, >Picture theory.
There are no incomplete ideas, for example that half a sofa is missing.
>Interpretation.
But too much storage capacity would be necessary to store all the information from the retina.
I 256
Besides, there would be no practical access if all of them were stored. So there must be some interpretation.
Pictorial ideas are never necessarily true. (In contrast to some propositions).
>Truth, >Logical truth, >Propositions.
Imagination/visual/Kosslyn: mere having an imagination does not imply that there is a causal role here.
>Causal roles.
I 260
Thesis: Our perception consists of parts assigned to objects. >Objects, >Parts, >Compositionality.
KosslynVsPylyshyn: we do have imaginary images. Even if they are not scanned internally.
If the images are saved uninterpreted, you do not need too much time to access them.
I 257
Pylyshyn Thesis: there must be a third code between language and visual presentation. Problem: that is uneconomical.
Cf. >P. Gärdenfors.

Pomerantz I
James R. Pomerantz
Stephen M. Kosslyn
"Imagery, Propositions, and the Form of Internal Representations", in: Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Imagination Pylyshyn Kosslyn I 253
Imagination/Pylyshyn: Problem: internal knowledge representation. Vs figurative imaginations as a qualitatively independent or theoretically adequate form of mental representation. Imagination, figurative/Kosslyn: Question: do they differ in structure and function from other imaginations?
Kosslyn I 253
Interpretation: we are never aware of having to interpret imaginary images. There are no incomplete imaginations, for example, that half a sofa is missing.
However, it would take too much storage capacity to store all the information from the retina.
Kosslyn I 256
Furthermore, there would be no practicable access if all of them were stored. So there must be some interpretation after all.
Figurative ideas are never necessarily true. (In contrast to some propositions).
Imagination/figurative/Kosslyn: the mere having does not imply that there is a causal role here.
Kosslyn I 260
Proposition: Our perception consists of parts that are assigned to objects. KosslynVsPylyshyn: we have imagination images. Even if they're not scanned internally.
If the images are stored uninterpreted, not too much time is required to access them.

PsychPyly I
Zenon W. Pylyshyn
Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World Cambrindge, MA 2011


Kosslyn I
Stephen M. Kosslyn
James R. Pomerantz
"Imagery, Propositions, and the Form of Internal Representations", in: Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992
Language Chomsky I 279ff
Language/Chomsky: apart from its mental representation, it has no objective existence. Therefore, we do not need to distinguish here between "systems of beliefs" and "knowledge". >Belief, >Knowledge.
---
II 319
Language/ChomskyVsQuine: must separate language and theory - otherwise, two speakers of the same language could have no disagreement. >Theory.
II 330
Language/Chomsky/Quine: no frame of a tentative theory as in physics. - Several analytical hypotheses are not only possible but necessary. >Analytical hypotheses.
ChomskyVsQuine: Vs "property space": not sure whether the concepts of the language can be explained with physical dimensions.
Aristotle: language is rather associated with actions.
VsQuine: it is not evident that similarities can be localized in a room. - Principles, not "learned sentences".
>Principles, >Similarity, >Reference.
II 333
VsQuine: language cannot be dependent on "disposition for reaction", otherwise moods, eye injuries, nutritional status, etc. would be essential.
II 343
Perhaps language does not have to be taught. ---
Graeser I 121f
Language/ChomskyVsGrice: Question: should the main aspect really be communication? Searle: rather representation, but not as opposite.
>Communication, >Representation.
Meaning/VsGrice: most of the sentences of a language have never been uttered, so anyone can hardly ever have meant something by them.
Meaning/VsGrice: we can only ever find out speaker meanings, because we know what the sentence means. - Students of Grice: Strawson and Searle.
---
Münch III 320
Language/Chomsky/Holenstein: language is not a natural kind. >Natural kinds.

Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992

Chomsky I
Noam Chomsky
"Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky II
Noam Chomsky
"Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky IV
N. Chomsky
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965
German Edition:
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Chomsky V
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006


Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Meaning Theory Schiffer I 12
Meaning theory/Schiffer: assuming compositionality, you can identify language with the system of conventions in P. - Then one has (with Davidson) the form of meaning theory. - No one has ever done this. >Compositionality, >Meaning theory/Davidson.
I 182
Truth Theory/Schiffer: a truth theory cannot be a meaning theory because its knowledge would not be sufficient for understanding the language. >Truth theory, >Understanding.
I 220
Meaning theory/Schiffer: not every language needs a correct meaning theory - because it has to do without the relation theory for belief. >Relation theory.
I 222
The relation theory for belief is wrong when languages have no compositional truth-theoretical semantics - otherwise it would be true.
I 261
Meaning/Meaning Theory/language/Schiffer: Thesis: all theories of language and thought are based on false prerequisites. Error: to think that language comprehension would be a process of inferences. Then every sentence must have a feature, and this could not merely consist in that the sentence has that and that meaning. Because that would be semantic. We need a non-semantic description.
Problem: E.g. "she gave it to him" has not even semantic properties.
E.g. "snow is white" has its semantic properties only contingently.
>Semantic properties.
I 264
SchifferVsGrice: we cannot formulate our semantic knowledge in non-semantic terms. >Intentions/Grice.
I 265
Meaning theory/meaning/SchifferVsMeaning theory: all theories have failed. Thesis: there is no meaning theory. - (This is the no-Theory-Theory of mental representation). Schiffer:Meaning is not an entity - therefore there is also no theory of this object.
I 269
Schiffer: Meaning is also determinable without meaning theory.
I 269
No-Theory-Theory of mental representation: there is no theory for intentionality, because having a concept does not mean that the quantifiable real would be entities. The scheme
"x believes y iff __"
cannot be supplemented.
The questions on our language processing are empirically, not philosophical.
>Language use, >Language behavior.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Mentalese Fodor Rorty I 269 ff
Rorty: Fodor's image of the internal representations has nothing to do with our mirror of nature that we have accepted. What is crucial, is that with regard to Fodor's "Language of thought" the skeptical question of "how exactly do the internal representations represent the reality" cannot be asked! There is no gap. >Representations, >Reference, >World/Thinking.
---
Newen/Schrenk I 132
Mentalese/language of thought/thought language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: thesis: thinking takes place with mental representations, e.g. fuel gauge, causal connection. >Thinking. Mentalese: mentaleses is as rich as natural language, but purely internal and symbolic; it is a purely syntactic symbol manipulation and exists only in connection with propositional attitudes.
>Propositional attitudes.
VsFodor: a) regress.
I 133
b) The supporters of the thesis of the prevalence of thought cannot explain the normativity of thinking with the help of social institutions such as the language. c) There are also beliefs without representation: e.g. chess computers: "brute force" then: "I should take the queen out of the game early". Cf. >Chess/Artificial intelligence.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Mentalese Schiffer I 73
Meaning in Mentalese determines meaning in public language, but not vice versa (on the content of thoughts). Fodor: we must see intentional properties of mental states as inherited from the semantic properties of the mental representations, which are implied in their tokening.
Neural state: also exists if false. - There is no object, since with truth value.
Schiffer: is still no system, not yet like a language.
Harman: thesis: inner representations have sentence-like structure.
>Mental representation.
Lewis: language of the brain of synaptic connections and neuronal fires -> SLT (strong thesis of a language of thought).
Other thesis: semantic properties are inherited from intentional properties. - (VsStrong thesis of a language of thought).
Strong thesis of a language of thought Vs: short/(s): mental representation determines intentionality. Tthis can be explained without public content.
SchifferVs: that cannot be fulfilled.
I 76
Mentalese/relation theory/Schiffer: which relation of sentences is there in Mentalese to sentences in English? >Relation theory.
Problem: the mental sentence "s" cannot be specified by meaning in English (that would be circular).
Also Vs core thesis of the strong thesis of a language of thought (semantic properties of the public language are inherited from intentional properties of mental states).
>Mental states.
I 282
Mentalese/Schiffer: meaning is here not a question of convention and intention - unlike public language. >Convention, >Intention, >Everyday language.
Solution/some authors: conceptual role (c.r.) in Mentalese.
>Conceptual role.
Public language: here sentences have a conceptual role only if they are also thought, not only spoken.
Problem: we need a non-semantic relation between mental representation and public sentences. - Fortunately the inner code needs not to be mentioned here.
E.g. "state with the same content".
Problem: the speaker could believe a sentence only under additional assumptions. - This only with reference to content. - That does not work in a strong thesis of a language of thought.
Conclusion: a neural sentence cannot be accepted without reference to the content as an object of belief.
>Objects of belief, >Content.
I 78
Mentalese/Schiffer: Relation theory requires complex properties, F which has everything; E.g. "flounders snore".
Problem: we must not presuppose anything about the intentional properties of mental states or meaning in public language.
I 79
Mentalese/Relation theory/belief/Fodor/Schiffer: for the attribution of truth values from situations to sentences: for this purpose, properties are used at the end of the causal chain. >Relation theory.
Problem: quantification via properties as semantic values ultimately goes via propositions.
>Propositions, >Quantification.
Solution: SLT (strong thesis of a language of thought) can use propositions together with conceptual roles for the individuation of content. - Truth values by M-function to possible situations - additional physical condition C.
Problem: this approach needs the theory of representation - (in which mental representation is only a special case).

Truth conditions: formula: a is the truth condition for s in x' inner code if under optimal conditions x s believes if and only if a exists. - So we can identify a pattern of neuronal firing with the display of a fly for a frog.
Problem: only under optimal conditions.
SchifferVsFodor: then everyone is omniscient and infallible.
I 87
Mentalese/Charity Principle/Schiffer: the charity principle is not for mentalism - this would have to be explained in terms of propositions.
I 83-90
Relation theory/Mentalese/Schiffer: Problem: competing attribution functions for truth conditions ("M functions") - wrong solution: "larger survival value" does not exclude wrong attribution functions - e.g. weight/mass.
I 189
SLT/strong thesis of a language of thought/Mentalese/Schiffer: thesis 1. the brain is a computer, we are information-processing systems with an inner neural code.
Schiffer: I can agree with that.
2. there is a computational relation R for every belief that one can have, so that one has this belief iff one has R for this formula.
Schiffer: that works, but only with substitutional quantification.
E.g. "Nodnol si yggof": Mentalese for London is foggy.
Then the sentence means that, but is not compositional.
N.B.: then the content of belief cannot be reduced. - (SchifferVsReductionism) - ((s) Mental content is irreducible (Schiffer pro Brentano).
E.g. knowledge-how cannot be analyzed in other terms - there is no fact that makes that something is this faith - + +
>Knowing-how, >Nonfactualism.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Metaphors Deacon I 120
Metaphors/Jackendoff/Deacon: Jackendoff (1992(1), 1994(2)) suggested that spatial metaphors such as "Higher Truth", "further developed", "remotely related" are the result of innate cognitive terms.
I 121
DeaconVsJackendoff: if we assume an evolutionary process of the common evolution of language and brain, we have an explanation that can dispense with hard wiring in the brain. >Color Words/Deacon.
That is what I call social universals or linguistic universals: for example, the same grouping and juxtaposition of colour contrasts in people all over the world.
It is about tendencies in the grouping of perceptions, behaviour and feelings.
>Emotion/Deacon, >Order, >Systems.
These common tendencies are non-genetic! It is about social evolution. These linguistic universals are only statistical, but supported by millions of speakers over ten thousands of years. Deviations are only temporary.
Innate/Deacon: one does not have to assume any innate structures in order to explain this constancy.
>Analogies, cf.>Innateness.

1. Jackendoff, Ray (1992). Languages of the Mind: Essays on Mental Representation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
2. Jackendoff, Ray (1994). Patterns in the mind: Language and human nature. New York: Basic Books.

Dea I
T. W. Deacon
The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998

Dea II
Terrence W. Deacon
Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013

Metaphors Jackendoff Deacon I 120
Metaphors/Jackendoff/Deacon: Jackendoff (1992(1), 1994(2)) has suggested that spatial metaphors such as "higher truth", "further developed", "remotely related" are the result of innate cognitive concepts.
I 121
DeaconVsJackendoff: if we assume an evolutionary process of the common evolution of language and brain, we have an explanation that can dispense with fixed wiring in the brain. See >color words/Deacon. This is what I call social universals or language universals: for example the same grouping and opposition of colour contrasts in people all over the world. It is about trends in the grouping of perceptions, behaviour and feelings. These common tendencies are non-genetic! It is social evolution. These linguistic universals are only statistical, but supported by millions of speakers over tens of thousands of years. Deviations are short-lived. Innate/Deacon: one does not have to assume congenital structures in order to explain this consistency.
>Colour words.


(1) Jackendoff, Ray (1992). Languages of the Mind: Essays on Mental Representation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
(2) Jackendoff, Ray (1994). Patterns in the mind: Language and human nature. New York: Basic Books.

Jackendoff I
Ray Jackendoff
Semantics and Cognition Cambridge, MA 1985


Dea I
T. W. Deacon
The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998

Dea II
Terrence W. Deacon
Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013
Mind Proust I 239
Animal/mind/consciousness/Proust: what about the ability of animals to form hypotheses that might point to a "theory of the mind"? This is true only for primates and large sea mammals, not for dogs and cats, who have acquired their relatively comprehensive communication repertoire only through domestication and interaction with us. Cf. >Theory of Mind.
E.g. shared attention: shared attention apparently implies a recognition of the fact that another has discovered an interesting object with its perception.
From this, however, the animal does not conceive the idea that its conspecific or the other has seen an object or knows a fact!
I 240
Primates do not perform spontaneous pointing gestures! They can only be teached if they are promised food. >Pointing, cf. >Ostensive definition, >Gestures.
Culture/Animal/Proust: e.g. washing potatoes: here nothing points to a pedagogic concern. The slowness of appropriation suggests that innovation is not acquired by either targeted education or imitation, it is about "stimulus intensification": the simple spatial proximity of a group member to the target object arouses the interest of the conspecifics for this type of object and leads to the testing of different possibilities of use.
Group behavior: also appeasement, etc. can be explained by simple social cooperation without mental representations. The animals do not need to know why they are doing the gestures.
>Group behavior/Psychology.
Tactical deception maneuvers are often found in primates.
I 242
Instead of assuming that animals "lie", it is now acknowledged that these behaviors can be explained by the learning of effective actions in a particular situation. >Learning, >Behavior.

Proust I
Joelle Proust
"L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Minimal Group Psychological Theories Haslam I 175
Minimal group/psychological theories: Problems: VsTajfel: By definition, minimal groups are not grounded in previous experiences, nor in already existing and easily accessible stereotypes. So how can minimal groups provide their new members with meaning? >Minimal Group/Tajfel, >Social Identity Theory/Tajfel.
Cadinu/Rothbart: ‘Overall, in-group favoritism in the minimal group paradigm is a well-established phenomenon, but the exact reasons for this favoritism remain unclear’ (Cadinu and Myron Rothbart: 1996(1): 661).
Explanation/Rothbart/Cadinu: two processes: a) because social categorization implies that the self and the ingroup share certain characteristics, people will be prone to project (aspects of) the typically positive representation of the individual self onto the ingroup (self-anchoring), thereby forming a positive ingroup representation.
b) people will also apply an „oppositeness heuristic“, assuming, that ingrop and outgroup do indeed differ.
Evidence: (Cadinu/Rothbart 1996(1)): manipulating the accessibility of the individual self prior to judgments about minimal groups affected ingroup but not outgroup ratings – making judgments of the ingroup more similar to those of the self.
Otten/Wentura: (2001)(2): the degree of overlap between self and ingroup ratings predicted the degree to which members of minimal groups showed evaluative intergroup bias. There was no evidence, however, that similarity or dissimilarity in the mental representations of self and outgroup was a relevant predictor of intergroup bias in a minimal group setting (see also Robbins and Krueger, 2005(3), for a similar conclusion).
Haslam I 176
Self-anchoring: findings on self-anchoring in minimal groups (cf.Cadinu/Rothbart 1969(1)) suggest that positive representations of the ingroup result from the projection of positive self characteristics onto this group, and that the positive differentiation from the outgroup is a by-product of this differentiation. In this way, an intergroup phenomenon, namely the positive differentiation of minimal ingroups from outgroups, can be traced back to an intragroup phenomenon, namely the link between self and ingroup. At the same time, the self-anchoring approach is consistent with the idea that differentiation between minimal groups is at least partly motivated by striving for meaning. Vs: Problem: the approach cannot convincingly explain why group members sacrifice maximum ingroup profit for the sake of maximum differentiation between ingroup and outgroup.
>Group behavior, >Social groups, >Social behavior, >Behavior,
>Common Ingroup Identity.

1. Cadinu, M. and Rothbart, M. (1996) ‘Self-anchoring and differentiation processes in the minimal group setting’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(4): 661–77.
2. Otten, S. and Wentura, D. (2001) ‘Self-anchoring and in-group favoritism: An individual profiles analysis’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37: 525–32.
3. Robbins, J.M. and Krueger, J.I. (2005) ‘Social projection to ingroups and outgroups: A review and meta-analysis’, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 9: 32–47.


Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Necessity Stalnaker I 18
Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis: necessity is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It results from optional descriptive semantics that happens to ​​characterize natural languages: a mechanism of establishing references. >Necessity a posteriori, >Reference.
StalnakerVsJackson: the reference-defining mechanisms are not optional as part of meta-semantics. They are part of the presentation of why internal states can be representational at all.
>Representation, >Mental states.
I 53
Necessary proposition/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis, there is only one necessary proposition: the set of all possible worlds. >Necessity/Lewis.
In order to know that it is true, i.e. that the real world is within this set. For this, you do not need to know any facts about the modal reality. Necessary truth is not made true by the facts.
>Facts, >Truthmakers, >Actual world/Lewis.
I 64
Metaphysical necessity/metaphysical possibility/Lewis/Louis/Stalnaker: it means: if you have a range of all possibilities, you can quantify with them. The modal operators are then just the quantifiers. >Metaphysical possibility.
Error: one can then still be wrong, but only about how one has to understand a sentence - not about how a possible situation would have to be.
>Understanding, >Situations.
I 189
Necessary a posteriori/contingent a priori/Stalnaker: assuming the inventor’s name was Judson - then both sentences, both "Judson invented the zipper" and "Julius invented ...", are necessary and both are contingent. >Reference/Stalnaker.
Contingent: both are contingent because the statement about Judson is a priori equivalent to the one about Julius. Necessary: both are necessary ​​because the statement "Julius is Judson" is a statement with two rigid designators - although the reference is determined by various causal chains.
>Proper names, >Rigidity, >Descriptions, >Contingency.
I 201
Necessity/N/Quine/Kripke/Stalnaker: before Quine and Kripke, all N were considered to be verbal or conceptual. >de dicto, >Necessity/Kripke, >Necessity/Quine, >de re.
Quine: one must always be skeptical about N, analyticity and a priori. Kripke: he was the first to move empiricism and terminology apart - by finding examples for contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori. Thereby, the separatation epistemic/metaphysical arose.
>Epistemic/ontologic, >Metaphysics.
I 202
Def nomologically necessary/Stalnaker: (in possible worlds x): nomologically necessary means true in all possible worlds that have the same laws as the possible world x ((s) relative to possible world x). Natural Laws/laws of nature/LoN/Stalnaker: thesis: laws of nature are contingent. They do not apply to possible worlds. >Natural laws, >Possible worlds.
Some authors: laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. Logic/Stalnaker/(s): logic cannot show what is metaphysically possible.
I 204
Necessity/conceptual/metaphysics/Stalnaker: the entire distinction is based on a confusion of a property of propositions with a property of linguistic and mental representations. Proposition: their contingency or necessity has nothing to do with our terms and their meanings. >Concepts, >Possibility.
Possibilities: possibilities would be the same, even if we had never thought of them.
>Conceivability/Chalmers.
Conceptually possible: simple metaphysical possibilities that we can imagine are conceptually possible.
>Metaphysical possibility.
I 205
Necessary a posteriori/Kripke/Stalnaker: the need stems from the fact that the secondary intension is necessary - the a posteriori character stems from the fact that the primary intension is a contingent proposition. >Intensions/Stalnaker.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Object Permanence Baillargeon Slater I 86
Object Permanence/Baillargeon: Thesis: Piaget (1954)(1) object permanence - an awareness that an object continues to exist when not available to the senses (literally „out of sight, out of mind“) - was not fully acquired until the second year of life had dominated thinking about early infant cognition. BaillargeonVsPiaget: (Baillargeon, Spelke and Wasserman (1985)(2) showed that infants as young as 5 months of age and later 3.5 months of age, Baillargeon 1987(3)) appeared to remember the continued existence of hidden objects and are aware that they maintained some of their physical properties.
The key was to move away from the Piagetian criteria of active retrieval (e.g., reaching) for a hidden object as a measure of knowledge.
Solution/Baillargeon: [she used] the so-called violation of expectation (VoE) paradigm: it is built on the idea that infants will orient more to novel or surprising events than familiar or expected ones (see Charlesworth, 1969(4).
Slater I 87
In particular, [Baillargeon] found that between 3.5 and 12 months of age infants became sensitive to the height (Baillargeon, 1987(3); Baillargeon & Graber 1987(5)), location (Baillargeon & Graber, 1988)(6), and solidity of hidden objects (Baillargeon, Graber, DeVos, & Black, 1990)(7). Baillargeon and colleagues also gradually pieced together infants’ understanding of the physical support relations that can exist between objects placed next to or on top of one another (Baillargeon, 2004(8); Needham & Baillargeon, 1993(9), 2000(10)). Experiment/Drawbridge study/HaithVsBaillargeon: (Haith 1998)(11)the conclusion of the drawbridge study are a product of „rich interpretation“ (Haith 1998) on the part of the researchers, rather than rich conceptual abilities on the part of young infants.
Slater I 88
Haith: There was always a more parsimonious perceptual explanation for the infants’ responses. >Object permanence/Haith. Drawbridge study/VsBaillargeon: Rivera, Wakeley, and Langer (1999)(12) Thesis: young infants simply have a general preference to look at the 180-degree rotation for cognitively uninteresting reasons (e.g., longer-lasting movement). Like Haith: Baillargeon’s findings can be explained without any attribution to an ability to think about an unseen object.
VsBaillargeon: Bogartz, Shinskey, and Schilling (2000)(13): the relatively high looking times to the 180-degree impossible event in the original drawbridge studies reflected a simple familiarity preference rather than a mental representation of a hidden object.
Slater I 89
After nearly two decades of argument in the literature and two highly anticipated debates on this topic at major conferences (Haith vs. Spelke at the Society for Research in Child Development (SRCD), 1997; Baillargeon vs. Smith at the International Conference for Infant Studies (ICIS), 1998), it became clear that behavioral methods alone were not going to produce a scientific consensus. Two key questions that emerged from these debates are (1) what actually constitutes evidence of object permanence (i.e., does passive surprise suffice or is active engagement required?) and
(2) where and how does this competence originate?
>Object permanence/neuroscience, >Object permanence/connectionism.


1. Piaget, J. (1954). The construction of reality in the child. New York: Basic Books.
2. Baillargeon, R., Spelke, E. S., & Wasserman, S. (1985). Object permanence in five-month-old infants. Cognition, 20, 191–208.
3. Baillargeon, R. (1987). Object permanence in 3 1/2-and 4 1/2-month-old infants. Developmental Psychology, 23, 655–664.
4. Charlesworth, W. R. (1969). The role of surprise in cognitive development. In D. Elkind & J. Flavell (Eds), Studies in cognitive development. Essays in honor of Jean Piaget (pp. 257–314). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Baillargeon, R., & Graber, M. (1987). Where’s the rabbit? 5.5-month-old infants’ representation of the height of a hidden object. Cognitive Development, 2, 375–392.

6. Baillargeon, R., & Graber, M. (1988). Evidence of location memory in 8-month-old infants in a nonsearch AB task. Developmental Psychology, 24, 502–511.
7. Baillargeon, R., Graber, M., DeVos, J., & Black, J. (1990). Why do young infants fail to search for hidden objects? Cognition, 36, 255–284.
8. Baillargeon, R., (2004). Infants’ reasoning about hidden objects. Evidence for event-general and event-specific expectations. Developmental Science, 7, 391-414.
9. Needham, A., & Baillargeon, R. (1993). Intuitions about support in 4.5-month-old infants. Cognition, 47, 121–48.
10. Needham, A., & Baillargeon, R. (2000). Infants’ use of featural and experiential information in segregating and individuating objects: A reply to Xu, Carey and Welch (2000). Cognition, 74, 255–284.
11. Haith, M. M. (1998). Who put the cog in infant cognition? Is rich interpretation too costly? Infant Behavior and Development, 21, 167–179.
12. Rivera, S. M., Wakeley, A., & Langer, J. (1999). The drawbridge phenomenon: Representational reasoning or perceptual preference? Developmental Psychology, 35, 427–435.
13. Bogartz, R. S., Shinskey, J. L., & Schilling, T. H. (2000). Object permanence in five-and-a-half-month-old infants? Infancy, 1, 403–428.


Denis Mareschal and Jordy Kaufman, „Object permanence in Infancy. Revisiting Baillargeon’s Drawbridge Experiment“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Object Permanence Neuroscience Slater I 90
Object permanence/neuroscience: Tallon-Baudry and colleagues (1998)(1) reported that there was a significant increase in temporal cortex activity when adults were prompted to keep the image of a hidden object in mind. This finding along with the discovery that this type of activity can be detectible in the infant brain (Csibra et al., 2000)(2) formed the basis for an entirely new line of object permanence research in infants by Kaufman and colleagues. First, Kaufman, Csibra, and Johnson (2003)(3) measured brain responses in infants while they watched videos of a toy train entering and leaving a toy tunnel. Each trial was predetermined to be a “possible” or “impossible” trial. 1) Infants looked longer at the impossible event than the possible event.
2) Kaufman et al. found significant right-temporal cortex activity of infants in the times and conditions in which there was a hidden object that could elicit mental representation. This activity was temporally and spatially similar to Tallon-Baudry’s (1998)(1) finding with adults suggesting that the neural processes underlying hidden object representation in infants and adults are similar.
Slater I 91
Arguably, if out of sight were really out of mind for young infants, it would also be “out of brain,” and this was not the case. However, this argument is only partially persuasive as infants might be remembering the object without any real conception or perception of the object having continued to exist. That is, this brain activity could relate to either an expectation formed between the reaching hand and the object’s appearance or it could relate to a memory for the object unrelated to a perception that the object continues to exist. Solution: Kaufman, Csibra, and Johnson (2005)(3) presented infants with pictures of toys that disappeared in one of two different ways:
they disintegrated
they appeared to become occluded (which is consistent with continued existence). This time, no hand was involved in the action. The study was chosen to test the hypothesizes that this brain activity is related to a perception of the object’s continued existence rather than a simple memory trace for something that had been previously seen.
Cf. >Object permanence/Baillargeon; >Vs Baillargeon.
Again, the results were that right-temporal brain activity increased following an object occlusion event but not after a disintegration event, indicating that right-temporal activity in the infant brain (as in the in the adult brain) is related to object processing relevant to continued existence and is important for the understanding of object permanence.
In another study (Southgate, Csibra, Kaufman, & Johnson, 2008)(4) there was an increase in brain activity related to a toy’s occlusion. Interestingly though, this activity was not apparent when a face was hidden. This leads to the intriguing possibility that, at least for young infants, the brain mechanisms used to remember the existence of objects are not used to remember faces.
Slater I 92
This result is consistent with behavioral studies demonstrating that infants are not very good at remembering the locations of occluded faces (Mareschal & Johnson, 2003)(5).
1. Tallon-Baudry, C., Bertrand, O., Peronnet, F., & Pernier, J. (1998). Induced y-band activity during the delay of a visual short-term memory task in humans. The Journal of Neuroscience, 18, 4244–4254.
2..Csibra, G., Davis, G., Spratling, M. W., & Johnson, M. H. (2000). Gamma oscillations and object processing in the infant brain. Science, 290, 1582–1585.
3. Kaufman, J., Csibra, G., & Johnson, M. H. (2005). Oscillatory activity in the infant brain reflects object maintenance. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 102, 15271–15274.
4. Southgate, V., Csibra, G., Kaufman, J., & Johnson, M. H. (2008). Distinct processing of objects and faces in the infant brain. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20, 741–9.
5. Mareschal, D., & Johnson, M. H. (2003). The “what” and “where” of object representations in infancy. Cognition, 88, 259–276.

Denis Mareschal and Jordy Kaufman, „Object permanence in Infancy. Revisiting Baillargeon’s Drawbridge Experiment“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Possible World Semantics Cresswell I 99
Possible World Semantics/Cresswell: Advantage: allows quantification in belief contexts. >Opacity, >Quantification into belief context.
II 72
Definition true/truth/semantics of possible worlds/Cresswell: a sentence is true in a possible world iff this world is in the set of worlds, which is its intension (of the sentence). >Intensions, >Extensions.
Cresswell: therefore it can be said that the extension of the theorem is its truth value.
>Truth Value/Frege.
II 163
Possible World Semantics/possible world/FieldVsPossible World Semantics/Cresswell: (Field 1978(1), 40) the use of possible worlds binds someone to a general concept of synonymy. >Synonymy.
II 163
Possible World Semantics/Cresswell: allows an immediate access to terms such as entailment and inconsistency. That is, meaning postulates are superfluous. >Meaning postulates.
II 164
Def Entailment/Possible World Semantics: is simply the class inclusion in the set of possible worlds. >Entailment.
Def contradiction: something that is true in no possible world.
>Contradictions, >Impossible worlds.

1. Field, H. 1978. Mental Representation. In: Erkenntnis 13. Reprinted in Block 1981, pp. 9-61.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Problem Solving Klahr Slater I 65
Problem solving/developmental psychology/Klahr: in order to test the abilities in making inferences, Klahr (Klahr & Robinson, 1981)(1) modified the Tower of Hanoi to find out what problem-solving strategies a child can develop. Choosing cups instead of discs makes it impossible to put a smaller one on a larger one without giving explanations. The child was asked to tell the experimenter what she (the experimenter) should do in order to get her (the experimenter’s) cans to look just like the child’s in order to find out what mental representations the child could create.
Slater I 66
Participants: 51 children, 19 each in a 4-year and 5-year groups and 13 in a 6-year group. Approximately equal numbers of boys and girls at each age level. The children were told a cover story about three monkeys on a riverbank (father, mother, child), which were represented by the cups (red, yellow, blue).
Slater I 67
The main question of interest is how far into the future a child could “see” in describing move sequences. To avoid overestimating this capacity on the basis of a few fortuitous solutions, we used a very strict criterion: a child was scored as able to solve n-move problems only after proposing the minimum path solution for all four of the problems of length n.
Slater I 68
KlahrVsPiaget:
(Cf. >Abilities/Klahr, >Method/Piaget, >Thinking/Piaget) the absolute level of performance was striking, given Piaget’s earlier claims. Over two-thirds of the five-year-olds and nearly all of the six-year-olds consistently gave perfect four-move solutions, and over half of the six-year-olds gave perfect six-move solutions. Almost half of the four-year-olds could do the three-move problems. Recall that these solutions required that the child manipulate mental representations of future states, because the cans were not moved during or after the child’s description of the solution sequence.

1. Klahr, D., & Robinson, M. (1981). Formal assessment of problem solving and planning processes in preschool children. Cognitive Psychology, 13, 113–148.


David Klahr, ”Revisiting Piaget. A Perspective from Studies of Children’s Problem-solving Abilities”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Proper Names Frege I 54
Proper name/Frege: for a proper name the extension is presumed. Otherwise, the negation would be: "Kepler did not die in misery or the name is meaningless". >Extension.
II 69
The "meaning" of a name is never a concept (predicate), but always only an object. >Concept, >Object, >Predicate.
II 72f
Proper name/Frege: a proper name (saturated) can never be a predicate (but part of a predicate). Names/understanding/Frege: understanding a name means to know what object it denotes. Problem: are names without a carriers (e.g. unicorn). Problem: e.g. different names with the same carrier.
>Unicorn-example, >Non-existence.

Husted V 99/100
The fact that a name stands for an object is a consequence rather than part of the fact that it has a certain sense. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning,

Chisholm II 144f
Names/Frege: "mixed proper name": contains linguistic and non-linguistic parts: the circumstances. Circumstances: are part of the meaning of an expression. >Circumstances. ChisholmVsFrege: he neglects ostension.

Dummett III 68f
Names/FregeVsRussell: names may well have the same sense as a specific description - what is actually considered to be a representation of an object: Valencia from the air, from the ground, within a specific buildind, or on the map? Recognition: necessary: is ​​the awareness that the object falls under the concept that determines the proper identity criterion (here: "city"). This is the ability for recognition instead of the method of picking out ("red": is recognition, not a method for red). >Recognition.

Frege II 69
Name/Frege: a name can never be a predicate - but certainly part of a predicate. >Predicate.
Stalnaker I 183
Names/proper names/Frege/Stalnaker: for him there is a mental representation, i.e. we only have ideas about something that presents itself to us in a certain way. ((s) This can be reconciled with Donnellan’s attributive use). >Attributive/referential.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


Husted I
Jörgen Husted
"Searle"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted II
Jörgen Husted
"Austin"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted III
Jörgen Husted
"John Langshaw Austin"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted IV
Jörgen Husted
"M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993

Husted V
J. Husted
"Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Properties Cresswell I 117ff
Properties/possible worlds/Cresswell: E.g. in some possibe worlds there is a thing that has both: the property, the largest wooden and the property, to be the most beautiful building - in other possible worlds this thing has only one of the two properties. Then you can see it (description: "The largest wooden building"
a) as a function, the value is in every possible world the thing that is the largest wooden building
b) as a function whose value is the most beautiful.
Contingent identity fails because from f(w) = g(w) does not follow f = g.
>Identity.
For necessary identity see: >Identity/Kripke.
II 166
Definition Properties/Proposition/Definition/Cresswell: if we accept propositions as basic concepts, we can define properties as the function of individuals on propositions. >Propositions, >Basic concepts.
II II 167
RescherVs: (Rescher, 1975)(1): preferred to see properties as basic concepts - Field: (1978)(2): banishes propositions, but allows properties. >Properties.

1. Rescher, Nicholas 1975. Temporal Logic. In; J. Symbolic LogicVolume 40, Issue 2 (1975)
2. Field, H.H. Mental representation. Erkenntnis 13, 9–61 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00160888

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Propositional Content Brandom I 215
Propositional content/Brandom: from social structures that transmit it, fundamental representational contents - ((s) what is considered to be correct perception is socially regulated by standards.)
I 217
Auxiliary hypotheses are different from person to person.
I 218
Access: to pragmatics. Normativally - to semantics: inferentially - to the interaction between conceptual contents: social.
I 236
Propositional content/Field/Brandom: two-staged: 1) belief in Mentalese, 2) meaning in public language.
I 327
Maths propositional content: without empiricism.
I 240
Propositional content/Brandom: (the believable) shall be distinguished by the pragmatic property of assertibility.
I 254
Definition propositional content: that which is expressed by performances and which determines the specific characteristics of their significance within the genus of asserting.
I 402
Propositional content: role as premises - starts with the concept of truth instead of inference - Definition action: make something true.
I 473
Propositional content/Brandom: Thesis: cannot play a fundamental explanatory role - is parasitic to the expressive role! - It is about the act of asserting and not about what is asserted.
I 873
Content/Brandom: propositional and other conceptual contents with which the behavior of the system is to be measured, cannot be justified with this behavior itself. >Justification.
I 897
Propositional content/Brandom: what we mean depends on the actual circumstances, even if we do not know what they are. This is the perspective character of propositional content - hence the externalism begins at home: The contents of external definitions depend on their actions and of the truth of that which they make an assertion about. >Circumstances, >Meaning (intending), cf. >Externalism. ---
II 207
Propositional content/Brandom: always also representational - propositional content can be reflected on in concepts of truth or reasons - "aboutness", "about" is not necessary in addition to representation - but propositional content must be able to be characterized non-representationally.
II 263
Objectivity/Brandom: of the propositional content: the objectivity (fact) says nothing about who could reasonably assert something - and such facts would even exist without living beings - this objectivity is a characteristic that we can make understandable as a structure of the definitions and authorisations - every community that recognizes definition and authorization as a normative status can recognize propositional content that are objective in this sense. >Objectivity.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Propositions Schiffer Graeser I 129
SchifferVsPropositions: propositions are no language-independent contents of corresponding settings: they could not even perform this function. >Content.
SchifferVsRepresentation: the contents of sentences in question cannot be representations, for example, in a language of thought.
>Representation, >Language of thought.
Belief/Schiffer: Vs belief as a relation.
>Relation theory.
Meaning/SchifferVsDavidson: if there can neither be a sentence-oriented nor a non-sentence-oriented analysis of meaning, then also the possibility of conception of judgmental settings as relations collapses.
Graeser: thus we lose the ground under our feet.
---
Schiffer I XVIIff
SchifferVsPropositions/late: propositions should contain E.g. dog property. Intention-based semantics/Grice: requires, however, that propositions are neural sentences.
Problem: there are no truth conditions in mentalese.
>Mentalese, >Truth conditions.
I 14
Propositions: have their truth values ​​essentially. Phrases/expressionsSchiffer: have their truth values ​​contingently. - (in public speech or in mentalese)
Proposition: content itself, is not representation but is represented.
I 49f
Propositions/Belief object/relation theory/SchifferVsPropositions: a proposition always requires natural kind terms. Even substitution is not compatible with any propositional theory.
Propositional theory: says
1) that "p" is a real object variable
2) that propositions are their values.
Proposition: abstract, not in space and time - yet real concrete components.
E.g. Capitol in "The Capitol is in NY".
But only if fine-grained (as a complex of individuals and properties). - They are objective and mind-independent as opposed to pain and mental representations.
>Pain, >Mental representation.
"Thought"/Frege: = Proposition; also the components and characteristics of propositions are abstract and language independent: e.g. the whiteness of snow.
Problem: VsPropositions: they carry an ontological commitment to Platonism.
>Platonism.
I 51
SchifferVsPropositions: propositions are superfluous such as facts and features. - E.g. Michele has the property to be funny (or the fact that funny ...). - This is a doubling. Complexes that include individuals as a structure as components and properties.
Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry, Lewis 1970a - (grainy: set of)
Problem: from compositionality for reference follows that the proposition "snow is white" is necessarily true if snow is white.
Different: as sets of possible worlds propositions include their speakers not as components.
>Fine-grained/coarse-grained.
I 52
Proposition: different: if = functions of possible worlds on truth values, then speakers do not function as components. - Then maybe partial functions that maps a possible world onto the truth, iff snow is white. Problem: unstructured propositions (functions) cause necessary equivalent propositions to be identical. - Then the problem of logical omniscience follows.
>Omniscience.
Solution: structured (fine-grained) entities: contain objects, properties, operators, which they determine.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987


Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
Relationships Attachment Theory Corr I 247
Relations/relationships/attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: attachment theory does not assert that a person’s current attachment orientation must mirror or match his or her attachment orientations with parents during childhood. Rather, the current orientation is a complex amalgam of historical and contemporary factors, and it can be changed by updating and reworking mental representations of self and attachment figures. >Representation/Attachment theory, >Representation/Psychoanalysis, >About the Attachment theory.

Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Developmental, psychodynamic and optimal-functioning aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Representation Attachment Theory Corr I 230
Representation/Attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: mental representations of attachment figures (see relations/Bowlby) and self-sub-routines that develop through the internalization of caring and soothing qualities of attachment figures can serve as symbolic sources of support, comfort and protection (Mikulincer and Shaver 2004(1)). They can also provide models of effective, loving behaviour that influence the way a person regards and treats him- or herself in the temporary absence of an actual attachment figure. >Representation/Bowlby, >Attachment theory/Bowlby.
Using contemporary research techniques, we (Mikulincer, Birnbaum and Woddis and Nachmias 2000(2); Mikulincer, Gillath and Shaver 2002(3)) have found
Corr I 231
that adults react to even minimal threat cues with activation of proximity-related thoughts and mental representations of security-providing attachment figures. In these studies, subliminal priming with a threat word (e.g., illness, failure) was found to heighten the cognitive accessibility of attachment-related mental representations, indicated by faster lexical-decision times for proximity-related words (e.g., love, closeness) and the names of people nominated as providing protection and security (e.g., the name of a parent, spouse or close friend). >About the Attachment theory.

1. Mikulincer, M. and Shaver, P. R. 2004. Security-based self-representations in adulthood: contents and processes, in W. S. Rholes and J. A. Simpson (eds.), Adult attachment: theory, research, and clinical implications, pp. 159–95. New York: Guilford Press
2. Mikulincer, M., Birnbaum, G., Woddis, D. and Nachmias, O. 2000. Stress and accessibility of proximity-related thoughts: exploring the normative and intraindividual components of attachment theory, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78: 509–23
3. Mikulincer, M., Gillath, O. and Shaver, P. R. 2002. Activation of the attachment system in adulthood: threat-related primes increase the accessibility of mental representations of attachment figures, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83: 881–95


Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Representation Bowlby Corr I 230
Representation/Bowlby/Attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: although Bowlby (1982/1969(1), 1988(2)) assumed that age and psychological development result in an increased ability to gain comfort from attachment-related mental representations, he also assumed that no one of any age is completely free of reliance on actual others when confronting illness, death of loved others, aging and other natural and human-caused disasters and traumas.
Corr I 232
Representation/Bowlby: Bowlby (1973)(3) assumed that the residues of (…) social encounters are stored as mental representations of person-environment transactions, which he called working models of self and other, and that these representations shape the functioning of a person’s >behavioural system and the way he or she behaves in particular social situations. >Attachment theory.

1. Bowlby, J. 1982. Attachment and loss, vol. I, Attachment, 2nd edn. New York: Basic Books (original edn 1969)
2. Bowlby, J. 1988. A secure base: clinical applications of attachment theory. London: Routledge
3. Bowlby, J. 1973. Attachment and loss, vol. II, Separation: anxiety and anger. New York: Basic Books

Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Representation Deacon I 77
Signs/representation/Deacon: a sign is interpreted - and is thus seen as a representation - by reducing it (i.e. splitting it into partial representations) until it cannot be further reduced. This is the basis on which all other representations are built.
I 78
Representation/Deacon: Icon and index do not simply correspond to perception and learning, but refer to abilities to draw conclusions and predictions that are involved in the respective neuronal processes. >Icon/Deacon.
Representational relations are not simply these mechanisms, but they are a characteristic of their potential relations to past, future, absent or imaginary objects. These objects are not re-presented, but are virtually represented by learned reactions that would normally be generated if these objects were present. In this sense, mental processes are no less representative than external communication processes and external communication processes are no less representative in this respect than mental processes.
N.B.: Mental representation is reduced to internal communication.
I 300
Representation/Brain/Deacon: the systematic nature of the symbolic reference suggests that the representation of symbolic associations is distributed across the brain and that similar word classes share neuronal similarities. >Word classes.
To the extent that higher-level representations can be broken down into lower-level components, we may expect their neuronal representations to have a similarly intertwined hierarchical structure.
I 397
Representation/symbols/symbolic communication/Deacon: we should not underestimate what can be represented without symbols: almost everything can be represented by indexical or iconic means alone. >Symbols/Deacon.
Animal calls can refer specifically to species of enemies, types of food and much more.
>Animals, >Animal language.
Indexical reference: however, requires a part-whole relationship.
>Part-of relation, >Parts, >Wholes, >Indexicality.
Human communication: its special feature is the possible reference to the non-material through symbols.
>Reference.
I 400
Punishment for sexual infidelity is tolerated or promoted in human communities. This requires a high degree of abstraction, such as reference to the past and possible consequences in the future. >Abstraction.

Dea I
T. W. Deacon
The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998

Dea II
Terrence W. Deacon
Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013

Representation Dretske Pauen I 230
Meaning/Naturalization/mental representation/Dretske/Pauen: (Dretske 1994(1),1995(2)): tries like Fodor to explain the emergence of meaning in a purely naturalistic manner. However, this also extends to non-human creatures. Four aspects:
1. Causal relation between object and representation
2. Function of representation for the organism
3. Development history of acquiring
4. Possibility of change.
>Naturalism.

Sign/Meaning/Causality/Dretske/Pauen: (ad 1.) a pure causal relation can only produce a natural sign ("sign/indication"). The normative moment has no place here.
>Signs, >Meaning.

ad 2. The normative distinction between the right and the wrong of the mental representation comes into play when a device or an organ receives the function of displaying another state of affairs.

ad 3. E.g. Magnetotactic bacteria are looking for deeper, oxygen-deficient water layers.
If these bacteria were transported to the northern hemisphere, they would seek flatter, more oxygen-rich water layers!
Here it would remain unclear what exactly the object of the representation is: is it the magnetic fields or the oxygen concentration?
I 232
Dretske: admits that this is hard to decide here. Solution: most organisms have several approaches to a state of affairs.
If a representation occurs in the normal case in the presence of an enemy, one can speak of a representation of the enemy.

ad 4. It seems possible that the objection, not the enemy, but the disjunction of all stimuli, is the object of the representation. E.g. smell or silhouette, or sound.
Here the learning ability is important. Higher living beings can learn new stimuli here, with which even a complete old disjunction might be absent.
Thus the disjunction is also not considered as a representation.
VsDretske/Pauen: a causally determined sun burn is nevertheless not a representation of the sun.
I 233
Stomach upsets are no representation of spoiled food.
1. Fred Dretske 1994. If You Can't Make One, You Don't Know How It Works. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1994.tb00299.x (03.06.2020)
2. Fred Dretske 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
---
Schiffer I 46
Representation/fuel gauge/Dretske/Terminology/Schiffer: (Dretske 1986)(1): "fuel gauge model of representation: it represents the fuel status because it is a reliable indicator for it. ((s) By regularity to the representation. Additional assumption: Counterfactual conditional). >Counterfactual conditionals, >Fuel gauge example.

1. Fred Dretske 1986. Misrepresentation. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press. pp. 17--36
---

Perler I 225
Mental representation/Dretske/Proust: 1. Covariance between internal condition and external situation ("Indication".) 2. The internal indicator has the function to display the external situation. Then it represents them.
3. Representations can be true or false.

Perler I: Joelle Proust Das intentionale Tier in D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt/M. 2005

Dretske I
Fred Dretske
"Minimal Rationality", in: S. L. Hurley and M. Nudds (Eds.) Rational Animals?, Oxford 2005
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Dretske II
F. Dretske
Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997


Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Perler I
Dominik Perler
Markus Wild
Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005
Representation Piaget Slater I 71/72
Representation/Piaget: Piaget describes (Piaget, 1951(1), p. 63) the behavior of an 18 months old baby, imitating the [behavior] of another child that had visited her on the day before. The baby reproduced the behavior some time after it happened. Therefore, she must have internalized the action at the time of its occurrence: the capacity of representation had appeared (…) allowing for the possibility of deferred imitation. >Imitation/Piaget, >Imitation/Meltzoff.

1. Piaget, J. (1951). Play, dreams, and imitation in childhood. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Inc.

Alan M. Slater, “Imitation in Infancy. Revisiting Meltzoff and Moore’s (1977) Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications

Upton I 14
Representation/Piaget: thesis: children develop progressively more elaborate and sophisticated mental representations of the world. These mental representations, or schemas, are based on their own actions on the environment and the consequences of these actions. (Piaget 1952(1), 1962(2)). Critically: Piaget saw the role of the child as taking an active role in his or her own development.
>Development stages/Piaget, >Psychological theories on development stages.

1. Piaget, J. (1952) The Origins of Intelligence in Children. New York: International Universities
Press.
2. Piaget,J. (1962) Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood. New York: Norton.

Piag I
J. Piaget
The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012

Upton I
Penney Upton
Developmental Psychology 2011
Representation Proust I 225
Mental representation/Dretske/Proust: 1. Covariance between internal condition and external situation ("Indication").
2. The internal indicator has the function of displaying the external situation. Then it represents it.
3. Representations can be true or false.
I 227
Representation/Proust: the everyday understanding commits a petitio principii when it refers to a particular representation, which is to be based only on a difference between inside and outside or on spatial concepts. >Space/Proust, >Inside/Outside.
Spatial concepts can only provide a solution when it comes to explaining the use of spatial relations to distinguish terms.
>Concepts/Proust, >Concepts.
I 229
Representation/Animal/Proust: we see that probably many animals have mental representations.
I 230
These are also objective. Question: are these animals that are obviously capable of a kind of proto belief, also capable of real beliefs, or do they only have non-conceptual perception abilities?
>Proto-thought, >Thinking without language, >Animals, >Animal language.

Proust I
Joelle Proust
"L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Representation Psychoanalysis Corr I 247
Representation/PsychoanalysisVsAttachment theory/VsPsychoanalysis/Psychoanalysis/ Shaver/Mikulincer: outcomes. While contemporary psychoanalysis still views adult mental representations of self and others as mental residues of childhood experiences, Bowlby (1973(1), 1980(2)) believed that the developmental trajectory of working models is not linear or simple and that these mental representations in adulthood are not exclusively based on early experiences. Rather, they can be updated throughout life and affected by a broad array of contextual factors. >Representation/Bowlby, >Representation/Attachment theory.

1. Bowlby, J. 1973. Attachment and loss, vol. II, Separation: anxiety and anger. New York: Basic Books
2. Bowlby, J. 1980. Attachment and loss, vol. III, Sadness and depression. New York: Basic Books

Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Developmental, psychodynamic and optimal-functioning aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Representation Schiffer Graeser I 129
SchifferVsRepresentation: the contents of sentences in question cannot be representations, for example, in a "language of thought". >Language of thoguht, >Sentences, >Content.
Belief/Schiffer: Vs belief as a relation.
>Relation theory.
Meaning/SchifferVsDavidson: if there cannot be a sentence-oriented, nor a non-sentence-oriented analysis of meaning, then also the possibility of a conception of judgmental settings as relations collapses.
>Meaning, >Judgments.
Graeser: thus, we lose the ground under our feet.
---
Schiffer I 15
Representations/Schiffer: representations realize mental states- - Mental representations are in mentalese. >Mentalese, >Mental states.

I 275
Truth Value/representation: borderline case: propositional attitude as a relation to neural formulas: then belief is a relation to other beliefs. - As representational states beliefs have then truth values, regardless of whether they have a sentence structure. >Truth values, >Beliefs/Schiffer, >Sentences.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987


Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
Representation Shaver Corr I 238
Representations/attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: as compared with other mental representations, (a) working models (see >Terminology/Bowlby) also contain or express a person’s wishes, fears, conflicts and psychological defences; (b, a related point) working models seem to have a powerful affective component and tend to be shaped by emotion-regulation processes; (c) working models tend to be constructed in relational terms and to organize representations of the social self, interaction partners and social interactions; and (d) attachment working models are broad, rich and complex structures which can include tandem or opposite representations of the same social experiences at episodic, semantic and procedural levels of encoding (Shaver, Collins and Clark 1996)(1). >Working models, >Attachment theory.

1. Shaver, P. R., Collins, N. L. and Clark, C. L. 1996. Attachment styles and internal working models of self and relationship partners, in G. J. O. Fletcher and J. Fitness (eds.), Knowledge structures in close relationships: a social psychological approach, pp. 25–61. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum

Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Similarity Churchland Fodor IV 188
Condition/Equality/Similarity/Quality/Paul Churchland: basic cncepts: State space, similarity space, similarity metric. E.g. "Anglophone hyperspace with logical relations on hypersurfaces." Should replace Chomsky's image.
((s) Hypersurface/Churchland/(s): something on that you can go up/down, right/left, and front/back, and that within a language. Is needed to describe objects and their relationships.)
---
IV 189
Fodor/Lepore: that assumes that state spaces also reflect grammar. Churchland: It also has in mind that a kind of representations reflect "contents" of neurological states.
Fodor: Thereby he's up to his neck in his intentionality.
---
Fodor IV 193
Similarity/Equality/Semantics/Paul Churchland/Fodor/Lepore: surprisingly begins with sensations, not with intentionality (such as with propositional attitudes or concepts). Thesis: if we had an adequate access to sensations, this could be generalized to a general mental representation.
Churchland: the qualitative character of our sensations is generally considered to be inaccessible as neurobiological reduction.
But even so, we find that a determined attempt to find an order here, reveals a considerable amount of explicit information.
E.g. color dice with frequencies.
---
IV 194
Fodor/Lepore: Churchland actually assumes here that this is an access to the sensations (via frequencies!), not only to the discriminatory ability of the nervous system. Churchland: so the inexpressible can be expressed. The "unspeakable pink" can be grasped by frequency. So maybe the everyday language can also be replaced.
---
IV 195
Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: how plausible is this story in terms of sensations? Does it provide a robust concept of equality in general?

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Churli II
Patricia S. Churchland
"Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996


F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Symbolic Play Piaget Upton I 78
Symbolic playPiaget/Upton: Two- and three-year-old children often engage in what Piaget (1923)(1) called symbolic play. In this form of play, children use one object to represent another that they do not have access to at the time, for example a lego block as a hair brush; a chair as a car; a finger as a toothbrush (Boyatzis and Watson, 1993)(2). Having the ability to pretend that a particular object can be something else that is not present shows that they have a mental representation of that object. Gradually, this ability to use symbols becomes more sophisticated, so that by the age of four children no longer need to use an object to symbolise another object that is not present. An imaginary representation can be used; Boyatzis and Watson found that a three or four year old will use their finger as a toothbrush when the object is not present, while a five year old will pretend that he or she is holding a toothbrush.
>Development stages/Piaget, cf. >Psychological theories on play.


1. Piaget, J. (1923) Language and Thought of the Child. London: Routledge.
2. Boyatzis, C.J. and Watson, M.W. (1993) Preschool children’s symbolic representation of objects through gestures. Child Development, 67(3): 729–35.

Piag I
J. Piaget
The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969


Upton I
Penney Upton
Developmental Psychology 2011
Terminology Bowlby Corr I 230
Terminology/Bowlby/Shaver/Mikulincer: attachment figure: a person tends automatically to turn for protection and comfort to supportive others (whom Bowlby called attachment figures), and to maintain proximity to these ‘stronger and wiser’ figures until a state of protection and security is attained.(1)
Corr I 238
Working models: cognitive structures provide increasingly stable knowledge about the self, relationship partners and close relationships, just as increased experience in any domain contributes to the formation of mental schemas related to those domains. Bowlby (1982/1969(1), 1973(2)) called these cognitive structures working models. From a social cognition standpoint, the concept of working model is similar to such concepts as ‘script’ and ‘social schema’. Like those concepts, working models are viewed as being stored in an associative memory network, as having excitatory and inhibitory connections with other mental representations, and as possessing a certain level of accessibility determined by past experiences and current context (e.g., Collins and Read 1994(3); Mikulincer and Shaver 2007(4); Shaver, Collins and Clark 1996(5)).

1. Bowlby, J. 1982. Attachment and loss, vol. I, Attachment, 2nd edn. New York: Basic Books (original edn 1969)
2. Collins, N. L. and Read, S. J. 1994. Cognitive representations of attachment: the structure and function of working models, in K. Bartholomew and D. Perlman (eds.), Advances in personal relationships: attachment processes in adulthood, vol. V, pp. 53–92. London: Jessica Kingsley
3.Bowlby, J. 1973. Attachment and loss, vol. II, Separation: anxiety and anger. New York: Basic Books
4. Mikulincer, M. and Shaver, P. R. 2007. Attachment in adulthood: structure, dynamics, and change. New York: Guilford Press
5.Collins, N. L. 1996. Working models of attachment: implications for explanation, emotion and behaviour, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71: 810–32


Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Truth Conditions Schiffer I 95ff
Relation Theory/mentalese/solution/Schiffer: new thesis: Suppose we are thinking in public English. - Suppose we know the truth conditions for our mental representation: namely the homophone Tarski schema "s" iff s. >Homophony, >Tarski scheme.
Then E.g.
"Reagan is a Chinese"
forms the phrase on Reagan's being Chinese.
N.B.: we cannot say now what determines the truth conditions for mentalese, but we can find out empirically. - By the discovery of causal relations to things outside the head.
>Language of thought.
Problem: it cannot be accepted that any package of conceptual role/causal relation is appropriate for our own inner English.
>Conceptual role, >Causal relations.
I 98
Vs this solution: problem: the assumptions are wrong or unjustifiable. - One cannot assume that Mentalese is identical with public English. >Mentalese, >Relation theory.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Unconscious Attachment Theory Corr I 232
Unconscious/Bowlby/attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: Bowlby (1973)(1) assumed that the residues of (…) social encounters are stored as mental representations of person-environment transactions, which he called working models of self and other, and that these representations shape the functioning of a person’s behavioural system and the way he or she behaves in particular social situations. >J. Bowlby, >Working models.
These models presumably operate mainly at a cortical level and in both unconscious and fairly reflective and intentional ways. Even when they initially operate consciously, however, with repeated use they can become automatic and unconscious, either as most well-formed habits do or by virtue of motivated defensive manoeuvres. These models are an important source of within-person continuity over time and individual differences between persons, so they are properly regarded as important aspects of personality.
>About the Attachment theory.

1. Bowlby, J. 1973. Attachment and loss, vol. II, Separation: anxiety and anger. New York: Basic Books

Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Unconscious Bowlby Corr I 232
Unconscious/Bowlby/attachment theory/ Shaver/Mikulincer: Bowlby (1973)(1) assumed that the residues of (…) social encounters are stored as mental representations of person-environment transactions, which he called working models of self and other, and that these representations shape the functioning of a person’s behavioural system and the way he or she behaves in particular social situations. These models presumably operate mainly at a cortical level and in both unconscious and fairly reflective and intentional ways. Even when they initially operate consciously, however, with repeated use they can become automatic and unconscious, either as most well-formed habits do or by virtue of motivated defensive manoeuvres. These models are an important source of within-person continuity over time and individual differences between persons, so they are properly regarded as important aspects of personality. >Attachment theory, >Personality, >Affectional bonds, >Relationships, >Social relationships.


1. Bowlby, J. 1973. Attachment and loss, vol. II, Separation: anxiety and anger. New York: Basic Books

Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Working Models Attachment Theory Corr I 240
Working models/attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: Because working models, at least initially, are based on the internalization of specific interactions with a particular attachment figure, a person can hold multiple working models that differ in the outcome of the interaction (success or failure to attain security) and the strategy used to deal with insecurity in that interaction (hyperactivation or deactivation of the attachment system). Like other mental representations, these working models form excitatory and inhibitory associations with each other (e.g., experiencing or thinking about security attainment activates memories of congruent episodes of gaining protection and security), and these associations favour the formation of more abstract and generalized representations of self and others. In a recent study, Overall, Fletcher and Friesen (2003)(1) provided evidence for this hierarchical cognitive network of attachment working models.
>About the Attachment theory.

1. Overall, N. C., Fletcher, G. J. O. and Friesen, M. D. 2003. Mapping the intimate relationship mind: comparisons between three models of attachment representations, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 29: 1479–93

Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
World Festinger Haslam I 43
Social World/individual/perception/Festinger: According to Festinger, individuals represent the social world as a set of mental cognitions. Any behaviour, attitude or emotion was considered a cognition – that is, a mental representation within a person’s mind. So, too, were the perceptions of the world around us. Our perceptions of other people, social groups and the physical world were all considered to be cognitive representations. Those representations existed in relationship to each other – sometimes fitting together consistently and sometimes inconsistently in people’s minds. (Festinger 1957)(1). >Cognitive dissonance/Festinger.

1. Festinger, L. (1957) A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Joel Cooper, “Cognitive Dissonance. Revisiting Festinger’s End of the World study”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017

The author or concept searched is found in the following 19 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Behaviorism Chomsky Vs Behaviorism Dantos2 I 268
Rotating figuresVsBehaviorism > Mental representation (inner r.)Vsintrospection (ChomskyVsBehaviorism) - FodorVsBehaviorism
Chomsky I 278
ChomskyVsBehaviorism: has proven to be quite unfruitful. It excludes the concept of "what is perceived" and of "what is learnt" from the start.
II 351
ChomskyVsBehaviorism: is just as if you were to call physics the "science of reading scales".
Searle VIII 404
ChomskyVsBehaviorism: fundamental confusion between data and object of investigation.

Chomsky I
Noam Chomsky
"Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky II
Noam Chomsky
"Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky IV
N. Chomsky
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965
German Edition:
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Chomsky V
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Behaviorism Fodor Vs Behaviorism Danto I 268
Rotary FiguresVsBehaviorism > Mental Representation (inner r) VsIntrospection (ChomskyVsBehaviorism), FodorVsBehaviorism.
Fodor/Lepore IV 56
VsBehaviorism/Fodor/Lepore: E.g. assuming "dog" and "shmog" are two words with which speakers react to exactly the same stimuli, namely dogs. Then for e.g. Skinner would follow that "dog" and "shmog" are synonymous. Then, the following sentence would be analytical in the language of the speaker: "Whatever is a dog, is a shmog." QuineVs: there are neither synonyms nor analytic sentences!
IV 57
So Skinner’s semantics must be wrong. VsVs: it is namely a priori! Even worse: all the semantics must be wrong, a priori, because this nihilistic theory will say that there are no semantic properties at all. Fodor/Lepore: what went wrong this time? We have taken literally, that Quine has not shown in Two Dogmas (TD) (and also has not argued) that there are no semantic facts and no analytic truths.
Meaning/Fodor/Lepore: what we rather concede is that if meaning is to have any sense at all, then it cannot be reconstructed by reference to the sentences to which the speaker agrees. Meaning/Two Dogmas/TD/Quine: meaning cannot be reduced to the inferences to which one is willing to agree. Reason: what inferences you agree to only depends on how you see the world, i.e. what you intend your words to mean. ((s)> interest, intention, meaning). Important argument: it is impossible to detect which of his/her views the speaker accepts a priori! So there are no analytic sentences.
IV 195
Qualia/quality/sensation/exchanged spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green. If the exchange is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could uncover it. VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the reversed spectra thus seem to indicate that behaviorism is wrong (and also functionalism: Block/Fodor, Shoemaker). You might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been exchanged. And it is precisely the concept of the perceptual identity that becomes ambiguous because of that. VsChurchland: his approach does not help at all. The labels of the dots on the dice could be exactly reversed. ((s) You could always describe them without knowing what feelings are present in the other.)

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Chalmers, D. Stalnaker Vs Chalmers, D. I 194
Semantic Facts/Semantics/Stalnaker: the semantics assumes that the Semantic facts about a language that specifies two types of intensions that can be abstracted from these very Semantic facts and then also cannot be applied in possible worlds (poss.w.) in which those facts do not persist. We can take the primary intension in the actual world and consider its extension in any poss.w..
Meta semantics/Stalnaker: only assumes that the semantics (plus context)
I 195
defines a normal intension. So it assumes less what can be derived from a semantics for a language. primary intension/meta semantics/Stalnaker: here these functions have a more limited domain. Their values are only determinded for such poss.w. that contain this expression (the token).
Semantics/meta semantics/Chalmers: this distinction makes little difference.
StalnakerVsChalmers: on the contrary: it is not only about how you distinguish the different representations how referents are dependent from facts, the distinction reflects two different ways to use the two-dimensional device.
Difference:
a) we characterize the relevant two-dimensional and primary intensions as types of meaning,
b) not as meaning.
Stalnaker: this has consequences for our understanding of a priori knowledge and truth.

I 202
Necessary a posteriori: is divided into necessary truth a priori knowable by conceptual analysis and a part which is only a posteriori knowable but this one is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. Stalnaker: I agree with the two that this phenomenon has its roots in the relation between how we represent the world and the world itself, but
Two-dimensional semantics/StalnakerVsJackson/StalnakerVsChalmers: thesis: I think that shows something about the nature of mental representations and not only on the contingent functioning of languages.
I 210
Two-dimensional frame/Stalnaker: can be interpreted a) as Kaplan originally but extended
b) meta-semantically.
I 211
Ad a) then the causal chains are part of the semantic content Chalmers: this makes little difference
StalnakerVsChalmers: the difference is greater than he thinks. Necessity a posteriori is then analyzed differently.
Causal chain/Stalnaker: if it is part of the descriptive semantics then it is said by it how - given this descriptive semantics - the references are determined by the facts.
Problem: how did the facts determine which semantics the language has?

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Churchland, P. Fodor Vs Churchland, P. IV 189
Mind/brain/Churchland: thesis: the brain represents different aspects of reality through a position in an appropriate state space.
IV 191
FodorVsChurchland/LeporeVsChuchland: Churchland also seems to be guilty of the illusion, that there could ultimately be something empirical, so that conceptual relations could in the end be reduced to relations between observation concepts. Churchland: semantic identity goes back to the special place in the network of semantically relevant sentences (and that is of the whole language).
Translation: therefore, we can speak of the equality of sentences across languages!
IV 192
Equivalent expressions occupy the same (corresponding) places in the corresponding network of the other language. Nevertheless, translation should always take observability into account.
IV 193
Churchland/Fodor/Lepore: Churchland surprisingly begins with feelings, not with intentionality (e.g. with propositional attitudes or concepts). Thesis: if we had adequate access to feelings, it could be generalized to a general mental representation.
Churchland: the qualitative nature of our sensations is generally considered as inaccessible for the neurobiological reduction.
But even so, we find that a determined attempt to find an order here revealed a sizable chunk of expressible information, e.g. color cubes with frequencies.
IV 194
Fodor/Lepore: Churchland actually assumes that this is an access to the sensations (through frequencies!), not only to the discrimination ability of the nervous system. Churchland: thus, the inexpressible can be expressed! The "unspeakable rose" can be grasped by indication of the frequency. This is perhaps a way to replace everyday language.
IV 195
Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: how plausible is this story in terms of sensations? Does it provide a robust notion of equality in general? Qualia/quality/sensation/exchanged spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green.
If the exchange is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could uncover it.
VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the exchanged spectra thus seem to indicate that behaviorism is wrong and functionalism, too (Block/Fodor, Shoemaker).
One might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been exchanged. And it is precisely the concept of the perceptual identity that becomes ambiguous because of that. VsChurchland: Churchland's approach does not help at all. The labels of the dots on the dice could be exactly reversed.
IV 196
Why should a semantic space not be put beside it and the condition added that the dimensions of the semantic space must be semantic? They must designate content states through their contents. E.g. Perhaps we could then identify uncle, aunt, President, Cleopatra, etc. along these dimensions?
IV 197
E.g. Cleopatra as a politician is closer to the president in terms of marriageability. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: that is what we are really interested in: a robust theory of the equality of content rather than identity of content that has been lost with the analytic/synthetic distinction.
Problem: equality presupposes identity and a corresponding theory.
>State semantics: deals with the question of how the identity of the state spaces is fixed.
IV 200
Representation/neurophysiological/mind/brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies.
IV 201
Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: two different interpretations of his diagrams would also interpret neighborhoods very differently. ---
Metzinger II 466
"Eliminative Materialism"/Churchland: eliminative materialism means two things: 1) Materialism is most probably true.
2) Many traditional explanations of human behavior are not suitable for understanding the real causes.
II 467
"Request"/"conviction"/Churchland: Paul and Patricia Churchland: we will probably have to drop these "categories" (FodorVsChurchland, SearleVsChurchland).

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996
Compositionality Harman Vs Compositionality Schiffer I 188
Mentalese/HarmanVsCompositionality/Understanding: (Harman 1975, 271): (He was not confused by puns about "use"): even for the understanding of public language compositionality is not needed, provided that thinking takes place in their own public language. He needs two premises: 1) we would only need a compositional semantics if spoken utterances were a matter of decoding language into public Mentalese. 2) But because we think in German, there is no such decoding. Compositionality/Compositional Semantics/Representation/CS Theory/Schiffer: we must also recognize that the compositional semantics theory is not threatened by what I assume about mental representations:
(A) Even if we think in Mentalese, there is no true theory of intentionality or of representation as such, which implies that Mentalese has a compositional semantics
(B) The truth of (A) does not imply that the public language has no compositional semantics.

Harman I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995

Harman II
Gilbert Harman
"Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Dretske, F. Pauen Vs Dretske, F. V 230
Meaning/Naturalization/Mental Representation/Dretske/Pauen: (1994.1995): tries, like Fodor, to explain the origin of meaning purely naturalistically. But extends this also to non-human beings. Four aspects:
1) Causal relationship between object and representation
2) Representational function for the organism
3) Evolution of earning
4) Possibility of change.
Sign/Meaning/Causality/Dretske/Pauen: (ad 1) a purely causal relationship can only cause a natural sign ("signs"). The normative aspect has no place here.
ad 2) The normative distinction between right and wrong of the mental representation comes into play when a device or an organ is assigned the function of displaying a different state of affairs.

ad 3) e.g. magnetotactic bacteria pursue deeper, low-oxygen water layers.
Suppose these bacteria were brought to the northern hemisphere, they would head for shallower water layers with higher oxygen content!
Here it would be unclear what exactly is the object of representation: the magnetic fields or the oxygen concentration?
V 232
Dretske: acknowledges that this is difficult to decide. Solution: most organisms have multiple approaches to a situation.
If a representation normally occurs in the presence of an enemy, one can speak of a representation of the enemy.
ad 4) Only the objection that not the enemy, but the disjunction of all stimuli is the subject of the representation seems possible. E.g. odor or silhouette, or sound.
Here, the ability to learn is important. Higher organisms can learn new stimuli, which means that a complete old disjunction could even be absent.
Thus, the disjunction cannot be considered as a representation.
VsDretske/Pauen: a causally determined sunburn is still not a representation of the sun.
V 233
Indigestion are no representation of spoiled food.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Field, H. Putnam Vs Field, H. Field IV 405
Internal realism/metaphysical/Putnam/Field: (ad Putnam: Reason, Truth, and History): FieldVsPutnam: the contrast between internal realism and metaphysical realism is not defined clearly enough. >Internal realism, >metaphysical realism.
Metaphysical realism/Field: comprises three theses, which are not separated by Putnam.
1. metaphysical realism 1: thesis, the world is made up of a unity of mentally independent objects.
2. metaphysical realism 2: thesis, there is exactly one true and complete description (theory) of the world.
Metaphysical realism 2/Field: is not a consequence of the metaphysical realism 1 ((s) is independent) and is not a theory that any metaphysical realist would represent at all.
Description/world/FieldVsPutnam: how can there only be a single description of the world ((s) or of anything)? The terms that we use are never inevitable; Beings that are very different from us, could need predicates with other extensions, and these could be totally indefinable in our language.
Field IV 406
Why should such a strange description be "the same description"? Perhaps there is a very abstract characterization that allows this, but we do not have this yet. wrong solution: one cannot say, there is a single description that uses our own terms. Our current terms might not be sufficient for a description of the "complete" physics (or "complete" psychology, etc.).
One could at most represent that there is, at best, a true and complete description that uses our terms. However, this must be treated with caution because of the vagueness of our present terms.
Theory/world/FieldVsPutnam: the metaphysical realism should not only be distinguished from his opponent, the internal realism, by the adoption of one true theory.
3. Metaphysical realism 3/Field: Thesis, truth involves a kind of correspondence theory between words and external things.
VsMetaphysical Realism 3/VsCorrespondence Theory/Field: the correspondence theory is rejected by many people, even from representatives of the metaphysical realism 1 (mentally independent objects).
Field IV 429
Metaphysical realism/mR/FieldVsPutnam: a metaphysical realist is someone who accepts all of the three theses: Metaphysical realism 1: the world consists of a fixed totality of mentally independent objects.
Metaphysical realism 2: there is only one true and complete description of the world.
Metaphysical realism 3: truth involves a form of correspondence theory.
PutnamVsField: these three have no clear content, when they are separated. What does "object" or "fixed totality", "all objects", "mentally independent" mean outside certain philosophical discourses?
However, I can understand metaphysical realism 2 when I accept metaphysical realism 3.
I: is a definite set of individuals.

Williams II 430
P: set of all properties and relations Ideal Language: Suppose we have an ideal language with a name for each element of I and a predicate for each element of P.
This language will not be countable (unless we take properties as extensions) and then only countable if the number of individuals is finite. But it is unique up to isomorphism; (but not further, unique up to isomorphism).
Theory of World/Putnam: the amount of true propositions in relation to each particular type (up to any definite type) will also be unique.
Whole/totality/Putnam: conversely, if we assume that there is an ideal theory of the world, then the concept of a "fixed totality" is (of individuals and their properties and relations) of course explained by the totality of the individuals which are identified with the range of individual variables, and the totality of the properties and relations with the region of the predicate variables within the theory.
PutnamVsField: if he was right and there is no objective justification, how can there be objectivity of interpretation then?
Field/Putnam: could cover two positions:
1. He could say that there is a fact in regard to what good "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention is. And that treatment of "electron" as a rigid designator (of "what entity whatsoever", which is responsible for certain effects and obeys certain laws, but no objective fact of justification. Or.
2. He could say that interpretation is subjective, but that this does not mean that the reference is subjective.
Ad 1.: here he must claim that a real "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention of "general recognition" is separated, and also of "inductive competence", etc.
Problem: why should then the decision that something ("approximately") obeys certain laws or disobeys, (what then applies to Bohr's electrons of 1900 and 1934, but not for phlogiston) be completely different by nature (and be isolable) from decisions on rationality in general?
Ad 2.: this would mean that we have a term of reference, which is independent of procedures and practices with which we decide whether different people in different situations with different background beliefs actually refer on the same things. That seems incomprehensible.
Reference/theory change/Putnam: We assume, of course, that people who have spoken 200 years ago about plants, referred, on the whole, to the same as we do. If everything would be subjective, there would be no inter-theoretical, interlinguistic term of reference and truth.
If the reference is, however, objective, then I would ask why the terms of translation and interpretation are in a better shape than the term of justification.
---
Putnam III 208
Reference/PutnamVsField: there is nothing that would be in the nature of reference and that would make sure that the connection for two expressions would ever result in outcomes by "and". In short, we need a theory of "reference by description".
---
Putnam V 70
Reference/FieldVsPutnam: recently different view: reference is a "physicalist relationship": complex causal relationships between words or mental representations and objects. It is a task of empirical science to find out which physicalistic relationship this is about. PutnamVsField: this is not without problems. Suppose that there is a possible physicalist definition of reference and we also assume:
(1) x refers to y if and only if x stands in R to y.
Where R is a relationship that is scientifically defined, without semantic terms (such as "refers to"). Then (1) is a sentence that is true even when accepting the theory that the reference is only determined by operational or theoretical preconditions.
Sentence (1) would thus be a part of our "reflective equilibrium" theory (see above) in the world, or of our "ideal boundaries" theory of the world.
V 71
Reference/Reference/PutnamVsOperationalism: is the reference, however, only determined by operational and theoretical preconditions, the reference of "x is available in R y" is, in turn, undetermined. Knowing that (1) is true, is not of any use. Each permissible model of our object language will correspond to one model in our meta-language, in which (1) applies, and the interpretation of "x is in R to y" will determine the interpretation of "x refers to y". However, this will only be in a relation in each admissible model and it will not contribute anything to reduce the number of allowable models. FieldVs: this is not, of course, what Field intends. He claims (a) that there is a certain unique relationship between words and things, and (b) that this is the relationship that must also be used when assigning a truth value to (1) as the reference relation.
PutnamVsField: that cannot necessarily be expressed by simply pronouncing (1), and it is a mystery how we could learn to express what Field wans to say.
Field: a certain definite relationship between words and objects is true.
PutnamVsField: if it is so that (1) is true in this view by what is it then made true? What makes a particular correspondence R to be discarded? It appears, that the fact, that R is actually the reference, is a metaphysical inexplicable fact. (So magical theory of reference, as if referring to things is intrinsically adhered). (Not to be confused with Kripke's "metaphysically necessary" truth).
----
Putnam I (c) 93
PutnamVsField: truth and reference are not causally explanatory terms. Anyway, in a certain sense: even if Boyd's causal explanations of the success of science are wrong, we still need them to do formal logic.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

WilliamsB I
Bernard Williams
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011

WilliamsM I
Michael Williams
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001

WilliamsM II
Michael Williams
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Field, H. Schiffer Vs Field, H. I 105
SchifferVsField: wrong is his suggestion: physical relations as an explanation for the reference relation would also cover relations to things of which they are not true. (E.g. >"Arthritis"/"shmarthritis", E.g. >Addition/Quaddition. - FieldVsPhysicalism). Conclusion: no functional relation, which operates without disquotation scheme will be appropriate for the "true-of" relation. ((s) Anyway not the relation, but the theory works, if at all with the disquotation scheme.).
I 109
Def Conceptual Role/c.r./Field: (Field 1977): the subjective conditional probability-function of an agent Two mental representations S1 and S2 have the same cr for one person, iff. their (the person’s) subjective conditional prblty-function is so that s for any mental representation, given the subjective probability of s1 s is the same as that of s2 where s. SchifferVsField: This is of little use, because not two people have the same conditional probability function. But Field is anyway pessimistic with respect to a precise concept of intersubjective sameness of mental content that goes beyond sameness of referential significance.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Fodor, J. Lewis Vs Fodor, J. Block I 215
Pain/Lewis (VsFodor) can be analytically understood as a condition with a certain >causal role. (>Functionalism). Functionally uncharacterized condition, not a functional state. For example, a functionally uncharacterized brain state. "Pain" can then pick out a neurophysiological state. So he is committed to the assertion that to have pain = the state of this certain causal role.


Schwarz I 171
"Naturalization of the content"//Representation/Schwarz: Thesis: Mental representations are insofar alike sentences that their content can be explained by compositionality. (cf. Fodor 1990(1)). LewisVsFodor: principally misguided: only causal role in everyday life (behavior) is relevant. Even if, e.g. the wish to eat mushroom soup, is the beautiful addition of the wish for soup and the wish for mushroom. Because if it is reversely a wish for mushroom soup if the wish plays the exact causal role, regardless of how the wish is constituted. (1994b(2),320f)
We can imagine creatures which do not represent like sentences. (vcf. Armstrong 1973(3), chap 1, Braddon-Mitchell/Jackson 1996(4), chap. 10f).
Lewis' theory shall also be valid for this possible word, and shall also explain what determines the content.


1. Jerry A.Fodor [1990]: “A Theory of Content I & II”. In A Theory of Content and Other Essays,
Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 51–136
2. D. Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy
of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431
3. D. M. Armstrong [1973]: Belief, Truth, and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
4. David Braddon-Mitchell und Frank Jackson [1996]: Philosophy of Mind and Cognition.
Oxford: Blackwell

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007

Block II
Ned Block
"On a confusion about a function of consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Fodor, J. Putnam Vs Fodor, J. Pauen I 228
Meaning/VsFodor: it is not sure if Fodor has made here a sufficient condition for the emergence of meaning. Example, one could consider, according to Fodor, artificial chicken eggs as asymmetrically dependent on the production of real chicken eggs. Yet, one will not regard such eggs as a representation of chickens, although the latter represent the asymmetrical effective "causes" for the emergence of chicken eggs.
---
I 229
Meaning/PutnamVsFodor/Pauen: it is also unclear whether the asymmetric dependence of references of a mental representation is necessary. E.g. Super-Billionaire: here, the meaning does not depend on the meeting with real specimens.
E.g. Unicorn: can be no "original cause" of our thoughts.
The relation is much more complex than it is assumed in Fodor with a quasi one to one opposition. It's about the whole language practice of our ancestors.
Another problem: it has to be excluded that the original causations are from e.g. Lions children's books or television tubes.
---
Putnam III 56ff
Dependency/reference/Possible World/PutnamVsFodor: does the relationship really exist and is it asymmetrical? In the terminology of semantics of possible worlds this thought says that the "closest possible worlds" in which the cats do not trigger such remarks, are possible worlds, in which the word "cat" refers to something completely different (possible worlds not real worlds, but hypothetical situations). ---
III 57
This would show that the dependency relationship does exist, and the law according to which the expressions of images are triggered is dependent on the law that cats trigger the expressions. But it is not enough to show that they are asymmetrical. For this, the evidence would have to be provided: if not images, then also not cats as a trigger. Fodor thinks this is obvious, but is it really?
VsFodor: Would it not be reasonable to assume that the closest possible worlds, in which it is not a "law" that images are triggers, are possible worlds in which most people have no idea how cats look like at all!?
If these are the closest possible worlds in which images do not trigger any, then it would be the case when images would not trigger any remarks, cats would also not trigger any, and then the dependency relationship would be symmetrical.
FodorVsVs: possible answer: simply "intuitive" understanding. It could be about worlds in which people are blind.
---
III 58
VsFodor: but this does not seem reasonable. He could better say that the signs would sometimes be triggered. Then it could be objected that the thesis is too weak. One would probably say that the sentence could be true, but it is not "law-like". "Law-like"/Fodor: is an undefined basic concept in Fodors metaphysics. Not a property of sentences, but a relationship between universals. In this way, he fends off the objection by the use of this term, an already intentional concept is introduced. (Putnam: is probably intentional).
---
III 59
Fodor: even if the ordinary people there would have no idea, how cats look like, there would certainly be biologists and other specialists who would still know how cats look like. PutnamVs: at least for natural kinds it does not necessarily follow that it is possible for the theory to provide necessary and sufficient conditions of reference.
The theory even fails completely when it comes to extensions by an analytical definition of necessary and sufficient conditions.
---
III 60
E.g. "Super-billionaire" persons whose property is at least 100 billion Mark. It could be that there is not a single example of the triggering of such statements. Fodor could say, the characters would be triggered when the people would know about all the relevant facts. But what actually a relevant fact is, depends on the meaning of each considered word. The word is already interpreted. Omniscience is not only a non-real fact, but an impossible.
FodorVsVs: could say that his theory does not apply to words that have analytical definitions.
---
III 61
But especially Fodor's theory is anti-hermeneutic, he disputes the view that the reference of a word cannot be determined in isolation. Hermeneutics/PutnamVsFodor: according to the hermeneutic view, there can be no such thing as necessary and sufficient conditions for the reference of a word to individual x. The best we can hope for are the adequacy criteria of translation schemes. (FodorVs).
FodorVsVs: in his view, this leads to the "meaning-holism" which, in turn, results in the "meaning-nihilism" and thus the denial of the possibility of a "special science" of linguistics.
---
III 62
FodorVsVs: might reply, actually the theory should not apply to natural languages, but to his hypothetical innate thinking language "mentalese". PutnamVsFodor: definitely, Fodor's theory fails for other words: E.g. witch. Perhaps it is analytic that real witches possess magical powers and are women. But no necessary and sufficient conditions for witch. There are also good witches.
---
III 63
A witch-law (see above) would be wrong. Indeed, there are no witches that can trigger remarks.
---
III 67 ff
Cause/causality/PutnamVsFodor: uses the concept of causation very informal. ---
III 68
Putnam: the normal linguistic concept of cause is context-bound and interest-dependent. The concept of causality used by Fodor is not the relatively more context-independent concept of a contributing cause, but the context-sensitive and interest-relative concept of everyday language.
According to Fodor the presence of a cat is then a contributing cause for remarks.
---
III 69
PutnamVsFodor: now, then past behavior of past generations is (not to mention representatives of strong dialects) also a contributing factor. ---
III 70
FodorVsPutnam: that is certainly not Fodor's causality. All his examples just want to take the colloquial term as an undefined basic concept as a basis. PutnamVsFodor: the strange thing is that this is interest-relative. How do we use it, depends on what alternatives we consider for all relevants. (Intentionality).
---
III 71
Counterfactual conditionals/KoKo/Fodor: assumes, they had established truth values. PutnamVsFodor: counterfactual conditionals have no fixed truth values.
---
III 73
Possible Worlds/Putnam: we can then call "closer" worlds the ones which we believe are more relevant when it comes to determining the truth value of the conditional clause. ---
III 74
FodorVs: might reply that this physics would be given a special position compared to the specialized sciences. PutnamVsFodor: one might then reply, the laws of the special sciences are just as unproblematic as those of physics.
FodorVsVs: but that does not really work: E.g. "coffee, sugar cubes": it could mean that this piece of sugar is somehow "not normal."
---
III 78
Reductionism/PutnamVsFodor: Fodor fails in the scaling-down, because he fails to define the reference using these terms (law, counterfactual conditionals and causality). ---
III 79/80
PutnamVsFodor: from the fact that a statement does not specifically deal with something mental, it does not follow that no requirement of this statement refers to our cognitive interests. Causality/Putnam: the concept of causality has a cognitive dimension, even if it is used on inanimate objects.
---
Putnam I (k) 269
Meaning/PutnamVsFodor: actually makes the same mistake as Saussure and Derrida: that equality of meaning is, strictly speaking, only reasonable in the impossible case in which two languages or texts are isomorphic.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Fodor, J. Schiffer Vs Fodor, J. I 80
SchifferVsFodor: his theory implies that everyone is omniscient and infallible under optimal conditions. omniscient: because if any situation exists (and yourself are working perfectly) you believe it and probably know it.
infallible: because under ideal conditions nobody believes anything wrong.
Optimality condition/Optimum/Schiffer: whatever Fodor's optimality condition is, it is clear
1. that they will never be fulfilled
2. that we have no idea what they should be
3. if they are to serve the strong thesis of the language of thought, it must be shown without reference to semantic or intentional vocabulary
4. it is compliable, even though it will never be fulfilled. Otherwise (a) would incoherent. (…+…)
I 81
SchifferVsFodor: 1. his performance is not the best solution for finding naturalistic truth conditions for Mentalese. 2. Problem: reliability theory: each reliability theory for mental content must take into account that we ourselves are only reliable indicators in terms of some of our beliefs. E.g. Ralph sees a dog: Then the chances are good that he believes it is a dog. But: E.g. when Ralph Jesus sees how high are the chances that he thinks he's divine! E.g. I have exactly 11 dollars in my pocket: what are the chances that Ralph believes that?.
Truth conditions/Mentalese/SchifferVsFodor: So we must not individually proceed belief for belief!.
I 82
Reliability/truth conditions/Mentalese/SchifferVsFodor: the reliability considerations extend transversely through the systematic links that exist between the expressions in Mentalese. And again we should better look from the standpoint of thought language as a whole and not, as Fodor, for each mental representation individually.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Fodor, J. Peacocke Vs Fodor, J. I 208
Perception/Mentalese/MT/Fodor: what happens in perception, is a description of the environment in a vocabulary is not expressible, that refers to the values ​​of physical variables. E.g. "A butterfly is on the lawn" Instead, in Mentalese we shall speak of "light being the magnitude of the retina and region L".
PeacockeVsFodor/PeacockeVsMentalese: what is actually the token of Mentalese, that refers to this localization L? There seems to be nothing there.
E.g. a different retina area could supply information about a different localization, as well as the original cell.
I 209
But that leads to no difference within Mentalese! There is only a difference of the relata: one refers causally to one area of the retina, the other to another one. VsPeacocke: it could be argued that something like "foggy" ("it's foggy here") corresponds to the individual spots. "Foggy" then has no relevant syntactic structure, but when it occurs in a statement, it will refer to a specific place and time.
In fact, several central units of the nervous system must somehow receive non-indexical information from the periphery: E.g. someone who receives one hundred telegrams: "it is bright here", "it is raining here", etc. is not in a position to draw a map if he does not know where the telegrams come from.
Peacocke: but an indexical strategy cannot work for more complex contents. A given nerve cell may be neurophysiologically indistinguishable from another one, with completely different content conditions for firing.
Trivialization/Mentalese: but if these relations should count as part of the syntactic structure of a (mental) state, then the language of the mind is trivialized. There would be no true sentence analogs.
Mentalese/Perception/Fodor/Peacocke: a similar argument is about
e.g. approved detectors for lines, deep within the perceptual system: these suggest causal relations for perceptions.
But possession of a structured content does not require a corresponding physical structure in the state, but there may be in the pattern of relations in which the state stands.
Peacocke: a model that satisfies this relational paradigm, but does not require Mentalese must meet several conditions:
1) How can propositional content be ascribed without referring to syntactic structures? I.e. relatively complex contents must be attributed to syntactically unstructured (mental) ​​states.
2) It must be shown how these states interact with perception and behavior.

I 215
Computation/Language/Mentalese/PeacockeVsFodor: not even computation (calculation of behavior and perception) seems to require language: E.g. question whether the acting person should do φ.
Fodor: E.g. the actor is described as computing the anticipated benefit of φ-s under the condition C.
Peacocke: the extent to which the subject has the corresponding belief "C given that I φ" may consist in the presence of a corresponding physical state to a certain extent.
That would in turn only be a matter of pure relations!
The same applies to reaching the state "C and I φ".
The states can interact without requiring syntactic structures.
Def Computation/Peacocke: (calculation) is a question of states with content that emerge systematically from each other. This requires certain patterns of order and of causal relations, but no syntactic structure.
PeacockeVsFodor: it does not necessary apply: ​​"No representation, no computation".
I 215/216
Mentalese/Fodor: (Language of Thought, p. 199) Thesis: there can be no construction of psychology without assuming that organisms possess a proper description as instantiation (incarnation) of another formal system: "proper" requires: a) there must be a general procedure for the attribution of character formulas (assigning formulae) to states of the organism
b) for each propositional attitude there must be a causal state of the organism so that
c1) the state is interpretable as relation to a formula and
c2) it is nomologically necessary and sufficient (or contingently identical) to have these propositional attitudes.
d) Mental representations have their causal roles by virtue of their formal properties.
VsMentalese/PeacockeVsFodor: we can have all of this without Mentalese! Either:
1) There are really sentence analogues in the brain or:
2) Fodor's condition could be met otherwise: there could be a semantics that is correlated with Frege's thoughts.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Fodor, J. Pauen Vs Fodor, J. Pauen I 223
VsFodor/Pauen: unjustified preferential treatment of the computer analogy over the neural networks. It is disputed whether mental representation must always have a language-like form. Stock: Kosslyn/PomerantzVsFodor: pictorial representation.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Fodor, J. Newen Vs Fodor, J. NS I131
Language/Thinking/Newen/Schrenk: two main currents: 1) Thesis of the primacy of language: only beings gifted with language are able to think. The way of thinking is also influenced by the nature of the language: >Sapir-Whorf thesis
2) Thesis of the primacy of thought over language: Fodor, Descartes, Chisholm.
Mentalese/Language of Thoughts/Thought Language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: (Literature 9-8): Thesis: the medium of thought is a language of the mind ("language of thought"). Many empirical phenomena can only be explained with assumption of mental representations, e.g. perception-based beliefs.
NS I 132
Language/Fodor: it includes compositionality and productivity. Thinking/Fodor: Thesis: thinking is designed in a way that it has all the key properties of natural language already (from intentionality to systematicity). Thinking takes place with mental representations. E.g. gas gauge, fuel gauge, causal connection. Mental representations are realized through brain states.
Language of the Mind/Mentalese/Fodor: is as rich as a natural language, but it is a purely internal, symbolic representation that is modified only with syntactic symbol manipulation. It is completely characterizable through its character combination options (syntax).
It is only assumed to explain the dealing with propositional attitudes, it plays no role in the more fundamental mental phenomena like sensations, mental images, sensory memories.
VsFodor: a) Recourse: imminent if you want to explain the properties of natural language by assuming a different language.
NS I 133
b) the supporters of the thesis of the primacy of thinking cannot explain the normativity of thought with the help of social institutions such as the language. c) there can also be beliefs without an assignable mental representation. E.g. chess computer. They are nowadays programmed with statistical methods so that there is no fixable representation for the belief e.g. "I should take the queen out of the game early."
Representation/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: Fodor still assumes localizable, specifiable representations.
VsFodor: nowadays, neural networks are assumed.
Representation/Today/Newen/Schrenk: pre-conceptual: e.g. spatial orientation, basic cognitive skills.
- -
NS I 160
Conceptual Atomism/Fodor: E.g. "pet fish": typical pet: Dog, typical fish: trout, typical pet fish: Goldfish. I.e. no compositionality. Thesis: the availability of a concept does not depend on the fact that we have other concepts available. In other terms: Thesis: concepts have no structure. ((s) contradiction to the above: Fodor called concepts compositional.
Extension/Predicate/Fodor. Thesis: the extension is determined by which objects cause the utterance of a predicate.
VsFodor: Problem: with poor visibility it is possible to confuse a cow with a horse so that the predicates would become disjunctive: "horse or cow."
NS I 161
Solution/Fodor: the correct case is assumed as the primary case.
VsFodor:
1) the problem of co-extensional concepts. E.g. "King"/"Cardioid" - E.g. "Equilateral"/"Equiangular" (in triangles). 2) The problem of analytic intuitions: even though there is no absolute border between analytic and non-analytic sentences, we have reliable intuitions about this. E.g. the intuition that bachelors are unmarried.
FodorVsVs: does not deny that. But he claims that knowledge of such definitional relations is irrelevant for having a concept!
Concepts/Meaning/Predicate/Literature/Newen/Schrenk: more recent approaches: Margolis/Laurence. Cognitive Science.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Loar, B. Schiffer Vs Loar, B. I 274
Belief/Loar:/Schiffer (1981): ingenious theory about the thesis: belief is a relation in the public language of the ascribing, but in which the semantic properties that determine the content, are not defined in the public language, but in the Tarski-style.
I 275
Tarski-style/T-Def/Schiffer: is not of any role of (translation: prescinds from any role) that can have the expression in the communication: if "T" is defined for a language, then contains [s is T] nothing about the use of s in any population of speakers. (Tarski 1956).
I 15
Individuation/Belief/Loar/Schiffer: Loar's view makes it necessary that convictions based on interpersonal attributable functional states are individuated. ((s) So actually incompatible with Tarski). SchifferVsLoar:: (see below): which is not likely to go.
That leaves as the only way: (see above).
a) (compatible with IBS (intention based semantics): the local (topical) thesis that belief is a relation to a mental representation (in Mentalese).
That 1. the content of signs and sounds must be reduced to contents of mental states (i.e. their intentional properties that are attributed to that-propositions).
2. then the contents of mental states are reduced to semantic properties of non-public language of mental representations that realize these mental states. ((s) representations implement mental states).
Non-public language/Problem: the semantic properties of the non-public language of formulas in the inner system are contingent (!) properties! That means they require a theory that tells us what the truth conditions intends for sentences in Mentalese.
This is a difficult legacy.
Belief/Schiffer: but must be able to be explained without psychological vocabulary. (see above).
((s) representations/Schiffer/(s): must be explained in a non-public language, or the declaration itself in a public language, but as a phenomenon must be recognized that their contents are determined in a non-public language. (Non-public: E.g. attribution of truth values, but also Mentalese, content of mental states, etc.).
I 34
SchifferVsLoar/SchifferVsFolk psychology: there are not nearly enough M-restrictions in a possible folk psychology, that by definition must be accessible to everybody, E.g. the belief that New Zealand is not a dictatorship: with which "observation moderate belief" (or amounts of such) is this belief to be connected via M-restrictions?. SchifferVsFolk psychology: they can not afford the functionalist reduction.
I 45
Belief/Proposition/Loar/Schiffer: (Loar, 1981) began with propositions of belief objects, but then showed how it manages without the benefit of linguistic entities. SchifferVsLoar: 1. gives no completely general proposal. Its only meta condition is supplied from a common sense theory which is applicable only to normal adults.
I 46
Problem: it is a consequence of Loar's theory that E.g. the predicate "believes that the New Yorker publishes Ved Metha" in my idiolect is partially defined by a common sense theory, which is incorrect for the blind and therefore, as I use the predicate, the proposition "Ved Metha believes that the New Yorker publishes Ved Metha" cannot be correct, because Ved Metha is blind. 2. Loar's theory is not immune to twin-earth examples and Burges examples. (He is aware of that).

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Locke, J. Hacking Vs Locke, J. I 238
Appearance / Locke: first we have the phenomenon, then we compose mental representations and at last we search the reality. Appearance/ HackingVsLocke: the opposite is the case: 1. public representations (all mental representations are public), then we form the concept of reality as soon as the number of display systems increases, we become skeptics and shape the idea of a mere appearance.

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996
Naturalism Dummett Vs Naturalism Putnam I 148
DummettVsRepresentation/DummettVsNaturalism/Putnam: What then is the understanding of the own mental representations? The "Knowing of the truth conditions" leads to recourse or to the recognition that some characters need to be understood without the correspondence theory. If there were "thought characters" without language that we could compare directly with the uncomprehended reality, then the understanding of the characters would have to be preceded by a "grasping of the truth conditions". Absurd!

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Soames, S. Schiffer Vs Soames, S. I 217
Compositional Semantics/Comp.sem./Understanding/Explanation/Scott Soames/Schiffer: (Soames 1987) Thesis: comp.sem. is not needed for explaining the language understanding, nevertheless natural languages have a comp.sem .: Language understanding/Soames: you should not look at the semantics to explain semantic competence.
Instead one needs comp.sem you. for the explanation of the representational character of the language. The central semantic fact about language is that it is needed to represent the world.
Propositions encode systematic information that characterize the world so and so. We need comp.sem. for the analysis of the principles of this encoding.
SchifferVsSoames: Instead, I have introduced the expression potential. One might assume that a finally formulated theory should be able to formulate theorems for the attribution of expression potential to each proposition of the language. But would that then not be a compositional theory?.
I 218
E.g. Harvey: here we did not need comp.sem. to assume that for each proposition of M (internal language) there is a realization of belief, that means (µ)(∑P)(If μ is a proposition of M and in the box, then Harvey believes that P).
(s) Although here no connection between μ and P is specified).
Schiffer: Now we could find a picture of formulas of M into German, which is a translation. But that provides no finite theory which would provide a theorem for every formula μ of M as
If μ is in the box, then Harvey thinks that snow is sometimes purple.
Propositional attitude/Meaning theory/Schiffer: Problem: it is not possible to find a finite theory which ascribes verbs for belief characteristics of this type.
Pointe: yet the terms in M have meaning! E.g. "Nemrac seveileb taht emos wons si elprup" would realize the corresponding belief in Harvey and thus also mean trivially.
SchifferVsCompositionality: when the word-meaning contributs to the proposition-meaning, then it is this. Then expressions in M have meaning. But these are not characteristics that can be attributed to a finite theory.
We could find only the property to attribute to each proposition of M a particular belief, but that cannot happen in a finite theory.
mental representation/Mentalese/Schiffer: the formulas in M are mental representations. They represent external conditions. Propositions of E, Harvey's spoken speech, received their representational character via the connection with mental representations. Therefore Mentalese needs no comp.sem.
SchifferVsSoames: So he is wrong and we need the comp.sem. not even for an illustration of how our propositions represent the world.
I 219
We had already achieved this result via the expresion potentials. Because: representational character: is indistinguishable from the expression potential.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Stalnaker, R. Schiffer Vs Stalnaker, R. I 46
The second position in the logical space for the "propositionalist": (Stalnaker) represents a major divergence from functionalism: he concedes that no psychological theory will provide a definition of belief itself as E.g. x believes that some dogs have fleas. ((s) with content).
but probably of
x is a belief. ((s) without content).
1. you have to find a psychological theory, with which you can define the monadic predicate "x is a conviction".
2. define a functional property, for each composite belief property via non-functional, explicit definition of the form
(R) x believes p iff (Es)(s is a belief; x is in s; & R(s,p))
for a given specified relation R.
Stalnaker: takes up an idea of Dennis Stampe.
Stampe: (1977, unpublished) as the completion of (R )
(FG) x believes p iff x is in a belief system, that x would not have under optimal conditions, if it were not the case that p.
FG/Fuel gauge/Fuel gauge/Representation/Dretske/Terminology/Schiffer: (Dretske 1986): "Fuel gauge"-model of representation: it represents the fuel level, because it is a reliable indicator. ((s) By regularity to representation. Additional assumption: Counterfactual conditional).
I 47
Representation/Schiffer: is not only a feature of mental states! >fuel gauge example. SchifferVsStalnaker/Belief/theory: the fuel gauge model is only a first step. It implies that one has no wrong beliefs under optimal conditions. That may be.
Problem: 1. What shall these optimum conditions be then that will never be fulfilled? 2. how should they be fulfilled without the fuel gauge model becoming circular?.
"Optimal"/Condition/(s): as a condition in itself is suspicious circular: they are fulfilled when everything is ok.
(R)/belief/Schiffer: FG is only a proposal for the completion of (R). This should best determine the truth conditions in a system of mental representations.
Conclusion: if belief is a relation to propositions, and there is a non-mentalist specification of this relation, then it cannot be functionalist.
I 282
Belief content/Stalnaker: (1984): his approach refers to public language, but would be, based on Mentalese, the approach by Fodors, b) there is a ("optimum" -) Condition D - unfulfilled but fulfilled - and be specified in naturalistic vocabulary so
An M function f the truth-conditions for function x * lingua mentis M is if for every sentence s of M: D would consist, then x would believe if and only if f(s) consists).
Comparable, with "only if" rather than "if and only if". Then one is merely infallible under optimal conditions.
SchifferVsStalnaker: that is not much better.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Representation Pro Esfeld I 137
Content of belief states / Fodor: thesis: is derived from the original representational content. (Mental Representation originally). (Fodor and Lepore, 1992).

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Representation Churchland, P. Fod/Lep IV 189
Paul Churchland: it also has in mind - thesis: that a kind of representations reflect "contents" of neurological states. However, he is up to his neck in intentionality.
IV 189
Churchland: thesis: the brain represents different aspects of reality through a position in an appropriate state space.
IV 193
Thesis: what we then retain are random dimensions, depending on the taxonomy inclination of semantics. Churchland/Fodor/Lepore: starts surprisingly with feelings, not with intentionality (like propositional attitudes or terms).
Thesis: If we had adequate access to sensations, this could be generalized to a general mental representation.
Representation Esfeld, M. I 136
Representation/Cartesianism/Cartesian Tradition: three theses: 1. Semantic thesis: Beliefs and belief states represent things and events in such a way that realism is an original semantic characteristic.
2. Thesis about epistemic access to the world: access only through representation. Representation unlocks the world, they function as epistemic links between belief states and world.
I 137
(Weak representational realism) 3. Thesis about the direct object of reference of belief states: mental representations are the direct intentional object of our belief states including in particular our states of perception. Belief states then indirectly have something in the world as their object. That of which one is directly conscious is in reality a mental representation, e.g. of the tree. (Strong representational realism).
I 139
Def strong representational realism: thesis that mental representations are always the direct intentional object of our ordinary belief states. Thus the strong implies the weak representational realism.
An influential current attributes all three theses to Descartes. Also Rorty.
I 140
However, it is controversial whether Descartes represents a strong representational realism. This is rather a caricature. Explanation: the problem is only shifted, one does not explain the reference of belief states by saying that they refer directly to something mental.
I 143
Representational Realism/Esfeld: is the thesis that we have access to the world only through representations (as epistemic link).
Mentalese Field, Hartry Schiffer I 78
Meaning / Mentalese / Field: (Logic, Meaning and Conceptual Role, 1978, per SLT): Thesis: meaning of mental representation is determined by two factors:   First conceptual role (which must be inter-subjectively attributable) (SchifferVs).
  2nd truth conditions.
  Schiffer: no factor determines the other. Conceptual Role: see. below, 4.6.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Representation Fodor, J. Esfeld I 137
Content of belief states / Fodor: is derived from the original representational content. (Mental representation is the origin). (Fodor and Lepore, 1992).
F / L IV 127
Representation / Fodor / Lepore: their semantics is atomistic.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Mentalese Fodor, J. Cresswell II 55
Mentalese/Propositional Attitude/Fodor: Thesis: A belief sentence is a sentence in the speaker's thought language. CresswellVsFodor: Problem; then the original speaker and the attribution speaker must have the same sentence in mentalese in their inner system;
Newen/Schrenk I 131
Mentalese/language of thought/thought language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: (literature 9-8): Thesis: the medium of thought is a language of mind ("language of thought"). Many empirical phenomena can only be explained with the assumption of mental representations, e.g. perception-based beliefs.
I 132
Language/Fodor: it includes compositionality and productivity. Thinking/Fodor: thesis that thinking is lived in such a way that it already has all the core characteristics of natural language (from intentionality to systematicity). Thinking takes place with mental representations. For example, fuel gauge, fuel gauge, causal connection. Mental representations are realized by brain states.
I 215/216
Mentalese/Fodor: (Language of Thought, p.199) Thesis: One cannot give a construction of psychology without assuming that organisms possess a proper description as instantiation (embodiment) of another formal system: "Properly" requires: a) There must be a general procedure for assigning formulae to states of the organism.
b) For each propositional attitude there must be a causal state of the organism, so that
c1) the state can be interpreted as a relation to a formula and
c2) it is nomologically necessary and sufficient (or contingent identical) to have propositional attitudes for it.
d) Mentalese representations have their causal role by virtue of their formal characteristics.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Content Lewis, D. Schw I 161
Mental Content/Lewis: Thesis: is determined by the causal role, by the typical causes and effects. Content/DavidsonVsLewis: the content depends on the language we speak. (Davidson 1975)
Meaning/LewisVsDavidson: what the sentences of the public language mean depends on the content of our expectations, wishes and beliefs.
Schw I 171
Naturalization of Content/Representation/Schwarz: Thesis that mental representations are sentence-like to such an extent that their content can be explained compositionally. (cf. Fodor 1990).
Mentalese McGinn, C. Schiffer I 73
McGinn (1982a, 70): the inner sentences are the basic objects of interpretation. Their content gives the idea of ​​its content and thoughts transfer their contents to public language. Fodor: ((1987), "Guru of Mentalese"): (unpublished): the strategy is to take the property of the intentional mental states as inherited from the semantic properties of mental representations that are implied in their Tokening.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Conceptual Role Schiffer, St. I 93
Thesis: There is a single (clearly fixable) package of conceptual role and causal relations for reference that determines the truth condition function for each system of mental representations.
I 167
Conceptual Role/Schiffer: Thesis: Simple conceptual role instead of platonistic irreducible property e.g. "being a dog": hairy nice barking four-legged friends - accordingly one does not need primitive propositional attitudes and no belief properties.
I 187
Theory of Use/Reference/Meaning/Compositionality/Schiffer: Recent Tendency: (Putnam 1978): Thesis: We can have theories of use for language understanding (not meaning) that do not presuppose truth-theoretical semantics - the theories of understanding and reference do not have as much to do with truth as most believe. - Solution: if we start from the conceptual role (use), nothing at all is assumed of a "correspondence" of words and things.
Mentalese Schiffer, St. I 73
Mentalese/Harman: Thesis: internal representations have sentence-like structure - Lewis: Language of the brain from synaptic connections and neuronal firing - >SLT "Strong thesis of language of thoughts" = mental representation does not determine the intentionality. Belief refers to a neuronal sentence. Semantic properties of the public language are inherited from intentional properties of the mental states. Other theory: semantical properties inherited from intentional properties. (VsStrong thesis of language of thoughts) - SLTVs: short/(s): mental representation determines intentionaliy - this is explainable without public contents - SchifferVs: this is not fulfillable at all.
I 189
SLT/Strong Thesis of Language of Thought/Mentalese/Schiffer: Thesis: 1. The brain is a computer, we are information-processing systems with an inner neural code.
Schiffer: I can agree that this is a true and interesting thesis.
2. There is a computational relation R for every belief you can have so that you have that belief iff you have R for that formula.
Schiffer: I can also accept that.
...
I 190
I.e. we discover an illustration relation. This is a weak mentalese thesis. It is certainly empirical. > Then we can say carefully:
Meaning/Mentalese/Schiffer: the neuronal sentence µ "means" that snow is white. But that doesn't mean that we have a "semantics" there that should be explained in terms of the meaning of inner formulas. In particular, it does not imply that this semantics is compositional.
Two Dimensional Sem. Stalnaker, R. I 201/202
Two-Dimensional Semantics/StalnakerVsJackson/StalnakerVsChalmers: Thesis: I think this shows something about the nature of mental representation and not just about the contingent functioning of languages.
I 204
Two-dimensional Frame/Stalnaker: I will show the two ways to interpret it. a) semantic,
b) metasemantic.
Thesis: with this distinction I would like to reduce necessity a posteriori as Jackson and Chalmers have done. Thus the problem of intentionality can be solved.