Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 98 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| A priori | Lewis | IV 20 A priori/Lewis: if we take an a priori point of view, we lose our localization in possible worlds. ((s) Because a priori true statements are true in all worlds. Possible worlds do not differ in what is a priori in all worlds.) >Possible world/Lewis, >Localization, cf. >Centered world, >Identity across worlds. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Atomism | Sellars | I 33 Standard Conditions: assuming them leads out of the logical atomism. >Circumstances/Sellars. It is not enough that the conditions are appropriate, the subject must know that they are. >Conditions, >Standard conditions, >Ideal observer, >Observation, >Idealization. Circumstances: to determine them it is necessary to know something about the objects: how they are under different circumstances. --- I 34 Logical atomism: VsSellars: it could reply that Sellars 1) overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sense content. >Logical space. 2) the concepts of the sense contents have the kind of logical independence from one another which is characteristic of traditional empiricism. >Independence, >Empiricism. 3) concepts for theoretical entities such as molecules have the kind of interdependence which Sellars may have rightly attributed to the concepts of physical facts, but: the theoretical concepts have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space. >Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Unobservables. Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of a more fundamental logical space than that of the physical objects in space and time. >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Localization, >Objects. Logical atomism: statements only occur truth-functionally in statements. >Truth functions. --- I 70 Atomism/SellarsVsAtomism/SellarsVsWittgenstein: analysis does not stand for definition of terms, but for the exploration of the logical structure of discourse - which does not follow a simple pattern. >Analysis/Sellars. cf. Def truth-functional/Tugendhat: depends on other sentences, not on situations. Def truth-functional/Read: directly dependent only on the occurring concepts. --- II 314 SellarsVsWittgenstein/Paradox: to say of a particular atomic fact that it was represented by a certain elementary statement, we have to use a statement in which the elementary statement occurs, but this is not truth-functional. We have to say something like: (1) S (in L) represents aRb. >Complex, >Relation, >Atomism/Wittgenstein, >Atomism. This representation relationship cannot be expressed through a statement. Wittgenstein dito. --- II 321 If only simple non-linguistic objects could be represented, if complex objects were facts, that would lead to the well-known antinomy that there would have to be atomic facts which would be prerequisites for the fact that language can depict the world, but for which no example can be given if the speaker demands one. Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus). >Facts, >States of affairs. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Atoms | Quine | IX 7f Atomic schemas: E.g. "Fxy", "Gx" etc: can represent any number of complex statements. I 218 Atomic Facts/Quine/Cresswell: "Quine has no interest in a theory that would turn atomic facts into simple facts about our experience that are logically independent of all others. Quine: correct. See also >Atomism/Quine. XIII 12 Atom/Atoms/Quine: Worlds/Possible Worlds/Best World/Leibniz/Quine: according to Leibniz we are blessed with the "best of the worlds". But "the best" according to what criteria? He gives a hint: Def Perfection/perfect/Leibniz/Quine: wealth of purposes and economy of means. The number of components and forces with which the observed wealth of the world is attainable must be as small as possible. Science: similar procedure. Theory/Quine: is always more complicated than you want, but the scientist is committed to his/her stubborn data and does what he/she can. Leibniz/Quine: was himself a scientist, so he came up with it. Atomism/Atom/Democritus/Leukipp/Quine: also their atomism was motivated by the pursuit of economy. They limited the possible variability of the building blocks of nature. The atoms differed only in shape and size. XIII 13 Point event/four-dimensionalism/space-time points/Quine: pro: 1. because it turned out that the basic building blocks (quarks, etc.) are not as uniform as one had hoped from the atoms. 2. because there are problems identifying a particle from one moment to another (identity in time, temporal identity, elementary particles). Individuality/Particle Physics/Quine: the statistical interchangeability of particles threatens their individuality. Atom/Atomism/Quine: but which decisive move should make a theory atomistic anyway? XIII 14 Solution/Quine: Thesis: there are an infinite number of particles, but not an infinite number of types of particles. Identity/elementary particles/species/Quine: particles of the same species play an identical role within the laws of theory. Only this allows the theory to be suitable for measuring information. Def point event/Quine: are atoms whose types are the different states in which a point can be, according to prevailing physics. The atoms are the minimal space-time localizations and the species are the few things that can happen in such a place. Point/Linguistics/Atom/Quine: for linguists the point is the phoneme. Not the phonemes themselves, (their sound is individual to each speaker) but their classifiability! Def Phonem/Quine: is not a single sound, but a type of sound. They are then equivalent for all purposes in the particular language, even if they are not phonetically identical! Atoms/Speeche/Quine: Atoms fall under phonemes. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Bayesian Networks | Norvig | Norvig I 510 Bayesian Networks/belief networks/probabilistic networks/knowledge map/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Bayesian networks can represent essentially any full joint probability distribution and in many cases can do so very concisely. Norvig I 511 A Bayesian network is a directed graph in which each node is annotated with quantitative probability information. The full specification is as follows: 1. Each node corresponds to a random variable, which may be discrete or continuous. 2. A set of directed links or arrows connects pairs of nodes. If there is an arrow from node X to node Y,X is said to be a parent of Y. The graph has no directed cycles (and hence is a directed acyclic graph, or DAG. 3. Each node Xi has a conditional probability distribution P(Xi |Parents(Xi)) that quantifies the effect of the parents on the node. The topology of the network - the set of nodes and links - specifies the conditional independence relationships that hold in the domain (…). >Probability theory/Norvig, >Uncertainty/AI research. The intuitive meaning of an arrow is typically that X has a direct influence on Y, which suggests that causes should be parents of effects. Once the topology of the Bayesian network is laid out, we need only specify a conditional probability distribution for each variable, given its parents. Norvig I 512 Circumstances: The probabilities actually summarize a potentially Norvig I 513 Infinite set of circumstances. Norvig I 515 Inconsistency: If there is no redundancy, then there is no chance for inconsistency: it is impossible for the knowledge engineer or domain expert to create a Bayesian network that violates the axioms of probability. Norvig I 517 Diagnostic models: If we try to build a diagnostic model with links from symptoms to causes (…) we end up having to specify additional dependencies between otherwise independent causes (and often between separately occurring symptoms as well). Causal models: If we stick to a causal model, we end up having to specify fewer numbers, and the numbers will often be easier to come up with. In the domain of medicine, for example, it has been shown by Tversky and Kahneman (1982)(1) that expert physicians prefer to give probability judgments for causal rules rather than for diagnostic ones. Norvig I 529 Inference: because it includes inference in propositional logic as a special case, inference in Bayesian networks is NP-hard. >NP-Problems/Norvig. There is a close connection between the complexity of Bayesian network inference and the complexity of constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs). > Constraint satisfaction problems/Norvig. Clustering algirithms: Using clustering algorithms (also known as join tree algorithms), the time can be reduced to O(n). For this reason, these algorithms are widely used in commercial Bayesian network tools. The basic idea of clustering is to join individual nodes of the network to form cluster nodes in such a way that the resulting network is a polytree. Norvig I 539 (…) Bayesian networks are essentially propositional: the set of random variables is fixed and finite, and each has a fixed domain of possible values. This fact limits the applicability of Bayesian networks. If we can find a way to combine probability theory with the expressive power of first-order representations, we expect to be able to increase dramatically the range of problems that can be handled. Norvig I 540 Possible worlds/probabilities: for Bayesian networks, the possible worlds are assignments of values to variables; for the Boolean case in particular, the possible worlds are identical to those of propositional logic. For a first-order probability model, then, it seems we need the possible worlds to be those of first-order logic—that is, a set of objects with relations among them and an interpretation that maps constant symbols to objects, predicate symbols to relations, and function symbols to functions on those objects. Problem: the set of first-order models is infinite. Solution: The database semantics makes the unique names assumption—here, we adopt it for the constant symbols. It also assumes domain closure - there are no more objects than those that are named. We can then guarantee a finite set of possible worlds by making the set of objects in each world be exactly the set of constant Norvig I 541 Symbols that are used. There is no uncertainty about the mapping from symbols to objects or about the objects that exist. Relational probability models: We will call models defined in this way relational probability models, or RPMs. The name relational probability model was given by Pfeffer (2000)(2) to a slightly different representation, but the underlying ideas are the same. >Uncertainty/AI research. Norvig I 552 Judea Pearl developed the message-passing method for carrying out inference in tree networks (Pearl, 1982a)(3) and polytree networks (Kim and Pearl, 1983)(4) and explained the importance of causal rather than diagnostic probability models, in contrast to the certainty-factor systems then in vogue. The first expert system using Bayesian networks was CONVINCE (Kim, 1983)(5). Early applications in medicine included the MUNIN system for diagnosing neuromuscular disorders (Andersen et al., 1989)(6) and the PATHFINDER system for pathology (Heckerman, 1991)(7). Norvig I 553 Perhaps the most widely used Bayesian network systems have been the diagnosis and- repair modules (e.g., the PrinterWizard) in Microsoft Windows (Breese and Heckerman, 1996)(8) and the Office Assistant in Microsoft Office (Horvitz et al., 1998)(9). Another important application area is biology: Bayesian networks have been used for identifying human genes by reference to mouse genes (Zhang et al., 2003)(10), inferring cellular networks Friedman (2004)(11), and many other tasks in bioinformatics. We could go on, but instead we’ll refer you to Pourret et al. (2008)(12), a 400-page guide to applications of Bayesian networks. Ross Shachter (1986)(13), working in the influence diagram community, developed the first complete algorithm for general Bayesian networks. His method was based on goal-directed reduction of the network using posterior-preserving transformations. Pearl (1986)(14) developed a clustering algorithm for exact inference in general Bayesian networks, utilizing a conversion to a directed polytree of clusters in which message passing was used to achieve consistency over variables shared between clusters. A similar approach, developed by the statisticians David Spiegelhalter and Steffen Lauritzen (Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988)(15), is based on conversion to an undirected form of graphical model called a Markov network. This approach is implemented in the HUGIN system, an efficient and widely used tool for uncertain reasoning (Andersen et al., 1989)(6). Boutilier et al. (1996)(16) show how to exploit context-specific independence in clustering algorithms. Norvig I 604 Dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs): can be viewed as a sparse encoding of a Markov process and were first used in AI by Dean and Kanazawa (1989b)(17), Nicholson and Brady (1992)(18), and Kjaerulff (1992)(19). The last work extends the HUGIN Bayes net system to accommodate dynamic Bayesian networks. The book by Dean and Wellman (1991)(20) helped popularize DBNs and the probabilistic approach to planning and control within AI. Murphy (2002)(21) provides a thorough analysis of DBNs. Dynamic Bayesian networks have become popular for modeling a variety of complex motion processes in computer vision (Huang et al., 1994(22); Intille and Bobick, 1999)(23). Like HMMs, they have found applications in speech recognition (Zweig and Russell, 1998(24); Richardson et al., 2000(25); Stephenson et al., 2000(26); Nefian et al., 2002(27); Livescu et al., 2003(28)), Norvig I 605 genomics (Murphy and Mian, 1999(29); Perrin et al., 2003(30); Husmeier, 2003(31)) and robot localization (Theocharous et al., 2004)(32). The link between HMMs and DBNs, and between the forward–backward algorithm and Bayesian network propagation, was made explicitly by Smyth et al. (1997)(33). A further unification with Kalman filters (and other statistical models) appears in Roweis and Ghahramani (1999)(34). Procedures exist for learning the parameters (Binder et al., 1997a(35); Ghahramani, 1998(36)) and structures (Friedman et al., 1998)(37) of DBNs. 1. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1982). Causal schemata in judgements under uncertainty. In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (Eds.), Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. 2. Pfeffer, A. (2000). Probabilistic Reasoning for Complex Systems. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University 3. Pearl, J. (1982a). Reverend Bayes on inference engines: A distributed hierarchical approach. In AAAI- 82, pp. 133–136 4. Kim, J. H. and Pearl, J. (1983). A computational model for combined causal and diagnostic reasoning in inference systems. In IJCAI-83, pp. 190–193. 5. Kim, J. H. (1983). CONVINCE: A Conversational Inference Consolidation Engine. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of California at Los Angeles. 6. Andersen, S. K., Olesen, K. G., Jensen, F. V., and Jensen, F. (1989). HUGIN—A shell for building Bayesian belief universes for expert systems. In IJCAI-89, Vol. 2, pp. 1080–1085. 7. Heckerman, D. (1991). Probabilistic Similarity Networks. MIT Press. 8. Breese, J. S. and Heckerman, D. (1996). Decisiontheoretic troubleshooting: A framework for repair and experiment. In UAI-96, pp. 124–132. 9. Horvitz, E. J., Breese, J. S., Heckerman, D., and Hovel, D. (1998). The Lumiere project: Bayesian user modeling for inferring the goals and needs of software users. In UAI-98, pp. 256–265. 10. Zhang, L., Pavlovic, V., Cantor, C. R., and Kasif, S. (2003). Human-mouse gene identification by comparative evidence integration and evolutionary analysis. Genome Research, pp. 1–13. 11. Friedman, N. (2004). Inferring cellular networks using probabilistic graphical models. Science, 303(5659), 799–805. 12. Pourret, O., Naım, P., and Marcot, B. (2008). Bayesian Networks: A practical guide to applications. Wiley. 13. Shachter, R. D. (1986). Evaluating influence diagrams. Operations Research, 34, 871–882. 14. Pearl, J. (1986). Fusion, propagation, and structuring in belief networks. AIJ, 29, 241–288. 15. Lauritzen, S. and Spiegelhalter, D. J. (1988). Local computations with probabilities on graphical structures and their application to expert systems. J. Royal Statistical Society, B 50(2), 157–224. 16. Boutilier, C., Friedman, N., Goldszmidt, M., and Koller, D. (1996). Context-specific independence in Bayesian networks. In UAI-96, pp. 115–123. 17. Dean, T. and Kanazawa, K. (1989b). A model for reasoning about persistence and causation. Computational Intelligence, 5(3), 142–150. 18. Nicholson, A. and Brady, J. M. (1992). The data association problem when monitoring robot vehicles using dynamic belief networks. In ECAI-92, pp. 689–693. 19. Kjaerulff, U. (1992). A computational scheme for reasoning in dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-92, pp. 121–129. 20. Dean, T. and Wellman, M. P. (1991). Planning and Control. Morgan Kaufmann. 21. Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic Bayesian Networks: Representation, Inference and Learning. Ph.D. thesis, UC Berkeley 22. Huang, T., Koller, D., Malik, J., Ogasawara, G., Rao, B., Russell, S. J., and Weber, J. (1994). Automatic symbolic traffic scene analysis using belief networks. In AAAI-94, pp. 966–972 23. Intille, S. and Bobick, A. (1999). A framework for recognizing multi-agent action from visual evidence. In AAAI-99, pp. 518–525. 24. Zweig, G. and Russell, S. J. (1998). Speech recognition with dynamic Bayesian networks. In AAAI-98, pp. 173–180. 25. Richardson, M., Bilmes, J., and Diorio, C. (2000). Hidden-articulator Markov models: Performance improvements and robustness to noise. In ICASSP-00. 26. Stephenson, T., Bourlard, H., Bengio, S., and Morris, A. (2000). Automatic speech recognition using dynamic bayesian networks with both acoustic and articulatory features. In ICSLP-00, pp. 951-954. 27. Nefian, A., Liang, L., Pi, X., Liu, X., and Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic bayesian networks for audiovisual speech recognition. EURASIP, Journal of Applied Signal Processing, 11, 1–15. 28. Livescu, K., Glass, J., and Bilmes, J. (2003). Hidden feature modeling for speech recognition using dynamic Bayesian networks. In EUROSPEECH-2003, pp. 2529–2532 29. Murphy, K. and Mian, I. S. (1999). Modelling gene expression data using Bayesian networks. people.cs.ubc.ca/˜murphyk/Papers/ismb99.pdf. 30. Perrin, B. E., Ralaivola, L., and Mazurie, A. (2003). Gene networks inference using dynamic Bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19, II 138-II 148. 31. Husmeier, D. (2003). Sensitivity and specificity of inferring genetic regulatory interactions from microarray experiments with dynamic bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19(17), 2271-2282. 32. Theocharous, G., Murphy, K., and Kaelbling, L. P. (2004). Representing hierarchical POMDPs as DBNs for multi-scale robot localization. In ICRA-04. 33. Smyth, P., Heckerman, D., and Jordan, M. I. (1997). Probabilistic independence networks for hidden Markov probability models. Neural Computation, 9(2), 227–269. 34. Roweis, S. T. and Ghahramani, Z. (1999). A unifying review of Linear GaussianModels. Neural Computation, 11(2), 305–345. 35. Binder, J., Koller, D., Russell, S. J., and Kanazawa, K. (1997a). Adaptive probabilistic networks with hidden variables. Machine Learning, 29, 213–244. 36. Ghahramani, Z. (1998). Learning dynamic bayesian networks. In Adaptive Processing of Sequences and Data Structures, pp. 168–197. 37. Friedman, N., Murphy, K., and Russell, S. J. (1998). Learning the structure of dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-98. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Bayesian Networks | Russell | Norvig I 510 Bayesian Networks/belief networks/probabilistic networks/knowledge map/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Bayesian networks can represent essentially any full joint probability distribution and in many cases can do so very concisely. Norvig I 511 A Bayesian network is a directed graph in which each node is annotated with quantitative probability information. The full specification is as follows: 1. Each node corresponds to a random variable, which may be discrete or continuous. 2. A set of directed links or arrows connects pairs of nodes. If there is an arrow from node X to node Y,X is said to be a parent of Y. The graph has no directed cycles (and hence is a directed acyclic graph, or DAG. 3. Each node Xi has a conditional probability distribution P(Xi |Parents(Xi)) that quantifies the effect of the parents on the node. The topology of the network - the set of nodes and links - specifies the conditional independence relationships that hold in the domain (…). >Probability theory/Norvig, >Uncertainty/AI research. The intuitive meaning of an arrow is typically that X has a direct influence on Y, which suggests that causes should be parents of effects. Once the topology of the Bayesian network is laid out, we need only specify a conditional probability distribution for each variable, given its parents. Norvig I 512 Circumstances: The probabilities actually summarize a potentially Norvig I 513 Infinite set of circumstances. Norvig I 515 Inconsistency: If there is no redundancy, then there is no chance for inconsistency: it is impossible for the knowledge engineer or domain expert to create a Bayesian network that violates the axioms of probability. Norvig I 517 Diagnostic models: If we try to build a diagnostic model with links from symptoms to causes (…) we end up having to specify additional dependencies between otherwise independent causes (and often between separately occurring symptoms as well). Causal models: If we stick to a causal model, we end up having to specify fewer numbers, and the numbers will often be easier to come up with. In the domain of medicine, for example, it has been shown by Tversky and Kahneman (1982)(1) that expert physicians prefer to give probability judgments for causal rules rather than for diagnostic ones. Norvig I 529 Inference: because it includes inference in propositional logic as a special case, inference in Bayesian networks is NP-hard. >NP-Problems/Norvig. There is a close connection between the complexity of Bayesian network inference and the complexity of constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs). >Constraint satisfaction problems/Norvig. Clustering algirithms: Using clustering algorithms (also known as join tree algorithms), the time can be reduced to O(n). For this reason, these algorithms are widely used in commercial Bayesian network tools. The basic idea of clustering is to join individual nodes of the network to form cluster nodes in such a way that the resulting network is a polytree. Norvig I 539 (…) Bayesian networks are essentially propositional: the set of random variables is fixed and finite, and each has a fixed domain of possible values. This fact limits the applicability of Bayesian networks. If we can find a way to combine probability theory with the expressive power of first-order representations, we expect to be able to increase dramatically the range of problems that can be handled. Norvig I 540 Possible worlds/probabilities: for Bayesian networks, the possible worlds are assignments of values to variables; for the Boolean case in particular, the possible worlds are identical to those of propositional logic. For a first-order probability model, then, it seems we need the possible worlds to be those of first-order logic—that is, a set of objects with relations among them and an interpretation that maps constant symbols to objects, predicate symbols to relations, and function symbols to functions on those objects. Problem: the set of first-order models is infinite. Solution: The database semantics makes the unique names assumption—here, we adopt it for the constant symbols. It also assumes domain closure - there are no more objects than those that are named. We can then guarantee a finite set of possible worlds by making the set of objects in each world be exactly the set of constant Norvig I 541 Symbols that are used. There is no uncertainty about the mapping from symbols to objects or about the objects that exist. Relational probability models: We will call models defined in this way relational probability models, or RPMs. The name relational probability model was given by Pfeffer (2000)(2) to a slightly different representation, but the underlying ideas are the same. >Uncertainty/AI research. Norvig I 552 Judea Pearl developed the message-passing method for carrying out inference in tree networks (Pearl, 1982a)(3) and polytree networks (Kim and Pearl, 1983)(4) and explained the importance of causal rather than diagnostic probability models, in contrast to the certainty-factor systems then in vogue. The first expert system using Bayesian networks was CONVINCE (Kim, 1983)(5). Early applications in medicine included the MUNIN system for diagnosing neuromuscular disorders (Andersen et al., 1989)(6) and the PATHFINDER system for pathology (Heckerman, 1991)(7). Norvig I 553 Perhaps the most widely used Bayesian network systems have been the diagnosis and- repair modules (e.g., the PrinterWizard) in Microsoft Windows (Breese and Heckerman, 1996)(8) and the Office Assistant in Microsoft Office (Horvitz et al., 1998)(9). Another important application area is biology: Bayesian networks have been used for identifying human genes by reference to mouse genes (Zhang et al., 2003)(10), inferring cellular networks Friedman (2004)(11), and many other tasks in bioinformatics. We could go on, but instead we’ll refer you to Pourret et al. (2008)(12), a 400-page guide to applications of Bayesian networks. Ross Shachter (1986)(13), working in the influence diagram community, developed the first complete algorithm for general Bayesian networks. His method was based on goal-directed reduction of the network using posterior-preserving transformations. Pearl (1986)(14) developed a clustering algorithm for exact inference in general Bayesian networks, utilizing a conversion to a directed polytree of clusters in which message passing was used to achieve consistency over variables shared between clusters. A similar approach, developed by the statisticians David Spiegelhalter and Steffen Lauritzen (Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988)(15), is based on conversion to an undirected form of graphical model called a Markov network. This approach is implemented in the HUGIN system, an efficient and widely used tool for uncertain reasoning (Andersen et al., 1989)(6). Boutilier et al. (1996)(16) show how to exploit context-specific independence in clustering algorithms. Norvig I 604 Dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs): can be viewed as a sparse encoding of a Markov process and were first used in AI by Dean and Kanazawa (1989b)(17), Nicholson and Brady (1992)(18), and Kjaerulff (1992)(19). The last work extends the HUGIN Bayes net system to accommodate dynamic Bayesian networks. The book by Dean and Wellman (1991)(20) helped popularize DBNs and the probabilistic approach to planning and control within AI. Murphy (2002)(21) provides a thorough analysis of DBNs. Dynamic Bayesian networks have become popular for modeling a variety of complex motion processes in computer vision (Huang et al., 1994(22); Intille and Bobick, 1999)(23). Like HMMs, they have found applications in speech recognition (Zweig and Russell, 1998(24); Richardson et al., 2000(25); Stephenson et al., 2000(26); Nefian et al., 2002(27); Livescu et al., 2003(28)), Norvig I 605 genomics (Murphy and Mian, 1999(29); Perrin et al., 2003(30); Husmeier, 2003(31)) and robot localization (Theocharous et al., 2004)(32). The link between HMMs and DBNs, and between the forward–backward algorithm and Bayesian network propagation, was made explicitly by Smyth et al. (1997)(33). A further unification with Kalman filters (and other statistical models) appears in Roweis and Ghahramani (1999)(34). Procedures exist for learning the parameters (Binder et al., 1997a(35); Ghahramani, 1998(36)) and structures (Friedman et al., 1998)(37) of DBNs. 1. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1982). Causal schemata in judgements under uncertainty. In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (Eds.), Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. 2. Pfeffer, A. (2000). Probabilistic Reasoning for Complex Systems. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University 3. Pearl, J. (1982a). Reverend Bayes on inference engines: A distributed hierarchical approach. In AAAI- 82, pp. 133–136 4. Kim, J. H. and Pearl, J. (1983). A computational model for combined causal and diagnostic reasoning in inference systems. In IJCAI-83, pp. 190–193. 5. Kim, J. H. (1983). CONVINCE: A Conversational Inference Consolidation Engine. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of California at Los Angeles. 6. Andersen, S. K., Olesen, K. G., Jensen, F. V., and Jensen, F. (1989). HUGIN—A shell for building Bayesian belief universes for expert systems. In IJCAI-89, Vol. 2, pp. 1080–1085. 7. Heckerman, D. (1991). Probabilistic Similarity Networks. MIT Press. 8. Breese, J. S. and Heckerman, D. (1996). Decisiontheoretic troubleshooting: A framework for repair and experiment. In UAI-96, pp. 124–132. 9. Horvitz, E. J., Breese, J. S., Heckerman, D., and Hovel, D. (1998). The Lumiere project: Bayesian user modeling for inferring the goals and needs of software users. In UAI-98, pp. 256–265. 10. Zhang, L., Pavlovic, V., Cantor, C. R., and Kasif, S. (2003). Human-mouse gene identification by comparative evidence integration and evolutionary analysis. Genome Research, pp. 1–13. 11. Friedman, N. (2004). Inferring cellular networks using probabilistic graphical models. Science, 303(5659), 799–805. 12. Pourret, O., Naım, P., and Marcot, B. (2008). Bayesian Networks: A practical guide to applications. Wiley. 13. Shachter, R. D. (1986). Evaluating influence diagrams. Operations Research, 34, 871–882. 14. Pearl, J. (1986). Fusion, propagation, and structuring in belief networks. AIJ, 29, 241–288. 15. Lauritzen, S. and Spiegelhalter, D. J. (1988). Local computations with probabilities on graphical structures and their application to expert systems. J. Royal Statistical Society, B 50(2), 157–224. 16. Boutilier, C., Friedman, N., Goldszmidt, M., and Koller, D. (1996). Context-specific independence in Bayesian networks. In UAI-96, pp. 115–123. 17. Dean, T. and Kanazawa, K. (1989b). A model for reasoning about persistence and causation. Computational Intelligence, 5(3), 142–150. 18. Nicholson, A. and Brady, J. M. (1992). The data association problem when monitoring robot vehicles using dynamic belief networks. In ECAI-92, pp. 689–693. 19. Kjaerulff, U. (1992). A computational scheme for reasoning in dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-92, pp. 121–129. 20. Dean, T. and Wellman, M. P. (1991). Planning and Control. Morgan Kaufmann. 21. Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic Bayesian Networks: Representation, Inference and Learning. Ph.D. thesis, UC Berkeley 22. Huang, T., Koller, D., Malik, J., Ogasawara, G., Rao, B., Russell, S. J., and Weber, J. (1994). Automatic symbolic traffic scene analysis using belief networks. In AAAI-94, pp. 966–972 23. Intille, S. and Bobick, A. (1999). A framework for recognizing multi-agent action from visual evidence. In AAAI-99, pp. 518–525. 24. Zweig, G. and Russell, S. J. (1998). Speech recognition with dynamic Bayesian networks. In AAAI-98, pp. 173–180. 25. Richardson, M., Bilmes, J., and Diorio, C. (2000). Hidden-articulator Markov models: Performance improvements and robustness to noise. In ICASSP-00. 26. Stephenson, T., Bourlard, H., Bengio, S., and Morris, A. (2000). Automatic speech recognition using dynamic bayesian networks with both acoustic and articulatory features. In ICSLP-00, pp. 951-954. 27. Nefian, A., Liang, L., Pi, X., Liu, X., and Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic bayesian networks for audiovisual speech recognition. EURASIP, Journal of Applied Signal Processing, 11, 1–15. 28. Livescu, K., Glass, J., and Bilmes, J. (2003). Hidden feature modeling for speech recognition using dynamic Bayesian networks. In EUROSPEECH-2003, pp. 2529–2532 29. Murphy, K. and Mian, I. S. (1999). Modelling gene expression data using Bayesian networks. people.cs.ubc.ca/˜murphyk/Papers/ismb99.pdf. 30. Perrin, B. E., Ralaivola, L., and Mazurie, A. (2003). Gene networks inference using dynamic Bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19, II 138-II 148. 31. Husmeier, D. (2003). Sensitivity and specificity of inferring genetic regulatory interactions from microarray experiments with dynamic bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19(17), 2271-2282. 32. Theocharous, G., Murphy, K., and Kaelbling, L. P. (2004). Representing hierarchical POMDPs as DBNs for multi-scale robot localization. In ICRA-04. 33. Smyth, P., Heckerman, D., and Jordan, M. I. (1997). Probabilistic independence networks for hidden Markov probability models. Neural Computation, 9(2), 227–269. 34. Roweis, S. T. and Ghahramani, Z. (1999). A unifying review of Linear GaussianModels. Neural Computation, 11(2), 305–345. 35. Binder, J., Koller, D., Russell, S. J., and Kanazawa, K. (1997a). Adaptive probabilistic networks with hidden variables. Machine Learning, 29, 213–244. 36. Ghahramani, Z. (1998). Learning dynamic bayesian networks. In Adaptive Processing of Sequences and Data Structures, pp. 168–197. 37. Friedman, N., Murphy, K., and Russell, S. J. (1998). Learning the structure of dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-98. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Brains in a Vat | Evans | Frank I, 554f Brains in a vat/Evans: there are no truth-makers in ths case If the subject learns the truth, it would have to consider "nowhere". It is meaningless to identify themselves: "I am a brain" - body and localization crucial. Different: brain transplant: there is a history here: the brain would be experienced as "somewhere". ((s) Cf. >Identity/Parfit.) |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Centered Worlds | Chalmers | I 133 Centered World/Indexicality/Chalmers: if a centered world is once determined, i.e. if the localization of the center (e.g., I) is established, then a primary intension (e.g., water and H2O) provides a perfect non-indexical property. Cf. >Identity across worlds, >Identification, >Indexicality, >Intensions/Chalmers, >Terminology/Chalmers. Concepts: now one could assume that the term zombie would simply not be used in a zombie-centered world. >Zombies. ChalmersVs: the situation is more complicated: primary intensions do not require the presence of the original concept. This suggests that a posteriori necessity is not necessary for my arguments with regard to consciousness. >Necessity a posteriori. Intensions: the falling apart of primary and secondary intensions causes an uncertainty with regard to water: something watery does not have to be H2O. But that does not apply to consciousness. If something feels like a conscious experience, then it is conscious experience, no matter in which world. >Consciousness/Chalmers. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Change | AI Research | Norvig I 566 Change/probability/time/inference/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Agents in partially observable environments must be able to keep track of the current state, to the extent that their sensors allow. (…) an agent maintains a belief state that represents which states of the world are currently possible. >Belief states/Norvig. From the belief state and a transition model, the agent can predict how the world might evolve in the next time step. From the percepts observed and a sensor model, the agent can update the belief state. [There are two ways of representing belief states] (…) a) by explicitly enumerated sets of states, b) by logical formulas. Those approaches defined belief states in terms of which world states were possible, but could say nothing about which states were likely or unlikely. Problem: a changing world is modeled using a variable for each aspect of the world state at each point in time. The transition and sensor models may be uncertain: the transition model describes the probability distribution of the variables at time t, given the state of the world at past times, while the sensor model describes the probability of each percept at time t, given the current state of the world. Solution: three specific kinds of models: hidden Markov models, Kalman filters, and dynamic Bayesian networks (which include hidden Markov models and Kalman filters as special cases). Norvig I 567 To assess the current state from the history of evidence and to predict the outcomes of treatment actions, we must model these changes. We view the world as a series of snapshots, or time slices, each of which contains a set of random variables, some observable and some not. ((s) Cf. >Four dimensionalism/Philosophical theories). Norvig I 568 (…) the next step is to specify how the world evolves (the transition model) and how the evidence variables get their values (the sensor model). Norvig I 570 Order: increasing the order can always be reformulated as an increase in the set of state variables, keeping the order fixed. Notice that adding state variables might improve the system’s predictive power but also increases the prediction requirements (…). Norvig I 603 Problem: data association: When trying to keep track of many objects, uncertainty arises as to which observations belong to which objects—the data association problem. The number of association hypotheses is typically intractably large, but MCMC and particle filtering algorithms for data association work well in practice. Norvig I 602 MCMC: An MCMC algorithm explores the space of assignment histories. Norvig I 603 Change: The changing state of the world is handled by using a set of random variables to represent the state at each point in time. Representations: can be designed to satisfy the Markov property, so that the future is independent of the past given the present. Combined with the assumption that the process is stationary—that is, the dynamics do not change over time—this greatly simplifies the representation. Probability: A temporal probability model can be thought of as containing a transition model describing the state evolution and a sensor model describing the observation process. >Inference/AI research. Historical development: Many of the basic ideas for estimating the state of dynamical systems came from the mathematician C. F. Gauss (1809)(1), who formulated a deterministic least-squares algorithm for the problem of estimating orbits from astronomical observations. A. A. Markov (1913)(2) developed what was later called the Markov assumption in his analysis of stochastic processes; Norvig I 604 (…). The general theory of Markov chains and their mixing times is covered by Levin et al. (2008)(3). Significant classified work on filtering was done during World War II by Wiener (1942)(4) for continuous-time processes and by Kolmogorov (1941)(5) for discrete-time processes. Although this work led to important technological developments over the next 20 years, its use of a frequency-domain representation made many calculations quite cumbersome. Direct state-space modeling of the stochastic process turned out to be simpler, as shown by Peter Swerling (1959)(6) and Rudolf Kalman (1960)(7). The hidden Markov model and associated algorithms for inference and learning, including the forward–backward algorithm, were developed by Baum and Petrie (1966)(8). The Viterbi algorithm first appeared in (Viterbi, 1967)(9). Similar ideas also appeared independently in the Kalman filtering community (Rauch et al., 1965)(10). The forward–backward algorithm was one of the main precursors of the general formulation of the EM algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977)(11) (…). Dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs) can be viewed as a sparse encoding of a Markov process and were first used in AI by Dean and Kanazawa (1989b)(12), Nicholson and Brady (1992)(13), and Kjaerulff (1992)(14). The last work extends the HUGIN Bayes net system to accommodate dynamic Bayesian networks. The book by Dean and Wellman (1991)(15) helped popularize DBNs and the probabilistic approach to planning and control within AI. Murphy (2002)(16) provides a thorough analysis of DBNs. Dynamic Bayesian networks have become popular for modeling a variety of complex motion processes in computer vision (Huang et al., 1994(17); Intille and Bobick, 1999)(18). Like HMMs, they have found applications in speech recognition (Zweig and Russell, 1998(19)); Richardson et al., 2000(20); Stephenson et al., 2000(21); Nefian et al., 2002(22); Livescu et al., 2003(23)), Norvig I 605 genomics (Murphy and Mian, 1999(24); Perrin et al., 2003(25); Husmeier, 2003(26)) and robot localization (Theocharous et al., 2004)(27). The link between HMMs and DBNs, and between the forward–backward algorithm and Bayesian network propagation, was made explicitly by Smyth et al. (1997)(28). A further unification with Kalman filters (and other statistical models) appears in Roweis and Ghahramani (1999)(29). Procedures exist for learning the parameters (Binder et al., 1997a(30); Ghahramani, 1998)(31) and structures (Friedman et al., 1998)(32) of DBNs. Norvig I 606 Data association: Data association for multi target tracking was first described in a probabilistic setting by Sittler (1964)(33). The first practical algorithm for large-scale problems was the “multiple hypothesis tracker” or MHT algorithm (Reid, 1979)(34). Many important papers are collected by Bar-Shalom and Fortmann (1988)(35) and Bar-Shalom (1992)(36). The development of an MCMC algorithm for data association is due to Pasula et al. (1999)(37), who applied it to traffic surveillance problems. Oh et al. (2009)(38) provide a formal analysis and extensive experimental comparisons to other methods. Schulz et al. (2003)(39) describe a data association method based on particle filtering. Ingemar Cox analyzed the complexity of data association (Cox, 1993(40); Cox and Hingorani, 1994(41)) and brought the topic to the attention of the vision community. He also noted the applicability of the polynomial-time Hungarian algorithm to the problem of finding most-likely assignments, which had long been considered an intractable problem in the tracking community. The algorithm itself was published by Kuhn (1955)(42), based on translations of papers published in 1931 by two Hungarian mathematicians, Dénes König and Jenö Egerváry. The basic theorem had been derived previously, however, in an unpublished Latin manuscript by the famous Prussian mathematician Carl Gustav Jacobi (1804–1851). 1. Gauss, C. F. (1829). Beiträge zur Theorie der algebraischen Gleichungen. Collected in Werke, Vol. 3, pages 71–102. K. Gesellschaft Wissenschaft, Göttingen, Germany, 1876. 2. Markov, A. A. (1913). An example of statistical investigation in the text of “Eugene Onegin” illustrating coupling of “tests” in chains. Proc. Academy of Sciences of St. Petersburg, 7. 3. Levin, D. A., Peres, Y., and Wilmer, E. L. (2008). Markov Chains and Mixing Times. American Mathematical Society. 4. Wiener, N. (1942). The extrapolation, interpolation, and smoothing of stationary time series. Osrd 370, Report to the Services 19, Research Project DIC-6037, MIT. 5. Kolmogorov, A. N. (1941). Interpolation und Extrapolation von stationären zufälligen Folgen. Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Ser. Math. 5, 3–14. 6. Swerling, P. (1959). First order error propagation in a stagewise smoothing procedure for satellite observations. J. Astronautical Sciences, 6, 46–52. 7. Kalman, R. (1960). A new approach to linear filtering and prediction problems. J. Basic Engineering, 82, 35–46. 8. Baum, L. E. and Petrie, T. (1966). Statistical inference for probabilistic functions of finite state Markov chains. Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 41. 9. Viterbi, A. J. (1967). Error bounds for convolutional codes and an asymptotically optimum decoding algorithm. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 13(2), 260–269. 10. Rauch, H. E., Tung, F., and Striebel, C. T. (1965). Maximum likelihood estimates of linear dynamic systems. AIAA Journal, 3(8), 1445–1450. 11. Dempster, A. P., Laird, N., and Rubin, D. (1977). Maximum likelihood from incomplete data via the EM algorithm. J. Royal Statistical Society, 39 (Series B), 1–38. 12. Dean, T. and Kanazawa, K. (1989b). A model for reasoning about persistence and causation. Computational Intelligence, 5(3), 142–150. 13. Nicholson, A. and Brady, J. M. (1992). The data association problem when monitoring robot vehicles using dynamic belief networks. In ECAI-92, pp. 689–693. 14. Kjaerulff, U. (1992). A computational scheme for reasoning in dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-92, pp. 121–129. 15. Dean, T. and Wellman, M. P. (1991). Planning and Control. Morgan Kaufmann. 16. Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic Bayesian Networks: Representation, Inference and Learning. Ph.D. thesis, UC Berkeley 17. Huang, T., Koller, D., Malik, J., Ogasawara, G., Rao, B., Russell, S. J., and Weber, J. (1994). Automatic symbolic traffic scene analysis using belief networks. In AAAI-94, pp. 966–972 18. Intille, S. and Bobick, A. (1999). A framework for recognizing multi-agent action from visual evidence. In AAAI-99, pp. 518-525. 19. Zweig, G. and Russell, S. J. (1998). Speech recognition with dynamic Bayesian networks. In AAAI-98, pp. 173–180. 20. Richardson, M., Bilmes, J., and Diorio, C. (2000). Hidden-articulator Markov models: Performance improvements and robustness to noise. In ICASSP-00. 21. Stephenson, T., Bourlard, H., Bengio, S., and Morris, A. (2000). Automatic speech recognition using dynamic bayesian networks with both acoustic and articulatory features. In ICSLP-00, pp. 951-954. 22. Nefian, A., Liang, L., Pi, X., Liu, X., and Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic bayesian networks for audiovisual speech recognition. EURASIP, Journal of Applied Signal Processing, 11, 1–15. 23. Livescu, K., Glass, J., and Bilmes, J. (2003). Hidden feature modeling for speech recognition using dynamic Bayesian networks. In EUROSPEECH-2003, pp. 2529-2532 24. Murphy, K. and Mian, I. S. (1999). Modelling gene expression data using Bayesian networks. people.cs.ubc.ca/˜murphyk/Papers/ismb99.pdf. 25. Perrin, B. E., Ralaivola, L., and Mazurie, A. (2003). Gene networks inference using dynamic Bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19, II 138-II 148. 26. Husmeier, D. (2003). Sensitivity and specificity of inferring genetic regulatory interactions from microarray experiments with dynamic bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19(17), 2271-2282. 27. Theocharous, G., Murphy, K., and Kaelbling, L. P. (2004). Representing hierarchical POMDPs as DBNs for multi-scale robot localization. In ICRA-04. 28. Smyth, P., Heckerman, D., and Jordan, M. I. (1997). Probabilistic independence networks for hidden Markov probability models. Neural Computation, 9(2), 227-269. 29. Roweis, S. T. and Ghahramani, Z. (1999). A unifying review of Linear GaussianModels. Neural Computation, 11(2), 305-345. 30. Binder, J., Koller, D., Russell, S. J., and Kanazawa, K. (1997a). Adaptive probabilistic networks with hidden variables. Machine Learning, 29, 213-244. 31. Ghahramani, Z. (1998). Learning dynamic bayesian networks. In Adaptive Processing of Sequences and Data Structures, pp. 168–197. 32. Friedman, N., Murphy, K., and Russell, S. J. (1998). Learning the structure of dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-98. 33. Sittler, R. W. (1964). An optimal data association problem in surveillance theory. IEEE Transactions on Military Electronics, 8(2), 125-139. 34. Reid, D. B. (1979). An algorithm for tracking multiple targets. IEEE Trans. Automatic Control, 24(6), 843–854. 35. Bar-Shalom, Y. and Fortmann, T. E. (1988). Tracking and Data Association. Academic Press. 36. Bar-Shalom, Y. (Ed.). (1992). Multi target multi sensor tracking: Advanced applications. Artech House. 37. Pasula, H., Russell, S. J., Ostland, M., and Ritov, Y. (1999). Tracking many objects with many sensors. In IJCAI-99. 38. Oh, S., Russell, S. J., and Sastry, S. (2009). Markov chain Monte Carlo data association for multi-target tracking. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 54(3), 481-497. 39. Schulz, D., Burgard, W., Fox, D., and Cremers, A. B. (2003). People tracking with mobile robots using sample-based joint probabilistic data association filters. Int. J. Robotics Research, 22(2), 99-116 40. Cox, I. (1993). A review of statistical data association techniques for motion correspondence. IJCV, 10, 53–66. 41 Cox, I. and Hingorani, S. L. (1994). An efficient implementation and evaluation of Reid’s multiple hypothesis tracking algorithm for visual tracking. In ICPR-94, Vol. 1, pp. 437-442. 42. Kuhn, H. W. (1955). The Hungarian method for the assignment problem. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 2, 83-97. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Colour | Sellars | I 41 Epistemology/Color/Sellars: Traditional thesis: the expression "red" is released from the connections with the category of physical objects. SellarsVs. Tradition: E.g. we do not see the back. - E.g. a two-dimensional surface as a color carrier is not an object. >Aspects, >Perspective, >Objects, >Sense data. Colors/Sellars: The basic grammar of the attribute red is: the physical object x is red at location s and time t. However, the red color does not owe its redness in turn to a component that is red. You cannot find the place of the objects by analyzing the discourse of perception, just as entities in four-dimensional space are not due to the analysis of what we mean. >Meaning(Intending), >Colour words, >Language use, >Language game. I 42/43 Red color is not an extra component of an object - color cannot be gained from the analysis of the speech (as a component). Places in space cannot be found through analysis of what we mean. >Spatial order, >Spatial localization, >Reality, >World/thinking. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Communication | Frith | I 208 Definition "supported communication"/Frith: people with severe disability can communicate through an assistant. In tests, it can be found that it is the moderator who answers the questions. Until this is pointed out, he does not know this! Originator: the moderator is deceived about the origin. >Authorship. I 225 Communication/Frith: communication is more than just speaking. Representation/Frith: the representation that I have of a tree was developed by my brain. Through a series of assumptions and predictions. >Representation, >Localization, >Spatial localization. Communication: when I try to tell you something I have my idea in mind and my model of your idea. I can compare both directly. Control: I know I did not mediate my idea successfully when my prediction of what you are going to do next was wrong. More precisely, I can even look at the type of error: where exactly are the differences between my idea and my model of your idea? I 250 Communication/Frith: in communication you should always examine two brains at the same time. >Brain, >Brain states, >Brain/Frith. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Communication | Gärdenfors | I 17 Communication/Gärdenfors: human communication requires that one understands not only the meaning of the signs, but also understands that a sign can be used communicatively. (Communicative sign function). I 18 Communicative sign function/Gärdenfors: implies that the sign has the same meaning for transmitter and receiver. I 94 Communication/Levels/Gärdenfors: Level 0: Practice: Interaction without intentional communication. Level 1: Instruction: Coordination is produced by instruction. Level 2: Coordination of inner worlds: People inform each other mutually. Level 3: Coordination of meanings: people negotiate the meaning of expressions and other signals. I 97 Coordination/Gärdenfors: two main types: a) consensus about meanings, but not in the knowledge of facts of the world. For example, two people identify their localizations on a map. b) Adapting the understanding of meanings to be able to return to an earlier level of coordination. E.g. Coordination by updating the map. >Fixed point/Gärdenfors, Communication/Gärdenfors. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Content | Peacocke | I 144 Content/Peacocke: evidence-based approach: about constitutive role: "The person with these conscious states" = I. >Belief content, >Thought, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Constitutive role, >Roles, >Conceptual role, >Empirical content, >I, Ego, Self, >I think, >cogito, >Thinking, >Person. I 187 Description/Thought Content/Peacocke: Triple from way of givenness, object, point in time: no solution: a thought component could remain the same, while the object changes. >Descriptions, >Localization, >Identification, >Individuation, >Way of givenness. As with descriptive thoughts: it is possible that the content remains the same, while the "reference" changes. >Reference, cf. >Demonstratives, >Index Words, >Indexicality, >Objects of Belief, >Objects of Thought. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Correctness | Tugendhat | I 430 Correct/True/Truth/Correctness/Reference/Tugendhat: a speech event is only called a right (correct), when another one is called correct. - Then it has the sense of "true" - that constitutes the reference to objects. >Reference, >Truth. I 441 Correctness/Language/Tugendhat: E.g. signal language of animals or humans, rules causal or conventional, then the use is considered "right" - then classification expressions = quasi-predicates (only in presence of the object). >Predicates/Tugendhat, >Terminology/Tugendhat, >Animals, cf. >Animal language. I 442 Regardless of the situation: when the perceptual situation is specified by spatio-temporal localization and is thus objectified. I 444 If the observer speaks a situation-independent language, he can respond to a situation-dependent language (e.g. of measuring instruments) with the attribution of truth/falsehood. >Observation language, >Objectivity. I 445 Truth: if the speaker only has quasi-predicates, he would have to be able to distinguish between regulatory compliance and situation conformity - then correcting errors about verification rules. I 446 But by definition not if only quasi-predicate available - Solution: singular term, then constancy of an identifiable. I 519 "right"/Tugendhat: is a basic concept. >Basic concepts. I 448 Truth/Correctness/Tugendhat: the false use of a term (lie) presupposes that it is used in a rule-compliant way. >Truth. Therefore it is necessary to separate correctness and truth. - It must be possible to refer to other situations with singular terms and quantifiers. >Singular terms, >Quantifiers. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Covering Laws | Hempel | Wright I 23 Covering Laws/Hempel/von Wright, G. H.: the name for this approach by Hempel comes from a critic of this theory: William Dray(1). I 24 Subsumption theory/terminology/von Wright, G. H.: I choose this expression instead of the term of Hempel's Covering Law theory. There are two options: a) deductive-nomological: in this variant, all subsequent events logically follow from the existence of a situation and from laws. I 25 b) inductive-probabilistic: here there is a general law, the "bridge" or the "ribbon", which links the basis of the explanation to the subject matter. This is a probability hypothesis according to which, if events E1... Em (the base) are given, it is very likely that event E will take place(2). G. H. von WrightVsHempel: in what sense - if at all in one - can one speak of explanation? I 155 Hempel's terminology fluctuated. He called non-eductive explanations alternately inductive, statistical, probabilistic and inductive-statistical explanations. >Terminology/Hempel. I 156 von Wright, G. H.: The arguments of Scriven and Dray are related to my criticism of the scheme, Sriven uses the successful wording that Hempel's approach "gives the individual case away". Scriven: an event can move freely within a network of statistical laws, but is located within the "normic network" and explained by this localization(3)(4). I 26 Wright: the two schemes differ more than expected. WrightVsHempel: one should not speak of an explanation for the inductive-probabilistic model, but rather of the fact that certain expectations are justified. I 28 Wright: a test on the Covering Law approach would be to ask whether the law scheme of the explanation also covers teleological explanations. Teleology/von Wright, G. H.: there are two sections: a) the field of the term function, goal (purposefulness) and "organic wholeness" ("systems"). b) purposefulness and intentionality. See also >Feedback/von Wright, G. H., >Teleology. 1. W. Dray: Laws and Explanation in History, 1957, p. 1. 2. C. G. Hempel: Aspects of Scientific Explanation, in: "Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science", New York 1965. 3. M. Scriven: Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation, in: P. Gardiner (Ed.), 1959, p. 467. 4. W. Dray: The Historical Explanation of Actions Reconsidered, 1963. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Cross World Identity | Quine | II 158f The identification between possible worlds depends on the predicates. For bodies the identification also depends on space location, composition etc. Therefore it is not a "cross world". "The same object" is meaningless. We need singular terms instead of predicates. II 149 Possible World/Quine: a possible world is a vivid way, to assert an essentialist philosophy. In order to identify the subject in a world, essential properties are needed. >Possible World/Quine. Hintikka I 137 QuineVsModal Logic: there is the problem of Cross Word Identification. Cross World Identification/Quine/(s): Problem of identity conditions. If there are no identity conditions, there is no point in asking whether an individual is "the same as" one in another possible world. HintikkaVsQuine: my modified approach goes beyond the scope of Quine's criticism. World lines/Hintikka: are fixed by us, not by God. Yet they are not arbitrary. Their limitations are given by continuity of space and time, memory, localization, etc. I 138 It may even be that our presuppositions turn out to be wrong. Therefore, there can be no set of world lines covering all possible worlds that we need in the Alethic modal logic. Modal Logic/Quantification/Quine/Hintikka: a realistic interpretation of the quantified Alethic Modal Logic is impossible. But for reasons deeper than Quine assumed. Cross World Identification/HintikkaVsQuine: cross world identification is not intrinsically impossible. Quine/Hintikka: has recently even acknowledged this with restrictions. Solution/Hintikka: to see Cross World Identification as re-identification. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| de dicto | Lewis | IV 144 Knowledge de dicto/Lewis: E.g. encyclopedia - aimed at the world and provides knowledge about the world, not on the reader (de se) E.g. Lingens with memory loss finds himself in the library - (> tour guide example, Lost wanderers) - provides localization in logical space but not in space-time - but you can close the gap - E.g. map: will only be useful when the red dot "you are here" is removed. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| de re | Perry | Frank I 412 f de re/trivial theory: de re is usually explained by de dicto. >de dicto, >Explanations. Frank I 414 Localization/localizing opinions/re/erry: it's not surprising that de re doesn't help with localization: De re-propositions do not remain indexical. >Localization, >Propositions, >Indexicality, >Index words. Propositions that are partly individuated by objects remain just as insensitive to the essence of localizing opinions as those that are entirely individuated by concepts. >Individuation, >Terms, >Objects. The decisive change in my situation is concealed: I notice that the untidy customer was not only for the customer with the torn package, but for me. ((s) Two different descriptions without "I" are not sufficient). >Sugar trail example, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. John Perry (1979): The Problem of the Essential Indexicals, in : Nous 13 (1979), 3-21 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| de se | Lewis | Frank I 16ff Definition de se/Lewis: the self-attribution of individuating properties occurs with a belief de se (of oneself) - this cannot be analyzed as a belief de dicto - but vice versa: Belief de dicto and de re can be analyzed as a belief de se - narrower sense: self-attribution of properties that locate the individual in space and time - Castaneda: indexical references are not reducible to each other - VsLewis: therefore, apart from the belief de se, we actually also need a "de te", "de nunc", "de ibi" etc. >de dicto, >de re, >Attribution, >Self-ascription. --- Lewis IV ~ 121 Attitudes de se/Lewis: the attitudes that you irreducibly have about yourself are not propositional - but they can also be expressed by sentences - but they are not propositions - e.g. one considers oneself a fool - then you express more a property than a proposition. >Property/Lewis, >Proposition/Lewis. IV 145 De se/Wish/Lewis: objects of wishes are often properties, not propositions - must not be shared by all the inhabitants of the same world - Proposition/Lewis/(s) is true or not true in a possible world - then it applies to all, not in relation to certain persons. IV 145/146 De se/Lewis: certain role (localization in a certain way) in possible world e.g. being the "winner" oneself (equivalent to property) - de dicto: only wish for world with winners and losers (equivalent to proposition) - E.g. Two omniscient gods: the two do not differ with respect to any proposition - when it comes to sitting on the highest mountain and throwing Manna they can do it or leave it. >Two omniscient Gods. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Demonstratives | Peacocke | I 126 Place/location/Self/Peacocke: the demonstrative [this T place] does not reflect the sense of "here" in English. >Sense, >Index Words, >Indexicality, >Here, >Now. E.g. you can ask "What’s going on here" without perceiving something in a certain place. >Spatial localization, >Reference, >Thinking, >Object of thought, >Belief content. That is not analog with [self]: - E.g. it may well make sense to say: "[this T place] is not here". - E.g. Dennett is in Oklahoma, while his brain is in Houston. >Self, >Self identification, >He/he himself. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Designation | Designation: ascription of a character to an object that allows the localization within an order, as opposed to naming. See also denotation, individuation, identification, specification. |
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| Each/All/Every | Hintikka | II 40 Everyone/all/none/ontology/existence/non-existence/Hintikka: if we allow that the domain of our quantifiers is also extended to non-existent objects, the most urgent question is: Where are these non-existent objects? E.g. everyone's lover - e.g. no one's lover. Both are obviously possible. But unlike Meinong's round square. E.g. "the envy of all" - e.g. "the one who is envied by everyone". N.B.: both are incompatible. The former must love the latter, but the latter cannot be loved by the first. Everyone/all/nobody/Hintikka: it is not a solution here to claim that "everyone" or "nobody" is only possible with existent objects. ((s) That is, we must allow here non-existent or possible objects (possibilia).) Meinong/Hintikka: Meinong gains the power of his arguments from the fact that we have to allow non-existent objects here. (Also see Non-Existence/Terence Parsons). Non-existence/non-existent objects/localization/possible worlds/Hintikka: thesis: any non-existent object is in its own world. II 106 Quantification/quantifier/ambiguity/any/HintikkaVsMontague: on the whole, the Montague semantics shows how ambiguity arises through the interplay of quantifiers and intensional expressions. E.g. (12) A woman loves every man. (13) John is looking for a dog. HintikkaVsMontague: Montague explains only why certain expressions can be ambiguous, but not which ones they actually are. He generally predicts too many ambiguities. For he is not concerned with the grammatical principles, which often resolve ambiguities with quantifiers. Domain/Hintikka: the domain determines the logical order. Quantifier/quantification/every/he/Montague/Hintikka: e.g. (14) If he makes an effort, he will be happy. (15) If everyone makes an effort, he will be happy. Problem: in English, "if" has precedence with respect to "everyone" so that "everyone" in (15) can not precede the "he" as a pronoun ("pronominalize"). II 107 HintikkaVsMontague: so we need additional rules for the order of application of the rules. >Universal Quantification, >Existential quantification, >Domain, >Individuation, >Identification, >Reference. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Epistemology | Chalmers | I 73 Epistemology/Chalmers: For example, suppose there is a possible world that is physically indistinguishable from our actual world, but biologically distinguishable - would that raise radical epistemological problems? >Possible worlds, >Indistinguishability, >Comparisons, >Twin earth. I 74 How would we know then that we were not in the other world instead of our own? The other world might look the same, but be physically different. No investigation, however precise, could ascertain this. >Knowledge, >Causal theory of knowledge, >Consciousness, >Localization. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Equivalence | Stalnaker | I 84 Def Equivalence/localization/logical space/Stalnaker: to say that i is equivalent to j, is to say that the localization functions represent i and j in the same world. >Localization, >Equivalence, >Possible worlds, >Logical space. Def Intrinsic Property: an intrinsic property is the region in logical space that is invariant with respect to this equivalence relation. Contrast: in contrast to this stands the conventional property. >Intrinsicness, >Conventions. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Events | Gärdenfors | I 65 Event/Semantic Domain/Language Acquisition/Semantics/Gärdenfors: Thesis: I am modeling events with two vectors: a force vector, which typically represents an action, and a result vector that describes a change of a physical movement or an object. --- I 159 Events/Gärdenfors: there are principally three different approaches: (i) Metaphysical analyzes describing the ontology of events (ii) Cognitive models that represent how humans (or animals) represent events mentally. See Langacker (1987, sec. 3.3)(1), Givón (2001)(2), Croft & Wood (2000) (3), Langacker, (2008, chap. 3) (4); Croft, (2012a, sec. 1.4)(5). --- I 160 (iii) Linguistic studies describing the expressions with which events are constructed. E.g. [[ACT ‹Manner› ] CAUSE [BECOME (Y ‹BROKEN› ]]]. Vectors/event/Gärdenfors: with vectors we can represent changes of objects and distinguish events from their linguistic expressions: Definition State/Gärdenfors: is a set of points in a conceptual space. Definition Change/Gärdenfors: a change of a state is represented by a vector. Definition Path/Gärdenfors: is a continuous sequence of changes. (That is, there are no jumps). --- I 161 Vectors: not all belong to the acting ones: e.g. opposing forces. Acting/Agent: is not necessarily part of the event. Gärdenfors: this is about mental representation, not about a scientific representation of what is happening in an event, e.g. physically. --- I 162 Vectors: an event contains at least two vectors and one object. 1. Result vector: represents the change, 2. Force vector: causes the change. --- I 164 Event/intransitive/Gärdenfors: Problem: in intransitive constructions (e.g. "Susanna goes") the acting and the changed object (patiens) are identical. Then the conceptual space of the agent and of the object (patiens) coincide. --- I 165 Partial events/decomposition/parts/Gärdenfors: two ways can be selected when dividing into sub-events: 1. Events can be divided as simultaneously occurring or parallel partial events in the dimensions of the object space (patient space). 2. They can be represented successively by parts of paths. Agent/Patient/semantic roles/Gärdenfors: both can be represented as points in the category space. The domains of the space then define the properties of both. --- I 166 Patient/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: can be animated or inanimated, concrete or abstract. It has its own patient space with domains for properties. In contrast to the object categories, the properties usually contain the localization. Agent: has accordingly its agent space, which has at least one force domain. Dowty (1991): presents prototypical agents and prototypic patients. It is also about volitional involvement in an event.(6) --- I 171 Event/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: there are three approaches for dealing with events in linguistics: 1. Localist Approach: (Jackendoff, 1976, 1983, 1990)(7)(8)(9): Thesis: all verbs can be constructed as verbs of movement and localization. GärdenforsVsJackendoff: in his approach... --- I 172 ...force vectors cannot be represented appropriately. 2. Approach on aspects: (e.g. Vendler, 1957)(10): distinguishes between states, activities, achievements and accomplishments. See also Jackendoff, 1991, sec. 8.3; Levin & Rappaport Hovav, 2005, p. 90). --- I 174 3. Causal Approach: e.g. Croft (2012a, 2012b)(13)(14) three-dimensional representation of causal and aspectual structures of events. Gärdenfors: that comes closest to my own approach. A geometric model is designed here. --- I 175 The vectors in such models are not in a vacuum, but are always in relation to a domain and its information, e.g. temperature. GärdenforsVsCroft: his approach does not support force vectors. 1. Langacker, R. W. (1987). Foundations of cognitive grammar (Vol. 1). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 2. Givón, T. (2001). Syntax (Vol. 1). Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins. 3. Croft, W., & Wood, E. J. (2000). Construal operations in linguistics and artificial intelligence. In L. Albertazzi (Ed.), Meaning and cognition: A multidisciplinary approach (pp. 51–78). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 4. Langacker, R. W. (2008). Cognitive grammar: A basic introduction. Oxford. 5. Croft, W. (2012a). Verbs: Aspect and argument structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 6. Dowty, D. (1991). Thematic proto-roles and argument selection. Language, 67, 547–619. 7. Jackendoff, R. (1976). Toward an explanatory semantic representation. Linguistic Inquiry, 7, 89–150. 8. Jackendoff, R. (1983). Semantics and cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 9. Jackendoff, R. (1990). Semantic structures. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 10. Vendler, Z. (1957). Verbs and times. Philosophical Review, 56, 97 – 121. 11. Jackendoff, R. (1991). Parts and boundaries. Cognition, 41, 9–45. 12. Levin, B., & Rappaport Hovav, M. (2005). Argument realization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 13. Croft, W. (2012a). Verbs: Aspect and argument structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 14. Croft, W. (2012b). Dimensional models of event structure and verbal semantics. Theoretical Linguistics, 38, 195–203. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Events | Montague | Lewis V 246 Definiton Event/Richard Montague/Lewis: (Montague 1969)(1): certain properties of time. Lewis: that means it is identified with the property to be a time when it happens. >Properties, >Time, >Time points, >Space-time, >Spacetime points, >Temporal identity. LewisVsMontague: 1. in the Relativity Theory it is not always clear, what time is. >Relativity Theory. 2. With Montague we first have to find the place with it the region is already given. >Localization, >Spacetime region. Event/Quine: (as Lewis): can be easily identified with the region - then there cannot be two events in one region - if two in the same, it is a single event. >W.V.O. Quine. Wrong: to say e.g. that a "qua conference" the other "qua battle"(if it is the same). >Qua-objects. 1. Richard Montague. On the Nature of Certain Philosophical Entities. The Monist 53 (2):159-194 (1969) |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Events | Simons | I 129 Event/occurrents/Simons: events or processes are like continuants in time, but with temporal parts. No identity conditions can be specified. Continuants cannot be eliminated. Brutus-events cannot be seperated into individual events without reference to Brutus. I 131 Event/part/mereology/Simons: spatially and temporally extended events may have parts that are neither purely temporal nor purely spatial, e.g. the part of the football match which is attributable to a single player. Range/span/spn(e): a range or span is a spatiotemporal localization. "Being in": means within larger regions. "Covering": means covering exactly the part. Def spread/spr[e]: a spread is an exact space. Def spell/sp[e]: spell refers to an exact time. Atomic: if pan and spread = 0. Connected: two events are connected, if their span (consisting of span and spell) are topologically connected. Def temporal part: the temporal part contains all simultaneously occurring parts of the event (analog spatial part). Def phase: a phase has temporally related part. Def disc: a disc is a phase with duration 0. Def segment: a segment is a spatially related spatial part. Def section: a section is a segment with expansion 0. I 134 Sum/event/mereology/Simon: for sums of events, it is different than for sums of objects: if events are causally isolated, they cannot form a sum. However, they can be part of a wider whole (they may have an upper limit). Events do not satisfy the full mereology, but the weaker axioms. I 182 Product/events/Simons: problem: the products can exist interrupted. E.g. two objects could alternate between overlapping and separateness, e.g. light spots on a screen, e.g. two bodies share at a time certain members, at others times not. Problem: in the latter case the same product may arise again, but with other elements. >Interrupted Existence. I 183 The change of products requires topological terms. I 182 Coincidence/events: the lack of extensionality allows only one proof of coincidence instead of uniqueness. I 281 Event/reduction/reductionism/Forbes/Simons: events are open to a reduction in such a way as continuants are not, therefore, it is questionable whether there are irreducible truths de re about events ((s) that cannot be traced back to anything else). Essentialism: but as events are also real objects, there should also be essential truth about them. Problem: they are specified by descriptions. Simons: thesis: pro essentialism for events: e.g. the assassination of Franz Ferdinand by principle contains both essentially. E.g. bomb instead of firearm: is a different murder but not with swapped bullets. I 282 It is essential for an event that it is exactly part of those events, of which it is part at this point of time. Different: four-dimensionalism: it does not obey the essentialism. I 305 Event/continuants/Simons: event a: here a formula like "a < b" is complete. Continuants: here we need additionally a time index (with quantification): "ž(Et)[a |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Everyday Language | Minsky | Münch III 130 "Proximity"/simulation/Minsky: Terms like "proximity" are too important for our everyday life to give them up because they cannot be axiomatized. >Axiomatization, >Localization, >Formalization, >Artificial language, >Formal language, >Comprehension, >Simulation. Marvin Minsky, “A framework for representing knowledge” in: John Haugeland (Ed) Mind, design, Montgomery 1981, pp. 95-128 |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Existence | Brandom | Existing things are no types of things! I 615 ff Existence is not a characteristic. I 615f Existence/Brandom: external definition: 1) sortal restriction - 2) "canonical designators". >Sortals. Three types: numerical, physical, fictional - similarities - Role of canonical designators - existent things are no types of things. I 621 Existence/Frege/Brandom: from successful reference - localization in space. - E.g. in the space of the successor of the natural numbers - e.g. address in space and time - e.g. Pegasus example: no continuous path within the space towards the speaker - unattainable. - It is a type of expression not a type of thing. I 624 N.B.: existential definitions can be interpreted as substitutional definitions. >Definitions, >Substitution. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Explanation | Peacocke | I 71 Explanation/behavior/Peacocke: assuming, the spatial relations of a subject determine its settings. Problem: then we could explain the behavior solely from the accepted beliefs of the subject without mentioning the spatial relations. >Belief attitudes, >Spatial localization, >Behavior, >Behavioral explanation. I 81 Narrow explanation/Peacocke: E.g. someone has only the terms "there is an F", "there are two Fs", "There are three Fs" and "the Fs are numerically equivalent to the Gs". Then operations with higher numbers are explainable with these few terms. >Numerical equality. E.g. He actually arranges 20 pebbles and pieces of gold one to one. Then there is no difference in his intentional actions without one which is formulated with its few terms. >Intentions. Problem: such an unstructured ability would then be necessary and a priori. "Numerically equivalent"/numerical equality: can be treated as an unstructured operator of 2nd order. >Operators, >Description levels, >Levels/order, >Second Order Logic. I 133ff Explanation/Peacocke/Nozick: must rely on the nature of the object, not on the manner of givenness. - ((s) intension: is virtually equated with appearance- "nature" with "real object".) >Way of givenness, >Intensions. I 185 Action explanation/Peacocke: by properties of objects - explanation of thoughts: by specific markings - better: by the object itself. --- I 192 Action explanation/Peacocke: in the case of properties no specific object is meant: E.g. "red lamp", not "John's favorite color" - demonstrative: specific object, descriptively: can also be another object. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Explanation | Scriven | Wright I 156 Explanation/Scriven/Wright, G. H.: The arguments by Scriven and Dray are related to my criticism of the scheme, Scriven uses the successful wording that Hempel's approach "gives the individual case away". (Scriven, p. 467). Scriven: an event can move freely within a network of statistical laws, but is located within the "normic network" and explained by this localization. (Scriven(1), p. 467). >Events, >Statistics, >Laws. Schurz I 229 Explanation/Self-Explanation/Scriven: (Scriven 1959a(1), 468 469): Problem: It often happens that we explain an effect E by a real reason A, but our only reason for believing it is that we have observed the effect. >Causal explanation, >Effect, >Cause. "Self-confirming explanation/self-affirmation/self-justification/ Hempel: (1965(2),372): Ex red shift: is explained by the expansion of the universe, but the only reason to think the hypothesis of expansion is confirmed is the red shift itself. ((s) No "side perspective"). Solution/Schurz: a deductive nomological reason must have a prognostic function. There must be in knowledge W a set of evidences that confirm the antecedent without logically implying the event. This requirement is violated in Ex. Redshift. >Redshift. Chaos/explanation/short: it cannot be predicted when the avalanche will depart, but when it has departed, it can be accurately explained that there was a reduction in friction. ((s) post hoc, post festum). I 230 Relevance/explanation: solution to the problem of irrelevance: "irreducible representation" (without redundant elements). Any law premise must also satisfy the relevance condition. >Relevance. Law/explanation/Schurz/(s): if a law is needed for explanation, it is in the premise. 1. Scriven, M. (1959a). Truisms as Grounds for Historical Explanations. IN: P. Gardiner (ed.) Theories of History, New YOrk, The Free Press. 2. Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, New York: Free Press. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Facts | Chalmers | I 40 Definition Positive Fact/Chalmers: A positive fact in world W is one that applies in every possible world that contains W as a real part, correspondingly a positive property in W is one that is instantiated in every world containing W as a real part. (Chalmers I 363: Containment of possible worlds.) Lewis (1983a)(1) and Jackson (1993)(2) have noticed that it is pointless to define the relation of containing worlds once and for all. But you can use them as a basic term. ...+...) >Possible worlds/Lewis, >Possible worlds. On the other hand: Negative facts always imply negative existence statements, which cannot be evaluated locally on their part. >Existence sentences. We will restrict ourselves to positive facts and properties when considering supervenience. >Supervenience, >Supervenience/Chalmers, >Properties. I 85 Negative Facts/Chalmers: Facts that involve negative existence statements are not logically determined by any localizable facts. Even facts about conscious experience cannot help here. ((Chalmers I 369 Negative facts and logical supervenience ...+...). >Experience. I 86 Solution/Chalmers: we must introduce a second-level fact which, according to the enumeration of the microphysical, phenomenal, indexical, etc. facts says: "This is all." All the negative facts follow from the fact of the second level together with all the basic single facts. Reductive explanation: negative facts are not a serious problem for reductionist explanations. >Reduction/Chalmers, >Reductionism. 2nd level fact/Chalmers: there will be probably a statement "that is all" for every possible world and such a fact is never included in the single facts. It merely expresses the finite nature of our world or of any other world. It is a simple way to deal with negative and universally quantified facts. (> universal quantification, > lists, exterior/interior, > totality, cf. Lists. I 87 Facts/World/Chalmers: Facts about the world are exhausted by 1. Physical single facts 2. Facts about conscious experience 3. Natural laws 4. A fact of the 2nd level, which means "This is all." 5. An indexical fact about my localization. >Indexicality, >Laws of Nature, >Consciousness/Chalmers. 1. D. Lewis, Extrinsic properties. Philosophical Studies 44, 1983: pp. 197-200 2. F. Jackson, Armchair metaphysics. In: J. O'Leary-Hawthorne and M. Michael (Eds) Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht 1993 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Generality | Papineau | I 255 Generality/Animal/Thinking/Papineau: no simple organism explicitly represents general facts. E.g. it is one thing to represent the location of a particular pond, that water is in ponds is quite another matter. This corresponds to the question: which animals can have beliefs? >Animals, >Thinking, >World/thinking, >Thinking without language, >Spatial localization, >Representation. I 256 Purpose-means-thinking/Papineau: I have not defined this concept in terms of beliefs but of design: as the use of general representations. I avoid the concept belief. >Beliefs, >Content. Representation/Papineau: why should an animal have no general representations? I 257 After all, it has this disposition right now, because its behavior in the past has led to this result. >Generalization. Disposition/Representation/Papineau: should the disposition itself not be regarded as the incarnation of the general information "Drinking supplies water"? >Disposition, >Information. I do not want to dispute such content attribution. The disposition represents information about the general "connection of reaction with result" (B&T, V>R). Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: if it requires explicit representations, it no longer follows that simple creatures can be considered ZM thinkers. I 258 Explicit representation requires physical tangibility. Vs: all behavioral dispositions must have some kind of physical embodiment. >Behavior, >Embodiment. I 259 Explicit/implicit: if an organism has implicitly different pieces of general information in different dispositions ("water is in ponds"), it still has no system to combine them. >Complexity, >Parts, >Whole, >Sense. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| Goals | Gärdenfors | I 63 Goals/Intention/Intent/Language acquisition/Semantics/Gärdenfors: to represent intentions, the goal must already be represented. >Representation. I 64 Conceptual space/semantic domain: can be a product space of physical space with itself. The goal is then a vector with the endpoints agent and target object, or their localization. >Conceptual Space. Vectors: target vectors can be more abstract than motion vectors. They can be defined in all semantic domains. The classic case is Newell and Simons (1972)(1) General Problem Solver. The target spaces can be viewed as metaphorical transmissions of physical space, with the key concept still being the distance. Spatial metaphors: are omnipresent in our everyday language. See Lakoff & Johnson (1980)(2). >Metaphors. 1. Newell, A., & Simon, H. (1972). Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 2. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| God | Chalmers | I 87 God/Creation myth/Chalmers: everything that God had to do was to create the following facts: 1. Physical single facts 2. Facts about conscious experience 3. Natural laws 4. A fact of the 2nd level, which means "This is all." 5. An indexical fact about my localization. In the first instance, he will have created the laws of nature and then laws for conscious experience for economical reasons. It seems to lie beyond God's power to fix facts about my indexical circumstances. Another reason to be skeptical. >Facts, >Experience, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Indexicality, >Laws of Nature, >Omnipotence, >Omniscience. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| I, Ego, Self | Perry | Frank I 398ff Extra-sense/I/PerryVsCastaneda: can be recognized by others in the same way, does not explain the difference. >Extra-sense/Castaneda. Frank I 399f I/he/reference/relation/sense/meaning: difference: Quasi-indicator attributes reference, but does not establish it. >I/Castaneda, >quasi-indicator. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 Frank I 402ff I/Castaneda/Perry: "I" is not replaceable by specific labeling, when behavior is explained - "I" is a "key index word". Problem: same sentence, but different speaker: false belief "I'm making a mess ...". >Sugar trail example. Incorrect solution: "And I am the one": again a new index word. - "Lack of conceptual component" does not help: I can believe that it is me, with no specific concept of me. False: description: "the one who makes the mess"; this does not help, because there is no connection to me. Frank I 403 Belief/I/Perry: Solution: we need a distinction: belief-state/belief-object. E.g. the event starts at 12:00 - that means, "now!" or "already finished" or "there is still time". Subject: the event beginning at 12:00 State: "now". Specific decsription without an index is not enough. >Indexicality, >Index words. Frank I 414 I/individuation/Perry: The following conditions are not enough: Propositions de re, de dicto, additional conceptual feature localization in space and time, relativization on people and places, two different descriptions without "I". >Propositions, >de re, >de dicto, >Spatial localization, >Description. Perry like Castaneda: 'I' is not replaceable. >I, Ego, Self/Castaneda, >H.-N. Castaneda. Time/Person-Proposition: does not make me different from the others: "J.P. yesterday at the super market" is just as true for others. - judgement context = opinion context: "The event begins now" is true at 12:00 - does not help. True/false/truth value: does not help: that mountain A is higher than B, may be true, but does not lead to the right path. There is nothing what all have in common. >Wanderers-example. Solution: the lost wanderers are in the same opinion state (individuated by index words), but not of the same opinion. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | Stalnaker | I 20/21 I/objective self/Nagel/Stalnaker: when someone says "I’m RS" it seems that the person represents a fact... I 21 ...and it is an objective fact, whether this is true or false - no matter what the speaker thinks. Problem: our concept of an objective world seems to leave no room for such a fact. A complete description of the world as it is in itself will not pick out any particular person as me - it does not tell me who I am! Cf. >Two omniscient Gods/Lewis, >self-identification. Semantic diagnosis: the semantic diagnosis attempts a representation of index words or self-localization. >Index words, >Indexicality, >He/He himself, cf. >Quasi-indicator, >Identity/Nagel. NagelVsSemantic Diagnosis: the semantic diagnosis does not yet get to the heart of the matter. StalnakerVsVs: simply >homophonic truth condition. Problem: what is the content? The content (information) in indexical expressions is not transported by the truth conditions. The speaker might not have known the date and place and yet have believed what he/she said - the listener might have believed that as well, and yet both have understood the expression. Thomas Nagel: this is VsOntological self-objectification in any way. >Objectivity/Nagel. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Identification | Peacocke | I 173 Demonstratives/Identification/Evans/Peacocke: Liberal theory/Peacocke: general capacity for localization. Evans: plus current localization. >Identification/Evans, >Spatial localization. Peacocke: then it is not possible that a lost person can have thoughts about seen objects. >Thoughts, >Thinking, >Knowledge, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification. Cognitive Map/Memory images/Recognition/Peacocke: not causal but really demonstrative. >Recognition, >Memory. I 172 E.g. a lost person is thinking: here is a glass. Peacocke: that is still a statement about a place in the public space. >Space, >Predication, >Attribution. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Identification | Strawson | I 57 Identification/Strawson: if directly due to localization then without mentioning of other particulars - E.g. death depends on living things - e.g. but flash not from something flashing. >Dependence. I 64 Identification/Strawson: observable particulars can also be identified without mentioning their causes or the things on which they depend, - conceptual dependency does not matter - but one cannot always identify births without identifying them as the birth of a living being. I 65 Asymmetry: we do not need necessarily a term in language for births as particulars - but for living beings, because we are living beings ourselves. >Continuant, >Person, >Subject. I 66 Identifiability/particular/Strawson: minimum condition: they must be neither private nor unobservable. >Particulars/Strawson, >Language community, cf. >Private language, >Understanding, >Communication. I 87 Identificaion/Strawson: we cannot talk about private things when we cannot talk about public things. I 153 Identification/StrawsonVsLeibniz: identification requires a demonstrative element: that contradicts Leibniz monads for which there should be descriptions alone in general term. >General terms. Then, according to Leibniz, identification (individuation) is only possible for God: the "complete term" of an individual. That is at the same time a description of the entire universe (from a certain point, which guarantees the uniqueness). >Complete concept. I 245 Identification/Universal/names/particulars/Strawson: speaker/listener each must know a distinctive fact about Socrates. But it must not be the same - E.g. "That man there can lead you". Crucial: that someone stands there - N.B.: no part introduces a single thing, but the statement as a whole presents it. >Particulars/Strawson, >Introduction/Strawson. VII 124 Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel by swimming through it twice" - it has the (wrong!) appearances, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or b) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same error as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression. E.g. "Scott is Scott". >Waverley example. --- Tugendhat I 400-403 Identification/Strawson: a) pointing b) description, spacetime points. TugendhatVsStrawson: because he had accepted Russell's theory of direct relation unconsciously, he did not see that there are no two orders. Tugendhat like Brandom: demonstrative identification presupposes the spatiotemporal, non-demonstrative - (deixis presupposes anaphora). >Deixis/Brandom. Difference: specification/Tugendhat: "which of them all?" Identification: only kind: by spacetime points. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Identification | Tugendhat | I 395 Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: uses identification in the narrow sense. >Frederick Strawson. Tugendhat: my own notion "specification" (which of all objects is meant) is superior to this concept. >Specification. "picking out" (to pick put) is Strawson's expression - (assumed from Searle) - (Quine: "to specify"). I 400ff Identification/Identification/Tugendhat: space-time-location: this is an object - Specification: reference, stand for (another term) (in front of background of all other objects). >Reference, >Background. I 415 Identification/particular/TugendhatVsStrawson: space-time-relation not only anchored perceptively but also system of possible perception stand points - thus a system of demonstrative specification (in front of background). >Space, >Spacetime. I 417 Trough space-time description the perceptible object is specified as more perceptible - an essentially perceptibable cannot be the previous object who it is. Reference: is then to specify a verification situation. >Verification. I 422 Distinguishing objects only from variable usage situations of perception predicates. I 426 Particular/Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: "here", "now" suffice as object to make space-time locations existent. >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Indexicality. Space-time-locations are the most elementary objects - but there must also be something - at least hypothetically, then the corresponding question of verification provides, for which object the singular term stands. >Singular terms, >Objects. Top-down: the use of all singular terms refers to demonstrative expressions - bottom-up: if the verification situation for the applicability of the predicate is described by demonstratives. I 436 Localization/identification/Tugendhat: only by several speakers - not zero point, but set of surrounding objects. - The subjective zero point may be the own position. >Subjectivity. I 462 Identification/Tugendhat: spatial and temporal relation between objects insufficient - an infinite number of space-time locations, finitely many objects - presupposing space-time system - reference to space-time-points cannot fail. Talk of existence without location is pointless. - Identification only by simultaneous reference to all other (possible) objects. - Therefore existence sentences are general. >Existence, >Existence statements. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Imagination | Williams | Frank I 550 Imagination/Williams: (Williams 1973b)(1): E.g. "I am in the West Indies" - "someone is in the West Indies" Evans: there is a difference whether we take an internal perspective or not - but it does not follow that there is such a gap in apparent memories. >Localization, >Consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Knowledge. 1. Bernard Williams (1973). Problems of the Self. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (3):551-551 Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Index Words | Chalmers | I 84/85 Index words/Supervenience/Chalmers: Reference based on index words takes place on the basis of both: physical facts and "indexical facts" about localization and conceptual use. >Language use, >Identification, >Individuation, >Reference, >Indexicality, >Context. I 85 Reductive explanation/perspective/indexicality/problem: how do I explain that I am that particular person? And without tautologies? That the index word is true does not seem to be an objective fact about the world, but about the world as I find it, and that it needs an explanation is something I feel. (See Nagel 1986)(1). >Self-identification, >First person, cf. >Incorrigibility. Yet it is no obscure fact why it is true when David Chalmers says "I am David Chalmers". However, the failure of a reductive explanation for index words has to be distinguished from that in the case of consciousness. >Reduction, >Explanation, >Consciousness/Chalmers. 1. Th. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, New York 1986 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Individuation | Nozick | II 71ff I/Self/Individuation/Nozick: E.g. three completely bandaged persons with amnesia: X will die, Y will live, Z has 50/50 chance: they have to be moved into separate rooms: "the one who now hears my voice": this is not sufficient: Localization: (due to possible blindness), life history (for amnesia), physical description (ditto). Name: is insufficient: E.g. Oedipus. Originator of the tokens: is not sufficient: oral cavity + vocal chords ditto - Consciousness: is not sufficient: God covers the same description. >Identification, >Self-identification, >Localization, >Self-knowledge, >Self, >Person, >Action, >Memory, >Loss of memory, >Names. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Interpretation | Benacerraf | Field I 22 Interpretation/Benacerraf: (1965)(1) Thesis: Identification of mathematical objects with others is arbitrary - E.g. numbers with quantities. - E.g. real numbers with Dedekind cuts, Cauchy sequences, etc. - There is no fact that decides which is the right one. >Equations, >Equality, >Identification, >Real numbers, >Numbers, >Mathematics, >Mathematical entities. Field ditto. I 22 Indeterminacy of reference/Field: is not a problem, but commonplace. >Reference, >Indeterminacy. I 25 For Benacerraf it is about identity, not about reference - otherwise he might falsely be refuted with primitive reference: "Numbers" refers to numbers but not to quantities - But that is irrelevant. Cf. >Reference/Field. I 25 BenacerraffVsPlatonism: locus classicus - VsBenacerraf: based on an outdated causal theory of knowledge. >Platonism, >Causal theory of knowledge. Field I 25 BenacerrafVsPlatonism: (1973)(2): if without localization and interaction we cannot know whether they exist. VsBenacerraf: indispensability argument. 1. Benacerraf, P. What Numbers Could Not Be, The Philosophical Review 74, 1965, S. 47–73. 2. Benacerraf, P. Mathematical Truth, The Journal of Philosophy 70, 1973, S. 661–679. |
Bena I P. Benacerraf Philosophy of Mathematics 2ed: Selected Readings Cambridge 1984 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Interpretation | Foster | 2 Meaning Theory/Interpretibility/Foster: a meaning Theorymust be interpretive, i.e. the reference of the expressions must be clear. >Meaning theory, >Reference, >Meaning. I 3 Interpretability: is obtained in that the expressions of the object language are determined by structural descriptions (sounds, characters). Structural descriptions: Names concatenated with a predicate or a function expression - (but only physically, therefore no meaning is provided). I 3 Interpretability: the assignment of two lists is not sufficient for the identification of the reference. >Lists, >Order. I 5 To enable interpretability, the meaning theory must be in the same language as the object sentences. I 10 Interpretation/Meaning Theory/Foster: the interpretation is done by a localization of every sentence in the network of language by truth conditions. We obtain truth conditions through the structure of the sentence. This leads quasi to the interpretation of the whole language from the perspective of a sentence. >Truth conditions. |
Foster I John A. Foster "Meaning and Truth Theory" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Introduction | Introduction, philosophy: the introduction of objects establishes rules for the use of linguistic expressions for the objects, not a determination or description of these objects. See also definitions, use, language, expressiveness, localization. |
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| Judgments | Chalmers | I 173 Phenomenal Judgments/Chalmers: phenomenal judgements are the core of the relationships between cognition and consciousness. These are verbal expressions of assertions about consciousness. >Phenomena, >Cognition, >Consciousness. I 174 Judgment/Chalmers: judgements can be taken as what I and my zombie twin have in common. >Zombies. Semantic content/Chalmers: semantic content, on the other hand, is formed partly by conscious experiences themselves (e.g., beliefs about sensations of red). The judgments of the zombies have only the same form as my reports, they have no content. >Experience. I 175 I can only refer to the judgments of the zombies in a deflationist manner ((s) quoting into it). >Deflationism. Content/Chalmers: content can be attributed only by phenomenal beliefs, but it is unclear what role consciousness plays in this. >Content, >Semantic content. Phenomenal Judgments/Chalmers: 1st level: concerns the objects of experience. This is about awareness. >Awareness/Chalmers. I 176 2nd level: Judgments on conscious experiences. E.g. I note that I have an experience of something red. Such judgments can also be about kinds of experiences. 3rd level: on conscious experiences as a type of experience. E.g. about the fact that we have conscious experiences at all and how this can be explained. I 177 Problem: Consciousness cannot be explained reductively, but judgments have to be explained because they are in the field of psychology. Paradoxically, consciousness is ultimately irrelevant to the explanation of phenomenal judgments. (Avshalom Elitzur (1989)(1), Roger Shepard (Psychologist, 1993)(2). I 288 Judgement/phenomenal judgement/Qualia/Chalmers: a complete theory of the mind must provide (a) a nonreductive explanation of consciousness, and (b) a reductive explanation,... I 289 ...why we judge that we are conscious. >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Reduction/Chalmers. Even if consciousness itself is not part of the explanation of phenomenal judgments, the roots of consciousness will be. I 290 Consciousness system: has itself no access to information such as "This pattern has a wavelength of 500 nanometers" nor "There is now a 50 Hertz vibration in the brain". The system only has access to the localization in the information space. Thus the system finds itself in a place of this space. Later it can find names like "red", "green" etc. for it. Also the differences can only be expressed with such names of Qualia. >Qualia, >Color words. I 292 A conscious experience is a realization of an information state, a phenomenal judgment is explained by a different realization of the same information state. If we then postulate a phenomenal aspect of information, we have everything we needed to make sure our judgments are correct. 1. A. Elitzur, Consciousness and the incompleteness of the physical explanation of behavior. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10, 1989,: pp. 1-20. 2. R. N. Shepard, On the physical baisis, ölinguistic representation and conscious experiences of colors. In: G. Harman (Ed) Conceptions of the human Mind: Essays in Honor of George A. Miller, Hillsdale NJ 1993. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Language | Strawson | Meg I 297 Lie/Lying/Strawson: a lie is no correct use of a language. Strawson VII 114 Language/Strawson: two types of conventions: 1st Reference Rules: "About what". >Identification. 2nd attribution rules: "What do you say about it" >Predication. StrawsonVsLocke: the difference was not clear to Locke. Reference: it requires circumstances, time, location, etc. >Reference, >Circumstances, >Time, >Localisation, >Space/Strawson, >Identification/Strawson. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Laws | Field | III 59 Laws/physics/scalar quantities/temperature/Field: physical laws for scalar variables are often formulated as laws on a scalar T, that maps the quadruple of real numbers (space-time localization) to real numbers (e.g. temperature). Function T: (scalar) then has the form T = y  ° φ-1. Sseveral space points mapped to a point on the scale. φ -1: inverse of the function: (archetype instead of image): because it is processed twice: the second time backwards). φ (x): x coordinates of in space φ -1 (x): images of the coordinates on the line R). >Natural laws, >Natural constants, >Measurements, >Theories, >Physics. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Life | Kanitscheider | I 285 Life/Universe/Possible worlds/Kanitscheider: (Investigation of Ellis and Brundrit)(1) if one makes the plausible assumption that there is a finite probability for life in galaxies of our type, then there is certainly in one of the other life-bearing systems an individual with identical genetic construction as a special living being on earth. But if there is also only one individual of a certain type, it follows immediately from the presupposed finite, non-vanishing probability that there are infinitely many genetically identical living beings in the universe at any time! Not only copies, but also their history several times existing! However, this is valid only if one refrains from the fact that the space-time allows infinitely many different localizations of the events because of its continuity. One must put a kind of finite grid over the space-time so that the finite events also occur infinitely often. I 287 The striking thing about this argument is that, in addition to cosmological data, it relies only on a relatively weak assumption that there are not an infinite number of different life forms. Physically, this is credible because there are only finitely many elements and the maximum size of stable molecules is certainly finite. So the kinds of life we know are certainly a true fraction of all possible life forms Kanitscheider: moreover, practically only carbon can be considered as a basis, silicon life is inferior to carbon life in the competition. Ellis/Brundrit(1), however, consider even more exotic objections: if a now-unknown long-range force played a role in the origin of life, so that the probability of life in larger systems would decrease, the result would still remain intact, since particle horizons exist in almost all FRW worlds, limiting the interactions. the present probabilities for life on separate Earth-like planets are independent of each other. At any point in time, there are infinitely many causally decoupled regions in a low total energy universe. I 288 Now in each of them only a finite number of viable structures can exist, the infinite multiplicity of these organisms is inevitable! If one does not want to share these assumptions, nevertheless the ways out are not less strange, under retention of the homogeneity one would have to already 1. deny that the origin of life can be estimated at all with a probability measure, or that this is vanishingly small. Or: 2. a) (with homogeneity): the space-like hypersurfaces would have to be compact (K = +1). That would be a universe with negative total energy (high density). This is not supported empirically at present. b) Way out: force solution: one would have to provide the space sections with local hyperbolic or Euclidean geometry via identification topologies with a compact connection form. Ex (k = 0): then the local geometry of spacetime can be described in the line element ds² = dt² + R²(t)[dx² + dy² + dz²] Notation: L: coordinate length. (see below identification topology, determines the galaxy number). If one chooses in this space a cube of the coordinate length L, x, y, z respectively between 0 and L, and identifies opposite sides, then this does not change the local spatial structure, but the spatial coordinates become cyclic in the sense that (t, x, y, z) and (t, x +L, y + L, z + L) represent the same event. By the new coherence form, the spatial sections have now become 3-toroi of finite volume V =R³L³. In such a finite Euclidean space, of course, there are only finitely many galaxies, just as in a space with positive curvature. so the multiplicity of things would be avoided. >Coordinate system/Kanitscheider. I 289 In exchange, however, a new parameter emerges which is not at all determined by local physics, namely the length scale of the identification topology L. The quantity L which determines the galaxy number could be determined in any number of different ways without being supported by local empirical information. However, if one sticks to the principle of choosing more exotic topologies only when prompted by empirical evidence, it follows that each of us has infinite doubles, most of them behind a particle horizon. Steady-State Theory SST would have the same consequence in temporal terms. At infinity, any particle combination for which there is even a tiny finite probability simply occurs infinitely often. Copernican Principle/Ellis: his main point was to point out that the Copernican Principle has no empirical support, on the other hand it leads to such strange consequences. I 290 Ellis: to make this clearer, he designed a Bsp alternative model universe, locally isotropic, but without Copernican principle, which nevertheless covers all empirical findings. SSS: Spherically symmetric static universe, two centers, near one we live, the other is a naked singularity. Redshift here is interpreted not as result of space expansion, but as gravitational redshift, background not as relic radiation, but as result of hot fireball sphere permanently surrounding second singularity. Cold center C, hot center S. At a point p near the cold center, the background radiation is taken as an indication that the past light cone refocuses from p toward the hot singularity. The world is spherically symmetric about S and C. If one goes from C in the direction of S, it becomes hotter and hotter. Near the singularity, all the things happen that happen in a FRW world in the deep past. Symmetrically around S, there is an area of decoupling, and even closer, an area of nucleosynthesis. Circulation, light elements drift from S to C, there heavy elements are formed, which migrate back. I 291 Such a world is dominated by the singularity as the "soul of the universe". It also provides the dominant arrow of time. Methodologically, it is now important whether one can make the correspondence between a Steady State (SSS) and a Friedman world perfect. The temporal range of circumstances favorable to life in the Friedman world is matched in the SSS by a small spatial range around C. This is a real alternative to the Copernican principle for some authors. (I.e. it looks completely different somewhere else, conclusions from our environment on distant sections of the universe are not allowed). With alternative theories one decides mostly after simplicity and uniformity points of view. Kanitscheider: The absurd consequence of the infinitely many doubles does not seem to be a sufficient argument for leaving the homogeneity assumption. >Universe/Kanitscheider. 1. Ellis, G. F. R. & Brundrit, G. B. Life in the infinite universe. Royal Astronomical Society, Quarterly Journal, vol. 20, Mar. 1979, p. 37-41. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Logical Space | Stalnaker | I 81 Glue/Glueness/Stalnaker: glue does not form a region in logical space. >Grue. Logical space: principle: all relations must be found on intrinsic properties. >Intrinsicness, >Relations, >Foundation. I 83/84 Def Equivalence/localization/logical space/Stalnaker: saying that i is equivalent to j is to say that the localization functions i and j represent the same possible world. >Equivalence. Def intrinsic property: an intrinsic property is a region in logical space that is invariant with respect to this equivalence relation. Contrast: the contrasting property is the conventional property. >Conventions, >Properties. I 85 Logical space/Stalnaker: logical space does not exist independently of the individuals who inhabit it, but is abstracted from the world as we find it. >Abstraction. I 127 Spatial/logical/Stalnaker: solution/Stalnaker: the solution is our intuition: most of us have an actualistic conception of a possible world and possible individuals, but they represent a possibilism regarding spatial localization. Places north and south of us are just as real. We do not need surrogates for absent objects - even if there is no world-independent identity, there is still a localization-independent one. >Localization, >Identity. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Map Example | Lewis | IV 144 Knowledge de dicto/Map-Example/Lewis: e.g. encyclopedia - applies to the world and provides knowledge about the world, not about the reader (de se). - E.g. Lingens with memory loss found himself in a library and reads his own story. (-> E.g. Lost wanderers). - Knowledge de dicto provides localization in the logical space but not in space-time - but you can close the gap. - E.g. Map: will only be used if the red dot "you are here" is removed. Explanation/(s):E.g., Two lost hikers meet. By chance they have the same hiking book. Then they will not find out their localization with the help of this book alone. Reason: In the printed book, the walkers are not identified, for example, as the one who came from the west and the one who came from the east. Solution: A modern navigation system registers the route and uses it to identify the user holding the device. >Propositional knowledge, >Non-propositional knowledge, >Self-identification, >Self-ascription. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Map Example | Peacocke | I 76 Map/Peacocke: in order to use a map, you have to be able to trace the trail of your own movements. ((s)> e.g. Two lost wanderers/J. Perry). ((s) e.g. GPS: intensional (tells you "who you are"). Map: (extensional) will not help you. It does not tell you who you are.) >Propositional knowledge, >Intensions, >Intensionality, >Extensions, >Extensionality, >Spatial localization. ((s) Explanation/(s): E.g., Two lost hikers meet. By chance, they have the same hiking book. Then, with the help of this book alone, they will not find out their localization. Reason: in the printed book the hikers are not identified, e.g. as the one who came from the west and the one who came from the east. Solution: modern navigation system: registers the path and identifies by it the user who holds the device in his hand. Distinction: propositional/non-propositional knowledge). |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Metonymy | Gärdenfors | I 40 Metonymy/Gärdenfors: their role is above all referential: it takes out a certain aspect of an entity and helps in understanding a situation. Classical cases are pars pro toto and totum pro parte. E.g. Proust is difficult to read, e.g. Napoleon attacked Russia. Metaphor: is based on similarity between domains Metonymy: is based on meronomic (part/whole-) relations within one and the same domain. (See also Lakoff and Turner (1989, p. 103).(1) Gärdenfors: Thesis on metaphors and metonymies: metaphors refer to images between domains - metonymies refer to meronomic (part/whole-) relations and other relations within domains. --- I 41 Metonymy/Tradition: traditionally the metonymy was explained by contiguity. Later, cognitive linguistics introduced the terms domain and domain matrix. VsContiguity/linguistics: contiguity is too vague and requires prototypes as examples. Problem: e.g. the whole house woke up: the people are not parts of the house. Rather, their localization is part of the localization of the house. (See Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006)).(2) 1. Lakoff, G., & Turner, M. (1989). More than cool reason: A field guide to poetic metaphor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Peirsman, Y., & Geeraerts, D. (2006). Metonymy as a prototypical category. Cognitive Linguistics, 17, 269–316. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Natural Laws | Pinker | I 344 Mirror/natural laws/Pinker: for all objects and processes in the universe is true that one cannot know if one sees the thing itself, or its mirror image - exception: decay of cobalt 60: emits preferably particles at the South Pole. >Symmetries, >Asymmetry. Chirality/Pinker: random, not predetermined by nature - the mind treats both cases as if they were the same. >Chirality. I 346 Language: the words "next to" say nothing about the right and left - but there is nothing appropriate for up and down or in front and behind. >Localization, >Local/global, >Reference system. I 347 We are quite insensitive to right/left, a tiger may come next time from the other side - Definition "right"/encyclopedia/Pinker: "eastern direction, if you look north". I 352 Mental turning: the mirror image must be fold in the fourth dimension. I 382 Natural Law/Law/Pinker: the laws of physics determine that objects with a greater density than water are not on the surface. Selection along with physics specifies that objects that move quickly, are streamlined. >Selection. Genetics causes that the offspring resembles the parents. The human intentions provide chairs with forms and materials that turn them into stable seating. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Nobody, Some | Hintikka | II 40 Everyone/all/nobody/ontology/existence/non-existence/Hintikka: if we allow the domain of our quantifiers to be extended to non-existent objects, the most urgent question is: Where are these non-existent objects? E.g. "everyone's lover", e.g. "nobody's lover". Both are obviously possible. But unlike Meinong's round square. E.g. "the envy of all", e.g. "which is envied by everyone". N.B.: both are incompatible. The former must love the latter, but the latter cannot be loved by the former. Every/all/nobody/Hintikka: it is no solution to claim that "everyone" or "nobody" go only via existent things. ((s) That is, we need to allow non-existent or possible objects (possibilia) here. >Possibilia. Meinong/Hintikka: Meinong gained the power of his arguments from the fact that we have to allow non-existent objects here. (See also Non-Existence/Terence Parsons). Non-existence/non-existent objects/localization/possible worlds/Hintikka: thesis: every non-existent object is in its own world. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Object | Quine | I 102 Goodman: "Rabbitness": is a discontinuous space-time segment, which consists of rabbits. --- I 372f Objects of propositional attitude eliminated: "Thomas believes (Cicero has): no longer the form" Fab" a = Thomas, b = () - but: "Fa" where "F" is a complex expression - no longer "believes" term, but operator. I 402 Existence: does not arise from dichotomy "single thing" - "universal" - it does not matter whether they do exist. "Equator", "North Pole" - linking with stimuli is weak argument for primacy of physical objects, but makes terms accessible for all positions. >Existence/Quine. I 412 Object: name which is denoted by singular terms, accepts it as values - (but the singular term is eliminated!) - E.g. "glimmer", but not "glimmeriness". I 438 Ideal objects are not permitted - geometric objects are permitted (no identity without localization). I 435 Relativity: additional dimension: space-time: point moments are absolutely different, independent of relative movement of the viewpoint. II 30 Object/Quine: space-time piece can also be distributed or scattered. (Nominalism, Goodman). II 23 Physical object is deceptive - better space-time pieces - "space" and "places as such" untenable, otherwise there would be absolute standstill and absolute movement - 4-digit coordinates suffice - ontology of pure set theory - no more physical object. II 156 ff Object (physical)/Quine: arbitrarily scattered and arbitrarily singled out - pocket contents, single coin at various points in time, combination with the Eiffel Tower, space-time points, anything - are not so strongly body-oriented - identification like from one possible world to another: without content as long as no instructions are given - value of a variable. VI 32 Object/Ontology/Quine: bodies constitute themselves as ideal nodes in the centers of overlapping observation sentences - problem: observation sentences are not permanent - therefore the objectification (reification) is always already a theory. VI 34 Question: what should be considered real objectification and not just a theoretically useful one (like classes). VI 35 Abstract objects: it is pointless to speak of permanent stimulus phases - solution: pronouns and bound variables - Vs singular term: are often not referring - there must be unspecifiable irrational numbers - Solution: bound variable instead of singular term. VI 38f Objectification/Reification/Quine: for the first time in predicative connection of observation sentences - instead of their mere conjunction - "This is a blue pebble": calls for embedding pebble into the blue. VI 41 Abstract objects/Modal/Putnam/Parsons: modal operators can save abstract objects - QuineVsModal logic: instead quantification (postulation of objects) - so we can take the slack out of the truth function. >Modal Logic/Quine. VII (d) 69 Object/Quine: may be unconnected: E.g. USA Alaska. XII 36 Properties/Identity/Quine: Problem: (unlike objects) they are ultimately based on synonymy within a language - more language-specific identity. >Properties/Quine. V 39 Ultimately we do without rigorous individuation of properties and propositions. (different term scheme) - Frege dito: (Basic Laws): do not extend identity to terms. XII 68 Object/Theory/Quine: what is an object, ultimately, cannot be stated - only in terms of a theory - (ultimately overall theory, i.e. language use) - but wrong: to say that talk about things would only make sense within a wider range - that would correspond to the false thesis that no predicate applied to all things - there are universal predicates. >Mention, >use, >word, >object. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Objects of Belief | Lewis | IV 134 Objects of belief/Lewis: we should attribute properties instead propositions as objects of belief - they work in more cases - Proposition: set of possible worlds - i.e. a region in the logical space - in contrast properties: set of individuals. --- IV 138 Attitudes/Belief/Objects of belief/Relation theory/Lewis: instead of propositions as objects of belief: - self-attribution of properties - e.g. spatial (not logical) localization: is not a proposition: E.g. I am on the 6th floor of the Stanford library - is not a property that corresponds to a proposition - E.g. >Lingens lost his memory and has to identify himself as a member of a sub-population, whose boundaries do not coincide with the boundaries of possible worlds - with the sub-population whose sole member he is himself - propositional knowledge/Lewis: knowledge of perception: I perceive does not correspond to any proposition - reason: there are possible worlds in which someone has this perception situation and someone else ((s)the same time) does not. --- IV 139 Self-attribution of a property: is >de se, not >de dicto. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Ontology | Chalmers | I 286 Ontology/Aspects/Information/Psychological/Physical/Chalmers: If we speak of phenomenal and physical (physically realized) information, how seriously do we have to take ontological implications? To what extent is information here reified? Does it mean that the physical, the phenomenal or both are ontologically dependent on the information? >Aspects. I 301 Ontology/Chalmers: if we regard information as something with two aspects, which one is primary? Are information spaces and informational states merely useful constructs or are they ontologically fundamental, is information primary or the physical and the phenomenal? I 302 Property dualism/Chalmers: I want to go beyond it, because the two aspects are merely separated in him. I would like to take the role that the information plays more seriously. We will pursue speculative metaphysics. >Property dualism/Chalmers. In physical theories, fundamental states are individuated as information states. While physics does not tell us what mass or charge is, it has to do with differences and localizations in the corresponding information spaces. Physics does not make any statements as to how the information states are realized, as long as the causal or dynamic structure is correctly captured. I 303 So the universe could be a gigantic computer. Fredkin: (1990)(1) Thesis: the universe could be a huge cellular automaton. Leckey: (1993)(2) Thesis: the space-time could be based in a computer process with different registers with appropriate causal relations between them for every basic property of the world. Ontology/Chalmers: then one would have a picture of the world as a world of pure information. According to this point of view, it is a mistake to want to say more about the world. I 304 VsWheeler/VsFredkin: 1. Phenomenal properties have an intrinsic nature that is exhausted by localization in the information space. >Intrinsic, >Extrinsic. 2. The concept of a pure flow of information is not coherent. Could not there be differences which, on their part, are not again based in differences of some underlying property? Differences must always be differences in something. Solution/VsVs/Chalmers: We could have direct knowledge about an intrinsic nature in the world and this might be used to justify informational states. I 305 Chalmers: so we can pick up Russell's suggestion and say that the unknown intrinsic properties of the world are phenomenal (or proto-phanomenal) properties. Russell needed them as the causal characteristics underlying physics, we need them for the foundation of informational states. We can solve two problems at the same time with this. >Foundation. Chalmer's thesis: the information spaces that physics demands are themselves based on phenomenal or proto-phanomenal properties. Each time a mass or charge is realized, this is based on micro-phenomenal property behind it. The final differences are micro-phenomenal differences. Thus, we have two aspects. > Phenomenology/Chalmers. 1. E. Fredikin, Digital Mechanics. Physica D45, 1990,: pp. 254-70 2. M. Leckey, The universe as a computer. A model for prespace metaphysics. Ms Philosophy Department, Monash University, 1993. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Ontology | Hintikka | II 40 Ontology/existence/non-existence/Hintikka: if we allow the range of our quantifiers to be extended for non-existent objects, the most urgent question is: Where are these non-existent objects? E.g. "everyone's lover", e.g. "no one's lover". Both are obviously possible but unlike Meinong's round square. >Non-existence, >Round square, >Logical possibility. E.g. "the envy of all", e.g. "which is envied by everyone". N.B.: both are incompatible. The former must love the latter, but the latter cannot be loved by the first. Everyone/all/nobody/Hintikka: it is no solution here to claim that "everyone" or "nobody" only goes via existent objects ((s) that is, we must allow non-existent or possible objects (>possibilia)). Meinong/Hintikka: Meinong gained the power of his arguments from the fact that we have to allow non-existent objects here. (Also >Terence Parsons). Non-existence/non-existent objects/localization/possible worlds/Hintikka: thesis: any non-existent object is in its own world. >Possible worlds. II 88 Ontology/thing/subject/object/Hintikka: the ontology of most philosophers is upside down. This is because they seek independent objects as building blocks. II 89 HintikkaVsTradition: solid objects are not the building blocks of our world. Instead, we are dealing with mass points which result in the objects as solutions of differential equations. Cf. >Four-dimensionalism, >Space-time. Geometry/Hintikka: for the same reason, geometry is more fundamental than quantum theory. Space/time/Kant/Hintikka: Kant, therefore, is right because of another reason, as our analysis shows: space and time are fundamental because the objects are formed in them. ((s) Because of the sometimes not closed curves, something is not an object in a possible world (here = time segment), but in another one). Space/time/Hintikka: the conceptual precedence of space and time also has other consequences: it shows that the expression "possible world" is inappropriate: II 90 Possible Worlds/Hintikka: the expression "possible worlds" presupposes that space-time is divided. II 90 Object/thing/identification/identity/individuation/space time/Hintikka: space time is still just a means of identification. What determines the result of the identification is the triple of the functions f, g, h. This function specifies the totality of the motions of the mass points in our model. They are the hard core of identification and individuation. Matter/Hintikka: identification and individuation are based on material reality. >Identification, >Individuation. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Order | Carnap | VI 206 System/Reference/Transformation/Meaning/Relation/Permutation/Carnap: any other relations could be accepted arbitrarily, for which still exactly the same empirical propositions (according to the signs!) apply, which now mean something else, however. - E.g. we only need a harmonized transformation of the set of the basic elements in itself and as a new basic relation those relations whose inventory is the transformed inventory of the old basic relations. Then, the new relations are structurally equivalent (isomorphic) to the old ones. VI 213 Order/Carnap: E.g. dog in the zoological realm: point - as an individual different - temporal order unlike any other - the distinction singular term/general term corresponds to that between orders - qualities are ordered differently than by space and time - this is equivalent to the difference between identity of localization and sameness of color of view field points - reason: different equally located (with the same number of digits) quality classes can never belong to the same elementary experience, but those of the same color can. Only thus could we separate the two orders of field of view and color body (>dimensions). VI 215 Identity of location: is what allows the knowledge synthesis in the first place. - ((s) Two things can only be in the same place after one another - temporal dimension - not with sameness of color). >Similarity, >Quality, >Identity, >Space, >Time; cf. >Simultaneity. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Ostension | Gärdenfors | I 62 Showing/Ostension/Gärdenfors: (Hurford 2007(1), p.224): pointing communicates only the localization of an object and says nothing about its properties. Gärdenfors: that means that pointing can work without an established and divided object category. Language acquisition/learning/child/Gärdenfors: before children use words alone, they combine the uttering and pointing at them. (Goldin-Meadow, 2007(2)). Triangulation/Gärdenfors: the communicators meet in two respects: the spatial-visual domain and the space of the object categories. --- I 77 Pointing/Ostension/Gärdenfors: Thesis: the processing of meaning in pointing is essentially the same as in linguistic communication. The development of communicative skills can be understood as a transfer from the spatial-visual domain to "pointing" in other domains. This concerns the domains of feelings, the subject space, and the target domain. Meaning/Pointing/Gärdenfors: thesis: I understand communication as a "meeting of minds", whereby the meanings are not only in the world, but they also develop in communicative interaction (see Brinck, 2001(3), 2004b(4)). --- I 78 Pointing/Gärdenfors: a) imperative pointing is seen as the basic form, following Bates et al. (Bates 1975(5), 1976(6), Brinck 2004a(7)). It is not necessarily intentional. It can be used purely reinforcing. --- I 79 b) Declarative pointing: involves the attention of another person being directed to an object (Bates et al., 1975(6), Brinck 2004a(7), Tomasello et al., 2007(8)). --- I 80 Decisive: it is not about a desire of the object, but about common attention. c) emotive, declarative pointing: requires no understanding of the intentions or beliefs (Brinck, 2008)(9). --- I 81 D) Information-requesting pointing: combines the spatial-visual domain with the category space for objects. e.g. "What is it?" --- L 81/82 Proto speech act/Searle: this kind of pointing can be understood as a proto speech act. (Searle, 1969)(10). e) Targeted pointing: e.g. a child points to the relocated glasses. (Liszkowski et al., 2007)(11). The intention of the other is recorded as well as a deviation in the target. This can be understood as proto-declarative. Intersubjectivity must only encompass the understanding of the goals, not the beliefs. (Brinck, 2001, 2004a). 1. Hurford, J. R. ( 2007). The origins of meaning: Language in the light of evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Goldin-Meadow, S. (2007). Pointing sets the stage für learning language - and creating language, Child Development 78, 741-754. 3. Brinck, I. (2001) Attention and the evolution of intentional communication. Pragmatics and Cognition, 9, 255-272 4. Brinck, I. (2004b) Joint attention, triangulation and radical interpretation: A üroblemn and its solution. Dialectica, 58(2), 179-205 5. Bates, E., Camaioni, L., & Volterra, V. (1975). The acquisition of performatives prior to speech. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 21, 205-224. 6. Bates, E. /ed) (1976). Language and context: The acquisition of pragmatics. New York: Academic Press. 7. Brinck, I. (2004a). The pragmatics of imperative and declarative pointing. Cognitive Science Quarterly, 3, 429-446. 8. Tomasello, M. Carpenter, M., & Liszkowski, U. (2007). A new look at infant pointing. child Development, 78, 705-722. 9. Brinck, I. (2008) The role of intersubjectivity for the development of intentional communication. In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha, & E. Itkonen (Eds.) The shared mind: Perspectives on intersubjectivity (pp. 115-140). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 10. Searle, J. (1969). Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 11. Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M. & Tomasello, M. (2007). Reference and attitude in infant pointing. Journal of Child Language, 34, 1-20. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Pain | Searle | I 81 Common sense/Searle: common sense can be wrong (localization of pain). I 138 Pain/Kripke: the identity of pain and a neurophysiological state would be necessary (both sides are rigid) >rigidity. But that is not given. Heat is different. >E.g. >Heat/Kripke, >identity/Kripke. II 326 Pain/Searle: pain is irreducible. No one has ever come to the conclusion through a thorough phenomenological examination that, for example, one's own pain does not exist. III 162 Pain/Searle: pain can be independent of representation without being independent of mind. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Part-of-Relation | Gärdenfors | I 34 Part-whole-relation/meronomic relations/Gärdenfors: such relations are not only found in the conceptual space of form - they can also occur in other domains: e.g. chord, family, limerick, etc. Semantic roles: for meronomic structures: are often nouns. The corresponding objects often have diverse properties. On the other hand: Dimensional conceptual space: e.g. color/color space: here the individual localizations stand for a single property. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Particulars | Tugendhat | I 422 Particulars/TugendhatVsDonnellan: localizing identifications are fundamental. Cf. >Individuation/Strawson, >Individuation, >Identification, >Localization. With these, there is no longer a distinction between referential and attributive use. >Attributive/referential. Attributive is also referential in a broad sense because, although it does not identify the object, it specifies it (distinguishes it against a background). >Specification. I 426 Einzelding/Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: "here", "now" suffice to make object and spacetime places existent. >Demonstratives, >Logical proper names. Spacetime places are the most elementary objects. >Ontology. But there must be something there - at least hypothetically, then corresponding question of verification provides for which object the singular term stands. >Singular terms, >Empty space, >Substantivalism, >Relationism. Top-down: the use of all singular terms refers to demonstrative expressions. Bottom-up: when demonstratives denote the verificational situation for the predicate to be true. >Predicates, >Satisfaction, >Situation. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Perspective | Perspective: is the arrangement of objects as it arises with respect to the perception from a geometrical localization of the perceiver within an object space. In a broader sense, taking a foreign perspective also means taking the position of another person or group in the context of a discussion. See also bat example, foreign psychological. |
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| Perspective | Hintikka | II 115 Knowing-who/seeing/visual perception/perspective identification/Hintikka: Def Seeing/Hintikka: seeing an object: people and bodies who occupy the same gap in John's perception field can be identified by him. He also knows that different objects can be at different times in the same place. N.B.: John does not have to know who this person is! Knowing-who/seeing-who/Hintikka: we also need an identification based on public (object-centered) criteria. Public/perspective/language/logical form/Hintikka: the difference between perspective and public identification is also expressed linguistically: E.g. public: an identification is successful if it is true that: (1) John sees who b is. (2) John remembers who b is. (3) John knows who b is. II 116 On the other hand: perspective: (4) John sees b. (5) John remembers b. (6) John knows b. Hintikka/(s): the perspective can be a mere regarding, letting the eyes rest on something without knowing who or what that is. Cross-World Identification/rigidity/HintikkaVsKripke: it is more about the way of identification (public/perspective) than about rigidity or non-rigidity. >Rigidity, >Possible worlds. The way of identification decides about what counts as one and the same individual. II 120 Def Identification/visual perception/perspective/private/Hintikka: to identify b in the perspective sense means, to find a gap for b among the visual objects. That is, to locate b visually. Logical form: visual identification corresponds to answering a question of where ((s) localization in the facial room). Perspective/Hintikka/(s): perspective does not correspond strictly to the private point of view but it stands in contrast to the public point of view. Def Identification/visual perception/public/t/Hintikka: identification is the ability to locate b on the map of abstract more-than-personal knowledge. That is, the ability to interpret what you see. Logical Form: a logical form is visual identification. Public: public means to answer a what-question or a who-question. Interpretation/seeing/perception/Hintikka: the interpretation here is to attribute a meaning to our senses. Analog: analog means to interpret abstract characters as letters (seeing-as). ((s) Stronger/weaker: to look at a printed page and noticing that it is printed is weak. Stronger: reading the printed page is stronger). Public/identification/Hintikka: it is dangerous to interpret our methods of public identification in this way. >Identification/Hintikka. Perspective/private/Hintikka: the perspective identification provides an independent conceptual system. Symmetry/asymmetry/identification/logical form/everyday language/identification/perspective/public/Hintikka: Symmetry: in logic (logical form) there is a symmetry between the expressions for public or perspective identification. Asymmetry/everyday language: in the normal language, this symmetry does not exist. Reason: for public identification, we have hidden quantifiers. Perspective: here we need a direct object construction. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Perspective | Peacocke | I 67 Perspective/Peacocke: an explanation of perspective sensitivity (e.g. response to displacement of the food). - It should make clear the dependence of body movements on changes of the location. >Behaviour, >Explanation, >Animal language, >Animals. But: the subject never needs to move, it just needs to have the ability of re-centering of the intentional network. >Localization, >Perception, >Reference, cf. >Triangulation. I 75 Behavior / perspective / Peacocke: if an entity displays perspective behavior, it will be correlated not only with changing sensation qualities of his experience, but also with everything else, with which the sensation features are correlated - but it does not follow that he has attitudes about his retinal irritation - therefore we need to have access to other content, related to the retina irritation. >Description levels, >Levels/order, >Reflection, >Consciousness. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Phenomena | Stalnaker | I 269 Def phenomenal information/terminology/Lewis/Stalnaker: phenomenal information is - beyond physical information - an irreducible other type of information. The two are independent. Stalnaker: it is the kind of information that Jackson's color researcher Mary acquires. It is compatible with the modest view. >Colour researcher Mary, >Colours/Jackson, >Knowledge/Jackson, >Knowledge how. Lewis: thesis: Mary is not missing phenomenal information. I 271ff Phenomenal information/self/subjectivity/Stalnaker: e.g. Mary knows in her room, that the treasure lies at a huge military cemetery in the 143rd row in the southerly direction and in the 57th row in the westerly direction. Problem: they still do not know that the treasure is "here". Problem: even if she stands in front of it, then she may have miscounted. ((s) Then she does not know what proposition the sentence expresses.) In the room: she cannot be fooled. Objective content: objective content is already in the room and possible to learn. Subjective content: subjective content cannot be expressed as a timeless proposition with "here". >Localization, >Index words, >Indexicality. I 274 Phenomenal indistinguishability, is possible in relation to colors, but not in relation to possible worlds. >Indistinguishability, >Possible worlds. Phenomenal information/self-identification/Stalnaker: e.g. person with memory loss: Rudolf Lingens does not know whether he is Lingens or Gustav Lauben. >Self-identification. Error: it is false to assume that there will be a possible world, that is just like the actual world, except that the experiences of Lingens were reversed with those of Lauben. Even if such an interpersonal comparison between worlds is understandable, it would not be compatible with the fact that self-localization is an irreducible information. >Centered worlds. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Possibilia | Hintikka | II 40/41 Non-existence/non-existent objects/localization/possible worlds/Hintikka: thesis: any non-existent object is in its own world. >Possible worlds. Possible Worlds/Leibniz/Duns Scotus/Hintikka: such considerations led Leibniz and Duns Scotus before him to distribute the unordered set of non-existent individuals to divided worlds. The totality of all non-existent objects is a non-well-formed whole. >Possible worlds/Leibniz. Non-existent objects/possible objects/unrealized possibilities/Hintikka: are not some of these non-existent objects in our own actual world? Hintikka: thesis: yes, some of these barely possible objects are in the actual world. Bona fide object/Hintikka: a bona fide object can exist in a possible world and might be missing in another possible world. World Line/Hintikka: when it comes to which world line can be drawn, existence is not the most important problem, the problem is rather being well-defined. >World lines. HintikkaVsLeibniz: we also allow that an object can exist in several worlds. Question: if inhabitants of two different worlds can be identical when are they identical then? II 73 Possibilia/Hintikka: thesis: the speech about human experience makes the assumption of possibilia necessary (unrealized possibilities, HintikkaVsQuine). Intentionality/Husserl/Hintikka: according to Husserl, the essence of human thought is in a relationship to unrealized possibilities. Possibilia/Hintikka: we need possibilia to deal with logically incompatible entities of the same logical type. >Possibilia. Semantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: the semantics of possible worlds is the corresponding model theory. >Possible world semantics. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Possibility | Quine | I 423f Unrealized possibilities: e.g. the different kinds of possible hotels on the corner: no identity by localization - they are at most universals. III 259 Possibility/possible objects/actual/real/Quine: some are of the opinion that there are concrete individuals of two species: a) real (actual) b) unreal (not actual). QuineVs: this overpopulates the universe. (s) Problem: should one then say "not real Zerberus is real", or "the real Zerberus is not real"? For it would be too much to want to say "the unreal Zerberus is not real". At most, a representative could invoke that "not really Zerberus" is already a double. III 260 Not actual/Possibility/Quine: the trick here depends on the concept of the possible. QuineVs: but this is not possible for more complicated cases. Example "the round pyramid of Copilco": is completely impossible ((s) not updatable). Non-existence/possibility/meaning/significance/Quine: wrong solution: some authors think that a word for a completely impossible object is meaningless. Analogue: just as a logically unrealizable sentence is a non sentence, is not false but meaningless. ((s) (here sic, but otherwise mostly called senseless.) >Meaning/Quine. QuineVs: 1. this is unnatural. 2. it is also impractical. Then we no longer have a test procedure for significance, just as the quantifier logic has no decision procedure for universality and satisfiability. >Satisfaction/Quine. Solution/Quine: it is sufficient that words have the task of designating something. This is sufficient to express non-existence. The words have a full meaning. >Designation/Quine. VI 102 Necessity/Possibility/Quine: are intensional in that they do not conform to the substitutability of identity. Again fluctuating between de re and de dicto. >de re/Quine, >de dicto/Quine. VII (h) 148 Necessity/possibility/Quine: is not a general feature of the objects concerned but depends on the way of reference. >Necessity/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Predicates | Davidson | Glüer II 94f Predicates/Davidson: shorter formulations with less relations do not lead to significant different predicates. - Toast-Example: "Strange goings on! Jones did it slowly, deliberately, in the bathroom, with a knife, at midnight. What he did was butter a piece of toast. (1967) (7) Jones buttered in the bathroom at midnight with a knife and deliberately a toast. (8) Jones buttering a toast at midnight (9) Jones is buttering a toast. Toast Example: Shorter formulations with fewer relations do not lead to different predicates. Toast bread Bsp/Davidson/Glüer: it is not clear why a predicate ad infinitum could not be modified: if we had to assume a change of meaning every time, we would be standing on an infinite >lexicon. II 95 Davidson proposes to interpret sentences like (9) as quantification of existence, and predicates like "buttertert" as three-digit, that is, with an additional event place not reflected at the surface of the sentence. Thus (9) is true precisely when (9') (Ex)(butter(Jones,a toast, x)) if there is at least one event x, so that x is a buttering of a toast by Jones. For Davidson, propositions of action have the form of existential quantifying predications, so they are not descriptions of action in the sense that they refer as a whole to a certain event. From such predications, however, singular terms can be formed, e.g. "the churning of the toast by Jones".((s) This is a description) Davidson: "dated particulars" non-repeatable entities with definite spatial temporal localization. More complex ones are to be interpreted as conjunctions. (8') (Ex)(buttered (Jones, a toast,x) and at midnight(x)) ((s) Cf. nowadays >frame theories.) |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Proof of God’s Existence | Bolzano | Simons I 321 Cosmological proof of God/unconditioned existence/Bolzano/Simons: (circumvents the problem of being founded by referring to classes. >Classes. A) there is something real, e.g. my thoughts that it is like that. B) Suppose there is some thing A that is absolutely essential in its existence, then we already have it C) Suppose A is conditional. Then form the class of all conditional real things A, B, C, ... This is also possible if this class is infinite D) the class of all conditioned real things is itself real. Is it conditional or unconditional? If it is absolute, we already have it E) Suppose it is conditional: every conditioned presupposes the existence of something else, whose existence it determines. Thus even the class of all conditional things, if conditioned, presupposes the existence of something that determines it. F) This other thing must be unconditioned, for if it were conditioned, it would belong to the class of all conditioned things G) Therefore, there is something unconditional, e.g. a god. Simons: this makes no use of being founded: C) leaves the possibility of an infinite chain open. >Foundation, >Justification, >Reasons, >Ultimate justification, >Conditions. 1. RussellVsBolzano/Simons: one might have doubts about the "class of all unconditioned things". >Paradoxes, >Russell's paradox, >Sets, >Set theory. Solution/Bolzano: it's about the real things from which we can assume spatial-temporal localization. >Localization. 2. SimonsVsBolzano: Step F) I 322 Why should the class of all conditioned things not be conditioned by something within? This would be conditioned itself, etc. but any attempt to stop the recourse would again appeal to being founded. ((s) The thing that conditions would be within the class of conditioned things, it would be conditioned and conditional at the same time). >Regress. Solution/Simons: we need additionally a conditioning principle. Definition Conditioning Principle/Simons: if a class C is such that each dependent element of it has all the objects on which it depends within X, then X is not dependent. (Simons pro). Simons: this allows infinite chains of dependencies. A kind of infinite dependence already arises e.g. when two objects are mutually dependent. >Dependence, >Causal dependence, >Ontological dependence. If the conditioning principle applies, why should the class X be still externally conditioned? Ad Bolzano: Suppose we accept his argument until e). Then it can go on like this: H) if the class of all conditioned things is conditioned, then there is an element of it that is dependent on something that is not an element of that class. (Contraposition to the conditioning principle) >Contraposition. I) Then such an (unconditioned) object is not an element of the class of all conditioned things, and is thus unconditional. J) Therefore, there is in any case something unconditioned. SimonsVsAtomism: that is better than anything that an atomism achieves. >Atomism. Conditioning principle/Simons: is the best extension of the strong rigid dependency (//), i.e. (N) (a // x ↔ (Ey) [x ε a u a // x] u ~ x ε a) >Rigidity. SimonsVsBlack: with the strong instead of the weak dependency, we can counter Black. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. I 323 God/Mereology/Ontology/Simons: in any case, the strong rigid dependence does not prove the existence of God. Only the existence of an unconditional, which Bolzano cautiously calls "a God". >God, >Existence, >Ontology. Independence/Simons: does not include divinity. >Independence, >Existence statement. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Properties | Lewis | Frank I 357 Definition property/Lewis: the set of exactly those possible beings, actual or non-actual, that do or do not have a specified property - E.g. properties that segments of a street do or do not have. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 --- Lewis IV X Properties/Lewis: These are the appropriate objects of attitudes. >Propositional attitudes. IV 135 Properties/Lewis: Sets of individuals - "something that segments of things (in time or space) simply have. Also extrinsic properties (that things have because of their relation to other things) - in general: the property to live on one world from any set of possible worlds corresponds to these possible worlds - i.e. for each proposition there is a property to live in a world where this proposition is true. Ad IV 146 Proposition/Property/Lewis/(s): Proposition: not related to people, without spatiotemporal localization - simply true in possible world - E.g. Someone is happy - not possible to wish for me, because I do not know if I’m the one - in contrast, property: related to person - I am happy. --- Schwarz I 94 Properties/Quantity theory/Lewis: no properties: being no cat, identity, element-ship > heterology. Schwarz I 97 Disjunctive property/Lewis/Schwarz: 1) Any property is equivalent with a disjunction of two properties - disjunctive property: only if even more unnatural than the members: E.g. round is not disjunctive, as it clearly is not more unnatural than round and not red - E.g. round and lonely or not round and not lonely in contrast, are disjunctive, because it is less natural than round and lonely. Schwarz I 97 Properties/Lewis/Schwarz: Definition intrinsic property: never differ between perfect duplicates. Duplicate: Defined not by sum, but by distribution of the perfectly natural property. Def Perfectly natural property: (PNP) = fundamental property: all qualitative intrinsic differences between things (also possible worlds) are based on their instantiation. - E.g. Fred is the tallest in his family, but his duplicate is not in his family. - that depends on distribution of intrinsic properties: if we duplicate the entire family, the duplicate is sure to be the tallest there as well. >Possible world/Lewis, >Instantiation. Schwarz I 101 Class/Quantity/Properties/Lewis: things with E.g. same charge have to be more common than if they were an element of the same class. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Propositions | Lewis | Frank I 17 Proposition/Lewis: the number of possible worlds in which this proposition is true. >Possible world/Lewis. Def property/Lewis: the number of (actual or non-actual) beings that have this property. >Properties/Lewis. Proposition/Lewis/Frank: now a one-to-one correspondence can be established between each proposition and the property to inhabit a world in which the proposition applies. It makes it possible to dispense with propositions as the objects of the attitudes. But there are now attitudes that cannot be analyzed as an attitude toward a proposition: where we locate ourselves in space and time. E.g. memory loss: someone bumps into their own biography and can still not fit themselves in. - ((s) Because proposition = number of possible worlds, then - e.g. I’m true here in every possible worlds. - Therefore no knowledge). Frank I 329 Proposition: number of possible worlds in which they are true (extensional). Advantage: non-perspectivic access. - ((s) Not everyone has their own possible worlds.) Frank I 355 Propositions: have nothing intersubjective per se. - Problematic therefore is the subjectivity of reference of the first person. >First Person, >Subjectivity, >Centered world. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 --- Lewis IV 137 Proposition/Lewis: divides the population into inhabitants of such worlds in which it applies and those in which it does not apply - one assigns oneself to one of the worlds through belief and localizes oneself in a region of logical space - if quantification over several possible worlds is possible (cross-world), there is a large population across worlds and times. IV 142 E.g. Heimson thinks I’m Hume/Perry/Lewis: self-attribution of a property, not an empty proposition Heimson is Hume - all propositions that are true for Hume, are also true for Heimson, because both live in the same world. - Lewis: So Heimson believes the same things as Hume by believing a true proposition - the predicate -believes to be Hume - applies to both. E.g. of HeimsonVsPropositions as objects of belief - otherwise "I am Hume" would either be true both times or false both times - ((s) difference > proposition / > statement). IV 145 Proposition: in a divided world any proposition is either true or false - hence individual objects of desire are more likely properties (that can be self-attributed) than propositions. IV 146 Proposition: No Proposition: E.g. - there is something that I wish now and I will also want it even when I have it, only I will be happier then - no proposition, because it applies to the time before and after - one time of me will not be happy to live in a world where it will happen at some time. - Solution: the wish for the property to be located later in time - localization in logical space instead of proposition: E.g. The Crusader wants a region in logical space without avoidable misfortune - these are properties. V 160 Proposition: no linguistic entity - no language has enough sentences to express all the propositions - truth functional operations with propositions are Boolean operations about sets of possible worlds. - > inclusion, overlapping. --- ad Stechow 42 Language/Infinite/Lewis/(s): number of propositions is greater than the number of sentences, because power set of the possible worlds). |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Propositions | Perry | Frank I 396 Meaning/idea/PerryVsFrege: We must separate sharply meaning and thoughts. >Thoughts, >Thoughts/Frege, >Sense. The thought is not a mental entity, but corresponds to the informational content. >Thought content, cf. >Thought objects. The meaning corresponds to the role of words. >Conceptual role, >Words, >Word meaning. The same role creates another de re proposition in any context. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Context, >de re. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 --- I 409f Proposition/PerryVsTradition: what is missing, is not a conceptual component, but an indexical. >Indexicality, >Index words. New theory: a kind of proposition is individuated by an object and a part of the old proposition. VsTradition: limiting the substitutability in quotations with propositional attitudes is not explained. >Opacity, >Substitutability. Tradition: E.g. Dean/Franks neighbor (identical, one and the same person): no variable but term. Problem: "He" does not provide a concept but a variable. Cf. >He/He himself. Solution/Perry: "open proposition": with objects and a conceptual component: "de re". - Then the "dean himself" is included and not only the term "Dean". >de re. Then a substitution by "Frank's neighbor" is valid and a quantification meaningful. >Quantification. Vs: de re does not solve the problem of mess in the supermarket (sugar trail) - (because of "I"). >Sugar trail example. --- I 455f Proposition/extra sense//Perry: parabola E.g. early humans who can only eat carrots lying in front of them, are equipped with the ability to believe propositions (to collect and pick up carrots). - Nothing happens, because the propositions do not say to humans that they even appear in it. Solution/Castaneda: additional localization in space and time. >Extra-Sense/Castaneda. Vs: the king of France does not know that he is the King of France and whether the carrot is not in front of the editor of Soul. VsExtra-sense: an extra-sense does not help the thinker embedding himself into a network of mental states. People understand sentences but do not form beliefs. >Understanding, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. List of extra senses for everyone: too long. Extra-sense "i" for everyone: validity by decree: solves the carrots problem but maims the language. Rule: "I" stands for the user ": makes people to speak of themselves in the "third person": ""I" is doing this". Problem: for truth of such sentences one needs reference (reference), meaning ("user") is not enough. >Reference, >Sense. The same meaning cannot perform different references. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Propositions | Sellars | I XXXII Proposition/thoughts/tradition: classical empirical model of thoughts: they have the function to give worrds and sentences a meaning. >Word meaning, >Sentence meaning. Task: to produce actions in form of beliefs. RyleVsTradition: category confusion: thoughts are not locatable. >Thoughts, >Categories/Ryle, >Localization, >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Logical space. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Prototypes | Gärdenfors | I 26 Prototypes/Properties/Gärdenfors: (see Rosch, 1975(1), 1978, Mervis & Rosch, 1981(2), Lakoff, 1987(3)): we can conceive prototypes of properties as central points in a region within domains. --- I 27 Prototypes/Properties/Gärdenfors: Properties like e.g. warm or e.g. large have no prototypes. They correspond to open regions in a domain where no point can be identified as the most typical. The domain can then be divided by a Voronoi tessellation. Similarity: a Voronoi tessellation can provide a similarity measure in a domain that provides a set of categories along with a set of prototypes. This division into discrete spaces makes it possible for only a finite number of words to be used to refer to the regions. This explains a cognitive economy when learning terms. --- I 28 The tessellation of the domain in regions can be finer and coarser. --- I 42 Prototype/Terms/Learning/Gärdenfors: if we accept prototypes when learning terms, we can assume that these are within the conceptual space geometrically between the localizations of learning examples for the corresponding term. Learning: When learning, i.e. the introduction of new examples, the geometrical localization of the prototype shifts, i.e., the center of the domain formed by the examples. --- I 43 This makes the terms dynamic. The boundary lines of the Voronoi tesselation are also shifting, that is, a new tessellation comes about. Categories: in the course of shifting the boundaries of tessellation (when learning new examples for terms), new categories are also emerging, but only those categories that are adjacent to the modified prototypes. Learning: this learning mechanism allows extremely fast learning. --- I 44 Errors: errors in learning are also explained: the child has only names for a few animals that are all located in the same category. Through the adding of new examples, the conceptual space animal becomes finer and new prototypes are established. > Vagueness/Gärdenfors, Language acquisition/Gärdenfors). 1. Rosch, E. (1975). Cognitive representations of semantic categories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 104, 192-233. 2. Rosch, E. (1978). Prototype classification and logical classification. The two systems. In E. Scholnik (Ed.), New trends in cognitive representation: Challenges to Piaget's theory (pp. 73-86). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 3. Mervis, C. & Rosch, E. (1981) Categorization of natural objects. Annual Review of Psychology, 32, 89-115. 4. Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, fire, and dangerous things. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Proximal Theory | Proust | I 227 Proximal/Proust: primitive creatures such as the lumpfish (a species of sea snails) react to a proximal state of the receptors. I 227 Proximal/Proust: e.g. snail: a snail can only process information when there is contact with its receptors. Distal: Birds and mammals need no contact with their receptors. Therefore, they can develop completely different spatial terms. >Proximal theory/Quine, >Seeing, >Perception, >Sensory impressions, >Reality, >World/Thinking. I 228 Space/Animal/Thinking/Proust: intuitive, space is a kind of empty framework for possible perceptual content. >Content. The relation which is of interest to us is the occurrence at the same place, i.e. the equivalence class for all perception experience that affect the same localization in the environment. Proust: this relation is interesting because it does not presuppose either the concept of space or the concept of a concept. It is purely logical. >Concepts, >Concepts/Proust. Proust: the occurrence in the same place is also essential as a basis for the recognition of objects. >Recognition. I 229 Definition Calibration/Proust: Calibration is adaptation of an auditory pattern to a visual. ((s) Coordination of sensory impressions.) Proust: this mechanism is essential to correct the sensory inputs. |
Proust I Joelle Proust "L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Qualia | Shoemaker | Stalnaker I 220 Qualia/common sense/Shoemaker: Thesis: Qualia are internal, intrinsic, but also locally comparable. >Intrinsicness, >Internalism, >Localization, >Comparability. VsFrege-Schlick view. > StalnakerVsShoemaker: per "old-fashioned" Frege-Schlick view. >Inverted spectra. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Reference Systems | Reference system, philosophy: demarcated area with rules for the creating of symbols and their manipulation. The system allows the localization of a statement within this frame. See also frame, localization, reference, reference class, domains, interpretation, theories. |
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| Relationism | Stalnaker | I 82f Relationism/relationalism/Stalnaker: to represent relationism in terms of the logical space, it must be assumed that the logical space itself is partially conventional. >Logical space. I 84 This means, we must assume that the localization function sometimes only conventionally differs and therefore actually represents the same possible world. >Localization. It is not conventional that the origin of the coordinate system can be chosen freely. - This is true for each coordinate system. It would be true even if an absolute theory of space were true. >Coordinate system, >Absoluteness, >Absolute space, >Space, cf. >Substantivalism. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Relativism | Harman | II 426f Moral relativism/Harman: moral relativism corresponds to the >metaphysical realism: there is no place for purely normative facts in a world that consistently has a unique causal order. They are not localizable (Harman pro). Moral absolutism/Harman: moral absolutism is possible in the internal realism, because there is no single and unambiguous causal explanation and order. Then there is not the problem of localization (Putnam pro). >Absoluteness. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Representation | Minsky | Münch III 127 Representation/Minsky: Problem: How does one represent "ordinary"? >Normality, >Representation, >Image theory, >Mapping. Marvin Minsky, “A framework for representing knowledge” in: John Haugeland (Ed) Mind, design, Montgomery 1981, pp. 95-128 Minsky I 157 Representation/Minsky: rearrangements of memory: E.g. what would we need to imagine moving things around a room? First we'd need some way to represent how objects are arranged in space. (…) we could use the following simple four-step script: 1. Store the state of A in M-1. 2. Store the state of B in M-2. 3. Use M-2 to determine the state of A. 4. Use M-1 to determine the state of B. A memory-control script like this can work only if we have memory-units that are small enough to pick out couch-sized portions of the larger scene. M-1 and M-2 would not do the job if they could store only descriptions of entire rooms. In other words, we have to be able to connect our short-term memories only to appropriate aspects of our current problems. Learning such abilities is not simple, and perhaps it is a skill some people never really master. Our pair-exchanging script needs more machinery. Because each memory-unit must wait until the previous step is finished, the timing of each script step may have to depend on various condition sensors. >Lokalization. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Roles | Peacocke | I 109ff Constitutive role: 1st sortal, 2nd psychic state, 3rd relation between 1 and 2. >Sortals, >Psychological states, >Roles, >Constitutive role. Evidence: Sensitivity for evidence is dependend on terms developed for them. >Concepts, >Language use, >Reference. Of two descriptions the constitutive role is the uninformative one. >Description. Constitutive role: "the person who has these perceptions" explains immunity to misidentification. >Incorrigibility, >Cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception. Constitutive role of" now": "the time when this attitude (belief, idea, etc.) occurred". >Localisation. Instead of trivial identity "I am I ": Constitutive role: "I am the person with these states". >Predication. I 122 Constitutive role/I/Peacocke: the constitutive role brings just the difference to the trivial identity: "I am the person with these states" instead of "I am I". >Identity, >Self-identification. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Self | Stalnaker | I 253 Self/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: the semantic diagnosis is unsatisfactory. VsOntological solution: the ontological solution wants to enrich the objective, centerless world in the wrong way. Nagel: center position thesis: there is an objective self. StalnakerVsNagel: the semantic diagnosis has more potential than Nagel thinks. Simple solution: we need context-dependent or subjective information. I 255 Belief/conviction/Stalnaker: beliefs are sets of uncentered possible worlds. They are a self-attribution of property. >Self/Nagel. I 264 Objective self/modest semantic view/Stalnaker: the objective self dispenses with subjective content that would be more than self-localization - there is no realm of subjective facts. Cf. >Centered worlds, >Subjectivity, >Objectivity/Nagel. I 269 Then one would have to know what it is like for Napoleon to be Napoleon if all the facts are considered. Minimal subject: >Subjects/Stalnaker. I 270 Objective self/StalnakerVsObjectivation: (of subjective content) 1) the objective self takes on an extravagant metaphysics and 2) requires an explanation of the special relationship that we still would have to it. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Self- Identification | Evans | Frank I 504ff Incorrigibility/Evans: the view is idealistic if it assumes the self-construction of the world through us. On the other hand, the possibility of identifying ourselves as objective persons cannot be exploited verificationistically. >Incorrigibility. I 515 Immunity/Evans: immunity against misidentification is a direct result of demonstrative identification. - But it is not about "identification". - Erorr: to believe that immunity does not extend to physical characteristics. I 518 Self-identification/Evans: logical form: structure: if we consider [I am F] as if it were based on [b is F] and [I am b], then we get into trouble. I 545 Identification/self-identification/I/Evans: identification is based on localization in space. I 557ff Self-identification/SI/Evans: you cannot identify yourself as a "bearer of pain" (circular). - Pain must first be learned through your own experience. - ((s) Correspondingly with other physical experiences: body does not identify the self/I.) Evans: The idea that I associate with my name does not allow self-identification. Self-Identification: is mixed and not decomposable (in physical/mental components). - Otherwise it is circular. It is not absurd that one cannot identify oneself. >Self-knowledge, >Self-ascription. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Identification | Nagel | Frank I 572f Self-identification/Nagel: how is it possible to identify oneself with a material thing (a body). >I, Ego, Self, >Self. Evans: here the localization is not enough. >Localization. In addition: physical perception and knowledge of your own body. - To have pain is immune to misidentification, but not without thought. ((s) so the subject is required.) >Pain. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Semantic Web | Gärdenfors | I 257 Semantic Web/Gärdenfors: Berners-Lee, Hendler, and Lassila (2001)(1) Thesis: the Semantic Web is an extension of the current web in which the meaning of the given information is well-defined which facilitates the cooperation between human and robot. GärdenforsVsBerners-Lee: instead of developing RDF (for information representation) and OWL (for expressing the ontology), one should examine how people process words. --- I 258 Semantic Web: the dream is to develop a unified language for the representation of everything that exists on the web. Berners-Lee: (Berners-Lee, 1998) Thesis: the semantic web is what we get when we apply the same globalization process, that the web originally applied to the hypertext, to the representation of knowledge. We create the central concepts of absolute truth, total knowledge, and total demonstrability, and see what we can do with limited knowledge. --- I 258 Semantic Web/Shirky/Gärdenfors: Shirky (2003)(2) Thesis: The Semantic Web assumes that many important aspects of the world can be represented in an unambiguous way and in a universally accepted way. After that, a lot of time is spent on the question which is the ideal XML format for such descriptions. This places too much emphasis on a wrong part of the problem: if the world were easy to describe, one could describe it in Sanskrit. Solution/Gärdenfors: Conceptual Spaces. --- I 259 Semantic Web/GärdenforsVsSemantic Web: Classification/similarity/Gärdenfors: when we consider how people deal with concepts, then the class structures mostly capture similarities between the objects. (Goldstone, 1994, Gärdenfors, 2000). Problem: precisely a term like similarity cannot be expressed in the ontology of the Semantic Web. Semantic Web/Shirky/Gärdenfors: (Shirky, 2003)(2): Thesis: the Semantic Web is a machine for the creation of syllogisms. So if the Semantic Web wants to improve all domains where we use syllogisms, then one has to say that is practically nowhere. --- I 260 Semantic Web/Conceptual Space/Gärdenfors: when we use conceptual spaces (with the representation of objects with properties as points in dimensions and regions) for the formation of the Semantic Web, taxonomies (concept hierarchies) occur by themselves. These hierarchies are used for symbolic structures. E.g. a robin is a bird: automatically originates from the fact that the region robin is a subregion of the region that represents birds. Ontology/Computation: a Voronoi tessellation of the conceptual space can be created automatically by the computer and that is all that is necessary for an ontology. (See Noy & McGuinnes, 2001)(3). Identity: also results automatically from the coincidence of points. Properties: Characteristics of properties such as transitivity and symmetry result from the format of conceptual spaces. E.g. the transitivity of "earlier than" follows from the linear structure of the time dimension. ((s) Conclusion: instead of word lists and lists of word lists with an explanation of concept hierarchies and distinction of word classes (such as e.g. the particular role of links and operators or quantifiers), one only needs the geometric properties of points. The explanations of the differences in the word classes would in turn be given in words, which becomes superfluous by conceptual spaces. Thus a) the handling by computer becomes easier and b) a possible circularity in the explanation of the role of words by words becomes more improbable.) --- I 261 Conclusions/Gärdenfors: then you do not need any more inference engines on the symbolic level. E.g. product search: you can find a similar wine with many similar and some different properties through the geometrical localization in the conceptual space. 1. Berners-Lee,T., Hendler, J., & Lassila, O. (2001). The Semantic Web. Scientific American, 284(5), 34-43. 2. Shirky, C., (2003) The Semantic Web, syllogism, and worldview. http://www.shirky.com/writings/semantic_syllogism.html 3. Noy, N. F. & McGuinnes, M. L. (2001). Ontology development 101: A guide to creating your first ontology. Stanford Knowledge Systems Laboratory Technical Report, Stanford, CA. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Space | Geach | I 315 Space/time/Geach: Time and space are radically different: that you need "between" in both cases, is misleading. Spatial order: affects individual objects. Temporal order: what is ordered here, is represented by complex sentences. Geach: in the temporal sense there are more and more complex structures, not in the spatial dimension. E.g. "x is between (y and w) and z" makes no sense. >Time, >Space, >Dimensions, >Localization, >Temporal order, >Spatial order. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Space | Proust | Perler I 228 Space/Animal/Thinking/Proust: intuitive, space is a kind of empty framework for possible perceptual content. >Animals. The relation which is of interest to us is the occurrence at the same place, i.e the equivalence class for all perception experience that affect the same localization in the environment. >Regularity, >Logic, >Concepts. Proust: this relation is interesting because it does not presuppose either the concept of space or the concept of a concept. It is purely logical. Proust: the occurrence in the same place is also essential as a basis for the recognition of objects. >Recognition. |
Proust I Joelle Proust "L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Perler I Dominik Perler Markus Wild Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 |
| Space | Searle | I 149 Space/time/consciousness: asymmetry: consciousness is in time but not in space (Kant, Searle). I 81 Common sense is very far off when it comes to locating pain in physical space. But even such a blatant error does not show that there is no pain. >Pain. II 335 Certainly our speech about mental states lacks a consolidated spatio-temporal localization, which is possible with body movements. >Space-time. But suppose we had a perfect science of the brain so that we could trace experiences like thirst back to a localized physical structure. But then the mental state would still be a global state because the corner of the brain is not thirsty in itself. Cf. >localization. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Space | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 90/91 Language/object/phenomenological/Wittgenstein/early/Hintikka: in the early Wittgenstein the language is based on the visual space and deals with immediately given phenomena. We can see that in the writings of the middle period. I 179 Space/field/absolute/localization/individuation/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: there must be absolute points in visual space, otherwise one could not tell if a spot remains in the same place or not - that is, points in visual space have a logical form - (1931) - Hintikka: therefore they can be Tractatus objects. >Objects, >Things. I 99 Subjective/subjectivity/Wittgenstein: "..another does not see the objects in the same way as I do. Does this mean that the visual space, I am talking about is mine? So that it is subjective? No: it has been merely seen subjective here, and it is opposed to an objective space, but which is only a construction, with the visual space as a base "(VII 71, 100). I 110 ff Subject/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Question: if the objects of the Tractatus are really objects of acquaintance (direct experience) why has Wittgenstein never mentioned this? >Acquaintance. I 111 Tractatus 2.0131 "the spatial object must lie in the infinite space. (A point in space is an argument location). Although the spot in the visual field does not need to be red, but it must have a color, it has, so to speak, a color space around it. >Colour. I 167 ff Space/Space terms/logic/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the same incompatibility (incompatibility as of the color terms) is also raised by the space concepts). The same color spot cannot be located at different places of the space. Wittgenstein: But that is no problem. The space is for him a form of spatial objects. (Tractatus 2.0251: "Space and time are forms of objects".) I 179 Space/visual space/absolute/location/individuation/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: there must be absolute points in the visual space, otherwise you could not tell if a spot remains in the same place or not - that is, points in visual space have a logical form - (1931) - Hintikka: therefore they can be Tractatus objects. >Absoluteness. I 215 Visual space/seeing/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the visual space has its independent reality - it itself has no subject - it is autonomous. --- II 36 Infinite divisibility and space/Wittgenstein: it has been asserted that space is not infinitely divisible. However, regarding the possibilities of the experiment one cannot prove anything. II 39 Search/explore/invent/Wittgenstein: a space is not searched for - searched are things in space. - The room is everything, which one must be certain about in order to ask a question - what you look for, must be fully describable. - On the contrary: logical discovery: different from finding something in the space. - If we could describe this, we would have already found it. II 89 Space/visual space/Wittgenstein: a) visual space: here it is pointless to say something would look like, as if it were further away than the moon - b) physical space: here it makes sense - if we saw how the moon gets smaller, we could not say that it goes away in the visual space, but in the physical - this is a distinction between sense-data and physical object - but useful in both spaces: that A of B is equidistant from C. - We do not need a theory to bring our knowledge of sense data with beliefs about objects in compliance - additionally, what we mean when we say "the penny is round" could also mean that it looks elliptical. - Visual space: here, a circular piece canot look straight - physical space: here it can look straight. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Superintelligence | Hillis | Brockman I 172 Superintelligence/Hillis: Although we do not always perceive it, hybrid superintelligences such as nation- states and corporations have their own emergent goals. Although they are built by and for humans, they often act like independent intelligent entities, and their actions are not always aligned with the interests of the people who created them. The state is not always for the citizen, nor the company for the shareholder. Nor do not-for-profits, religious orders, or political parties always act in furtherance of their founding principles. Intuitively, we recognize that their actions are guided by internal goals, which is why we personify them, both legally and in our habits of thought. Brockman I 173 The components’ good intentions are not a guarantee of the emergent system’s good behavior. Brockman I 174 It is interesting to consider how the hybrid superintelligences [e.g., companies or nations] currently deal with conflicts among themselves. They are willing, if necessary, to demand great sacrifices of their citizens to enforce their authority, even to the point of sacrificing their citizens’ lives. Brockman I 175 Localization: This geographical division of authority made logical sense when most of the actors were humans who spent their lives within a single nation-state, but now that the actors of importance include geographically distributed hybrid intelligences such as multinational corporations, that logic is less obvious. An artificial intelligence might well exist “in the cloud” rather than at any physical location. Possible scenarios: 1st. Multiple machine intelligences will ultimately be controlled by and allied with, individual nation-state, e.g., American and Chinese super-AIs. In this scenario, the superintelligences become an extension of the state, and vice versa. 2nd Scenario: corporate/AI scenario: (…) companies [like Amazon, Baidu, Microsoft, Facebook, Apple, and IBM] all see a business imperative to build artificial intelligences of their own. It is easy to imagine a future in which corporations independently build their own machine intelligences, protected within firewalls preventing the machines from taking advantage of one another’s knowledge. 3rd Scenario: perhaps the one people fear the most, is that artificial intelligences will not be aligned with either humans or hybrid superintelligences but will act solely in their own interests. They might even merge into a single machine superintelligence (…). Brockman I 176 4th scenario: machine intelligences will not be allied with one another but instead will work to further the goals of humanity as a whole. In this optimistic scenario, AI could help us restore the balance of power between the individual and the corporation, between the citizen and the state. Hillis, D. W. “The First Machine Intelligences” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Terminology | Lacan | I 125 Gap/Lacan: "Ontological to the function of the unconscious is the gap through which this something, whose adventure in our field is obviously of such short duration, is brought to light for a moment ... what happens here remains inadequate for the contradiction of spatial-temporal localization and also for the function of time." The desire, though indestructible, escaped in time. We must distinguish a second mode of time: logical time! Discontinuity, moment of "gaping". |
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| Truthmakers | Evans | Frank I 554f Brains in a vat/BIV/Evans: in the situation of the brains in a vat there are no truth-makers - if the subject learns the truth, it would have to hold itself for "nowhere located". Senseless/meaningless: to identify himself: "I am a brain". - The body or localization is crucial. Contrary to this: e.g. brain transplant: here there is a history: the brain would be experienced as "somewhere". ((s) Cf. >Identity/Parfit). Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Two Omniscient Gods | Lewis | IV 139 Two Omniscient Gods/2 Gods/Lewis: the example is to show that objects of attitudes should not be identified with propositions as sets of possible worlds. E.g. both know exactly the world they inhabit - i.e. they know every true proposition - but do not know who they are themselves. Solution: self-attribution of a property, not a proposition - (spatial (not logical) localization is not propositional knowledge). >Localization, >Propositional knowledge. LewisVsCastaneda: Solution: de se: we just need to find a case where the editor of soul knows which world is his without knowing if he is among the millionaires - de se: self-identification, self-localization. de dicto: self-localization in logical space (which proposition one believes). >de re, >de dicto, >de se. IV 141 Two omniscient gods/Lewis: E.g. assuming a variant with two pairs of two gods in two possible worlds W and V, who swapped places - Assuming God 1 knows that the proposition "I’m on the highest" is true in W - and he knows that he lives in W! - It does not follow that he knows that he is on the highest! - Because if he had been on the coldest, the same sentence would have expressed a different proposition, one that is true in V and wrong in W - one of which he knew that it is false. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Vagueness | Gärdenfors | I 44 Vagueness/Language/Gärdenfors: Language is full of vagueness. Since Leibniz, philosophers have dreamed of a precise language. --- I 45 Gärdenfors thesis: vague concepts are necessary in a language for reasons of cognitive economy. The vagueness results for the most part from the fact that we learn concepts through individual examples and counterexamples. --- I 46 Explanation of the vagueness: 1. With changing boundary lines of the domains, there is a different probability for the localization of a prototype. 2. Vagueness stems from the changing weighting of the dimensions in one domain. The different weights result in changing contexts. > Perception/Gärdenfors, > prototypes/Gärdenfors, categories/Gärdenfors. --- I 47 General: cognitive limitations relating to the location of the prototypes and relative weighting of the dimensions explain why terms are generally vague and why categorial perception is omnipresent. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Word Classes | Gärdenfors | I 115 Word classes/Gärdenfors: in all languages, words can be grouped into classes with different semantic and syntactic functions. In English usually in eight classes: nouns, pronouns, adjectives, verbs, adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions and interjections. --- I 116 Definition word class/linguistics: class of words with the same syntactic properties, in particular, inflection and localization in sentences. (Croft, 2001).(1) Communication: that verbs, nouns, and adjectives can be identified in almost all languages, suggests that general patterns of human cognition make a division into these classes useful. (Dixon, 2004)(2). Communication/Gärdenfors: its structure is subject to the same restrictions as thinking and problem solving. --- I 231 Word classes/Gärdenfors: are almost exclusively syntactically determined. GärdenforsVsTradition: I believe that syntactic markers are an effect, not the cause of the division of words into classes. There are cognitive and communicative restrictions on how words are grouped. (See also Langacker (1991b)(3) for a similar approach.) --- I 239 Word classes/Conceptual Space/Areas/Gärdenfors: Thesis: Words in all content word classes, except nouns, refer to a single area. 1. Croft, W. (2001). Radical construction grammar: Syntactic theory in typological perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Dixon, R. M. W. (2004). Adjective Classes in typological perspective. In R. M. W. Dixon & A. Y. Aikhenvald (Eds.) Adjective classes: A cross-linguistic typology (pp. 1-49) Oxford. 3. Langacker, R. W. (1991b). Concept, image, symbol. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Benacerraf, P. | Field Vs Benacerraf, P. | I 24 VsBenacerraf/Field: another argument could be brought forward: the problem of consistent arbitrariness of identifications is a phenomenon not only in mathematics, but also in other areas: E.g. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: E.g. some say it is arbitrary whether a point is a convergent number of ever smaller regions, all of which are non-zero. Anti-PlatonismVs: If no sets are assumed, the problem takes care of itself. I 25 Arbitrariness/Field: Thesis: In the realm of physical objects, we do not have the same consistent arbitrariness as in mathematics. VsPlatonism/Mathematics/Field: 1) The most-discussed challenge to him is the epistemological position. Locus classicus: BenacerrafVsPlatonism: (1973): FieldVsBenacerraf: Problem: it relies on an outdated causal theory of knowledge. BenacerrafVsPlatonism: if there were language and mind-independent mathematical entities without spatiotemporal localization which cannot enter any physical interactions, then we cannot know if they exist nor know anything else about them. The Platonist had to postulate mysterious forces. VsBenacerraf: here we could respond with the indispensability argument: Mathematical entities (ME) are indispensable in our different theories about physical objects. FieldVsVs: but this assumes that they are indispensable, and I don’t believe they are. Benacerraf/Field: However, we can formulate his argument more sharply. Cannot be explained as a problem of our ability to justify belief in mathematical entities, but rather the reliability of our belief. In that, we assume that there are positive reasons to believe in such mathematical entities. I 26 Benacerraf’s challenge is that we need to provide access to the mechanisms that explain how our beliefs about such remote entities reproduces facts about them so well. Important argument: if you cannot explain that in principle, the belief in the mathematical entities wanes. Benacerraf shows that the cost of an assumption of ME is high. Perhaps they are not indispensable after all? (At least this is how I I understand Benacerraf). I 27 VsBenacerraf/Field: 2) sometimes it is objected to his position (as I have explained) that a declaration of reliability is required if these facts are contingent, which would be dropped in the case of necessary facts. (FieldVs: see below, Essay 7). I 29 Indispensability Argument/Field: could even be explained with evolutionary theory: that the evolutionary pressure led us to finally find the empirically indispensable mathematical assumptions plausible. FieldVsVsBenacerraf: Problem: the level of mathematics which applied in empirical science is relatively small! That means only this small part could be confirmed as reliable by this empiricism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Bolzano, B. | Simons Vs Bolzano, B. | I 321 Cosmological proof of God’s existence/unconditional existence/Bolzano/Simons: avoids the problem of foundedness by referring to classes. a) There is something real e.g. my thoughts that it is so. b) Suppose there is any thing, e.g. A that is unconditional in its existence, then we have it already. c) Suppose A is conditional. Then the class of all conditional real things forms A, B, C, ... This is also possible if this class is infinite. d) The class of all conditional real things is itself real. Is it conditional or unconditional? If it is unconditional, we have it already. e) Suppose it is conditional: each conditional presupposes the existence of something else, the existence of which it requires. So even the class of all conditioned things, if conditional, requires the existence of something that it presupposes. f) This other thing has to be unconditional because if it were conditional, it would belong to the class of all conditional things. g) Therefore, there is something unconditional, e.g. a God. Simons: this does not use foundedness: c) leaves the possibility of an infinite chain open. RussellVsBolzano/Simons: one could have doubts about the "class of all unconditional things" (> paradoxes). Solution/Bolzano: it is exactly about the real things of which we can assume spatiotemporal localization. 2. SimonsVsBolzano: step f) I 322 Why should the class of all conditional things not be required by something within? This itself would be conditional, etc. but any attempt to stop the recourse would again appeal to foundedness. ((s) The conditional would be within the class of conditional things, it would be conditional and conditioning at the same time.) Solution/Simons: we need a conditioning principle in addition. Def Conditioning Principle/Simons: if a class C is such that each dependent member of her has all of the objects on which it depends within X, then X is not dependent (Simons pro). Simons: this allows infinite chains of dependencies. A kind of infinite dependence appears already if e.g. two objects mutually require each other. If the conditioning principle applies, why should the class X then be even conditioned from the outside? Ad Bolzano: suppose we accept his argument up to e). Then it can go on like this: h) If the class of all conditional things is conditional, then there is an element of it which is dependent on something that is not a member of this class (contraposition to the conditioning principle). i) Then such an (unconditional) object is no member of the class of all conditional things and therefore unconditional. j) Therefore, something unconditional definitely exists. SimonsVsAtomism: that is better than anything the atomism accomplishes. Conditioning Principle/Simons: the conditioning principle is the best extension of strong rigid dependence (7), that means that: (N) (a 7 x ≡ (Ey)[x ε a u a 7 x] u ~ x ε a) SimonsVsBlack: we can face Black with the strong rather than with the weak dependence. I 323 God/mereology/ontology/Simons: in any case, the strong rigid dependence does not prove the existence of God. Only the existence of something unconditional that Bolzano prudently called "a god". Independence/Simons: independence includes by no means divinity. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Burke, Michael | Simons Vs Burke, Michael | I 195 Interrupted Existence/Simons: interrupted existence met us in connection with temporal sums and products and will meet us again below in connection with superposition (to be in the same place at the same time). Anyway, it is not clear to decide if it exists: E.g. an artifact can be taken apart and reassembled, for example for maintenance or repair. Here, we will say that it exists again when it resumes its old function. I 197 E.g. if some parts are scattered and may be lost and must be replaced by other parts it is a matter of chance. Then the question is whether an object exists in the state, not only dependent on the current physical state and on the history but also on the further course of development, and that seems wrong. Artifacts/Simons: of course, the conditions for the survival of artifacts are vague. We certainly allow the replacement of parts. E.g. a machine that is fed with any powder and water and busts of Mozart are made of it. After a while, the busts are crashed and the powder is filled again in the machine. Then again a bust of Mozart is made. Should it be the same? No, because the atoms are in another place. E.g. variant: in the variant Mozart and Beethoven busts are produced alternately. Then the case would be clear anyway. (For the defenders of continuity): there is a new bust every time, despite the complete continuity. Stronger example: Chisholm's toy castle: here the building blocks are always in the same place. E.g. Michael Burke: a table is created with thirty blocks, then disassembled and with the same building blocks a chair and a bird house are created. Then again a table. I 198 Burke: 1. The table ended its existence when being disassembled: 2. The same table is created again. Simons: then the continuity theorists are in trouble no matter what strategies they apply. But Burke leaves the way open for them to deny identity across the gap: they can still claim that the example corresponds to the one of the busts, despite the fixed localization of parts: a new table is always created out of old material. BurkeVs: pro identity. SimonsVsBurke: Burke's arguments for identity are less convincing than for the ends of the existence of the table. His point is rather that so well controlled interruptions are ontologically harmless and not one has to search the traces of parts across the gap. "Continuity Theory"/terminology/Simons: the continuity theory is the thesis that the "old" existence is resumed after the interruption. SimonsVs: it paid a price for it: namely the exaggeration of objects which are broken down into its parts or duplication of objects that do not take place. Simons: but both views seem benign: each has its arguments. The only problem is that the two are contradicting each other. This can be seen with e.g. the Ship of Theseus. I 199 Ship of Theseus/Simons: problem: there are conflicting claims: between a) the "Collector": he places value on substantive continuity and b) the "Pragmatist": he wants functional continuity. Problem: both sides have complementary things that speak for each of them. Wrong solution: "relativized identity": then both sides would virtually no longer "touch" each other but that would not explain why there is a problem at all. SimonsVsBurke: that the type of an object is a function of its properties is regardless of it wrong: e.g. objects that are needed in a community: there are many pairs of objects which are physico-chemically exactly alike but belong to different types: e.g. holy/normal water, real/ perfectly counterfeit banknotes, originals/replicas, wedding rings/other rings, maybe also person/body. Of course, each of these objects falls under a higher sortal. Burke: thesis: various substantive objects cannot be simultaneously embodied in one and the same matter. SimonsVsBurke: on the contrary, e.g. (see above) different boards may have the same members. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Denotation Theory | Zink Vs Denotation Theory | Wolf II 153 Denotation/Zink: E.g. "Eisenhower is the former president of the United States" the representative of the denotation theory will say that the listener can understand the meaning of the name, but cannot specify the meaning: the meaning is the named thing. The strength of this objection is that this does not necessarily speak for the connotation theory because other interpretations are possible. The explanatory words allegedly contain a kind of pointer, which points to the thing. --- II 154 That would explain why it still works in the absence of the thing. ("Verbal Showing"). Denotation theory/Zink: two variants: 1. the name means the thing. The meaning is simply that thing. 2. the name means the thing in so far it gets pointed at. The meaning of the name is pointing to the thing. The two exclude each other alternately. Because the thing cannot be the same as the pointing. No object can point to itself. E.g. Although a part of the object can point to itself, like a bent back finger. Pointing includes more than just the thing: the gesture of pointing. Then understanding of the name is always more than the thing includes. --- II 155 ZinkVsDenotation: 1. to understand the "denotative" meaning, we must understand a "connotative meaning" (description). a) we need to understand a general term to understand a name. (Class expression, meaning includes the meaning of "have duration " (general term)). b) to understand a concrete thing as a single thing, we have to understand it as a general type of thing too. (General characteristic of the temporal localization, we need to understand). 2. more radical: the thing that is supposedly the meaning of the proper name , cannot be any part of its meaning! --- II 157 Individual thing/Zink: there are no things that would be mere individual things! Symbol/Zink: advantage: includes aspects that can never be isolated in reality. A word for the color, another for the expansion, although both are never separate in reality . Pointe: the meaning of a symbol (for one aspect), must include the meaning of another symbol (for a different aspect). Understanding/Zink: so the meaning of a symbol is recorded only if one also covers the meaning, designated by a different symbol. (Color/extension). But "color" does not mean the same as "expanded". So also a proper name as a symbol for a particular means everything what this general type of thing symbolizes and means. --- II 158 Meaning/names/Zink: we could decide that the meaning of a general name are those which it names. But that would be wrong! (S.U.) Names/meaning/symbols/Zink: we can now show that the things are neither for the general-name nor for the proper name part of the meaning! Argument: the condition that there is the meaning "B" is that there is a symbol S If a thing is the meaning of a symbol, then at least the thing has, as distinguished from the symbol, no meaning! have/be. Only the symbol has a meaning. (Denotation theory: thing is meaning class is meaning of the general name). --- II 162 Denotation theory/Zink: ad 2. (see above: The meaning is pointing): contain a) Pointing is included in meaning b) Pointing itself is the meaning. Vs b) may not be sufficient because we understand the name, even if no one points, or in the absence of the thing. In addition, only people, not names, are pointing to things. Pointing requires that one has already understood the meaning! a)Zink: that's right: understanding a proper name means understanding what it would mean to point at this thing that means under which circumstances one would do it. |
Zink I Sidney ZInk "The Meaning of Proper Names", in: Mind 72 (1963) S. 481-499 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Descartes, R. | Evans Vs Descartes, R. | Frank I 497 EvansVsDescartes/EvansVsHume/EvansVsLocke/EvansVsKant: the "I" of mental self-attribution refers neither to a Cartesian "Ego" now to a Lockean person, nor to a Humean bundle of perceptions, nor to a Kantian I, but rather to an object of flesh and blood! Consequence: the background element of self-identification must be the localization in space and time. I 517 EvansVsDescartes: strongest antidote: the fact that these ways to acquire knowledge about ourselves must be incoporated in the information component of a functional characterization of our "I" ideas. I 522 Body Awareness/Descartes: not a way to achieve knowledge about oneself, but only about something that one has. EvansVsDescartes: It’s hard to make sense from this. (s) This is not an argument. Descartes: I have to admit defeat when Descartes says that this was a way to gain knowledge about myself, but one that uses my identification! Evans: I have to admit that. I 523 EvansVsDescartes: our "I" notions are notions of bearers of physical no less than mental properties. I 562 EvansVsDescartes: the use of "I" simply bridges the gap between the mental and the physical and is not more closely connected to one aspect than to the other. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Evans, G. | Peacocke Vs Evans, G. | I 169/170 Demonstratives/Evans: perceptually demonstrative ways of givenness are possible, because these conditions are fulfilled: in a normal perception situation, there is an information link between subject and object, and also the subject knows or is able to find out where the object is. If the subject has the general ability to know what propositions makes of the form "π = p" true for any π (where π is an identification of a public place without index words (in a non-indexical frame of reference)) if p is the notion of a place in its egocentric space. If it is also able to locate the object in its egocentric space, we can say that it has an idea of the object. Idea/Notion/Evans/Terminology/Intension/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: Evans "Idea" (notion) corresponds to my way of givenness "mode of presentation". Idea/Evans: Thesis: we can conceive the idea of an object a as consisting in its knowledge of what it is to be true for an arbitrary sentence of the form "δ = a". Peacocke: where "δ" is the area of the basic ideas of an object. Fundamental Idea/Evans: is what you have if you think of an object as the possessor of the fundamental ground of difference that it actually has. Peacocke: i.e. what distinguishes an object from all others. I.e. for material objects type and location. PeacockeVsEvans: we have already seen cases where the thinker was unable to locate the object in his egocentric space: E.g. the craters on the moon. I 171 E.g. apple in the mirror cabinet. But it still seems possible to think about it, for example, wonder where it is! It is true that it is possible to at least provide a rough direction in egocentric space, but that is hardly sufficient for the knowledge condition of Evans. In the case of the memory image, it is clearer that no localization in the current egocentric space is needed. pro Evans: there must be additional imaginable evidence, e.g. experience or tools for localization (if necessary, even space travel!). If that were not imaginable, we would have to assume that the subject was not able to think of the object in public space! pro Evans: an information link is not sufficient to think demonstratively about the object. VsEvans: but that is less than to demand that the thinker can locate the object at present. Weaker Requirement: Instead, a general ability of the subject can locate the object, if necessary, is sufficient. Evans: if you cannot locate an object, you can still think of it in the mixed demonstrative descriptive way of givenness: "that which causes my experience". But in normal cases this is a wrong description! Peacocke: it also seems to be wrong in the examples of the lunar craters, the apple in the mirror cabinet. PeacockeVsEvans: trange asymmetry: Idea/Evans: an idea a of a place in a self-centered space is an adequate idea of a place in the public space. Holistic/Evans: if an arbitrarily fundamental identification of a location is possible, it is holistic. (Varieties of reference, p. 162). Peacocke: this knowledge is grounded in a general ability to put a cognitive map of the objective spatial world over our own egocentric space. I 172 E.g. in some cases this will not be possible, for example, when you are kidnapped, or ended up in an unknown area, etc. Point: even in such cases, you can still use the demonstrative pronoun "here" (in reference to objects). I.e. the thoughts are still thoughts about public space! ((s) and the self-centered space). Idea/Demonstrative Way of Givenness/PeacockeVsEvans: so his theory does not demand any ability to give a public, non-egocentric individuation our thoughts to have thoughts about a place in the public space at all. Analogy/Peacocke: exactly analogous objections can be made in the case of demonstrative ways of givenness: E.g. Suppose a subject perceives an object of type F in the manner H. Then F is the token way of givenness. Then we can introduce: [W, Fs] for the perceptual "this F". Then there is exactly one proposition of the form "p = localization of [W, Fs] now", which is true, and the subject knows what it is for it that it is true for it. PeacockeVsEvans: why should we demand here, but not in the earlier example, that the subject also knows which p (or which in the earlier case) is mentioned in this one true proposition? This is particularly absurd in the case of the lost subject. PeacockeVsEvans: his theory allows that [W, Fs] is an adequate idea here, although the subject has no fundamental idea of the object. Peacocke: but if we insisted that it could have a fundamental idea if he had more evidence, then why is an analogous possibility not also sufficient for adequacy in terms of the egocentric space? I 173 There seem to be only two uniform positions: 1) Identification/Localization/Idea/Demonstratives/Liberal Position: sufficient for a genuine way of givenness or adequate ideas are the general ability of localization plus uniqueness of the current localization in the relevant space. 2) Strict position: this is neither sufficient for genuine ways of givenness nor for adequate ideas. PeacockeVs: this can hardly be represented as a unified theory: it means that, if you are lost, you cannot think about the objects that you see around you. That would also mean to preclude a priori that you as a kidnapped person can ask the question "Which city is this?". Demonstratives/Peacocke: Thesis: I represent the uniformly liberal position Demonstratives/Evans: Thesis: is liberal in terms of public space and strictly in terms of egocentric space! ad 1): does not deny the importance of fundamental ideas. If a subject is neither able to locate an object in the public nor in egocentric space ((s) E.g. he wakes up from anesthesia and hears a monaural sound), then it must still believe that this object has a fundamental identification. Otherwise it would have to assume that there is no object there. Anscombe: E.g. a subject sees two matchboxes through two holes which (are manipulated) so arranged that it sees only one box, then the subject does not know what it means for the sentence "this matchbox is F" to be true. The uniformly liberal view allows the subject to use demonstratives which depend on mental images, even if it has no idea where in the public space and when it has encountered the object. EvansVs: representatives of this position will say that the knowledge of the subject is at least partial, I 174 because this idea causally results from an encounter with the object. But that makes their position worse instead of better: for it completely twists the grammar and logic of the concept of knowing what it is for the subject that p is true. Ability/PeacockeVsEvans: but a capability can also consist in the experience of finding out the right causal chains in a given environment: the same goes for the localization of an object point seen in the mirror in egocentric space. PeacockeVsEvans: his distinction seems unreal: it may be simultaneously true that someone has a relation R to the object due to causal relations, and be true that the possibility of being in this relation R is a question of the abilities of the subject. E.g. (Evans) to recognize the ball: Peacocke: this is not a sensory motor skill, but rather the ability to draw certain conclusions, which however require an earlier encounter. This also applies to e.g. the cognitive map, which is placed over the egocentric space: PeacockeVsEvans: in both cases it does not follow that the presented object, remembered or perceived, is thought of explicitly in causal terms: the way of givenness is truly demonstrative. First Person/PeacockeVsEvans: the second major objection concerns thoughts of the first person: the different examples of immunity to misidentification, which contain the first person, roughly break down into two groups: a) here, immunity seems absolute: E.g. "I am in pain". I 175 b) Here, the immunity seems to depend on presuppositions about the world: if these assumptions are wrong, they open the possibility of picking out something wrong without stopping to use the word "I". These include: E.g. "I was on the ocean liner": memory image. E.g. "I sit at the desk": visual, kinesthetic, tactile perceptions. The distinction between a) and b) may be made by the constitutive role: "The person with these conscious states." Infallibility/Tradition/Evans: (absolutely immune judgments): the judgment to be a judgment of a specific content can be constituted by the fact that this judgement responds to this state. Peacocke pro. PeacockeVsEvans: Problem: can this infallibility be connected to the rest of Evans' theory? Because: I/Evans: Thesis: the reference of "I" may fail! Peacocke: how is that compatible with the absolute immunity of "I am in pain"? Conditionalisation: does not help: E.g. "if I exist, I am in pain" that cannot fulfill the purpose: the existence of the idea still needs the reference of "I". Similarly: E.g. "If my use of "I" refers, I am in pain": because "my use" must be explained in terms of the first person. Question: Can we use memory demonstratives which refer to previous use of first-person ways of givenness? E.g. "If those earlier uses of "I" speak, I am in pain." (Point: not "my uses"). PeacockeVs: that does not help: Descartes' evil demon could have suggested you the memories of someone else. (>Shoemaker: q-memories.) I 176 Constitutive Role/Brains in the Vat/BIV/EvansVsPeacocke: the constitutive role of [self] would not explain why the brains in the vat would be able to speak in a demonstrative way about their own experiences: Mental States/Evans: differ from all other states and objects in that they refer demonstratively to their owners. Pain is identified as an element of the objective order. Then someone can have no adequate idea of these mental states if he does not know to which person they happen. Peacocke: we can even concede thoughts about its pain to the brain in a vat, provided that it can give a fundamental identification of the person who has the pain. Peacocke: No, the nerves must be wired correctly. I.e. this is not true for the brains in the vat. So we can stick to the liberal point of view and at the constitutive role and the idea of a person. Also to the fact that the mental states are individuated on the person who has them. Individuation/Mental States/PeacockeVsEvans: not through localization (like with material objects), but through the person. I 177 E.g. Split-Brain Patient/Peacocke: here we can speak of different, but qualitatively equivalent experiences. From this could follow two centers of consciousness in a single brain. But: after the surgery we should not say that one of the two was the original and the other one was added later. E.g. olfactory sensation of the left and right nostril separate. Then there are actually separate causes for both experiences. ((s), but the same source.) Peacocke: it does not follow that in normal brains two consciousnesses work in harmony. Here, the sense of smell is caused by simultaneous input through both nostrils and is thus overdetermined. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Fodor, J. | Peacocke Vs Fodor, J. | I 208 Perception/Mentalese/MT/Fodor: what happens in perception, is a description of the environment in a vocabulary is not expressible, that refers to the values of physical variables. E.g. "A butterfly is on the lawn" Instead, in Mentalese we shall speak of "light being the magnitude of the retina and region L". PeacockeVsFodor/PeacockeVsMentalese: what is actually the token of Mentalese, that refers to this localization L? There seems to be nothing there. E.g. a different retina area could supply information about a different localization, as well as the original cell. I 209 But that leads to no difference within Mentalese! There is only a difference of the relata: one refers causally to one area of the retina, the other to another one. VsPeacocke: it could be argued that something like "foggy" ("it's foggy here") corresponds to the individual spots. "Foggy" then has no relevant syntactic structure, but when it occurs in a statement, it will refer to a specific place and time. In fact, several central units of the nervous system must somehow receive non-indexical information from the periphery: E.g. someone who receives one hundred telegrams: "it is bright here", "it is raining here", etc. is not in a position to draw a map if he does not know where the telegrams come from. Peacocke: but an indexical strategy cannot work for more complex contents. A given nerve cell may be neurophysiologically indistinguishable from another one, with completely different content conditions for firing. Trivialization/Mentalese: but if these relations should count as part of the syntactic structure of a (mental) state, then the language of the mind is trivialized. There would be no true sentence analogs. Mentalese/Perception/Fodor/Peacocke: a similar argument is about e.g. approved detectors for lines, deep within the perceptual system: these suggest causal relations for perceptions. But possession of a structured content does not require a corresponding physical structure in the state, but there may be in the pattern of relations in which the state stands. Peacocke: a model that satisfies this relational paradigm, but does not require Mentalese must meet several conditions: 1) How can propositional content be ascribed without referring to syntactic structures? I.e. relatively complex contents must be attributed to syntactically unstructured (mental) states. 2) It must be shown how these states interact with perception and behavior. I 215 Computation/Language/Mentalese/PeacockeVsFodor: not even computation (calculation of behavior and perception) seems to require language: E.g. question whether the acting person should do φ. Fodor: E.g. the actor is described as computing the anticipated benefit of φ-s under the condition C. Peacocke: the extent to which the subject has the corresponding belief "C given that I φ" may consist in the presence of a corresponding physical state to a certain extent. That would in turn only be a matter of pure relations! The same applies to reaching the state "C and I φ". The states can interact without requiring syntactic structures. Def Computation/Peacocke: (calculation) is a question of states with content that emerge systematically from each other. This requires certain patterns of order and of causal relations, but no syntactic structure. PeacockeVsFodor: it does not necessary apply: "No representation, no computation". I 215/216 Mentalese/Fodor: (Language of Thought, p. 199) Thesis: there can be no construction of psychology without assuming that organisms possess a proper description as instantiation (incarnation) of another formal system: "proper" requires: a) there must be a general procedure for the attribution of character formulas (assigning formulae) to states of the organism b) for each propositional attitude there must be a causal state of the organism so that c1) the state is interpretable as relation to a formula and c2) it is nomologically necessary and sufficient (or contingently identical) to have these propositional attitudes. d) Mental representations have their causal roles by virtue of their formal properties. VsMentalese/PeacockeVsFodor: we can have all of this without Mentalese! Either: 1) There are really sentence analogues in the brain or: 2) Fodor's condition could be met otherwise: there could be a semantics that is correlated with Frege's thoughts. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 |
| Fodor, J. | Stalnaker Vs Fodor, J. | II 176 Def narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: is a generalization of Kaplan's character in the sense that the context considers any for the speaker external fact that is relevant to the determination of the wide content. Extensional identity criterion/narrow content/Fodor: (1987, 30 – 48)(1): C: be the condition that is fulfilled by the twin-me on twin-earth, C’: by myself in the actual world. Since there is no miracle it must be true that when an organism shares the neurophysiological constitution of my twin and fulfills C it follows that his thoughts and my twin also share the truth conditions (tr.c.). So the extensional identity criterion is that two thought contents (mental content) are the same iff they cause the same mapping of thoughts and context on truth conditions. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: that tells us less than it appears about the mapping that is used here. Nor how the relevant function is determined by what is going on in the mind of the believer. II 177 StalnakerVsFodor: we consider the following parody of his argument: e.g. I have the property of being exactly three miles from a burning stable - my twin is located on twin earth at exactly the same place, but, however, has the property of being exactly three miles from a snowy henhouse. C: then there surely is a property for my twin due to which he is three miles from the henhouse while this property does not exist for me. We call this condition C. C’: is then the property that makes up for me that I am three miles from the burning stable which does not exist for my twin. Since there is no miracle, we know at least this much: both, my twin and I, would in our respective world be three miles from a snowy henhouse when condition C ruled and both three miles from a burning stable if C' ruled. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: which determines no function at all that makes the condition C' to the property to be three miles from a snowy henhouse and at the same time condition C to the property to be three miles from a burning stable - a function that allegedly makes the contribution of the location of the subject to a specific relational property. StalnakerVsFodor: there are such functions and there is no need to identify one of them with the contribution of my intrinsic localization with the special relational property. My twin cannot sensibly say: "I did my part, as I - if condition C had ruled, .... Each localization is in the way that for any external conditions if those conditions rule something in this localizations is three miles away from a burning stable. narrow content/Stalnaker: question: does my cousin have the same narrow content as my conviction that salt is soluble in water but not in something else? StalnakerVsFodor: his theory gives no indication as to how an answer to this question was to be found! Note: however for me it is not about an uncertainty at all, this is also true for wide content but that we do not know at all how to identify narrow content. II 180 Belief/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: his image of faith is decisively motivated by his approach that there is an internal language (Mentalese) which is saved in the internal Belief/Fodor: are saved inner propositions. ((s) not propositions). They are convictions by virtue of their internal functional role. They are also identifiable independent of the environment of the subject. Semantic properties/Fodor: however partly depend on what happens in the environment around it but the way how they depend on it is determined by purely internal states of the subject! StalnakerVsFodor: here strong empirical presuppositions are in play. Def narrow content/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: function of context (in a very wide sense) on truth conditional content. StalnakerVsFodor: this is attractive for his intentions but it does not explain how it ever comes to that. And how to identify any narrow content. Narrow content/Stalnaker: is there any way at all to identify narrow content that is not based on Mentalese? Yes, by Dennett (…+…) II 188 Def individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/Fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically. Important argument: thus it is not excluded that mental states are individuated due to relational properties. Relational properties/Fodor: are taxonomically when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence StalnakerVsFodor: a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers. But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal powers. Therefore Fodor represents only the weaker thesis. Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger. StalnakerVsFodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (FodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of the strong with the weak thesis. Stalnaker: to exclude that psychological states are individuated by normal wide content you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. E.g. Fodor: Individualism/Fodor/Stalnaker: Fodor defends his version of individualism with an example of a causal irrelevant relational property: e.g. h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with heads up, II 189 t-particle: we call that way the same particle if the coin shows tails. Fodor: no reasonable theory will use this distinction to explain the behavior of the particle. StalnakerVsFodor: but from this it does not follow that psychological states must be purely internal (intrinsic). (1) Fodor, J. A. (1987): Explorations in cognitive science, No. 2.Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. British Psychological Society; The MIT Press. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Haecceitism | Lewis Vs Haecceitism | IV 140 LewisVsHaecceitism: Haecceitism/Possible World/poss.w./VsLewis: Followers of haecceity are not persuaded by the example of the two gods. Variant: e.g. 2 gods: both live in world W, two other gods live in world V, which differs from W because both gods have swapped their seats. The god on the highest mountain in W and the god on the coldest mountain in V are linked by a simple bond which somehow makes them one. (The same is valid for the other two.) If the god on the highest mountain in W does not know whether he sits on the hightest or the coldest mountain, then he cannot know for sure which one of the worlds is his. He may know everything about the qualitative state that can be known about his world, but he does not know whether his world is W or V. If he knew, he would know every proposition that is valid in his world. But it seems that he does not know one proposition: The one which would correspond to the sentence "I sit on the highest mountain." I/Haecceitism: If his pronoun "I" is accurate for both, his brother and him, in haecceitas on the coldest mountain, then the proposition is indeed valid in W, but not in V! IV 141 If he were to know this proposition, would he then not know that he sits on the hightest mountain? 2 gods/LewisVsHaeccetism: I would love to discover what I should know about the objects of belief, and leave the followers of haeccetism to themselves. But I cannot resist to barge in. If you were a follower of haecceitism, I would recommend you to not believe the analysis written above. Haecceitism or not, there is a kind of not knowing which cannot be healed by some sort of self-localization in the logical space. E.g. supposing that both gods have swapped their places, and it shall be conceded that the god on the highest mountain knows that his world is W and not V! He shall be all-knowing with regards to all propositions, not only the qualitative ones. Is this helpful? Do not occupy yourself with V of which he knows that he does not live there. Does he know the proposition: "I am on the highest mountain"? Naturally, he does! He knows all the propositions, and this is one of them. Does he therefore know that he sits on the highest mountain? No! Because this does not follow from it. Since he is the one on the highest mountain, his sentence expresses a particular proposition which is true in W but not in V. It is one he knows to be true. Had he been the god on the coldest mountain (which he could be for all he knows), the same sentence would have expressed a different proposition, one that is true in V and wrong in W. It would be one of which he knows that it is wrong. He would know the proposition which would indeed by expressed by "I am on the highest mountain". But that does not mean that he knows whether he is on the highest mountain. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Harman, G. | Putnam Vs Harman, G. | Harman II 421 Truth/HarmanVsPutnam: it is not merely idealized rational acceptability. It involves a relationship between a remark or a thought and the way how things are in the world. Putnam/Harman: is right when he equates the decisive point with a determination to the localization of all the facts in a world. Harman: when I suppose, thesis, there is one clear causal physical order, I ask myself the following questions: "What is the place of the mind in the physical world?", "What is the place of values in the world of facts?" I believe that it is a serious philosophical error, if we believe we can avoid these issues. PutnamVsHarman: a position as Harman's leads to two implausible conclusions: 1. Identity thesis of body and mind. (HarmanVs! I do not think that it follows from the assumption of a single causal order, rather to functionalism, that Putnam himself represented) 2. moral relativism. (Harman pro! There is nothing problematic). Harmans II 428 Truth/HarmanVsPutnam: I do not think that he would consider it as a good argument for the conclusion that truth is the same as >consistency: Problem: but then his argument does not show that truth is an idealization of rational acceptability. Harman II 434 Competence/Chomsky/Putnam: (Chomsky Syntactic Structures) promised us that there would be a normal form for grammars and a mathematical simplicity function that would explain everything precisely. Here you would have to look at various descriptions of the speaker's competence, which are given in the normal form, and measure the simplicity of every description, (with the mathematical function) in order to find the easiest. This would be "the" description of the speaker's competence. Putnam: actually Chomsky owes us also a mathematical function with which one measures the "goodness", with which the competence description fits with the actual performance. Chomsky/Putnam: the idea of mathematization has since been abandoned. The idea currently rests that the speaker's competence could be given by an idealization of the actual speaker's behavior, on an intuitive notion of a "best idealization" or "best explanation". Justification/PutnamVsChomskyPutnamVsHarman: to assume that the concept of justification could be made physicalistically through identification with what people should say in accordance with the description of their competence, is absurd. Harman II 435 Harman/Putnam: but would say that there is a difference whether one asks if the earth might have emerged only a few thousand years ago, Harman II 436 or whether one asks something moral, because there are no physical facts, which decide about it. PutnamVsHarman: if the metaphysical realism with Harman (and with Mackie) has to break, then the whole justification of the distinction facts/values is damaged. Interpretation/explanation/Putnam: our ideas of interpretation, explanation, etc. come from human needs as deep as ethical values. Putnam: then a critic might say of me, (even if he remains metaphysical realism): "All right, then explanation, interpretation and ethics are in the same boat" ("Companions in Guilt" argument). Putnam: and this is where I wanted it to be. That was my main concern in "truth, reason and history." (Putnam thesis explanation, interpretation and ethics are not in the same boat" ("companions in guilt" argument: in case of partial relativism the total relativism is near. PutnamVsHarman). Relativism/Putnam: There is no rational reason to support ethical relativism, but not at the same total relativism. Reference/Harman/Putnam: Harman's answer is that the world has a unique causal order. Harman II 437 PutnamVsHarman: but that does not help: if my linguistic competence is caused by E1, E2 ... , then it's true that it was caused* by E*1, E*2 ... whereby* the corresponding entity designates in a non-standard model. ((s)>Löwenheim) Problem: why is reference then determined by cause and not by cause*? Reference/Physicalism/Putnam: the only answer he could give, would be: "because it is the nature of reference". This would mean that nature itself picks out objects and places them in correspondence to our words. David Lewis/Putnam: has suggested something similar: ... + ... |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Hume, D. | Nozick Vs Hume, D. | Brendel I 254 Skepticism/Dretske/Nozick/Brendel: both. Thesis: the truth of the skeptical hypothesis is, however, not to be excluded. But it does not follow the impossibility of any knowledge. DretskeVsHume/NozickVsHume/Brendel: knowledge and the possibility of skepticism can coexist peacefully. Nozick II 111 I/Self/Property/Tradition: Thesis: the I (self) as a property. I.e. not as an object. The solves the problem e.g. of localization and other problems: 1) Hume: "I cannot perceive myself independent of any other perception." NozickVsHume: perhaps he did not search thoroughly. He has done nothing specific to search for the self, has he? 2) Advantage: the approach explains why it is difficult to imagine the self without embodiment. 3) It is difficult to imagine how the self should be identical with any particular stuff. II 112 A property is never the identical with the object. The difficulty of specifying the relationsh of a property with an object is the general reason why we have such trouble locating the self, but that is not a particular problem of the relation between self and body. Property/Nozick: there are at least two ways how a person can be identified with a property: 1) with a non-indexical, non-reflexive property: E.g. "being Robert Nozick" 2) an identification whose definition uses a reflexive pronoun of the first person: E.g. "being me". This introduces reflexivity. Right into the nature of the self at that. I Problem: it is obscure, because it introduces the reflexivity in the nature of the self, but it explains why all public or physicalist descriptions leave me out, because they are not reflective. Unit/Merger/I/Self/Tradition: the I merges with the "one", but does not disappear in the process. The I is a property of the one, I am not separate from it. Reflexivity/Property: E.g. reflexive property: "being me". Problem: 1) P is the ability to be reflexively self-referring. People have P, tables do not. I have the property P and so do you, II 113 but you have it by virtue of the fact that you are you, I have it by virtue of the other fact that I am I. We both have the property of being me, but the property is indexical. I.e. the properties differ! Point: they both arise from the same non-indexical property P: being reflexively self-referring! |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Jackson, F. | Lewis Vs Jackson, F. | V 154/155 Robust/LewisVsJackson: There are two form of robustness: Def robust1: A is robust1 with regard to B, if P(A) and P(A I B) are close and both are high (like Jackson). (probability). Def robust2: A is robust2 with regard to B, if P(A) is high and remains high, even when we learn that B. (Learning!) E.g. A is robust1 with regard to B only, but not with regard to B and E together. Then A will not be robust2 with regard to B. A: "I will not believe that Reagan works for the KGB!" B: "Reagan works for the KGB". E: Not A. (I believe that Reagan works for the KGB.) ((s) robust1 on B only: even if "...I will not believe this" But only if both probabilities are high!) not robust2: (learning): When I learn that he works for the KGB, I need to believe it. Lewis: If the KGB is so successful to have one of their people on the presidential seat, then they will also control the news so that we do not learn about this. So P(A) and P(A I BE) are equally high. But naturally P(A I BE) = 0. (If I believe that Reagan works for the KGB, I will not believe that he does not work for them = 0). Learning: What I learn is what I need to believe (in order to have been able to learn). And this contrary to my initial original belief that the KGB is going to deceive me. So A is not robust2 with regard to B. Example Richmond Thomason: a man accepts: "If my wife cheats on me, I won't believe it (because she is clever)". But he doesn't mean that if he is made to believe the antecedens, he will believe the consequences. ((s) Conditional(s): the A can become more and more likely here without the speaker believing it, but if the probability function for the speaker gets higher, he/she will reject the whole conditional. Robust/Conditional/Lewis: which of the two types of robustness affects the indicative conditional? It depends on robustness2: it signals more information. V 15 On the other hand, robustness1 is much easier to determine. Both are equivalent on the assumption that the learner conditionalizes. R1 is a good guide for R2, which is really important. It is not surprising that we can signal R1, even if it clearly diverges from R2! Example I can very well say: "If Reagan works for the KGB, I'll never believe it!". Stalnaker I 269 Def Phenomenal Information/Terminology/Lewis/Stalnaker: is - beyond physical information - an irreducible different kind of information. The two are independent of each other. Stalnaker: it is the kind of information Jackson's color researcher Mary acquires. It must be included in a non-centered description of the world. Lewis/Stalnaker: had designed it for a possible response LewisVsJackson. But: I 270 LewisVsPhenomenal Information/LewisVsJackson: enriching our description of the world would not in itself solve the problem of what it is that Mary does not know. Lewis: For example parapsychology: is what one could call the science of non-physical things. Suppose we learn as much about parapsychology as possible. Yet we would always not know "what it is like..." Stalnaker: this is the same argument as Nagel's against the ontological view of self-localization. It is in vain to try to objectify a certain type of information, because the information "as it is..." will always be omitted. Objectification/VsVs: could then answer that this special information is only accessible to the subject. (see above: like Frege). Intentionality/Stalnaker: this requires access to intentionality, which explains how objective content can have this particular status. Semantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: seems to me to dampen the temptation to objectify the content. StalnakerVsObjectivation: (of subjective content) 1. takes on an extravagant metaphysics. 2. requires an explanation of the special relation we should still have additionally. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Kant | Nozick Vs Kant | II 12 Hypothesis/How-is-it-possible questions/Nozick: a hypothesis that is false does not explain how something is possible. But maybe it increases understanding. Hypothesis: must not even be plausible. How-is-it-possible question: can go so deep that the only answers that are sufficient, are implausible. One should not exclude that the p with which the question began is excluded at the end. (VsKant). II 110 Synthesis/Self/I/Nozick: VsKant: VsSynthesis: against the perspective of self-synthesizing self could be argued that it does not localize itself as an entity, it is not a "part of the equipment of the universe". possible solution: II 111 I/Self/Property/Tradition: Thesis: the I (self) as a property. I.e. not as an object. That solves, for example, the problem of the localization and other problems: 1) Hume: "I cannot perceive myself independent of any other perception." NozickVsHume: perhaps he has not searched thoroughly. He has done nothing specific to search for the self, has he? 2) Advantage: the approach explains why it is difficult to imagine the self without embodiment. 3) It is difficult to imagine how the self should be identical with any particular stuff. II 112 A property is never identical with the object. The difficulty to specify the relation of a property to the object is the general reason why we can only locate the self with difficulty, but it is not a specific problem of the relation between self and body. Property/Nozick: there are at least two ways to identify a person with a property: 1) with a non-indexical, non-reflexive property: E.g. "being Robert Nozick" 2) an identification whose definition uses a reflexive pronoun of the first person: E.g. "being me". This introduces reflexivity. Right into the nature of the self at that. I Problem: it is obscure, because it introduces the reflexivity in the nature of the self, but it explains why all public or physicalist descriptions leave me out, because they are not reflective. Unit/Merger/I/Self/Tradition: the I merges with the "one", but does not disappear in the process. The I is a property of the one, I am not separate from it. Reflexivity/Property: E.g. reflexive property: "being me". Problem: 1) P is the ability to be reflexively self-referring. People have P, tables do not. I have the property P and so do you, II 113 but you have it by virtue of the fact that you are you, I have it by virtue of the other fact that I am I. We both have the property of being me, but the property is indexical. I.e. the properties differ! Point: they both arise from the same non-indexical property P: being reflexively self-referring! II 318 Action/Decision/Free Will/Knowledge/Belief/Nozick: Is there a parallel between belief and action, according to the model by which we have established conditions for belief and knowledge in the previous chapter? Belief is in connection with facts (covariance). What are actions to be connected to? Just like beliefs should respond to facts, actions should respond to correctness or quality ("bestness", optimum, "optimal desirability", "the best"). Then we need to know the relevant facts as well. II 319 Our actions must be sensitive to accuracy or "the best". Conditions: (1) Action A is correct (2) S does A on purpose (intentionally) (III) if A were not right, S would not do A intentionally. (IV) if A were correct, S would intentionally do A. Distinction: "Allowed"/"the best" (nothing better). Similar: "Maximum": several maximums possible: even if there is nothing bigger. Maximum: only one possible. "bigger than all the others". then: correctness: (3) if A was not allowed, S would not do A (4) if A were mandatory, S would do A. "the best": (1) A is the best (at least maximum, perhaps maximum) (2) S does A intentionally (3) if A were not as good as a possible other thing, S would not do A (4) if A were better than anything else, S would do A. II 320 So here we can also introduce a reference to a motif M in accordance with conditions (3) and (4). Moral/Kant/Nozick: when we happen to do something moral, immoral motives may be present. Problem: it could be that if the act is immoral, other non-moral (neutral) motives move the person to carry out the action anyway. NozickVsKant: he would be better served with our conditions (3) and (4). In addition, we need the inclusion of methodologies (see above, example grandmother: would still believe, even if the facts were different. E.g. Theater/Nuclear Reactor: if it were not a play, the person would still believe it via other methods). Action: similar: E.g. someone carries out a mandatory action after careful consideration. If it were not right, its moral quality would never have come to his attention, but he could still have chosen it. Only this time without reflection on its correctness. Method/Action/Nozick: like with belief, methods can also be weighed against each other even with actions: A person meets the Kantian requirements if there is a motive M for which he does a, which satisfies the conditions (3) and (4), and outweighs any other motive M' that does not satisfy (3) and (4). II 352 Self-Choice/Action/Morality/Ethics/Free Will/Nozick: the concept of a free action as in connection with accuracy (or "the best") is defined in terms of the result. And not so much as a process. Tradition: Thinks that a free action emerges from a process of choice that could also have had an incorrect result. How close can we get to the process of choice in a simulation? II 353 Anyway, we will not get out of a causal nexus. 1) Locke/Hume/Tradition/Nozick: we are not free if our actions are caused. 2) Kant: we are free if our actions are in harmony with reason 3) Free actions must not be caused by any independent source, II 354 but must come forth from our nature. (Spinoza: only God is free). Hegel: combines 2) and 3): (with Aristotle) Reason and thought are the essence of man. We are free when we are limited by a law of reason in a way conscious of ourselves, which is a constitutive principle of our nature. Nozick: is that enough? Although our actions come forth from our nature, would we then not be unfree in the extent that we are bound by our nature? Could external sources not be as binding for us? Why should I want to be moral? Do I have to wish to be happy? Why should I want to be rational? "Your being is rationality, do what is rational to realize your nature". Why should I realize my nature? It's bad enough that it is so difficult. "Your nature, that is you." If I am not really me, do I have to wish to be me? Could I not wish to be the Messiah? "But you have no choice, you had to be what you are." So, that is what you offer me as freedom. Objective morality seems to be something inevitable. Categorical Imperative/Nozick: some read it as follows: "Do this if you wish to be rational" "Do this if you want to be free" (absurd: command). Freedom/Nozick: has to be something that does not bind us. II 355 Then there can be no free will with objective morality. Law/Kant/Nozick: the law that does not bind us is the one that we give ourselves, that is not borrowed from nature, but is set by reason itself as a necessity of its own nature. Nozick: but does that not bind us, too? Could we not act as autonomously out of very different motives? NozickVsKant: the status of morality in his theory is unclear. Example: Suppose someone finds out what the categorical imperative wants and then does the opposite. "But what motive could he have for that?" Perhaps he just wants autonomy? The chances are not good. Morality/Freedom/Nozick: Thesis: must not only be chosen by ourselves, it must also be given by something that is in turn chosen for its part! Only something that arises from a chosen nature will not bind us. But if the nature is chosen, how should then it be inevitable? (>self-choice, self-ownership.). |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Cavell Vs Kripke, S. A. | I 216 Kripke's Wittgenstein: skeptical paradox: nothing, no rule, no presence can control the meaning of my words. That is the end of the possibility of meaning anything at all. Solution: Introduction of socially sanctioned conditions of assertiveness. Kripke: Main point: the absence of meaningful facts. CavellVsKripke: 1. probably Wittgenstein himself did not see the paradox that way. Nor would he demand such facts that guarantee meaning, and that should be more stable than our practice. I 217 CavellVsKripke: 2. Kripke goes unnoticed from "being inclined" to "being entitled": Wittgenstein: "I've exhausted the reasoning, I'm inclined to say." Kripke seems to believe (unlike Wittgenstein) that agreement is something like a contract. I 218 His solution is more skeptical than the problem it is supposed to solve. I (c) 220 Kripke's Wittgenstein/Cavell: for Kripke, rules are more fundamental than criteria for Wittgenstein's scepticism about meanings. CavellVsKripke: the problem of the ordinary remains underexposed. I (c) 221 For me, conversely, the rules are subordinate to the criteria. Kripke: E.g. "Tisuhl" Suppose I enter the Eiffel Tower for the first time and see a table standing at its foot. Do I know how to answer the skeptic who assumes that I meant "Tisuhl" in the past, that is, something that is a table not at the foot of the Eiffel Tower or a chair located there? Did I explicitly think of the Eiffel Tower when I first "grasped the concept of the table" and did I give myself instructions as to what I meant by "table"? CavellVsKripke: we can say with Wittgenstein: we are not equipped for all possibilities with rules and we come to an end with our reasons. Localization in the Eiffel Tower, like any other criterion, would be like a reason I can have to name any object as I call it outside the tower. I (c) 248 But I do not have any criteria yet, so I have not come to an end with my explanations, I have not even started with explanations yet. CavellVsKripke: what skepticism brings us to is something like a compulsion to remove criteria from us, but not, like Kripke, to arbitrarily handle criteria. I (c) 255 CavellVsKripke: he says that we "come to agreement" with regard to our criteria. But that would be a rejection of Wittgenstein's idea of agreement. For Wittgenstein, this lies in our reactions. We agree in walking, but that has not been attained. We have come to walk. I (c) 256 Concept/Wittgenstein: concepts lead us to investigations, they are the expression of our interest and guide our interest. Cavell: common terms have a history, mathematical ones do not. These have a before and after, no past and no future. Example "Tisuhl": shows that we can subject our ordinary concepts to a special form of mathematization. I (c) 257 CavellVsKripke: he robs us of our criteria, so he is too skeptical. Why should the answer not be: "So be it! |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Modal Realism | Stalnaker Vs Modal Realism | Stalnaker I 36 Proposition/closeness/Stalnaker: whatever propositions are, if there are any at all, there are also sets of them. And for each set of propositions it is definitely true or false, that all of its elements are true. And this is of course again a proposition. (W5) Closeness-condition: for each set of propositions G there is a proposition A so that G implies A and A implies every element of G. Stalnaker: that means that for each set of propositions there is a proposition that says that every proposition in the set is true. So I suppose that the world-stories-theorists wants to add (W5) to his theory. (W6) Equivalent propositions are identical. Problem: the problems of (W6) are known. ((s) > hyperintensionalism/ hyperintensionality): propositions that are true in the same worlds are indistinguishable, VsPossible worlds semantics). I 40 modal realism/MR/Lewis/Stalnaker: by Lewis the actual world (act. wrld.) is only a real part of a reality which consists of many parallel universes which are spatially and temporally separated. Actual world/Lewis/Stalnaker: is then indexically defined as the part that is related to us. Unrealized possibilities/Possibilia/Lewis/Stalnaker: then actually exists, but in another part of the reality. Its non-actuality only exists in its localisation somewhere else. ((s) This is only a polemical presentation: Localization must be more than "somewhere else". Localization may be not carried out by us for areas that do are not related to us because we have then no knowledge.) Modal Realism/MR/Stalnaker: divides into 1. semantic thesis: assertions about what is possible and necessary, should be analyzed in concepts about what is true in some or all parts of reality 2. metaphysical thesis: about the existence of possible worlds (poss.w.). Semantic MR/Stalnaker: problem: VsMR it could be argued that it is not possible to know the metaphysical facts about it even if the semantic part was true. I 41 Lewis: there is a parallel here to Benacerraf's dilemma of mathematical truth and knowledge. I 42 EpistemologyVsModal Realism/Stalnaker: the representatives of the epistemological argument against the MR reject the parallel between mathematical objects and realistically construed possibilia. They insist that reference and knowledge require causal relation of concrete things even if that does not apply for abstract things (numbers etc.). Knowledge/LewisVs: why should the limit between what for knowledge and reference requires a causal relation to be made in concepts of the distinction abstract/concrete? Knowledge/Lewis: instead we should say that reference and knowledge require a causal relation of contigent facts but not the one of modal reality (knowledge about what is possible and necessary). Modal Realism/knowledge/Lewis: thesis: in the context of MR, we can say that indexical knowledge requires causal relation, but impersonal knowledge does not. I 43 Platonism/mathematics/Stalnaker: pro Lewis: here knowledge does not have to be based on a causal relation. Then Benacerraf's dilemma can be solved. EpistemologyVsModal realism/Stalnaker: but I still feel the force of the epistemological argument VsMR. Reference/knowledge/Stalnaker: problem: to explain the difference between knowledge and reference to numbers, sets and cabbages and so on. I 49 Possible worlds/pos.w./MR/Vsmodal realism/knowledge/verificationism/StalnakerVsLewis: the modal realist can cite no verificationist principles for what he calls his knowledge. Conclusion: problem: the MR cannot say on the one hand that poss.w. things are of the same kind (contingent physical objects) like the real world and say on the other side that poss.w. things are of what we know in the same kind as of numbers, sets, functions. ((s) The latter are not "real" things). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Nagel, Th. | Peacocke Vs Nagel, Th. | I 167 Nagel/Peacocke: (first Tanner Lecture, 1980) E.g. "I am TN" seems to express a real fact on the one hand, which cannot be described from a certain perspective of the world, ((s) to be more true than from another perspective.) I 168 on the other hand it seems to be impossible that irreducible facts of the first person exist. Nagel:~ "TN, like the rest of you, it turns out, not only as a single creature with a special perspective on the world from the position in its interior. Every other human being contains a very special kind of subject in the same way. The "additional fact" that I am TN is the fact that this impersonal conception of the world can close over itself? Through localization of the subject that forms it in a certain point of the world by perceiving it. This fact is linked to the perspective of TN. And because it is not an irreducible fact of the first person, it can be part of the real world! " PeacockeVsNagel: does he really state a fact of the real world here? There is an implicit indexicality in the sentence "locate the subject that forms it (the world)". It comes out more clearly here: Nagel: ~"when I have the philosophical thought: "I am TN", then I realize that the objective individual self, which is the subject of this centerless idea of a world, is located in the TN and at the same time sees the world through the perspective of TN. Idea/PeacockeVsNagel: ideas can be a) public types that can be shared by different people. Or they may b) correspond to the principle of "one thinker, one idea" (token), even if the same idea can come up on several occasions. Nagel: must use the latter concept, because nothing that could correspond to a subject is in the sense of the type. Peacocke: but in the sense of the token it seems to be true that the content is indexical. Namely, the person with this particular idea of TN (Peacocke: constitutive role). Admittedly, this is not a thought of the first person. Peacocke: but the motivation of Nagel that there can be no irreducible thoughts of the first person in the world seems to apply to all demonstrative ways of givenness. I 169 E.g. Suppose Nagel contemplates his objective idea of the world at a moment about and thinks "I am TN" Peacocke: that is potentially informative if it is epistemically possible that the person who is thinking is not TN. Nagel: the problem with "I'm TN" is not a pseudo-problem associated with a misunderstanding of the logic of index words. Def Character/Kaplan: ("On the Logic of Demonstratives"): the character of an expression is a function of contexts on contents and these include no indexical ways of givenness. PeacockeVsNagel: if we take this as the basis, it is not so surprising that the way of givenness of a fact - in contrast to the fact itself - should be irreducibly indexical. Nagel's point that we are able to step back from our standpoint and to form a more objective idea in which the position in turn is located, is of great philosophical interest. Nevertheless, it should be formulated with reference to the different ways in which we think about ourselves when we make such a separation. So if we rather have a different way of giveness than a different type of object, then we can give up the question: "Is this objective self mine?" For Nagel this question is only meaningless if were a mere facon de parler for "the person with this objective idea". |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Nagel, Th. | Stalnaker Vs Nagel, Th. | I 20 Objective Self/Nagel/Stalnaker: Nagel begins with the expression of a general sense of confusion about one's place in an impersonal world. I: if somebody says "I am RS" it seems that the person expresses a fact. I 21 Important argument: it is an objective fact whether such a statement is true or false, regardless of what the speaker thinks. Problem: our concept of the objective world seems to leave no place for such a fact! A full representation of the world as it is in itself will not pick out any particular person as me. (single out). It will not tell me who I am. Semantic diagnosis: attempts a representation of index words or self-localization as a solution. NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: that does not get to the heart of the matter. StalnakerVsNagel: a particular variant can solve our particular problem here but many others remain with regard to the relation between a person and the world they inhabited, namely what exactly the subjective facts about the experience tell us how the world in itself is Self-identification/Self-localisation/belief/Stalnaker: nothing could be easier: if EA says on June 5, 1953 "I am a philosopher" then that is true iff EA is a philosopher on June 5, 1953. Problem: what is the content of the statement? Content/truth conditions/tr.cond./Self-identification/I/Stalnaker: the content, the information is not recognized through tr.cond. if the tr.cond. are made timeless and impersonal. ((s) The truth conditions for self-identification or self-localization are not homophonic! That means they are not the repetition of "I'm sick" but they need to be complemented by place, date and information about the person so that they are timeless and capable of truth. Problem/Stalnaker: the speaker could have believed what he said, without even knowing the date and place at all or his audience could understand the statement without knowing the date, etc.. Solution: semantic diagnosis needs a representation of subjective or contextual content. Nagel: is in any case certain that he rejects the reverse solution: an ontological perspective that objectifies the self-.properties. Stalnaker: that would be something like the assertion that each of us has a certain irreducible self-property with which he is known. ((s) >bug example, Wittgenstein dito), tentatively I suppose that that could be exemplified in the objectification of the phenomenal character of experience. I 253 Self/Thomas Nagel/Stalnaker: Nagel finds it surprising that he of all people must be from all Thomas Nagel. Self/subjective/objective/Stalnaker: general problem: to accommodate the position of a person in a non-centered idea of an objective world. It is not clear how to represent this relation. Self/I/Nagel/Stalnaker: e.g. "I am TN". Problem: it is not clear why our world has space for such facts. Dilemma: a) such facts must exist because otherwise things would be incomplete b) they cannot exist because the way things are they do not contain such facts. (Nagel 1986, 57). Self/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: unsatisfactory: NagelVsOntological solution: wants to enrich the objective, centerless world in a wrong way. Nagel: center position thesis: There is an objective self. StalnakerVsNagel: this is difficult to grasp and neither necessary nor helpful. I 254 Semantic diagnosis/StalnakerVsNagel: has more potential than Nagel assumes. My plan is: 1. semantic diagnosis 2. sketch of a metaphysical solution 3. objective self is a mistake 4. general problem of subjective viewpoints 5. context-dependent or subjective information - simple solution for qualitative experiences. Self/subjective/objective/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: (in Stalnaker's version): This does not include that "I am TN" is supposedly without content. StalnakerVsNagel: the identity of the first person is not "automatically and therefore uninteresting". semantic diagnosis: starts with the tr.cond. WB: "I am F" expressed by XY is true iff XY is F. What information is transmitted with it? I 255 Content/information/self/identity/Stalnaker: a solution: if the following is true: Belief/conviction/Stalnaker: are sets of non-centered poss.w. Content/self-ascription/Stalnaker: is then a set of centered poss.w. E.g. I am TN is true iff it is expressed by TN, Content: is represented by the set of centered poss.w. that have TN as their marked object. Content/conviction/Lewis/Stalnaker: with Lewis belief contents can also be regarded as properties. (Lewis 1979). I 257 Semantic diagnosis/NagelVsSemantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: "It does not make the problem go away". Stalnaker: What is the problem then? Problem/Nagel: an appropriate solution would have to bring the subjective and objective concepts into harmony. I 258 StalnakerVsNagel: for that you would have to better articulate the problem's sources than Nagel does. Analogy. E.g. suppose a far too simple skeptic says: "Knowledge implies truth so you can only know necessary truths". Vs: which is a confusion of different ranges of modality. VsVs: the skeptic might then reply "This diagnosis is not satisfactory because it does not make the problem go away". Problem/Stalnaker: general: a problem may turn out to be more sophisticated, but even then it can only be a linguistic trick. Illusion/explanation/problem/Stalnaker: it is not enough to realize that an illusion is at the root of the problem. Some illusions are persistent, we feel their existence even after they are explained. But that again does not imply that it is a problem. I 259 Why-questions/Stalnaker: e.g. "Why should it be possible that..." (e.g. that physical brain states cause qualia). Such questions only make sense if it is more likely that the underlying is not possible. I 260 Self-deception/memory loss/self/error/Stalnaker: e.g. suppose TN is mistaken about who he is, then he does not know that TN itself has the property to be TN even though he knows that TN has the self-property of TN! (He does not know that he himself is TN.) He does not know that he has the property which he calls "to be me". ((s) "to be me" is to refer here only to TN not to any speaker). objective/non-centered world/self/Stalnaker: this is a fact about the objective, non-centered world and if he knows it he knows who he is. Thus the representative of the ontological perspective says. Ontological perspective/StalnakerVsNagel/StalnakerVsVs: the strategy is interesting: first, the self is objectified - by transforming self-localizing properties into characteristics of the non-centered world. Then you try to keep the essential subjective character by the subjective ability of detecting. I 263 Nagel: thesis: because the objective representation has a subject there is also its possible presence in the world and that allows me to bring together the subjective and objective view. StalnakerVsNagel: I do not see how that is concluded from it. Why should from the fact that I can think of a possible situation be concluded that I could be in it? Fiction: here there are both, participating narrator and the narrator from outside, omniscient or not. I 264 Semantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: may be sufficient for normal self-localization. But Nagel wants more: a philosophical thought. StalnakerVsNagel: I do not think there is more to a philosophical thought here than to the normal. Perhaps there is a different attitude (approach) but that requires no difference in the content! Subjective content/Stalnaker: (as it is identified by the semantic diagnosis) seems to be a plausible candidate to me. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Possible Worlds | Stalnaker Vs Possible Worlds | I 49 Possible world/poss.w./knowledge/mathematics/StalnakerVsLewis/Stalnaker: I am inclined to say that the poss.w.-theory makes assumptions about the nature of their properties that are - unlike the corresponding assumptions of mathematical platonism - incompatible with the representation of the connection between the knowledge subjects and their objects in the case of poss.w.. poss.w./MR/VsModal realism/knowledge/verificationism/StalnakerVsLewis: the modal realist cannot cite any verificationist principles for what he calls his knowledge. Conclusion: problem: the MR cannot on the one hand say that poss.w. things are of the same kind as the actual world (contingent physical objects) and say on the other hand that poss.w. are things of which we know by the same kind like of numbers, sets, functions. ((s) Namely no real existing things.). I 53 StalnakerVsLewis: he contradicts himself because his other thesis about poss.w. about which we can have substantial beliefs contradicts his definition of content (see above). I 58 Contradiction/Lewis: there is no object howsoever fantastic about which one could tell the truth by contradicting oneself. Footnote: Takashi YagisawaVsLewis: why not? What should you expect otherwise? Impossible things are impossible. II 20 Belief ascription/solution/Stalnaker: I always wonder how the poss.w. would be according to what the believer believes. E.g. Pierre: for him there are two cities (Londres and London) E.g. Lingens in the library: for him there are two men, one named "Lingens" about which the other reads something. Relations theory/RelTh/Stalnaker: this can reconcile with the assumption that propositions are the belief objects. (Team: Stalnaker pro Relations theory? (1999)) Index/belief/Stalnaker: nevertheless I believe that convictions have an irreducible indexical element. Solution/Lewis: sets of centered poss.w. as belief objects. StalnakerVsLewis: although I have accepted that such poss.w. then include a representation of the mental state of the believer. But that is not what it is about! It is not sufficient that poss.w. that are compatible with one's convictions then include a person who has these convictions (> e.g. Lingens), the believer must identify himself with the person who has this thought! Proposition/identification/self-identification/Stalnaker: I am not suggesting that this identification is fulfilled by the belief in a proposition. I now think that this is not at all about some kind of cognitive performance. Indexical conviction/Stalnaker: (E.g. Perry: memory loss, library, e.g. Lewis: 2 gods (2 omniscient gods, e.g. Castaneda: memory loss): indexical unknowing. Stalnaker: thesis: people do not differ in what they believe. II 21 E.g. O'Leary knows that he is in the basement and that Daniels is in the kitchen. And Daniels knows the same thing: that he is in the kitchen and O'Leary in the basement. Everyone knows who and where he is and who and where the other is. The poss.w. that are compatible with the convictions of the two are the same. They argue about nothing. Yet there is an obvious difference in their doxastic situation: O'Leary identifies himself with the one in the basement and Daniels identifies himself as one who is in the kitchen. poss.w. semantics/StalnakerVsPossible worlds semantics/Stalnaker: this difference in the belief states of the two is not reflected by a set of poss.w. as belief state. Solution/Lewis: self-ascription of properties, or - equivalently - sets of centered poss.w.. StalnakerVsLewis: I do not want that. StalnakerVsLewis: problem: it is wrong to treat the difference in perspective as a dispute (disagreement). The two argue about nothing. Problem: it is not sure if one can express their agreement with the fact that the set of their uncentered poss.w. is the same. Because E.g. Heimson/Perry/Stalnaker: (Heimson believes "I am David Hume") all his impersonal beliefs about Hume are correct. Suppose they are the same convictions as the convictions of Hume about Hume. Stalnaker: nevertheless it would be wrong to say that they argue about nothing. ((s) unlike O'Leary and Daniels). II 134 Localization/space/time/self-localization/logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: set of poss.w. from which one selects one. Self-localization/physical: in space and time. We usually know where we are. ((s) but we never know all poss.w. in which we could be localized, we cannot distinguish all poss.w. because we do not know everything). Gods example/Stalnaker: the two know exactly where they are in the logical space. II 135 But they do not know where within this poss.w. they are. LewisVsTradition: the doctrine of the proposition is focused only on one of the two types of localized belief. Generalization: is what we need and for that the transition from propositions to properties (as belief objects) serves. II 144 Gods example/Stalnaker: this is also a case of unknowing, which of two indistinguishable poss.w. is actual. One is actually the actual world while the other exactly the sam, with the exception that the god who sits in the actual world on the highest mountain is this time sitting on the coldest mountain and in fact with all the properties that the god on the highest mountain actually has. ((s) two individuals change places but keep all the properties. This is only possible if localization is not a property) Omniscience/Stalnaker: then you have to say, the two gods are not really omniscient regarding propositions, but rather omniscient in relation to purely qualitative criteria. LewisVsStalnaker: Lewis rejects this explanation for two reasons: 1. because he represents the counterpart theory (c.th.) that makes the cross world identity superfluous or meaningless. 2. even without counterpart it would not work because Assuming that the two gods of world W have traded places in world V assuming the god on the highest knows that his world is W, not V. Assuming he is omniscient with respect to all propositions not only the qualitative propositions. II 145 V: the world V cannot be relevant because he knows that he does not live there. Problem: there are still two mountains in a poss.w. W where he after all what he knows can live. StalnakerVsLewis: that does not answer the question: you cannot simply stipulate that the God in W knows something and not V. Because after the explanation we proposed that leads to the fact that he knows on which mountain he lives. Lewis/Stalnaker: his explanation is plausible if one conceives it as a metaphor for a location in the logical space: logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: assume that a map of the logical space divided into large regions match the poss.w. and in smaller subdivisions represent the locations within poss.w.. Important argument: then we can tell someone in which large region he is without telling him exactly where he is located in it. Modal Realism/MR/logical space/Stalnaker: for him this image might be appropriate. Actualism/logical space/localization/Stalnaker: for the actualism this image is misleading: to know in which country you are is different to know where in the country you are but it is not so clear that there is a difference between the fact that one knows anything about in which poss.w. one is and knowing which poss.w. is the actual. Lewis also admits this. Stalnaker: my approach seems to be really close to the one of Lewis, but no. Centered poss.w.: one should perhaps instead of indistinguishable poss.w. speak of centered worlds (after Quine). These are then distinguishable. Indistinguishability/poss.w./Stalnaker: distinct but indistinguishable poss.w. would then be the same worlds but with different centers. Attitude/properties/propositions/centered world/Lewis: to treat objects of attitudes as sets of centered poss.w. makes them to properties instead of propositions. Centered poss.w./Stalnaker: I agree that possible situations normally, perhaps even essential, are centered in the sense of a representation of a particular mental state. II 146 StalnakerVsLewis: but this makes the approach (gods example) more complicated when it comes to the relations between different mental states. E.g. to compare past with current states is then more difficult, or relations between the convictions of different people. Information/communication/Stalnaker: we need then additional explanation about how information is exchanged. Two examples: E.g. O'Leary is freed from his trunk and wonders at around nine: a) "What time was it when I wondered what time it was?" Stalnaker: that is the same question like the one he asked then. When he learns that it was three o'clock, his doubt has been eliminated. Solution: the doubt is eliminated since all possible situations (poss.w.) in which a thought occurs at two different times are involved. The centers of these situations have moved in the sense that it is now nine o'clock and O'Leary no longer in the trunk but it may be that the first occurrence of the then thought is what O'Leary is now thinking about. Important argument: this moving of the center does not require that the poss.w. that the propositions characterize are changed. b) "What time was it when I wondered if it was three or four?". (If he wondered twice) Indistinguishability: even if the two incidents were indistinguishable for O'Leary, it may still be that it was the first time which O'Leary remembers at around nine o'clock. StalnakerVsLewis: his approach is more complicated. According to his approach we have to say at three o'clock, O'Leary wonders about his current temporal localization in the actual world (act.wrld.) instead of wondering in what poss.w. he is. Versus: at nine, things are quite different: now he wonders if he lives in a poss.w. in which a particular thought occurred at three or four. This is unnecessarily complicated. E.g. Lingens, still in the library, meets Ortcutt and asks him "Do you know who I am?" – "You are my cousin, Rudolf Lingens!". Stalnaker: that seems to be a simple and successful communication. Information was requested and given. The question was answered. II 147 Proposition/Stalnaker: (Propositions as belief objects) Ortcutt's answer expresses a proposition that distinguishes between possible situations and eliminates Lingen's doubt. StalnakerVsLewis: according to his approach (self-ascription of properties), it is again more complicated: Lingens: asks if he correctly ascribes himself a certain set of properties i. Ortcutt: answers by ascribing himself a completely different set of properties. Lingens: has to conclude then subsequently himself the answer. So all the answers are always indirect in communication. ((s) also StalnakerVsChisholm, implicit). Communication/Lewis/Chisholm/StalnakerVsLewis/StalnakerVsChsholm: everyone then always speaks only about himself. Solution/Stalnaker: Lewis would otherwise have to distinguish between attitudes and speech acts and say that speech acts have propositions as object and attitudes properties as an object. Problem/StalnakerVsLewis: Lewis cannot say by intuition that the content of Ortcutt's answer is the information that eliminates Lingen's doubt. That is also a problem for Perry's approach. (> StalnakerVsPerry) |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Prior, A. | Lewis Vs Prior, A. | IV 19 Perspective/Index/Indexicality/Time/Lewis: when we take a timeless viewpoint and neglect our own localization in time, the great difference between the present and other times disappears. Cf. >Perspective. However, this is not because we then regard all times as equal, but because we IV 20 lose the possibility to use indexical time words we "currently"! Possible world/perspective: just the same, if we take an a priori standpoint and neglect our localization in the worlds, then we lose the distinction between the worlds. This is not because we consider all worlds to be the same, but because we could no longer use index words like "actual". Prior: the word "aktual" can then no longer be used to classify a world that is more real than others!° LewisVsPrior: he fell for it himself: "real" can no longer be used as an index word. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Russell, B. | Tugendhat Vs Russell, B. | Wolf II 22 Identification/Individualization/Tugendhat: the subjective and the objective localization are equally original. TugendhatVsStrawson: space-time not only particularly important, but the only possibility of identification. Like Strawson: sortal predicates must be added. (Taking out of the situation, recognition, countability). All singular terms refer to the lowest level of identification. "This F is G", verifiable. (KantVs). TugendhatVsRussell: although the existential statement "there is exactly one F here and now" is still implied here, it is no longer a general statement as with Russell: "among all objects there is one..." but localization. Only with localizing expressions we have singular terms whose reference can no longer fail. Therefore, they no longer imply existential statements! Thus they resemble Russell's logical proper names. Difference: they no longer stand in an isolated assignment to the object, but in a space-time order. Tugendhat I 378 Existential Statements/Tugendhat: contrary to appearances not statements about individual things but always general statements. In principle, the talk of existence always assumes that one speaks of all objects, and therefore one could not even say (VsRussell) of a single object that it exists. I 383 TugendhatVsRussell: but here it's not about a relation at all, specification takes place against the background of all objects. Russell has already seen that correctly with regard to singular terms, but with his logical proper names he was wrong anyway, precisely because he denied them the reference to that background of a peculiar generality. III 214 TugendhatVsRussell: neither the reaction of a living being nor the triggering sign can be true or false, because here there is no assumption that something is so or so, consequently no error is possible. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Searle, J.R. | Zink Vs Searle, J.R. | Wolf II 15 Names/ZinkVsSearle: Example Assuming that most of Aristotle's descriptions proved to be false and correct in relation to another person, then we should not say that "Aristotle" is the name of that other person, it is sufficient, "was born in 384 B.C., in Stagira". Meaning of the proper name/Zink: "The person who is actually called E.N.". (Certain identification, like Burks). ZinkVsBurks: not any property, but a predicate such as "person" with identity criteria must be included. Wolf II 167 Name/Meaning/Searle: ("Proper Names", Mind 67) no set of descriptions can indicate the meaning! The use presupposes the truth of a certain set of descriptions. But neither this set is exactly defined, nor is the meaning in the set. For then every true description of the thing would be analytically true! No discovery about it would be an empirical discovery! Possible Solution/Searle: the necessary and sufficient conditions for the meaning of the name: that it is identical to an object originally baptized in that way. II 168 SearleVs: "Aristotle" can be applied to any individual baptized this way. ZinkVsSearle: this can be eliminated by localization. |
Zink I Sidney ZInk "The Meaning of Proper Names", in: Mind 72 (1963) S. 481-499 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Sellars, W. | Putnam Vs Sellars, W. | III 131 Map/Sellars: unlike truth and reference: our normal linguistic schemata map the world more or less adequate. Some schemes are more adequate than others, although they are in no objective semantic relationship to the world. This has led to a split in the students of Sellars: Sellarean Left: Rorty waives the notion of mapping. PutnamVsSellars: does not explain how the picture would be possible for the frame of the ideal scientific scheme. III 132 To make a "perspective", characters and sounds have to map something. To give an objective description, they have to describe something. Absolute View/Williams: it will tell us, but not necessarily foreign researchers, how we understand this view. Putnam: So the "theory of error" is not provided by the absolute view, but from the "local perspective". Be it a perspective that is characterized by the absolute view. Does Williams claim that the existence of the absolute view is a member of our local perspective? Rorty could even agree on this. --- I (c) 96 Realism/theory/science/Peirce/Sellars: both try to maintain the idea that the theory B1 - (B) A statement may be wrong, even if it follows from our theory (or our theory plus the set of true observation sentences) - Could be wrong (yes, sooner or later turn out to be incorrect) without using a realistic concept of truth by not having identified them with present justified assertibility but with ideally justified assertibility. That is what both consider the meaning of the assertion, the Venus could also have no carbon dioxide. Realism/truth/PutnamVsPeirce/PutnamVsSellars: However, this presupposes that we sensibly fill the concept of "ideal limit" without a frame of spacetime localizations, objects, etc. and can specify the conditions for science. And that does not work. Besides, it also requires convergence. If there is no convergence, (so just more frequent cases of failure of convergence than of success) as Kuhn and Feyerabend believe, then the "ideal limit" is treated as badly as the realism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Swoyer, Chr. | Armstrong Vs Swoyer, Chr. | Armstrong III 160 Properties/Swoyer: (1982)(1) thesis: prop. must have "essential characteristics". But they are not phenomenal and do not consist in prop of prop. They are the relations of the "nomic implications" which they have for other prop. VsSwoyer: (elsewhere: PutnamVsLewis: prop cannot simply exist): Why should prop have essential characteristics at all? Perhaps their identity is simple. Otherwise one would have to give up Leibniz’s principle of the indistinguishability of the identical (in terms of prop.). E.g. prop. may be different, such as: most of us would say that particulars (P) can be different, although they have all features in common. ((s) ultimately distinguished by local prop?) (> Lit.: Armstrong, Universals, 1978(2), Chapter 9.1). SwoyerVs: these "simple" distinction must be grounded in something: its spatiotemporal localization. ArmstrongVsSwoyer: But suppose, as it seems conceivable, that there are Ps that are not spatio-temporal. Pace Thomas Aquinas: E.g. Two angels could not be different, even though they have all features in common. Armstrong: Why not just a "simple property" that has no essential characteristic, but simply is "itself"?. 1. C. Swoyer, The Nature of Natural Laws, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 60 (1982). 2. D. M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, 2 vols, Cambridge 1978 |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Use Theory | Zink Vs Use Theory | Wolf II 163 Meaning/Naming/Name/Zink: but the meaning of the name is with what it names! It is not the named thing. It is also not "the naming". Naming/Zink: is a use of words and not a meaning. II 164 Use for localization. No showing/pointing. Showing/Pointing/Zink: one can point to something, but one hopes that the meaning communicates itself indirectly. Learning/Zink: you also do not show the meaning, but give a hint from which you can start to learn the words. Understanding/Zink: one does not understand in a context of things, but in a context of words! But one has not understood if one could not point to the thing. II 165 ZinkVsUse Theory: Meaning not use, but that whose understanding makes use possible. |
Zink I Sidney ZInk "The Meaning of Proper Names", in: Mind 72 (1963) S. 481-499 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Wiggins, D. | Simons Vs Wiggins, D. | I 130 Event/mereology/relation/Simons: how do the mereological relations between events look like? Here, we do not need to modify the predicates timely like continuants. This makes the event interesting for philosophers who want to preserve the extensionality. Relation currently: is for events direct and narrow. Relation to the space: is for events indirect on the continuants involved in them. Duality/Wiggins: (1980,25-6,n12): events are "dual" to continuants in this regard. SimonsVsWiggins: this is not perfect because continuants occupy space and continue as well. Event/splitting/scattered/Simons: because continuants are involved in them they can be split (to be divided, dispersed, scattered). And therefore they can have both spatial and temporal parts. But not as events involved continuants, e.g. the increase in the intensity of a magnetic field. Field: whether itself is a continuant is controversial. Event/localization: localization is only possible by the continuants involved in them. Entering/time/happening/Simons: the time of the happening (whether continuants are involved or not) can only be calculated by measuring time intervals. We must rely on local cyclic processes. I 221 Superposition/SimonsVsWiggins: what the superposition of things of the same kind is about is that we have no way to track things ((s) in its coming together and breaking up). I 222 Namely, they are temporarily indistinguishable (this is an epistemic problem). Epistemic/(s): why are epistemic problems at all important or interesting? Because we have to revise our language use in epistemic impossibility: for basically indistinguishable we should not use different words (no distinction without difference). Simons: e.g. two bee swarms unite and separate again. We generally do not know if the two are afterwards the same two as before. This could be, however, clarified by tracking each individual bee. Therefore, it is not an ontological problem. Superposition/Simons: there are apparently cases where things can superimpose in the same way and we can still track them: E.g. moving points of light or shadow, which overlap for a moment. E.g. mutually parallel wavefronts, here we assume this in addition to uniform wave velocity. E.g. (shorter): clouds of water vapor that can be manipulated by a "cloud projector", here we have a means of identification: causal paths. I 223 Wiggin's Principle/WP/Wiggins: pro: space can be displayed only by reference to its occupiers (availability), and spatial facts are conceptually independent of the existence of facts about individual things (particulars) and the identities of these particulars. Now, if space is mapped by reference to permanent particulars the non-identity of the particulars A and B, that are both of the type f, has to be sufficient to determine that the place of A to t is different from the place of B to t. Simons is pro illustration by reference to particulars. SimonsVsWiggins: nevertheless, objects of the same type may coincide: because the requirement of illustration only requires that some specific continuants can impossibly coincide with others of their kind. There are exceptions, though they are a minority: e.g. see above clouds, points of light, shadow, waves, etc. VsSimons: it could be argued that these objects are not material or substances. Simons: they actually are not substances. Just like accidents or disruptions. SimonsVsVs: still the answer is not yet there if two things of a kind can superimpose whether they can be substances. The examples suggest that we can appease Wiggins' fear that we cannot retrace the traces if we find the appropriate means, e.g. separate causes or uniform speed. Wiggins/Simons: Wiggins is only right if everything with which we can trace a continuant is, so to speak, in its own container. If this is the case, his principle (WP) is correct. These cases seem to make out the majority, so we have no problem to map the space (illustrating, mapping). Sortal Concept/Simons: (for a continuant): the sortal concept tells us, inter alia, under which conditions the object continues to exist and under which it ceases. These were the "existence-conditions" ((s) meaning linguistically!). Superposition/SimonsVsWiggins: that various objects can superimpose follows from the fact that a single piece of matter can be in such a state that it simultaneously fulfills different existence conditions ((s) meaning intensional). I 260 Neccessary/Nec/Wiggins: "Nec" is a predicate modifier working on λ-abstraction, rather than using the proposition operator "N". QuineVsWiggins: (1977, 236): misleading: "Nec[(λx)(λy)(x = y)]" for "the relation like any r and s have if they are necessary identical" correct: "(λx)(λy)(N(x = y)" (p. 293). SimonsVsWiggins : "Nec" seems to be superfluous and Wiggins suggests this himself. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
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Reference |
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| Selfconsciousn.. irreduc. | Versus | Peacocke I 146 Evans: concept of the self dependend on localization in space. (> Frank I 550) |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Self | Nozick, R. | II 111 I/Self/Property/Tradition: Thesis: the I (Self) as a property. So not as an object. This solves e.g. the problem of localization and other problems. Peacock I 133/134 I/NozickVsPeacocke: thesis: the ego is designed and synthesized around the act of reflexive self-reference. Only in this way can we explain why, when we reflexively refer to ourselves, we know that we ourselves are the ones to whom we refer. |
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| Counterpart Theory | Stalnaker, R. | I 11 Counterpart Theory/Actualism/Stalnaker: in part III I use an updated version of the counterpart theory. The original one was of course developed by David Lewis for a realistic theory. Stalnaker: Thesis: the modal properties of individuals is a function of the properties of their counterparts. For example Aristotle could have died as a child iff a counterpart of him died as a child. Actualism: also he can have a motivation for the counterpart theory, namely a reductionist in relation to individuals: a bundle theory according to which an individual's identity is based on his qualitative character and his localization. I 120 Counterpart Theory/Stalnaker: my variant: thesis the individual that I would be if things were different would still be identical to me (despite counterpart theory). I 142 Counterparts/Stalnaker: Thesis: are representations, not objects. I 185 Def liberal Leibniz-Approach/Terminology/Stalnaker: Thesis: Shakespeare - the person himself - would not have had to write plays, but a counterpart of the person in another possible world. Counterpart Relation/Stalnaker: can be reduced to a kind of qualitative similarity. Counterpart Theory/Leibniz/Stalnaker: the Leibniz version of counterpart theory is not a thesis about names - it is a thesis about the modal properties of individuals, no matter how they are referred to. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Vs Absolutism. | Leibniz, G.W. | Staln I 226 Relationalism / space / Leibniz / Stalnaker: Thesis: per conceptual independence of space and time. Stalnaker: I think it is coherent. Thesis: there is no absolute localization (position, no absolute rest point). That the assignment of number triples to space points is arbitrary. Relationism Vs absolutism / Stalnaker: the bone of contention is whether the identification of space points in time is conventional. Relationism: there is no absolute motion. Only change in the time the relative positions of things. Motion / relationism / Stalnaker: allegations of movements are completely useful here. But they are always understood in terms of a frame (frame of reference). |
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