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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Causality | Bigelow | I 264 Explanation/causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: because of impending circularity, we cannot explain causality by laws or counterfactual conditional or probability. >Circular reasoning, >Counterfactual conditionals, >Probability, >Laws, >Explanations, >Causal explanation. Counterfactual Conditional/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Conversely, counterfactual conditionals are analyzed in terms of causality. Just as necessary. >Necessity. Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Must be an unanalyzed basic concept. It is a structural universal. Fundamental forces play a major role. >Basic concepts, >Causation, >Universals, >Forces. Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are vectors. >Vectors. I 265 Causality/causation/explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: first we refute some common theories. Causation/Tradition/Bigelow/Pargetter: is often regarded as a kind of "necessary connection". Normally, this is expressed in such a way that either the cause is necessary for the effect or the effect is a necessary consequence of the cause. Then the cause is either a necessary or a sufficient condition or both. >Cause, >Effect. Weaker: some authors: it is only unlikely to find a cause without effect (or vice versa). (Probabilistic theories of causation, Lewis 1979(1), Tooley 1987)(2). >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. "Necessity Theories"/Bigelow/Pargetter: should explain on what kind of necessity they rely on. Cause/Effect/BigelowVsTradition/BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis that a cause does not have to be a sufficient or a necessary cause for an effect, the effect could have occurred without or by another cause, or without cause at all! One cannot always assume a high probability. A cause does not always have to increase the probability of an event. I 266 Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: that's what we learned from him. (HumeVsLewis). Causality/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: his conception of it has a theological background (from Descartes and Malebranche): Thesis: it could not be that God was bound by any restrictions. >Causality/Hume. Therefore, it could not be that God would be compelled to allow the effect to follow. It would always have to come out of God's free choice and be a miracle every time. Cf. >Causes/Nietzsche. Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: Hume's theory simply eliminates God. Hume simply asks us to imagine that the effect could not follow from the cause. Bigelow/Pargetter: he's right! It is not only logically possible, but also empirically possible. >Possibility, >Logical possibility, >Metaphysical possibility. Presentation/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: is for Hume the guide to the possibility. He thus swings from a theological to a psychological argument. Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: Causes are not sufficient conditions. They are not always necessary. >Sufficiency. I 267 Solution/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: inner expectations of regularities. Cause/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to Hume "sufficient" cannot be considered modal. That is, that "sufficient" must not be considered realistic. >Modalities, >Modal logic, >Realism. BigelowVsHume: Hume went too far in his rejection of necessity in laws. But not far enough in his rejection of the necessity approach of causality. 1. Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76 2. Tooley, M. (1987). Causation. A realist's approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| God | Kant | I 64 God/Malebranche: Thesis: not I myself perceive God but God perceives through me. God/Spinoza: I feel my existence in God. God/Kant: his critique is directed against the threat of self-alienation: the space seems to be something like the stomach of God, that digested all independent individuals to mere accidents. --- Adorno XIII 223 God/religious belief/Kant/Adorno: there is a Kantian postulate of practical reason from the divinity that the suffering and the wrong of the world would not be endured if one had not the idea of a being that is totally relieved from all this. >Theodicy, >Suffering. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Information | Bigelow | I 68 Information/Movement/Causality/Speed of Light/Bigelow/Pargetter: an image can be transmitted faster than light: e.g. a laser cannon on earth can swing on the surface of the Jupiter moon Callisto and move an image from one point to another through the angular speed, which is faster than the speed of light. I 69 This is possible because there is no causal process under way here. The point at a time is not the same thing as the point at another time, the point is not an object. >Causality, >Causation. N.B.: then in the case of this point there is only one Ockhamistic speed, no vector. Saying "it" moved was misleading. It also has no identity in time. >Temporal identity. Cause: is the movement of the laser cannon on Earth. >Causes. N.B.: therefore, the existence of a pattern of 2nd level of positions does not imply the existence of a property of the 1st level of the instantaneous velocity. >Levels/order, >Description levels. Newton: shows again that instantaneous velocity (property of the 1st level) does not imply properties of the 2nd level (sequence of positions). Flux theory: this is what it needs, the logical independence of properties 1st and 2nd level. Nevertheless, it must accept an intimate connection between the two. >Flux/Bigelow. False solution: to say that the point of light receives its identity from the numerical identity. That would be a dubious combination of first and second level properties. I 70 Vs: if, for example, a world of Malebranche - God creates the moving objects at any time in any place - is a logical possibility, then there is no implication (entailment) between Ockhamistic speed and velocity according to the flux theory (2nd and 1st level of properties). >Malebranche, >Entailment, >Implication, >William of Ockham. Bigelow/Pargetter: That is why we say that the connection between Ockham speed and flux speed is not guaranteed by a metaphysically necessary connection, but by a contingent natural law. >Laws of nature, >Contingency. Motion/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Ockham's change of location is often explained by instantaneous speed. The reason is that there is no other possibility according to the laws of nature. >Motion, >Change. Moment/Bigelow/Pargetter: this vector understands velocity among itself. Moment is not an intrinsic property (or "invariant"), but is relativized to a frame of reference. >Reference systems. Vector/Natural Laws/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Vectors play an important role in natural laws. It is they who give the natural laws their explanatory power. Intrinsic property/Vector/Bigelow/Pargetter: each vector constitutes an intrinsic characteristic of an object at a time. ((s) No contradiction to above, if related to point of time). Velocity/acceleration/Bigelow/Pargetter: their connection is mediated by their role in natural laws. Gravitational Acceleration/Galilei/Bigelow/Pargetter: is actually not quite constant, because gravitation becomes stronger when approaching the center of gravity. And it is increasingly accelerating. Galilei, however, assumes constancy. I 71 Explanation/Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: not all quantities play an explanatory role such as acceleration and velocity. For example, the change in acceleration (see above gravitational acceleration) does not play an explanatory role. That is why we do not assume a vector for them. All we need here is "Ockham's" pattern of acceleration. No flux. However, we do need the flux for the underlying vectors of velocity and acceleration. >Intrinsic. Vector/Physics/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: there is no reason to assume vectors above the level of acceleration, neither flux vectors nor Ockhamist vectors. >Vectors. Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: this shows an explanatory link between flux vectors and patterns in time. >Explanations, >Causal explanation. This connection is not a close logical or metaphysical one, but a looser, a nomological one. >Metaphysics, >Metaphysical possibility, >Nomothetic/idiographic. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Vectors | Bigelow | I 65 Vector/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: a vector explains the positions of the object, not vice versa. Problem: this seems to require the assumption that a body could have a velocity without taking several positions. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: the connection between velocity and positions is created so that the vector explains the change of position, not because it is defined by the change. >Definition, >Definability, >Explanation. Motion/location/change/position/change/status/Bigelow/Pargetter: although both are logically independent of each other, they are connected by physical laws. >Motion, >Change. Explanation/Theory/Explanation Direction/Bigelow/Pargetter: The theory of flux changes the direction of the explanation. >Flux/Bigelow. I 66 Independence/Explanation/Science/Bigelow/Pargetter: logical independence must not be pushed to the point where there is no relevant link between the entities. (Here properties of the 1st and 2nd level). >Independence, >Dependence. I 67 Independence/Movement/before/after/Pre-history/Determination/Ockhamists/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: at the top of a parabola (trajectory of a projectile), the body moves horizontally, but this is not independent of the before and after. Flux/Vector/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: considers the movement at this point as independent. There is at least one logical independence. Velocity/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: can be completely independent of 2nd level properties: e.g. transmission of velocities by impact. (+...) I 68 Consistency/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: after that, it is not even absurd to attribute a velocity of 0 to a body that does not move noticeably. Vector/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: therefore, it is not logically necessary that a vector is linked to attributes that change over time. Change of location/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: when we look at the sequence of positions in time, the Ockhamists do not imply instantaneous velocity (entails). >William of Ockham, >Time. Malebranche/Change/Movement/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Ockhamist): according to Malebranche, God creates the object anew at every point. This is not a causal process. >Malebranche. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Perception | Malebranche, N. | Kant I 64 Gott/Malebranche: These: nicht ich selbst nehme wahr, sondern Gott durch mich. DF |
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