Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Adaption | Deacon | I 330 Adaptation/brain/language/Deacon: when it comes to whether the brain adapts to certain requirements of language processing and language acquisition, the following is crucial: apart from the fact that a noun remains a noun and a change of time a change of time, regardless of the words involved, there must be more constant things between individuals, certain functions that are always processed in the same way in different ways under all conditions. There must be certain invariant sensory motoric or mnemonic features that could be adapted. >Language acquisition, >Invariance, >Covariance, >Language processing. I 331 Such characteristics are present in the case of alarm calls from animals, e.g. when a distinction is made between enemies on the ground and enemies of the air. I 331/332 Symbols/symbolic learning/adaptation/Deacon: it is precisely the complex structure that forms symbols among each other that make it impossible for them to be genetically assimilated. >Symbols/Deacon. Most grammatical operations have no direct connection to things in the world. Therefore, there is hardly any innate reference in the human language. The grammatical peculiarities also change from language to language, so that there is little consistency for possible adaptation. Deep structure: maybe this is what is open to adaptation? In order to adapt a function, it is not necessary for a certain place in the brain to remain constant for this function. Newer theories speak more of "language programs" and "data structures". >Deep structure, >Grammar, >Symbolic learning. I 333 The way these structures are distributed in the brain should remain invariant when assimilated in an evolutionary process. >Language origins. Speech processing: interestingly, it is not the logical operations but the analysis of the physical signals that are assigned to specific brain regions. This has major consequences. The grammatical structures are the ones that have had the least chance of establishing a fixed place in the brain for their processing. >Brain/Deacon. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
Analog/Digital | Dyson | Brockman I 35 Analog/digital/Dyson, George: Electronics underwent two fundamental transitions over the past hundred years: from analog to digital and from vacuum tubes to solid state. That these transitions occurred together does not mean they are inextricably linked. Just as digital computation was implemented using vacuum tube components, analog computation can be implemented in solid state. Analog computation is alive and well, even though vacuum tubes are commercially extinct. There is no precise distinction between analog and digital computing. Many systems operate across both analog and digital regimes. A tree integrates a wide range of inputs as continuous functions, but if you cut down that tree, you find that it has been counting the years digitally all along. In analog computing, complexity resides in network topology, not in code. Information is processed as continuous functions of values such as voltage and relative pulse frequency rather than by logical operations on discrete strings of bits. Brockman I 36 Digital computing, intolerant of error or ambiguity, depends upon error correction at every step along the way. Analog computing tolerates errors, allowing you to live with them. Nature uses digital coding for the storage, replication, and recombination of sequences of nucleotides, but relies on analog computing, running on nervous systems, for intelligence and control. The genetic system in every living cell is a stored-program computer. Brains aren’t. Analog computers also mediate transformations between two forms of information: structure in space and behavior in time. There is no code and no programming. (…) nature evolved analog computers known as nervous systems, which embody information absorbed from the world. They learn. Dyson, G. “The Third Law”. In: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Dyson I Esther Dyson Release 2.1: A Design for Living in the Digital Age New York 1998 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
Negation | Dummett | II 118 Double Negation/Dummett: weaker claim as an assertion: that the sentence can not be falsified. See also >Multi-valued Logic/Dummett. III 14 Negation/Dummett: there is no single rule for the negation. ((s) Because of the different logical operations like "and", "or" etc.). III 15 Problem: how do we determine the general sense of negation when the sense of the original sentence is given? III 29 Even in the negation of statements there must be something [that corresponds to the facts of the statement]. Cf. >Negative facts. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |