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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Holism | Schurz | I 190 Verification holism/Holism/Schurz: deduction-logical background: if the set of premises (H1...Hn) logically implies the prediction P, then (per modus tollens) the negation of the prediction, ~P implies the negation of the conjunction of all premises, i.e. ~(H1,...Hn). The latter is logically equivalent to the disjunction of all negated premises, i.e. ~H1 v ...v ~Hn i.e. at least one of the premises Hi is false. ((s) "i" instead of "n", because n would be merely the last hypothesis). Theory net/Schurz: consists of different theory associations. There are at least 3 kinds of relations between the theory elements of a theory net: 1. through the relation of specialization: hierarchical theory associations are formed 2. the relation of the Vortheoretizität: can exist both within and between theory federations. These two relations connect only theoretically homogeneous theory elements with each other. Terms that are identical in expression are identified with each other. Elements connected in this way can never compete. Anders: 3. between different theory associations there are intertheoretical cross connections: (a) simplest case: again identity connections. I 191 Ex electrostatic force within a mechanical model. b) Bridging principles: Ex between phenomenological thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, according to which temperature is proportional to the mean kinetic energy of molecules. c) approximate theory reduction. Ex Newtonian mechanics Relativity. >Theories, >Relativity theory, >Bridge laws, >Laws of nature, >Laws. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Hypotheses | Poundstone | I 48 Hypotheses/Poundstone: most are generalizations. >Generalization, >Induction, >Generality, >Generalizability. Nicods criterion (Raven paradox): Relevance. Black and non-black non-ravens are irrelevant. >Relevance, >Statistics. I 60 Poundstone: even observing black ravens is virtually irrelevant. >Observation, >Observability. I 88 Poor hypotheses spoil good supporting evidence. >Evidence I 55 Auxiliary hypotheses/Coherence theory/Poundstone: additional hypotheses usually areassumptions about the functioning of the instruments. >Additional hypotheses, >Measurements. Problem: often the applicability of the modus tollens is not guaranteed. >modus tollens. E.g. Uranus was correctly predicted due to perturbations, Neptune wrongly predicted based on the same assumptions and methods. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Minimalism | Wright | I 52 Definition minimalism/Wright: Ingredients: (i) the equivalent scheme "it is true that P if and only if P, (ii) "P" says that P, (iii) a sentence can be characterized as true if its proposition is true, (iv) the validity of the modus tollens, (v) that it is not malicious, "P" corresponds to the facts "more than" "the things are as "P" says that they are" - recognizes truth as a real property.(VsDeflationism) >Deflationism, >Truth, >Validity, >modus tollens, >Propositions, >Sentences, >Equivalence. I 102f Minimalism/Wright: neutral between anti-realism: (Super-assertibility) and Realism: evidence transcendental truth. >Superassertibility, >Assertibility, >Realism, >Anti-realism. I 225 Minimal capacity for truth/Wright more than minimal capacity for truth: if the facts must be mentioned in the best explanation of our true beliefs to which the beliefs relate. >Truth evaluability, >Best Explanation/Wright. ((s) Truth evaluability: this is about the question whether a truth value (true/false) can be attributed at all in some cases as e.g. moral judgments or assertions about the comical.) I 267ff Global Minimalism/Wright: ... it could be a global minimalism concluded rather than a total skepticism: all meanings and the truth are only at the most minimal capable of truth. I 271 Boghossian: Global minimalism, Non-Factualism: related to meaning, not truth: there is no property that a word means something, hence no fact - attracts global non-factualism unlike any other non-factualism. >Non-factualism. I 285 Boghossian: "global minimalism": with the truth also all meaning tilts. >Meaning, >Facts. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Piaget | Schurz | I 192 Piaget/Developmental Theory/Science Theory/Schurz: Piaget thesis: The development of child intelligence is stage-like. It is based on the gradual formation of general logical structural abilities. Once these are formed, they can be applied anywhere in a short time. Before that, the corresponding cognitive tasks are simply not grasped. Piaget thesis: Sensorimotor stage: reached at 2 years of age. Concrete operational stage:reached at about 6-7 years. . Formal operational stage: reached at 13-14 years. Concrete operational stage/Piaget: (6-7) Ex 1. Ability to change perspective, distinguish own from others. Thus transition from egocentric to sociocentric thinking. 2. ability to recognize that certain operations which change the appearance of objects can be undone. (Reversibility). Thus, at the same time: invariant recognition. Two areas: a) invariance of the number of objects. b) Invariance of the quantity of a substance. Verification/Piaget: by test that provide laws of association: Ex change of perspective: mountain landscape that children could walk around. Invariance of number: ex. coins. Invariance of quantity of substance: ex clay ball deformed into a sausage. I 193 Ex core: intelligence development is primarily based on stages development of logical structural abilities. Ex Periphery: at 6-7 years almost all children reach the concrete operational stage. Ex Empirical prediction: almost all children fail it at 6, all can do it at 7. I 194 Test/adequacy/selectivity/Schurz: a test must be adequate for the characteristic being studied. i.e. it must be selective. I.e., they must measure the traits (abilities) and not others at the same time. At the same time, the indicators must be interchangeable. Ex It must not matter for the change of perspective whether it is examined on a mountain landscape or on another form. Indicator/(s): Object within an experiment. VsPiaget/Schurz: It was shown that his hypotheses violated the requirement of interchangeability of indicators: Bsp children presented with a simpler shape than a mountain landscape (a box with four different colored sides) could solve the task at age 4 (instead of age 6-7). Schurz: But that did not mean that one gave away the core of the theory. (according to the Lakatos motto). ((s) i.e. the stages proceeded differently, the assumption of the importance of the logical-structural was maintained. I 195 VsPiaget: it was concluded that his test was not really selective. Solution: the mountain landscape involved hidden variables (hidden difficulties). (BrainerdVsPiaget, Brainerd 1978(1)) 2. VsPiaget: example number test: problem: the children had not understood the linguistic formulation "more coins". New: E.g. The children had to choose pictures with the same number of coins (without language, non verbal): this number test was then already mastered by 4-5 year olds! Kern/Periphery/Schurz: all this was directed only against the periphery! Core/VsPiaget: Example propositional logic. According to Piaget, children with 13-14 years would have to master propositional logic correct conclusions. Problem: modus ponens is actually mastered already with 3 years, modus tollens often not even by adults, thus often never! VsPiaget: Problem: This cannot be fixed by changing a law for indicators or special laws. It directly attacks the core of the theory. Core/VsPiaget: Ex. conservation of the object: I 196 Cognitive principle: (here): Objects that are occluded do not therefore cease to exist. Piaget: this is already mastered after completion of the sensorimotor stage at 2 years. Variant: E.g. dissolving sugar in water: is not even mastered at 6 years: a weak majority answers incorrectly: the sugar is no longer there. Conclusion: VsPiaget: the core must be abandoned. Intelligence/development/alternative theoryVsPiaget: The development of intelligence is not about the formation of general abstract structures, but is based on the development of content-specific and content-bound abilities. (Ausubel, 1978(2), Novak 1980(3), Schurz 1985(4)). >J. Piaget, >VsPiaget. 1. Brainerd, C. (1978). Piaget's Theory of Intelligence. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 2. Ausubel D. et al. (1978). Educational Psychology: A Cognitive View. New York: Holt. 3. Novak, J. (1980) "Eine Alternative zu Piagets Psychologie". In: Jung W. (Hg., 1980) Piaget und die Physikdidaktik. Physica Didactica 7, 17-24. 4. Schurz, G. (1985). "Denken, Sprache und Erziehung: Die aktuelle Piaget-Kontroverse", Zeitschrift für Semiotik, 7, Heft 4 1985, 335-366. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Review | Lakatos | Schurz I 196 Theory revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974(1), 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in case of conflict with experience by making adjustments at the periphery. I 197 2. protective belt": every (physical ) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (exclusive ceteris paribus hypotheses) to make empirical predictions. These are stored like a protective belt in the outer periphery around center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be eliminated by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Def Anomaly/Lakatos: an observable that contradicts the entire theory (core + periphery). Solution: Def ad-hoc hypothesis: assumes more complicated system conditions in which unknown confounding factors are postulated. Vs: problem: this does not explain the divergent date. I.e. it remains an anomaly even after the ad hoc hypothesis is introduced! ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are legitimate at all only if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content. Schurz I 198 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: A theory version is falsified only if there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). I.e. there is no "instant rationality" (instant decision) which theory is better. That only becomes apparent in the historical development. Def research program/Lakatos: hard core of theory together with a negative and a positive heuristic. Def negative heuristic/Lakatos: adjustments are not made in the core but only at the periphery, However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can turn on against the core. Def positive heuristic/Lakatos: Program according to which increasingly complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core can cope with recalcitrant data. I 199 Theory version/Schurz: core plus periphery. I 200 Def Falsification/Schurz: A theory version is falsified, gdw. some phenomena deductively following from it were falsified by actual observation sets. (s) Schurz always speaks of propositions instead of observations. 1. Lakatos, I. (1974). "Falsifikation und die Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme". In: Lakatos, I. und Musgrave, A., Kritik und Erkenntnisfortschritt. Braunschweig: Vieweg. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Theories | Lakatos | Feyerabend I 238 Lakatos/Feyerabend: also Lakatos' insightful attempt to establish a methodology that takes the historical reality of the sciences seriously, but which nevertheless subjects them to a control on the basis of regularities discovered in itself, is not excluded from this conclusion: 1. There are not the regularities to which Lakatos refers to, he idealizes the sciences just as his predecessors. 2. If the regularities were regularities of the sciences, and therefore useless to the "objective" judgment. 3. Lakatos' regularities are only a finery behind which an anarchic process is basically concealed. >Regularity, >Objectivity/Lakatos. I 239 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper/Feyerabend: some of the most famous falsifications were anything but that. And, moreover, completely irrational. >Falsification. I 240 Lakatos/Feyerabend: Thesis: one should grant theories a "breathing space": in the evaluation counts the development of theories over a long period of time and not the current form. Moreover, methodological standards are not beyond criticism. --- Hacking I 206 Theories/Knowledge/HackingVsLakatos: Instead of increase of knowledge, it should mean: increase of theories! Feyerabend/VsLakatos: his "methodology" is of no use when one needs advice on current research. Schurz I 196 Theory revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974, 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "Immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in the event of a conflict with the experience by making adjustments to the periphery. I 197 2. "Protective Belt": every (physical) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (excluding ceteris paribus hypotheses) to provide empirical predictions. These lie like a protective belt in the outer periphery around the center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be eliminated by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Definition Anomaly/Lakatos: an observation date which contradicts the entire theory (core + periphery). Solution: Definition ad hoc hypothesis: assumes more complex system conditions in which unknown disturbing factors are postulated. >Hypotheses, >Additional hypotheses. Vs: Problem: this does not explain the different date. That is, it remains an anomaly even after the introduction of the ad hoc hypothesis! Ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are only legitimate if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content. I 198 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: a theory version is only falsified when there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). That is, there is no "immediate rationality" (instant decision) which theory is better. This can only be seen in historical development. Definition Research Program/Lakatos: hard theoretical core along with a negative and a positive heuristics. Definition negative heuristics/Lakatos: Adaptations are not made in the core, but only at the periphery. However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can also be directed against the core. Definition positive heuristics/Lakatos: a program that allows more and more complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core to deal with unruly data. I 199 Theory version/Schurz: core plus periphery. I 200 Definition Falsification/Schurz: a theory version is falsified, iff. some of the phenomena derived deductively from it were falsified by actual observational sentences. ((s) Schurz always speaks of sentences instead of observations.) I 202 Verisimilitude/SchurzVs/Failure/Success/Theory: the concept of failure has the advantage that it is not the epistemological-conflicted consequences of the theory that are understood, but the phenomena. The concept of truth is based only on the consequences. I 206 Definition tacking paradox/Lakatos/Schurz: the possibility to increase the empirical content of a theory version by the mere conjunctive addition of some empirically unchecked assertion. Solution/Lakatos: the connection of an auxiliary hypothesis creating a new empirical content with the previous theory must be more intimate than that of a mere conjunction. I 207 Solution: the theory T must be homogeneous with respect to the empirical content: Definition Homogeneity/Theory/Schurz: a factorization ((s) division) of T with respect to E (T) is not possible. Logical form: subdivision of T and E(T) into two disjoint subsets T1UT2 = T and E1UE2 = E (T) so that T1 implies all phenomena in E1 and T2 implies all phenomena in E2. If this is possible, the theory is heterogeneous. Any theory obtained by irrelevant amplification can be factored in this sense. A connection of the theory T with this gain H is empirically not creative. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Boghossian, Paul | Wright Vs Boghossian, Paul | I 270 Boghossian: let us consider a non factualism exclusively related to meaning (not truth): there is no property of the kind that a word means something, and consequently no such fact. Since now the truth condition of a proposition is a function of its meaning, non-factualism regarding meaning necessarily requires a non-factualism regarding truth conditions. Then it results: (5) For all S,P: "S has the truth condition P" is not truth conditional. after disquotation: (4) For each S: "S" is not truth conditional. "Fascinating consequence"/Boghossian: of a non-factualism of meaning: a global non-factualism. And this is precisely where a non-factualism of meaning differs from a non-factualism with reference to any other object... I 271 WrightVsBoghossian: many will protest against his implicit philosophy of truth, but there is nothing against the use of the word alone. Global Minimalism/WrightVsBoghossian: Problem: 1. Can the required notion of substantial truth be completely understandable if there are no examples of it at all? ((s) Because that is just denied by the thesis). 2. The status of the justification is even more difficult. Does an advocate not have to demand that the reasoning be valid? Such a justification, however, must at least show cognitive coercion and thus exceed minimalism. I 273 WrightVsBoghossian: with the principle that only a sentence with a truth condition can be true, we can go over to it: (iv) It is not the case that S is true and then, by using (i) - the premise of reasoning - for S (v) It is not the case that (i) is true. From this follows the "disquotation properties": (vi) It is not the case that it is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition. But is this a reductio ad absurdum of (i)? This is not a stupid question! If truth is understood as substantial, and contrasted with an inferior surrogate, then the denial of truth is not necessarily inconsistent with the assertion of its correctness. A correct reductio should show that (i) is not even correct. Boghossian is thus faced with a dilemma: a) if it is a reductio of (i), it shows that the minimalism of meaning is incoherent, I 274 b) if it is not reductio - if the negation in (vi) rejects a substantial truth and not merely negates correctness - then (iii) can no longer be an expression of global minimalism (meaning and truth), for (iii) is consistent with the correctness of the assertion that certain propositions possess substantial truth conditions. (iii) Can at most require that any statement that can only be correct cannot itself be considered correct. WrightVsBoghossian: the "fascinating consequence" is nowhere in sight. 1. Minimalism of meaning does not cancel itself out. 2. There is also not logically necessary a minimalism regarding the distinction between discourses that are suitable for substantial truth and those that are not. Problem: that Boghossian has to work with different truth predicates ("true" and "correct"). Of course, this is important for his differentiation, but it has a potential effect on the disquotation, which is so important for him. Wright: "strong need": a philosophy that distinguishes between the substantially true and the merely correct must itself be substantial. I 275 WrightVsBoghossian: the details: the move from (ii) to (iii) is a modus tollens on the right left section of the disquotation scheme (DS): (I) A > "A" is true. Question: can we safely assume that this principle is at least correct when both truth and correctness are involved? No: if A is just correct, the claim that "A" is true will at best reflect its status incorrectly! Decisive: for the transition from (ii) to (iii) is the relevant substitute for "A": "S" has the truth condition that "P" is a sentence which, according to minimalism of meaning, allows only correctness and not truth. Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposal actually assumes that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense. A perfectly reasonable counterproposal, however, is that A should be much more complementary to the strict notion of the former negation. Then, in the event that A is merely correct, the assessment of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the truth predicate will generally be conservative. WrightVsVs: but now there are problems to be found elsewhere: the transition from (i) to (ii): the seemingly unassailable principle that only a sentence with a truth condition can be true would have the form of the conditional: (II) "A" is true > "A" has a truth condition I 276/277 And any conservative matrix for ""A" is true" jeopardizes this principle in the case where A is not truthful but correct. Because then the conservative matrix will rate ""a" is true" as correct. The consequence (II) that "A" has a truth condition (a fact that makes it true) will then probably be incorrect. I 277/278 WrightVsBoghossian: Conclusion: If the matrix (truth table) for "true" is not conservative, then the citation scheme fails in the decisive direction for the transition from (ii) to (iii), If, on the other hand, the matrix is conservative, the principle that only a sentence with a truth condition is true fails in view of premise (i). (The sentence is incorrect). Finally, if premise (i) is not allowed, there is no argument at all. I 293 Deflationism: any significant sentence (i.e. a sentence with a truth condition) is suitable for deflationary truth or falsehood. But if truth is not deflationary, "true" must refer to a substantial property of statements. (Deflationism: Truth is not a property). WrightVsBoghossian: his problem is that he must reconcile both. Is the reasoning not simply a game of "refers to a property"? (to avoid truth as property.) |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Piaget, J. | Schurz Vs Piaget, J. | I 194 VsPiaget/Schurz: it was shown that his hypotheses violated the requirement of interchangeability of indicators: For example, children who were presented with a simpler form than a mountain landscape (a box with four differently coloured sides) could solve the problem at the age of 4 (instead of 6-7). Schurz: this did not mean, however, that the core of the theory was revealed. (according to the Lakatos motto). I 195 1. VsPiaget: it was concluded that its test was not really selective. Solution: the mountain landscape involved hidden variables (hidden difficulties). (BrainerdVsPiaget, 1978). 2. VsPiaget: e.g. number test: problem: the children had not understood the linguistic formulation "more coins". New. E.g.: the children should select pictures with the same number of coins (without language, non verbal): this payment test was then already mastered by 4-5 year olds! Core/Periphery/Schurz: all this was directed only against the periphery! Core/VsPiaget: e.g. statement logic. According to Piaget, children of 13-14 years of age should be able to make propositional logic correct statements. Problem: modus ponens is actually controlled at the age of 3, modus tollens often not even by adults, thus often never! VsPiaget: Problem: this cannot be solved by changing a law for indicators or special laws. It directly attacks the core of the theory. Core/VsPiaget: e.g. preservation of the object: I 196 Cognitive Principle: (here): objects that are hidden therefore do not cease to exist. Piaget: this is already mastered after completion of the senso-motoric stage at the age of 2. Variant. For example, dissolving sugar in water: is not even mastered at the age of 6: a weak majority answers incorrectly: the sugar is no longer there. Conclusion: VsPiaget: the core must be abandoned. Intelligence/Development/Alternative TheoryVsPiaget: the development of intelligence is not based on the formation of general abstract structures, but on the development of content-specific and content-related abilities. (Ausubel, 1978, Novak 1980, Schurz 1985). |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Popper, K. | Lakatos Vs Popper, K. | Feyerabend I 239 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: some of the most famous falsifications were anything but such. And beyond that totally irrational. Hacking I 199 "Protective belts"/Lakatos: you only make a selection of problems you are dealing with. Further objections are then ignored. LakatosVsPopper: so verification still has a place! The researchers choose a few problems, refutations can then be completely uninteresting! Hacking I 286 Observation/LakatosVsPopper: Falsificationism cannot be right because it presupposes the distinction between theory and observation. The simple rule according to which the human thinks and directs nature is not tenable. Two false assumptions: 1. there is a psychological boundary between speculative and observational sentences 2. assuming that observational evidence could be proven by facts. Schurz I 196 Theory Revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974, 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "Immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in the event of a conflict with experience by making adjustments at the periphery. I 197 2. "Protective belt": every (physical) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (exclusive ceteris paribus hypotheses) to establish empirical prognoses. These are located like a protective belt in the outer periphery around center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be resolved by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Def Anomaly/Lakatos: an observation date that contradicts the whole theory (core + periphery). Solution: Def ad hoc hypothesis: assumes more complicated system conditions in which unknown interfering factors are postulated. Vs: Problem: this does not explain the different date. I.e. it remains an anomaly even after the introduction of the ad hoc hypothesis! Ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are only legitimate if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content. I 198 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: a theory version is falsified only when there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). I.e. there is no "immediate rationality" (immediate decision) which theory is better. This only becomes apparent in the historical development. Def Research Program/Lakatos: hard theory core together with a negative and a positive heuristic. Def Negative Heuristics/Lakatos: adjustments are not made in the core but only on the periphery. However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can be directed against the core. Def Positive Heuristics/Lakatos: Program according to which increasingly complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core can be handled with recalcitrant data. I 199 Theoretical version/Schurz: Core plus periphery. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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