Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Entry
Reference
Articles Russell Cresswell I 179
Definite Article/theory of descriptions/Russell: requiring that a sentence e.g. "the φ is ψ" provided that "the φ" has a wide range, entails that there exists a unique φ.
Russell I X
Russell/Gödel: (K.Gödel, Preface to Principia Mathematica) Russell avoids any axioms about the particular articles "the", "the", "that". - Frege, on the other hand, must make an axiom about it! The advantage for Russell, however, remains only as long as he interprets definitions as mere typographical abbreviations, not as the introduction of names.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Descriptions Description: A. Characterization of singular objects or events instead of giving a name. As opposed to names descriptions are not rigid, i.e. they may refer to different objects in different worlds. - B. Linguistic form for attributing predicates according to the perceptions of objects. See also rigidity, theory of descriptions.

Descriptions Cresswell I 184
Description/Quantification/Cresswell: definite and indefinite descriptions are not quantifiers - the bond is in the depth structure - e.g. if you offer each boy a job, some boy will refuse it - "it" signals no variable bound by "a job", however quantification in depth. ---
II, 47f
Theory of descriptions/Russell/Cresswell: according to Russell e.g.
(24) BELIEVE (a, x) u x e . β . L)

is possible, because "The planet which is called "Phosphorus"" can occur outside the range of the modal operator.
---
II 48
N.B: this allows us to talk about the thing that is actually called "Phosphorus" and ask what happens when it is not called like this - ((s) out of reach of the modal operator: allows unambiguous reference to the thing). ---
II 140
Theory of descriptions/Russell/Cresswell: Thesis: a particular description is in the same syntactic category as a quantifier, e.g. "Someone" problem: E.g. "Someone does not come" does not mean the same as "It is not the case that someone comes" - Solution/Russell: different ranges in modal and doxastic contexts - A) (narrow range) "the person next door lives next door" is logically equivalent with "exactly one person lives next door" and therefore it is in a sense necessarily true.
B) (wide range) it is true that the person next door could also have lived somewhere else (so it is contingent).
---
II 149
Theory of descriptions/Russell/Kripke/Cresswell: Kripke per Russell with regard to descriptions - not only with regard to names.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Descriptions Kripke I 78 ff
You could say "The Jonah of the book never existed", as one might say "the Hitler of Nazi propaganda never existed." Existence independent of representation. ---
I 94
Reference by description: E.g. "Jack the Ripper"
E.g. "Neptune" was named as such before anyone had seen him. The reference was determined because of the description of its place. At this point they were not able to see the planet. Counter-example: "Volcano".
---
I 94f
It might also turn out that the description does not apply to the object although the reference of the name was specified with the description. E.g. the reference of "Venus" as the "morning star", which later turns out not to be a fixed star at all. In such cases, you know in no sense a priori that the description that has defined the reference applies to the object. ---
I 93ff
Description does not shorten the name. E.g. Even if the murdered Schmidt discovered the famous sentence, Goedel would still refer to Goedel. ---
I 112f
Description determines a reference, it does not provide synonymy. "Standard meter" is not synonymous with the length - description provides contingent identity: Inventor post minister. ---
I 115
Identity: Through the use of descriptions contingent identity statements can be made. ---
I 117
QuineVsMarcus ("mere tag") is not a necessary identity of proper names, but an empirical discovery - (Cicero = Tully) identity does not necessarily follow from description - identity of Gaurisankar is also an empirical discovery. ---
I 25/26
Description/names/Kripke: Serves only to determine the reference, not to identify the object (for counterfactual situations), nor to determine the meaning.
I 36
Description is fulfilled: Only one sole object fulfils the description (e.g. "The man drinking champagne is angry" (but he drinks water).) apparent description: e.g. Holy Roman Empire (neither holy nor Roman) hidden proper name.
---
III 353
Description/Substitutional Quantification: L must not occur in the substitution class: necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure that each sentence of the referential language retains its truth value is that whenever (Exi)f is true (when only xi is free), a substitution class f" of f will be be true (> condition (6)) - this does not work with certain L, even if (6) is fulfilled. ---
III 369
Theory of Descriptions/Russell: y(ixf(x)) where f(x) is atomic, analyzed as follows: (Ey)(x)(y = x ↔ f(x)) ∧ y(y)) (Wessel: exactly one": (Ex)(P(x) ∧ (y)(P(y) > x = y)) "There is not more than one thing": (x)(y)(x = y) - ambiguous, if more than one description: Order of elimination.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Descriptions McDowell I 132
Theory of Descriptions/SearleVsRussell/McDowell: here it is easy to be on the side of Searle (i.e., to assume intentionality). ---
I 132/33
McDowellVsSearle: it is better to give up Searle's desire and clarify what the non-obvious descriptions are. (With Evans): the conceptual area should not be regarded as a "predicative", but as "belonging to the area of Fregean sense".
---
I 210
McDowell Thesis: Fregean sense is effective in the area of reasons. Because rationality is a condition in the community, we do not distinguish between different senses. But in order to attribute rationality to a subject, we must distinguish between senses (rational and irrational).
VsMcDowell: but then we need some theory of descriptions.
Theory of Descriptions/Russell/McDowell: Indirect relation to the world.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Descriptions Prior I 124
Theory of Descriptions/unicorn/Russell/Prior: a) "the so-and-so φ-s" b) "X thinks that the so-and-so φ-s" - in a) and b) the marking has the same meaning whether the object exists or does not exist - in b) the sentence even has the same truth value.
---
I 148
Theory of Descriptions/Russell: singular names: "The only thing that φ-s". Geach: this analysis has two parts:
a) explicitly predicative use: "x is the only thing that φ-s"
b) use as apparent subject: can be explained as an explication of an implicit predicative use: "the only thing that φ-s, ψ-s."
a) as "something that .."
b) "If something ..."
Prior: solution for non-existing. Problem: different scope:
a) as part of a complex predicate: "Something is both the only-thing- that-φ-s and not ψ-s.".
b) as part of a complex sentence: "It is not the case that ..".
Markings: useful: "the φ-re does not exist" not with logically proper name "this".
---
I 152
Champagne-Example/PriorVsRussell: has overlooked that markings can be used differently : "the man over there," does not speak of something that it is "man" or that it is "over there" - if it is true that he is clever, then even if it is a disguised woman - attribution does not require proper identification - it is only required that it is "the only ...".

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Descriptions Quine I 320
Elimination of singular descriptions/Quine: there are no more truth value gaps. All are wrong now: "..y .. and only y" instead of "y = (ix) (x .. ..)" when applicable to nothing.
I 328f
Descriptions can be revived. This is possible in all positions. Socrates is then again definable as a singular term. Quotes are names of linguistic structures. They eliminate the characteristic occurrences of the corresponding terms.
II 75 ff
Russell/Theory of Descriptions: a term is not defined by equivalence but through paraphrases. Reference is only simulated, not fixed.
VII (i) 167
Descriptions/Quine: descriptions are singular terms. >Singular Terms/Quine.
III 279
Description/Synonymy/Quine: whether a description assumption is available at all depends on an appropriate translation, and this in turn depends on the vague concept of synonymy. What is synonymous for us depends on what you first got to know in your individual learning history. Solution/Quine: we separate logic from empiricism by emphasizing the priority of the predicates: we insist that what we learn through perception is never terms, but only predicates. ((s) We then use these in the descriptions as building blocks.)
III 280
Predicate/Quine: a predicate (instead of description) should then only apply to this (shown) object. Then we explain "(ix)Fx" as the actual name, where "F" stands for this basic predicate. That does not even apply to epistemology. Description/singular term/Quine: then nothing prevents us anymore to regard all singular terms as descriptions! If, for example, "The author of Waverley" is given, we do not need to stop looking for the correct "F" for translation into the "(ix)Fx" description. We allow the following: "(ix)(x is cerberus)" (>unicorn as description).
Any less incompetent translation would only differ in its clarity, not in its meaning.
Singular terms/Quine: treating all as descriptios has the advantage,
III 281
to spare a difference to non-descriptive singular terms. The dispute over descriptions becomes one about predicates. >Predicates/Quine.
III 293
Description/Equal Sign/Quine: if we have the equal sign, we can afford the luxury of introducing descriptions without having to calculate them as primitive basic concepts. Because with the equal sign we can eliminate a description from every sentence. >Equal sign/Quine.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Descriptions Russell Cresswell I 117
Descriptions/Russell: are never names - Other authors VsRussell: Descriptions are names, but not of normal objects but of intensional objects (various objects in different worlds). - CresswellVs intentional objects.
Geach I 61
Description/Russell is never a name: E.g. The Duke of Cambridge is also a pub, but the Duke does not sell beer.
Newen/Schrenk I 90
Theory of Descriptions/Russell: E.g. 1. There is at least one author of "Waverley" (existence assertion) - 2. There is at most one author of "Waverley" (uniqueness assertion) - 3. Whoever wrote "Waverley", was a Scott (statement content) - E.g. The current King of France/empty names: At least one king of France is bald - 2. At most one - 3. whoever ... is bald - E.g. identity: at least one denounced Catiline - 2. At most one ... - 1* at least one wrote "De Oratore" - 2* at most one ... - 3. Whoever denounced Catiline, wrote ... - E.g. negative existence sentences "It is not the case that 1. At least one .. - 2. At most one ... - RussellVsFrege: thus one avoids to accept Fregean sense as an abstract entity.
Truth-value gaps/RussellVsFrege: they too are thus avoided.
I 92
N.B.: sentences that seemed to be about a subject, are now about general propositions about the world.
Russell I VIII
E.g. Waverley - all true sentences have the same meaning - e.g. "Author of Waverley." Is no description of Scott - Description (labeling) is not the same as assertion - this does not refer to an object. - StrawsonVs - A sentence with "Waverley" says nothing about Scott, because it does not contain Scott.
I 46
Descriptions/Russell: are always in the singular E.g. "father of" but not "son of" (not clear - always presuppoes quotes without "the": "jx": "x is φ" - instead of (ix)(jx) in short "R'y": the R of y, "the father of y" - characterizing function, not propositional function all mathematical functions are distinctive features.
I 96
Description/Principia Mathematica/Russell: "The author of Waverley" means nothing - we cannot define (ix)(jx) only its use - (> definition, definability).

Flor III 122
Descriptions/Russell/Flor: are not names - reason: otherwise it would result in a mere triviality: "a = a" or something wrong. E.g. "The Snow man does not exist" is something different than to say, "Paul does not exist" - Descriptions: incomplete symbols - ((s) If description were names, they could not fail.)

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Flor I
Jan Riis Flor
"Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Flor II
Jan Riis Flor
"Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Flor III
J.R. Flor
"Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Flor IV
Jan Riis Flor
"Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Descriptions Searle I 43 f
"Topic-neutral" (Austin): is not nomological - SearleVs "topic-neutral" e.g. digestive does not need an additional state which must be described separately.
II 317
Description/Frege: delivers the sense, but not the definition (otherwise Aristotle is analytically Alexander's teacher).
II 319
Description/SearleVsKripke: some labels are rigid: when they include the identity condition for the object - e.g. "the object that I perceive" - also: every description can be made rigid by taking the actual world as an index - then "the inventor of bifocal glasses" is clear.
V 146
Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Searle: every sentence with reference can be replaced by an existence theorem - Searle: this is the true discovery of the theory of description.
V 236ff
Theory of description/Russell: Sentence with description: hidden existence assertion - SearleVsRussell: propositional act (expression of the proposition, certain reference) can never be identical with the illocutionary act of assertion (p.a. is part of i.a.)- - (s) Reference is not existence assertion.
V 240
Searle: from the fact that a speech can be carried out only under certain circumstances (conditions) does not follow that the mere execution already claims that the conditions are satisfied - e.g. "bring this to the King of France" is not a claim and contains none. Cf. >theory of descriptions.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Formal Language Strawson I 250
ideal language/Quine/Strawson: here without singular term, extended theory of descriptions, but no subject expression as a genuine proper name - instead subject existence sentences with uniqueness condition - completeness: "There is something that is the only F". ---
I 251
Incomplete: "..dito..., and that..." - then subject/common language: from quantified assertion (also some U-terms) - predicate: if it does not dissolve like this.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Idealism McDowell I 209
Idealism/VsMcDowell/McDowell: his opponents could speak of a "danger of idealism": idealistic basic mood of the "elimination of the outer boundary". This eludes us a possibility which we should not renounce: the possibility of direct contact between the spiritual and the objects.
We became aware of this possibility in the criticism VsRussell, theory of descriptions.
If one accepts the world as all that is the case, then the world is subordinated to the realm of Fregean sense ("kingdom of the conceivable").
Then there are not episodes and acts of thought but identity. Facts in this sense are thoughts; The conceivable, which is the case.
---
I 209
McDowellVs: However, objects do not belong to the sphere of the conceivable (Fregean sense) but to the realm of the object reference (Fregean meaning).

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Identity Bigelow I 140
Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: we understand this here as a 2-digit predicate, we do not need to expand the language. ---
I 141
Axioms:
A19. (x)(x = x)
A20. (a u ~a (σ/λ) > σ unequal λ) Everyday language translation: if something is true of something and not true of something, then these two things cannot be identical.
---
I 141
Contingent Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: these two axioms have a surprising consequence: namely that all identity is necessary. There is then no contingent identity. Non-identity is then also necessary. So the following can be proved as theorems:
NI. (x = y) > N(x = y)
NNI. (x unequal y) > N(x unequal y) Semantic rule: then causes an identity statement to be true in all possible worlds or true in none.
Valuation rule/identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: V (=) (c, c) = W
W: is the set of all possible worlds.
Identity statements/Bigelow/Pargetter: are then either necessary or impossible.
This is surprising and shows another illustration of the interplay between semantics and ontology.
Ontology/Bigelow/Pargetter: is what is suggested to us by a streamlined and plausible semantics.
Identity/Science/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the history of science there have often been discoveries that have shown us that things we thought were different are identical.
---
I 143
Now one should think that these are contingent identities. Contingent Identity/Semantics/Bigelow/Pargetter: if they like contingent identity, they would have to change the semantics. And that is not hard:
Definition Diversity/new: instead of saying that two things are different, if something is true of one but not true of the other, we could say that something non-modal is true of one, but not true of the other.
That brings out some new systems.
It is interesting to note that some of these systems verify NNI while they continue to falsify NI.
For example, it is more difficult to allow New York and Miami to be one and the same city than to allow Miami to be two cities.
Identity/BigelowVsContingent Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: we should let the semantics decide and say that there is simply no contingent identity.
Contingent Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: instead of changing the semantics and then to allow it nevertheless, we should rather explain why they seem to exist: e.g.
Theory of descriptions/Russell/Bigelow/Pargetter: provides a means to reconcile contingently with necessary identities: assertions of the form
the F = the G
can be analyzed as contingent by saying that the properties F and G are co-instantiated by a single thing. This is still compatible with the necessary self-identity.
Bigelow/Pargetter: through descriptions most contingent identities are explained away.
---
I 144
Introverted Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above Chapter 1) introverted realism, as can be seen here, can reinforce the extroverted realism from which it originated.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Knowledge Russell Frank I 654ff
Proposition/Knowledge/Russell: one can know propositions, even if one is not familiar with all components.
Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58

Russell IV 116
Knowledge/wrong knowledge/false knowledge/Russell: E.g. Someone thinks that the name of the Prime Minister starts with B (Bannerman is correct) - but he thinks Balfour was Prime Minister - no true knowledge.
Hintikka 167
Knowledge/who/what/where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze constructions of the form white + W sentence. General: (10) a knows who (e.g., x) is such that A (x)
becomes
(11) (Ex) a knows that A (x).
Hintikka: but this is only possible if we modify Russell's approach:
Problem: the existential generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be traced back to the non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed with Russell's theory of descriptions (ThdK).
Problem: for each person, there are a lot of people whose names the person knows and of whose existence the person knows, but of whom the person does not know who they are. ((s) celebrities, people of whom one has heard, hear-say) not aquaintance, but by description.
I 168
Charles Dodgson, for instance, was for Queen Victoria one person she had heard of, but she did not know herself. Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10) it applies:
(12) ~ (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x
But this is trivially wrong, even according to Russell.
The following is certainly true:
(13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson
Existential Generalization/EG: results then in:
(14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x
So exactly the negation of (12) is a contradiction.
Descriptions/Hintikka: descriptions are not involved here at all. Therefore Russell's theory of descriptions cannot help here.
I 170
Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Uniqueness/Russell/Hintikka: What ways Russell could have taken? Knowledge-who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge who did something with the existence of an individual of whom is known that it has done so.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Translation Searle V 236
Translation/theory of descriptions/Russell/Searle: Russell thesis: ranslation is never an >analysis - just an >analog.
V 64
Convention/Translation/Searle: saying "je promets" in French and "I promise" in English is a >convention.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Truth Value Gaps Quine I 307
Truth Value Gap/Non-existence/Quine: We interpreted "exists" as (Ex)(y=x) which applies to everything just like "x=x". But also with this procedure anomalies result. It seems strange that "Pegasus exists" should be wrong if "(x)(x exists)" is true and "Pegasus" takes a purely descriptive position. Something is wrong if Pegasus is granted the purely descriptive position.
I 308
The sense should be that the term concerned is used exclusively to indicate an object about which the rest of the sentence can say something. We can call this "truth value gaps" (the expression comes from Strawson). With open sentences we have not been disturbed by the fact that they have no truth value, but they can already be recognized by the way they are written. Here the gaps are disturbing precisely because they are not recognizable. Perhaps best with trivalent logic ("undecidable")?
QuineVs: one does not assume that the difficulties come from a pedantic distinction between what is true and what is neither true nor false. If one were to summarize both categories under the rubric of the false, nothing would be gained.
For they are distinguished from one another by the fact that one category contains the negations of all their elements, while the other does not contain a single negation of their elements.
I 318
Singular descriptions "the", e.g. "the setting of the sun" Iota operator "i" (inverted, without dot) (ix)(...x...) "This x, for that applies" Here no synonymy is claimed by additional information (as in § 33). The logical theory made possible by the canonical framework treats ambiguous terms and indicator words as if they had fixed objects of reference.
I 319
Let us now compare the identity statement "y = (ix)(...x...)" with the quantification: (1) (x)(...x...if and only if x = y)
can be read briefly as
"...y...and exclusively y".
If either (1) or the reformulation applies to an object y, both are probably true. Nevertheless, both may differ in their conditions of falsity with respect to truth values!
Because one can understand these gaps in such a way that "y = (ix)(...x...)" in relation to each object y has no truth value, if it applies to none,
while "...y....and exclusively y" is simply wrong in relation to any object, if it doesn't apply to any.
So we can simply put our aversion to gaps into action and equate "y = (ix)( ...x...) with "...y... and exclusively y" and accordingly fill the truth value gaps of "y = (ix)(...x..)" with the truth value incorrectly.
This step enables us to make the singular identifications disappear at all.
I 327
Definition/singular terms/truth value gaps/Quine: if we interpret definitions as instructions for the transformation of singular terms, we can avoid the annoyance of truth value gaps:
I 328
The definition of the singular descriptions is then simple as follows: Def Singular Description: Write
"y = (ix)(...x...)" and "(ix)(...x...) exists"
as notation variants of
"...y...and exclusively y."
And with recourse to §37: Write "(ix)(...x...) " as abbreviation of
(7) (Ey)[y = (ix)(...x...) and y ],
(In this representation, we have " y " as any open sentence.) If we apply the three parts of the above definition successively and repeatedly, they are sufficient to make "(ix)(...x...)" accessible again to any position where free variables may occur.
I 389/90
Conditional: the indicative conditional is unproblematic. In unquantified form "if p then q" it is perhaps best expressed as containing a truth value gap (§ 37) if its antecedence is false.(See also EFQ (ex falso quodlibet): ex falso quodlibet).
I 449
In the case of the indicative conditional, the initial problems are the truth value gaps and the ambiguity of the truth conditions. They are solved by being able to dispense with the indicative conditional in favor of a truth function.
I 447
StrawsonVsRussell: Strawson has misnamed Russell's theory of descriptions because of their treatment of truth value gaps.
III 282
Truth Value Gap/Quine: comes from everyday language, in logic we have to fill it. And be it arbitrary. Every sentence should have a truth value (true or false).
XI 39
Canonical Notation/Quine/Lauener: closes truth value gaps.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Description Theory Searle Vs Description Theory Searle V 236
Theory of Descriptions/Russell: the expression obtained by a translation is according to this interpretation by no means an analysis of the original expression, but merely an analogy. Sense/Frege: Question: what is the relationship between an indicative expression and its meaning? Answer: the sense of an indicative expression is "the manner of presentation."
RussellVsFrege: for him there is no relationship between certain descriptions and their meanings!
For him, a proposition that includes a description is the hidden form of a proposition that asserts the existence of an object.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Description Theory Schiffer Vs Description Theory I 36
SchifferVsDescription theory (as solution for Twin earth e.g.)/theory of descriptions: you can not just say "This thing before me" or unshakable truth: "This is the thing in front of me". (see below). Twin Earth Example/Some authors Vs Twin earth example: the example had too strong science fiction character.
SchifferVsVs: going past the point: it's all about that to believe in cats you need to have contact with cats.
I 37
Twin earth/SchifferVsDescription theory: (see below 3.5) the description theory of terms for natural species is as wrong as a philosophical theory of this state can be.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Frege, G. Newen Vs Frege, G. I 209
Physicalism/Identity Theory/New: because of the possibility that mental phenomena could be realized in different ways (functionalism) token physicalism was abandoned in favor of type physicalism. (VsToken Physicalism) Functionalism/Newen: Problem: we do not know what the possibly physical states have in common ((s) on a mental level). Mental Universals/Newen: are needed then. Bieri: Problem: either a theory about mental universals seems empirically implausible. Or it is empirically plausible, then it does not tell us what we want to know. (Bieri: Anal. Ph. d. Geistes, p. 41).
Functional State/Newen: similar to dispositions in that it can be characterized by hypothetical relations between initial situations and consequent states.
I 211
VsFunctionalism/Newen: qualia problem FunctionalismVsVs: zombie argument:
I 212
There need be no qualia to explain behavior. Mental Causation/Newen: is still an open question.

NS I 90
Descriptions/Theory/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: the objective is to overcome two problems: 1) identity statements: need to be informative 2) negative existential statements or statements with empty descriptions must be sensible. Names/Personal Names/Russell: Thesis: names are nothing but abbreviations for decriptions.
Theory of Descriptions/Russell: E.g. 1) There is at least one author of "Waverley" (existence assertion). 2) There is not more than one author of "Waverley" (uniqueness assertion) 3) Whoever wrote "Waverley", was a Scot (statement content).
This is about three possible situations where the sentence may be wrong: a) nobody wrote Waverley, b) several persons did it, c) the author is not a Scot.
NS I 91
Identity/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: if the identity of Cicero with Tullius is necessary (as self-identity), how can the corresponding sentence be informative then? Solution/Russell: 1) There is at least one Roman consul who denounced Catiline 2) There is not more than one Roman consul who denounced Catiline 1*) There is at least one author of "De Oratore" 2*) There is not more than one author of "De Oratore" 3) whoever denounced Catiline is identical with the author of "De Oratore". Empty Names/Empty Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Solution: 1) There is at least one present king of France 2) There is not more than one present king of France 3) Whoever is the present King of France is bald. Thus the sentence makes sense, even though the first part of the statement is incorrect.
Negative Existential Statements/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: assigning a sensible content. It is not the case that 1) there is at least one flying horse 2) not more than one flying horse. Thus, the negative existence statement "The flying horse does not exist" makes sense and is true.
RussellVsFrege/RussellvsFregean Sense/Newen/Schrenk: this is to avoid that "sense" (the content) must be assumed as an abstract entity. Truth-Value Gaps/RussellVsFrege: they, too, are thus avoided. Point: sentences that seemed to be about a subject, however, now become general propositions about the world.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Russell, B. Lewis Vs Russell, B. Schwarz I 211
Theory of Descriptions/Tradition/Russell: here the description associated with a name should be given to the carrier! Name/Identification/LewisVsRussell: in modal contexts, the identification is not necessary for the carrier, this is regulated by secondary truth conditions.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Russell, B. Quine Vs Russell, B. Chisholm II 75
Predicates/Denote/Russell: denoting expressions: proper names stand for individual things and general expressions for universals. (Probleme d. Phil. p. 82f). In every sentence, at least one word refers to a universal. QuineVsRussell: confusion!
II 108
Theory of Descriptions/VsRussell/Brandl: thus the whole theory is suspected of neglecting the fact that material objects can never be part of propositions. QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use.
Quine II 97
Pricipia mathematica, 1903: Here, Russell's ontology is rampant: every word refers to something. If a word is a proper name, then its object is a thing, otherwise it is a concept. He limits the term "existence" to things, but has a liberal conception of things which even includes times and points in empty space! Then there are, beyond the existent things, other entities: "numbers, the gods of Homer, relationships, fantasies, and four-dimensional space". The word "concept", used by Russell in this manner, has the connotation of "merely a concept". Caution: Gods and fantasies are as real as numbers for Russell!
QuineVsRussell: this is an intolerably indiscriminate ontology. Example: Take impossible numbers, e.g. prime numbers that are divisible by 6. It must be wrong in a certain sense that they exist, and that is in a sense in which it is right that there are prime numbers! Do fantasies exist in this sense?

II 101
Russell has a preference for the term "propositional function" against "class concept". In P.M. both expressions appear. Here: Def "Propositional Function": especially based on forms of notation, e.g. open sentences, while concepts are decidedly independent of notation. However, according to Meinong Russell's confidence is in concepts was diminished, and he prefers the more nominalistic sound of the expression "propositional function" which is now carries twice the load (later as Principia Mathematica.)
Use/Mention/Quine: if we now tried to deal with the difference between use and mention as carelessly as Russell has managed to do sixty years ago, we can see how he might have felt that his theory of propositional functions was notation based, while a theory of types of real classes would be ontological.
Quine: we who pay attention to use and mention can specify when Russell's so-called propositional functions as terms (more specific than properties and relations) must be construed as concepts, and when they may be construed as a mere open sentences or predicates: a) when he quantifies about them, he (unknowingly) reifies them as concepts.
For this reason, nothing more be presumed for his elimination of classes than I have stated above: a derivation of the classes from properties or concepts by means of a context definition that is formulated such that it provides the missing extensionality.
QuineVsRussell: thinks wrongly that his theory has eliminated classes more thoroughly from the world than in terms of a reduction to properties.
II 102
RussellVsFrege: "~ the entire distinction between meaning and designating is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where are we to find the designating complex which supposedly designates C?" QuineVsRussell: Russell's position sometimes seems to stem from a confusion of the expression with its meaning, sometimes from the confusion of the expression with its mention.
II 103/104
In other papers Russel used meaning usually in the sense of "referencing" (would correspond to Frege): "Napoleon" particular individual, "human" whole class of such individual things that have proper names.
Russell rarely seems to look for an existing entity under any heading that would be such that we could call it the meaning that goes beyond the existing referent.
Russell tends to let this entity melt into the expression itself, a tendency he has in general when it comes to existing entities.
QuineVsRussell: for my taste, Russell is too wasteful with existing entities. Precisely because he does not differentiate enough, he lets insignificance and missed reference commingle.
Theory of Descriptions: He cannot get rid of the "King of France" without first inventing the description theory: being meaningful would mean: have a meaning and the meaning is the reference. I.e. "King of France" without meaning, and "The King of France is bald" only had a meaning, because it is the short form of a sentence that does not contain the expression "King of France".
Quine: actually unnecessary, but enlightening.
Russell tends commingle existing entities and expressions. Also on the occasion of his remarks on
Propositions: (P.M.): propositions are always expressions, but then he speaks in a manner that does not match this attitude of the "unity of the propositions" (p.50) and of the impossibility of infinite propositions (p.145)
II 105
Russell: The proposition is nothing more than a symbol, even later, instead: Apparently, propositions are nothing..." the assumption that there are a huge number of false propositions running around in the real, natural world is outrageous." Quine: this revocation is astounding. What is now being offered to us instead of existence is nothingness. Basically Russell has ceased to speak of existence.
What had once been regarded as existing is now accommodated in one of three ways
a) equated with the expression,
b) utterly rejected
c) elevated to the status of proper existence.

II 107
Russell/later: "All there is in the world I call a fact." QuineVsRussell: Russell's preference for an ontology of facts depends on his confusion of meaning with reference. Otherwise he would probably have finished the facts off quickly.
What the reader of "Philosophy of logical atomism" notices would have deterred Russell himself, namely how much the analysis of facts is based on the analysis of language.
Russell does not recognize the facts as fundamental in any case. Atomic facts are as atomic as facts can be.
Atomic Facts/Quine: but they are composite objects! Russell's atoms are not atomic facts, but sense data!

II 183 ff
Russell: Pure mathematics is the class of all sentences of the form "p implies q" where p and q are sentences with one or more variables, and in both sets the same. "We never know what is being discussed, nor if what we say is true."
II 184
This misinterpretation of mathematics was a response to non-Euclidean geometry. Numbers: how about elementary arithmetic? Pure numbers, etc. should be regarded as uninterpreted. Then the application to apples is an accumulation.
Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I find this attitude completely wrong. The words "five" and "twelve" are nowhere uninterpreted, they are as much essential components of our interpreted language as apples. >Numbers. They denote two intangible objects, numbers that are the sizes of quantities of apples and the like. The "plus" in addition is also interpreted from start to finish, but it has nothing to do with the accumulation of things. Five plus twelve is: how many apples there are in two separate piles. However, without pouring them together. The numbers "five" and "twelve" differ from apples in that they do not denote a body, that has nothing to do with misinterpretation. The same could be said of "nation" or "species". The ordinary interpreted scientific speech is determined to abstract objects as it is determined to apples and bodies. All these things appear in our world system as values ​​of variables.
II 185
It even has nothing to do with purity (e.g. of the set theory). Purity is something other than uninterpretedness.
XII 60
Expression/Numbers/Knowledge/Explication/Explanation/Quine: our knowledge of expressions is alone in their laws of interlinking. Therefore, every structure that fulfills these laws can be an explication.
XII 61
Knowledge of numbers: consists alone in the laws of arithmetic. Then any lawful construction is an explication of the numbers. RussellVs: (early): Thesis: arithmetic laws are not sufficient for understanding numbers. We also need to know applications (use) or their embedding in the talk about other things.
Number/Russell: is the key concept here: "there are n such and suches".
Number/Definition/QuineVsRussell: we can define "there are n such and suches" without ever deciding what numbers are beyond their fulfillment of arithmetic addition.
Application/Use/QuineVsRussell: wherever there is structure, the applications set in. E.g. expressions and Gödel numbers: even the mention of an inscription was no definitive proof that we are talking about expressions and not about Gödel numbers. We can always say that our ostension was shifted.

VII (e) 80
Principia Mathematica/PM/Russell/Whitehead/Quine: shows that the whole of mathematics can be translated into logic. Only three concepts need to be clarified: Mathematics, translation and logic.
VII (e) 81
QuineVsRussell: the concept of the propositional function is unclear and obscures the entire PM.
VII (e) 93
QuineVsRussell: PM must be complemented by the axiom of infinity if certain mathematical principles are to be derived.
VII (e) 93/94
Axiom of infinity: ensures the existence of a class with infinitely many elements. Quine: New Foundations instead makes do with the universal class: θ or x^ (x = x).

VII (f) 122
Propositional Functions/QuineVsRussell: ambiguous: a) open sentences
b) properties.
Russell no classes theory uses propositional functions as properties as value-bound variables.

IX 15
QuineVsRussell: inexact terminology. "Propositional function", he used this expression both when referring to attributes (real properties) and when referring to statements or predicates. In truth, he only reduced the theory of classes to an unreduced theory of attributes.
IX 93
Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I differ in one point: for me, rational numbers are themselves real numbers, not so for Russell and Whitehead. Russell: rational numbers are pairwise disjoint for them like those of Peano. (See Chapter 17), while their real numbers are nested. ((s) pairwise disjoint, contrast: nested)
Natural Numbers/Quine: for me as for most authors: no rational integers.
Rational Numbers/Russell: accordingly, no rational real numbers. They are only "imitated" by the rational real numbers.
Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: for me, however, the rational numbers are real numbers. This is because I have constructed the real numbers according to Russell's version b) without using the name and the designation of rational numbers.
Therefore, I was able to retain name and designation for the rational real numbers

IX 181
Type Theory/TT/QuineVsRussell: in the present form our theory is too weak to prove some sentences of classical mathematics. E.g. proof that every limited class of real numbers has a least upper boundary (LUB).
IX 182
Suppose the real numbers were developed in Russell's theory similar to Section VI, however, attributes were now to take the place of classes and the alocation to attributes replaces the element relation to classes. LUB: (Capters 18, 19) of a limited class of real numbers: the class Uz or {x:Ey(x ε y ε z)}.
Attribute: in parallel, we might thus expect that the LUB of a limited attribute φ of real numbers in Russell's system is equal to the
Attribute Eψ(φψ u ψ^x).
Problem: under Russell's order doctrine is this LUB ψ is of a higher order than that of the real numbers ψ which fall under the attribute φ whose LUB is sought.
Boundary/LUB/QuineVsRussell: You need LUB for the entire classic technique of calculus, which is based on continuity. However, LUB have no value for these purposes if they are not available as values ​​of the same variables whose value range already includes those numbers whose upper boundary is wanted.
An upper boundary (i.e. LUB) of higher order cannot be the value of such variables, and thus misses its purpose.
Solution/Russell: Axiom of Reducibility:
Def Axiom of Reducibility/RA/Russell/Quine: every propositional function has the same extension as a certain predicative one. I.e.
Ey∀x(ψ!x φx), Eψ∀x∀y[ψ!(x,y) φ(x,y)], etc.
IX 184
VsConstruktivism/Construction/QuineVsRussell: we have seen Russell's constructivist approach to the real numbers fail (LUB, see above). He gave up on constructivism and took refuge in the RA.
IX 184/185
The way he gave it up had something perverse to it: Axiom of Reducibility/QuineVsRussell: the RA implies that all the distinctions that gave rise to its creation are superfluous! (... + ...)

IX 185
Propositional Function/PF/Attribute/Predicate/TT/QuineVsRussell: overlooked the following difference and its analogs: a) "propositional functions": as attributes (or intentional relations) and
b) proposition functions: as expressions, i.e. predicates (and open statements: e.g. "x is mortal") Accordingly:
a) attributes
b) open statements
As expressions they differ visibly in the order if the order is to be assessed on the basis of the indices of bound variables within the expression. For Russell everything is "AF".
Since Russell failed to distinguish between formula and object (word/object, mention/use), he did not remember the trick of allowing that an expression of higher order refers straight to an attribute or a relation of lower order.

X 95
Context Definition/Properties/Stage 2 Logic/Quine: if you prefer properties as sets, you can introduce quantification over properties, and then introduce quantification over sets through a schematic context definition. Russell: has taken this path.
Quine: but the definition has to ensure that the principle of extensionality applies to sets, but not to properties. That is precisely the difference.
Russell/QuineVsRussell: why did he want properties?
X 96
He did not notice at which point the unproblematic talk of predicates capsized to speaking about properties. ((s) object language/meta language/mention/use). Propositional Function/PF: Russell took it over from Frege.
QuineVsRussell: he sometimes used PF to refer to predicates, sometimes to properties.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Russell, B. Searle Vs Russell, B. V 122
Theory of descriptions/Russell/Searle: Russell went as far as to negate that a specific description could ever be used as reference! ((s) This is about fictions) Description/fiction/SearleVsRussell: of course you can refer to literary figures. Condition: they must exist (in the literature). You cannot refer to the wife of Sherlock Holmes, because he was not married.
V 129
Theory of descriptions/Russell/problem: E.g. "The man insulted me" means that one might assume that only one man exists in the universe. SearleVsRussell: actually asserted something like this in the theory of descriptions.

V 245
Names/descriptions/SearleVsRussell: from the supposed distinction between proper names and certain descriptions the metaphysical distinction between objects and properties is derived.
V 131
definite article/reference/SearleVsRussell: there is absolutely no use of the definite article, which implies in itself that only one object can be meant.
V 132/133
definite article: its function is rather to indicate that the speaker intends a singular reference.
V 144
Proposition/Searle: only the expression in a particular context (circumstances) ensures the transmitting of a proposition! SearleVsRussell: no class of logically proper names can exist at all (this, now, there). If their expressions gave no descriptive content (Russell), there is no way to establish a relation between the expression and the object. How could one explain that this term refers to that object?

V 238
Searle: a propositional act can never be identical to the illocutionary act of the assertion, since a propositional act can never occur independently but only as part of an illocutionary act. SearleVsRussell: the attempt to equate the specific reference (propositional act) with the setting up of assertions (illocutionary act) was bound to fail.
V 239
Because Russell used the formal notation, complete statements must be prepared for him, even if there is no object.
V 240
But from the fact that a certain type of acts can be carried out only under certain conditions, does not simply follow that implementation of such an act in itself already represents the assertion that these conditions were met. Searle: The command "Bring this to the King of France" is neither a statement nor does it contain such. (> E.g. "The present King of France is bald.")

IV 113
Sense/Russell: E.g. pointless: "Four-pageness drinking postponement": SearleVsRussell: is read by many authors as a metaphorical statement about the Quadripartite Agreement after WW2. But none of the words occurs here literally!

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Russell, B. Strawson Vs Russell, B. Wolf II 17
StrawsonVsRussell: Vs Russell's resolution of singular sentences like "the F, which is G, is H" are general sentences such as "There is exactly one F, which is G, and this F is H" : this is inappropriate. Thus it is not included, that we refer with the singular term to individual things.
---
Newen/Schrenk I 92
Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: ("On Referring") in 1950, 45 years after Russell's "On Denoting" (1905)). Strawson: 5 theses
(i) one must distinguish between a) the sentence, b) the use, c) the expression (on one occasion)
(ii) there is a difference between (logical) implying and presupposition
(iii) truth value gaps are allowed
(iv) The meaning of an expression is not its referent, but the conventions and rules. In various uses the term can therefore refer to different objects.
(v) expressions can be used referential and predicative (attributing properties).
Sentence/truth value/tr.v./Strawson: Thesis: sentences themselves cannot be true or false, only their use.
Presupposition/implication/Strawson: difference:
Definition implication/Strawson: A implies B iff it cannot be that A is true but B is false. On the other hand:
Definition presupposition/Strawson: A presupposes B iff B must be true so that A can take a truth value.
Existence assertion/uniqueness assertion/Strawson: are only presupposed by a sentence with description, but not implied.
E.g. King of France/presupposition/Strawson: the sentence presupposes the existence, however, does not imply it. And also does not claim the existence and uniqueness.
Newen/Schrenk VsStrawson: Strawson provides no philosophical-logical arguments for his thesis.
Newen/Schrenk I 94
He rather refers to our everyday practice. Truth-value gaps/StrawsonVsRussell: accepted by him.
Negative existential statements/existence/existence theorem/Strawson/VsStrawson/Newen/Schrenk: his approach lets the problem of empty existence theorems look even trickier.
Referential/predicative/singular term/designation/name/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis:
Proper names/demonstratives: are largely used referential.
Description: have a maximum predicative, so descriptive meaning (but can also simultaneously refer).
Identity/informative identity sentences/referential/predicative/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: here the description has (or two occurring descriptions) such an extreme predicative use that E.g. "Napoleon is identical to the man who ordered the execution of the Duke" is as good as synonymous with the phrase "Napoleon ordered the ...".
In principle, both sentences are used for a predication. Thus, the first sentence is informative when it is read predicative and not purely referential.
---
Quine I 447
StrawsonVsRussell: has called Russell's theory of descriptions false because of their treatment of the truth value gaps. ---
Schulte III 433
StrawsonVsRussell/Theory of descriptions: Strawson brings a series of basic distinctions between types and levels of use of linguistic expressions into play. Fundamental difference between the logical subject and logical predicate. Pleads for stronger focus on everyday language.
"The common language has no exact logic"
Schulte III 434
King-xample: "The present king of France is bald". Russell: here the description must not be considered a logical subject. Russell: Such sentences are simply wrong in the case of non-existence. Then we also not need to make any dubious ontological conditions. We analyze (according to Russell) the sentence as follows: it is in reality a conjunction of three sentences:
1. There is a king of France.
2. There are no more than a king of France.
3. There is nothing that is King of France and is not bald.
Since at least one member in the conjunction is false, it is wrong in total.
StrawsonVsRussell: 1. he speaks too careless of sentences and their meanings. But one has to consider the use of linguistic expressions, which shows that there must be a much finer distinction.
2. Russell confused what a sentence says with the terms of the meaningful use of this sentence.
3. The everyday language and not the formal logic determines the meaning.
---
Schulte III 435
Reference/Strawson: an expression does not refer to anything by itself. King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: with the sentence "The present king of France is bald" no existence assertion is pronounced. Rather, it is "implied".
Therefore, the sentence does not need to be true or false. The term does not refer to anything.
Definition truth value gap (Strawson): E.g. King-Example: refers to nothing. Wittgenstein: a failed move in the language game.
---
VII 95
Description/Strawson: sure I use in E.g. "Napoleon was the greatest French soldier", the word "Napoleon", to name the person, not the predicate. StrawsonVsRussell: but I can use the description very well to name a person.
There can also be more than one description in one sentence.
VII 98
StrawsonVsRussell: seems to imply that there are such logical subject predicate sentences. Russell solution: only logical proper names - for example, "This" - are real subjects in logical sentences. The meaning is exactly the individual thing.
This leads him to the fact that he can no longer regard sentences with descriptions as logical propositions.
Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: Solution: in "clear referring use" also dscriptions can be used. But these are not "descriptions" in Russell's sense.
VII 99
King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: claims three statements, one of which in any case would be wrong. The conjunction of three statements, one of which is wrong and the others are true, is false, but meaningful.
VII 100
Reference/description/StrawsonVsRussell: distinction: terminology:
"Unique reference": expression. (Clearly referring description).
Sentence begins with clear referring description.
Sentences that can start with a description:
(A1) sentence
(A2) use of a sentence (A3) uttering of a sentence
accordingly:
(B1) expression
(B2) use of an expression (B3) utterance of an expression.
King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: the utterance (assertion (>utterance) "The present king of France is wise" can be true or false at different times, but the sentence is the same.
VII 101
Various uses: according to whether at the time of Louis XIV. or Louis XV. Sentence/statement/statement/assertion/proposition/Strawson:
Assertion (assertion): can be true or false at different times.
Statement (proposition): ditto
Sentence is always the same. (Difference sentence/Proposition).
VII 102
StrawsonVsRussell: he overlooks the distinction between use and meaning.
VII 104
Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: the question of whether a sentence makes sense, has nothing to do with whether it is needed at a particular opportunity to say something true or false or to refer to something existent or non-existent.
VII 105
Meaning/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "The table is covered with books": Everyone understands this sentence, it is absurd to ask "what object" the sentence is about (about many!). It is also absurd to ask whether it is true or false.
VII 106
Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: that the sentence makes sense, has to do with the fact that it is used correctly (or can be), not that it can be negated. Sense cannot be determined with respect to a specific (individual) use.
It is about conventions, habits and rules.
VII 106/107
King-Example/Russell/Strawson: Russell says two true things about it: 1. The sentence E.g. "The present king of France is wise" makes sense.
2. whoever expresses the sentence now, would make a true statement, if there is now one,
StrawsonVsRussell: 1. wrong to say who uttered the sentence now, would either make a true or a false claim.
2. false, that a part of this claim states that the king exists.
Strawson: the question wrong/false does not arise because of the non-existence. E.g. It is not like grasping after a raincoat suggests that one believes that it is raining. (> Presupposition/Strawson).
Implication/Imply/StrawsonVsRussell: the predication does not assert an existence of the object.
VII 110
Existence/StrawsonVsRussell: the use of "the" is not synonymous with the assertion that the object exists. Principia Mathematica: (p.30) "strict use" of the definite article: "only applies if object exists".
StrawsonVsRussell: the sentence "The table is covered with books" does not only apply if there is exactly one table
VII 111
This is not claimed with the sentence, but (commonplace) implied that there is exactly one thing that belongs to the type of table and that it is also one to which the speaker refers. Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: referring is not to say that one refers.
Saying that there is one or the other table, which is referred to, is not the same as to designate a certain table.
Referencing is not the same as claiming.
Logical proper names/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. I could form my empty hand and say "This is a beautiful red!" The other notes that there is nothing.
Therefore, "this" no "camouflaged description" in Russell's sense. Also no logical proper name.
You have to know what the sentence means to be able to respond to the statement.
VII 112
StrawsonVsRussell: this blurs the distinction between pure existence theorems and sentences that contain an expression to point to an object or to refer to it. Russell's "Inquiry into meaning and truth" contains a logical catastrophic name theory. (Logical proper names).
He takes away the status of logical subjects from the descriptions, but offers no substitute.
VII 113
Reference/Name/referent/StrawsonVsRussell: not even names are enough for this ambitious standard. Strawson: The meaning of the name is not the object. (Confusion of utterance and use).
They are the expressions together with the context that one needs to clearly refer to something.
When we refer we do not achieve completeness anyway. This also allows the fiction. (Footnote: later: does not seem very durable to me because of the implicit restrictive use of "refer to".)
VII 122
StrawsonVsRussell: Summit of circulatory: to treat names as camouflaged descriptions. Names are choosen arbitrary or conventional. Otherwise names would be descriptive.
VII 123
Vague reference/"Somebody"/implication/Strawson: E.g. "A man told me ..." Russell: existence assertion: "There is a man who ..."
StrawsonVsRussell: ridiculous to say here that "class of men was not empty ..."
Here uniqueness is also implicated as in "the table".
VII 124
Tautology/StrawsonVsRussell: one does not need to believe in the triviality. That only believe those who believe that the meaning of an expression is the object. (E.g. Scott is Scott).
VII 126
Presupposition/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "My children sleep" Here, everyone will assume that the speaker has children. Everyday language has no exact logic. This is misjudged by Aristotle and Russell.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Schulte I
J. Schulte
Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001

Schulte II
J. Schulte
U. J. Wenzel
Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Frankfurt 2001

Schulte III
Joachim Schulte
"Peter Frederick Strawson"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Russell, B. Hintikka Vs Russell, B. II 165
On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: with phrases that stand for genuine constituents of propositions. Problem/Frege: failure of substitutivity of identity (SI) in intensional contexts.
Informative Identity/Frege: the fact that identity can even sometimes be informative is connected to this.
EG/Existential Generalization/Russell: it, too, may fail in in intensional contexts, (problem of empty terms).
HintikkaVsRussell: he does not recognize the depth of the problem and rather circumvents the problems of denoting terms.
E.g. The bald king of France/Russell: Problem: we cannot prove by existential generalization that there is a present king of France.
HintikkaVsRussell: But there are also other problems. (see below for ambiguity of cross world identificaiton).
Description/Russell/Hintikka:
Def Primary Description: the substitutivity of identity applies to them (SI)
Def secondary description: for them, substitutivity of identity (SI) fails.
II 166
Existential Generalization/Russell: two readings: (1) George IV did not know whether Scott was the author of Waverley.
Description/Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: "the author of Waverley": (ix)A(x)
primarily: the description has the following power:
(2) (Ex)[A(x) & (y) A(y) > y = x) & ~ George IV knew that (Scott = x)].
((s) notation: quantifier here always normal existential quantifier, mirrored E).
I.e. the quantifier has the maximum range in the primary identification.
The second reading is more likely, however: Secondary:
(3) ~George IV knew that (Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x & (Scott = x)].
((s) narrow range):
Range/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is also a third option for the range of a quantifier ((s) >"medium range"/Kripke).
(4) ~(Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x ) & George IV knew that (Scott = x)].
II 166
Existential Generalization/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not see that there was a reason for the failure of the existential generalization, which is not caused by the non-existence of the object. E.g.
(5) George IV knew that the author of Waverley is the author of Waverley.
a) trivial interpretation:
I 167
(6) George IV knew that (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x)) everyday language translation: he knew that one and only one person wrote Waverley.
I 166
b) non-trivial interpretation: (7) (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x) & George IV knew that (A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x))).
((s) no quantifier after "knew that
everyday language translation: George knew of the only person who actually wrote Waverley, that they did.
Because knowledge implies truth, (7) is equivalent to
(8) (Ex) George IV knew that (Ez)(A(z) & (y)(A(y) > y = z) & x = z).
this is equivalent to.
(9) (Ex) George IV knew that (the author of Waverley = x)
Here, the description has secondary (narrow) range.
Everyday language translation: George knew who the author of Waverley is.
I 167
Knowledge/Who/What/Where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze structures of the form knows + W-sentence. General: (10) a knows, who (Ex x) is so that A(x)
becomes
(11) (Ex) a knows that A(x).
Hintikka: this is only possible if we modify Russell’s approach:
Problem: the existential generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be attributed to non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed by Russell’s Theory of Descriptions (ThoD).
Problem: for every person, there are a lot of people whose names they know and of whose existence they know, but of who they do not know who they are.
II 168
E.g. Charles Dodgson was for Queen Victoria someone of whom she had heard, but whom she did not know. Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10), the following applies.
(12) ~(Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x)
But that’s trivially false, even according to Russell.
Because the following is certainly true:
(13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson)
Existential Generalization/EG: then yields
(14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x)
So exactly the negation of (12) contradiction.
II 168
Descriptions/Hintikka: are not involved here. Therefore, Russell’s description theory cannot help here, either. E.g. we can also assume that Victoria knew of the existence of Dodgson.
Empty Terms/Empty Names: are therefore not the problem, either.
Ontology/Hintikka: so our problem gets an ontological aspect.
Existential Generalization/EG/Being/Quine/Ontology/Hintikka: the question of whether existential generalization may be applied on a singular term "b", E.g. in a context "F(b)", is the same as whether b may be value of a bound variable.
Existential Generalization/Hintikka: does not fail here because of non-existence.
II 169
We are dealing with the following problems here: Manifestation used by
a) no SI Frege, Russell
b) no EG
(i) due to non-existence Russell
(ii) because of ambiguity Hintikka
Ambiguity/Solution/Hintikka: possible worlds semantics.
E.g. (12) - (14) the problem is not that Dodgson did not exist in the actual world or not in one of Victoria’s worlds of knowledge, but that the name Dodgson singles out different individuals in different possible worlds.
Hence (14) does not follow from (13).
II 170
Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Clarity/Russell/Hintikka: Which way would have been open to Russell?. Knowing-Who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself very often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge, who did something with the existence of another individual, which is known to have done... + ...
II 173
Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: Important argument: an ingenious feature of Russell’s theory of denotation from 1905 is that it is the quantifiers that denote! Theory of Denotation/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") includes the reduction of descriptions to objects of acquaintance.
II 174
Hintikka: this relation is amazing, it also seems to be circular to allow only objects of acquaintance. Solution: We need to see what successfully denoting expressions (phrases) actually denote: they precisely denote objects of acquaintance.
Ambiguity/Clarity/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization.
Existential Generalization/Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: his own example shows that only objects of acquaintance are allowed: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is in fact a primary incident i.e. his example (2).
"Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "if" instead of "did not know". (secondary?).
Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed like this: that George wanted to know of the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott.
II 175
That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (in the distance) and had asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell select an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not usually deal with beings of flesh and blood whose identity is known to us, instead of only with objects of perception?.
Knowing Who/Knowing What/Perception Object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely with perception objects it seems as if the kind of clarity that we need for a knowing-who, is not just given.
Identifcation/Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in my approach Dodgson is a bona fide individual iff. he is one and the same individual in all worlds of knowledge of Victoria. I.e. identifiable iff.
(15) (E.g.) in all relevant possible worlds it is true that (Dodgson = x).
Problem: What are the relevant possible worlds?.
II 178
Quantifier/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell systematically confuses two types of quantifiers. (a) of acquaintance, b) of description). Problem: Russell has not realized that the difference cannot be defined solely in terms of the actual world!.
Solution/Hintikka: we need a relativization to sets of possible worlds that change with the different propositional attitudes.
II 179
RussellVsHintikka: he would not have accepted my representation of his position like this. HintikkaVsRussell: but the reason for this merely lies in a further error of Russell’s: I have not attributed to him what he believed, but what he should have believed.
Quantification/Russell/Hintikka: he should have reduced to objects of acquaintance. Russell believed, however, it was sufficient to eliminate expressions that seemingly denote objects that are not such of acquaintance.
Important argument: in that his quantifiers do not enter any ontological commitment. Only denoting expressions do that.
Variable/Russell/Hintikka: are only notational patterns in Russell.
Ontological Commitment/Quine/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell did not recognize the ontological commitment that ​​1st order languages bring with them.
Being/Ontology/Quine: "Being means being value of a bound variable".
HintikkaVsRussell: he has realized that.
II 180
Elimination/Eliminability/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in order to eliminate merely seemingly denoting descriptions one must assume that the quantifiers and bound variables go over individuals that are identified by way of description. ((s) Object of the >Description). Otherwise, the real Bismarck would not be a permissible value of the variables with which we express that there is an individual of a certain species.
Problem: then these quantifiers may not be constituents of propositions, because their value ranges do not only consist of objects of acquaintance. Therefore, Russell’s mistake was twofold.
Quantifier/Variable/Russell/Hintikka, 1905, he had already stopped thinking that quantifiers and bound variables are real constituents of propositions.
Def Pseudo Variable/Russell/Hintikka: = bound variable.
Acquaintance/Russell: values of the variable ​​should only be objects of acquaintance. (HintikkaVsRussell).
Quantifiers/HintikkaVsRussell: now we can see why Russell did not differentiate between different quantifiers (acquaintance/description): For him quantifiers were only notational patterns, and for them the range of possible interpretations need not be determined, therefore it makes no difference if the rage changes!.
Quantification/Russell: for him, it was implicitly objectional (referential), and in any event not substitutional.

Peacocke I 190
Possible Worlds/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: R. is unable to explain the cases in which we quantify in belief contexts (!) where (according to Hintikka) the quantifier over "publicly descriptively identified" particulars is sufficient. Hintikka: compares with a "roman à clef".
Peacocke: it is not clear that (whether) this could not be explained by Russell as cases of general ideas, so that the person with such and such characteristics is so and so.
Universals/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: we are familiar with universals and they are constituents of our thoughts.
HintikkaVsRussell: this is a desperate remedy to save the principle of acquaintance.
PeacockeVsRussell: his arguments are also very weak.
Russell: E.g. we cannot understand the transitivity of "before" if we are not acquainted with "before", and even less what it means that one thing is before another. While the judgment depends on a consciousness of a complex, whose analysis we do not understand if we do not understand the terms used.
I 191
PeacockeVsRussell: what kind of relationship should exist between subject and universal?. Solution: the reformulated PB: Here we can see to which conditions a term is subject, similar to the principle of sensitivity in relational givenness.
I 192
HintikkaVsRussell: ("On denoting what?", 1981, p.167 ff): the elimination of objects with which the subject is not familiar from the singular term position is not sufficient for the irreducibility of acquaintance that Russell had in mind. Quantification/Hintikka: the quantifiers will still reach over objects with which the subject is not familiar.
But such quantifiers cannot be constituents of propositions, if that is to be compatible with the PB. Because they would certainly occur through their value range Occur and these do not consist of particulars with which one is familiar.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Russell, B. Castaneda Vs Russell, B. Frank I 382
CastanedaVsRussell: his reduction has devastating effects on ethical contexts. (Theory of Descriptions).

Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference,
and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55

James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An
International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians,
Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Russell, B. Donnellan Vs Russell, B. I 18/19
DonnellanVsRussell: has not grasped the referential use, but placed it in a strange construct of "logically proper names". DonnellanVsStrawson: does not see the difference ref/att correctly and mixes the two.
Referential/Attributive/Donnellan: varies even when it comes to the importance of the distinction: 1) Text: only pragmatic distinction, 2) later: "semantic significance". KripkeVsDonnellan: denies semantic ambiguity of the use of descriptions. Both can be grasped with the Russell’s analysis: sentences of the form "The F which is G is H" have the same truth conditions, they are true, if the only F that fulfils G is actually H.
I 193
DonnellanVsRussell: his strict implication works at most with attributive use. (But he does note make the distinction).
I 194
Def Description/Russell: affects an entity which only it fulfills. Donnellan: that is certainly applicable to both uses(!). Ref/Att/Donnellan: if both are not distinguished, the danger is that it must be assumed that the speaker would have to refer to something without knowing it. E.g. "Presidential candidate": we had no idea that it would be Goldwater. Nevertheless, "presidential candidate" would absurdly refer to Goldwater. Solution: DonnellanVsRussell: attributive use.
I 205
Logical Proper Names/"This"/Russell: refer to something without attributing properties! (Donnellan pro) Donnellan: It could eb said that they refer to the thing itself, not to the thing under the condition that it has any special properties. DonnellanVsRussell: he believed that this is something that a description cannot do. But it does work with referential use.
I 275
Theory of Descriptions/Reference/Existence/Russell/Donnellan: Attributed to himself as a merit to explain the reference to non-existent things without the need to bring the idea of ​​non-existent references of singular terms into play. His fully developed theory of singular terms extended this to the of proper names. Philosophy of logical atomism: names as covert descriptions.
I 275/276
Here, the theory "proper names in the strict logical sense" was introduced, which is rarely found in everyday speech. ((s) logical proper names: "this", etc.) DonnellanVsRussell: we want to try to make Russell’s attempt at a solution (which has not failed) redundant with the "historic explanation". (> like ZinK).
I 281
Logical Proper Names/DonellanVsRussell: have no place in a correct theory of reference. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: Russell’s view is incorrect in terms of common singular terms: it is not true that common proper names always have a descriptive content. Question: does this mean that ordinary singular terms might be able to fulfill the function which according to Russell only logical proper names can have?.
I 283
Descriptions/DonellanVsRussell: it seems absurd to deny that in E.g. Waverley that what is described by the description, i.e. Scott, is not "part" of the expressed proposition. Russell: was of the opinion that such statements are not really statements about the described or the reference of the name, that they do not really name the described thing! Only logical proper names could accomplish the feat of actually mentioning a certain particular. "About"/Reference/DonnellanVsRussell: Putting great emphasis on concepts such as "about" would lead us into marshy terrain. We should require no definition of "about"!.
It would be a delicate task to show that such a statement is either not a statement in any sense of "about" about the described thing or that there is a clear sense of "about" by it being not.
I 285/286
DonnellanVsRussell: For his theory he paid the price of giving up the natural use of singular terms. RussellVsVs: but with the "natural conception" we end up at the Meinong population explosion. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: according to my theory names are no hidden descriptions. E.g. "Homer" is not an abbreviation for "The author of the Homeric poems".
I 209
DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Question: Does he refute Russell? No, in itself not! For methodological considerations, Russell’s theory is better than many thought. Nevertheless, it will probably fail in the end.
I 222
Statement/Donnellan/VsRussell/Kripke: It’s not so clear that Donnellan refutes Russell. E.g. "Her husband is kind to her": had Donnellan flatly asserted that this is true iff. the lover is nice, without regard to the niceness of the husband (is perhaps also nice), he would have started a dispute with Russell. But he does not assert this! If we now asked "Is the statement is true?", Donnellan would elude us. Because if description is used referentially, it is unclear what is meant by "statement". If the statement is to be that the husband is nice, the problem is: to decide whether ref. or att. Referential: in this case, we would repeat the speech act wrongly, Attributive: we ourselves would be referring to someone, and we can only do that if we ourselves believe that it is the husband.
I 232
DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Are the two really conflicting? I propose a test: Test: if you consider whether a particular linguistic phenomenon in English is a counterexample to an analysis, you should consider a hypothetical language that is similar to English, except that here the analysis is assumed to be correct. If the phenomenon in question also appears in the corresponding (hypothetical) community, the fact that it occurs in English cannot refute the hypothesis that the analysis for English is correct!. DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Test: would the phenomenon ref/att occur in different languages?.
I 234
E.g. Sparkling Wine: speakers of the weaker and middle languages think (albeit erroneously) that the truth conditions are fulfilled. Weak: here, the apparatus seems to be entirely adequate. The semantic reference is the only object. Our intuitions are fully explained. Strong: Here, the phenomenon may occur as well. Even ironic use may be clear if the affected person drinks soda.
I 235
These uses would become more common in the strong language (which is not English, of course), because the definite article is prohibited. This leads to an expansion of the speaker reference: If the speaker thinks an item to be fulfilling (Ex)(φ x u ψx), it is the speaker reference, then it may indeed be fulfilling or not. Middle: if speaker reference is applicable in the strong one, it is just as easily transferred to the middle one, because the speaker reference of "ψ(ixφ(x)" is then the thing that the speaker has in mind, which is the only one to fulfill φ(x) and about which he wants to announce that it ψ-s. Conclusion: because the phenomenon occurs in all languages, the fact that it occurs in English can be no argument that English is not a Russell language.
Newen/Schrenk I 95
Def Attributive/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the view of the body of Schmidt ((s) In the absence of the person in question, no matter whether it is them or not, "Whoever ...".). Def referential/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the face of a wild rampaging man at court - while Schmidt comes through the door - ((s) in view of the man in question, no matter whether it’s him or not. "This one, whatever he did...").

Donnellan I
Keith S. Donnellan
"Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Strawson, P. F. Quine Vs Strawson, P. F. I 299
Strawson/Quine: he introduces a category of "process-things" which can be identified neither with the processes nor with the things. QuineVsStrawson: unnecessary as a category. Strawson takes proper examples from the usage of language, unnecessary for canonical notation. (>Strawson I 72).

Tugendhat II 76
QuineVsStrawson: he made a fundamental mistake to assume that the elimination of singular terms by the Theory of Descriptions leads to the elimination of demonstratives.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Various Authors Prior Vs Various Authors I 123
Intentionality/Findlay: relational property with only one side. ((s) Vs: absurd.) Of course, "thinking about T" is a property of the thinker.
I 124
Touchstone for Intentionality: is the "built-in reference to what is not part of it and what does not need to exist anywhere". There is absolutely no intrinsic difference between thinking and speaking about what does and what does not exist. (>Anscombe pro: >Objects of Thougt/Anscombe).
That would only be a Pickwickian distinction (>difference without a difference).
FindlayVsRussell: VsTheory of Descriptions.
PriorVsFindlay: that's not fair, because he just offered the solution.
I 127
PriorVsReid/VsAnscombe/VsFindlay: it is not easy to hold the following two sentences together: (1) What X thinks of Y, plans to do with him, appreciates about him, always involves Y as much as X.
(2) There are cases in which X thinks of Y (appreciates, etc.), and there is no Y at all.
At least it's difficult in this case to dismiss the following three considerations that merely seem to make them consistent:
a) Thinking about an unreal object is a different kind of thinking than that about a real object.
b) our thinking would not put us in relation to an object, but only to an "idea" of it.
c) there would be strong and weak types of reality. (>Subsistence).
I 128
Thinking/Anscombe/Prior: could "think" not be replaced with any other (at least intentional) verb? Object/Tradition/Anscombe: something cannot just be an object without being object of something. I.e. "relational property" of being an object.

Simons I 119
Identity/Simons: is transitive. Prior: this is questionable (the only one). (PriorVsTransitivity of identity).

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Identity Cresswell, M.J. I 117
Identity / Intensional Language / Cresswell: here there are two strategies:   1st is based on Russell’s Theory of Descriptions: Thesis: descriptions are never names.
  2nd descriptions are names, but not from normal objects but of intensional objects (different objects in different worlds).
  Cresswell: Thesis: per Neo-Russell, CresswellVsIntensional Objects.
narrow/wide Russell, B. Cresswell II 140
Descriptions/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Cresswell: Thesis: a certain description is in the same syntactic category as a quantifier such as "someone". - Problem: "Someone does not come" does not mean the same as "It is not the case that someone comes". Solution/Russell: different ranges in modal and doxastic contexts:
a) (close range) "The person next door lives next door" is logically equivalent to "exactly one person lives next door" and therefore it is necessarily true in a sense.
b) (wide range) It is true that the person next door could have lived somewhere else (so it is contingent).

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984