Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 77 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actions | Arendt | Brocker I 361 Action/Act/Arendt: In the public space, the members of the community meet; in this space "action" takes place. It is only in this space that its (unforeseeable) consequences become visible, which may not correspond at all to the expectations and hopes of those who have begun the actions. After all, acting per se is not as purpose-oriented as producing is. It is more focused on the others, on those involved than on a fixed goal. Thus, action is also not identical with making and producing, an idea that has prevailed in modernism, in which political action is defined as purpose-rational action with which one achieves certain goals. The sole purpose of action is common understanding of the common good that goes beyond the sum of the respective interests. >Rationality, >Procedural rationality, >Communication, >Understanding, >Community, >Collective action, >Purposes, >Goals. Antonia Grunenberg, „Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder Vom tätigen Leben“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Arendt I H. Arendt Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics. Civil Disobedience. On Violence. Thoughts on Politics and Revolution Boston 1972 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Administration | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 160 Administration/political theories/Bohman: A. Newer forms of political authority such as expertise and the media seem to operate outside the potentially discursively designed constitutional state and are less open to discursive influence. Administrative institutions act for the common good, a use of public power authorized by legislative mandates to achieve certain ends. Tradition: for that reason, philosophers from Locke to Hegel and Weber see administrators as engaged only in 'neutral' means/ends reasoning, a necessity for the exercise of effective political power. >J. Locke, >G.W.F. Hegel, >M. Weber, >Power, >Society, >State, >Power/Locke, >State/Locke, >Society/Hegel, >State/Hegel. FoucaultVsTradition: Foucault and others have analysed the way in which this power is exercised in part via discursive means, in the way that people and things are named, classified and disciplined in a 'symbolic order' (Foucault, 1977(1); Bourdieu, 1991(2); Flyvbjerg, 1998(3)). >M. Foucault, >P. Bourdieu. Sociology: Social scientists also have long recognized the ambiguous relationship between democracy and bureaucracy: Weber saw that democracy helps produce more bureaucracy, even as bureaucracy tends to undermine democracy as the former becomes an efficient 'social machine' (Weber, 1946(4); Hummel, 1994(5)), open only indirectly to deliberative influence. >Bureaucracy, >Bureaucracy/Weber. B. Deliberative planning: The alternative is to put deliberative mechanisms and interaction with the public within the design of administrative institutions themselves, and this sort of design has taken the form of 'deliberative planning' (Fischer and Forester, 1994(6); Forester, 1993(7)). >Institutions/Discourse theories, >Administration/Discourse theories, >Deliberative Democracy. 1. Foucault, Michel (1977) Discipline and Punish. New York: Vantage. 2. Bourdieu, Pierre (1991) Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge: Polity. 3. Flyvbjerg, Bent (1998) Rationality and Power. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 4. Weber, Max (1946) From Max Weber, eds, H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Hummel, R. P. (1994) The Bureaucratic Experience: A Critique of Life in the Modern Organization. New York: St Martin's. 6. Fischer, Frank and John Forester, eds (1994) The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 7. Forester, John (1993) Critical Theory, Public Policy, and Planning Practice. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Bohman, James 2004. „Discourse Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Behavior | Surowiecki | I 97 Behavior/decision making/decision/Surowiecki: if you want to optimise the decision making of a company or an economy, you should ensure that decisions are made almost simultaneously and not one by one. ((Surowiecki I 93) >Information Cascades: If the behavior of others is merely imitated, the common good of the group suffers. >Decisions, >Decision theory, >Community, >Utility. |
Surowi I James Surowiecki Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005 |
| Citizens | Mbembe | Brocker I 920 Citizen/State/Society/Mbembe/Herb: "Today citizens are those who gain access to the networks of the parallel economy and the income that makes this economy possible" (Mbembe 2016(1), 154). In African states, according to Mbembe, the fiscal relationship between the individual and the state is initially a purely violent one; it is not mediated through a public discourse on the common good. >Government policy/Mbembe, >Tax policy/Mbembe, >Postcolonialism/Mbembe. 1. Achille Mbembe, De la postcolonie. Essai sur l’imagination politique dans l’Afrique contemporaine, Paris 2000. Dt.: Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie. Zur politischen Vorstellungskraft im Afrika der Gegenwart, Wien/Berlin 2016 Karlfriedrich Herb, „Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie (2000)“. In: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Civil Society | Giddens | Brocker I 872 Civil Society/Giddens: is to emerge from the renewal and society-wide dissemination of local, self-organised initiatives of citizens who, on their own initiative, come together to fulfil tasks in important areas of life in a self-determined manner that simultaneously serve the common good and benefit them themselves. >Society, >Community, >State. The range of fields of action for this civil society commitment is extremely broad and is highlighted in detail in a separate diagram: "Promotion of the non-profit sector" (e.g. in social assistance), "Protection of the local public" (in the ecological sense and with regard to public safety), "Revitalisation of community life" (as a prophylactic fight against crime) and "The democratic family".(1) >Family. Brocker I 873 From a decided opposition to the state, civil society tried there to seize some important functions for the citizens, for example in the areas of education and the public sphere. As a result, civil society can fulfil many of the public functions itself once it is mobilized. >Third Way/Giddens. 1.Anthony Giddens, Der dritte Weg. Die Erneuerung der sozialen Demokratie, Frankfurt/M. 1999, p. 96. Thomas Meyer, „Anthony Giddens, Der dritte Weg“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Civil Society | Pettit | Brocker I 859 Civil Society/Pettit: Unlike and more concrete than Rawls, Pettit has forces in mind that demand and promote a competitive democracy. Pettit recognizes them in "civil society". For him, these are "extrafamilial, infrapolitical association[s]".(1) Cf. >J. Rawls, >Democracy, >Society/Rawls. The Republican cause therefore remains dependent on the support of politically sensitive individuals and groups committed to the common good and endowed with an idea of "good governance". Civil Society/PettitVsTradition: compared to traditional theories, which in many cases had placed the political-educational function in the foreground, which, through political participation from individuals, shapes state-carrying citizens by showing their interest and sensitivity for the Brocker I 860 common political concerns and encourages them to participate, Pettit sees no need for information about how this sensitization for the common good can be acquired and trained. >Participation, >Common good. Pettit simply assumes the potential of civil society. Pettit then comes up with a new term as a solution: "Untouchable Hand"/"intangible Hand"/Terminology/Pettit: a non-materializable force that emerges from the citizenry itself and contributes to the creation of critical public attention that encourages sceptical observation of political events and to use democratic opposition at the right moment to a state action that deprives freedom.(2) SellersVsPettit: the question remains, where do the forces come from, which only lead to a constitutional order oriented towards an imagined common good. (3) 1. Philip Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford 1997, p. 242 2. Ibid. p. 254. 3. Mortimer Sellers, »The Republican Manifesto«, in: Santa Clara Law Review 39/1,1998, p. 365. Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Common Interest | Rousseau | Habermas IV 124 General interest/common interests/Rousseau/Durkheim/Habermas: Durkheim follows Rousseau's famous distinction (1): thesis: the common good is by no means the sum, or a compromise between many individual interests; a morally binding force sees the general interest rather from its impersonal and impartial character: Durkheim: The role of the state is in fact not to express and summarize the unreflected thinking of the masses, but to (...) Habermas IV 125 add a more thoughtful thinking to it, which therefore cannot help but be different. (2) >State, >Interest, >Community, cf. >Public good. 1. E.Durkheim, Montesquieu et Rousseau, précurseurs de la sociologie, Ed. A. Cuvillier, Paris, 1953; engl. Ann Arbor 1960. 2. E. Durkheim, Lecons de sociologie, Physique des moeurs et du droit. Paris 1969, S. 125; (engl. London 1957). |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Communicative Practice | Pettit | Brocker I 857 Communicative Practice/Community/PettitVsHabermas/Pettit: There is nothing to suggest that Pettit is giving a culture of public debate a truly constructive contribution to the generation and maintenance of public welfare orientations. In the later work, Pettit tends to envisage, as legitimate guardians of the common good, councils, expert groups or committees of inquiry, which, so to speak, are exclusively dedicated to the common good. >Democracy, >Deliberative democracy, >Welfare economics. He is convinced that they have the merit of being removed from the public opinion struggle, and he himself, provocatively and misleadingly, sees them as elements of an Brocker I 858 "depoliticization".(1) >Politics/Pettit. 1. Philip Pettit, »Depoliticizing Democracy«, in: Ratio Juris 17/1, 2004 S. 53 Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Community | Thomas Aquinas | Höffe I 152 Community/Thomas/Höffe: Since no human can live for him- or herself alone in accordance with his or her purpose, it was given to him or her by nature to "live sociably with many"(1). This living together - here Thomas Aquinas shows himself to be a republican. - There should be a Höffe I 153 a "Society of free men." >Society. Governance: According to another partial argument, the gap between the personal and the common good, there is a need for an authority that guides people. Only for this reason, because the welfare of the individual can run counter to the welfare of the community, does a rule become necessary. For it is only with its help that the multiplicity of individuals becomes the unity of a community. Monarchy: The factual follow-up question of whether one or more persons should rule, i.e. the question of the best constitution, is answered by Thomas Aquinas, although in the aforementioned sense a Republican, in favour of sole rule, namely the monarchy. >State (Polity). However, he does impose one condition on it: it must be exercised fairly, which in Thomas Aquinas' case, as is customary with Aristotle, Stoa and Cicero, means serving the common good. >Aristotle, >Cicero, >Stoicism as an author, >About stoicism. Righteous rule: Righteous is a rule that serves not the ruler but the community. Thomas Aquinas' sees its core in inner peace, which is not only suggested by the historical situation when the Sicilian Empire of Frederick II. fell apart and an interregnum ("intermediate rule") prevailed in the Roman-German Empire after the end of the Staufer dynasty. Community: Surprisingly, the definition of the commonwealth as a legal order, which is important in the Iex tract of the sum of theology, plays no role in the writing On the Rule of Princes. ThomasVsAristotle: [Thomas Aquinas' goes beyond Aristotle here]: Following his model of communities, the kingdoms of the time - not the Greek city republics as Aristotle did - he does not only follow the house and the village (qua clan) with civitas, the citizenship and city community. Cf. >Polis. In addition, he introduces the provincia or regnum, a community that spans several cities and landscapes. Only this greater unity makes it possible - according to medieval experience - to guarantee all the necessities of life almost autonomously. 1. Thomas De regno ad regem Cypri I, 1 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Constitution | Aristotle | Höffe I 63 Constitution/Aristotle/Höffe: The constitution of Greek communities was highly unstable, which is why Aristotle reflects on the reasons for stability and instability. The relevant Book V(1), the first systematic treatment of this topic, contains a high degree of historical analysis. Höffe: Of course, the historical material presented serves primarily to illustrate causal laws, which is why certain one-sidedness is inevitable. They do not, however, significantly limit the historical source value of the investigation, but Aristotle's inclination towards antithetical schemata is not without cause for concern. Mixed Constitution: Book VI discusses the establishment of democracies and oligarchies. Against the tendency to establish their most radical form in each case, Aristotle recommends a corrective that will become influential as a "mixed constitution": a combination of institutional elements of different oligarchic and democratic constitutions adapted to the respective circumstances. Common good: (...) the term remains peculiarly pale. It is only from the picture that Aristotle draws at the end, in Books VII to VIII, of an ideal Höffe I 64 polis, a "polis as desired", that the concept takes shape. First and foremost is national defence or military security. >Politics/Aristotle, >Community/Aristotle, >Order/Aristotle. Trade/Economy: Next, trade relations are important, followed by the division of arable land. >Economy/Aristotle. Property: Aristotle proposes a "mixed property system", rejecting both full nationalisation of land and purely private ownership. For the public duties, which are financed today by taxes, at that time for the ritual acts and the common meals, there should be a common property (state land), the "rest" should become private property. Each citizen is given two parcels of land, one towards the national border and one in the interior of the country, both for reasons of justice and to achieve unanimity against hostile neighbours. Höffe I 67 Aristotle's doctrine of three good and three degenerate forms of government (...) is already found (...) in Plato's Politikos(2) (...), [it] will become a basic pattern of political thought: A constitution that serves the common good is regarded as good and successful; bad or degenerate is that which pursues the interests of the ruling class.(3) Depending on whether one, a few or all of them rule, the positive side is the monarchy or kingship, the aristocracy and politics, the constitutional state as a civil state of free and equal citizens. A. Depending on the type of citizenship - monarchical, - aristocratic or - political constitution must be natural. B. The bad or degenerate ones, however, are "against nature"(4): the tyranny that serves the interests of the sole ruler, the oligarchy, which is concerned about the interests of the few (oligoi) and the wealthy, hence also called plutocracy, the rule of the rich, and democracy, which focuses on the interests of the demos, the mass of the poor who are not bound by any laws. Aristocracy: excludes farmers, wage-earners, craftsmen and merchants from the circle of citizens with the argument that they lead a ignoble life instead of devoting themselves to that leisure (scholê) without which one could not form virtue and act politically;(5) in the background is the distinction between a form of life subject to the necessities of life and a life deprived of necessities and thus free. >Democracy/Aristotle. Höffe I 68 God State/Aristoteles: Not least Aristotle rejects three forms of constitution, against which also today's democracy sees itself as an alternative: Lordships by the grace of God, by a superior power or by superior birth. Moreover, since he favours a mixed constitution that combines oligarchic with democratic elements, commits them to the common good and has the important decisions made by the People's Assembly, Aristotle can be considered largely democratic in the modern sense. ((s) But see >Inequality/Aristotle.) 1. Arist., Politika 2. Platon, Politikos 291c ff 3. Arist., Politika III 7 4. III 17, 1287b37 ff. 5. VII 9, 1328b38 ff. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Constitution | Cicero | Höffe I 81 Constitution/State/Cicero/Höffe: Cicero] follows the division known from the Greeks into three successful forms, because they serve the common good, and three degenerate forms, because they are fixed on the ruler's good(1). In the monarchy (regnum), it is later said, what matters is the care (caritas) for the subjects, in the aristocracy (civitas optimatium) the insight and advice of the best, in democracy (civitas popularis) the freedom of the people. Problems: - The monarchy excludes all subjects from consultation, - the aristocracy gives too little freedom to the great masses, and - democracy, because of its equality, does not allow any gradation according to dignity. Moreover, the three successful forms of government are not sufficiently equipped against instability, which is why they easily turn into the three degenerate forms: - monarchy in tyranny, - the aristocracy in oligarchy and - democracy into the rule of an unrestrained crowd. In the absence of a legal community, these three degenerations do not deserve the title of a community; they cannot be considered res publica at all. Höffe I 86 The three forms of state considered illegitimate in classical constitutional theory - tyranny, oligarchy and democracy qua arbitrary rule of the masses - are not considered to be decaying forms of statehood. They are not bad states, but non-states, they are "no state at all"(2). A true community has to fulfil four conditions, the first two of which have the character of justice and the last two of which amount to a (civic) friendship: (1) The people must not be oppressed; they must exist: (2) a community of law, (3) a popular consensus and (4) an attachment of the Community. >State (Polity), >Democracy, >Republic, >Community, >Society. >Law. 1. De re publica I 42–45 2. III 45 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Constitution | Thomas Aquinas | Höffe I 150 Constitution/Thomas Aquinas/Höffe: Community: in relation to the family and the community, the greater unity, the state, is regarded as the perfect community, as communitas perfecta(1). In it, legislation, including the constitution, is a matter for the people or the person who has to provide for the main political goal, the common good. Old Testament constitution: When asked whether "the Old Testament correctly determined the rule in ancient Israel", Thomas Aquinas gives the expected answer that God had given the Israelites the "very best constitution" (optima ordinatio))(2) (la Ilae qu. 105). Mixed constitution: It consists in the one known not only by Aristotle. Here it is mixed consisting of the kingship, where the supreme leadership is located, an aristocracy, the 72 elders chosen according to their virtue, and democracy, since the leaders are elected by the people (ex popularibus). >Constitution/Aristotle. Through this mixture the rights of the royal ruler are to be curtailed, in particular the Council of Elders is to protect the rule from slipping into a tyranny. >Tyranny. 1. Summa la Ilae qu. 90, 3 2. Ibid qu. 105 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Decreasing-Cost Industries | Coase | Kiesling I 46 Decreasing-cost industries/marginal cost controversy/Coase /Kiesling: In 1938 Harold Hotelling(1) published an argument in favour of marginal cost pricing on efficiency grounds, based on the general argument that social welfare is maximized where marginal benefit equals marginal cost. For that reason, Hotelling argued, these firms should charge consumers a price equal to marginal cost and receive taxpayer-funded subsidies to cover their fixed costs (which, again, are considerable). Hotelling relied on taxation theories to suggest lump-sum taxes on consumers that, in aggregate, would pay for fixed costs. >Marginal costs, >Efficiency, >Taxation. Coase: In 1946 Coase’s analysis of Hotelling’s proposal, “The Marginal Cost Controversy,”(2) clarified the question and gave the debate its name. (Frischmann and Hogendorn (2015)(3) provide an excellent summary of the marginal cost controversy debate and the lasting relevance of Coase’s argument today.) While acknowledging the efficiencies inherent in marginal cost pricing, Coase argued that imposing lump-sum taxes to pay for firms’ fixed costs would not actually result in the most efficient outcome. Coase distilled the problem down to three essential parts: 1) The divergence between marginal cost and average cost, with marginal cost lower than average cost; 2) The allocation of common costs across consumers; 3) That many fixed costs are pre-payments on long-term contracts for inputs that could be considered variable costs. While the divergence between marginal and average cost is the predominant analytical issue, the other two are tricky. When there is a common fixed cost that must be shared across consumers, economic theory does not suggest a single, clear, definitive method of doing so. In electricity, for example, much of the capital in the distribution system creates a shared network that different consumers use to different degrees (and at different times of day). Kiesling I 47 How should the costs be apportioned among these different consumers, particularly at the time Coase was writing, when digital technologies did not exist to enable precise measurement of use of the distribution grid? This question of the apportioning of common costs remains relevant in regulated electric utility rate design. CoaseVsHotelling: [Coase] argued that while price would equal marginal cost, resource misallocation would still arise because neither producers nor consumers would take fixed costs into account in making production and consumption decisions. Taxation/fixed costs: In other words, if fixed costs were paid for through taxes or subsidies, neither producers nor consumers would have any incentive to consider the opportunity cost of those resources. Price/opportunity cost: Coase also argued that in the absence of a market price that reflected opportunity costs, there would be no institutional framework, no market process, for learning whether or not consumers were willing to pay the full cost of the output they consumed; this observation overlaps with the challenge of allocating common costs across consumers. Common good: Finally, Coase observed that in Hotelling’s system the redistribution of wealth from people who used only a little of the product in question to those who used a lot of it would be almost unavoidable. Redistribution: Wealth redistribution would also arise from the mismatch between consumers and taxpayers - not all consumers of the firm’s output would necessarily be taxpayers, and vice versa. Incentives/CoaseVsHotelling: Rather than accepting Hotelling’s static analysis of an already-existing decreasing-cost firm, Coase performed a dynamic analysis of the broader incentives of Hotelling’s proposal and the realistic institutional framework that would be required to implement it. How would the government determine consumer demand to learn consumer preferences, to make sure that the right amount and type of fixed costs were incurred? >Preferences, >Government policy. In his emphasis on government ability to acquire knowledge, government performance, and the assumption of government as neutral public servants, Coase makes points that presage the later developments of public choice economics in the 1950s and 1960s. Kiesling I 48 Solution/Coase: Coase made an alternative proposal to Hotelling’s: multi-part pricing. While he did not provide specifics in his 1946 article, his idea was to have the price include a component that reflected the marginal cost and a component that allocated the fixed cost, subject to the constraint that the firm does not earn losses; this example is called a two-part tariff. Such pricing incorporates all costs into the prices to which producers and consumers respond, and does not involve either the funding problems or institutional incentive problems that Coase identified with the tax/subsidy proposal. Multi-part pricing does not avoid the problem of allocating common costs across consumers, and such allocation will also be the province of estimates and be prone to bureaucratic manipulation, but it may be the best we can do given realistic assumptions about our constraints and the limitations of our knowledge. Today: Coase’s analytical framework for decreasing-cost industries persists to this day in the form of regulated rate setting in the electricity and natural gas distribution industries. If you look at your electric bill you will see a variable “energy charge,” reflecting marginal cost, and a “wires charge” or “carrying charge,” that allocates a share of the fixed costs of constructing, maintaining, and operating the distribution network. At least in theory, regulated rate setting is grounded in Coase’s logic. >Efficiency/Coase. 1. Hotelling, H. (1938). The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates. Econometrica, 6 (3), 242–269. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907054 2. Coase, Ronald H. (1946). The Marginal Cost Controversy. Economica 13, 51: 169-182. 3. Frischmann, Brett M., and Christiaan Hogendorn (2015). Retrospectives: The Marginal Cost Controversy. Journal of Economic Perspectives 29, 1: 193-206. |
Kiesling I L. Lynne Kiesling The Essential Ronald Coase Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2021 |
| Democracy | Aristotle | Höffe I 67 Democracy/Aristoteles/Höffe: Depending on the circle of citizens admitted to rule and the Höffe I 68 scope of their authority to rule, Aristotle distinguishes five forms of democracy. In this way he tacitly introduces a comparative concept, a concept of more-or-less democracy(1). The first three forms are still bound by the law. In the fourth, extreme form, all citizens are capable of ruling, which we consider positive today. However, according to the negative side, they are allowed to exempt themselves from all legal requirements, even to commit blatant violations of the law. Radical democracy: Because they do not aim at the common good but at their own good, radical democracy, as Mill will repeat, appears as a tyranny of the majority.(2) Constitution: "where there is no law, there is no constitution (politeia). Laws: (...) the law must rule the whole, but those who govern must rule the individual cases".(3) Rule of law: Here Aristotle pleads for a core element of the modern understanding of democracy, for a constitutional state. Since [Aristotle] (...) favours a mixed constitution that combines oligarchic with democratic elements, commits them to the common good and allows the People's Assembly to make the important decisions, Aristotle can be considered largely democratic in the modern sense of the word. ((s) But see >Inequality/Aristotle. >Constitution/Aristotle, >Coercion/Aristotle. 1. Arist. Politika IV 4 2. IV 4, 1292a15 ff.). 3. 1292a32–34 - - - Gaus I 314 Democracy/Aristotle/Keyt/Miller: Aristotle is more favourable to democracy than Plato, and in his famous 'summation' argument, which applies his favoured standard for distributing political power to men taken collectively as well as individually (Pol. Ill. I l), he even offers an 'aristocratic' justification (for which see Keyt, 1991a(1): 270—2; Waldron, 1995(2)). >Governance/Aristotle, >Constitution/Aristotle, >Tyranny/Aristotle, >Nomos/Aristotle, >Politics/Aristotle; Cf. >Family/Aristotle, >Equal rights/Aristotle. Pol: Aristotle Politics 1. Keyt, David (1991a) 'Aristotle's theory of distributive justice'. In David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, eds, A Companion to Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell. 2. Waldron, Jeremy (1995) 'The wisdom of the multitude: some reflections on Book 3, Chapter Il of Aristotle's Politics'. Political Theory, 23: 563-84. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Democracy | Dryzek | Gaus I 143 Democracy/Dryzek: Adversarial, aggregative, associative, capitalist, Christian, classical, communicative, communitarian, consensual, consociational, constitutional, contestatory, corporatist, cosmopolitan, delegative, deliberative, developmental, difference, direct, discursive, ecological, economic, electoral, elitist, epistemic, feminist, global, grassroots, green, juridical, industrial, legal, liberal, local, majoritarian, minimalist, parliamentary, participatory, peoples' , pluralist, populist, presidential, procedural, property-owning, protective, push-button, radical, reflective, representative, social, strong, thin, transnational and unitary are all adjectives that can be, and have been, attached to democracy. Dryzek: The categories represented by the adjectives are not mutually exclusive. While there are some obvious binary oppositions (...), many combinations are plausible and have their advocates and critics. The categories represented by these adjectives are not collectively exhaustive. The conversation about democratic development shows no signs of closure. Boundaries: While covering a lot of territory, democratic theory is not completely unbounded. Contributors to the enterprise all address questions pertaining to the collective construction, distribution, application, and limitation of political authority. >Democratic theory/Dryzek. Gaus I 144 (...) part of what makes democracy interesting in both theory and practice is contestation over its essence. (...) any search for the essential meaning of democracy is undermined by conceptual historians who point to the inevitable historical contingency of key political concepts like democracy (Hanson, 1989)(1), and how democracy's meaning is itself constitutive of politics at particular times and laces. >Deliberative democracy/Dryzek. Gaus I 148 Problems with deliberation and democracy: If democracy involves aggregation (however much it is downplayed by deliberative democrats), that can be across judgements and not just across preferences as emphasized in social choice theory. Such judgements can involve disagreement over (say) what is in the common good. This epistemic way of thinking about democracy is associated with Rousseau, according to whom the general will can be ascertained by voting. Bernard Grofman and Scott Feld (1988)(2) argue that if indeed there is such a thing as the common good, though people differ in their judgements about which option will best serve it, then Condorcet's jury theorem applies. Jury theorem/Condorcet/Dryzek: This theorem demonstrates that if each citizen has a better than even chance of being correct in his/her judgement, then the larger the number of voters, the greater the chance of the majority choosing the correct option. The jury theorem therefore justifies the rationality of majoritarian democracy, at least in a republican context of a search for the common good, though only if each citizen reaches and exercises independent judgement. So there should be no factions (which reduce the effective number of voters) and, it might seem, no communication. These, at least, were Rousseau's own views: deliberation should only be a matter of internal reflection, not communication. However, as Robert Goodin (2002(3): 125) and others point out, discussion is fine so long as people then subsequently exercise their own independent judgements when voting. 1. Hanson, Russell L. (1989) 'Democracy'. In Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson, eds, Political Innovation and Conceptual Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Grofman, Bernard and Scott Feld (1988) 'Rousseau's general will: a Condorcetian perspective'. American Political Science Review, 82: 567-76. 3. Goodin, Robert E. (2002) Reflective Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Democracy | Marsilius of Padua | Höffe I 180 Democracy/Marsilius/Höffe: Amazing for the political thinking of the Middle Ages, but to be expected for a theorist of popular sovereignty and republicanism, Marsilius gives the people the power to reprimand a government where necessary and if the law is broken, Farms I 181 to even depose the government. However, how a dismissal is to be made remains open(1). In arguing in favour of the people, Marsilius, like his philosophical model, Aristotle, in the appropriate place, is also optimistic to believe that the people or their majority will only enact laws for the common good, because nobody knowingly harms himself. >State/Marsilius, >Governance/Marsilius, >Law/Marsilius. Marsilius' thinking is (...) forward-looking because it subjects even the Church to the idea of popular sovereignty and republicanism. By analogy with the political community, the totality of all citizens (universitas civium), the Church is to be understood as the totality of believers (universitas fidelium) who believe in and call upon the name of Christ. For this reason the clergy derives its legitimacy from the totality of believers. >Church/Marsilius. 1. Marsilius, Defensor pacis, I, 18 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Democracy | Schumpeter | Brocker I 260 Democracy/Schumpeter: For Schumpeter, the defining feature of democracy consists in placing a "competition for political leadership" (1) at the centre of attention. The core idea is: similar to the way companies compete for the favour of consumers, Brocker I 261 politicians and parties are in competition for the favour of voters (2) - with the important difference that people are usually well informed in economic matters, but usually rationally ignorant in political matters (3). What both systems have in common is the striving for one's own individual advantage. Thesis: Modern democracy is a product of the capitalist process (4); however, two important prerequisites for the functioning of democracy in contemporary capitalism are no longer fulfilled: a) the ideal of the economical state (5) b) the basic social consensus.(6) Because of the expectation of large parts of the electorate to live at the expense of the state.(7) >Free riders, >State, >Economy, >Society. 1. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York 1942. Dt.: Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie, Tübingen/Basel 2005 (zuerst: Bern 1946), p. 427. 2. Ibid p. 427-433 3. Ibid p. 407 – 420. 4. Ibid p. 471. 5. Ibid p.. 471f. 6. Ibid p. 473. 7. Ibid p. 472. Ingo Pies, „Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie (1942)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. Gaus I 148 Democracy/Schumpeter/Dryzek: The model of democracy most popular among comparative politics scholars, especially those in the burgeoning field of democratic transition and consolidation, expects far less from democracy than do the deliberative democrats. >Deliberative democracy This model is essentially that proposed long ago by Schumpeter (1942)(1): democracy is no more than competition among elites for popular approval that confers the right to rule. In the 1950s this idea became the foundation for 'empirical' theories of democracy happy with the generally apathetic role of the ignorant and potentially authoritarian masses (Berelson, 1952(2); Sartori, 1962(3)). Competition models of democracy: Such competitive elitist models have Gaus I 149 long been discredited among democratic theorists - not least those such as Dahl (1989)(4) who had earlier believed in them as both accurate descriptions of United States politics and desirable states of affairs. Yet they live on among transitologists and consolidologists, who see the hallmark of a consolidated democracy as a set of well-behaved parties representing material interests engaged in electoral competition regulated by constitutional rules (see, for example, Di Palma, 1990(5); Huntington, 1991(6); Mueller, 1996(7); Schedler, 1998(8)). The deliberative democrat's concern with authenticity is nowhere to be seen. Active citizens play no role in such models. 1. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1942) Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper. 2. Berelson, Bernard (1952) 'Democratic theory and public opinion'. Public Opinion Quarterly, 16: 313—30. 3. Sartori, Giovanni (1962) Democratic Theory. Detroit: Wayne State Umversity Press. 4. Dahl, Robert A. (1989) Democracy and its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 5. Di Palma, Giuseppe (1990) To Craft Democracies. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 6. Huntington, Samuel (1991) The Third Wave. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. 7. Mueller, John (1996) 'Democracy, capitalism and the end of transition'. In Michael Mandelbaum, ed. Postcommunism: Four Perspectives. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 8. Schedler, A. (1998) 'What is democratic consolidation?' Journal of Democracy, 9: 91-107. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications Sobel I 28 Democracy/Schumpeter/Sobel/Clemens: „Nothing is easier than to compile an impressive list offailures of the democratic method, especially if we include not only cases in which there was actual breakdown or national discomfiture but also those in which, though the nation led a healthy and prosperous life, the performance in the political sector was clearly substandard relative to the performance in others.“ Joseph A. Schumpeter (1942), Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy(1): 289. Sobel/Clemens: Joseph Schumpeter is largely known for his seminal contributions to our understanding of the role of entrepreneurs, innovation, and creative destruction in economic growth and development. >Business cycle/Schumpeter, >Innovation/Schumpeter, >Competition/Schumpeter, >Creative destruction/Schumpeter, >Entrepreneurship/Schumpeter. However, Schumpeter's economic insights extend far beyond just his most well-known work on innovation. Another area where Schumpeter was well ahead of the economics profession and provided real insights is the nature of politics and the democratic process of collective decision making. The economic analysis of the process of politics and collective decision making is the focus of a modern field of economics known as public choice. While Schumpeter wrote prior to the formal origins of this field in economics, early scholars such as Anthony Downs did cite and attribute some of his ideas to Schumpeter's writings in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (CSD)(1).* >Government policy/Schumpeter. Democracy: Schumpeter understood that democracy was merely an alternative process for producing social and economic outcomes, and "it would not necessarily follow that the political decisions produced by that process from the raw material of those individual volitions would represent anything that could in any convincing sense be called the will of the people" (CSD(1): 254). Regarding the idea that government pursues some common good, Schumpeter argues: „There is, first, no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all People could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument. This is due not primarily to the fact that some people may want things other than the common good but to the much more fundamental fact that to different individuals and groups the common good is bound to mean different things ... as a consequence ... the particular concept of the will of the people ... vanishes into thin air.“ (CSD(1): 251-252) Sobel/Clemens: Schumpeter recognized that to understand democratic outcomes one must look to understand the motivations and different desires of the individuals involved in the process, be they the voters, elected politicians, or administrators and bureaucrats running government agencies. That is, to understand democratic outcomes one must understand the role of what he termed "Human Nature in Politics". Thus, Schumpeter shared a common insight with the founders of the field of public choice, such as Nobel Laureate James Buchanan, who recognized that just because individuals step into the public sphere, they do not suddenly start acting for the common good - instead they continue to be self-interested actors concerned with their own goals and desires. >James M. Buchanan. Democracy/Schumpeter: According to Schumpeter, democracy is best understood as follows: "it may be put into the nutshell of a definition ... the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people's vote." (CSD(1): 269). According to Schumpeter, as far as there are genuine group-wise volitions ... we are now able to insert them in exactly the role they actually play…called to life by some political leader who turns them into political factors …by working them up and by including eventually appropriate items in his competitive offering ... The incessant competitive struggle to get into offce or to Stay in it imparts to every consideration of policies and measures the bias so admirably expressed by the phrase about "dealing in votes". (CSD(1): 270, 287). * In The Economic Theory of Democracy, Downs writes: "Schumpeter's profound analysis of democracy forms the inspiration and foundation for our whole thesis, and our debt and gratitude to him are great indeed" (1957(2):29). 1. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy [CSD]. Harper & Brothers. 2. Downs, Anthony (1957). The Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper & Row. |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Sobel I Russell S. Sobel Jason Clemens The Essential Joseph Schumpeter Vancouver 2020 |
| Environmental Goods | Economic Theories | Mause I 408f Environmental Goods/Preferences/Economic Theories: There are individual environmental areas in which the long-term effects of environmental impairments are not always fully assessed individually (e.g. preservation of mountain forests due to avalanche danger) and therefore an at least partial correction of individual preferences through so-called meritorial interventions by the state (e.g. prohibition of deforestation of "protective forests") is necessary (Zimmermann et al. 2012, p. 498) (1). For the vast majority of environmental goods, however, it can be assumed in principle that corresponding environmental protection preferences exist in society without, however, sufficient quantities and quality of these goods being offered via the market. Mause I 409 Environmental goods have the typical characteristics of public goods. >Public Goods. a) Non-rivalry in consumption: consumption by one citizen does not diminish that of another. Example air. This means that no market prices arise here. b) The exclusion principle cannot be applied: nobody can be excluded from the use by assignment of exclusive property rights. This means that a private supplier could not achieve cost-covering prices with these goods. Conclusion: Clean environment cannot be sold via a market. Common goods/Common: these are goods for which rival consumption may occur. Although there is no market here either, the lack of ownership rights means that there is no incentive to treat the environmental goods concerned with care. Example Overfishing (2). Prisoner's Dielmma/Ostrom. Cfl. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Horst Zimmermann, Horst, Klaus-Dirk Henke, und Michael Broer, Finanzwissenschaft. Eine Einführung in die Lehre von der öffentlichen Finanzwirtschaft, 11. ed. München 2012. 2. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge 1990. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Environmental Policy | Public Choice | Mause I 413 Environmental Policy/New Political Economy/Public Choice: since the New Political Economy assumes that the respective (short-term) chances of re-election constitute a central restriction to action for politicians, well-informed and influential political actors or groups in environmental policy - contrary to the common good - can shape or even block the choice of environmental policy strategies according to their specific preferences (Döring and Pahl 2003, S. 94)(1), as was already fundamentally explained by Olson (1965)(2) in his reflections on the "logic of collective action". The particular interests of relatively small and financially well-funded interest groups will therefore have a greater chance of asserting themselves. Problem: heterogeneous groups such as taxpayers, consumers and environmental activists are thus subject to asymmetry in terms of influence. >State/Public Choice. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Thomas Döring & Thilo Pahl. Kooperative Lösungen in der Umweltpolitik – eine ökonomische Sicht. In Kooperative Umweltpolitik, Hrsg. Bernd Hansjürgens, Wolfgang Köck und Georg Kneer, 89– 112. Baden-Baden 2003. 2. Mancur Olson, The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge 1965. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Equal Rights | Mill | Höffe I 358 Equal Rights/Mill/Höffe: In his third directly political work, The Subjection of Women(1), Mill demands with particular emphasis that the almost despotic power of men over women be broken. Instead of subjecting women in marriage to strict surveillance, they should be granted the same rights and legal protection. Progress: From the result, the eventual equality of women in family and society, he even expects a progress in moral ethics, which would entail nothing less than a "moral regeneration of humanity". Utilitarianism: This motif, the progress of moral ethics, is not a secondary thought for Mill. On the contrary, it connects the writing on the women's issue with the writing "On Liberty", its commitment of citizens to the common good, and, beyond that, with the utilitarian principle of general utility. >Utilitarianism/Mill. VsEqual Rights: (...) Mill deals (...) with two of the counter-arguments widespread at the time, with the alleged natural inferiority of women and with the supposed voluntariness of their subjugation. MillVsVs: a) Mill exposes the first counter-argument as a product of social circumstances - the alleged nature of women is artificially created, the result of forced degradation; b) and to the second counter-argument he counters the already older liberal thesis that being allowed to give up one's freedom does not belong to freedom. 1. J.St. Mill The Subjection of Women, 1869 |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Mill Ja I James Mill Commerce Defended: An Answer to the Arguments by which Mr. Spence, Mr. Cobbett, and Others, Have Attempted to Prove that Commerce is Not a Source of National Wealth 1808 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Ethics | Bostrom | I 257 Ethics/morals/morality/superintelligence//Bostrom: No ethical theory commands majority support among philosophers, so most philosophers must be wrong. ((s)VsBostrom: It is not a question of applause as to which theory is correct.) I 369 Majorities in ethics/Bostrom: A recent canvass of professional philosophers found the percentage of respondents who “accept or leans toward” various positions. On normative ethics, the results were deontology 25.9%; - consequentialism 23.6%; - virtue ethics 18.2%. On metaethics, results were moral realism 56.4%; - moral anti-realism 27.7%. On moral judgment: cognitivism 65.7%; - non-cognitivism 17.0% (Bourget and Chalmers 2009(1)) >Norms/normativity/superintelligence/Bostrom, >Ethics/superintelligence/Yudkowsky. Morality models: I 259 Coherent Extrapolated Volition/CEV/Yudkowsky: Our coherent extrapolated volition is our wish if we knew more, thought faster, were more the people we wished we were, had grown up farther together; where the extrapolation converges rather than diverges, where our wishes cohere rather than interfere; extrapolated as we wish that extrapolated, interpreted as we wish that interpreted. >Ethics/superintelligence/Yudkowsky. I 266 VsCEV/Bostrom: instead: Moral rightness/MR/Bostrom: (…) build an AI with the goal of doing what is morally right, relying on the AI’s superior cognitive capacities to figure out just which actions fit that description. We can call this proposal “moral rightness” (MR). The idea is that we humans have an imperfect understanding of what is right and wrong (…) ((s)VsBostrom: This delegates human responsibility and ultimately assumes that human decisions are only provisional until non-human decisions are made.) I 267 BostromVsYudkowsky: MR would do away with various free parameters in CEV, such as the degree of coherence among extrapolated volitions that is required for the AI to act on the result, the ease with which a majority can overrule dissenting minorities, and the nature of the social environment within which our extrapolated selves are to be supposed to have “grown up farther together.” BostromVsMR: Problem: 1. MR would also appear to have some disadvantages. It relies on the notion of “morally right,” a notoriously difficult concept (…). I 268 2. (…) [MR] might not give us what we want or what we would choose if we were brighter and better informed. Solution/Bostrom: Goal for AI: MP: Among the actions that are morally permissible for the AI, take one that humanity’s CEV would prefer. However, if some part of this instruction has no well-specified meaning, or if we are radically confused about its meaning, or if moral realism is false, or if we acted morally impermissibly in creating an AI with this goal, then undergo a controlled shutdown.(*) Follow the intended meaning of this instruction. I 373 (Annotation) *Moral permissibility/Bostrom: When the AI evaluates the moral permissibility of our act of creating the AI, it should interpret permissibility in its objective sense. In one ordinary sense of “morally permissible,” a doctor acts morally permissibly when she prescribes a drug she believes will cure her patient - even if the patient, unbeknownst to the doctor, is allergic to the drug and dies as a result. Focusing on objective moral permissibility takes advantage of the presumably superior epistemic position of the AI. ((s)VsBostrom: The last sentence (severability) is circular, especially when there are no longer individuals in decision-making positions who could object to it. >Goals/superintelligence/Bostrom. I 312 Def Common good principle/Bostrom: Superintelligence should be developed only for the benefit of all of humanity and in the service of widely shared ethical ideals. I 380 This formulation is intended to be read so as to include a prescription that the well-being of nonhuman animals and other sentient beings (including digital minds) that exist or may come to exist be given due consideration. It is not meant to be read as a license for one AI developer to substitute his or her own moral intuitions for those of the wider moral community. 1. Bourget, David, and Chalmers, David. 2009. “The PhilPapers Surveys.” November. Available at http://philpapers.org/surveys/ |
Bostrom I Nick Bostrom Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017 |
| Ethics | Thomas Aquinas | Höffe I 146 Ethics/Thomas Aquinas/Höffe: In his ethics Thomas Aquinas tries to bring various Aristotelian doctrines into the unity which is missing in his model, and which he also consciously avoids. Nicomachean ethics: [Thomas Aquinas] takes from Aristotle's (...) main writing, Nicomachean ethics, both the theory of action - human action strives for a goal - and the associated thought of the highest and at the same time most comprehensive goal, happiness (beatitudo). >Ethics/Aristotle. Striving for happiness: In connection with the teleology of physics, it represents the idea of a natural striving (desiderium naturale) for happiness. His ethics thus remains, in Greek terms, eudaimonistic, which has an impact on political thinking. Its guiding principle is the common good (bonum commune). >Happiness/Thomas Aquinas. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Eudemonia | Thomas Aquinas | Höffe I 146 Eudemonia/Thomas Aquinas/Höffe: In connection with the teleology of physics [Thomas Aquinas] represents the idea of a natural striving (desiderium naturale) for happiness. His ethics thus remains, in Greek terms, eudaimonistic, which has an impact on political thinking. Its guiding principle is the common good (bonum commune). >Happiness/Thomas Aquinas. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Free-rider Problem | Buchanan | Boudreaux I 79 Free-rider Problem/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: The chief problem that exists with many collective activities that are potentially beneficial to all is that each individual has an incentive to free ride off of the contributions of others. This problem exists whenever it is difficult to exclude those who don’t pay for some good or service from using it. Under such a circumstance, each person has the incentive not to pay for the good, hoping that others will pay for it. The result is that there will be too few contributions toward the good’s financing. Social goods: A good that everyone wants to consume will be underprovided. In this situation, individuals might agree to be forced to pay toward financing the good if everyone else is also forced to pay. Everyone could hold the same opinion, saying they do not want to pay unless everyone is forced to pay, but they would all agree to a policy that forces everyone to pay. People could agree to be coerced. >Moral Hazard, >Coercion. Social contract/agreement: The idea that people could agree to be coerced lies at the foundation of the social-contract theory of the state. Even though there is no actual contract, people would agree to give the state the authority to coerce those who violate its mandates, if everyone was bound to the same contract provisions. According to social-contract theory, because people would agree to be coerced for their own benefit, the exercise of such coercion violates no individual’s rights. >Agreement/Buchanan, >Social Contract/Buchanan, >Society/Buchanan, >Social goods, >Common goods. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 |
| General Will | Rousseau | Höffe I 277 General Will/Rousseau/Höffe: The core idea of Rousseau's social contract(1) consists in a collective common will, the volonté générale. It comes into being as soon as several people unite as a single body with a single will. Unlike the "distributive" common will, the sum of individual private interests and individual intentions, and the mutable will of all (volonté des tous), Rousseau's common will is by its very nature "always constant, unchangeable and pure". Common good: Since [the common good] is oriented towards the good of the whole, both the common preservation and the general welfare, it always and without restriction has normative precedence over the (particular) will of the individuals. The common good is based on the will of those concerned. Höffe: Question: How is this will determined? [Rousseau] votes (...) for an empirical reading of the common will. Cf. >Human rights/Rousseau, >Parliamentarism/Rousseau. 1. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique), 1762 |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Governance | Machiavelli | Höffe I 194 Governance/Machiavelli/Höffe: [Justification of Governance]: 1. A ruler who is committed to reality must prepare himself for the situation that either his competitors, his officials or his subjects or all of them prove to be ungrateful, fickle and hypocritical. In order not to be surprised by this situation and then suffer political damage, it is better both to reckon with it and to act preventively, i.e. to prefer to act immorally oneself rather than become the prey of foreign immorality. 2. The Reigning Prince takes his consistently power-functional view under the political conditions of the time, the obvious lack of legal certainty. Necessity: Indirectly, this brings another basic concept into play, the necessita, the necessity: both for the sake of his own power and for the common good, the ruler sees himself forced to deny personal morality every right of his own and to rely on two other things: (...) one's own willingness to perform and efficiency, the virtü, and on its competitive but also complementary concept, the unavailable but nevertheless influenceable fortuna. >Power, >Necessity. Machiavelli (...) tacitly advocates the unquestionably unrealistic view that the good of the ruler always coincides with the common good, in the end even with the good of every citizen. >Common good. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Governance | Pettit | Brocker I 855 Rule/Government/Pettit: Pettit wants to create the image of public life that offers freedom without domination. His ideal-typical conceptualization of the political sphere should be pluralistic, adaptable and focused on sustainability. >Pluralism. It should not only balance out different interests and needs in an egalitarian direction, but also foster public sensitivity to ecological issues, women's emancipation, minority problems and multicultural coexistence. >Egalitarianism, >Minorities, >Emancipation, >Ecology, >Multiculturalism. Pettit is particularly concerned with related constitutional law problems. Brocker I 856 Constitution/Pettit: some authors consider his discussion of constitutional issues too coarse. VsPettit: (2)(3) >Constitution. Pettit's Replica: PettitVsVs: (4)(5) Brocker I 860 VsPettit: Pettit ends up with an amazingly conventional idea of governing. McMahonVsPettit: He ignores the adverse conditions for implementing republican guarantees of freedom in the thicket of real political contexts of action. (6) VsPettit: Pettit ultimately ends up in the liberalism he criticized, or a liberal model of the common good that puts respect for the freedom of the individual in the first place. >Liberalism, >Individuals/Pettit. Problem: Pettit has no clear reinterpretation of the collective interaction of individuals and their political function.(9) Philip Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford 1997, S. 129 2. John A. Bruegger »Republican Freedom: Three Problems«, in: The Journal Jurisprudence 11, 2011, p. 582 3. McMahon, Christopher, »The Indeterminacy of Republican Policy«, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs 33/1, 2005, 67-93. 4. Philip Pettit, »The Determinacy of Republican Policy: A Reply to McMahon«, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs 34/3, 2005, 275-283. 5. Philipp Schink,»Freedom, Control and the State«, in: Andreas Niederberger/Philipp Schink (Hg.), Republican Democracy. Liberty, Law, and Politics, Edinburgh 2013, p. 224 6. McMahon Ibid. 7.Laborde, Cécile/Maynor, John, »The Republican Contribution to Contemporary Political Theory«, in: dies. (Hg.), Republicanism and Political Theory, Malden, Mass./Oxford/Carlton 2008, p. 1 - 28 8. John P. McCormick, »Republicanism and Democracy«, in: Andreas Niederberger/Philipp Schink (Hg.), Republican Democracy. Liberty, Law, and Politics, Edinburgh 2013 9. Laborde, Cécile/Maynor, John, »The Republican Contribution to Contemporary Political Theory«, in: dies. (Hg.), Republicanism and Political Theory, Malden, Mass./Oxford/Carlton 2008, p. 9. Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Governance | Thomas Aquinas | Höffe I 148 Governance/Community/Thomas Aquinas/Höffe: The authorities must (...) not act arbitrarily. To enact any laws and not being authorized, it has to concretize the highly general law of nature in relation to the historical situation, and where necessary to develop it further. Law: It should serve the welfare of the community and prevent harm to the people by prohibiting murder and theft. Exceptions: Because of the situation the detailed regulations can vary, and can also be changed again. >Equity. Höffe I 151 About the reign of Princes/Thomas: (De regno): Despite its fragmentary character Thomas Aquinas' intention becomes clear (...): Aristotle's political philosophy should (...) come alive as an independent thought, additionally concretized under the conditions of the time. The preface points to God as the "King of all kings and Lord of all rulers". It determines as object "the origin of royal rule (regni origo) and everything that is connected with the profession of a king". Realistic view: Thomas remains (...) true to his basic intellectual attitude that the human is able to recognize the things essential to him or her by means of his or her autonomous and experience-enriched reason, even without revelation. Höffe I 152 De regno: The text can be simplified into four parts: (1) the justification of rule, which includes a plea for the monarchy and against tyranny (Book I, chap. 1-6: ratio regiminis), (...) (2) an indirect mirror of princes, namely a reflection on the motives of a just ruler (1 7-11: ratio regentis) (...) (3) which correspond to the tasks of government (1 12-15: ratio gubernationis),(...) (4) the unfinished Book II [discusses] the most important task of government, the foundation of a a community, a city or an empire (...) (II 1-4). Monarchy: is not considered by Thomas Aquinas to be naturally legitimate. Human/Citizen/Anthropology: Aristotle's definition of the human being as a political being by nature is further developed into the concept of the animal sociale et politicum, the social and political being. (...) [Thomas Aquinas'] view is that the human, both a deficient and a rational being, must take care of his or her own life with his or her own hands and work. Höffe I 155 Common good: In the ruler's commitment to the common good [Thomas Aquinas] again proves to be a realist open to experience. For he does not bind this obligation to an altruistic sense of responsibility. ThomasVsCicero: Against Cicero, the appropriate reward does not consist in honor or fame, which are held in low esteem by the good, Höffe I 156 and, moreover, result in such dangerous evils as pernicious warfare and hypocrisy. >Cicero. Corruption: It should come down to money even less what is reminiscent of Plato(2). Rather, what counts is the reward to be expected from God, the highest degree of heavenly bliss(3). Expectation of salvation: Both the expectation of this worldly good and the other worldly good motivate the king to rule well, rather than to become a tyrant(4). >Tyranny. 1. Thomas De regno ad regem Cypri 2. Ibid. I, 7 3. Ibid. I, 9 4. Ibid. I, 10f |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Government Policy | Mbembe | Brocker I 919 Government policy/state/Africa/postcolonialism/Mbembe/Herb: "Indirect private government" (2016(1), 126-169): another narrative in the crisis history of postcolonial Africa MbembeVsTradition/MbembeVsPolitical Science: The political science talk of the failing state misjudges the dynamics of African conditions. (...) the separation of public and private spheres in the post-colony, which is so fundamental for western democracies, is undermined several times. »Gouvernement privé indirect«: that would ruin both good government and the common good. Mbembe holds the precarious situation of African states in world trade primarily responsible for this development: the exclusion of Africa from the regular world markets on the one hand, and integration into the cycles of the international parallel economy on the other. Such forms of obedience and rule, which are not based solely on arbitrariness and brute force, Mbembe, following Jean-François Bayart, calls "politics of the belly". Such a policy, which exerts control over people people through the allocation of goods and profits, becomes obsolete with the financial crisis of the African states (...). The increasing privatization of public authority and its abuse for private purposes, as is characteristic of the "gouvernement privé indirect", is leading to ruinous consequences in the state and civil society: to a shadow economy in which state institutions such as the police, army, customs and tax authorities struggle for informal influence, and to the dismantling of post-colonial citizenship. >Citizens/Mbembe. 1. Achille Mbembe, De la postcolonie. Essai sur l’imagination politique dans l’Afrique contemporaine, Paris 2000. Dt.: Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie. Zur politischen Vorstellungskraft im Afrika der Gegenwart, Wien/Berlin 2016 Karlfriedrich Herb, „Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie (2000)“. In: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Government Policy | Schumpeter | Sobel I 28 Government policy/Schumpeter/Sobel/Clemens: Schumpeter's ideas about the functioning of government were likely informed by his first-hand experience as the minister of finance of Austria. At the time, and even today, much of the economic analysis of government intervention relied on a set ofimplicit (sometimes explicit) assumptions about the actors in the political sphere - that they are selfless, benevolent, leaders and bureaucrats worried only about the public interest, untouched by influence from interest groups. Indeed, much of the interventionist approach to macroeconomic policy championed by John Maynard Keynes implicitly relies on the wise actions of benevolent government actors who selflessly worry about the common good. SchumpeterVsKeynes: Schumpeter knew from his own experience that these assumptions were incorrect. >John Maynard Keynes, >Keynesianism. Democracy: Schumpeter understood that democracy was merely an alternative process for producing social and economic outcomes, and "it would not necessarily follow that the political decisions produced by that process from the raw material of those individual volitions would represent anything that could in any convincing sense be called the will of the people" (CSD(1): 254). Regarding the idea that government pursues some common good, Schumpeter argues: „There is, first, no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all People could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument. This is due not primarily to the fact that some people may want things other than the common good but to the much more fundamental fact that to different individuals and groups the common good is bound to mean different things ... as a consequence ... the particular concept of the will of the people ... vanishes into thin air.“ (CSD(1): 251-252) Sobel/Clemens: Schumpeter recognized that to understand democratic outcomes one must look to understand the motivations and different desires of the individuals involved in the process, be they the voters, elected politicians, or administrators and bureaucrats running government agencies. That is, to understand democratic outcomes one must understand the role of what he termed "Human Nature in Politics". Thus, Schumpeter shared a common insight With the founders of the field of public choice, such as Nobel Laureate James Buchanan, who recognized that just because individuals step into the public sphere, they do not suddenly start acting for the common good - instead they continue to be self-interested actors concerned With their own goals and desires. >James M. Buchanan, >Public Choice Theory, >Public Choice. Democracy/Schumpeter: According to Schumpeter, democracy is best understood as follows: "it may be put into the nutshell of a definition ... the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people's vote" (CSD(1): 269). According to Schumpeter, as far as there are genuine group-wise volitions ... we are now able to insert them in exactly the role they actually play … called to life by some political leader who turns them into political factors ... by working them up and by including eventually appropriate items in his competitive offering ... The incessant competitive struggle to get into offce or to Stay in it imparts to every consideration of policies and measures the bias so admirably expressed by the phrase about "dealing in votes". (CSD(1): 270, 287). |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Sobel I Russell S. Sobel Jason Clemens The Essential Joseph Schumpeter Vancouver 2020 |
| Human Rights | Rousseau | Höffe I 271 Human Rights/Rousseau/Höffe: According to Rousseau, there is no natural law, no law of nature that precedes the civil state. The right arises only in political society and with it.(1) >State/Rousseau. >Natural State/Rousseau. Höffe I 275 Origin/Justification: Because the state takes its origin in an act of freedom, it has legitimacy, which however comes into being exclusively by the means of a free consent, i.e. the >Social Contract. No power, no matter how superior, can create any right. Only an all-sided consensus, an agreement which is not contradicted by any of the parties concerned, empowers to rule lawfully (2). >Justification/Rousseau, >State/Rousseau, >Social Contract/Rousseau. Höffe I 278 Common good: Since [the common good] is oriented towards the good of the whole, both the common preservation and the general welfare, it always and without restriction has normative precedence over the (particular) will of the individuals. The common good is based on the will of those concerned. Höffe: Question: How do you determine this will? A conception of the common will (volonté général) as a thought experiment could lead to a criterion of consentability: The answer could (...) consist in human rights according to this strict understanding, i.e. in rights that are due to a person simply because he or she is a human being. Rousseau/Höffe: Even if one can interpret some references in this sense, Rousseau does not defend such rights in the articles of association. Instead, he votes for an empirical reading of the common will. >General Will/Rousseau. 1. Rousseau, Discours sur l'inégalité parmi les hommes, 1755 2. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique), 1762 |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Institutions | Morozov | I 117 Institutions/Morozov: most public institutions should not be measured against the standards of their private counterparts, simply because it is their task to provide goods and services that cannot or should not provide markets. The attitude of citizens facing the state as consumers is characterized by Catherine Needham: Needham: "The fundamental danger is that consumerism promotes privatised and disgruntled citizens whose expectations of the government can never be fulfilled and cannot develop concern for the common good, which must be the basis for democratic engagement and support for public services. (1) >Public goods, >Public sphere, >Society, >Community, >State. 1. Catherine Needham, Citizen Consumers, 2003, quoted in Matthew Flinders, Defending Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 83. |
Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Judgments | Gadamer | Gadamer I 36 Judgment/"Urteilskraft"/Humanities/Gadamer: The "common sense" ["Gesunder Menschenverstand"] (...) is (...) decisively characterized by judgement. >Sensus communis, >Common sense. The introduction of the word in the 18th century thus wants to adequately reflect the concept of iudicium, which has to be considered a basic spiritual virtue. Sensus communis: In the same sense, English moral philosophers stress that moral and aesthetic judgements do not obey reason but have the character of sentiment (or taste), and similarly Tetens, one of the representatives of the German Enlightenment, sees in sensus communis an "iudicium without reflection"(1). Judgement: In fact, the activity of judgement is to subsume a particular under a general, to recognize something as the case of a rule; this is logically not demonstrable. Judgment is therefore in a fundamental embarrassment because of a principle which could guide its application. It would itself require a different power of judgement for the observance of this principle, as Kant astutely observes(2). It cannot therefore be taught in general, but only practised on a case-by-case basis, and in this respect it is more a skill as the senses are. It is something quite simply unlearnable, because no demonstration of concepts can guide the application of rules. Cf. >Rule following. Enlightenment: Consequently, the German philosophy of the Enlightenment did not attribute the power of judgement to the higher faculty of the mind, but to the lower faculty of knowledge. It has thus taken a direction that departs far from the original Roman sense of sensus communis and continues the scholastic tradition. This was to take on a special significance for aesthetics. >Judgement/Baumgarten. I 37 Urteilskraft/GadamerVsKant/Gadamer: The generality ascribed to judgement is nothing as " vulgar ["gemein"] " as Kant sees it. Judgement is not at all so very much a skill than a demand to be placed on everyone. All have enough "common sense," that is, judgment, to be able to expect of them the proof of a "common sense" of genuine moral and civic solidarity, but that is to say, judgment of right and wrong and concern for the "common good". This is what makes Vico's appeal to the humanistic tradition so impressive that, in contrast to the logics of the concept of public spirit, he captures the whole content of what was alive in the Roman tradition of this word (...). Shaftesbury/Gadamer: Likewise, Shaftesbury's taking up this I 38 concept, as we saw (>Sensus communis/Shaftesbury), at the same time a link to the political and social tradition of humanism. The sensus communis is a moment of bourgeois-moral being. Even where this term, as in Pietism or in the philosophy of the Scots (>Th. Reid), means a polemical turn against metaphysics, it still remains in the line of its original critical function. In contrast, Kant's adoption of this term is accentuated quite differently in the "Critique of Judgment"(3). >Judgement/Kant. 1. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung, Leipzig 1777, 1, 520. 2. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft 1799, S. Vll. 3. Kritik der Urteilskraft, S 40. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Jury Theorem | Condorcet | Gaus I 148 Jury theorem/Condorcet/Dryzek: This theorem demonstrates that if each citizen has a better than even chance of being correct in his/her judgement, then the larger the number of voters, the greater the chance of the majority choosing the correct option. The jury theorem therefore justifies the rationality of majoritarian democracy, at least in a republican context of a search for the common good, though only if each citizen reaches and exercises independent judgement. So there should be no factions (which reduce the effective number of voters) and, it might seem, no communication. These, at least, were Rousseau's own views: deliberation should only be a matter of internal reflection, not communication. However, as Robert Goodin (2002(1): 125) and others point out, discussion is fine so long as people then subsequently exercise their own independent judgements when voting. >Democracy/Dryzek, >Deliberative Democray/Dryzek. Problems with deliberation and democracy: If democracy involves aggregation (however much it is downplayed by deliberative democrats), that can be across judgements and not just across preferences as emphasized in social choice theory. Such judgements can involve disagreement over (say) what is in the common good. This epistemic way of thinking about democracy is associated with Rousseau, according to whom the general will can be ascertained by voting. Bernard Grofman and Scott Feld (1988)(2) argue that if indeed there is such a thing as the common good, though people differ in their judgements about which option will best serve it, then Condorcet's jury theorem applies. 1 Goodin, Robert E. (2002) Reflective Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Grofman, Bernard and Scott Feld (1988) 'Rousseau's general will: a Condorcetian perspective'. American Political Science Review, 82: 567-76. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications Parisi I 494 Jury theorem/Condorcet/Nitzan/Paroush: The Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794) is considered one of the pioneers of the social sciences. In the English literature, Baker (1976)(1) and Black (1958)(2) were among the first to turn the attention of the scientific community to the importance of Condorcet’s writings (see Young, 1995)(3). In 1785 no jury existed in France. Condorcet applied probability theory to judicial questions and argued that the English demand for unanimity among jurors was unreasonable, suggesting instead a jury of twelve members that can convict with a majority of at least ten. >Condorcet Jury Theorem, >Decision-making processes. 1. Baker, M. K., ed. (1976). Condorcet: selected writings. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill. 2. Black, D. (1958). The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Young, P. (1995). “Optimal Voting Rules.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(1): 51–64. Shmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush. “Collective Decision-making and the Jury Theorems”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Condo I N. de Condorcet Tableau historique des progrès de l’ esprit humain Paris 2004 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Law | Hayek | Parisi I 282 Law/Hayek/Menger: The process of rule evolution or generation in a common law system is based on trial and error (Hayek, 2011/1960(1), pp. 122–125). Therefore at any given point in time some rules or application of rules will simply be wrong. In other words, they will be ripe for revision as the process continues. For Hayek, the primary focus is on the overall system. The system is or should be the primary object of normative evaluation. Its mistakes are in a sense simply part of the process. Menger: It should be noted that Menger did not share Hayek’s presumption that common law was more conducive to the general welfare than statutory law. He argued, “For common law has also proved harmful to the common good often enough, and on the contrary, legislation has just as often changed common law in a way benefitting the common good” (1985(2), p. 233). Menger believed that common law could serve the common welfare without a single mind directing its development, but this need not occur. 1. Hayek, F. A. (2011/1960). Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Menger, C. (1985). Investigations Into the Method of the Social Sciences. New York: New York University Press. Rajagopalan, Shruti and Mario J. Rizzo “Austrian Perspectives on Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Hayek I Friedrich A. Hayek The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 2) Chicago 2007 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Law | Thomas Aquinas | Höffe I 147 Right/Thomas/Höffe: (...) Thomas Aquinas [distinguishes] four ranked types. 1. (...) the eternal law (lex aeterna(1)), the Höffe I 148 epitome of all rational principles according to which God rules the world. 2. (...) the plan of the world, the natural law (lex naturali(2)), which can be discerned from the order of creation through reason. According to the Apostle Paul(3), "written into the heart of man" by God, it means a participation of the law in us(4). To this secondly ranked natural law which appears with the claim to overpositive obligation, belong self-preservation, preservation of the species and a life according to the nature of reason(5), and in detail the prohibitions of robbery and insult. 3. (...) the divine law (lex divina(6)) of revelation, found in the Old and New Testaments and interpreted by the Church. 4. (...) human law (lex humana(7)), which acts with coercive power and is issued by the authority responsible for the community. However, the authorities must not act arbitrarily. Law/Thomas: It should serve the welfare of the community and by means of prohibitions, e.g. of murder and theft, it should avert harm from the people. Exceptions: Because of the situation reference the closer regulations can turn out differently, they can also be changed. >Equity. Natural justice: The power of the legislature in the context of its guiding task, the service of the common good, to enact laws appropriate to the situation can be regarded as a moderate natural law approach and at the same time as moderate legal positivism. >Natural justice. 1. Thomas Summa lIa Ilae, qu. 93 2. Ebenda qu.94 3. Römer 2, 15 4. Summa Iia Iiae qu.96,2 5.Ebenda qu.94,2 6. Ebenda, qu. 91, 5 7. Ebenda, qu. 95. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Laws | Thomas Aquinas | Höffe I 148 Laws/Thomas/Höffe: Neither does Thomas represent a legal moralism nor a legal positivism of a secular or theological nature. Origin of laws: According to [Thomas], law and justice are not founded in power, neither in human nor divine arbitrariness. Even though their origin may lie in God, law and statute consist in principles of reason, through which natural law becomes a law of reason. >Reason, >Rationality. Natural Law: The authority of the legislator in the context of its guiding task, the service of the common good, to enact laws appropriate to the situation can be regarded as a moderate thinking of the natural law and at the same time as moderate legal positivism. >Natural justice. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Liberalism | Communitarianism | Gaus I 172 Liberalism/Communitarianism/Dagger: Those enlisted on the communitarian side of the Debate [between liberals and communitarians] have pressed four major objections against their 'liberal' or 'individualist' opponents. 1) the first is the complaint, already noted in Walzer, that abstract reason will not bear the weight philosophers have placed on it in their attempts to ground justice and morality. This 'Enlightenment project' (MacIntyre, 1981(1)) is doomed by its failure to recognize that reasoning about these matters cannot proceed apart from shared traditions and practices, each with its own set of roles, responsibilities, and virtues. 2) second, the liberal emphasis on individual rights and justice comes at the expense of civic duty and the common good. In Sandel's words, 'justice finds its limits in those forms of community that engage the identity as well as the interests of the participants. LTJo some I owe more than justice requires or even permits in virtue of those more or less enduring attachments and commitments which taken together partly define the person I am' (1982(2): 179, 182). 3) Contemporary liberals are blind to these enduring attachments and commitments, according to the third charge, because they too often rely on an atomistic conception of the self - an 'unencumbered self' in Sandel's terms - that is supposedly prior to its ends and attachments. Such a conception is both false and pernicious, for individual selves are largely constituted by the communities that nurture and sustain them. When Rawls and other 'deontological liberals' teach individuals to think of themselves as somehow prior to and apart from these communities, they are engaged quite literally in a self-defeating enterprise. >M. Sandel. 4) the fourth objection, then, is that these abstract and universalistic theories of justice and rights have contributed to the withdrawal into private life and the intransigent insistence on one's rights against others that threaten modern societies. There is little sense of a common good or even a common ground on which citizens can meet. In MacIntyre's words, the conflict between the advo- cates of incommensurable moral positions has so riven modern societies that politics now 'is civil war carried on by other means' (1981(1): 253). For a valuable, full-length survey of this debate, see Mulhall and Swift, 1996(3). >Communitarianism, >Communitarianism as an author, >A. MacIntyre. 1. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1981 ) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 2. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Mulhall, Stephen and Adam Swift (1996) Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Liberalism | Locke | Höffe I 254 Liberalism/LockeVsAbsolutism/Locke/Höffe: In Locke's political liberalism, the uncompromising veto against absolutism is even more important than averting danger, because a state authority that stands above all laws contradicts its origins in treaty theory. Non-transferability: Because the law of nature does not grant absolute power to anyone, it cannot be transferred to the state, because what one does not possess cannot be ceded. Transfer: According to the two dangers threatening the state of nature, two rights are transferred to the public authorities in the state-founding social contract: the right to interpret the moral natural law and the right to punish crimes committed against the natural law. >Absolutism. Non-transferable: (...) the three basic goods life, freedom and property [are] not transferred. Because otherwise one would fall into a self-slavery forbidden by natural law. Höffe I 255 the state authority may only promote the common good, which consists above all in securing the three (...) basic goods [life, freedom and property]. >Social contract, >Freedom, >Liberty, >Society, >Community. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Marginal Cost Controversy | Coase | Kiesling I 46 Decreasing-cost industries/marginal cost controversy/Coase /Kiesling: In 1938 Harold Hotelling(1) published an argument in favour of marginal cost pricing on efficiency grounds, based on the general argument that social welfare is maximized where marginal benefit equals marginal cost. For that reason, Hotelling argued, these firms should charge consumers a price equal to marginal cost and receive taxpayer-funded subsidies to cover their fixed costs (which, again, are considerable). Hotelling relied on taxation theories to suggest lump-sum taxes on consumers that, in aggregate, would pay for fixed costs. >Marginal cost, >Efficiency, >Taxation. Coase: In 1946 Coase’s analysis of Hotelling’s proposal, “The Marginal Cost Controversy,”(2) clarified the question and gave the debate its name. (Frischmann and Hogendorn (2015)(3) provide an excellent summary of the marginal cost controversy debate and the lasting relevance of Coase’s argument today.) While acknowledging the efficiencies inherent in marginal cost pricing, Coase argued that imposing lump-sum taxes to pay for firms’ fixed costs would not actually result in the most efficient outcome. Coase distilled the problem down to three essential parts: 1) The divergence between marginal cost and average cost, with marginal cost lower than average cost; 2) The allocation of common costs across consumers; 3) That many fixed costs are pre-payments on long-term contracts for inputs that could be considered variable costs. While the divergence between marginal and average cost is the predominant analytical issue, the other two are tricky. When there is a common fixed cost that must be shared across consumers, economic theory does not suggest a single, clear, definitive method of doing so. In electricity, for example, much of the capital in the distribution system creates a shared network that different consumers use to different degrees (and at different times of day). Kiesling I 47 How should the costs be apportioned among these different consumers, particularly at the time Coase was writing, when digital technologies did not exist to enable precise measurement of use of the distribution grid? This question of the apportioning of common costs remains relevant in regulated electric utility rate design. CoaseVsHotelling: [Coase] argued that while price would equal marginal cost, resource misallocation would still arise because neither producers nor consumers would take fixed costs into account in making production and consumption decisions. Taxation/fixed costs: In other words, if fixed costs were paid for through taxes or subsidies, neither producers nor consumers would have any incentive to consider the opportunity cost of those resources. Price/opportunity cost: Coase also argued that in the absence of a market price that reflected opportunity costs, there would be no institutional framework, no market process, for learning whether or not consumers were willing to pay the full cost of the output they consumed; this observation overlaps with the challenge of allocating common costs across consumers. Common good: Finally, Coase observed that in Hotelling’s system the redistribution of wealth from people who used only a little of the product in question to those who used a lot of it would be almost unavoidable. Redistribution: Wealth redistribution would also arise from the mismatch between consumers and taxpayers - not all consumers of the firm’s output would necessarily be taxpayers, and vice versa. Incentives/CoaseVsHotelling: Rather than accepting Hotelling’s static analysis of an already-existing decreasing-cost firm, Coase performed a dynamic analysis of the broader incentives of Hotelling’s proposal and the realistic institutional framework that would be required to implement it. How would the government determine consumer demand to learn consumer preferences, to make sure that the right amount and type of fixed costs were incurred? >Preferences, >Government policy. In his emphasis on government ability to acquire knowledge, government performance, and the assumption of government as neutral public servants, Coase makes points that presage the later developments of public choice economics in the 1950s and 1960s. Kiesling I 48 Solution/Coase: Coase made an alternative proposal to Hotelling’s: multi-part pricing. While he did not provide specifics in his 1946 article, his idea was to have the price include a component that reflected the marginal cost and a component that allocated the fixed cost, subject to the constraint that the firm does not earn losses; this example is called a two-part tariff. Such pricing incorporates all costs into the prices to which producers and consumers respond, and does not involve either the funding problems or institutional incentive problems that Coase identified with the tax/subsidy proposal. Multi-part pricing does not avoid the problem of allocating common costs across consumers, and such allocation will also be the province of estimates and be prone to bureaucratic manipulation, but it may be the best we can do given realistic assumptions about our constraints and the limitations of our knowledge. Today: Coase’s analytical framework for decreasing-cost industries persists to this day in the form of regulated rate setting in the electricity and natural gas distribution industries. If you look at your electric bill you will see a variable “energy charge,” reflecting marginal cost, and a “wires charge” or “carrying charge,” that allocates a share of the fixed costs of constructing, maintaining, and operating the distribution network. At least in theory, regulated rate setting is grounded in Coase’s logic. >Efficiency/Coase. 1. Hotelling, H. (1938). The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates. Econometrica, 6 (3), 242–269. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907054 2. Coase, Ronald H. (1946). The Marginal Cost Controversy. Economica 13, 51: 169-182. 3. Frischmann, Brett M., and Christiaan Hogendorn (2015). Retrospectives: The Marginal Cost Controversy. Journal of Economic Perspectives 29, 1: 193-206. |
Kiesling I L. Lynne Kiesling The Essential Ronald Coase Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2021 |
| Neo-Republicanism | Sunstein | Gaus I 175 Neo-Republicanism/Sunstein/Dagger: Republican political institutions, (...), must ensure the political equality of self-governing citizens. To this end, neorepublicans call for a more deliberative form of politics.As Cass Sunstein puts it, 'republicans will attempt to design political institutions that promote discussion and debate among the citizenry; they will be hostile to systems that promote lawmaking as "deals" or bargains among self-interested private groups' (1988(1): 1549). Dagger: this is not to say that republicans believe that citizens would easily or quickly come to agreement about what the common good requires if only government could be freed from the stranglehold of interest groups. The point, instead, is that reviving the republican conception of politics as the public business means rejecting the 'economic model' of politics, according to which individuals and groups bring their preferences, already fixed, to the political marketplace, where they use their political capital and bargaining power to strike the best deals for themselves. On the republican view, politics of this sort is a form of corruption that reduces the citizen to a consumer seeking to promote his or her personal interests. Steps must be taken, then, to limit the power of private interests, to prepare people through civic education to take the part of the public-spirited citizen, and to provide them with arenas or forums in which they may engage in debate and deliberation on the public business. 1. Sunstein, Cass (1988) 'Beyond the republican revival'. Yale Law Journal, 97 (July): 1539-89. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Sunstein I Cass R. Sunstein Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008 Sunstein II Cass R. Sunstein #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Neoliberalism | Crouch | Mause I 73f Neoliberalism/Crouch: Crouch does not use the term "neoliberalism" in the sense of economic theory. The process of post-democratization (see Post-Democracy/Crouch) is attributed to the influence of neoliberalism. Crouch thesis: Neoliberalism gives economic interests priority over the welfare state and an egalitarian understanding of the common good, and sees the free market as the best means of satisfying individual and social needs. CrouchVsNeoliberalism: "Overlap": Market economy logic is no longer used only in the sphere of economy, but also in the political and social sphere. (1) 1. C. Crouch, Das befremdliche Überleben des Neoliberalismus. Frankfurt a. M. 2011, S. 153f. |
PolCrouch I Colin Crouch Henry Farrell Breaking the path of institutional development? Alternatives to the new determinism 2004 PolCrouch II Colin Crouch Post-democracy London 2004 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Organisation | Ostrom | Brocker I 730 Organisation/Ostrom: Market or state organisation types inevitably have a multi-level problem: there are rules on an operational, collective or constitutional level. Operational level: here it concerns appropriation, provision and monitoring ((s) in this context it concerns common goods). Collective level: this involves the choice of practices, management and assessment of the procedures chosen. Constitutional level: here we are concerned with the formulation, control, assessment and amendment of constitutional decisions.(1) ((s) This does not always mean a state constitution, but also an operational constitution). Problem: Rules from different levels can block each other. Ostrom sees the reason for a multi-level approach in the necessity of trying out rules and their effects. When trying out the theory, the rules are kept constant at a lower level. Brocker I 731 Problem: for self-organizing actors, switching between levels is a key strategy for solving problems.(2) See Self-organization/Ostrom. 1. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge 1990. Dt.: Elinor Ostrom, Die Verfassung der Allmende. Jenseits von Staat und Merkt, Tübingen 1999, p. 68. 2. Ibid. p. 70 Markus Hanisch, „Elinor Ostrom Die Verfassung der Allmende“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOstr I Elinor Ostrom Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action Cambridge 1990 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Patents | Rothbard | Rothbard III 745 Patents/Rothbard: E.g., You have patented your invention and you read in the newspaper one day that John Doe, who lives in a City 2,000 miles from your town, has invented an identical or similar device, that he has licensed the EZ company to manufacture it.... Neither Doe nor the EZ company ... ever heard of your invention. All believe Doe to be the inventor of a new and original device. They may all be guilty of infringing your patent ... the fact that their infringement was in ignorance of the true facts and unintentional will not constitute a defense.(1) Rothbard: Patent, then, has nothing to do with implicit theft. It confers an exclusive privilege on the first inventor, and if anyone else should, quite independently, invent the same or similar machine or product, the latter would be debarred by violence from using it in production. Cf. >Copyright/Rothbard. Rothbard III 747 VsPatents: Part of the patent protection now obtained by an inventor could be achieved on the free market by a type of "copyright" protection. Thus, inventors must now mark their machines as being patented. Free market: The patent is incompatible with the free market precisely to the extent that it goes beyond the copyright. The man who has not bought a machine and who arrives at the same invention independently, will, on the free market, be perfectly able to use and sell his invention. Patents prevent a man from using his invention even though all the property is his and he has not stolen the invention, either explicitly or implicitly, from the first inventor. >Free market/Rothbard. Monopoly privilege: Patents, therefore, are grants of exclusive monopoly privilege by the State and are invasive of property rights on the market. The crucial distinction between patents and copyrights, then, is not that one is mechanical and the other literary [ a book]. The fact that they have been applied that way is an historical accident and does not reveal the critical difference between them.(2) The crucial difference is that copyright is a logical attribute of property right on the free market, while patent is a monopoly invasion of that right. >Monopolies/Rothbard. Inventions/copyright/patent/Rothbard: The application of patents to mechanical inventions and copyrights to literary works is peculiarly inappropriate. It would be more in keeping with the free market to be just the reverse. For literary creations are unique products of the individual; it is almost impossible for them to be independently duplicated by someone else. Rothbard III 748 Therefore, a patent, instead of a copyright, for literary productions would make little difference in practice. On the other hand, mechanical inventions are discoveries of natural law rather than individual creations, and hence similar independent inventions occur all the time.(3) The simultaneity of inventions is a familiar historical fact. Hence, if it is desired to maintain a free market, it is particularly important to allow copyrights, but not patents, for mechanical inventions. Rothbard III 750 Monopoly privileges: Some defenders of patents assert that they are not monopoly privileges, but simply property rights in inventions or even in "ideas." But (…) everyone's property right is defended in libertarian law without a patent. If someone has an idea or plan and constructs an invention, and it is stolen from his house, the stealing is an act of theft illegal under general law. On the other hand, patents actually invade the property rights of those independent discoverers of an idea or invention who made the discovery after the patentee. Patents, therefore, invade rather than defend property rights. The speciousness of this argument that patents protect property rights in ideas is demonstrated by the fact that not all, but only certain types of original ideas, certain types of innovations, are considered patentable. Society/common good: Another common argument for patents is that "society" is simply making a contract with the inventor to purchase his secret, so that "society" will have use of it. RothbardVs: 1) (…) "society" could pay a straight subsidy, or price, to the inventor; it would not have to prevent all later inventors from marketing their inventions in this field. 2) (…) there is nothing in the free economy to prevent any individual or group of individuals from purchasing secret inventions from their creators. No monopolistic patent is necessary. Utilitarianism: The most popular argument for patents among economists is the utilitarian one that a patent for a certain number of years is necessary to encourage a suffcient amount of research expenditure for inventions and innovations in processes and products. RothbardVs: This is a curious argument, because the question immediately arises: By what standard do you judge that research expenditures are "too much," "too little," or just about enough? This is a problem faced by every governmental intervention in the market's production. >Interventions/Rothbard. Rothbard III 751 Interventions/inventions/Rothbard: Many advocates of patents believe that the ordinary competitive conditions of the market do not suffciently encourage the adoption of new processes and that therefore innovations must be coercively promoted by the government. RothbardVs: But the market decides on the rate of introduction of new processes just as it decides on the rate of industrialization of a new geographic area. In fact, this argument for patents is very similar to the infant-industry argument for tariffs - that market processes are not suffcient to permit the introduction of worthwhile new processes. >Research expenditures. Rothbard III 751 Patents/Rothbard: It is by no means self-evident that patents encourage an increased absolute quantity of research expenditures. Rothbard III 752 But certainly patents distort the type of research expenditure being conducted. For while it is true that the first discoverer benefits from the privilege, it is also true that his competitors are excluded from production in the area of the patent for many years. And since one patent can build upon a related one in the same field, competitors can often be indefinitely discouraged fromfurther research expenditures in the general area covered by the patent. Moreover, the patentee is himself discouraged from engaging in further research in this field (…). 1. Irving Mandell, How to Protect and Patent Your Invention (New York: Oceana Publishers, 1951), p. 34. 2. This can be seen in the field of designs, which can be either copyrighted or patented. 3. For a legal hint on the proper distinction between copyright and monopoly, see F.E. Skone James, “Copyright” in Encyclopedia Britannica (14th ed.; London, 1929), VI, 415–16. For the views of nineteenth-century economists on patents, see Fritz Machlup and Edith T. Penrose, “The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of Economic History, May, 1950, pp. 1–29. Also see Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1958). |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Plato | Aristotle | Höffe I 53 Plato/Aristotle/Höffe: [Aristotle] rejects Plato's theory of ideas and criticizes his political thinking, partly explicitly, partly tacitly. >Idea/Plato, >Politics/Plato, >Philosopher King/Plato. Polis/AristoteleVsPlato: [Aristotle turns against] every only functional determination of the polis. Philosopher rule/AristotleVsPlato: In contrast to Plato's Politeia, the poets remain autonomous, as well as the economy, and politics anyway. Society: Aristotle thus already advocated an idea that sociological systems theory believes to be established only after the dissolution of the so-called old European society: a relative independence of different areas of society. AristotleVsEqual rights: On the other hand, Aristotle does not adopt Plato's emancipatory element, the equality of women. >Equal rights/Aristotle. Similarities with Plato: State: Also Aristotle [obligates] the state to happiness and determines the good constitution from the common good; thus he too represents a political Eudaimonism. Aristocracy: [Aristotle, like Plato] also thinks aristocratically, of course, because the citizens in the narrower sense, those who possess civic virtue, are relieved of work for a living. Idiopragy: He also takes up Plato's idiopragy formula: that everyone should do what is proper to him, his own (idion). Cf. >Justice/Plato. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Plato | Höffe | I 42 Plato/Höffe: A few questions come to mind: I. Justice: Plato, on the other hand, derives from his idea of specialization, the idiopragy formula, an understanding of justice according to which every part, be it the soul, be it the community, has to fulfil its peculiar task(1). Question:Does Plato want to clarify the usual understanding of justice about himself or introduce a new, "revisionist" understanding? a) The idioprague formula does indeed speak for a revisionist understanding. b) Plato, however, starts with a traditional principle ("to each his own") and "only" expands the meaning of the term as he sees fit. The unspoken assertion in this connection is (...) [one] must (...) make a partial revision and understand justice as harmony, as a harmony both in the individual and in the state. II. Can Platonic justice bring about one's own well-being I 43 or does it not need that addition that Plato himself introduces in the outlook of the Politeia, the view into the (balancing) beyond? >Justice/Plato. Governance: Above all Plato's philosopher-king theorem raises questions: Thanks to their knowledge of the whole and their readiness to serve the community, philosophers should be decisive for the common good and because of their authoritativeness also responsible. This assumption contains two questionable equations. a) On the one hand, it can be argued that Plato confuses the genuine philosophical knowledge of the whole, a mere knowledge of principles, with a more substantial knowledge of the whole, the insight into elementary conditions of just living together. b) On the other hand, he equates the knowledge of principles with the competence required for politics to concretize and apply knowledge in the respective situation. A knowledge of principles includes at least the ability to judge, experience and persuasiveness necessary for politics, not least a sense of power not necessary. PlatonVsVs/Höffe: However, Plato cannot be criticised so easily. In the Politeia he demands far more competences for the ruler. They start with those preconditions that are already fulfilled by the guardians, i.e. bravery, perceptiveness, good memory, curiosity and righteousness(2). Moreover, the rulers must have proved themselves the best in war(3). In addition, they are trained "artistically and gymnastically" in preliminary exercises. Furthermore, experience and a good advice (euboulia), i.e. (...) common-interest oriented I 44 expertise is required (...). 1 Politeia, IV 433a ff 2. II 375a et seq.) 3. 543a |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Plato | Popper | Höffe I 45 Plato/Popper/Höffe: After [Popper's] work The Open Society and its Enemies (1957)(1) Plato appears in the Politeia as an opponent of an open society and advocate of collectivist utilitarianism. >Utilitarianism. Höffe: It is true that Plato's main work contains many highly objectionable elements. For example, he subjects the guardian state to strict rules of reproduction; he allows censorship, even a political lie, i.e. a deception, provided it serves the common good. Euthanasia/Platon: Furthermore he advocates a rigorous euthanasia - not uncommon in antiquity, of course - he allows infanticide and refuses medical help for people who are malignant and incurable according to their soul. Equality/PlatonVsVs/Höffe: But it is also true that Plato opposes the inequality of men and women that prevailed at that time and considers institutional precautions against corruption. HöffeVsPopper: One can hardly blame the philosopher for not being aware of the openness and dynamics of modern societies, even to a limited extent, for not correctly assessing the measure that was already possible back then. More importantly, Plato is concerned with an element that also deprives modernity of openness and dynamism, the basic and framework conditions of the community. Idiopragy/Plato: With Plato, the idiopragy formula is considered unchangeable; in modernity it is democracy in conjunction with fundamental rights and separation of powers. On the other hand, the idiopragy formula allows for openness and dynamism, and accordingly gifted people are open to advancement(2). 2. popperVsPlaton: Popper's second accusation, that Plato subjects the individual to the collective good, can refer to the beginning of Book IV, according to which it does not matter that any group (ethnos: tribe) is particularly happy, but the whole polis (3). Polis/PlatonVsVs/Höffe: A Platonic polis does not sacrifice the welfare of individuals or groups for the common good. Rather, it is set up in such a way that everyone, groups as well as individuals, can become happy. The above-mentioned passage only formulates, in provocative exaggeration of Plato's basic intention, that no one may pursue his interests in an exclusiveness that robs others of the same right to pursue their interests. >K. Popper, >VsPopper. 1. K.Popper 1945. Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde. London: Routledge 2. Politeia III 415 b–c 3. 420b |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Political Representation | Barber | Brocker I 682 Political Representation/Barber: Barber's thesis: the concept of representation of liberalism destroys participation and citizenship. (1) This is because liberalism misunderstands democracy as a "policy of keeping predators". See also Democracy/Barber. Brocker I 686 In the various forms of "authoritarian", "juridical" and "pluralistic" democracy, Barber sees fundamental weaknesses in representation. (See Terminology/Barber). Problem: the "reintroduction of independent reasons" (2): neither elites nor philosophers or judges or leaders of associations can lift the controversy over key political ideas. It is precisely the assumption that there are actors with special access to "good reasons" or even a free play of forces that produces the common good almost automatically that leads to arbitrary rule. BarberVsDirect Democracy: direct democracy is what Barber calls "unity democracy": Brocker I 687 This rejects representation in its entirety and replaces it with the consensus of all citizens. According to Barber, it takes on "malicious" characteristics in larger associations at the latest. (3) The reason for this is that community here may no longer be based on voluntary identification and shared norms, but only on repression and manipulation. Solution/Barber: "Strong democracy" (see Democracy/Barber): here conflicts are subjected to an "endless process of consultation, decision and action". (4) 1. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democary, Participatory Politics for a New Age, Berkeley CA, 1984, Dt. Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie. Über die Teilhabe am Politischen, Hamburg 1994, S. 13. 2. Ebenda S. 138 3. Ebenda S. 144 4. Ebenda S. 147. Michael Haus, „Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolBarb I Benjamin Barber The Truth of Power. Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House New York 2001 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Politics | Pettit | Brocker I 858 Politics/Depoliticization/Pettit: Pettit defines "depoliticization"(1) as distancing political decision-making from an emotionally charged, moralizing and clichédly prejudiced struggle of opinion in which he fears that simple and polarizing platitudes rather than public welfare-oriented considerations will prevail. Instead of, however, in a good republican tradition, branding this shift from public welfare orientation to strategic, effect-hasty incitement as a process of "de-politicization", as an alarming loss of civic political judgement, Pettit understands de-politicization exactly the other way round as a taming of the downright dreaded will of the people by a rationality examination of the arguments, which circulate and meet in the public opinion struggle exercised by experts.(2) ((s) PettitVsHabermas). ((s) "Government of Experts", "Government of Technocrats", "Technical Cabinets": see also Sartori). PettitVsRepublicanism: Pettit obviously does not share the republican punch line that "politicization" is precisely the measure for the ability to make intuitive and conscious references to the common good. John P. McCormickVsPettit: In this respect, says disrespectfully that Pettit has made a democratically forgotten, institution-centred "senatorial move" and shows the tendency to neglect the problem horizon of nurturing and sharpening the political judgement of citizens, a genuine and central concern of Republican thought.(3) RichterVsPettit: Pettit did not succeed in resolving the tension between state trust and criticism of power, between civic participation and elite trust which he is building. PettitVsRawls: see Justice/Pettit. 1. Philip Pettit, »Depoliticizing Democracy«, in: Ratio Juris 17/1, 2004 p. 53 2. Ibid. p. 63 3. John P. McCormick, »Republicanism and Democracy«, in: Andreas Niederberger/Philipp Schink (Hg.), Republican Democracy. Liberty, Law, and Politics, Edinburgh 2013, p. 108 Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Politics | Plato | Höffe I 38 Politics/Platon/Höffe: While we (...) when we think of a politician or statesman as a field of activity, Plato places value on a certain knowledge. For him, "politician" means who, in contrast to the "sophists and jugglers", has the êpistemê politikê, i.e. a political science. Episteme politike/knowledge/Plato: This is neither an empirical political science nor a politics-related experience of life, neither the political wisdom nor the knowledge of a historian. Focused on the (normative) foundations of a polity, Plato's political science is a normative theory of the state which, similar to the politeia, enables the person who controls it to lead the state in a concrete way. It consists in a kind of integration knowledge which, according to Plato's image of the "royal weaving art", is able to "weave together" all knowledge relevant to the common good.(1) >Laws/Plato, >Polis/Plato, >Governance/Plato. 1. politicos, 305e |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Power | Locke | Höffe I 255 Power/Locke/Höffe: Hobbes' basic question was: "How do you protect the individual from violence from fellow human beings, the potential enemy of civil war?" Locke poses the follow-up question to the threat of abuse of power: "How do you protect the protected from their protector?" He gives three answers: 1) (...) Separation of powers: The supreme but not sovereign power, the legislature, must be separated from the executive power, which is responsible for law enforcement. 2) In addition, there is a third power, which, however, does not exist in the judiciary as is usual today, but is assigned to the executive. 3) The third power, called "federal", decides on war and peace, on alliances and all other foreign policy issues. Because it is responsible for the external perspective, it is different in nature from the executive power, but, Locke admits, it is difficult to separate from it in terms of personnel. Ad 2): The second answer subjects the two non-legislative powers to the law (principle of legality). If it is violated, one acts tyrannically. Without mentioning here the "arch-philosopher" (§74, FN)(1), i.e. Aristotle, Locke adopts the distinction, which goes back to him, of a power serving either the common good or the ruler's good. >Authority, >Governance, >Legislation. 1. J. Locke, Second treatise of Government |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Prisoner’s Dilemma | Fudenberg | Mause I 156f Prisoner's Dilemma/Commodity Allocation/Economy/Common goods/Fudenberg: rationally, each player (user of a general good) places his own interests in the foreground. (See Prisoner's Dilemma/Ostrom). As a result, all those involved find themselves in the worst collective situation of all-round overuse - the Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium. Repetition/Fudenberg: In game theory, this does not change even if the users play their prisoner's dilemma (finally often) repeatedly: the defection of all inevitably leads to the pareto inferiority of the game result. Only in the theoretical extreme case of an infinite repetition of always the same game predicts the theoretical folk theorem (e.g. Fudenberg and Maskin 1986) (1) that mutual cooperation can also be of equal importance. 1. D. Fudenberg, E. Maskin, The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica 54, (3) 1986, p. 533– 554. |
EconFud I Drew Fudenberg Eric Maskin The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information 1986 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Prisoner’s Dilemma | Ostrom | Mause I 157f Prisoner's Dilemma/Common Good/Common/Social Goods/Ostrom: the so-called "tragedy of the commons" (see Social Goods/Hardin) is often illustrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma, e.g. Ostrom. (1) For example, pasture and arable land used jointly by the farmers of a village. Options: a) "pure cooperation": restrictions of individual use to the level compatible with the collective optimisation (b) "pure defection": no restriction In this situation, each player, no matter how the rest of the villagers behave, will rationally prioritize their individual self-interests: On the one hand, everyone has the chance to reach their preferred situation by playing off their 'free rider strategy'. (...) So while the (weak) Pareto principle calls for cooperation, the principle of dominance urges every player to act against the common interest. In the end, everyone finds themselves in the worst collective situation. On the repetition of the Prisoner's Dilemma, see Prisoner's Dilemma/Fudenberg. 1. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the commons. The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge: 1990, p. 3-5. |
EconOstr I Elinor Ostrom Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action Cambridge 1990 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Property | Locke | Mause I 36 Property/Locke: State purpose for Locke is the protection of property. Legitimate state power finds its limits in the property rights of citizens, whereby Locke understands "property" in a comprehensive sense as "life", "liberty" and "ownership". (1) 1.J. Locke, Zwei Abhandlungen über die Regierung, Hrsg. Walter Euchner, Frankfurt 1977 S. 253. Höffe I 249 Property/Locke/Höffe: Because the definition of political violence(1) cites property as the only basic good, Locke seems to represent exclusively economic liberalism, as some critics claim. By property, however, he understands, as was not uncommon in England at the time, far more than a material possession essential to the economy. For him, life and freedom are also important, and only then does possession rank. Furthermore, political power may only be used for the benefit of the common good. >Governance/Locke, >State/Locke, >Natural State/Locke. Höffe I 252 Property is (...) a necessary condition for human life; in working nature, humans procures for themselves the material conditions for their survival. Prehistory/Locke: [There is one] original common property, the property of all in the earth and its fruits. Höffe I 253 Private property: Personal property, private property, is created through agreements and contracts and is therefore already bound to a legal and state system. Natural state: In contrast, Locke(3) claims that one acquires property already in the natural state. God gave the earth and all lower living beings to all people together. In the natural state, however, there is also a non-collective ownership, as a quasi-divine fiefdom the ownership of one's own person. Acquisition of property: On the basis of this still pre-economic property, humans can acquire property through their activity in the usual economic understanding. The decisive, property-creating factor is thus the labour that is both commanded by God and forced by the needs of people. >Labour/Locke. (...) even the industrious [may] not acquire as much property as they like, because they are subject to a natural law limit, which of course cannot be justified so obviously by the prohibition of damage: One may only make oneself property to the extent that one "can use it to any advantage for one's life before it spoils"(4). Höffe I 254 HöffeVsLocke: two questions: 1) If the pragmatic argument "useless" already applies, why does the moral criterion of dishonesty still need to be applied? 2) And what about those who are neither hard-working nor sensible: should they starve? >Labour/Locke, >Money/Locke. 1. Locke, Second treatise of Government, 1689/90 2. Ibid., Chap. V. 3. Ibid., §§ 27ff. 4. Ibid., § 31 |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Reciprocity | Buchanan | Mause I 158f Reciprocity/Common/Externality/Common goods/Buchanan: External effects arise when someone claims a right against others without this right being matched by a duty to compensate others for the costs imposed by consumption. The exemption from the obligation to pay in return induces an increased demand compared to the allocation on the perfect market, because the costs - in the form of a complete or partial renunciation of consumption - are externalized to others. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) therefore made the creation of reciprocity the central principle of solving the common problems he described in anarchy. (1) Reciprocity/Problems: 1. Rule Problem: what rule can be used to restore reciprocity in rationing and reduce excess demand for the common good? The reduction in demand requires a "behavioural exchange". (2) Everyone shall waive that part of the right which he has exercised, provided that all others waive in a similar manner. 2. Self-binding problem: the parties involved must be committed to cooperative behaviour in a situation corresponding to the Prisoner's Dilemma. Two possibilities: a) State intervention (see Interventionism/Habermas) b) Self-management. See an overview in: (3). 1. James M. Buchanan, R. D. Congleton, Politics by principle, not interest. Toward nondiscriminatory democracy. Cambridge 1998. 2. J.A. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit – Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan. Tübingen 1984, S. 85 3. E. Ostrom, Governing the commons. The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge 1990, S. 8-13. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Reciprocity | Hobbes | Mause I 158 Reciprocity/Common/Externality/Common goods/Hobbes: External effects arise when someone claims a right against others without this right being matched by a duty to compensate others for the costs imposed by consumption. >Externalities. The exemption from the obligation to pay in return induces an increased demand compared to the allocation on the perfect market, because the costs - in the form of a complete or partial renunciation of consumption - are externalized to others. >Allocation. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) therefore made the creation of reciprocity the central principle of solving the common problems he described in anarchy. (1) >Th. Hobbes. 1. Th. Hobbes, Leviathan oder Stoff, Form und Gewalt eines bürgerlichen und kirchlichen Staates. Frankfurt a. M. 1976. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Republic | Montesquieu | Gaus I 170 Republic/Montesquieu/Dagger: A prudent republic will (...) be a small one. That, at least, has been the conclusion - or presumption - of many republicans throughout the centuries. Montesquieu: 'In a large republic,' Montesquieu explained in The Spirit of the Laws, 'the common good is sacrificed to a thousand considerations; it is subordinated to exceptions; it depends upon accidents. In a small one, the public good is better felt, better known, lies nearer to each citizen; abuses are less extensive and consequently less protected' (1989(1): 124 [Book VII], ch. 161). United states/Dagger: So widespread was this view in the late eighteenth century that the American authors of the Federalist found it necessary to point out that Montesquieu had also allowed for the possibility of a 'federal' or 'CONFEDERATE' (Federalist 9) republic. Even then, the debate over the proposed Constitution often turned on the question of whether the United States would become a 'federal' or a 'compound' republic - that is, a republic comprising 13 or more smaller republics - or whether it would become a 'consolidated' republic that could not long preserve its republican character. >State, >Constitution/Montesquieu. 1. Montesquieu, C. (1989 Il 7481) The Spirit of the Laws, eds and trans. A. Cohler, B. Miller and H. Stone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Federalist 9 Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Monte I Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu De l’esprit des lois, Paris 1748 German Edition: Vom Geist der Gesetze Stuttgart 2011 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Self-Organization | Ostrom | Brocker I 730 Self-Organization/levels/economy/social goods/Ostrom: Market and state organisations inevitably have a multi-level problem: there are rules at a operational, collective or constitutional level. Brocker I 731 Problem: to test rules and their effects in theory, it is assumed that when rules are changed, those at lower levels are kept constant. (1) Self-organization: this assumption cannot be established in systems with self-organizing actors. Actors must be able to switch between levels to solve problems. Individuals who do not have autonomy for self-organization and self-administration remain imprisoned in their one-level world. (2) Brocker I 732 For the study of strategies for the sustainable management of common goods (social goods), Ostrom selects very different examples from different regions of the world (Switzerland, Japan, Philippines, Spain) with different cultures and environmental conditions. (3) Question: are there general principles for the establishment of management rules and cooperation between the actors that can be recognised by these different cases? Operational Rules/Ostrom: (see also Organization/Ostrom): here there are also construction principles that have a decisive influence on the sustainability of the presented resource management systems: 1. clearly defined limits for households or persons who have the right to withdraw units from the common land. 2. congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 3. arrangements for collective decisions: most people can participate in decisions about changes to the operational rules. 4. supervision: the supervisors are accountable to the owners (of common goods) or even are owners themselves. 5. graduated sanctions for breaches of the rules 6. conflict resolution mechanisms: participants have quick access to low-cost local arenas that resolve conflicts. 7. minimal recognition of the right to organise: the right of owners to develop their own institutions is not called into question by any external state authority. 8. embedded companies: (for larger, more complex systems): here, appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution and administration are embedded in several levels. Common goods/overuse: None of the above rules in itself is sufficient to prevent Hardin's "tragedy of the common good" (see Social Goods/Hardin) - i.e. the forced overuse of common goods. Brocker I 734 Free-rider problem/solution/Ostrom: only investments in cost-effective, self-organized monitoring make the promises of the individual users credible. At the same time, they participate in the surveillance themselves in order to prevent exploitation by their neighbours. Learning/Sanctions: for learning it is important that the sanctions are not existentially threatening at the beginning. Brocker I 734 State intervention: Problem: Self-regulation and self-initiative are threatened by state intervention and regulation.(4)(5) >Social Goods/Ostrom., >Free-rider. 1. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge 1990. Dt.: Elinor Ostrom, Die Verfassung der Allmende. Jenseits von Staat und Merkt, Tübingen 1999, p. 68. 2. Ibid. p. 70 3. Ibid. p. 72f 4. Hanisch „Cooperatives in Rural Devolopment and Poverty Alleviation“, in: Jos Bijman/Roldan Muradian/Jur Schuurman (Ed.) Cooperatives, Economic Democratization and Rural Development, Cheltenham/Northampton 2016, p. 55 5. Helen Markelova Ruth Meinzen-Dick/Jon Hellin/Stephan Dohrn, „Collective Action for Smallholder Market Access“, in: Food Policy 34/1, 2009, p. 5 Markus Hanisch, „Elinor Ostrom Die Verfassung der Allmende“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOstr I Elinor Ostrom Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action Cambridge 1990 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Self-Realization | Hobhouse | Gaus I 415 Self-realization/Hobhouse/Weinstein: New liberals joined Bosanquet in combining a moralized theory of freedom and strong rights with a communitarian social ontology. >Liberty/Bosanquet. For Green, Ritchie, Hobhouse and Hobson, moral self-realization was unconditionally good. Realizing oneself morally meant being fully free by being both 'out- ward[ly]' and 'inward[ly]' free (Green, 1986(1): 234—5). It meant having the enabling 'positive power or capacity of doing ... something worth doing' and actually 'doing ... something worth doing' (1986(1): 199). Self-realization/Hobhouse: As Hobhouse put it, self-realization consists in 'social' as well as 'moral' freedom. Whereas the former concerns external harmony between citizens or 'freedom of man in society', the latter is 'proportionate to the [self'sl] internal harmony' (Hobhouse, 1949(2): 51, 57).* Self-realization/liberalism: For new liberals as well, rights indirectly promoted everyone's self-realization by enabling each to flourish. And to the extent that each flourished morally, each, in turn, promoted common good by respecting the rights of others. Thus, for Hobhouse, common good was 'the foundation of all personal rights' (1968(3): 198). In Green's words, rights realize our moral capacity negatively by 'securing the treatment of one man by another as equally free with himself, but they do not realise positively, because their possession does not imply that the individual makes a common good his own' (1986(1): 26). New Liberalism: However, new liberals favoured a more robust threshold of equalizing opportunity rights. Although they concurred with Bosanquet that possessing property was a potent means of 'self-utterance' and therefore crucial to successfully externalizing and realizing ourselves, they also stipulated that private property was legitimate only in so far as it did not Gaus I 416 subvert equal opportunity. Hobson: In Hobson's words, 'A man is not really free for purposes of self-development who is not adequately provided' with equal and easy access to land, a home, capital and credit. Hobson concludes that although liberalism is not state socialism, it nevertheless implies considerably 'increased public ownership and control of industry' (1974(4): xii).ll New liberals, then, transformed English liberalism by making social welfare, and the state's role in promoting it, pivotal. They crafted welfare liberalism into a sophisticated theoretical alternative.** * Also see Ritchie (1895(5): 430). Ritchie's new liberalism eclectically blends utilitarianism, neo-Hegelianism and Darwinism. >Individualism/Ritchie. ** Idealists, like Jones and >Collingwood, similarly favoured vigorously expanding equal opportunities through government. 1. Green, T. H. (1986 [1895]) Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Essays, eds Paul Harris and John Morrow. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 194-212. 2. Hobhouse, L. T. (1949 [1922]) The Elements of Social Justice. London: Allen and Unwin. 3. Hobhouse, L. T. (1968 [1911]) Social Evolution and Political Thought. Port Washington: Kennikat. 4. Hobson, J. A. (1974 [1909]) The Crisis of Liberalism. Brighton: Barnes and Noble. 5. Ritchie, D. G. (1895) 'Free-will and responsibility'. International Journal of Ethics, 5: 409-31. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Sensus communis | Shaftesbury | Gadamer I 30 Sensus communis/Shaftesbury/Gadamer: Shaftesbury places the appreciation of the social significance of wit and humour under the title sensus communis and expressly refers to to the Roman classics and their humanistic interpreters(1). Certainly the term sensus communis has for us (...) also a stoic, natural-law sound. Nevertheless, the humanistic interpretation based on the Roman classics and on which Shaftesbury is based, cannot be denied its correctness. According to Shaftesbury, the humanists understood sensus communis to mean the sense of the common good, but also love of the community or society, natural affection, humanity, obligingness "cum quibus versatur, modeste, modiceque de se sentiens«. So it is not so much a natural law endowment given to all people, as a social virtue, a virtue of the heart more than the head, which Shaftesbury means. And if he understands wit and humour from there, he also follows old Roman concepts, which in humanitas included the fine way of life, the attitude of the man who understands and makes fun, because he is sure of a deeper solidarity with his counterpart. (Shaftesbury explicitly limits wit and humour to the social interaction between friends). If sensus communis seems almost like a social virtue here, in reality a moral, even a metaphysical basis is implied. It is the intellectual and social virtue of sympathy that Shaftesbury has in mind and on which, as we know, he has based not only morality but an entire aesthetic metaphysics. His successors, above all Hutcheson(2) and Hume, developed his ideas into the doctrine of moral sense, which was later to serve as a background for Kantian ethics. >D. Hume, >Ethics/Kant. 1. Shaftesbury, Characteristics, Treatise Il, insbesondere Part. Ill, Sect. I. 2. Hutcheson verdeutlicht sensus communis geradezu durch sympathy. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Sensus communis | Thomas Aquinas | Gadamer I 27 Sensus communis/Thomas/Gadamer: In scholasticism, for example for Thomas, the sensus communis, a further development of "De anima"(1), is the common root of the external senses, or rather the ability to combine them, which is determined by the Gadamer I 28 skill given to all people(2). VicoVsThomas: For Vico, on the other hand, the sensus communis is a sense of rights and common good that lives in all people, and even more so a sense acquired through the commonality of life, determined by its orders and purposes. >Sensus communis/Vico. 1. Aristoteles, De anima, 425 a 14ff. 2. Thomas Aq. S. Th. 1. q. 1, 3 q. 78, 4 ad 1. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Social Goods | Demsetz | Henderson I 39 Social goods/Demsetz/Henderson/Globerman: Demsetz (…) analyzed the tragedy of commons a full year and a half before the famous Science article, "The Tragedy of the Commons," by biologist Garrett Hardin(1). >Social goods/Garrett Hardin. Hardin: The Hardin article had introduced the concept of the tragedy of the commons. The core idea is that if a commons, that is, an area that no one owns, is unmanaged, people will overuse it. If, for example, no one owns land on which cattle graze, and no one manages the land, cattle owners will overgraze the land and reduce its value. The Hardin article is one of the most-cited Science articles ever. Demsetz: In his version of the idea published earlier in relation to the fur trade(2), Demsetz wrote: „Because of the lack of control over hunting by others, it is in no person's interest to invest in increasing or maintaining the stock of game. Overly intensive hunting takes place. Thus a successful hunt is viewed as imposing external costs on subsequent hunters - costs that are not taken into account fully in the determination of the extent of hunting and of animal husbandry.“ (p. 351) Later in his article, Demsetz wrote: „It will be best to begin by considering a particularly useful example that focuses our attention on the problem of land ownership. Suppose that land is communally owned. Every person has the right to hunt, till, or mine the land. >Collective goods, >Public goods. Henderson I 40 This form of ownership fails to concentrate the cost associated with any person's exercise of his communal right on that person. If a person seeks to maximize the value ofhis communal rights, he will tend to overhunt and overwork the land because some of the costs ofhis doing so are borne by others. The stock of game and the richness of the soil will be diminished too quickly. It is conceivable that those who own these rights, i.e., every member of the community, can agree to curtail the rate at which they work the lands if negotiating and policing costs are zero. Each can agree to abridge his rights. It is obvious that the costs of reaching such an agreement will not be zero. What is not obvious is just how large these costs may be. (1967(2): 354) Hardin/Demsetz/Henderson: Notice how this anticipates Hardin's later article in Science. Demsetz wrote, "The geographical or distributional evidence collected by Leacock(3) indicates an unmistakable correlation between early centers offur trade and the oldest and most complete development of the private hunting territory." (p. 352)(2). Tribes agreed to hunt in their own well-defined areas. Since furry animals aren't migratory, the agreed-upon territorial rights had value. Conversely, grazing animals in the Southwest wandered all over the land, so territorial rights there didn't have as much value. Costs: Put differently, in the Southwest, the costs of enclosing grazing animals in a specific geographical area were prohibitively high. Recall that this was many decades before the post-Civil War invention of barbed wire. The Iower costs of husbanding fur-bearing forest animals together with the higher commercial value of fur-bearing animals made it productive to establish private hunting lands. Externalities: „Hence both the value and cost of establishing private hunting lands in the Southwest are such that we would expect little development along these lines. The externality was just not worth taking into account.“(1) (p. 353) Property rights: What is particularly interesting in the hunting example is that the property rights arrangement in Quebec that Demsetz cited arose voluntarily in response to circumstances that made the arrangement effcient. Property rights did not come about by government fiat. In furthering their economic interests, people typically choose the property rights regime that best promotes their economic interests. Henderson I 41 Private goods/Demsetz: Among wandering primitive peoples, the cost of policing property is relatively Iow for highly portable objects. The owning family can protect such objects while carrying on its daily activities. If these objects are also very useful, property rights should appear frequently, so as to internalize the benefits and costs oftheir use. It is generally true among most primitive communities that weapons and household utensils, such as pottery, are regarded as private property. Both types of articles are portable and both require an investment of time to produce.(2) (p. 353). 1. Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162 (3859), December 13, 1968, pp. 682-83. www.garretthardinsociety.org/articles/art_tragedy_of_the_commons.html). 2. Demsetz, Harold (1967). Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 57, 2: 347-359. 3. Leacock, Eleanor Burke. (1954). The Montagnais „hunting territory“ and the fur trade. (tDAR id: 256329). National Archeological Database (NADB). Mause I 154f Social Goods/Demsetz: since common goods are scarce, they cannot simply be consumed free of charge, but their benefits must first be appropriated by using time and other scarce resources. (1) See Social Goods/Hardin. 1. Alchian, Armen A., and Harold Demsetz. 1973. The property rights paradigm. Journal of Economic History 33 (1), 1973, pp. 16– 27. |
EconDems I Harold Demsetz Toward a theory of property rights 1967 Henderson I David R. Henderson Steven Globerman The Essential UCLA School of Economics Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2019 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Social Goods | Hardin | Shirky I 51 Social goods/Commons/Garrett Hardin/Shirky: Hardin used the term "The Tragedy of the Commons"(1) for the problem that when it comes to the use of common goods such as fish stocks or pastureland, those who miss out and wait until it is their turn and therefore try to get a bigger share for themselves. This leads to overfishing of fish stocks, for example. One reason for antisocial behaviour is that sheep "do not drive themselves to the market". ((s) An added value must therefore be generated). Shirky I 53 In connection with the tragedy of the common land, there is the fact that no one pays taxes voluntarily. >Taxation. 1. Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162 (3859), December 13, 1968, pp. 682-83. - www.garretthardinsociety.org/articles/art_tragedy_of_the_commons.html). |
EconHardin I Garrett Hardin Living within Limits: Ecology, Economics, and Population Taboos Oxford 1995 Shirky I Clay Shirky Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations New York 2009 |
| Social Goods | Hirsch | Mause I 155 Social goods/common goods/Hirsch: The missing price mechanism is (...) being replaced by rationing according to the priority principle ("First come, first served"). The non-application of the exclusion principle makes a scarce resource a positional good (for this term Hirsch 1980(1)), which only provides benefit as long as one is the first (or one of the first) to use it; the (net) benefit, on the other hand, is zero if everyone has the good. >Benefit, >Utility, >Community, >Competition, >Moral hazard, >Free rider. 1. Fred Hirsch, Die sozialen Grenzen des Wachstums. Reinbek 1980. |
EconHirsch I Fred Hirsch Die sozialen Grenzen des Wachstums Reinbek 1980 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Social Goods | Olson | Brocker I 477 Social goods/collective goods/Olson: generally, goods are differentiated in the economic literature as follows: Private Goods/Musgrave: are characterised by exclusivity (not everyone has access) and rivalry (consumption reduces the amount of goods) Club goods: Excludability - Rivalry Common goods: non-excludability - Rivalry (e.g. fishing) Public goods: Non-excludability - Non-Rivalry. (1) On the other hand Olson: distinguishes between exclusive and including goods. Def Exclusive Collective Goods: are primarily found in market-oriented groups. They are characterised by rivalry. (2) Here the total benefit of the collective good does not increase with the number of users. Thus it corresponds to the common good. The benefit for the individual decreases with the number of users. Def including collective goods/Olson: are characterized by non-rivalry. The benefits for all increase with an increasing number of users (non-excludability). These goods are also called pure collective goods. ((s) Example Networks). Brocker I 487 VsOlson: some authors note that collective goods may have far more properties than those used by Olson and that these properties may also be relevant to the question of the realisation of these goods in groups (3). Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1970) (4), for example, analyse collective goods that are only made possible with a large number of collective users. In addition, there are goods that are not continuously variable, but require a minimum level of participation in order to be made available at all (Chong 1991)(5). 1. Musgrave, Richard A., »Public Finance and Finanzwissenschaft Traditions Compared«, in: FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analysis 53/2, 1996, 145-193. Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert (suhrkamp taschenbuch wissenschaft) (German Edition) (Kindle Locations 9884-9886). Suhrkamp Verlag. Kindle Edition. 2. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968)., S. 36f. 3. Carolin Stange, Die Übertragbarkeit lokaler Lösungsansätze auf Bereitstellungsprobleme Globaler Öffentlicher Güter, Dissertation, Bamberg 2017, Kap. 2. 4. Frohlich, Norman/Oppenheimer Joe A., »I Get By With a Little Help from My Friends«, in: World Politics 23/1, 1970, 104-120. 5. Chong, Dennis, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement, Chicago/London 1991. Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Social Goods | Ostrom | Brocker I 727 Social Goods/Ostrom: Ostrom thesis: Common goods (jointly used goods, social goods) can often be managed successfully and sustainably by their users themselves without the mandatory need for state supervision or individually shared private property. Brocker I 728 OstromVsTradition/OstromVsHardin: the conditions under which the actors in Garrett Hardin's contribution decide (see Social Goods/Hardin) are very restrictive and are by no means directly transferred to the reality of many common situations. OstromVsHardin/OstromVsOlson: (see Social Goods/Olson): The pessimistic findings of Hardin and Olson lead either to direct attention away from individual decisions and towards state solutions or to question the millennia-old institution of community property in principle or to ignore it in political decisions. (1) Solution/Ostrom: more attention must be paid to the problem-solving potential of local individuals. In traditional approaches, individuals are regarded as "prisoners" (2) Nor do they produce "relentless tragedies"(3) (OstromVsHardin). Brocker I 729 Questions: 1. How and by whom does it come to the provision of the common good management system, i.e. the organisational performance and the rules of the game? 2. how do users ("owners") and providers manage mutual credible commitments of participation and self-restraint? 3. How and by whom is the monitoring and sanctioning of compliance with such restrictions and rules of use? Brocker I 730 Ostrom thesis: Unlike in business theory or state theory, in a theory of the self-organisation of common goods we must assume that expenditure is the result of collective action and complex distributional tasks. See Collective Action/Ostrom, Self-Organization/Ostrom. Brocker I 737 Problems: Ostrom shows through examples of failed common management (coastal fishing cooperatives, forest management) that at least one of her 8 building principles of self-organization does not apply. (4) (See Self-Organization/Ostrom). Core elements of an analysis of collective actions are for Ostrom: institutional analysis, multi-level consideration and rational election actions. OstromVsTradition: the common problem can also be self-organized and solved sustainably. It does not necessarily require the division and entrepreneurial use of the common good through the individual allocation of private property rights or state paternalism or regulation. VsOstrom: she was criticised for her broad use of the term and for the fact that its methodological individualistic approach largely ignores the effect of structural elements such as social power relations. OstromVsVs: Ostrom showed that its research results could be made fruitful across disciplines, e.g. in resource economics, experimental economics and behavioral research. 1. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge 1990. Dt.: Elinor Ostrom, Die Verfassung der Allmende. Jenseits von Staat und Merkt, Tübingen 1999, p. 18 2. Ibid. p. 8 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. chap 5. Markus Hanisch, „Elinor Ostrom Die Verfassung der Allmende“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOstr I Elinor Ostrom Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action Cambridge 1990 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Social Goods | Rawls | I 92 Public goods/social goods/Rawls: primary social goods are rights and freedoms, opportunities and powers, income and prosperity. These goods are social because of their connection with the basic structure of a society; freedoms and powers are defined by the rules of the larger institutions; income distribution and prosperity are regulated by them. Rawls: The theory of common goods goes back to Aristotle and is shared by such diverse authors as Kant and Sidgwick. It is also controversial between utilitarianism and contract theory. >Contracts, >Contract theory, >Utilitarianism, >I. Kant, >H. Sidgwick. I 93 Goods/Rawls: a good is the fulfilment of a rational interest. We can assume that a rational individual has a plan that can fulfill different desires without mutual interference. Def rational plan/Rawls: be a plan that cannot be improved. I. e. there is no other plan that is preferred. >Planning. Def primary goods/Rawls: are those that all need, even if their plans differ. For example, intelligence, prosperity and opportunities are means of achieving goals that a person could not achieve by other means. In the initial state (of a society to be established), where people do not yet know what role they will play, these goods are what they know they are striving for. >Veil of ignorance. Problem: to create an index of available primary social and natural resources. Our principles, when processed in lexical order, help to do this. >Principles/Rawls. I 266 Public goods/Rawls: are above all indivisible and open to the public(1). If citizens want to benefit from this, it must be set up in such a way that everyone benefits to the same extent. National defense, for example. I 267 This means that public goods have to be steered by the political process and not by the market. Problems: special problems arise for public goods: 1. the free-rider problem(2): There is a temptation not to do one's own part of the duties, because this amount does not have a noticeable effect on the overall result. For the individual, the contribution of others always appears to have already been made. Therefore, the state must take over the regulation of the corresponding public goods(3). >Free riders. I 268 2. Characteristic of public goods: Externality. The production of these goods is also at the expense of those who never profit from them. Not all wishes are taken into account. For example, someone who gets vaccinated helps others as well as himself, even if he will never be exposed to this infection. >Externalities. For example, environmental damage is not normally regulated by the market. For example, raw materials may be produced at a much lower cost than their marginal social costs. Here there is a difference between private and social accounting that the market does not register. In this case, the indivisibility of public goods (e. g. infrastructure, freedoms, etc.) requires the state to take over the regulation. Problem: even in a society of fair people, the isolation of individual decisions does not lead to the fulfilment of the general interest. >Environmental damage. I 270 Economic form: the proportion of public goods in the economy as a whole is independent of the economic form - be it socialist or private - because the proportion of social resources spent on their production is independent of the question of the ownership of the means of production. >Socialism, >Capitalism. 1. See J. M. Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Chicago, 1968, ch. IX. 2. Buchanan, ch. V; Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA, 1965, ch. I, II. 3. See W.J. Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State, London, 1952, ch. I, VII-IX, XII. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Society | Arendt | Brocker I 366 Society/Activity/Labour/Arendt: Thesis: There is no alternative to a society in which work and production have the highest value. Action/Arendt, Labour/Arendt, World/Arendt. GrunenbergVsWellmer see Modernism/Wellmer. Arendt takes a different approach. She places the break in the Western tradition, as a result of which Brocker I 367 the common good has been placed under the dictates of labour and production, in the center. Antonia Grunenberg, „Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder Vom tätigen Leben“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Arendt I H. Arendt Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics. Civil Disobedience. On Violence. Thoughts on Politics and Revolution Boston 1972 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Sovereignty | International Political Theory | Gaus I 292 Sovereignty/International Political Theory/Brown: (...) the 'sovereignty' norms associated with the so-called Westphalia system, (...) endorse notions such as national self-determination and non-intervention and focus on the rights of states and/or political communities (...).Richard Tuck (1999)(1) has traced the way in which humanist, Roman and republican notions of politics contested with medieval, scholastic universalism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As Friedrich Kratochwil (1995)(2) has argued, the origin of the Westphalian notion of sovereignty is best understood in terms of the successful assertion by seventeenth-century rulers of the Roman notion of dominium with respect to their territories. Originally, sovereigns were - with one or two minor exceptions - actual individuals, but with the coming of nationalism in the nineteenth century, the system adapted to accommodate the idea of popular sovereignty, with the same rights and privileges assigned to the sovereign people as has been claimed by kings and princes. Self-determination/non-intervention: more, the doctrine of popular sovereignty became associated with the right to national self-determination, which, although initially subversive of multinational empires, ultimately strengthened the norm of non-intervention, by assigning a moral status to national autonomy. Thus were set in place the Westphalian norms that were challenged by the development of a human rights regime post-1945 (...). Westphalian order/Brown: why should states as opposed to individuals be assumed to be the normative focus of the system? Theorists of 'international society' offer two, conflicting rationales: a) that Westphalian norms allow for pluralism, the coexistence of competing conceptions of the good; and, b) conversely and from a solidarist viewpoint, that states are, in Hedley Bull's phrase, 'local agents of the common good' (1984(3): 14; Wheeler, 1992(4)). Ad a) The first of these ideas is best represented today by Terry Nardin's (1983)(5) Oakeshottian account of international society as a 'practical association', the international equivalent of Oakeshott's (1975)(6) 'civic association'. States are committed to the practices of conventional international law and diplomacy because they have no common projects; they simply desire to coexist under conditions of peace and (procedural) justice. Non-intervention: the norm of non- intervention protects the ability of states to be different, to develop their own sense of the good. This position is not, strictly speaking, anti-universalist, because it applies to all states, but it clearly stands in opposition to the substantive universalism of the international human rights regime. Partly for this reason Nardin (1989)(7) has recently somewhat distanced himself from his earlier work, but the latter still stands as the best defence of the conventional Westphalian norms currently available. >International political theory/Brown. Utilitarianism: the notion that states are local agents of the common good can be expressed in simple, utilitarian terms: a common good can be identified, but the world is simply too big and complex to allow for global government, and the interests of all are served by a plurality of governments. Vs: however, such a position does not require that states be sovereign, as opposed, for example, to being members of a global federation. Sovereignty/Hegel: a better defence of state sovereignty on these lines might be Hegelian: the rights of individuals are actually established by the state and therefore the sovereignty of the latter is not in conflict with the rights of the former. Mervyn Frost (1996)(8) provides a modern version of this argument. >Sovereignty/Walzer, >International law/International political theory. 1. Tuck, R. (1999) The Rights ofWar and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Kratochwil, F. (1995) 'Sovereignty as dominion: is there a right of humanitarian intervention?' In G. Lyons and M. Mastanduno, eds, Beyond Westphalia? Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 21-42. 3. Bull, H. (1984) Justice in International Relations: The Hagey Lectures. Waterloo, ON: University of Waterloo. 4. Wheeler, N. J. (1992) 'Pluralist and solidarist conceptions of international society: Bull and Vincent on humanltarian intervention'. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 21: 463-87. 5. Nardin, T. (1983) Law, Morality and the Relations of States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 6. Oakeshott, M. (1975) On Human Conduct. Oxford: Clarendon. 7. Nardin, T. (1989) 'The problem of relativism in international ethics'. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 18: 140-61. 8. Frost, M. (1996) Ethics in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| State (Polity) | Hegel | Mause I 47 State/society/Hegel: Hegel reconstructs the relationship between the social order of the market and the political order of the constitutional-monarchical state within the framework of a theory of modern "morality" (1), which he describes on the basis of the three institutionalized spheres of socialization and action of "family", "bourgeois society" and "state"(2). I 48 Bourgeois society/Hegel: Hegel describes this as the "state of need and understanding"(3), which he distinguishes from the "state" as the "reality of the moral idea"(4), that is, from the "state" of the third section of morality.(5) HegelVsRousseau: Hegel reconstructs the monarchical-constitutional state as a supraindividual moral communication and meaning context and thus reconstructs the Republican primacy of politics over the economy. MarxVsHegel, State/Marx. Brocker I 794 State/Hegel/HonnethVsHegel/Honneth: instead of understanding the moral sphere of the state as an intersubjective relationship of reciprocal acts of recognition, Hegel treats the state in his later writings as if it were always an existing entity before all interaction. >Intersubjectivity/Hegel. Consequently, it is only the vertically conceived relationships that the individuals maintain "to the higher authority of the state" as "the embodiment of the mental", "which in its approach suddenly assume the role that certain, highly demanding forms of mutual recognition should have played in a concept of moral recognition theory".(6) Solution/HonnethVsHegel: this results in the task of replacing Hegel's speculative categories with concepts of empirical science and thus making them Brocker I 795 "empirically controllable". (7) 1. G. W. F. Hegel Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Werke 7, Hrsg. Eva Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt a. M. 1989, p. 292. 2. Ibid. p. 307. 3. Ibid. p. 340 4. Ibid. p. 389 5. Cf. K. Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, Hamburg 1986, S 261-264. 6. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p. 98 7. Ibid. p. 150 Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I 331 State/Hegel/Höffe: Hegel develops his system of political thought, the philosophy of law and state, against the background of his now expanded philosophical system(1). HegelVsKant: Against the - allegedly threatening in Kant - the danger of a purely through thought Höffe I 332 conceived construction of normative claims, the subject area of the philosophy of law and state is considerably expanded. Instead of being content with a normative theory, an a priori theory of law and justice, Hegel also focuses on motivational, social, and above all institutional factors (...). Philosophical Philosophy of Law/Hegel: "(...) the idea of the law, (...) the concept of the law and its realization becomes the object"(2). State: (...) [is the] "moral universe," [which] is to be understood as something reasonable. Freedom: The guiding principle in legal and state theory is free will. From it Hegel wants to show how, under the condition of modernity, an epoch of alienation, he gradually attains his full, alienation-absorbing reality. >Freedom/Hegel, >Morals/Hegel, >Customs/Morality/Hegel. Höffe I 336 The culmination of morality, its synthesis, at the same time the summit of Hegel's entire philosophy of law, is the state as a "mediated by itself", which is now far more than just a state of necessity and understanding. As a community in the literal sense it is the public institution responsible for the common good, the "reality of the moral idea". Because in it freedom attains its perfect form, it is not "something arbitrary" but "supreme duty," i.e. again a categorical imperative, for man to be a member of a State. [This is a] modern, namely no longer eudaimony-based, but freedom-based way (...). Only in the living together of free and equal people can [the human] complete both his/her rational nature and his/her nature based on right and justice. >Society/Hegel. Höffe I 337 From abstract law to morality, the "idea of free will in and for itself" finally develops into the unity and truth of both moments. In it, in morality, Hegel in turn advances from the natural spirit, the "family," through the stage of separation, the "bourgeois society," to objective freedom, the "State. Within the section "the State," however, there is surprisingly, instead of a further stage, now a regression. For the opposition to free will, the full legal relations and the moral whole, is achieved already at the first stage, the "internal constitutional law". On the second stage, however, the "external constitutional law," the moral whole is exposed to chance. And the last stage is determined ambivalently with respect to free will. 1. G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820 2. Ibid. § 1 |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| State (Polity) | Machiavelli | Höffe I 198 State/Machiavelli/Höffe: [Machiavelli is concerned with the] basic question of how political power can be acquired, maintained and increased to greatness in a hostile environment. The "prince"(1) deals with it in terms of an autocrat, the discussions(2) in view of a republic, for Machiavelli, of course, that of his home city Florence. He takes the early (noble) republic of Rome as his model, as Titus Livius (59 B.C.-17 A.D.) describes it in the first ten books, the first decade, of his history of Rome. Machiavelli recommends three means: the practice of religion, the preservation of civic virtue and the periodic renewal of the Republic by returning it to its origins. Purposes: [Machiavelli] commits (...) the community to three purposes: to freedom (libertå) of the citizens, to greatness (grandezza) and to the common good (bene commune). >Common Good, >Freedom, >Rule/Machiavelli, >Power/Machivelli. Republic/Prince's rule/Machiavelli/Höffe: [Machiavelli worked on both writings at the same time. A preference for one of the two forms of state can therefore not be discerned]. >Republic. Höffe I 199 Höffe: Thesis: In order to keep open the return to political office under both boundary conditions, a princely and a republican rule, Machiavelli sets a political monument to both constitutions. In his innermost being, however, the humanistically educated Machiavelli probably preferred the Republic. Republic: [Machiavelli] sees in the disagreement between the Roman people and the senate a contribution to the freedom and power of the republic(3). It considers it necessary to be able to bring charges against citizens who endanger freedom(4). Religion: He emphasizes the weight of religion, which, however, unlike Augustine who is not mentioned anywhere, was lost through the fault of the Roman Church, with the result that the country fell apart(5). Wars: Both princes and republicans who do not have their own war powers are to be blamed. Criminal law: Well-ordered republics set rewards and punishments, but never allow a citizen to go unpunished for a crime just because he has earned great merit(6). >Punishment. Democracy: Even weak republics make their decisions more out of necessity than out of their own choice(7). Furthermore, the masses are considered wiser and more consistent than a prince(8). 1. Machiavelli, Il Principe 2. Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio 3. Discorsi, I, Chap. 4 4. Ibid. I , Chap. 3 5. Ibid. I , Chap. 12 6. Ibid. I , Chap. 24 7. Ibid. I , Chap. 38 8. Ibid. I , Chap. 58 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| State (Polity) | More | Höffe I 204 State/More/Höffe: Money/Private Property/More: Because the "utopians" understand justice as strict equality, they have no private property and do not need money. That is precisely why, More expects, they live in harmony, care seriously for the common good and there are neither poor nor beggars. In Utopia, people are engaged in agriculture and crafts. >Money, >Property. Science/Education/More: Education is offered to every inhabitant in public lectures. And without having any knowledge of ancient science, one has arrived at about the same insights in music, dialectics and mathematics. >Science, >Education, >Education policy. Universalism: In it, a universalistic understanding of science that anticipates the Enlightenment is revealed: (...) Scientific contents are the same across cultures and epochs. >Universalism. Religion: In religion, too, people rely on general human reason and cultivate (...) religious tolerance. >Religion, >Toleration, >Culture, >Cultural transmission. Laws: Although the families have a patriarchal structure, the authorities are elected strictly democratically. Moreover, More puts his own profession, jurisprudence, within narrow bounds, for there are few laws in Utopia, and they are easy to interpret. >Family, >Utopias, cf. >Utopianism. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| State (Polity) | Republicanism | Gaus I 170 State/republicanism/Dagger: A prudent republic will (...) be a small one. That, at least, has been the conclusion - or presumption - of many republicans throughout the centuries. Montesquieu: 'In a large republic,' Montesquieu explained in The Spirit of the Laws, 'the common good is sacrificed to a thousand considerations; it is subordinated to exceptions; it depends upon accidents. In a small one, the public good is better felt, better known, lies nearer to each citizen; abuses are less extensive and consequently less protected' (1989(1): 124 [Book VII], ch. 161). United states/Dagger: So widespread was this view in the late eighteenth century that the American authors of the Federalist found it necessary to point out that Montesquieu had also allowed for the possibility of a 'federal' or 'CONFEDERATE' (Federalist 9) republic. Even then, the debate over the proposed Constitution often turned on the question of whether the United States would become a 'federal' or a 'compound' republic - that is, a republic comprising 13 or more smaller republics - or whether it would become a 'consolidated' republic that could not long preserve its republican character. Vs: Some scholars have taken disagreements about the proper size of a republic to mark one way in which modern republicans have diverged from the path of classical republicanism. According to this view (Pangle, 1988(3); Rahe, 1992(4); Zuckert, 1994(5)), the truly classical republicans of ancient Greece saw civic virtue as desirable because it protected and preserved the polis in which the highest virtues could be cultivated (....). VsVs: By contrast, modern republicans, who stem from Machiavelli, are willing to accept representative government and large polities because of their conception of virtue, which allows for commerce and acquisitiveness, and their concern for natural rights. >Republic/Political Philosophy. 1. Montesquieu, C. (1989 Il 7481) The Spirit of the Laws, eds and trans. A. Cohler, B. Miller and H. Stone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Federalist 9 3. Pangle, Thomas (1988) The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 4. Rahe, Paul (1992) Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 5. Zuckert, Michael (1994) Natural Rights and the New Republicanism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Taxation | Mbembe | Brocker I 920 Fiscal policy/taxation/statehood/citizen/Mbembe/Herb: In African states, according to Mbembe, the fiscal relationship between the individual and the state is initially a purely violent one; it is not mediated by a public discourse on the common good. In contrast, the political significance of the tax at the beginning of modernity, for example in France, was to create a loyal relationship between the state and the citizen and to provide the state as guardian of order with military force (Mbembe 2016(1),165): "Monopoly of force and monopoly of taxation thus justified and reinforced each other"(166). In the African case, however, this relationship is realised in a different way for Mbembe: It leads to a "new organizational form of power" (167) and a "new political economy", which, however, do not strengthen the connection between state and civil society, authority and loyalty, but rather lead to the "invention of new systems of coercion and strategies of exploitation" (168). >Postcolonialism/Mbembe, >Society/Mbembe. 1. Achille Mbembe, De la postcolonie. Essai sur l’imagination politique dans l’Afrique contemporaine, Paris 2000. Dt.: Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie. Zur politischen Vorstellungskraft im Afrika der Gegenwart, Wien/Berlin 2016 Karlfriedrich Herb, „Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie (2000)“. In: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Optimal tax rate. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Terminology | Bostrom | I 259 CEV/terminology/Bostrom: Ethics/morality/superintelligence/Yudkowsky: Yudkowsky has proposed that a seed AI be given the final goal of carrying out humanity’s “coherent extrapolated volition” (CEV), which he defines as follows: CEV/Yudkowsky: Our Coherent Extrapolated Volition is our wish if we knew more, thought faster, were more the people we wished we were, had grown up farther together; where the extrapolation converges rather than diverges, where our wishes cohere rather than interfere; extrapolated as we wish that extrapolated, interpreted as we wish that interpreted. I 266 Moral rightness/MR/Bostrom: (…) build an AI with the goal of doing what is morally right, relying on the AI’s superior cognitive capacities to figure out just which actions fit that description. I 268 MP: Among the actions that are morally permissible for the AI, take one that humanity’s CEV would prefer. However, if some part of this instruction has no well-specified meaning, or if we are radically confused about its meaning, or if moral realism is false, or if we acted morally impermissibly in creating an AI with this goal, then undergo a controlled shutdown. I 312 Def Common good principle/Bostrom: Superintelligence should be developed only for the benefit of all of humanity and in the service of widely shared ethical ideals. |
Bostrom I Nick Bostrom Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017 |
| Utilitarianism | Mill | Höffe I 348 Utilitarianism/Mill/Höffe: Def Utilitarianism/Mill(1): (...) the view that the basis of morality is the greatest happiness, whereby happiness is to be understood in the concept of pleasure and the freedom from lust or suffering. Because "pleasure" means hédoné in Greek, it is a hedonism. >Hedonism. MillVsBentham: In comparison to Mill's model, Bentham, it is striking that the second part of his utilitarian principle "the greatest number", for which the "greatest happiness" is to be sought, is missing here. >Utilitarianism/Bentham, >J. Bentham. Freedom/MillVsBentham: For Mill as a passionate advocate of individual freedom, this deficit is hardly a coincidence. >Freedom. Later in the text the formula "happiness of all concerned" does appear, but without Bentham's double maximization: "greatest" happiness of the "greatest" number. Because of this deficit, Mill does not deal with Bentham's suggestion and his considerable difficulties in calculating the sought-after collective well-being with a simple procedure, a "hedonic calculus". MillVsBentham: 1) The first and most significant change, qualitative hedonism, counters the accusation made against Bentham that utilitarianism is an ethics for pleasure-seekers. The British writer and historian Thomas Carlyle had sharpened it to the objection that utilitarianism is a philosophy for pigs (pig philosophy). Bentham: According to Bentham's provocative aphorism that, with the same quality of pleasure, an undemanding child's play is as good as poetry, the qualitative differences between the various occasions and types of pleasure expressly do not count. Höffe I 349 Mill: Against this vulgarized hedonism, Mill argues with the pointed counter-thesis that it is better to be a discontented Socrates than a satisfied pig. He emphasizes the different rank of the pleasures one can enjoy and at the same time the priority of scientific, artistic and humanitarian activities. 2) (...) in trying to prove the utilitarian principle, Mill rightly rejects the possibility of direct proof. For true principles are, per se, first sentences that exactly therefore cannot be proved. >Theory/Mill. Solution/Mill: a) The core is the expression "desirable", which has two meanings. In an empirical-psychological sense it describes what people actually consider desirable and desirable, in a normative-ethical sense what they are supposed to assess. Naturalistic Misconclusions/HöffeVsMill: If one interprets Mill's so-called proof as a logical deduction of the ethical meaning of desirable from the empirical meaning, there is obviously a "being-should" misconception. VsVs: But since Mill in his Höffe I 350 system of logic, whose last chapter, clearly distinguishes between being and shall, the so called proof can be interpreted benevolently as well: An ethics open to experience understands what is desirable in the sense of those enlightened people who know the different pleasures and prefer those which are higher-ranking in human terms. ((s)Cf. >Preferential Utilitarianism). 3) Is justice compatible with utilitarianism? Mill here acknowledges the existence of a natural sense of justice, but does not consider this to be an original, but a derived sense. To defend this thesis, he distinguishes between different views of justice, such as the imperative to respect a person's legally guaranteed rights, to give everyone what he or she deserves, and the ideas of impartiality and equality. He then recognizes the traditional distinction between perfect (justice) and imperfect (charity) duties. Finally, he claims that having a right means having something that society should protect for no other reason than general utility. Common Goods/Mill/Höffe: In this argument lies either the thesis that there can be no conflict between the collective good, general utility, and the rights of an individual, or the assertion that in the case of conflict the collective good takes precedence over subjective rights such as basic and human rights. HöffeVsMill: Even if it serves the collective good, the right of an innocent person not to be punished, or the right of a suspect not to be tortured, must under no circumstances be violated. >Common Good. 1. J.St. Mill, Utilitarianism 1861 |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Mill Ja I James Mill Commerce Defended: An Answer to the Arguments by which Mr. Spence, Mr. Cobbett, and Others, Have Attempted to Prove that Commerce is Not a Source of National Wealth 1808 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Utopia | More | Höffe I 203 Utopia/More/Höffe: More [begins] with a criticism of England's social Höffe I 204 and political grievances. The first book deals with the many wars, the mercilessly harsh criminal law, the growing tax burden, the impoverishment of the (small) middle class and peasantry some of which is due to an increase in criminality. >War. State/More: (...) [Mores'] draft of an exemplary, not only well-ordered, but also prosperous community borrowed some ideas from Aristotle, Epicurus and especially Plato. But as a whole the draft is new. For example, More applies to the entire citizenry a regulation that Plato proposed only for the political leadership elite: Money/Private Property/More: Because the "utopians" understand justice as strict equality, they have no private property and need no money. For this very reason, More expects, they live in harmony, they care seriously for the common good and there are neither poor nor beggars. >Money, >Property, >Justice. Education/Training: Utopia is a place of agriculture and craftsmanship. Every inhabitant is offered education in public lectures. And without having any knowledge of ancient science, one has arrived at about the same insights in music, dialectics and mathematics. >Science, >Education, >Education policy. Science/Knowledge/Universalism: This reveals a universalistic understanding of science that anticipates the Enlightenment: (...) Scientific contents are the same across cultures and epochs. >Universalism. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
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| Mill, J. St. | Mackie Vs Mill, J. St. | Stegmüller IV 209 VsUtilitarianism/Mill: (even U.) concedes that utilitarian theories often fail due to the vagueness and diversity of conceptions of justice. Mill: still, the utility principle has the same sanctions available as all other moral norms. MackieVsMIll: that is empirically false: violationy of the common good upset us far more than violations of special rules of justice. Rule-Utilitarianism: more indirect than U.: two stages: (Austin): IV 210 1. The benchmark of our rules should be usefulness 2. The benchmark of our actions should be the rules. Puts the rules far more to the fore and draws on utility only to justify the rules. These rules do not need to be explicit. VsRule-Utilitarianism: all problems of utilitarianism return on a higher level of abstraction. IV 211 Utilitarianism/Mill: transition from individualistic to universalistic hedonism. If happiness is a good for each individual, then general happiness is a good for the totality of all people. Utilitarianism/MackieVsMill: the alleged proof sneaks in ineligible premises. The entirety of human kind is falsely treated as a psychological subject. Humanity never has a choice. (IV 225) IV 212 Fallacy: from "everyone" to "all". In addition, in the transition from the individual to society, instead of subjectivism an objectivism of values (Wertobjektivismus) is introduced. IV 263 Morality/ethics/Mill: Thesis: believed in a gradual change of human nature toward "universal human kindness". J. F. StephenVsMill: that's "transcendental Utilitarianism": a person animated by "impartial charity" might behave in a Stalinist way. Anything can be used to justify violence. Mackie dito. IV 264 Morality/ethics/Mackie: must refer to anthropological conditions: different ideals require general (common) principles. IV 265 The rejection of objective values includes rejection of objective rights. Consequence: special rights cannot be deduced a priori from general reasons. IV 269 MackieVsMill: his utilitarian concept of justification is shaky: the "principle of non-intervention" would be better justified differently: IV 270 via the conception of the good for human kind. Good/MackieVsMill: 1. not everyone is able to always correctly assess their own good. 2. Mill's principle is too weak. Ex. freedom of thought, freedom of speech. Both cannot be justified by Mills principle alone! Mackie: instead, we need a "principle of legitimate intervention." |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Utilitarianism | Nagel Vs Utilitarianism | III 109 Ethics/Nagel: dispute between consequentialist conceptions (among others, utilitarianism: thesis: the consequences an action ultimately has in the world are important, not what it is like for the actor) and on the other hand the question of: "what to do". VsUtilitarianism/Nagel: criticism of the external standpoint (what is best for the state of the world) wants to give the individual a certain margin, to lead their own life (Nagel's internal position from which alone we can lead our lives). Common good as only justification for action does not leave any own desires unaccounted for. III 110 ((s) consequentialism/(s): ethical position which takes into account only the consequences (for the "world state", not for the actor)). NagelVs: it is about the permission to lead our own lives! III 110 /! 11 NagelVsUtilitarianism/Objectivity: we are not only dealing with a conflict between inter-personal and individual values, but: Someone who does not accept the consequentialist commandments, because they claim dominance over his own internal standpoint, will naturally transfer this objection to others as well. So this takes you more to an alternative ethics than to the rejection of ethics in general! |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Utilitarianism | Newen Vs Utilitarianism | New I 144 Def Classic Utilitarianism/Newen: Thesis: it is about the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Logical form: the main institutions of society should be such that they produce the greatest amount of happiness for all the members. Two conditions: 1) Substitution Principle: the satisfaction of the interests of one individual can be replaced by those of another individual. 2) Principle of Equivalence: dispenses with the difference between action and omission. I 145 Utilitarianism is a rational theory. Benefit/Calculation/Newen: Suppose the benefit for each person could be quantified. Then a benefit value: Ni can be specified for each individual i = 1,2, ... n ( "luck factor"). General Benefit/Common Good: W: sum of the benefit of all individuals: W = N1 + N2 + ... + Nn. VsUtilitarianism: it is not possible to specify what constitutes the happiness of a person. UtilitarianismVsVs: Modification: preference utilitarianism. Def Preference Utilitarianism/Newen: the "happiness" of the individual is no longer assessed, but their preferences are taken into account. I 146 VsUtilitarianism/VsPreference Utilitarianism/Newen: both ignore the intuition that a society in which all are doing approximately equally well is more just than one in which some are doing much worse. E.g. a society is be considered as fairer if a person is put 5 points up while at the same time two people are put 2 points down. E.g. W1 (29) = N1 (7) + N2 (7) + N3 (15) mean benefit 29: 3 = 9.66 W2 (30) = N1 (5) + N2 (5) + N3 (20) mean benefit 30: 3 = 10 W3 (31) = N1 (4) + N2 (4) + N3 (19) + N4(4) mean benefit 31: 3 = 7.75 population growth Utilitarianism: for him, the overall benefit would be increased, i.e. W2 more just than W1. Vs: intuitively, this world is not more just for us, because more people are worse off. (Rawls ditto). UtilitarismVsVs: further modification: instead of overall benefit: mean benefit. I 147 RawlsVsUtilitarianism: makes an unrestricted population growth desirable, because this would achieve an increase of overall benefit without anyone having to be better off. Even new people at the lowest level increase the overall benefit (see above, W4). Mean Benefit/VsMean Benefit/Newen: does not help to explain why W1 is more just than W2, because the mean benefit is increased in W2. Problem: also the mean benefit is ultimately independent of the individual distribution of benefit to the people. I 148 VsUtilitarianism/Newen: E.g. according to utilitarianism, it would be necessary for a healthy person to donate their heart and liver in order to save the lives of two patients and thus to shift the benefit from one person to two. UtilitarianismVsVs: Solution: rule utilitarianism (see below) Def Action Utilitarianism/Newen: every single action must be assessed according to its consequences. Def Rule Utilitarianism/Newen: this is about types of actions, the rule utilitarianism may judge a rule morally superior, because it usually has positive consequences, although there are exceptions. I 149 RawlsVsUtilitarianism/Utilitarianism/Newen: utilitarianism binds morality to a moral-independent criterion. Happiness/Rawls: it is completely open what someone defines as happiness. I.e. it is also counted if it makes somebody happy e.g. to discriminate against others. Rawls: but discrimination is wrong in itself. It violates a principle, to which we ourselves would agree in its original state. (Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, ThdG, p. 49). |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
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