Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Categories | Lewis | IV 250 Category/Linguistics/spelling/terminology/Lewis: an S/N (see General Semantics) is something that forms a sentence together with a name. That means it is an intransitive verb. E.g. transitive verb: (S/N)/N takes a name to form an intransitive verb. E.g. (S/S)/S two-digit connection or operator: takes a sentence in order to form something that can be combined with a sentence in turn to form a sentence. Intension: an X/Y has no extension. Its intension is a function of appropriate intentions for elements of Category Y on appropriate intensions for elements of the category X. >Intension/Lewis, >Extension/Lewis, >Operator. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Grammar | Brandom | I 570ff Functional grammar/Lewis: General Semantics - 1. value: place for substitutions - 2. argument: substitutable expression - 3.function: frame (derivative) - Brandom: orthogonal to the division into functional and categorical basal and derived categories. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Knowledge | Benacerraf | Stalnaker I 41 Knowledge/Causal Theory/Mathematics/Benacerraf/Stalnaker: for mathematics we should expect a semantics that is a continuation of the general semantics. >Semantics, >Causal theory of knowledge. Existence statements about numbers, functions, and sets should be interpreted with the same truth-conditional semantics as sentences about tables, quarks, etc. >Existence statements, >Truth Conditions, >Numbers, >Sets, >Functions, >Mathematical Entities. Stalnaker I 42 Platonism/Mathematics/Benacerraf: Platonism gives a natural semantics, but it does not allow plausible epistemology. >Platonism, >Theory of knowledge. Reference/Benacerraf: thesis: real reference needs a causal connection. >Reference, >Causality, >Causal relation. |
Bena I P. Benacerraf Philosophy of Mathematics 2ed: Selected Readings Cambridge 1984 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Perception | Danto | I 117 Verificationism: All perception must be translatable into perception sentences. If Apple is a meaningful concept, it is in red, round, sour, etc. translatable. Cf. >General Semantics. There are several spectral mixtures that cause the same color impression! (Fig: I 122 different curves for "Lemon Yellow".) >Color, >Color words, >Sensory impressions, >Experience. I 122 For this reason, the quality of the perception remains indefinable. >Qualities, >Qualia, >Phenomena, >Definitions, >Definability. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Semantics | Black | II 166 "General Semantics"/nominalism/Alfred Korzybski/Black: educational movement U.S. after World War 1 - VsLogic. E.g., distortions call on diseases - "cow" should be replaced by "Bessie". VsGeneral terms; VsAbstraction. >General terms, >Generalization, >Generality, >Abstraction, >Abstractness. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Benacerraf, P. | Lewis Vs Benacerraf, P. | Field I 231 Example (2) if most mathematicians accept "p" as an axiom, then p. I 232 VsPlatonism: he has a problem if he cannot explain (2). This is a reformulation of the famous problem of Benacerraf in "Mathematical truth". (see above). (>Benacerraf here departs from a causal theory of truth). Field: our current approach does not depend on that, though. I 233 Knowledge/Mathematics/Field: our approach does not depend on the givenness of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. Instead: Reliability Theory/Knowledge/Field: the view that we should be skeptical if the reliability of our knowledge is not explainable in principle. Mathematics/LewisVsBenacerraf: (Lewis, 1986, p.111 12): Benacerraf's case is not a problem for mathematics because most mathematical facts necessarily apply. Reliability Theory/Lewis: then we also need an explanation of the reliable relationship, e.g., between facts about electrons and our "electron" belief states and we even have them! In this case, it is the causal approach, according to which the "electron" beliefs counterfactually (>counterfactual conditionals) depend on the existence and nature of electrons. Explanation/Lewis: now it's precisely the contingent existence and nature of electrons, which makes the question of their existence and nature meaningful. Lewis: nothing can counterfactually depend on non-contingent things. E.g. nothing can counterfactually depend on which mathematical entities there are. Nothing meaningful can be said about which of our opinions would be different if the number 17 did not exist. Stalnaker I 41 Mathematics/Benacerraf/Stalnaker: for mathematics we should expect a semantics that is a continuation of general semantics. We should interpret existence statements about numbers, functions and sets with the same truth-conditional semantics as propositions about tables, quarks, etc. I 42 Knowledge/Mathematics/Reality/Stalnaker: On the other hand, we should also expect that the access to our mathematical knowledge is continuous to the to everyday knowledge. The procedures by which we evaluate and justify mathematical statements should be explained by a general approach to knowledge, together with a representation of mathematical knowledge. Platonism/Mathematics/Benacerraf: Thesis: he gives natural semantics, but does not allow plausible epistemology. ((s) that does not explain how we come to knowledge). Combinatorial Approach/Combinatorial/Terminology/Benacerraf: Example conventionalism, example formalism: they show mathematical procedures, but do not tell us what the corresponding confirmed mathematical statements tell us. Benacerraf/Stalnaker: he himself does not offer any solution. Reference/Benacerraf: Thesis: true reference needs a causal link. Knowledge/Possible Worlds/Poss.W./Solution/LewisVsBenacerraf: pro Platonism but Vs causal link for reference. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Semantic Value | Verschiedene Vs Semantic Value | Schwarz I 198 Def Semantic Value/Lewis/Schwarz: in the next step semantic values are assigned: from these at the end the truth conditions (truth con.) of sentences (functions of possible situations on truth values) should emerge. Schw I 199 Category N: these expressions are assigned a function in intensional semantics from possible situations to things. The values for other categories then result again from their syntactic role: For example, since "laughs" is an expression of the category (S/N), its semantic value together with the value of an N expression must supply the value of an S expression. For example the semantic value of "laughs" is thus a function of N-values (functions of possible situations on individuals) on S-values (functions of possible situations on truth values). For example the adverb "loud" has as semantic value a function of (S/N)-values on (S/N)-values (So a function of functions of functions of situations on individuals on functions of functions of situations on truth values on functions of functions of situations on individuals on functions of situations on truth values). Meaning/Vs Semantic Value/VsLewis: Question: is the meaning of "Frieda" really a function of situations on individuals, and not simply Frieda herself? Lewis/Schwarz: Such concerns do not stop him: to say what meaning is, we must first ask what meaning does and then find what it does. (1970b(1),193). 1. David Lewis [1970b]: “General Semantics”. Synthese, 22: 18–67. In [Lewis 1983d] |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Supervaluation | Schwarz Vs Supervaluation | Schwarz I 204 Supervaluation/vagueness/Lewis/Schwarz: an utterance of a vague proposition is true iff nearly all his clarifications are true if the statement is true, then, almost regardless of the precise semantic values is considered accurate. (For the first time Lewis 1970b(1), 228f, 1993c(2), 172f, now known as the supervaluationistic theory of vagueness> Supervaluation (> van Fraassen). SchwarzVsSupervaluation: Consequence: vague phrases no longer follow the usual rules of logic. E.g. "it does not rain" is only then true if it clearly is not raining. In borderline cases, then both propositions are not true. Paradoxes/Supervaluation: this is precisely what avoids paradoxes. 1. David Lewis [1970b]: “General Semantics”. Synthese, 22: 18–67. In [Lewis 1983d] 2. David Lewis [1993c]: “Many, But Almost One”. In [Bacon et al. 1993]: 23–38, und in [Lewis 1999a] |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| General Semantics | |||
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