Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 44 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actions | Habermas | III 36 Action/Rationality/Habermas: Actors behave rationally as long as they use predicates in such a way that other members of their environment would recognize their own reactions to similar situations under these descriptions. III 126 Action/Habermas: a) Teleological action: the actor realizes a purpose or causes the occurrence of a desirable state by choosing and appropriately applying the means promising in the given situation. III 127 The central concept is the decision between action alternatives based on an interpretation of the situation. Strategic action: here, the expectation of decisions from at least one other purposefully acting actor is included. This model of action is often interpreted utilitarian. b) Norm-regulated action does not refer to the behaviour of a basically solitary actor who finds other actors in his environment, but to members of a social group who orientate their actions towards common values. This model is based on the role theory. III 128 c) Dramaturgical acting refers primarily to interaction participants who form an audience for each other, in front of which they present themselves. The actor evokes a certain image, an impression of himself/herself in his audience by revealing his subjectivity more or less purposefully. d) Communicative action: the concept refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who enter into an interpersonal relationship (by linguistic or non-linguistic means). The actors seek an understanding to coordinate their plans and thus their actions. >Rationality, >Understanding, >Understandability, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. III 144 Def Action/Habermas: Actions are only what I call such symbolic expressions with which the actor, as in teleological, norm-regulated and dramaturgical action, makes a reference to at least one world (the physical, the consciousness or the mentally divided world) but always also to the objective world. From these I distinguish between body movements and secondary operations. III 150 The model of communicative action does not equate action with communication. >Behavior, >Language Behavior. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Consciousness | McDowell | I 113 ff Confidence/Kant: "I think" that must be able to accompany all my ideas. Temporal continuity. But only formally, otherwise Cartesian. >I think/Kant, >cogito, >Cartesianism, >Dualism, cf. >Skepticism. I 113 ff Definition Person/Locke: "a thinking intelligent being in possession of reason and consideration, and able to consider itself as itself. Even in different places and times. >Person. I 126/27 Consciousness/Apperception/Criterion/KantVsLocke: his point (chapter on paralogism): the self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity. The subject does not need to make an effort to focus its attention on one and the same thing. >Experience/McDowell, >Awareness/Chalmers. I 127 Consciousness/McDowell: to avoid Cartesianism we should not speak of the "flow of consciousness" (stream of consciousness), but of a lasting perspective on something that is itself outside of consciousness. I 128 "I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms). >Given, >Reality, >Stream of consciousness/Husserl. I 129f McDowellVsKant: it is unsatisfactory if consciousness is to be only the continuity of one aspect, one perspective without a body. The notion of continuity cannot be conceived without the notion of the living thing - as little as digestion. But that is not to say that physical presence is always connected with a self-consciousness. Consciousness/Kant: only creatures with conceptual skills have self-consciousness. McDowell pro. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Consciousness | McGinn | I 49 Consciousness/mind-body problem/McGinn: there seem to be no properties of physical organisms from which consciousness could arise under certain circumstances. Now, it is also difficult to specify exactly which property of consciousness ensures that it refuses a physical explanation. I 52 Consciousness/McGinn: Problem: what is the real hallmark of a state of consciousness? Where is the problem located? "What is it like to be a K?" I 56 Consciousness/McGinn: Problem: how is it possible that states whose condition is associated with "being-like" emerge from states where there is no "being-like"? Cf. >"What is it like to be a bat?", >Knowing how, >Experience. I 68 Consciousness/McGinnVsSearle: states of consciousness do not allow emergence-theoretical explanations with mereological terms. We are unable to reduce pain to the underlying neural units. On the contrary to that it is quite possible to explain the higher-level properties of liquids in this way. (s) because all levels are easily accessible to us. States of consciousness can therefore not be explored according to Combinatorial Atomism with lawlike mappings. We can well understand higher-level brain functions from their constituents, but if we start with consciousness, this explanation fails. >Explanation. I 74 Mind/brain/meaning/reference/McGinn: so according to this view, there is no referent that would ever raise a philosophical problem of its own, because the objective world is not a problem from a philosophical point of view. Philosophical problems arise from the meanings in the light of which we understand the world. It is not the soul as a referent to which the mystery clings. >Philosophy. Consciousness/McGinn: is theoretically unfathomable, because we do not understand what kind of relationship would be capable of linking experience with the world in a way that is given by our imagination when we talk about knowledge. I 192 What does it really mean for my mind to put itself in the position of the world? Since we receive no response, there is the notion that our cognitive powers are directed entirely inwards. However, this retreat is a deception according to transcendental naturalism. >Terminology/McGinn. II 68 If the only thing on which we had relied was brain research, we would never even have got the idea that the brain houses a consciousness at all. I 86ff Knowledge/awareness/McGinn: even complete knowledge of ourselves would not let us look better in terms of consciousness. >Awareness/Chalmers. II 216 Consciousness is not a property that depends on its origin. >Artificial consciousness. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Cooperation | Piaget | Habermas III 33 Cooperation/Piaget: Piaget developed the combined model of social cooperation, according to which several subjects coordinate their interventions in the objective world through communicative action.(1). Habermas: only when one tries to separate cognitive-instrumental rationality from communicative rationality do contrasts emerge, e. g. in terms such as accountability and autonomy. III 34 If the demands are geared to success, it is sufficient to demand that alternatives can be chosen and that conditions can be monitored. However, if rationality is measured by the success of communication processes, the demands are higher: here only those who, as members of a communication community, can orientate their actions towards intersubjectively recognized claims of validity may be regarded as responsible. Cf. >Rationality/Habermas, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Intersubjectivity, >Interactionism. 1. J. Piaget, Die Entwicklung des Erkennens III, Stuttgart 1973, p. 190. Two types of interaction: a) interaction between agent and objects mediated by teleological action, b) through communicative action: Interaction between the subject and other subjects. |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Correspondence | Millikan | I 107 Correspondence/correspondence relation/Millikan: here we are dealing with the relationship between an indicative intentional icon and its real value. 1. Definition: real value is the normal condition for the exertion of the direct eigenfunction of the icon. 2. There are correspondences between transformations on both sides! 3. Each transformation on the page of the icon has a normal condition for the eigenfunction (proper performance) of the corresponding transformation of the real value. N.B.: this is about a comparison of the transformations of icon and real value, not a correspondence of the elements of icon and real value. ((s)> covariance). Transformation/Millikan: this is not about "parts" but about invariant and variable aspects ((s) of a whole). E.g. bee dance: variable: direction - invariant: existence of nectar. I 108 Transformation/sentence/Millikan: for sentences, the most frequent transformation is substitution or negation. E.g. "Theaitetos swims" Every transformation corresponds to a possible world situation (fact, world affair). Articulation: a fact, is determined by a group of possible transformations. I 307 Consensus/Millikan: first you have to know something about the objective world, not the world, as we perceive it (sensory world). Consensus/judgment: consensus in judgment is not to respond to the same stimulus with the same reaction. Rarely two people react to the same stimulus with the same choice of words. There is also no agreement on how to divide the world into pieces. Instead, it is a sign that each speaker has contact with the world in its own way, and that it is the same, which is mapped in different ways. Cf. >Picture theory. I 329 Correspondence/Putnam: it is incoherent to assume that truth is a correspondence with the WORLD. Image/Representation/Putnam: mathematical images are omnipresent, representations are not omnipresent. Problem: a correspondence theory based on the fact that there is a mapping relation between a complete set of true representations and the world is empty. I 330 Solution: there must first be a distinction between images and representations. >Representation. Solution: there must be an additional condition for reference, namely, that an intended interpretation is marked. >Reference, >Interpretation. Causal theory/Putnam: a causal theory would not help here. For it is just as uncertain whether "cause" clearly refers, as if "cat" clearly refers. Concept/Sign/Ockham/Putnam: Problem: a concept must not simply be a "mental particular", otherwise every sign merely refers to another sign again. PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: it is incomprehensible how a relation between a sign and its object could be picked out, either by holding up the sign itself, E.g. COW Or by holding up a different sign, e.g. REFERS Or maybe CAUSES. Meaning/Meaning rationalism/Putnam/Millikan: this is the meaning rationalism: in order to mean something, we must know what we mean and namely "know" with a very definite, meaning-rationalist shine on "know": The relation between the head and the world must be reflected wholly in the head, ((s)> See Leibniz, the "overarching general"). PutnamVs: that would only work if there was a mysterious "direct understanding of forms" ((s) platonistic). Then the relation would not have to be mirrored again. I 331 Correspondence/to mean/Meaning/References/MillikanVsPutnam/Millikan: Thesis: the relations between the head and the world are indeed between the head and the world. However, the understanding of these relations does not contribute to the justification of meaning and reference. They do not have to be intended so that one can refer. >Intentionality. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Cultural Tradition | Habermas | III 108 Tradition/Culture/Myth/Myths/Habermas: In mythical worldviews as the background for the interpretation of a lifeworld in a social group, the burden of interpretation is taken away from the individual family members as well as the chance to achieve a critical agreement. Here, the linguistic view of the world is reified as a world order and cannot be seen through as a critisable system of interpretation. >Worldviews, >Interpretation. In this way it becomes clear which formal characteristics cultural traditions must exhibit if rational orientations for action are to be possible in an appropriately interpreted environment: III 109 a) Cultural tradition must provide formal concepts for the objective, the social and the subjective world; it must allow for differentiated claims of validity (propositional truth, normative correctness, subjective truthfulness) and stimulate a corresponding differentiation of basic attitudes (objectifying, normative and expressive). >Validity claims, >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world. Then symbolic expressions can be presented at a formal level, where they are systematically linked to reasons and are accessible for an objective assessment. b) Cultural tradition must allow a reflexive relationship with itself. c) It must be able to feed back in its cognitive and evaluative components with specialised arguments to the extent that the corresponding learning processes can be socially institutionalised. d) Finally, it must interpret the world in such a way that success-oriented action is released from the imperatives of a communication to be renewed again and again and can be at least partially decoupled from communication-oriented action. >History, >Historiography, >Philosophy of History, >Culture. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Ethics | Nagel | III 109f Ethics/Nagel. Consequentialism: thesis: the consequences of action are important - not how the action feels for the actor. >Consequentialism, >Action. NagelVs: it about the permission to lead one’s own life. III 111 Internal perspective: Problem: that murder is prohibited does not command to prevent others from committing it. Utilitarianism: good/bad. Internal perspective: legal/illegal. >Subjectivity/Nagel, >Utilitarianism. III 112 Ethics/Nagel: core question: how far may the internal point of view be included? Life is always the individual life. - It cannot be lived sub specie aeternitatis. - The limits are always the individual possibilities. >Limits. III 87ff Ethics/Nagel: the acting from one’s own perspective has such a strong value that deontological paradoxes cannot be excluded. - They would only be avoidable at the cost of the impersonal world. >Deontology. III 86 Parallel objectivity/consciousness/ethics/Nagel: the objective world must contain the subjective perspectives. >Objectivity, >Objectivity/Nagel. Ethics: the neutral reasons that consider the actions of the subject with all its seemingly superstitious reasons. >Recognition, >Intersubjectivity. II 49 Determinism/ethics/Nagel: responsibility also exists in deterministic actions when the determination is intrinsic. - Actions that are determined by nothing are incomprehensible. >Determinism. II 54 Ethics/law/moral/God/theology/Nagel: an act is not converted into something wrong just because God exists. >Morals, >God, >Justification, >Theology. II 54 Categorical imperative/NagelVsKant: nothing but a direct interest in the other can be considered as a basis of ethics. >Categorical imperative. II 55 But: the reason not to do evil to someone else cannot be anchored in the individual person - II 61 Problem: Moral should not depend on the strength of interest in others. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| I, Ego, Self | Evans | Frank I 24 I/EvansVsDescartes: the I is the body! - The I-centered space becomes an objective world place only when the subject can transfer it to a public map and recognize it. - The convertibility of the speaker's perspective, which has been described demonstratively, requires an independent space. --- Frank I 485f I/Evans: 1. void of criteria, 2. limited access (not everyone, not at any time) - 3. the manner of givenness is dependent on the existence: I must be in the place to say "here", but change is possible ("new meaning, old meaning "). --- I 488 I-thoughts are de re. (They need information). --- I 503 I/GeachVsDescartes: instead of "I get into a terrible mess!" I can also say: "This is really a terrible confusion" - Strawson: "There is a pain" instead of "I have pain". EvansVsGeach/EvansVsStrawson: a part of the reference is to make its audience do something. --- I 504 I/Evans: our view of ourselves is not idealistic: we can understand the following without being able to justify or decide it: e.g. "I have been stilled" - "I will die". --- I 545 "Here"/"I"/Evans: "here" and "I" are equal, both are not possible without the other. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | Stalnaker | I 20/21 I/objective self/Nagel/Stalnaker: when someone says "I’m RS" it seems that the person represents a fact... I 21 ...and it is an objective fact, whether this is true or false - no matter what the speaker thinks. Problem: our concept of an objective world seems to leave no room for such a fact. A complete description of the world as it is in itself will not pick out any particular person as me - it does not tell me who I am! Cf. >Two omniscient Gods/Lewis, >self-identification. Semantic diagnosis: the semantic diagnosis attempts a representation of index words or self-localization. >Index words, >Indexicality, >He/He himself, cf. >Quasi-indicator, >Identity/Nagel. NagelVsSemantic Diagnosis: the semantic diagnosis does not yet get to the heart of the matter. StalnakerVsVs: simply >homophonic truth condition. Problem: what is the content? The content (information) in indexical expressions is not transported by the truth conditions. The speaker might not have known the date and place and yet have believed what he/she said - the listener might have believed that as well, and yet both have understood the expression. Thomas Nagel: this is VsOntological self-objectification in any way. >Objectivity/Nagel. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Imagination | Hume | I 19 Imagination/Hume: principle: each imagination originates from a corresponding impression. I 69 Imagination/representation/Hume: the idea does not represent, it is a rule, a scheme, a design rule. >Sensory impression, >Principles/Hume, >Representation, >Fiction. I 96 Imagination/Hume: if we apply the corrective rules, we get a contradiction between the principles of the imagination and those of reason. This is where the imagination opposes for the first time as a world principle to correction because the fiction has become a principle, it cannot be corrected by the reflection. the is delirious mind. >Reason/Hume. I 104 Imagination/Hume: imagination is not an ability or organizing principle. Instead: it is a totality, inventory. >Totality. --- Vaihinger 152 ff Ideas/Hume: one-sided negatively: imagination corresponds to fictions. >Ideas/Hume, >Fictions/Hume. Ideas/Kant: ideas have cognitive value, because only from these subjective ideas results the objective world for us. >Ideas Kant. --- McGinn II 58 Identity/Hume: absolutely logical: according to that (=imagination) we can have no good idea about the identity of material objects over time, nor about the self or causal necessity. >Mind/Hume. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Inner World | Habermas | III 131/132 Inner world/Action/Habermas: strategically acting subjects must be cognitively equipped in such a way that not only physical objects but also decision-making systems can occur in the world for them. They need to expand their conceptual apparatus for what may be the case, but they do not need richer ontological premises. With the complexity of the inner world entities, the concept of the objective world itself does not become more complex. >Objectivity, >World, >External world, >Complexity, >Reality. III 376 Inner World/Habermas: Thesis: for the purposes of our sociological investigations we should differentiate the outer world into an objective and a social world and introduce the inner world as a complementary concept to this outer world. The corresponding claims of validity (truth, correctness, truthfulness) can serve as a guideline for the choice of theoretical aspects for the classification of the speech acts. >Validity claims, >Truth, >Correctness, >Truthfulness, >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Interpretation | Habermas | III 150 Interpretation/action/situation/Habermas: None of the participants in an action situation has a monopoly on interpretation. Each communication participant assigns the various elements of the action situation to one of the three worlds (one objective, one social world and one subjective world as the entirety of the speaker's privilegedly accessible experiences). >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world. Interpretations do not have to lead to a stable and clearly differentiated classification in every case or even normally. III 154 Standards-regulated action: in its interpretation the actor challenges the interpreter to check not only the actual conformity with a standard or the actual validity of a standard, but also the correctness of that standard itself. >Norms, >Correctness. III 155 The interpreter can reject this challenge as pointless from a sceptical point of view. >Values, >Sense. III 158 Problem: for the understanding of communicative actions we have to distinguish between questions of meaning and validity. The interpretation performance of an observer differs from the coordination efforts of the participants. >Observation, >Exterior/Interior. The observer does not seek an interpretation able to take a consensus. But perhaps only the functions differed here, not the structures of interpretation. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Language | Quine | X 134 Language/Carnap/Quine: the language is presented as a deductive system Carnap - 1. Formation rules: Deliver the grammar and the lexicon so that they deliver the well formed formulas - 2. Transformation rules: these provide logical truths (including the mathematical, generally the analytical truths). >Logical Truth/Quine.# VI 17 Ontology/Language/Quine: as far as the assumption of a scientific theory can be called a linguistic matter, the assumption of an ontology can also be called a linguistic matter - but not more than this. >Ontology/Quine. VI 63 Language/Observation/Translation/Quine: most of our utterances are not correlated with stimuli at all, e.g. connectives etc. VI 64 The linguist can create an archive of uninterpreted sentences and dissect them. Recurring segments can be treated as words. (Analytical hypothesis). VI 65 Ultimately, we depend on very poor data material. We can expect successive statements to have something to do with each other. Later, the translator will be dependent on psychological hypotheses. What will the jungle inhabitants most likely believe to be true? What will they probably believe? VI 66 In this case, preference is given to recognizably rational translations. But to establish an alleged grammar and semantics of the natives would be nothing more than bad psychology. Instead one should assume that the psyche of the natives is largely like ours. VI 67 When the linguist discovers an error, he will wonder how far back it goes. VI 105 Language/QuineVsMentalism: The prerequisite of language is that people perceive that others perceive something. This, however, is the seduction to overstretch the mentalistic way of speaking. Mentalism. VII (b) 26 Definition/Quine: can serve two opposite purposes: 1. abbreviation and practical representation (short notation) 2. reverse: redundancy in grammar and vocabulary. Economical vocabulary leads to longer strings. Conversely, economical vocabulary simplifies the theoretical discourse about a language. Language/Quine: by habit these two types are fused together, one as part of the other: External language: is redundant in grammar and vocabulary and economical in terms of the length of strings. Partial language "primitive notation": is economical in grammar and vocabulary. VII (b) 27 Part and whole are connected by translation rules. We call these definitions. They are not assigned to one of the two languages, but connect them. But they are not arbitrary. They should show how primitive notations can serve all purposes. VII (d) 61 Language/Translation/Whorf/Cassirer/Quine: you cannot separate the language from the rest of the world. Differences in language will correspond to differences in life form. Therefore, it is not at all clear how to assume that words and syntax change from language to language while the content remains fixed. VII (d) 77 Introduction/Language/General Term/Quine: the use of general terms has probably arisen in the course of language development because similar stimuli cause similar reactions. Language would be impossible without general terms. In order to understand them, one must recognize the additional operator "class of" or "-ness" when introducing them. Failure to do so was probably the reason for accepting abstract entities. >General Terms/Quine. VII (d) 78 Science/Language/Quine: how much of our science is actually contributed by language, and how much is an original (real) reflection of reality? To answer this, we have to talk about both the world and the language! ((s) And that is already the answer!) Quine: and in order to talk about the world, we have to presuppose a certain conceptual scheme that belongs to our particular language. Conceptual Scheme/Quine: we were born into it, but we can change it bit by bit, like Neurath's ship. VII (d) 79 Language/Quine: its purpose is efficiency in communication and prediction. Elegance is even added as an end in itself. X 34/35 Truth/Language/Quine: Truth depends on language, because it is possible that sounds or characters in one language are equivalent to "2 < 5" and in another to "2 > 5". When meaning changes over many years within a language, we think that they are two different languages. Because of this relativity, it makes sense to attribute a truth value only to tokens of sentences. Truth/World/Quine: the desire for an extra-linguistic basis for truth arises only if one ignores the fact that the truth predicate has precisely the purpose of linking the mention of linguistic forms with the interest in the objective world. X 42 Immanent/Language/Quine: are immanent in language: educational rules, grammatical categories, the concept of the word, or technically: the morpheme. ad X 62 Object language/meta language/mention/use/(s): the object language is mentioned (spoken about), the meta language is used to speak about the object language. X 87 Language/Grammar/Quine: the same language - the same infinite set of sentences can be created with different educational rules from different lexicons. Therefore, the concept (definition) of logical truth is not transcendent, but (language) immanent. (logical truth: is always related to a certain language, because of grammatical structure). >Logical Truth/Quine. Dependence on language and its grammatization. XI 114 Theory/Language/Quine/Lauener: we do not have to have an interpreted language in order to formulate a theory afterwards. This is the rejection of the isolated content of theoretical sentences. Language/Syntax/Lauener: Language cannot be considered purely syntactically as the set of all correctly formed expressions, because an uninterpreted system is a mere formalism. ((s) Such a system is not truthful). XI 115 Language/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine/Lauener: a person's language and theory are different systems in any case, even if you would agree with Quine otherwise. XI 116 Quine: (ditto). Uncertainty of translation: because of it one cannot speak of a theory invariant to translations. Nor can one say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or conversely that different (even contradictory) theories can be expressed in one language. ((s) Because of the ontological statement that I cannot argue about ontology by telling the other that the things that exist in it do not exist in me, because then I contradict myself that there are things that do not exist). Lauener: that would correspond to the fallacy that language contributes to the syntax but theory to the empirical content. Language/Theory/Quine/Lauener: i.e. not that there is no contradiction between the two at all: insofar as two different theories are laid down in the same language, this means that the expressions are not interchangeable in all expressions. But there are also contexts where the distinction between language and theory has no meaning. Therefore, the difference is gradual. The contexts where language and theory are interchangeable are those where Quine speaks of a network. V 32 Def Language/Quine: is a "complex of dispositions to linguistic behaviour". V 59 Language/Quine: ideas may be one way or the other, but words are out there where you can see and hear them. Nominalism/Quine: turns away from ideas and towards words. Language/QuineVsLocke: does not serve to transmit ideas! (> NominalismVsLocke). >Nominalism. Quine: it is probably true that when we learn a language we learn how to connect words with the same ideas (if you accept ideas). Problem: how do you know that these ideas are the same? V 89 Composition/language/animal/animal language/Quine: animals lack the ability to assemble expressions. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Lifeworld | Habermas | III 72 Lifeworld/Habermas: this is about the socio-cultural conditions of a rational lifestyle. Here we must examine the structures that enable individuals and groups to rationalize their actions. >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas >Rationality/Habermas, >Group behavior. III 73 Interpretational systems and world views that reflect the background knowledge of social groups play a role here. >Background. III 107 I first introduce the concept of the lifeworld as a correlative to processes of understanding. Communicatively acting subjects always communicate in the horizon of a lifeworld. >Agreement, >Horizon. Their lifeworld is based on more or less diffuse, always unproblematic background beliefs. It saves the interpretation work of previous generations; it is the conservative counterbalance to the risk of disagreement that arises with every current communication process. >Cultural tradition. III 108 Myth/Myths/Habermas. In mythical worldviews as the background for the interpretation of a lifeworld in a social group, the burden of interpretation is taken away from the individual group members as well as the chance to achieve a critical agreement. Here, the linguistic view of the world is reified as a world order and cannot be seen through as a critisable system of interpretation. >Worldviews. IV 189 Lifeworld/Method/HabermasVsHusserl/Habermas: If we give up the basic concepts of consciousness philosophy in which Husserl deals with the lifeworld problems (1), we can think of the lifeworld represented by a culturally handed down and linguistically organized inventory of interpretative patterns. >E. Husserl. Then the context of reference no longer has to be explained in the context of phenomenology and psychology of perception, but as a context of meaning. >Phenomenology, >Cognitive Psychology. IV 191 Lifeworld/Habermas: since the communication participants cannot take an extramundane position towards it, it has a different status than the other world concepts (the social, the subjective and the objective world), in which speakers and listeners can optionally refer to something objective, normative or subjective. This is not possible in relation to the lifeworld. With their help, the participants cannot refer to something "inter-subjective" either. >Intersubjectivity, >Objectivity, >Norms, >Subjectivity. IV 192 They always move within the horizon of their lifeworld and cannot refer to "something in the lifeworld", such as facts, norms or experiences. >Facts, >Experiences. The lifeworld is also the transcendental place where speakers and listeners can meet and reciprocally claim that their statements fit into the world (the objective, social or subjective world). IV 198 The phenomenologically described basic features of the constituted lifeworld can be explained without difficulty if "lifeworld" is introduced as a complementary term to "communicative action". >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. IV 205 Background/Lifeworld/Habermas: the lifeworld should not be equated with the background consisting of cultural knowledge. Instead, it is the case that the solidarity of the groups and competences of socialized individuals integrated via values and norms flow into communicative action. IV 224 Lifeworld/Habermas: when we conceive of society as a lifeworld, we assume a) the autonomy of those acting, b) the independence of culture, c) the transparency of communication. >Autonomy, >Culture. These three fictions are built into the grammar of narratives and return in a culturally biased Verstehen. >Fiction/Habermas). IV 230 Lifeworld/System/Habermas: I understand social evolution as a second-level process of differentiation: system and lifeworld differentiate, in that the complexity of one and the rationality of the other grows, not only in each case as a system and as lifeworld - but both also differentiate from each other at the same time. From a systemic point of view, these stages can be characterized by newly occurring systemic mechanisms. These are increasingly separating themselves from the social structures through which social integration takes place. Cf. >Systems. IV 273 Lifeworld/control media/communication media/language/Habermas: the conversion from language to control media (money, power (influence, reputation)) means a decoupling of the interaction from lifeworld contexts (see Lifeworld/Habermas), >Control media, >Communication media, >Money, >Power, >Recognition. Media such as money and power begin with the empirically motivated ties; they code a purpose-rational handling of calculable amounts of value and enable a generalized strategic influence on the decisions of other interaction participants, bypassing linguistic consensus-building processes. >Language/Habermas. N.B.: thus, the lifeworld is no longer needed for the coordination of actions. 1. E.Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, Hamburg 1948; zur Kritik an den bewusstseinstheoretischen Grundlagen der phänomenologischen Sozialontologie von A. Schütz vgl. M. Theunissen, Der Andere, Berlin 1965, S. 406ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Meaning Change | Quine | X 34/35 Truth/Language/Quine: Truth depends on the language, because it is possible that sounds or characters in one language are synonymous with "2 < 5" and in another with "2 > 5". When meaning changes over the course of many years within a language, we think that these are two different languages. Because of this relativity, it makes sense to assign a truth value only to tokens of sentences. >Truth Values/Quine. Truth/World/Quine: the desire for an extra-linguistic basis for truth only arises if one does not take into account that the truth predicate has precisely the purpose of combining the mentioning of linguistic forms with the interest in the objective world. >Truth Predicate/Quine. This mention of sentences is only a technical necessity that arises if we want to generalize in a dimension that cannot be captured by a variable. Ad I 40 Example (s) neutrinos: if neutrinos have a mass, then this is a completely different object but not another term. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Method | Habermas | IV 205 Method/Lifeworld Concept/Lifeworld/Habermas: the communication-theoretical concept of the lifeworld developed from the participant's perspective Habermas IV 206 is not directly useful for theoretical purposes; it is not suitable for defining a social science object area, i.e. the region within the objective world that forms the totality of hermeneutically accessible, in the broadest sense historical or socio-cultural facts. >Levels/Order, >Description Levels. The everyday concept of the lifeworld is recommended for this purpose, with the help of which communicative actors locate and date themselves and their expressions in social spaces and historical times. >Lifeworld/Habermas. In narratives, the actors take a lay concept of the "world" as a basis in the sense of the everyday or lifeworld, which defines the totality of the facts that can be reproduced in true stories. This narrative practice also has a function for the self-image of the persons who have to objectify their belonging to the lifeworld (...). For the analysis of narrative statements in this sense: see A. C. Danto: (1) >History, >Historiography, cf. >Philosophy of History. 1.A.C. Danto, Analytische Philosophie der Geschichte, Frankfurt 1974. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Mind Body Problem | James | Diaz-Bone I 41 Mind Body Problem/James: James' psychology can be seen as an attempt to overcome the dualism of body and mind. Both are part of nature and the objective world. Even a complete discovery and explanation of brain activity cannot be equated with knowledge of consciousness. The attempt to solve the mind body problem by overcoming the dualism is regarded as a failure for James, since a scientific explanation for free will cannot be achieved. >Psychology/James, >Dualism. |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Myth | Habermas | III 81 Myths/Mythical world interpretation/Myth/mythical culture/forms of life/Habermas: we are dealing here with a confusion between internal meaningful and external factual contexts. >Exterior/interior, >Perspective, >Levels of description, >Levels/order, >Subjects, >Reality, >Theory. Internal relationships exist between symbolic expressions, external relationships between entities that occur in the world. >World/thinking, >Facts, >Concepts, >Symbols, >Language. In this sense, the logical relationship between reason and consequence is regarded as internal, the causal relationship between cause and effect as external. >Reasons, >Rationale, >Causality, >Reason/Cause. III 83 But only against the backdrop of an objective world and measured against criticisable claims to truth and success can opinions appear to be systematically false, intentions for action seem to be systematically hopeless, could thoughts appear as fantasies, as mere imaginations. >Validity claims. III 108 Myth/Myths/Habermas: In mythical worldviews as the background for the interpretation of a lifeworld in a social group, the burden of interpretation is taken away from the individual group members as well as the chance to achieve a critical agreement. >Background. Here, the linguistic view of the world is reified as a world order and cannot be seen through as a critisable system of interpretation. >Criticism/Habermas, >Language/Habermas. IV 280 Myths/Habermas: while mythical narratives interpret a ritual practice and make it understandable, but are themselves part of this practice, the religious and metaphysical worldviews of prophetic origin have the form of intellectually editable doctrines that explain and justify an existing order of rule within the framework of the world order they explicate.(1) >Foundation, >Ultimate justification, >Religion. 1.S.N.Eisenstadt Cultural Traditions and Political Dynamics: the Origins and Modes of Ideological Politics, Brit. J. Soc, 32, 1981, p. 155ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Norms | Habermas | III 35 Norms/Knowledge/Habermas: the knowledge embodied in norm-regulated actions or in expressive expressions does not (...) refer to the existence of facts, but to the target validity of norms and to the subjective experiences that emerge. >truthfulness, >Subjectivity, >Correctness. III 132 Norms/Habermas: are not expressed by existential clauses such as "It is the case that q is required", but in the form of "It is required that q". This concerns the claim to normative correctness, which is expressed in such a way that it applies to a group of addressees. >Deontology, >Deontic logic. III 133 The a fact that a norm actually exists means that the claim to validity with which it occurs is recognised by the parties concerned. >Validity claim. III 134 Norm-regulated action requires two worlds, the objective and a social world. >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world. Acting in accordance with norms presupposes that the actor can distinguish between the factual and the normative elements. III 135 of his acting situation, i. e. can distinguish the conditions and means from values. III 405 Norms/Habermas: Within a standardised framework, the filing of a validity claim is not an expression of a contingent will. >Objectivity, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas Likewise, agreement to a claim to validity is not an empirically motivated decision alone. The rejection of such a claim can only take the form of a criticism and the defence of the claim can only take the form of a refutation of the criticism. >Critique/Habermas. Whoever doubts the validity of norms will have to give reasons, whether against the legality of the regulation, i.e. the legality of its social validity - or against the legitimacy of the regulation, i.e. the claim to be correct or justified in a moral-practical sense. Here, conditions of acceptability are sufficient for compliance with a norm; they do not have to be supplemented by conditions of sanctions. >Acceptability/Habermas, >Justification, >Rationale, >Reasons. IV 65 Norms/Tradition/VsTradition/Habermas: only when the power of tradition has been broken to such an extent that the legitimacy of existing orders can be viewed in the light of hypothetical alternatives, the relatives of one cooperation ask themselves. That is to say, a group dependent on joint efforts to achieve collective objectives, whether the norms in question regulate the arbitrariness of the relatives in such a way that each of them can see his or her interests safeguarded. >Cultural tradition, >Conventions. IV 143 Norms/Language/Mead/Habermas: As language establishes itself as a principle of socialization, the conditions of sociality converge with conditions of communicatively established intersubjectivity. Since the authority of the holy is transformed into the binding power of normative claims to validity, which can only be discursively redeemed, the notion of the validitiy to be achieved is purified from empirical admixtures. In the end, the validity of a norm only means that it could be accepted by all those concerned for good reasons. >Validity claims, >Intersubjectivity, >Society, >Community. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Objective Mind | Habermas | III 124 Objective mind/Habermas: I would like to overcome the term "objective mind" in favour of one concept of cultural knowledge differentiated according to several claims of validity. >Validity claims, >Culture/Habermas, >Society. III 125 However, I would like to insist on the speech of three worlds (Popper: World 1: physical objects, World 2: states of consciousness, World 3: objective thought content). These three worlds are to be distinguished from the lifeworld. >K. Popper. Only one of them, namely the objective world, can be regarded as a correlate... III 126 ...to the totality of true statements. >Consciousness, >States of belief, >Objectivity, >World, >World/thinking, >Life-world, >Thinking, >Thoughts, >Content, >Laws of nature. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Objectivity | Brandom | I 136f Objectivity/Brandom: naive: from the success of representations - Objectivity is a characteristic of assessment practices regarding the correctness of representation - representation in response to what is representation, not as what the represented is conceived to be - so the status goes beyond the attitude - therefore representation is not a basic semantic concept. >Representation. I 692 Objective: socially instituted, but not intersubjectively. Objectivity: depends on what is true from what assertions and concept applications actually represent or what they are about, and not about what somebody or everybody deems to be true. >Intersubjectivity. I 736 Objectivity consist of the distinction between attribution, acceptance and definition. I 822 ff What is objectively right and true is determined by the objects being talked about, not by what is said about them; not even by the attitudes of any or all members of the community. >Truthmakers. I 314 Objectivity/Brandom: an objective or naturalistic theory of cognitive authorization cannot be derived only from reliability considerations; not even a naturalistic theory of the proper use of the concept. >Reliability theory. I 823 Objectivity/Standards/Community/Language/Brandom: Vs I-We conception of social practices: Incorrect comparison of the views of the individual with those of the community (inter-subjectivity) - BrandomVsIntersubjectivity as a model for objectivity - Problem: the community as a whole loses the ability to distinguish - that is what the community assimilates to its individuals. I 824 Objectivity/Reality/World/Brandom: that our concepts are about an objective world is partly due to the fact that there is an objective sense of accuracy to which their application is subjected. >Reality, >World. I 825 A propositional or other content may only be specified from one point of view and this is subjective, not in a Cartesian sense, but in the very practical sense (account managing subject) - BrandomVsTradition: instead of non-perspective facts one must pay attention only to the structural characteristics of the accounting practices. I 826 Objectivity consists in the distinction between attribution, acceptance and definition. >Attribution. I 828 Difference between objective and subjective correct content is allocated between an assigned definition and one that is approved by the speaker - within each perspective there is a difference between status and attitude - objectivity is then a structural aspect of the social-perspective form of conceptual contents. >Conceptual content. I 829 Objective representational content: de-re allocation: he thinks of quinine that... - thereby specification of objects. >Identification, >Individuation. I 831 I-You style/account management/Brandom: the definitions are made by an individual (account holder), not by "the community" - BrandomVsInter-subjectivity (I-We style): cannot grant the possibility of error on the part of the privileged perspective. Cf. >I-You-relationship/Gadamer. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Objectivity | Habermas | III 27 Objectivity/Habermas: an assessment can be objective if it is made on the basis of a trans-subjective claim to validity which has the same meaning for any observer and addressee as for the subject itself. >Validity claims, >Truth, >Correctness, >Truthfulness, >Intersubjectivity. Validity: Claims of this kind are truth and efficiency. >Efficiency. III 30 Objectivity/Realism: for the "realistic" approach, the world as the epitome of what is the case, is objective. >Facts, >Facts/Wittgenstein, >World/Wittgenstein, >Tractatus. III 31 Objectivity/Phenomenology: for the "phenomenological" approach, it is first necessary to determine the conditions under which the unity of an objective world is constituted for the members of a communication community. >Phenomenology, >Community, >Language Community, >Objectivity, >Objectivism/Husserl. Rorty I 417 (According to Rorty) Habermas' thesis: scientific research is both, limited and allowed by inevitably subjective conditions. >Subjectivity, >Science. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Observation | Habermas | III 171 Observation/Ontology/Habermas: when we describe a behaviour as a teleological action, we assume that the actor makes certain ontological conditions, that he or she expects an objective world in which he or she recognizes something and in which he or she can intervene purposefully. >Behavior, >Goals, >Intentionality, >Interpretation, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. At the same time, the observer creates ontological conditions with regard to the subjective world of the actor. He or she distinguishes between "the" world and the world as it appears from the point of view of the actor. He or she can determine descriptively what the actor thinks is true, in contrast to what the observer believes is true. >External world/Habermas, >Internal world, >Other minds, >Conflicts, >Justification. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Ontology | Habermas | III 171 Ontology/observation/interpretation/sociology/method/Habermas: when we describe a behaviour as a teleological action, we assume that the actor makes certain ontological conditions, that he or she expects an objective world in which he or she recognizes something and in which he or she can intervene purposefully. >Observation, >Interpretation, >Sociology, >Method, >Teleology, >Procedural rationality. At the same time, the observer creates ontological conditions with regard to the subjective world of the actor. He or she distinguishes between "the" world and the world as it appears from the point of view of the actor. He or she can determine descriptively what the actor thinks is true, in contrast to what the observer believes is true. >Facts, >Situations, >Reality, >Objectivity, >Objectivity/Habermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Outer World | Habermas | III 376 Outer World/Habermas: Thesis: for the purposes of our sociological investigations we should differentiate the external world into an objective and a social world and introduce the internal world as a complementary concept to this external world. >Inner world, >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world, >World. The corresponding claims of validity (truth, correctness, truthfulness) can serve as a guideline for the choice of theoretical aspects for the classification of the speech acts. >Validity claims, >Truth, >Correctness, >Truthfulness |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Philosophy | McGinn | I 11 Philosophy/McGinn: Thesis: Philosophical problems are not strange beings, but limits of our cognition - Def Transcendental Naturalism/McGinn: Transcendental Naturalism: Thesis: our faculty of knowledge hinders the realization of the true nature of the objective world - but from this nothing follows for the ontology. >Terminology/McGinn, >Ontology. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Rationality | Habermas | III 25 Rationality/Habermas: has less to do with acquisition than with the use of knowledge. Knowledge can be criticized as unreliable. III 26 This is where the ability to justify comes into play. For example, actions which the actor himself/herself considers to be hopeless cannot be justified. >Justification, >Reasons, >Contradictions, >Knowledge. III 30 Rationality/Realism/Phenomenology/Habermas: two approaches differ in the way propositional knowledge is used: a) The "realistic" position is based on the ontological premise of the world as the epitome of what is the case, in order to clarify on this basis the conditions of rational behaviour. The realist can limit himself/herself to the conditions for objectives and their realization. b) The "phenomenological" position reflects on the fact that the rational actors themselves must presuppose an objective world. >Propositional knowledge. III 31 It makes the ontological preconditions a problem and asks about the conditions under which the unity of an objective world is constituted for the members of a communication community. It must be regarded by the subjects as one and the same world in order to gain objectivity. >Lifeworld, >Rationality/Pollner. III 33 The concept of cognitive-instrumental rationality, derived from the realistic approach, can be added to the broader phenomenological concept of rationality. There are relationships between the ability of decentral perception and manipulation of things and events on the one hand and the ability of intersubjective communication on the other. (See also Cooperation/Piaget), >Cooperation. III 36 Action/Rationality/Habermas: Actors behave rationally as long as they use predicates in such a way that other members of their lifeworld would recognize their own reactions to similar situations under these descriptions. >Descriptions, >Predication, >Attribution, cf. >Score keeping. III 44 Those who use their own symbolic means of expression dogmatically behave irrationally. Cf. >Language use. IV 132 Rationality/Habermas: we can trace the conditions of rationality back to conditions for a communicatively achieved, justified consensus. Linguistic communication, which is designed for communication and does not merely serve to influence one another, fulfils the prerequisites for rational expressions or for the rationality of subjects capable of speaking and acting. The potential for rationalization (...) can be released (...) to the extent that the language fulfils functions of communication (and) coordination of action (...) and thus becomes a medium through which cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization take place. >Language/Habermas. Rorty I I 92 RortyVsHabermas: his own attempt to put communicative reason in the place of "subject-centered reason", is in itself a step towards the replacement of the "what" by a "how". >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas, >RortyVsHabermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Rationality | Weber | Habermas III 239 Rationality/Weber/Habermas: the term can have several meanings: a) increasing theoretical mastery of reality through increasingly precise abstract terms b) methodological achievement of objectives through more precise calculation of means.(1) III 240 Practical rationality/Weber/Habermas: a) Weber starts from a broad concept of technology that exists for every action, e.g. prayer techniques... III 241 b) This broad meaning limits Weber by specifying means that are part of the objective world. III 242 c) Not only means, also purposes can be more or less rational. (2) III 243 In this context, a distinction is made between formal (more technical) and material (more ethical) rationality. d) According to formal rationality, the actor must be aware of his preferences. Weber is, however, sceptical about normative issues. >Purpose rationality, >Purposes, >Preferences, >Goals, cf. >Technology. 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I. 1963, p. 265f. 2. Ibid. p. 265 |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Realism | Nagel | I 119 The mere recognition of a distinction between appearance and reality provides no way to discover reality. >Method, >Reality, >Appearance, >Perception Def Internal realism: our seemingly objective world view should be understood as if it was essentially a creative product of our language and our points of view, the truth of our beliefs is to be understood as their continuation in the context of an ideal development of the corresponding point of view. >Internal realism. I 130 Putnam: Def truth is nothing but "idealized rational acceptability". LL. And as long as "acceptability" means the same as "acceptability for us", the logical gap between thought and the world will disappear. I 130ff NagelVsPutnam: The internal realism fails on its own test of rational acceptability. What we actually accept is a worldview which confirms or denies our perceptions. Even our interpretation of quantum theory and the related observations would be a view of the suchness of the world, even if a physicist says it could not be interpreted realistically. It would not eb a view that would rightly be limited by means of an "internalist" interpretation. Our point of view is a set of beliefs that concern the real suchness, while admitting that there is much we do not know. The only method for establishing the rational acceptability is to think about whether it is true. >Acceptability/Habermas. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Reification | Lukács | Habermas III 474 Reification/Lukács/Habermas: Lukács thesis: "in the structure of the relationship of goods (can) the archetype of all forms of representationalism and all corresponding forms of subjectivity be found in bourgeois society". (1) Habermas: Lukács uses the new Kantian expression "representational form" in a sense shaped by Dilthey as a historically created "form of existence or thought" that distinguishes the "totality of the stage of development of society as a whole". >Neo-Kantianism, >W. Dilthey, >About Dilthey. He understands the development of society as "the history of the uninterrupted transformation of the representational forms that shape people's existence". LukácsVsHistorism/Habermas: Lukács does not, however, share the historicist view that the particularity of each unique culture is expressed in a representational form. The forms of representationalism convey "the confrontation of the human Habermas III 475 with his/her environment, which determines the representationalism of his/her inner and outer life".(2) >Historism. Def Reification/Lukács/Habermas: Reification is the peculiar assimilation of social relationships and experiences to things, i.e. to objects that we can perceive and manipulate. The three worlds (subjective, objective and social ((s) shared) world) are so miscoordinated in the social a priori of the living world that category errors are built into our understanding of interpersonal relationships and subjective experiences: we understand them in the form of things, as entities that belong to the objective world, although in reality they are components of our common social world or of our own subjective world. >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world, >Life world. Habermas: because understanding and comprehending are constitutive for the communicative handling itself, such a systematic misunderstanding affects the practice, not only the way of thinking but also the "way of being" of the subjects. It is the lifeworld itself that is "reified". Habermas: Lukács sees the cause of this deformation in a Habermas III 476 method of production that is based on wage labour and requires "becoming goods of a function of humans"(3). Habermas III 489 AdornoVsLukács/HorkheimerVsLukács/Habermas: Horkheimer and Adorno shift the beginnings of reification in the dialectic of the Enlightenment back behind the capitalist beginning of modernity to the beginnings of the incarnation. >Dialectic of Enlightenment, >M. Horkheimer, >Th.W. Adorno. The reason for this is that Lukác's theory of the unforeseen integration achievements of advanced capitalist societies has been denied. >Society, >Capitalism. 1. G. Lukács, „Die Verdinglichung und das Bewusstsein des Proletariats“ in: G. Lukács, Werke, Bd. 2. Neuwied 1968, S. 257-397. 2.G.Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Werke, Bd. 2, 1968, S. 336 3. Ebenda S. 267. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Rule Following | Habermas | III 143 Rule Following/communicative action/Habermas: the concept of communicative action owes a great deal to the linguistic philosophical investigations that go back to Wittgenstein, but the concept of rule following falls short. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas >Rule following/Wittgenstein, >Rule following/Kripke. III 144 Concentrating on this, the aspect of the triple world-reference (to an objective, a social world and a subjective world as the entirety of the privilegedly accessible experiences of the speaker) would be lost. >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world. IV 33 Rule Following/Wittgenstein/Habermas: the N.B. of Wittgenstein's argument is that A cannot be sure whether he follows a rule at all, if there is not a situation in which he exposes his behavior to a basically consensual criticism by B. For Wittgenstein, the identity and validity of rules are systematically linked. Following a rule means to follow the same rule in every single case. Habermas: However, this identity of the rule is not based on observable invariances, but on the intersubjectivity of their validity. >Intersubjectivity, >Validity/Habermas, >Rules. Since rules are counterfactual, it is possible to criticize (...) behaviour or to evaluate it as incorrect. Two roles are assumed for the interaction participants then: IV 34 The competence to follow the rules and the competence to assess behaviour (which in turn presupposes rule competence). >Counterfactuals. N.B.: these roles or competences must be interchangeable: each participant in the interaction must be able to exercise them; on the other hand, the identity of the rules would not be secure. >Communicative Action/Habermas. Question: how are rules initially established at all? See Rules/Habermas |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Situations | Habermas | III 150 Situation/action situation/Habermas: a situation definition establishes an order. With it, the communication participants assign the various elements of the action situation to one of the three worlds (one objective, one social world and one subjective world as the entirety of the speaker's privilegedly accessible experiences). >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. In doing so, they incorporate the current situation of their preinterpreted lifeworld. Deviation of the situation definition by the opposite presents a different kind of problem. None of those involved has a monopoly on interpretation. >Interpretation. IV 188 Situations/LifeWorld/Understanding/Habermas: for the participants, the action situation forms the centre of their life world; it has a moving horizon because it refers to the complexity of the life world: In a sense, the world to which the communication participants belong is always present, but only in such a way that it forms the background for a current scene. As soon as such a reference context is included in a situation (...), it loses its triviality and unquestionable solidity. New information can be raised. >Life world/Habermas, >Language/Habermas. IV 189 Relevance: before it is explicitly mentioned, the facts of life are given only as a matter of course. From the perspective of the situation, the life world appears to be a reservoir of self-evidence or unshaken beliefs. >Background. These self-evident facts are mobilized when they become relevant to a situation. ((s) For today's discussion see also Frame Theories). IV 203 Situation/Habermas: the situation includes everything that can be seen as a restriction for (...) action initiatives. While the actor retains the environment as a resource for communication-oriented action, the restrictions imposed by the circumstances of the implementation of his plans are part of the situation. IV 204 These limitations can be sorted by facts, norms and experiences within the framework of the three formal world concepts. Theoretical status: the communication-theoretical concept of the life world developed from the participant's perspective... IV 206 ...is not directly useful for theoretical purposes; it is not suitable for delimiting an object area of social science, i.e. the region within the objective world that forms the totality of hermeneutically accessible, in the broadest sense historical or socio-cultural facts. The everyday concept of the life world is recommended for this purpose, with the help of which communicative actors locate and date themselves and their expressions in social spaces and historical times. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Skepticism | McGinn | I 152 Skepticism/McGinn: 1. The general problem of skepticism: the reasons for our knowledge claims remain miserably behind the content of this claim. Problem of lacking. The input is not sufficient to justify the output. 2. Specific knowledge problems: are ahead of the skepticism: how do we get to the "a priori" knowledge? >Knowledge, >a priori/McGinn. I 174f Skepticism: a) skepticism of the first person: limits to my knowledge coincide with the limits of my phenomenal experience. b) skepticism of the third person: biological limit. How can we as a few pounds of meat, permeated by nerves, make an image of the outside world? McGinnVsSkepticism: Takes advantage of the idea, there would be a metaphysical gap between subject and knowledge object. a) For position of the first-person between the states of consciousness and the conditions in the outside world b) For the position of the third person: the gap is seen as a part of the objective world which would face another part of the world, while both parts have their own characteristics. I 176 We need to prove that despite these gaps knowledge is possible, and that the gaps of knowledge are not as detrimental as it seems. I 177 Knowledge/Transcendental Naturalism/TN: claims that the gaps are ultimately gaps in our understanding ability. Its origin is of epistemological, not of ontological kind. >Terminology/McGinn. I 196 The skeptic misinterprets our principled disability on the level of meta-theory as a case of irrationality on the basis level. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Skepticism | Stroud | I 13 Descartes: I cannot distinguish alertness from dream. Stroud: 1. the possibility that he dreams is really a threat to his knowledge of the world. 2. But he does not need to know whether he is dreaming to know something about the world. No knowledge: if one dreams E.g. that the shutters rattle and the dream caused it, one does not know that it rattles - (false causation, defies identity of the event). >Causal theory of knowledge, >Causation. I 17 Alone the possibility of deception is sufficient. >Deceptions. I 18 StroudVsDescartes: we can know sometimes that we are not dreaming - knowing that we do not dream is the condition for knowledge. I 37 Intersubjectivity: it also is affected by Descartes' skepticism. >Intersubjectivity, cf. >Solipsism. I 77 Platitudes/skepticism/Stroud: natural strategy VsSkepticism: e.g. The objective world was there before us. - E.g. I believe that a mountain in Africa is more than 5000m high. - That is completely independent of my knowledge. - Then it is not about assertibility conditions or truth conditions. >Reality, >Assertibility conditions, >Assertibility, >Truth conditions, >Empiricism. Otherwise: if you believe that we now know more about physics than 200 years ago, a reference to community and knowledge is implied - now truth condition and assertibility condition but still objectivity. >Objectivity. Aeroplane-example: whether the manual is correct or not, is an objective fact that can be seen from the distanced position. Distanced position: equivalent to skepticism - and at the same time determination that inside and outside diverge. Inside: corresponds to our social practice. >inside/outside. I 87 Philosophical skepticism/Stroud: its problem is not empirical. I 110 Skepticism/Stroud: it is not sufficient to put forward a specific case - Descartes makes an assessment of all our knowledge. >Knowledge. I 270 Imaginability/Stroud: it is hard to say whether something is conceivable or not - a possibility would be to imagine it and see what happens. Vs: but that is not conclusive, since it may be that what my thoughts make possible for me, is even hidden from me. >Conceivability. I 272f Dream/skepticism/Stroud: We have not yet asked if the dream opportunity is knowable to others. - StroudVs(s): we can very well "be all in the same boat" - I can use myself instead of Descartes. Stroud: I always say: it seems possible. Imaginability: requires comprehensibility. - And the possibility is comprehensible that we all dream - and then the question is whether I am dreaming, completely independent from the fact if someone else knows. - Then it is possible that all dream and nobody knows anything - and the skepticism is not to sit in opposition, thereby that it contradicts its premises. Conclusion: dream possibility: there is ultimately one because the possibility that someone knows something must not be presupposed. Stroud pro Descartes. >Skepticism/Descartes, >René Descartes. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Strategies | Habermas | III 131/132 Strategy/action/Habermas: subjects acting strategically must be cognitively equipped in such a way that not only physical objects but also decision-making systems can occur in the world for them. They need to expand their conceptual apparatus for what may be the case, but they do not need richer ontological premises. With the complexity of the inner world entities, the concept of the objective world itself does not become more complex. >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas, >Complexity, >Decisions. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Structural Violence | Habermas | IV 278 Structural Violence/Habermas: Reproductive constraints that instrumentalize a lifeworld without impairing the appearance of self-sufficiency in the lifeworld, must hide in the pores of communicative action. This results in a structural violence that, without becoming manifest as such, takes over the form of inter-subjectivity of possible understanding. >Violence. Structural violence is exercised through a systematic restriction of communication; it is anchored in the formal conditions of communicative action in such a way that the connection between objective, social and subjective world is typically prejudiced for the communication participants. For this relative a priori of understanding I would like to introduce the concept of the form of communication in analogy to the a priori of knowledge of the form of object (Lukács). >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world, >Agreement/Habermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Subjectivity | Husserl | Gadamer I 249 Subjectivity/Husserl/Gadamer: Validity of being (German: "Seinsgeltung") now also possesses human subjectivity [in Husserl's phenomenology](1). It is therefore to be regarded just as much, i.e. it too is to be explored in the multiplicity of its modes of existence. Such an exploration of the ego as a phenomenon is not "inner perception" of a real ego, but it is also not a mere reconstruction of the i.e. relationship of the contents of consciousness to a transcendental ego pole (Natorp)(2) but is a highly differentiated subject of transcendental reflection. Cf. >Objectivism/Husserl, >Consciousness/Husserl. Way of Givenness: This reflection represents the growth of a new dimension of research compared to the mere fact of phenomena of objective consciousness, a fact in intentional experiences. For there is also a given fact that is not itself the object of intentional acts. Every experience has implied horizons of the before and after and finally merges with the continuum of the before and after present experiences to form the unity of the stream of experience. >Time Consciousness/Husserl. Gadamer I 251 Subjectivity/Husserl/Gadamer: The fact that Husserl has that "performance" of transcendental subjectivity everywhere in mind simply corresponds to the task of phenomenological constitutional research. But it is characteristic of his actual intention that he no longer says consciousness, or even subjectivity, but "life". He simply wants to go back behind the actuality of the consciousness that means, yes, also behind the potentiality of the fellow-mine to the universality of a last, which alone is able to measure the universality of what has been accomplished, i.e. what is constituted in its validity. It is a fundamentally anonymous intentionality, i.e. one that is no longer performed by anyone by name, through which the all-encompassing world horizon is constituted. Husserl, consciously countering a concept of the world that encompasses the universe of that which can be objectified by the sciences, calls this phenomenological concept of the world "the life-world," i.e., the world "into" which we live in the natural setting, which does not as such ever become representational to us, but which represents the given ground of all experience. >Lifeworld/Husserl. Gadamer I 253 Subject/Husserl/Gadamer: "The radical view of the world is a systematic and pure inner view of the self in the outward subjectivity(3). It is like in the unity of a living organism, which we can well observe and dissect from the outside, but can only understand if we go back to its hidden roots...". Subject/Husserl: In this way, the subject's behavior in the world also has its comprehensibility not in the conscious experiences and their intentionality, but in the anonymous ones of life. >I, Ego, Self/Husserl. Subjectivity/Husserl/Gadamer: (...) this is how one is led into the proximity of the speculative concept of life of German idealism. What Husserl is trying to say is that one must not think of subjectivity as an opposition to objectivity, because such a concept of subjectivity would itself be objectivistic. His transcendental phenomenology wants to be "correlation research" instead. But this says: the relation is the primary, and the "poles" into which it unfolds are "enclosed by itself"(4) just as the living encloses all its expressions of life in the uniformity of its organic being. HusserlVsHume: "The naivety of the speech of the experiencing, recognizing, the really concretely performing subjectivity leaves completely out of question, the naivety of the scientist Gadamer I 254 of nature, of the world in general, who is blind to the fact that all the truths he gains as objective ones, and the objective world itself, which in his formulas is substrate, is his own life structure that has become in him - is of course no longer possible, as soon as life comes into focus," (Husserl writes this with reference to Hume(5)). 1. Husserliana VI. 169. 2. Natorp, Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode, 1888; Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode, 1912. 3. Husserliana VI, p. 116. 4. Cf. C. Wolzogen, „Die autonome Relation. Zum Problem der Beziehung im Spätwerk Paul Natorps. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theorien der Relation“ 1984 and my review in Philos. Rdsch. 32 (1985), p. 1601. 5. Husserliana VI p. 99 |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Subjectivity | Nagel | Frank I 132f Subjectivity/Nagel(1): the fact that it is somehow avoids the attribution of a separate aspect such as quality. >Properties, >Qualities, >Qualia, >Attribution, >Aspects. NagelVsReductionism: the way something is cannot be reduced. 1. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 Nagel III 116 ff Subjective/Objective/Gradual/Nagel: so the distinction is relative! (Polarity, continuum, respects: space, time, opportunities, scales). - E.g. a universal human perspective is more objective than that of an indidvidual, but less objective than a physical one. >Perspective/Nagel. Subjectivity: not necessarily something private. >Intersubjectivity. Objectivity: you cannot approach it by expansion of the imagination. III 120 Problem: for physical objectivity, the subject depends on those of its own components that it deems most suitable. >Objectivity/Nagel. III 28ff Subjectivity/Completeness/Objectivity/Reality/Nagel: since scrambled eggs taste like something for a cockroach and we will never know how (because we cannot imagine), we must say: either a) that the subjective qualities are not part of reality (absurd) or b) that not everything that is real is part of the objective world. Reality/Nagel: thesis: reality is not only the objective reality. >Reality, >Reality/Nagel. III 30 The world is neither my world nor ours. (This does not even apply to the mental world). |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Subjectivity | Stalnaker | I 255 Subjective/Subjectivity/Stalnaker: subjectivity always depends on the context. Objectivity: contents of normal beliefs about objective facts are objective and removable from the context. I 265 Subjectivity/subjective experience/Nagel/Stalnaker: If we understand experience only from an objective point of view, we do not yet know what it is like to grasp something. Ex how scrambled eggs taste to a cockroach. >Hetero-phenomenology. Stalnaker: Are you saying that there are. 1. subjective facts exist, which even a complete description leaves out, or 2. that we could never grasp them? Modest view/Stalnaker: the modest view is compatible with the 2nd view. Objective fact/Stalnaker: but is it even an objective fact what scrambled eggs taste like to a cockroach? Which, if it could be expressed by a proposition of the cockroach, would be incomprehensible to us? >Understanding, >Knowledge how. I 266 "Scrambled eggs taste like this": this cannot be taken seriously. Subjective content/modest view/stalnaker: An alternative view is also compatible with the modest view: Analogy: Ex The fact of how scrambled eggs are for the cockroach is as incomprehensible to me as the fact TN expresses when he says "I am TN." or E.g. "The treasure is buried here" when I am not in the place. >Phenomena/Stalnaker. Subjective facts/Stalnaker: Subjective facts are not separable from the subject. Subjective/objective/subjectivity/stalnaker: we can reconcile the two only by bringing together features of the objective world with facts about the subject's place in the world. This requires a decision about how rich such a picture of the world should be, so that it becomes clear that we are things that can have a subjective point of view. That's a daunting task. Subject/Stalnaker: "What is it like to be a subject?". Obviously there are objective differences between subjects and other things. Some Vs: This is already a bias, because there are no facts about what has a subjective point of view and what does not. >Facts, >Nonfactualism. A person can treat things as foreign selves: Ex being angry at his computer, Ex being angry at a golf club, etc. Stalnaker: certainly there is no clear line between things that are subjects and things that are not. Subjecthood is complex. There are also gradations. Relatively simple things can be subjects. I 267 Def minimal subject/terminology/stalnaker: a minimal subject is Bsp anything that is a representative, that receives, stores, or transmits information. An objective representation can be given in functional terms. A richer representation will take into account the abilities to represent. It is ultimately the capacity for phenomenal awareness. How something is to the thing. Consciousness/objective/stalnaker: an objective representation will not tell us what it is like to be conscious, but that is not its goal either. >Consciousness. But it must say, how the world must be constituted, so that a thing can be conscious in it. There is no claim that we have to simulate a subjective point of view with it. Or that we would have to replace it by an objective representation. >Objectivity. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Teleology | Habermas | III 130 Teleology/Habermas: The model of teleological action equips the actor with a "cognitive-volatile complex" so that he/she can develop opinions and intentions. At the semantic level, facts are represented here as propositional contents of statements or intentions. The statements of an actor may be judged by third parties to be appropriate or inappropriate. >Actions/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas III 131 We can classify teleological action as a term that presupposes a world, the objective world. This also applies to the concept of strategic action. >Objectivity, >Actions, >Intentions, >Intentionality, >Goals, >Purposes, >Procedural rationality, >Purposive action. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Terminology | Habermas | IV 188 Reference context/terminology/Habermas: In a sense, the world to which the communication participants belong is always present, but only in such a way that it forms the background for a current scene: the context of reference. IV 189 Lifeworld/Habermas: If we give up the basic concepts of consciousness philosophy in which Husserl deals with the problem of the life world, we can think of the life world represented by a culturally handed down and linguistically organised inventory of patterns of interpretation. Then the context of reference must no longer be explained in the context of phenomenology and psychology of perception, but as IV 190 a connection of meaning between a communicative utterance, the context and the connotative horizon of meaning. Reference contexts go back to grammatically regulated relationships between elements of a linguistically organized inventory of knowledge. IV 209 Def Culture/Habermas: I call culture the inventory of knowledge from which the communication participants provide themselves with interpretations by communicating about something in a world. Def Society/Habermas: I call society the legitimate orders through which communication participants regulate their affiliation to social groups and thus ensure solidarity. Def Personality/Habermas: By personality I understand the competences that make a subject capable of speaking and acting, i.e. repairing, participating in processes of communication and thereby asserting one's own identity. Semantics/Habermas: the semantic field of symbolic contents form dimensions in which the communicative actions extend. Medium/Habermas: the interactions interwoven into the network of everyday communicative practice form the medium through which culture, society and person reproduce themselves. These reproductive processes extend to the symbolic structures of the lifeworld. We must differentiate between the preservation of the material substrate of the lifeworld. IV 260 Norm/Terminology/Habermas: Norm = generalized behavioral expectation. Principles: = higher-level norms. IV 278 Form of communication/terminology/Habermas: Structural violence is exercised through a systematic restriction of communication; it is anchored in the formal conditions of communicative action in such a way that the connection between objective, social and subjective world is typically prejudiced for the communication participants. For this relative a priori of understanding I would like to introduce the concept of the form of communication in analogy to the a priori of knowledge of the form of object (Lukács). IV 413 Def Control Media/terminology/Habermas: are those media that replace language as a mechanism for action coordination . Def communication media/Habermas: are such media that merely simplify over-complex contexts of communication-oriented action, but remain dependent on language and on a lifeworld. IV 536 Def Legal Institution/Terminology/Habermas: I call legal institutions legal norms, which cannot be sufficiently legitimized by the positivistic reference to procedures. E.g. the foundations of constitutional law, the principles of criminal law and criminal procedure. As soon as they are questioned, the reference to their legality is not sufficient. They require material justification because they belong to the legitimate orders of the lifeworld itself and, together with informal norms of action, form the background of communicative action. IV 539 Def Inner colonization/Habermas: this thesis states that as a result of capitalist growth, the subsystems of economy and state become more and more complex and penetrate deeper and deeper into the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld. IV 548 The thesis makes it possible to analyze processes of real abstraction, to which Marx had an eye, without using an equivalent of value theory (see Value Theory/Habermas). III 144 Def Action/Habermas: Actions are only what I call such symbolic expressions with which the actor, as in teleological, norm-regulated and dramaturgical action, makes a reference to at least one world (the physical, the consciousness or the mentally divided world) but always also to the objective world. From these I distinguish between body movements and secondary operations. III 70 Def Critique/Habermas: I speak of criticism instead of discourse whenever arguments are used, without the participants having to assume that the conditions for a speech situation free of external and internal constraints are fulfilled. Aesthetic critique is about opening the eyes of participants, i. e. leading them to an authenticating aesthetic perception. III 412 Def Meaning/Communicative Action/Habermas: within our theory of communicative action, the meaning of an elementary expression consists in the contribution it makes to the meaning of an acceptable speech action. And to understand what a speaker wants to say with such an act, the listener must know the conditions under which he can be accepted. III 41 Def rationality/culture/Habermas: we call a person rational who interprets his or her nature of need in the light of culturally well-coordinated value standards, but especially when he or she is able to adopt a reflexive attitude towards the standards of value that interpret needs. IV 251 Def Productive Forces/Marx/Habermas: According to Marx, productive forces consist of a) the labour force of those working in production, the producers; b) the technically usable knowledge, insofar as it is converted into productivity-increasing work tools, into production techniques; c) organisational knowledge, insofar as it is used to set workers in motion efficiently, to qualify workers and to effectively coordinate the division of labour cooperation of the workers. IV 252 The productive forces determined the degree of possible availability of natural processes. IV 252 Def Relations of Production/Marx/Habermas: relations of production are those institutions and social mechanisms that determine how the labour force, at a given level of productive forces, is combined with the available means of production. The regulation of access to the means of production or the way in which the socially used workforce is controlled also indirectly determines the distribution of socially generated wealth. Relations of production express the distribution of social power; they prejudice the structure of interests that exists in a society with the distribution pattern of socially recognized opportunities of the satisfaction of needs. IV 203 Def Situation/Habermas: the situation includes everything that can be seen as a restriction for (...) action initiatives. While the actor retains the environment as a resource for communication-oriented action, the restrictions imposed by the circumstances of the implementation of his plans are part of the situation. III 400 Def Understanding/Communication/Habermas: in our theory of communicative action we limit ourselves to acts of speech under standard conditions, i.e. we assume that a speaker means nothing else than the literal meaning of what he/she says. Understanding a sentence is then defined as knowing what makes that sentence acceptable. From the speaker's perspective, the conditions of acceptability are identical to the conditions of his/her illocutionary success. Acceptability is not defined in an objective sense from the perspective of an observer, but from the performative attitude of the communication participant. IV 270 Def Knowledge/Habermas: I use "knowledge" in a broader sense that covers everything that can be acquired through learning as well as through the appropriation of cultural tradition, which extends to both cognitive and social integrative, i.e. to expressive and moral-practical elements. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Unity | Kant | Strawson V 82 Unity/Consciousness/Thinking/Subject/StrawsonVsKant: the thesis of the unit itself is based on a deeper distinction: between intuition and concept. >Concept/Kant. Strawson V 83 Strawson: objects could be accusatives and form a sequence, so that no distinction between it and the result of relevant events can be made - such objects could be sense-data and the terms only about these. V 84 This could not be unified with the concept of an "object" - problem: the interest of the objects of experience is their percipi and vice versa - no reason for the distinction between esse and percipi. --- Adorno XIII 103 Unity/Kant/Adorno: according to Kant, the unity moment of all the subjective abilities underlying the various criticisms is actually reason itself or the mind. >Reason/Kant, >Self/Kant. Adorno XIII 122 Unity/Subject/Object/Material/Content/Foundation/Idealism/Kant/Adorno: one has deduced from the identity of reason another concept of identity, namely that of the particular identity of the subject and the object. The I and the objective world are to be identical with each other, because every objective unity-consciousness is a unity-consciousness of reason. But since this objective identity in Kant is possible only by referring to a given, to the material of the senses, it is not purely consistent. Material/Kant/Adorno: that what is underlying the objective in each case should not itself be a product of the reason activity. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Utilitarianism | Parsons | Habermas IV 305 Utilitarianism/Parsons/ParsonsVsUtilitarism/Habermas: in "The Structure of Social Action" Parsons shows by the concept of purpose-rational action that utilitarianism cannot justify the subject's freedom of decision. >Procedural rationality, >Actions/Parsons. Habermas IV 311 The utilitarian dilemma: 1. The acotr faces exactly one objective world of existing facts and has a more or less exact empirical knowledge of this situation. Habermas IV 312 2. Success/Parsons: in this case is measured exclusively by whether the goal has been achieved. >Double Contingency/Parsons. Norms: are limited here to regulating the relationship between purposes, means and conditions. The choice of purposes is therefore left undetermined. "("randomness of ends").(1) 3. Purposive Rationality: does not provide for a mechanism through which the actions of different actors can be coordinated. This is what Parsons calls the "atomistic" concept of action. Stability can only result from coincidentally intertwined interests. Dilemma: how can freedom of decision as the core of freedom of action be developed from the utilitarian concept of action? Habermas IV 313 a) Purposes may vary regardless of means and conditions, this condition is necessary but not sufficient. As long as no values other than decision maxims are permitted, there is room for two opposing interpretations, both of which are incompatible with freedom of choice, both in a positivist and rationalist sense. b) the determination of purposes as a function of knowledge: Here the action is a process of rational adaptation to the conditions. The active role of the actor is reduced to understanding the situation. >Purposes. Problem: neither the rationalist nor the positivist interpretation of the utilitarian model of action Habermas IV 314 can explain why the actor can make mistakes in a not only cognitive sense. >Autonomy/Parsons. Habermas IV 321 Utilitarianism/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons sticks to the core of the utilitarian concept of action. Perhaps he believes he can only save voluntarism by conceiving freedom of choice as contingent freedom of choice, in the language of German idealism: as arbitrariness. >Voluntarism. Habermas IV 371 Utilitarianism/Parsons/ParsonsVsUtilitarianism/Habermas: from the criticism of utilitarianism, Parsons initially gained the idea of a selection of purposes regulated by values and maxims. Solution: cultural values should be related to action situations by means of institutionalisation and internalisation and be linked to sanctions; in this way they should gain the stability of substantial morality in the reality of life forms and life stories. >Cultural values, >Institutionalization, >Internalization, >Lifeworld. 1.Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 49. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| World | Hegel | Adorno XII 174 World/Hegel/Adorno: not only the objective world is mediated by the subject but also the subjectivity and its categories are conversely mediated by the content and by the representational moments of knowledge. >Knowledge/Hegel, >Thinking/Hegel, >Mediation/Hegel, >Method/Hegel, >Dialectic/Hegel, >Totality, >Wholes, >Reality. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bennett, J. | Avramides Vs Bennett, J. | Avra I 17 Avramidis Bennett: Bennett/Avramidis: (Griceans, modified): Proposes a community of speakers who use a communication system that does not rely on Grice’ intentions and beliefs: the "Plain Talk" ("direct speech", "simple speech", "candid speech"). Def Plain Talk/Bennett: the speakers rely on the listener, they believe in the form of a generalization: whenever an utterance U is uttered, a particular proposition p is true. This is how they can do without a speaker’s intention. BennettVsGrice: if this simpler analysis is true, we do not need the more complicated one. (65). BennettVsVs: but Bennett himself believes that the Gricean is capable of withstanding this: GriceVsVs: Solution: "Background fact": if the speaker did not want to transmit p, the utterance U would have been inappropriate under the generalization that whenever U is uttered, p is true. (Bennett 1976 p.172). I 18 This saves the introduction of complex propositional attitudes in the analysis. Modification: the audience is presented with "intention dependent evidence for the proposition". AvramidesVsBennett: the modification is not necessary, it is already covered by Grice’ original analysis. Avra I 18 Communication/LoarVsBennett: Not only is this kind economy unnecessary, the elimination of the intentions removes something essential. The fact that intentions, expectations and beliefs should be simple in ordinary communication and personal relationships, seems to me so improbable that it surprises me why this should be a more realistic view. (70). I 121 Def Register/Bennett: A theoretical expression that stands for whatever in relation to an animal, and that validates predictions about its behavior (evaluates it, rates it yes/no) based on facts about its environment. (Bennett 1976, p.52). Avramides: Registering is necessary but not sufficient for belief. E.g. cruise missiles with thermal infrared equipment: can be described as reacting but not as learning. Belief/Bennett: We achieve sufficient conditions, if we add the ability to learn to registering. (see Bennett 1976, p 84). DavidsonVsBennett: Instead distinction subjective state/objective world. AvramidesVsDavidson: one could argue that the awareness of this distinction is the possession of the concept of belief. Davidson: this awareness is belief about a belief. Scaring/Davidson: only reaction to a stimulus. AvramidesVsDavidson: then there is certainly still room between the act of being surprised and the possession of the concept of belief. This allows, for example: the ability to learn that Bennett propagates. DavidsonVsBennett: rejects his approach, because his (Davidson’s) concept of awareness (of the distinction subjective / objective) is very strong. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Berkeley, G. | Mackie Vs Berkeley, G. | IV 384/385 Berkeley/Stegmüller: interpretation a): of his philosophy: not all details of our conception of the world are accurate in detail, only God gives us the ideas that accidentally allow for such interpretations. interpretation b): God himself perceives a four-dimensional world with a microstructure as it is brought to light by modern physics. That sounds more plausible, but bears four difficulties: We can trace and explain the sensory physiology, e.g. of the eye. Such explanations pose a problem for Berkeley's theory. How does it tackle it? 1. MackieVsBerkeley: part of the physical world are also anatomy and physiology of sensory perception itself. According to theism all that would be completely meaningless. The difficulty for Berkeley's theory, however, is greater when a causal relationship is being denied! IV 386 2. MackieVsBerkeley: Free will: if it existed, we would have to be able to bring about changes in God's ideas just by acts of volition! 3. MackieVsBerkeley: (more profound): according to Berkeley divine ideas would have to be consistent, but they need not be complete, that is, not necessarily determined continuously! They have the status of intentional objects, and their logic would also apply here: Ex.: I can think of a book on the shelf without thinking of the exact spot where it is located. Similarly, God also would have to have indeterminate ideas! In contrast, our sensual data altogether appears to reflect a completely determined world. VsVs: Berkeley could defend himself: it would be a peculiarity of God .... 4. MackieVsBerkeley: many details are completely natural, if one assumes a material, objective world; Berkeley artificially complicates them. IV 387 For the purposes of theoretical and modern physics a materialist theory is preferable. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 |
| Castaneda, H.-N. | Evans Vs Castaneda, H.-N. | Frank I24 "I"/Evans: directly referential (like Castaneda), but EvansVsCastanda: no fundamental priority over other index words. That which is identified by the "I" is always an object in space and time! EvansVsDescartes: I is nothing paranormal, timeless. No "res cogitans". Thus the need of intersubjective accessibility of the object of "I" thoughts is satisfied. The I-centered space only becomes an objective world place when the subject can transfer it to a public map and can recognize it. The convertibility of the demonstratively designated speaker’s perspective demands independent space. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Heidegger, M. | Habermas Vs Heidegger, M. | I 165 Subject Philosophy: Hegel and Marx had got caught in their own basic concepts while trying to overcome it. This objection cannot be raised against Heidegger, but similarly serious one. It distances himself so little from the problem specifications of transcendental consciousness that he can only overcome its concepts by means of abstract negation. But his "Letter on Humanism" (result of ten years of Nietzsche interpretation) relies essentially on Husserl’s phenomenology. I 178 HabermasVsHeidegger: does certainly not embark on the path to a communication-theoretical answer. Namely, he devalues the structures of the normal-life background from the outset as structures of an average everyday existence, the inauthentic existence. Therefore, he cannot make the analysis of "co-existence" fruitful. He only starts dealing with the analysis of language after he had steered his analyzes in a different direction. "Who?" of the existence: no subject, but a neuter, the one. I 179 HabermasVsHeidegger: World: when it comes to making the world intelligible as a process of its own, he falls back into the subject philosophical concept constraints. Because the solipsistically designed existence once more takes the place of transcendental subjectivity. The authorship for designing the world is expected of existence. I 180 The classical demand of the philosophy of origins for ultimate justification and self-justification is not rejected, but answered in the sense of a Fichtean action modified to a world design. The existence justifies itself on its own. I.e. Heidegger, in turn, conceives the world as a process only from the subjectivity of the will to self-assertion. This is the dead-end of the philosophy of the subject. It does not matter whether primacy is given to epistemological questions or question of existence. The monologue-like execution of intentions,i.e. purpose activity is considered as the primary form of action. (VsCommunication). The objective world remains the point of reference. (Model of the knowledge relation). I 182 HeideggerVsNietzsche "revolution of Platonism": HabermasVsHeidegger: Heidegger now used precisely this as a solution. He turns the philosophy of origin around without departing from its problem specifications. HabermasVsHeidegger: Downright world-historical significance of the turn: temporalization of existence. Uprooting of the propositional truth and devaluation of discursive thought. This is the only way it can make it appear as if it escaped the paradoxes of any self-referential criticism of reason. I 183 HabermasVsHeidegger: fails to recognize that the horizon of understanding the meaning borne to the being is not ahead of the question of truth, but, in turn, is subject to it. Whether the validity conditions are actually fulfilled, so that sentences can work does not depend on the language, but on the innerworldly success of practice. HabermasVsHeidegger: even the ultimate control authority of an how ever objective world is lost through the turnover: the prior dimension of unconcealment is an anonymous, submission-seeking, contingent, the course of the concrete history preempting fate of being. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Intersubjectivity | Brandom Vs Intersubjectivity | I 823 Vs I-we conceptions of social practices: they do not meet the adequacy condition. They found a distinction between what individuals consider as proper use and what is right on the comparison of the views of the individual and society. (VsInter-subjectivity) I 824 This is the usual way to treat objectivity as inter-subjectivity. The excessively high price is the loss of the ability of giving a sense to the distinction on the part of the entire community. This conception unduly assimilates the language communities to the individuals involved in it. It treats the community as something that brings forth and assesses performances. ((s) I.e. as a subject that it is not. Brandom: It is not the community that agrees on definitions, but individuals.) Objectivity: the fact that our concepts are about an objective world, is partially due to the fact that there is an objective sense of rightness to which their application is subjected. I 825 A propositional or other content can only be specified from one point of view, and that is subjective, not in a Cartesian sense, but in a very practical sense. (score-keeping subject). I 832 VsInter-subjectivity (I-We style) it is flawed, since it cannot give room to the possibility of error on the part of the privileged perspective! LL. The community (as composed of individuals) thus has a privileged perspective. In the face of it, one cannot take a third-person point of view as an individual and therefore one cannot judge from the outside, what is actually true. This leads to a full frame. (BrandomVs). I-you conception of inter-subjectivity: no perspective is privileged. Perspective form instead of cross-perspective content. The common aspect of all perspectives is that there is a difference. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Kant | McDowell Vs Kant | I 69 Experience/Kant/McDowell: is for Kant, as I see it, not behind a border that surrounds the sphere of the conceptual. McDowellVsKant: (I 67-69+) the talk of transcendental conditions renders the responsibility of our actions problematic. Although empirically speaking there may be justifications, transcendentally speaking we can only claim excuses! Kant/McDowell: we should not look for psychological phenomenalism in Kant. Strawson dito. McDowellVsKant: his philosophy leads to the disregard of the independence of reality. I 69 Idealism: Kant's followers claimed that one must give up the supernatural to arrive at a consistent idealism. McDowellVsBorder of the conceptual: thesis: Hegel expresses exactly that what I want: "I'm thinking I am free because I am not in an Other. I 109/110 Second Nature/(s): internalized background of norms that have been taken from nature. Second Nature/McDowell: they cannot hover freely above the opportunities that belong to the normal human body. > Education/McDowell. I 111 Rationality/Kant: acting freely in its own sphere. ((S) This is the origin of most problems covered here). McDowell: Thesis: we must reconcile Kant with Aristotle, for an adult is a rational being. RortyVsMcDowell: this reconciliation is an outdated ideal. (Reconciliation of subject and object). McDowellVsRorty: instead: reconciliation of reason and nature. I 122 Reality/Kant: attributes spirit of independence to the empirical world. I 123 McDowellVsKant: thinks that the interests of religion and morality can be protected by recognizing the supernatural. Nature/Kant: equal to the realm of natural laws. He does not know the concept of second nature, although well aware of the concept of education. But not as a background. I 126 Spontaneity/KantVsDavidson: it must structure the operations of our sensuality as such. McDowellVsKant: however, for him there remains only the resort to a transcendental realm. I 127 "I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms). McDowellVsKant: it is not satisfactory, if the self-consciousness is only the continuity of a face. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Metaphysics | Nagel Vs Metaphysics | I 126 Moore's Hands/NagelVsMoore: Moore commits a petitio principii by relying on the reality of his hands, because if there are no material objects, not even his hands exist, and he cannot help to clarify this. III 105 Identity/Person/Personal Identity/Temporal/Objectivity/Subjectivity/Nagel: Problem: the search for the conditions that must be met to be able to attribute two temporally separate experience episodes to the same person. Attempted solution: Continuities of physical, mental, causal or emotional nature are considered. Basic problem: even if an arbitrary number of conditions is satisfied, the question arises again whether we are still dealing with the same subject under these conditions! (s) E.g. "Is it the same subject for which this causal continuity applies?" etc.). Nagel: E.g. "Would this future experience indeed be my experience?" III 106 Person/Identity/NagelVsMetaphysics: even assuming a metaphysical ego, the question arises again. If, on the other hand, temporal identity was given solely by that it is still my ego, it cannot be the individual whose persistence guarantees my personal identity. Outside perspective: here, the problem seems not to exist anymore: people arise and pass in time and that is how they must be described! Subjective Perspective: here, the question of identity appears to have a content that cannot be grasped from any external description. III 107 You can inwardly ask about your identity by simply concentrating on your current experiences and determining the temporal extent of their subject. For the concept of the self is a psychological one. III 124 NagelVsMetaphysics/Problem: as soon as these things become part of the objective reality, the old problems arise again for them! It does not help us to enrich our image of the objective world by what the subjective perspective reveals to us, because the problem is not that anything has been omitted. This also applies to the prophecy (brain research) that the mental phenomena as soon as we will have understood them systematically, will be counted among the physical phenomena. NagelVsPhysicalism: we cannot solve these problems by incorporating everything in the objective (or even only the physical) world that is not already contained in it. Perhaps distancing and transcendence does simply not lead to a better description of the world. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Nagel, Th. | Stalnaker Vs Nagel, Th. | I 20 Objective Self/Nagel/Stalnaker: Nagel begins with the expression of a general sense of confusion about one's place in an impersonal world. I: if somebody says "I am RS" it seems that the person expresses a fact. I 21 Important argument: it is an objective fact whether such a statement is true or false, regardless of what the speaker thinks. Problem: our concept of the objective world seems to leave no place for such a fact! A full representation of the world as it is in itself will not pick out any particular person as me. (single out). It will not tell me who I am. Semantic diagnosis: attempts a representation of index words or self-localization as a solution. NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: that does not get to the heart of the matter. StalnakerVsNagel: a particular variant can solve our particular problem here but many others remain with regard to the relation between a person and the world they inhabited, namely what exactly the subjective facts about the experience tell us how the world in itself is Self-identification/Self-localisation/belief/Stalnaker: nothing could be easier: if EA says on June 5, 1953 "I am a philosopher" then that is true iff EA is a philosopher on June 5, 1953. Problem: what is the content of the statement? Content/truth conditions/tr.cond./Self-identification/I/Stalnaker: the content, the information is not recognized through tr.cond. if the tr.cond. are made timeless and impersonal. ((s) The truth conditions for self-identification or self-localization are not homophonic! That means they are not the repetition of "I'm sick" but they need to be complemented by place, date and information about the person so that they are timeless and capable of truth. Problem/Stalnaker: the speaker could have believed what he said, without even knowing the date and place at all or his audience could understand the statement without knowing the date, etc.. Solution: semantic diagnosis needs a representation of subjective or contextual content. Nagel: is in any case certain that he rejects the reverse solution: an ontological perspective that objectifies the self-.properties. Stalnaker: that would be something like the assertion that each of us has a certain irreducible self-property with which he is known. ((s) >bug example, Wittgenstein dito), tentatively I suppose that that could be exemplified in the objectification of the phenomenal character of experience. I 253 Self/Thomas Nagel/Stalnaker: Nagel finds it surprising that he of all people must be from all Thomas Nagel. Self/subjective/objective/Stalnaker: general problem: to accommodate the position of a person in a non-centered idea of an objective world. It is not clear how to represent this relation. Self/I/Nagel/Stalnaker: e.g. "I am TN". Problem: it is not clear why our world has space for such facts. Dilemma: a) such facts must exist because otherwise things would be incomplete b) they cannot exist because the way things are they do not contain such facts. (Nagel 1986, 57). Self/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: unsatisfactory: NagelVsOntological solution: wants to enrich the objective, centerless world in a wrong way. Nagel: center position thesis: There is an objective self. StalnakerVsNagel: this is difficult to grasp and neither necessary nor helpful. I 254 Semantic diagnosis/StalnakerVsNagel: has more potential than Nagel assumes. My plan is: 1. semantic diagnosis 2. sketch of a metaphysical solution 3. objective self is a mistake 4. general problem of subjective viewpoints 5. context-dependent or subjective information - simple solution for qualitative experiences. Self/subjective/objective/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: (in Stalnaker's version): This does not include that "I am TN" is supposedly without content. StalnakerVsNagel: the identity of the first person is not "automatically and therefore uninteresting". semantic diagnosis: starts with the tr.cond. WB: "I am F" expressed by XY is true iff XY is F. What information is transmitted with it? I 255 Content/information/self/identity/Stalnaker: a solution: if the following is true: Belief/conviction/Stalnaker: are sets of non-centered poss.w. Content/self-ascription/Stalnaker: is then a set of centered poss.w. E.g. I am TN is true iff it is expressed by TN, Content: is represented by the set of centered poss.w. that have TN as their marked object. Content/conviction/Lewis/Stalnaker: with Lewis belief contents can also be regarded as properties. (Lewis 1979). I 257 Semantic diagnosis/NagelVsSemantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: "It does not make the problem go away". Stalnaker: What is the problem then? Problem/Nagel: an appropriate solution would have to bring the subjective and objective concepts into harmony. I 258 StalnakerVsNagel: for that you would have to better articulate the problem's sources than Nagel does. Analogy. E.g. suppose a far too simple skeptic says: "Knowledge implies truth so you can only know necessary truths". Vs: which is a confusion of different ranges of modality. VsVs: the skeptic might then reply "This diagnosis is not satisfactory because it does not make the problem go away". Problem/Stalnaker: general: a problem may turn out to be more sophisticated, but even then it can only be a linguistic trick. Illusion/explanation/problem/Stalnaker: it is not enough to realize that an illusion is at the root of the problem. Some illusions are persistent, we feel their existence even after they are explained. But that again does not imply that it is a problem. I 259 Why-questions/Stalnaker: e.g. "Why should it be possible that..." (e.g. that physical brain states cause qualia). Such questions only make sense if it is more likely that the underlying is not possible. I 260 Self-deception/memory loss/self/error/Stalnaker: e.g. suppose TN is mistaken about who he is, then he does not know that TN itself has the property to be TN even though he knows that TN has the self-property of TN! (He does not know that he himself is TN.) He does not know that he has the property which he calls "to be me". ((s) "to be me" is to refer here only to TN not to any speaker). objective/non-centered world/self/Stalnaker: this is a fact about the objective, non-centered world and if he knows it he knows who he is. Thus the representative of the ontological perspective says. Ontological perspective/StalnakerVsNagel/StalnakerVsVs: the strategy is interesting: first, the self is objectified - by transforming self-localizing properties into characteristics of the non-centered world. Then you try to keep the essential subjective character by the subjective ability of detecting. I 263 Nagel: thesis: because the objective representation has a subject there is also its possible presence in the world and that allows me to bring together the subjective and objective view. StalnakerVsNagel: I do not see how that is concluded from it. Why should from the fact that I can think of a possible situation be concluded that I could be in it? Fiction: here there are both, participating narrator and the narrator from outside, omniscient or not. I 264 Semantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: may be sufficient for normal self-localization. But Nagel wants more: a philosophical thought. StalnakerVsNagel: I do not think there is more to a philosophical thought here than to the normal. Perhaps there is a different attitude (approach) but that requires no difference in the content! Subjective content/Stalnaker: (as it is identified by the semantic diagnosis) seems to be a plausible candidate to me. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Skepticism | McGinn Vs Skepticism | I174 Skepticism: a) first person perspective: limits to my knowledge coincide with the limits of my phenomenal experience. b) third person perspective: biological limit. How can we as a few pounds of meat permeated by nerve get an image of the outside world? I 176 McGinnVsSkepticism: uses the idea that there is a metaphysical gap between the subject and the object of knowledge. a) for the first-person stance: between the states of consciousness and the conditions in the outside world. b) for the third person: the gap is to be perceived as if a part of the objective world opposed another part of the world, while both parts each have their own characteristics. We need to prove that despite these gaps knowledge is possible, and that the gaps are not as detrimental to knowledge as it seems. I 191 McGinnVsSkepticism: its brittle core consists of two problematic ideas: 1. The idea of a possible content of attentive consciousness. 2. concept of the rationality of our inferences. I 193 If the premises are not enough logically, we are worried about the underdetermination through evidence. Often we intuitively deem a certain conclusion correct. This intuitive accuracy is an example of a classical philosophical riddle: there is an inexplicable transition from one kind of things to another type without clear principles being available to justify this stretch. Then we talk about innovation and creativity. I 196 McGinnVsSkepticism: the skeptic misinterprets our principle inability at the level of meta-theory as a case of irrationality on the basic level. I 196 McGinnVsSkepticism: a 3rd point is the viability of our cognitive practices. Does the way how we arrive at our beliefs entail a clue that this were deeply irrational? If it were, the problem would be far more drastic than the mere absence of justifications. I 199 transcendental naturalismVsSkepticism: the falsity of the skeptical position can only be seen from outside our system of concepts. It has to be explained psychologically, only that this explanation is beyond our capabilities. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Subject Philosophy | Habermas Vs Subject Philosophy | I 119 Philosophy of the Subject: (HabermasVs, NietzscheVs,) ... the nihilistic domination of subject-centered reason is conceived as result and expression of a perverseness of the will to power. I 180 ...the existence is justified out of itself. Thus, Heidegger conceives the world as a process again only from the subjectivity of the will self-assertion. This is the dead-end of the philosophy of the subject. It does not matter whether primacy is given to epistemological questions or the question of being. The monological execution of intentions, i.e. purpose activity is considered as the primary form of action. (VsCommunication). The objective world remains the point of reference. (Model of the cognitive relation). I 309 HabermasVsSubject Philosophy: the attempt to escape the unfortunate alternatives always ends in the entanglements of self-deifying subject consuming itself in acts of futile self-transcendence. Since Kant, the I simultaneously takes the position of an empirical subject in the world where it finds itself as an object among others. In the position of a transcendental subject it faces is a world as a whole which its constitutes itself as the totality of the objects of possible experiences. The attempts to understand these irreconcilable alternatives as self-generation of the mind or of the genus range from Hegel to Merleau-Ponty. HabermasVsHegel: because these hybrid undertakings pursue the utopia of complete self-knowledge, they keep turning into positivism. (Today: the body-soul problem). I 435 LuhmannVsSubject Philosophy: "Simple minds want to counter this with ethics." (Habermas: not without scorn.). HabermasVsSubject Philosophy: overall social awareness as a superordinate subject, it creates a zero-sum game in which the room for maneuver of individuals cannot be accommodated properly. ((s) Every social conflict would appear as schizophrenia.) Habermas: Solution: alternative concept strategy: public communities can be understood as a higher-level intersubjectivities. In this aggregated public there is also an overall social consciousness. This no longer needs to fulfill the precision requirements of the philosophy of the subject to the self-consciousness! Luhmann II 136 Subject Philosophy/Habermas: Problem: in philosophical discussions, ideological criticism not even survives the simplest self-application. At most, it can explain why someone is wrong, but it cannot show that there is a mistake. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Vs Skepticism | Austin, J.L. | Stroud I 42 AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes/Stroud: (Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, 1962, 4-5) one arrives at the source of Descartes' skeptical conclusion by uncovering a series of misunderstandings and (especially verbal) errors and fallacies. I 44 Knowledge/Philosophy/Everyday/Austin/Stroud: (Austin Other Minds, (Phil.Papers 1961,45) These typical philosophical investigations are carried out from our normal (everyday) practice. I 45 Austin Thesis: "enough is enough": i.e. not everything has to be said. It is not always necessary to prove that this goldfinch is not a stuffed bird. (OM 52). I 48 Dream/AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes: it is about Descartes' strong thesis that we cannot know if we are not dreaming. Without it, skepticism would be disarmed. Austin's nuclear thesis Method/Everyday Language/AustinVsDescartes: can it be shown ((s) >Manifestation) that Descartes with his strong thesis violates the normal standards or conditions for knowledge? I 51 Misconception/Deception/Austin: thesis "you cannot always deceive all people". I 64 StroudVsAustin: the accusation of AustinVsSkepticism (AustinVsDescartes) that the meaning of "Knowledge" has been distorted in everyday use can only be raised if it can be shown that a certain usage of language, a certain concept and the relation between them has been misinterpreted. Stroud: that is what I meant by the fact that the source of Descartes' demand reveals something deep and important. I 76 Stroud: this leads us to the depth and importance of skepticism. It is about much more than deciding if you know something about the world around you, it is about our practice (actions) and reflection of our knowledge (self-knowledge). Can we take a distant position here? I 82 Skepticism/Source/Stroud: Thesis: The source of the philosophical problem of the outside world lies somewhere in our notion of an objective world or our desire to understand our relation to the world. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Realität | Nagel, Th. | III 109 Nagel: something does not need to have a place in the objective world in order to be recognized as real. III 28f Reality / Nagel: the reality is more than only the objective reality. III 30 The world is not my world nor our world ( this applies not even to the mental world). |
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| Skepticism | Stroud, B. | Rorty VI 223 Skepticism/Stroud: Thesis: Skepticism appeals to something that lies deep in our nature. Therefore it is a serious and important thing. Descartes' demand that the dream possibility must be cleared out corresponds exactly to our normal, everyday knowledge-requirements. I 82 Skepticism/Source/Stroud: Thesis: The source of the philosophical problem of the outside world lies somewhere in our notion of an objective world or our desire to understand our relation to the world. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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