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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kant | Höffe | Höffe I 302 Kant/Höffe:. Critics of [Kant] (...) like to focus on some rightly objectionable views such as discrimination against both women and people without any property. Last but not least, Kant is criticized for his defence of the death penalty. Höffe: But the objectionable views do not arise easily from the main concern of legal and state theory, a justification of law and state that dispenses with all theological and empirical elements and operates solely on the basis of principles of a purely (legal) practical reason. Prehistory: Methodologically, Kant's legal and constitutional thinking belongs to modern natural law as critical rational law, i.e. to the tradition that leads from Hobbes via Spinoza, Pufendorf and Locke to Thomasius, Wolff and Achenwall. >Th. Hobbes, >B. Spinoza, >J. Locke. Höffe: The incriminated views do not even hit the core of Kant's political conviction, a living together in freedom determined by the a priori idea of law. Even less can they be justified by rational law. Höffe I 103 Political order: [Kant] (...) was the first of the Western philosophers to draft detailed principles of a globally valid legal and peace order consisting of the three dimensions of state law, international law, and world civil law. >International law, >Cosmopolitanism. KantVsUtilitarianism: In contrast to the empirical-social pragmatic theories of the later powerful utilitarianism, Kant represents a normative concept of law and state that gets by without empirical elements and is not oriented toward well-being. Rather, he will commit the coexistence of people to the claim of pure practical reason. This strict concept of reason includes an unrestricted "shall", a categorical legal imperative (...). >Utilitarianism, >Categorical imperative, >Principles, >Norms. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Legal Positivism | Weber | Habermas III 355 Legal positivism/Weber/Habermas: Weber defines modern law and legal rule so narrowly that the principle of need for justification is ignored in favour of the principle of statutes. Weber emphasizes above all the structural characteristics that are connected with the formalism of a technically systematized law and with the positivity of set norms (characteristics: positivity, legality and formality). HabermasVsWeber: Weber neglects the moment of need for justification. In doing so, he excludes the very rational ideas that arose with the right of reason in the 17th century and have since been characteristic, if not for all legal norms, then nevertheless for the legal system as a whole, especially for the public-law foundations of legal rule. >Rational law, >Rationality, >Rationalism, >Law, >Justification, >Ultimate justification. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Sense | Weber | Habermas III 22 Sense/Rationality/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber's hierarchy of action terms is based on the type of purpose-driven action, so that all other actions can be classified as specific deviations from this type. >Purpose rationality. Weber analyzes the method of understanding the sense in such a way that the more complex cases can be related to the borderline case of understanding purpose-rational action: The understanding of the subjectively success-oriented action requires at the same time its objective evaluation (according to standards of correctness rationality). >Success, >Rightness, >Rationality. Habermas III 229 Sense/Weber/Habermas: the empirical and completely mathematically oriented world view develops in principle the rejection of any viewpoint that asks for a 'sense' at all of the inner world happening. Wherever rational empirical recognition has consistently carried out the de-enchantment of the world and its transformation into a causal mechanism, tension finally emerges against the claims of the ethical postulate: that the world is a God-ordered, thus a somehow ethically meaningful cosmos. (1) >Ethics, >Justification, >Ultimate justification. Habermas III 315 Sense/Rationality/Weber/Habermas: That the world as a cosmos meets the requirements of rational religious ethics, or has some 'meaning', had nothing more to do with religious recognition. The cosmos of natural causality and the postulated cosmos of ethical equal causality were incompatible. The intellect created an unbrotherly aristocracy of rational cultural heritage independent of all personal ethical qualities of human beings.(2) >Protestant Ethics/Weber, Rationalization/Weber. HabermasVsWeber: this explanation of social rationalization is unsatisfactory: Weber fails to prove that a principle-driven moral consciousness can only survive in religious contexts. Habermas III 335/336 Sense/Weber/Habermas: Weber, Thesis of the loss of meaning: in view of the rational laws of modern life orders, both the ethical and theoretical unification of the world - whether in the name of religion or in the name of science - is no longer possible. >Unity, >Unification. Weber sees (in reference to the late work of J. St. Mill) a new polytheism, an objective figure of an antagonism between impersonal value and life orders. (3) Habermas: this reflects the generation-typical experience of nihilism. >Nihilism. Habermas III 337 Habermas: Weber justifies the thesis of the loss of meaning in this way: reason itself splits into a plurality of value spheres and destroys its own universality. The individual should now try to create this unit, which objectively can no longer be produced, in the privacy of his/her own biography. >Value spheres. Habermas III 377 Sense/Weber/Habermas: Weber introduces "sense" as an (undefined) basic concept for defining action. Thus, Weber has no theory of meaning behind him, but an intentionalist theory of consciousness. I.e. he does not refer to linguistic understanding but to the opinions and intentions of a subject of action. Habermas III 378 So it is a matter of purposive action, not communication. Communication can then only be constructed secondarily with the help of a concept of intention. (4) 1. M. Weber, M. Weber, Die protestantische Ethik, (Ed) J. Winckelmann, Vol. 2, Hamburg 1972, p. 569. 2. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I. 1963, p. 569. 3.M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, (Ed) J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1968, p. 603f. 4.M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, (Ed) J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, p. 3. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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