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Artworks | Flusser | Rötzer I 66/67 Artwork/Flusser: The second principle of thermodynamics has to be interpreted in such a way that the interesting things become increasingly rare. For works of art are not based on any theory, especially not on the information theory, they remain relatively uninformative and likely. >Second law of thermodynamics, >Information, >Probability, >Events, >Order. Flusser: it is not the size of works of art that is to be denied, but the production of them is to be freed from their mystical aura in order to be able to better estimate their size. >Aura. I 68 What does an author do? He collects information that he finds in already produced works according to criteria of his time, to which he adds information from a concrete life. Among the self-acquired information may also be noises, i. e. previously unavailable information. Rötzer I 70 Art making needs to be mechanized and theorized. (Ethics, behaviour and aesthetics, experience are never separated). >Ethics, >Behavior, >Aesthetics, >Experiences. Common sense/Flusser: Common sense proves to be a reactionary element here. Characteristic of the present. >Conservatism, >Present. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 Rötz I F. Rötzer Kunst machen? München 1991 |
Autonomy | Feyerabend | I 43 Principle of Autonomy/Feyerabend: collecting the facts for examination purposes is the only thing left for the scientist to do. If facts exist and are available, regardless of whether alternatives to the theory under consideration are looked at. Principle of the relative autonomy of facts. (versus theories). >Theories, >Facts. The principle does not mean that the discovery and description of facts is entirely theory-independent, but that the facts belonging to the empirical content of a theory are available, regardless of whether alternatives to this theory are taken into account. >Discoveries, >Empirical content. ((s) I.e. that facts are autonomous, independent of theories.) I 44 FeyerabendVsAutonomy Principle: this principle is far too simple a point of view. Facts and theories are much more closely linked than the principle of autonomy wants to admit. E.g. it is known today that the Brownian particles are a perpetuum mobile of the second kind, and that its existence refutes the second law of thermodynamics. (Henning GenzVs: that is not true.) Could this relationship between movement and theory have been shown or directly discovered? Two questions: 1) Could the relevance of the movement have been discovered in this way? 2) Could it have been shown to disprove the 2nd law of thermodynamics? ((s) Nonsense: to »observe« relevance). >Relevance. Each thermometer is subject to fluctuations which are the same as the Brownian movement. The actual refutation came about in a completely different way: with the help of the kinetic theory and its use by Einstein in his calculation of the statistical properties of the Brownian movement. In this refutation the consistency condition was violated: the phenomenological theory was incorporated into the larger framework of statistical physics. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
Cybernetics | Wiener | II 13 Cybernetics/Wiener: This is about machines for communication, some of which reveal the uncanny ability to imitate human behaviour and thereby possibly show the existence of enormous possibilities to replace the humans in such cases where they react relatively slowly and imperfectly; we are faced with the need to discuss the forces of these machines, insofar as they affect people, and the consequences of this new and fundamental technical revolution. >Machine learning. >Artificial intelligence, >Artificial consciousness, >Human machine communication. II 20 Cybernetics is concerned with messages and, in particular, regulatory messages. >Feedback, >Communication. II 26 Thesis: the working methods of the living individual and those of some newer communication machines run completely parallel. In both, the living being and the machine, information processing is used to have an effect on the outside world. >Information processing. In both cases, the activity carried out on the outside world and not only the intended activity is reported back to the central regulatory apparatus. II 81 Second principle of thermodynamics/cybernetics: the cybernetic form of the second principle is that information can be lost but not gained. >Second law of thermodynamics. |
WienerN I Norbert Wiener Cybernetics, Second Edition: or the Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine Cambridge, MA 1965 WienerN II N. Wiener The Human Use of Human Beings (Cybernetics and Society), Boston 1952 German Edition: Mensch und Menschmaschine Frankfurt/M. 1952 |
Evolution | Vollmer | I 51 Evolutionary Epistemology/Vollmer: in the evolution of science, there are no "mutations" because there is no "offspring" in scientific theories. Evolutionary epistemology is only useful insofar as subjective knowledge structures are inherited. >Success, >Pragmatism, >Proofs, >Provability. I 75 The evolutionary epistemology does not have the concept of truth of pragmatism - it is not proven by success. Success/Vollmer: only proves that the hypothesis was not entirely wrong. >Hypotheses. I 217 VsEvolution theory/VsDarwinismus. Circular. VollmerVsVs: it is wrong that "Fitness" can be defined without recourse to "surviving". >Survival, >Fitness. I 260 Fitness is not determined by the survival of the individual, but by reproductive success, more food, more habitat, more partners, more offspring, etc. I 264 Entropy/Evolution/life/Vollmer: contrary to popular belief it is not always a measure of disorder. >Entropy. Under special conditions (low total energy and existence of lasting interactions or inclusion by external forces) the increase in entropy even includes an increase of order and structure - thus the second law does not contradict the origin of living things. >Life, >Energy, >Order. I 279 Adaptation/selection/VsEvolutionary Epistemology is no falsification - the original eye is not falsyfied by the eye of the eagle - proper mapping does not matter - transferring the selection theory on cognitive skills can only succeed if there is objective truth and if knowledge is more useful than error (Simmel, 1895) - VollmerVsVs: this is not an argument VsEvolution - no matter who is adapting to whom - Co-adaption. I 298 Evolution/success/Vollmer: the accuracy of knowledge cannot be inferred from evolutionary success - otherwise naturalistic fallacy - confusion of facts with norms. >Naturalistic fallacy, >Norms, >Facts. --- II 190 Evolution/time direction/Vollmer: due to cosmic expansion there are no two moments of evolution identical - (> time arrow). |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
Falsification | Kuhn | I 90 Falsification/KuhnVsPopper: In the history of science, there is no example of falsification by comparison with nature - for those who have committed themselves to Newton's theory, his second law is simply a purely logical statement that cannot be contradicted by observations. >Science/Kuhn, >Paradigm, >Observation, >Confirmation, >Verification. --- I 157 Falsification/KuhnVsPopper: Anomalous experiences may not be equated with falsifying ones. I believe that the latter do not exist at all - on the one hand there is too much variation - on the other hand: if only major deviations lead to the rejection of a theory, there is no criterion. >Criteria/Kuhn, >Experience/Kuhn. --- I 158 Falsification is always after the event - but then it might as well be called verification of a new paradigm. >Paradigm/Kuhn. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 |
Information | Wiener | II 83 Information/Language/Wiener: it is theoretically possible to develop the statistics of semantic and behavioural language in such a way that we obtain a good measure of the amount of information in each system. >Language, >Meaning, >Semantics, >Language behavior. In any case, we can generally show that phonetic language contains less overall information in relation to the input of data... II 84 or in any case it does not contain more than the transmission system leading to the ear and that semantic and behavioural language contains even less information. This fact is a form of the second principle of thermodynamics and is only valid if we consider the transferred information at each stage as maximum information that could be transmitted with an appropriately encrypted receiving system. >Second law of thermodynamics. II 121 The right of ownership of information suffers from the necessary disadvantage that information intended to contribute to the general state of the Community's information must say something substantially different from the community's previous general possession of information. >Innovation, >Message, >Communication. II 122 The idea that information can be stacked in a changing world without noticeably reducing its value is wrong. >Change, >Knowledge. II 123 Information is more of a dynamic matter than a stacking affair. II 124 The time factor is essential in all assessments of the information value. Brockman I 155 Information/Wiener/Kaiser: [Wiener borrowed Shannon’s insight]: if information was like entropy, then it could not be conserved – or contained. >Information/Shannon, >Entropy. Conclusion/Wiener: it was folly for military leaders to try to stockpile the “Scientific know-how of the nation in static libraries and laboratories.”(1) Brockman I 156 Since “information and entropy are not conserved,” they are “equally unsuited to being commodities.”(2) Brockman I 157 KaiserVsWiener: what Wiener had in mind, was not what Shannon meant with “information”. Wiener’s treatment of “information” sounded more like Matthew Arnold in 1869(3) than Claude Shannon in 1948—more “body and spirit” than “bit.” >Body, >Mind. Brockman I 158 [Today] [i]n many ways, Wiener has been proved right. His vision of networked feedback loops driven by machine-to-machine communication has become a mundane feature of everyday life. >Machine learning, >Human machine communication, >Robots, >Artificial intelligence. 1. Wiener, N. (1950) The Human Use of Human Beings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 2. ibid. 3. Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, ed. Jane Garnett (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006). Kaiser, David “”Information” for Wiener, for Shannon, and for Us” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. Brockman I 179 Information/Wiener/Hillis: “Information is a name for the content of what is exchanged with the outer world as we adjust to it, and make our Brockman I 179 adjustment felt upon it.” In his words, information is what we use to “live effectively within that environment.”(1) For Wiener, information is a way for the weak to effectively cope with the strong. >Outer world, >Inner world, >Behavior, >Adaptation, >Niches. 1. Wiener, N. (1950) The Human Use of Human Beings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 17-18. Hillis, D. W. “The First Machine Intelligences” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
WienerN I Norbert Wiener Cybernetics, Second Edition: or the Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine Cambridge, MA 1965 WienerN II N. Wiener The Human Use of Human Beings (Cybernetics and Society), Boston 1952 German Edition: Mensch und Menschmaschine Frankfurt/M. 1952 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
Laws | Kuhn | I 195 Law/Definition/Correction/Corrigibility/Kuhn: Laws can be corrected step by step, definitions can only be discarded completely as they are tautologies. I 199 But: e.g. Newton's second law of motion is generally written as F = ma - which does not imply that anyone would at least agree with the meaning or the application. >Laws of nature, >Progress, >Science, >Definition. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 |
Life | Mayr | I 21 Life/Mayr: in reality it is only the process of being-alive (as opposed to death) made to a thing, and does not exist as an independent entity! One can even attempt to explain that being-alive as a process can be the product of molecules that are not themselves alive. Life: what is "life", has been strongly controversial since the 16th century. A group always claims that living organisms did not really differ from non-living matter: the physicalists. Vitalists: living organisms have properties that inanimate matter lacks, which is why biological theories and concepts cannot be reduced to the laws of physics and chemistry. >Physicalism, >Vitalism. Today it is clear that both groups were, in a sense, right and wrong. Today: "Organism": unites the most useful from both and rejects the extremes. I 46 Life/Mayr: can be synthesized in the laboratory. Principally open systems, therefore subjected to the second main sentence of thermodynamics. Cf. >St. Kauffman, >Second Law of Thermodynamics. I 349 Def Life/Mayr: Activities of self-developed systems, controlled by a genetic program. >Self-organisation. Def Life/Rensch(1): Living beings are hierarchically ordered, open systems, predominantly organic compounds, which normally appear as circumscribed, cell-structured individuals of temporally limited constancy. Def Life/Sattler 1986(2): an open system that replicates and regulates itself, shows individuality, and subsists on energy from the environment. MayrVs: all contain superfluous and do not go into the genetic program, which is perhaps the most important. More description than definition. 1. R. Sattler (1986). Biophilosophy. Berlin: Springer. S. 228. 2. B. Rensch (1968). Biophilosophie. Stuttgart: G. Fischer. S. 54. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
Many-Worlds Interpretation | Kanitscheider | II 122 Many-worlds-interpretation/coincidence/existence/life/Kanitscheider: Brandon Carter 1974(1) Suggestion: to accept an ensemble of worlds in which a real subset has a life-favorable tuning of the constants. The fact that our world belongs to the knowable subset is then logically necessary, otherwise we could not make such a consideration. ((s) Reversal: many worlds instead of a one-off coincidence. The anthropic principle works in reverse). Kanitscheider: This reduces the astonishment that we exist. Cf. >Anthropic principle. Many worlds/Epicurus(2): There are countless worlds, some similar to ours, some dissimilar. After all, atoms are not built for one world, nor for a limited number of worlds. Nothing stands in the way of the assumption of an infinite number of worlds. II 123 Many worlds/Giordano Bruno(3): It is a general, empty, immeasurable space in which countless globes float like this one. Space is infinite because there is no reason or possibility to limit it. Many worlds/Huygens(4): (1629 - 1695): "Principle of Plenitudo" as justification. Nature harbors unlimited potential, one would restrict its creative power too much if one only assumed one world. Many worlds/tradition/Kanitscheider: In traditional theses, very different ideas are assumed, some of these worlds are presented as alien planets, but always with a causal connection among these "worlds". Many worlds/modern cosmology/Kanitscheider: causal decoupling is assumed here. Among other things, because of infinite distances. >Causality. Many worlds/laws of nature/George Gamov(5): One could assume that the fundamental laws of relativity, quantum mechanics and thermodynamics apply to all worlds, but the natural constants have different values. >Natural constants. II 124 Some of these worlds are perfectly imaginable, while others, which are logically possible simply because they contain no internal contradictions, elude our imagination. Many worlds/Kanitscheider: Which processes take place in worlds with any but constant legal structure can hardly be determined. But you can override individual laws in a thought experiment. Eg second law suspended: anti-entropic worlds already have such bizarre properties that we probably cannot understand them properly. Empiricism/observation/Kanitscheider: Even in very close areas there are zones that are inaccessible to measuring devices for physical reasons. E.g. the interior of the sun. We will never observe it directly. >Quantum mechanics, >Measuring. II 125 Many worlds/Kanitscheider: If there was a proof from the principles of physics that quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity are the only ones that make our world possible, the matter would have been superfluous. But there is no such proof whatsoever. Simplicity/Theory/Kanitscheider: Whether the one-world hypothesis is the simplest depends on the respective theoretical situation. For example, in chaotic inflation, where quantum fluctuations in high-dimensional superspace represent the natural state of reality, a single world would be a difficult assumption. Many Worlds Interpretation/EWG/Everett(6)(9)/Wheeler/Graham: here the wave function contains all possibilities of states in superposition. Quantum cosmology/Kanitscheider: The traditional separation of measuring device, observer and object cannot be maintained here, since there is no outside. >Quantum mechanics. Everett/Wheeler/Graham/EWG: This thesis now proposes that the state vector (the geometric counterpart of the wave function in Hilbert space) never collapses. Instead, splitting up into parallel worlds. >Wave function. II 126 Simplicity/Theory/Kanitscheider: In view of the many-worlds interpretation, one can ask which quantum mechanics of measurement should be considered simpler: 1. The one that works with an acausal, discontinuous, untimely, indeterministic collapse process, or 2. The one that is based on a more comprehensive reality, but also on a deterministic, causal, continuous, dynamically describable measurement process. >Simplicity. Elementary particle physics/today/Kanitscheider: Everything that is not forbidden actually occurs. So decays that do not violate the conservation laws. >Conservation laws. Many Worlds/Sciama(7): The theory means no violation of Occam's razor if one interprets this as the lowest number of restrictions that are compatible with the observational material. Cf. >Conservativity. II 127 Einzigigkeit/Leibniz(8): Metaphysical justification: there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God. >Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Cf. >Possible Worlds. 1. Brandon Carter (1974). Large Number Coincidence amd the Anthropic Principle in Cosmology. In: M.S. Longair (Ed): Cosmological Theories in Confrontation with Cosmological Data. In: International Astronomical Union Symposium Nr. 63. Dordrecht. pp.291-298. 2. Diogenes Laertius: LEben und Meinungen berühmter Philosophen. Buch X, 45, 2. Aufl. Hamburg: Meiner. 1967. S. 243f. 3. Giordano Bruno: De L'infinito universo et mondi. Zitiert nach: A. Koyré: Von der geschlossenen Welt zum unendlichen Universum. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. 1969. 4. Ch. Huyghens;: The Celestial Worlds discovered: or, Conjectures concerning the inhabitants, planets and productions of the worlds in the planets. London 1698. 5. George Gamov: Mr. Tompkins seltsame Reisen durch Kosmos und Mikrokosmos. Braunschweig: Vieweg 1980. 6. B. S. DeWitt: The Everett-Wheeler-Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. In: C. DeWitt/J.A. Wheeler (eds.): Bettelle Rencontres, 1967, Lectures in Mathematics and Physics. New York: W.A. Benjamin 1968, S. 318-332 7. D.W. Sciama: The Anthropic Principle and the non-uniqueness of the Universe. In: F. Bertola/U. CUri (eds.): The Anthropic Principle. Cambridge: UP 1993, pp. 107-110. 8. G.W. Leibniz: Monadologie. Hamburg: Meiner 1976 § 53. 9. Hugh Everett (1957). “Relative State” Formulation of Quantum Mechanics. In: Reviews of modern physics. Vol. 29, 1957, S. 454–462 |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
Objectivism | Economic Theories | Kurz I 20 Objectivism/Economic theories/Kurz: Physical concepts were widely discussed by economists in the late nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century. Economists thus responded to developments in the sciences, especially John Dalton’s elaboration of the ‘atomic theory’ in chemistry. This theory was based on two laws: (i) the Law of the conservation of mass; and (ii) the Law of definite proportions. The latter stated that in a given chemical compound, the elements are always combined in the same proportion by mass. The first Law met largely with approval amongst economists which, however, did not necessarily mean much. More surprisingly, even the second Law appealed to some economists. It was discussed, for example, by Pantaleoni (1894, pp. 99 et seq.), whose work Sraffa had meticulously studied while still in Italy. Heinz D. Kurz and Neri Salvadori 2015. „Input–output analysis from a wider perspective. A comparison of the early works of Leontief and Sraffa“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
Objectivism | Leontief | Kurz I 20 Objectivism/Sraffa/Kurz: As [Sraffa’s] unpublished papers document in great detail, there were several stumbling blocks he had to remove on the way to developing a coherent theory of value and distribution exclusively in objectivist terms (quantities of materials, labour, etc.). These included, inter alia, the problems of how to deal with (i) durable instruments of production, (ii) scarce natural resources, such as land, and (iii) joint production. >Objectivism/Economic theories. Physical concepts were widely discussed by economists in the late nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century. Economists thus responded to developments in the sciences, especially John Dalton’s elaboration of the ‘atomic theory’ in chemistry. This theory was based on two laws: (i) the Law of the conservation of mass; and (ii) the Law of definite proportions. The latter stated that in a given chemical compound, the elements are always combined in the same proportion by mass. The first Law met largely with approval amongst economists which, however, did not necessarily mean much. More surprisingly, even the second Law appealed to some economists. It was discussed, for example, by Pantaleoni (1894, pp. 99 et seq.)(1), whose work Sraffa had meticulously studied while still in Italy. SraffaVsPantaleoni: [Sraffa] insisted that the Law does not carry over from chemistry to economics essentially for two reasons. First, workers can subsist in different ways and yet produce the same kind of commodity. (Similarly, they can subsist in the same way and yet produce different kinds of commodities.) Second, one and the same commodity can be produced using different methods of production which request the productive consumption of different means of production. >Production theory/Sraffa. 1. Pantaleoni, M. (1894) Principii di economia pura, 2nd edn (Firenze: Barbera). Heinz D. Kurz and Neri Salvadori 2015. „Input–output analysis from a wider perspective. A comparison of the early works of Leontief and Sraffa“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Leontief I Wassily Wassilyevich Leontief Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 60, pp. 577–623. 1928 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
Piketty | Economic Theories | Góes I 22 Piketty model/IMF/Góes(1): Piketty’s conclusion that inequality will increase in the future rests on the underlying assumption that, as growth decreases over time, driving the r − g spread to increase, capital-to-income ratios will increase. GoesVsPiketty: However, the results [from our testing models 2 an 3]* fail to show robust positive responses of capital share to shocks in r - g and cast doubt on Piketty’s conjecture. Elasticity: A possible reason for this is that Piketty could be underestimating diminishing returns of capital - thereby overestimating the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, whose empirical estimates tend to be much lower than what he assumes (cf. Rognlie 2014)(1). Krusell and Smith: This relationship is illustrated in this paper by the negative median responses of r - g to positive capital share shocks. Another less emphasized but equally important problem with Piketty’s conjecture is highlighted by Krusell and Smith (2015)(2), who argue that Piketty’s predictions are grounded on a flawed theory of savings - namely, that the savings rate net of depreciation is constant - which exacerbates the expected increase in capital-to-income ratios as growth rates tend to zero. They present an alternative model in which agents maximize inter-temporal utility and arrive in a setting in which, on an optimal growth path, the savings rate is pro-cyclical. By showing that the savings rate responds negatively to negative growth shocks (which, in turn, are translated into positive r−g shocks) for at least 75% of the countries in the sample, the results of [our] Model 3* provide empirical support to Krusell and Smith’s analysis. Piketty: Piketty (2012(3)) says in his online notes: “with g = 0%, we’re back to Marx apocalyptic conclusions,” in which capital share goes to 100% and workers take home none of the output. GóesVsPiketty: While this is logically consistent with the model’s assumptions, empirically there seem to be endogenous forces preventing that: non-negligible diminishing returns on capital and pro-cyclical changes in the savings rate. These are two different ways in which the transmission mechanism from r − g to the capital share might get stuck: with the former, at the limit the rate of return on capital tends to zero and there is no dynamic transmission; with the latter, if growth approaches zero, the savings might ultimately become zero, offsetting any effect of lower growth on capital share. They are, however, fundamentally different: the first regards the production function and technological change, while the second has to do life-cycle behavior of capital owners. Inequality: Regarding inequality, the results from [our] Model 1* contradict Piketty’s prediction stating that following exogenous shocks in r − g inequality should increase. Acemoglu and Robinson: In fact, for at least 75% of the countries in the sample, the result is negative. These findings are in line with previous results by Acemoglu and Robinson (2015)(4), who found negative coefficients in single-equation panel models when regressing r −g on the share of the top 1%. This paper goes further, not only because the model takes all variables as endogenous, but also because it incorporates tax variability across countries. MilanovicVsAcemoglu: Additionally, by decomposing between common and idiosyncratic shocks, rather than using time dummies, Model 1 does not throw away potentially important information about the effect of structural forces (e.g., globalization) on these dynamics —which, as Milanovic (2014)(5) argues, is a problem with Acemoglu and Robinson’s analysis. The fact that a positive r − g spread does not lead to higher inequality is not necessarily surprising. Góes I 23 MankivVsPiketty: As illustrated by Mankiw (2015)(6) through a standard model that incorporates taxation and depreciation, even if r > g, one can arrive in a steady state inequality which does not evolve into an endless inegalitarian spiral. MilanovicVsPiketty: Milanovic (2017, forthcoming) explains that the transmission mechanism between r > g and higher income inequality requires all of the following conditions to hold: (a) savings rates have to be sufficiently high; (b) capital income needs to more unequally distributed than labor income; and (c) a high correlation between drawing capital income and being on the top of the income distribution. In a dynamic fashion, this paper shows that this mechanism is getting stuck because the negative responses of the savings rate to r - g shocks violate the first condition, thereby preventing higher levels inequality when compared to those observed before the increases in r - g. Since estimated dynamics do not confirm Piketty’s theory, observed income inequality in many advanced economies over the past decades are probably explained by factors other than the spread between r and g. In fact, there is evidence that recent inequality trends are not related to the distribution of national income between factors of production but primarily to the rising inequality of labor income (cf. Francese and Mulas-Granados 2015)(7). Indeed, there are many potential explanations for the rising labor income inequality - as, for instance: Dabla-Norris et al. (2015)(8), after evaluating cross-country evidence, find that past changes in inequality in advanced economies are associated the most with two labor market changes: higher skill premia and lower union membership rates. Jaumotte and Buitron (2015) also present results that correlate changes in labor market institutions, particularly lower union density, with increases in income inequality in advanced economies. Aghion et al. (2015)(9) suggest innovation plays a significant role. If innovators are rewarded with higher incomes due to a temporary technological advantage (in a Schumpeterian fashion), inequality would be exacerbated. The authors show that innovation explains about a fifth of the higher inequality observed in the U.S. since 1975. Mare (2016)(10) and Greenwood et al. (2012)(11) argue that changes in mating behavior helped exacerbate income inequality. The probability that someone will marry another person with a similar socio-educational background (labeled “assortative mating”) increased in tandem with the rise in income inequality in U.S. in the recent decades. The interaction between higher skill premia and higher assortative mating exacerbates household income inequality, because the gap between higher and lower earners became larger and couples became more segregated. Chong and Gradstein (2007)(12) use a dynamic panel to show inequality tends to decrease as institutional quality improves. The underlying logic is that if the basic rules of economic behavior are not symmetrically enforced, the rich will have a higher chance to extract economic rents, thereby increasing inequality. Acemoglu and Robinson (2015)(4) make a similar argument. They say that economic institutions affect the distribution of skills in society, indirectly determining inequality patterns. Piketty: Some years after the publication of Capital(13), Piketty (2015)(14) himself recognized the “rise in labor income inequality in recent decades has evidently little to do with r - g, and it is clearly a very important historical development.” He nonetheless emphasized that a higher r - g spread will be important and will exacerbate future inequality changes. GóesVsPiketty: However, the results in this paper show that this is likely not to be the case. The results corroborate the idea that recent inequality changes are not explained by r - g but also that new shocks to r − g will likely not lead to higher inequality, as there is no evidence that shocks to r - g increase income inequality. Combined, the observed endogenous dynamics of r - g and the share of the top 1% and the capital share, respectively, cast doubt on the reasonability of Piketty’s prediction about inequality trends. Góes I 24 GoesVsPiketty: I found no evidence to corroborate the idea that the r-g gap drives the capital share in national income. Savings/cyclicality: There are endogenous forces overlooked by Piketty - particularly the cyclicality of the savings rate - which balance out predicted large increases in the capital share. Inequality: On inequality, the evidence against Piketty’s predictions is even stronger: for at least 75% of the countries, the response of inequality to increases in r - g has the opposite sign to that postulated by Piketty. These results are robust to different calculations of r - g. Regardless of taking the real return on capital as long-term sovereign bond yields, short-term interest rates or implied returns from national accounting tables, the dynamics move in the same direction. Additionally, including or excluding taxes does not alter the qualitative takeaways from the results either. *For the models in detail see https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16160.pdf 1. Rognlie, Matthew (2014). A note on Piketty and diminishing returns to capital. http://www.mit. edu/~mrognlie/piketty_diminishing_returns.pdf. Accessed: 11-Feb-2016. 2. Krusell, Per and Anthony Smith (2015). “Is Piketty’s ‘Second Law of Capitalism’ Fundamental?” In: Journal of Political Economy 123.4, pp. 725–748. doi: 10.1086/682574. 3. Piketty, Thomas (2012). ”Economics of Inequality. Course Notes: Models of Growth & Capital Accumulation. Is Balanced Growth Possible?”. http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fr/teaching/10/25. Accessed: 11-Feb-2016. 4. Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2015). “The Rise and Decline of General Laws of Capitalism”. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 29.1, pp. 3–28. doi: 10.1257/jep.29.1.3. 5. Milanovic, Branko (2014). My take on the Acemoglu-Robinson critique of Piketty. http://glineq. blogspot.com/2014/08/my-take-on-acemoglu-robinson-critique.html. Accessed: 11-Feb2016. 6. Mankiw, Greg (2015). “Yes, r > g. So What?” In: American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 105.5, pp. 43–47. doi: 10.1257/aer.p20151059. 7. Francese, Maura and Carlos Mulas-Granados (2015). Functional Income Distribution and Its Role in Explaining Inequality. IMF Working Paper 15/244. International Monetary Fund. doi: 10. 5089/9781513549828.001. 8. Dabla-Norris, Era et al. (2015). Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality: A Global Perspective. IMF Staff Discussion Note 15/13. International Monetary Fund. doi: 10.5089/9781513555188.006. 9. Aghion, Philippe et al. (2015). Innovation and Top Income Inequality. Working Paper 21247. National Bureau of Economic Research. doi: 10.3386/w21247. 10. Mare, Robert D. (2016). “Educational Homogamy in Two Gilded Ages: Evidence from Inter-generational Social Mobility Data”. In: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 663.1, pp. 117–139. doi: 10.1177/0002716215596967. 11. Greenwood, Jeremy et al. (2012). Technology and the Changing Family: A Unified Model of Marriage, Divorce, Educational Attainment and Married Female Labor-Force Participation. Working Paper 17735. National Bureau of Economic Research. doi: 10.3386/w17735. 12. Chong, Alberto and Mark Gradstein (2007). “Inequality and Institutions”. In: The Review of Economics and Statistics 89.3, pp. 454–465. doi: 10.1162/rest.89.3.454. 13. Piketty, T. (2014), Capital in the 21st Century, Cambridge, MA: Belknap 14. Piketty, T. About Capital in the Twenty-First Century American Economic Review vol. 105, no. 5, May 2015(pp. 48–53) Carlos Góes. 2016. Testing Piketty’s Hypothesis on the Drivers of Income Inequality: Evidence from Panel VARs with Heterogeneous Dynamics. IMF Working Paper WP16/160 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16160.pdf |
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Piketty Hypothesis | Economic Theories | Góes I 22 Piketty model/IMF/Góes(1): Piketty’s conclusion that inequality will increase in the future rests on the underlying assumption that, as growth decreases over time, driving the r − g spread to increase, capital-to-income ratios will increase. GoesVsPiketty: However, the results [from our testing models 2 an 3]* fail to show robust positive responses of capital share to shocks in r - g and cast doubt on Piketty’s conjecture. Elasticity: A possible reason for this is that Piketty could be underestimating diminishing returns of capital - thereby overestimating the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, whose empirical estimates tend to be much lower than what he assumes (cf. Rognlie 2014)(1). Krusell and Smith: This relationship is illustrated in this paper by the negative median responses of r - g to positive capital share shocks. Another less emphasized but equally important problem with Piketty’s conjecture is highlighted by Krusell and Smith (2015)(2), who argue that Piketty’s predictions are grounded on a flawed theory of savings - namely, that the savings rate net of depreciation is constant - which exacerbates the expected increase in capital-to-income ratios as growth rates tend to zero. They present an alternative model in which agents maximize inter-temporal utility and arrive in a setting in which, on an optimal growth path, the savings rate is pro-cyclical. By showing that the savings rate responds negatively to negative growth shocks (which, in turn, are translated into positive r−g shocks) for at least 75% of the countries in the sample, the results of [our] Model 3* provide empirical support to Krusell and Smith’s analysis. Piketty: Piketty (2012(3)) says in his online notes: “with g = 0%, we’re back to Marx apocalyptic conclusions,” in which capital share goes to 100% and workers take home none of the output. GóesVsPiketty: While this is logically consistent with the model’s assumptions, empirically there seem to be endogenous forces preventing that: non-negligible diminishing returns on capital and pro-cyclical changes in the savings rate. These are two different ways in which the transmission mechanism from r − g to the capital share might get stuck: with the former, at the limit the rate of return on capital tends to zero and there is no dynamic transmission; with the latter, if growth approaches zero, the savings might ultimately become zero, offsetting any effect of lower growth on capital share. They are, however, fundamentally different: the first regards the production function and technological change, while the second has to do life-cycle behavior of capital owners. Inequality: Regarding inequality, the results from [our] Model 1* contradict Piketty’s prediction stating that following exogenous shocks in r − g inequality should increase. Acemoglu and Robinson: In fact, for at least 75% of the countries in the sample, the result is negative. These findings are in line with previous results by Acemoglu and Robinson (2015)(4), who found negative coefficients in single-equation panel models when regressing r −g on the share of the top 1%. This paper goes further, not only because the model takes all variables as endogenous, but also because it incorporates tax variability across countries. MilanovicVsAcemoglu: Additionally, by decomposing between common and idiosyncratic shocks, rather than using time dummies, Model 1 does not throw away potentially important information about the effect of structural forces (e.g., globalization) on these dynamics —which, as Milanovic (2014)(5) argues, is a problem with Acemoglu and Robinson’s analysis. The fact that a positive r − g spread does not lead to higher inequality is not necessarily surprising. Góes I 23 MankivVsPiketty: As illustrated by Mankiw (2015)(6) through a standard model that incorporates taxation and depreciation, even if r > g, one can arrive in a steady state inequality which does not evolve into an endless inegalitarian spiral. MilanovicVsPiketty: Milanovic (2017, forthcoming) explains that the transmission mechanism between r > g and higher income inequality requires all of the following conditions to hold: (a) savings rates have to be sufficiently high; (b) capital income needs to more unequally distributed than labor income; and (c) a high correlation between drawing capital income and being on the top of the income distribution. In a dynamic fashion, this paper shows that this mechanism is getting stuck because the negative responses of the savings rate to r - g shocks violate the first condition, thereby preventing higher levels inequality when compared to those observed before the increases in r - g. Since estimated dynamics do not confirm Piketty’s theory, observed income inequality in many advanced economies over the past decades are probably explained by factors other than the spread between r and g. In fact, there is evidence that recent inequality trends are not related to the distribution of national income between factors of production but primarily to the rising inequality of labor income (cf. Francese and Mulas-Granados 2015)(7). Indeed, there are many potential explanations for the rising labor income inequality - as, for instance: Dabla-Norris et al. (2015)(8), after evaluating cross-country evidence, find that past changes in inequality in advanced economies are associated the most with two labor market changes: higher skill premia and lower union membership rates. Jaumotte and Buitron (2015) also present results that correlate changes in labor market institutions, particularly lower union density, with increases in income inequality in advanced economies. Aghion et al. (2015)(9) suggest innovation plays a significant role. If innovators are rewarded with higher incomes due to a temporary technological advantage (in a Schumpeterian fashion), inequality would be exacerbated. The authors show that innovation explains about a fifth of the higher inequality observed in the U.S. since 1975. Mare (2016)(10) and Greenwood et al. (2012)(11) argue that changes in mating behavior helped exacerbate income inequality. The probability that someone will marry another person with a similar socio-educational background (labeled “assortative mating”) increased in tandem with the rise in income inequality in U.S. in the recent decades. The interaction between higher skill premia and higher assortative mating exacerbates household income inequality, because the gap between higher and lower earners became larger and couples became more segregated. Chong and Gradstein (2007)(12) use a dynamic panel to show inequality tends to decrease as institutional quality improves. The underlying logic is that if the basic rules of economic behavior are not symmetrically enforced, the rich will have a higher chance to extract economic rents, thereby increasing inequality. Acemoglu and Robinson (2015)(4) make a similar argument. They say that economic institutions affect the distribution of skills in society, indirectly determining inequality patterns. Piketty: Some years after the publication of Capital(13), Piketty (2015)(14) himself recognized the “rise in labor income inequality in recent decades has evidently little to do with r - g, and it is clearly a very important historical development.” He nonetheless emphasized that a higher r - g spread will be important and will exacerbate future inequality changes. GóesVsPiketty: However, the results in this paper show that this is likely not to be the case. The results corroborate the idea that recent inequality changes are not explained by r - g but also that new shocks to r − g will likely not lead to higher inequality, as there is no evidence that shocks to r - g increase income inequality. Combined, the observed endogenous dynamics of r - g and the share of the top 1% and the capital share, respectively, cast doubt on the reasonability of Piketty’s prediction about inequality trends. Góes I 24 GoesVsPiketty: I found no evidence to corroborate the idea that the r-g gap drives the capital share in national income. Savings/cyclicality: There are endogenous forces overlooked by Piketty - particularly the cyclicality of the savings rate - which balance out predicted large increases in the capital share. Inequality: On inequality, the evidence against Piketty’s predictions is even stronger: for at least 75% of the countries, the response of inequality to increases in r - g has the opposite sign to that postulated by Piketty. These results are robust to different calculations of r - g. Regardless of taking the real return on capital as long-term sovereign bond yields, short-term interest rates or implied returns from national accounting tables, the dynamics move in the same direction. Additionally, including or excluding taxes does not alter the qualitative takeaways from the results either. *For the models in detail see https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16160.pdf 1. Rognlie, Matthew (2014). A note on Piketty and diminishing returns to capital. http://www.mit. edu/~mrognlie/piketty_diminishing_returns.pdf. Accessed: 11-Feb-2016. 2. Krusell, Per and Anthony Smith (2015). “Is Piketty’s ‘Second Law of Capitalism’ Fundamental?” In: Journal of Political Economy 123.4, pp. 725–748. doi: 10.1086/682574. 3. Piketty, Thomas (2012). ”Economics of Inequality. Course Notes: Models of Growth & Capital Accumulation. Is Balanced Growth Possible?”. http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fr/teaching/10/25. Accessed: 11-Feb-2016. 4. Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2015). “The Rise and Decline of General Laws of Capitalism”. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 29.1, pp. 3–28. doi: 10.1257/jep.29.1.3. 5. Milanovic, Branko (2014). My take on the Acemoglu-Robinson critique of Piketty. http://glineq. blogspot.com/2014/08/my-take-on-acemoglu-robinson-critique.html. Accessed: 11-Feb2016. 6. Mankiw, Greg (2015). “Yes, r > g. So What?” In: American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 105.5, pp. 43–47. doi: 10.1257/aer.p20151059. 7. Francese, Maura and Carlos Mulas-Granados (2015). Functional Income Distribution and Its Role in Explaining Inequality. IMF Working Paper 15/244. International Monetary Fund. doi: 10. 5089/9781513549828.001. 8. Dabla-Norris, Era et al. (2015). Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality: A Global Perspective. IMF Staff Discussion Note 15/13. International Monetary Fund. doi: 10.5089/9781513555188.006. 9. Aghion, Philippe et al. (2015). Innovation and Top Income Inequality. Working Paper 21247. National Bureau of Economic Research. doi: 10.3386/w21247. 10. Mare, Robert D. (2016). “Educational Homogamy in Two Gilded Ages: Evidence from Inter-generational Social Mobility Data”. In: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 663.1, pp. 117–139. doi: 10.1177/0002716215596967. 11. Greenwood, Jeremy et al. (2012). Technology and the Changing Family: A Unified Model of Marriage, Divorce, Educational Attainment and Married Female Labor-Force Participation. Working Paper 17735. National Bureau of Economic Research. doi: 10.3386/w17735. 12. Chong, Alberto and Mark Gradstein (2007). “Inequality and Institutions”. In: The Review of Economics and Statistics 89.3, pp. 454–465. doi: 10.1162/rest.89.3.454. 13. Piketty, T. (2014), Capital in the 21st Century, Cambridge, MA: Belknap 14. Piketty, T. About Capital in the Twenty-First Century American Economic Review vol. 105, no. 5, May 2015(pp. 48–53) Carlos Góes. 2016. Testing Piketty’s Hypothesis on the Drivers of Income Inequality: Evidence from Panel VARs with Heterogeneous Dynamics. IMF Working Paper WP16/160 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16160.pdf |
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Piketty Hypothesis | Góes | Góes I 22 Piketty model/IMF/Góes(1): Piketty’s conclusion that inequality will increase in the future rests on the underlying assumption that, as growth decreases over time, driving the r − g spread to increase, capital-to-income ratios will increase. GoesVsPiketty: However, the results [from our testing models 2 an 3]* fail to show robust positive responses of capital share to shocks in r - g and cast doubt on Piketty’s conjecture. Elasticity: A possible reason for this is that Piketty could be underestimating diminishing returns of capital - thereby overestimating the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, whose empirical estimates tend to be much lower than what he assumes (cf. Rognlie 2014)(1). Krusell and Smith: This relationship is illustrated in this paper by the negative median responses of r - g to positive capital share shocks. Another less emphasized but equally important problem with Piketty’s conjecture is highlighted by Krusell and Smith (2015)(2), who argue that Piketty’s predictions are grounded on a flawed theory of savings - namely, that the savings rate net of depreciation is constant - which exacerbates the expected increase in capital-to-income ratios as growth rates tend to zero. They present an alternative model in which agents maximize inter-temporal utility and arrive in a setting in which, on an optimal growth path, the savings rate is pro-cyclical. By showing that the savings rate responds negatively to negative growth shocks (which, in turn, are translated into positive r−g shocks) for at least 75% of the countries in the sample, the results of [our] Model 3* provide empirical support to Krusell and Smith’s analysis. Piketty: Piketty (2012(3)) says in his online notes: “with g = 0%, we’re back to Marx apocalyptic conclusions,” in which capital share goes to 100% and workers take home none of the output. GóesVsPiketty: While this is logically consistent with the model’s assumptions, empirically there seem to be endogenous forces preventing that: non-negligible diminishing returns on capital and pro-cyclical changes in the savings rate. These are two different ways in which the transmission mechanism from r − g to the capital share might get stuck: with the former, at the limit the rate of return on capital tends to zero and there is no dynamic transmission; with the latter, if growth approaches zero, the savings might ultimately become zero, offsetting any effect of lower growth on capital share. They are, however, fundamentally different: the first regards the production function and technological change, while the second has to do life-cycle behavior of capital owners. Inequality: Regarding inequality, the results from [our] Model 1* contradict Piketty’s prediction stating that following exogenous shocks in r − g inequality should increase. Acemoglu and Robinson: In fact, for at least 75% of the countries in the sample, the result is negative. These findings are in line with previous results by Acemoglu and Robinson (2015)(4), who found negative coefficients in single-equation panel models when regressing r −g on the share of the top 1%. This paper goes further, not only because the model takes all variables as endogenous, but also because it incorporates tax variability across countries. MilanovicVsAcemoglu: Additionally, by decomposing between common and idiosyncratic shocks, rather than using time dummies, Model 1 does not throw away potentially important information about the effect of structural forces (e.g., globalization) on these dynamics —which, as Milanovic (2014)(5) argues, is a problem with Acemoglu and Robinson’s analysis. The fact that a positive r − g spread does not lead to higher inequality is not necessarily surprising. Góes I 23 MankivVsPiketty: As illustrated by Mankiw (2015)(6) through a standard model that incorporates taxation and depreciation, even if r > g, one can arrive in a steady state inequality which does not evolve into an endless inegalitarian spiral. MilanovicVsPiketty: Milanovic (2017, forthcoming) explains that the transmission mechanism between r > g and higher income inequality requires all of the following conditions to hold: (a) savings rates have to be sufficiently high; (b) capital income needs to more unequally distributed than labor income; and (c) a high correlation between drawing capital income and being on the top of the income distribution. In a dynamic fashion, this paper shows that this mechanism is getting stuck because the negative responses of the savings rate to r - g shocks violate the first condition, thereby preventing higher levels inequality when compared to those observed before the increases in r - g. Since estimated dynamics do not confirm Piketty’s theory, observed income inequality in many advanced economies over the past decades are probably explained by factors other than the spread between r and g. In fact, there is evidence that recent inequality trends are not related to the distribution of national income between factors of production but primarily to the rising inequality of labor income (cf. Francese and Mulas-Granados 2015)(7). Indeed, there are many potential explanations for the rising labor income inequality - as, for instance: Dabla-Norris et al. (2015)(8), after evaluating cross-country evidence, find that past changes in inequality in advanced economies are associated the most with two labor market changes: higher skill premia and lower union membership rates. Jaumotte and Buitron (2015) also present results that correlate changes in labor market institutions, particularly lower union density, with increases in income inequality in advanced economies. Aghion et al. (2015)(9) suggest innovation plays a significant role. If innovators are rewarded with higher incomes due to a temporary technological advantage (in a Schumpeterian fashion), inequality would be exacerbated. The authors show that innovation explains about a fifth of the higher inequality observed in the U.S. since 1975. Mare (2016)(10) and Greenwood et al. (2012)(11) argue that changes in mating behavior helped exacerbate income inequality. The probability that someone will marry another person with a similar socio-educational background (labeled “assortative mating”) increased in tandem with the rise in income inequality in U.S. in the recent decades. The interaction between higher skill premia and higher assortative mating exacerbates household income inequality, because the gap between higher and lower earners became larger and couples became more segregated. Chong and Gradstein (2007)(12) use a dynamic panel to show inequality tends to decrease as institutional quality improves. The underlying logic is that if the basic rules of economic behavior are not symmetrically enforced, the rich will have a higher chance to extract economic rents, thereby increasing inequality. Acemoglu and Robinson (2015)(4) make a similar argument. They say that economic institutions affect the distribution of skills in society, indirectly determining inequality patterns. Piketty: Some years after the publication of Capital(13), Piketty (2015)(14) himself recognized the “rise in labor income inequality in recent decades has evidently little to do with r - g, and it is clearly a very important historical development.” He nonetheless emphasized that a higher r - g spread will be important and will exacerbate future inequality changes. GóesVsPiketty: However, the results in this paper show that this is likely not to be the case. The results corroborate the idea that recent inequality changes are not explained by r - g but also that new shocks to r − g will likely not lead to higher inequality, as there is no evidence that shocks to r - g increase income inequality. Combined, the observed endogenous dynamics of r - g and the share of the top 1% and the capital share, respectively, cast doubt on the reasonability of Piketty’s prediction about inequality trends. Góes I 24 GoesVsPiketty: I found no evidence to corroborate the idea that the r-g gap drives the capital share in national income. Savings/cyclicality: There are endogenous forces overlooked by Piketty - particularly the cyclicality of the savings rate - which balance out predicted large increases in the capital share. Inequality: On inequality, the evidence against Piketty’s predictions is even stronger: for at least 75% of the countries, the response of inequality to increases in r - g has the opposite sign to that postulated by Piketty. These results are robust to different calculations of r - g. Regardless of taking the real return on capital as long-term sovereign bond yields, short-term interest rates or implied returns from national accounting tables, the dynamics move in the same direction. Additionally, including or excluding taxes does not alter the qualitative takeaways from the results either. *For the models in detail see https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16160.pdf 1. Rognlie, Matthew (2014). A note on Piketty and diminishing returns to capital. http://www.mit. edu/~mrognlie/piketty_diminishing_returns.pdf. Accessed: 11-Feb-2016. 2. Krusell, Per and Anthony Smith (2015). “Is Piketty’s ‘Second Law of Capitalism’ Fundamental?” In: Journal of Political Economy 123.4, pp. 725–748. doi: 10.1086/682574. 3. Piketty, Thomas (2012). ”Economics of Inequality. Course Notes: Models of Growth & Capital Accumulation. Is Balanced Growth Possible?”. http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fr/teaching/10/25. Accessed: 11-Feb-2016. 4. Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2015). “The Rise and Decline of General Laws of Capitalism”. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 29.1, pp. 3–28. doi: 10.1257/jep.29.1.3. 5. Milanovic, Branko (2014). My take on the Acemoglu-Robinson critique of Piketty. http://glineq. blogspot.com/2014/08/my-take-on-acemoglu-robinson-critique.html. Accessed: 11-Feb2016. 6. Mankiw, Greg (2015). “Yes, r > g. So What?” In: American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 105.5, pp. 43–47. doi: 10.1257/aer.p20151059. 7. Francese, Maura and Carlos Mulas-Granados (2015). Functional Income Distribution and Its Role in Explaining Inequality. IMF Working Paper 15/244. International Monetary Fund. doi: 10. 5089/9781513549828.001. 8. Dabla-Norris, Era et al. (2015). Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality: A Global Perspective. IMF Staff Discussion Note 15/13. International Monetary Fund. doi: 10.5089/9781513555188.006. 9. Aghion, Philippe et al. (2015). Innovation and Top Income Inequality. Working Paper 21247. National Bureau of Economic Research. doi: 10.3386/w21247. 10. Mare, Robert D. (2016). “Educational Homogamy in Two Gilded Ages: Evidence from Inter-generational Social Mobility Data”. In: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 663.1, pp. 117–139. doi: 10.1177/0002716215596967. 11. Greenwood, Jeremy et al. (2012). Technology and the Changing Family: A Unified Model of Marriage, Divorce, Educational Attainment and Married Female Labor-Force Participation. Working Paper 17735. National Bureau of Economic Research. doi: 10.3386/w17735. 12. Chong, Alberto and Mark Gradstein (2007). “Inequality and Institutions”. In: The Review of Economics and Statistics 89.3, pp. 454–465. doi: 10.1162/rest.89.3.454. 13. Piketty, T. (2014), Capital in the 21st Century, Cambridge, MA: Belknap 14. Piketty, T. About Capital in the Twenty-First Century American Economic Review vol. 105, no. 5, May 2015(pp. 48–53) Carlos Góes. 2016. Testing Piketty’s Hypothesis on the Drivers of Income Inequality: Evidence from Panel VARs with Heterogeneous Dynamics. IMF Working Paper WP16/160 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16160.pdf |
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Probability | Genz | II 61 Negative probability/Weinberg/Genz: negative probability is absurd. That is controversial(1). II 266ff Probability/micro-state/Gas/Genz: it is so unlikely that all molecules will come together in the left half of the container and leave the right half empty that it will not occur in world ages. This is a physical "never" or "always", not a mathematical one. >Physics, >Mathematics, >Entropy, >Second Law of Thermodynamics. 1) See: http://www.wissenschaft.de/technik-kommunikation/physik/-/journal_content/56/12054/1196196/Negative-Wahrscheinlichkeiten-der-Quantenmechanik-experimentell-best%C3%A4tigt/ (03.0.4.2023). |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
Proof of God’s Existence | Hume | Fraassen I 212 Proof of God/HumeVsThomas Aquinas: the universe instead of God. If God's will would be crucial how should we understand this will? ((s) God's will would always be identical with the factual and therefore not to distinguish from anything else.) --- II 253 Cosmological proof of God: there must be a cause for every thing and thus an explanation of its existence. This is something necessary existent. >Cause, >Condition, >Dependence, >Causal dependence, >Ontological dependence. HumeVs: the existence of God would be a fact. Facts are never necessary. >Facts, >Necessity, >Contingency. Hume: the necessary existing could be the universe instead of God. >Totality, >Whole, >Universe. II 256 Teleological proof of God/Hume: the teological proof of god is the only one he takes seriously, because it does not require a priori assumptions. >Teleology. Here: variant: the amazing reconciliation cannot be a coincidence. An intelligent creator is necessary. >"Clockmaker". HumeVs: 1. It lacks the repetition which is necessary for connection. 2. The analogy to humans is questionable. >Absoluteness, >Connection, >Distribution. II 257 3. If yes, then they would make a) the unity of God and b) the immateriality and endlessness questionable. >Unity, >Infinity. II 259 4. Order is not evidence of conscious planning, e.g. animals have no less order than a clock, but are not begotten by a watchmaker, but by parents. >Order, >Planning, >Evolution. II 260 Principle: the production of plants and animals is always herbal or animal. In human inventions, there is an understanding of the causes but not in divine inventions. >Knowledge, >Causality. 5. (Anticipating the theory of evolution): matter is in constant motion and eventually reaches a certain stability. >Entropy, >Second law of thermodynamics. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
Savings Rate | Economic Theories | Góes I 22 Savings rate/Piketty-Model/Economic theories: (…) Another less emphasized but equally important problem with Piketty’s conjecture is highlighted by Krusell and Smith (2015)(1), who argue that Piketty’s predictions are grounded on a flawed theory of savings - namely, that the savings rate net of depreciation is constant - which exacerbates the expected increase in capital-to-income ratios as growth rates tend to zero. They present an alternative model in which agents maximize inter-temporal utility and arrive in a setting in which, on an optimal growth path, the savings rate is pro-cyclical. By showing that the savings rate responds negatively to negative growth shocks (which, in turn, are translated into positive r−g shocks) for at least 75% of the countries in the sample, the results of [our] Model 3* provide empirical support to Krusell and Smith’s analysis. Piketty: Piketty (2012(2)) says in his online notes: “with g = 0%, we’re back to Marx apocalyptic conclusions,” in which capital share goes to 100% and workers take home none of the output. GóesVsPiketty: While this is logically consistent with the model’s assumptions, empirically there seem to be endogenous forces preventing that: non-negligible diminishing returns on capital and pro-cyclical changes in the savings rate. These are two different ways in which the transmission mechanism from r − g to the capital share might get stuck: with the former, at the limit the rate of return on capital tends to zero and there is no dynamic transmission; with the latter, if growth approaches zero, the savings might ultimately become zero, offsetting any effect of lower growth on capital share. They are, however, fundamentally different: the first regards the production function and technological change, while the second has to do life-cycle behavior of capital owners. Inequality: Regarding inequality, the results from [our] Model 1 contradict Piketty’s prediction stating that following exogenous shocks in r − g inequality should increase. Acemoglu and Robinson: In fact, for at least 75% of the countries in the sample, the result is negative. These findings are in line with previous results by Acemoglu and Robinson (2015)(3), who found negative coefficients in single-equation panel models when regressing r −g on the share of the top 1%. This paper goes further, not only because the model takes all variables as endogenous, but also because it incorporates tax variability across countries. MilanovicVsAcemoglu: Additionally, by decomposing between common and idiosyncratic shocks, rather than using time dummies, Model 1* does not throw away potentially important information about the effect of structural forces (e.g., globalization) on these dynamics —which, as Milanovic (2014)(4) argues, is a problem with Acemoglu and Robinson’s analysis. The fact that a positive r − g spread does not lead to higher inequality is not necessarily surprising. Góes I 23 MankivVsPiketty: As illustrated by Mankiw (2015)(5) through a standard model that incorporates taxation and depreciation, even if r > g, one can arrive in a steady state inequality which does not evolve into an endless inegalitarian spiral. MilanovicVsPiketty: Milanovic (2017, forthcoming) explains that the transmission mechanism between r > g and higher income inequality requires all of the following conditions to hold: (a) savings rates have to be sufficiently high; (b) capital income needs to more unequally distributed than labor income; and (c) a high correlation between drawing capital income and being on the top of the income distribution. In a dynamic fashion, this paper shows that this mechanism is getting stuck because the negative responses of the savings rate to r - g shocks violate the first condition, thereby preventing higher levels inequality when compared to those observed before the increases in r - g. Since estimated dynamics do not confirm Piketty’s theory, observed income inequality in many advanced economies over the past decades are probably explained by factors other than the spread between r and g. Góes I 24 Savings/cyclicality: There are endogenous forces overlooked by Piketty - particularly the cyclicality of the savings rate - which balance out predicted large increases in the capital share. Inequality: On inequality, the evidence against Piketty’s predictions is even stronger: for at least 75% of the countries, the response of inequality to increases in r - g has the opposite sign to that postulated by Piketty. These results are robust to different calculations of r - g. Regardless of taking the real return on capital as long-term sovereign bond yields, short-term interest rates or implied returns from national accounting tables, the dynamics move in the same direction. Additionally, including or excluding taxes does not alter the qualitative takeaways from the results either. *For the models in detail see https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16160.pdf 1. Krusell, Per and Anthony Smith (2015). “Is Piketty’s ‘Second Law of Capitalism’ Fundamental?” In: Journal of Political Economy 123.4, pp. 725–748. doi: 10.1086/682574. 2. Piketty, Thomas (2012). ”Economics of Inequality. Course Notes: Models of Growth & Capital Accumulation. Is Balanced Growth Possible?”. http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fr/teaching/10/25. Accessed: 11-Feb-2016. 3. Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2015). “The Rise and Decline of General Laws of Capitalism”. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 29.1, pp. 3–28. doi: 10.1257/jep.29.1.3. 4. Milanovic, Branko (2014). My take on the Acemoglu-Robinson critique of Piketty. http://glineq. blogspot.com/2014/08/my-take-on-acemoglu-robinson-critique.html. Accessed: 11-Feb2016. 5. Mankiw, Greg (2015). “Yes, r > g. So What?” In: American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 105.5, pp. 43–47. doi: 10.1257/aer.p20151059. Carlos Góes. 2016. Testing Piketty’s Hypothesis on the Drivers of Income Inequality: Evidence from Panel VARs with Heterogeneous Dynamics. IMF Working Paper WP16/160 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16160.pdf |
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Time | Genz | II 250 Time/Newton/mechanics/Genz: in Newtonian mechanics, not only the earlier point of time determines the later one, but also vice versa the later point of time determines the earlier one. Deterministic/Genz: we must distinguish between forward deterministic laws and forward and backward deterministic laws. II 251 Question: are there also purely backwards deterministic laws? Definition Time/Genz: as long as we do not know anything else, we can simply define time as the direction in which deterministic laws of nature apply. This is necessarily identical to the direction in which the order cannot increase. >Entropy, >Second law of thermodynamics, >Arrow of time, >Determinism. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
Time Travel | Genz | Genz I 112 Time reversal/physics/thought experiment/time travel/Genz: e.g. assume a model of a gas of hard spheres. Question: is it possible to describe the difference between the past and future with the help of laws, which themselves do not know the difference? Time direction: the direction of time is practically given by the fact that in the immediate vicinity of each initial condition that causes an event there are infinitely many others, so that the same event would not result in world ages. >Probability, >Entropy, >Second law of thermodynamics, >Arrow of time, >Time. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
Universe | Teilhard de Chardin | Kanitscheider II 177 Teilhard de Chardin/Kanitscheider: Forerunner of process theology. Thesis: Immanence of God in an incomplete and ever evolving world. omega point. Teilhard distinguishes between two types of energy, "tangential" (physical), "radial" (spiritual). With evolution, spiritual energy becomes denser and more concentrated, which is reflected in the emergence of intelligent living beings. In the end, the radial dominates the tangential energy. >Energy, >Process philosophy. KanitscheiderVsTeilhard de Chardin: doubling technique! The motivation for his theory lies in the belief, common at the time, that the second law forbids the growth of complexity. >Complexity, >Entropy, >Second law of thermodynamics. Solution: Self-organization allows that with the evolutionary growth of complex systems only the information increases, which does not contradict thermodynamics. >Self-organization. II 178 Kanitscheider: The substantial spiritualization process is incompatible with today's understanding of the growth in complexity. |
Teilhard I Pierre Teilhard de Chardin The Phenomenon of Man New York 1976 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
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Phenomenalism | Feyerabend Vs Phenomenalism | II 19 Measurement: E.g. variations that limit the validity of the second law of phenomenological thermodynamics, can not be detected directly, because they occur in all measuring instruments in the same way. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
Popper, K. | Kuhn Vs Popper, K. | Hacking I 400 Messen/KuhnVsPopper: It almost never happens that theories are contradicted by precise measurements. Ex. Cavendish has not tested the theory of gravity but determines the value of G. Experiments are generally rewarded when the approximate numbers which were previously assumed come out. Kuhn I 90 Falsification/KuhnVsPopper: In the history of science, no example of falsification because of a comparison with nature! For those who decided to use Newton's theory, his second law is a purely logical statement that cannot be contradicted by observations. I 157 KuhnVsPopper: Anomalous experiences cannot be compared with falsified ones! I believe that the latter do not exist at all! If every single mismatch would be a reason for rejecting a theory, all theories would always need to be rejected. If, on the other hand, only a serious discorrespondency were to count, Popper's followers would need a "criterion of improbability "or the "degree of falsification". I 158 KuhnVsPopper: Falsification: Is a later and separate process, which could very well be called verification, since it represents the triumph of a new paradigm over an older one. Correspondence theory: For historians at least there is no much sense in the statement that verification is determining the correspondence between facts and theory. All historically significant theories corresponded to those facts, however only up to a certain point!(> Theory/Kuhn). However, it is quite reasonable to ask which of two competing theories fits better with the facts. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
Teilhard de Chardin | Verschiedene Vs Teilhard de Chardin | Kanitscheider II 178 KanitscheiderVsTeilhard de Chardin: Double technique! The motivation for his theory lies in the belief, common at his time, that the Second Law forbids the growth of complexity. Solution: Self-organization allows that with the evolutionary growth of complex systems only the information coincides, which does not contradict thermodynamics. The substantial process of spiritualization is incompatible with today's understanding of complexity growth. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
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