Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Decidability | Genz | II 206 Compressibility/Decidability/Genz: there can be no computer program that decides if any amount of data is compressible. Stronger: there is no way to prove that it is not compressible. Compressibility: can be proven but not refuted. II 207 Example number pi: π can be generated by a finite program. There are numbers that cannot be calculated in principle: Omega/Chaitin/Genz: this is what Chaitin calls a certain number of which not a single digit can be calculated. It is not accessible to any rule, it is outside mathematics. >Gregory Chaitin. II 218 Decidability/calculability/undecidable/non-calculable/Genz: non-calculable numbers are actually the same as non-decidable numbers. Incalculability/physics/quantum cosmology/Genz: apparent indecidability: the ... of the wave-function of the universe shows apparant indecidability. It deals with the possible geometry of three-dimensional spaces. >Wave function. Simplified: e. g. a circle (one dimensional): to calculate the wave function of the universe for the circle as an argument: the wave function can be represented as a sum of summands, where there is a series of handleless cups, one series of cups with a handle, one series of cups with two handles, etc., whereby the handles can be shaped differently in each case. These represent four-dimensional spaces (with time as 4th dimension). Circle: here time is added as the 2nd dimension. Together they form the two dimensions of the cup surfaces. II 219 3rd dimension: the 3rd dimension in which the surfaces are embedded, serves only as an illustration. It has no equivalent in reality. Problem: it is not possible to decide which cups are to be regarded as the same, which cups are to be regarded as different (cups with differently shaped handles have the same topology). Question: undecidable: whether two cups have the same or different number of handles. (Of course, this is about four, not two dimensions.) Indecidability/Genz: indecidability occurs here only if a computer is to perform the calculation: to describe a cup, it is covered with a certain number of equal triangles. Problem: there cannot be a computer program that decides for any number of covering flat triangles whether two (four-dimensional) cups have the same number of handles. II 220 Theorem: the theorem is rather tame: it now excludes that a program makes a decision for any number of flat triangles, but not for a given number - e. g. one million - flat triangles. This is simply a matter of increasing accuracy. That would be an example of an unpredictable number. Wave function of the Universe/Genz: it could be shown that there are calculable representations of it, so that its incalculability (similar to that of > NOPE) suggested by the regulation of the figure does not actually exist. Definition NOPE/Genz: the smallest number that can only be determined by more than thirteen words minus the smallest number that can only be determined by more than thirteen words N.B.: the rule is impracticable, but we still know that NOPE = 0! II 223 Problem/Genz: there cannot be a program that decides in finite time if any program ever stops. "Stopping problem"/"Non-stopping theorem"/Genz: the "stopping problem" is not a logical but a physical problem. It is impossible to perform infinitely many logical steps in finite time. Time travel/time reversal/time/decision problem/Genz: if time travel were possible, the stopping problem would only be valid to a limited extent. >Time, >Time reversal, >Time arrow, >Symmetries. II 224 Stopping problem/Platonism/Genz: in a platonic world where there are only logical steps instead of time, the non-stopping theorem would also be valid. The point here is the admissibility of evidence rather than its feasibility. >Proofs, >Provability. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Dualism | Chalmers | I 125 Dualism/Consciousness/Chalmers: we have seen that materialism failed because of the lack of logical supervenience of conscious experience on physical facts. >Supervenience, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Consciousness, >Materialism. This is followed by a dualism, but not a Cartesian dualism, which assumes a "mind in the machine", which performs extra causal work. Instead, for us, a kind of property duelism follows. > Property dualism/Chalmers, cf. >R. Descartes. I 134 Dualism/Chalmers: you could avoid the dualism by referring to a zombie world that is physically identical to ours as being described as false. >Zombies/Chalmers. I 135 This world would at the same time be identical and different. We could make the physical properties rigid with the operator "dthat", e.g. dthat (plays the role of ...). >"dthat", >Rigidity, >Operators, >Properties. N.B.: then the zombie world would not have some features that our world has. N.B.: then consciousness could metaphysically supervene on other properties. That would be an interesting argument. >Metaphysical possibility, >Metaphysics. ChalmersVsVs: 1. this is speculative. 2. (more direct): it is based on an incorrect semantics of physical concepts. I 136 For example, an electron with unrecognized properties would still be called an electron, but not an electron with the properties of a proton. >Change in meaning, >Change in theory. Metaphysics/Chalmers: semantics is not so decisive here, but the metaphysical question remains. I 154 Dualism/Definition Proto-phanomenal property/Chalmers: involves as the only one not experiencing itself, but several simultaneously existing could have this. This is strange to us, but cannot be excluded a priori. This would suggest a causal role of the phenomenal. Cf. >Emergence, >Emergence/Chalmers, >Causality, >Phenomena, >Experience, >Knowing how. To represent such a theory would simply mean to accept another possible world where something else had the role of causation, but such a world would not be logically excluded. >Causation. I 155 Dualism/Chalmers: if we were to take such a position, we would represent an essential dualism. >Essentialism. ChalmersVsDualism: one can also understand this position non-dualist, albeit not as a materialistic monism. It then provides a network of intrinsic properties that "realizes" the extrinsic physical properties. >Monism, >Extrinsic, >Intrinsic, cf. >Exemplification. The laws are still the physical ones. In extreme form, when all intrinsic properties are phenomenal, we are dealing with a variant of idealism, but according to Berkeley's type. >G. Berkeley, >Idealism. It would most likely correspond to a version of Russel's neutral monism: I 155 Monism/Russell/Chalmers: neutral monism: the fundamental properties of the world are neither physical nor phenomenal, but the physical and the phenomenal are both built up from this fundamental. The phenomenal is formed from the intrinsic natures, the physical from the extrinsic. I 156 Dualism/Definition Interactionistic Dualism/Definition Interactionism/Chalmers: here, experience fills the causal gaps in the physical process. >Experience. ChalmersVs: that creates more problems than it solves. It does not solve the problems with epiphenomenalism. >Epiphenomenalism. Pro: the only argument for interactionist dualism are some properties of quantum mechanics that could be better explained. (> Eccles 1986)(1) I 157 ChalmersVsEccles: the effects would be much too small to cause any eventual behavioral changes. Other counter examples: VsInteractionistic Dualism/VsInteractionism/Chalmers: 1. it contradicts the quantum mechanical postulate that the microscopic "decisions" are random. 2. a behavior that was triggered by these microscopic influences would have to differ from behavior triggered differently. ChalmersVsEccles: such theories are also silent on what should happen in the brain if the wave function collapses. ChalmersVsInteractionistic Dualism: this makes the phenomenal irrelevant. I 158 ChalmersVsEccles: if there are psychons, then they can manage with purely causal interactions, without assumed phenomenal properties. VsChalmers: one might object that psychons (or ectoplasm, or whatever) are constituted by phenomenal properties. ChalmersVsVs: even then their phenomenal properties are irrelevant to the explanation of behavior: in the history of causation, it is only the relational properties that count. Thus this adheres to the causal unity of the physical. ChalmersVsInteractionism/ChalmersVsEccles: even if one were assuming psychones, one could tell a story about zombies, which involved psychones. One would then again have to assume additional phenomenal properties of psychones without being able to prove them. I 162 Definition Interactionist Dualism/Chalmers: Chalmers accepts that consciousness is non-physical (VsMaterialism) but he denies that the physical world is causally closed so that consciousness can play an autonomous causal role. >Causal role, >Causality, >Causation. I 162 Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: so I characterize my own view: Thesis: Consciousness supervenes naturally on the physical, without supervening logically or "metaphysically". >Supervenience. I argue that materialism is wrong and that the realm of physical is causally completed. I 171 Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: my position is already implicitly shared by many who still call themselves "materialists". All I have done is to make the ontological implications of the naturalistic view explicit - that consciousness "emerges" from the physical. We do not have to give up much, what is important for our scientific world. Cf. >Emergence, >Emergence/Chalmers. 1. Eccles, J.C. (1986) Do Mental Events Cause Neural Events Analogously to the Probability Fields of Quantum Mechanics? Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 227, 411-428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1986.0031 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Interactionism | Chalmers | I 156 Dualism/Definition Interactionist Dualism/Definition Interactionism/Chalmers: here, experience fills the causal gaps in the physical process. ChalmersVs: that creates more problems than it solves. It does not solve the problems with epiphenomenalism. >Dualism, cf. >Property dualism, >Epiphenomenalism. Pro: the only argument for interactionist dualism are some properties of quantum mechanics that could be better explained. (> Eccles 1986)(1) I 157 ChalmersVsEccles: the effects would be much too small to effect any eventual behavioral changes. Other counter arguments: VsInteractionist dualism/Interactionism/Chalmers: 1. it contradicts the quantum mechanical postulate that the microscopic "decisions" are random. >Quantum mechanics. 2. a behavior that was triggered by these microscopic influences would have to differ from behavior triggered differently. ChalmersVsEccles: such theories are also silent on what should happen in the brain when the wave function collapses. >Wave function. ChalmersVsInteractionist dualism: this makes the phenomenal irrelevant: I 158 ChalmersVsEccles: if there are his psychons, then they can do without purely causal interactions, without assumed phenomenal properties. >Phenomena, >Experience. VsChalmers: one might object that psychons (or ectoplasm, or whatever) are constituted by phenomenal properties. ChalmersVsVs: even then their phenomenal properties are irrelevant to the explanation of the behavior: in the history of causation, it is only the relational properties that count. Thus it adheres to the causal unity of the physical. ChalmersVsInteractionism/ChalmersVsEccles: Even if one were to assume psychons, one could tell a story about zombies, which involved psychons. One would then again have to assume additional phenomenal properties of psychons without being able to prove them. >Zombies. I 162 Definition Interactionist Dualism/Chalmers: Chalmers accepts that consciousness is not physical (VsMaterialism) but he denies that the physical world is causally closed so that consciousness can play an autonomous causal role. >Causal closure, >Consciousness/Chalmers, cf. >Materialism. 1. Eccles, J.C. (1986) Do Mental Events Cause Neural Events Analogously to the Probability Fields of Quantum Mechanics? Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 227, 411-428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1986.0031 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Many-Worlds Interpretation | Kanitscheider | II 122 Many-worlds-interpretation/coincidence/existence/life/Kanitscheider: Brandon Carter 1974(1) Suggestion: to accept an ensemble of worlds in which a real subset has a life-favorable tuning of the constants. The fact that our world belongs to the knowable subset is then logically necessary, otherwise we could not make such a consideration. ((s) Reversal: many worlds instead of a one-off coincidence. The anthropic principle works in reverse). Kanitscheider: This reduces the astonishment that we exist. Cf. >Anthropic principle. Many worlds/Epicurus(2): There are countless worlds, some similar to ours, some dissimilar. After all, atoms are not built for one world, nor for a limited number of worlds. Nothing stands in the way of the assumption of an infinite number of worlds. II 123 Many worlds/Giordano Bruno(3): It is a general, empty, immeasurable space in which countless globes float like this one. Space is infinite because there is no reason or possibility to limit it. Many worlds/Huygens(4): (1629 - 1695): "Principle of Plenitudo" as justification. Nature harbors unlimited potential, one would restrict its creative power too much if one only assumed one world. Many worlds/tradition/Kanitscheider: In traditional theses, very different ideas are assumed, some of these worlds are presented as alien planets, but always with a causal connection among these "worlds". Many worlds/modern cosmology/Kanitscheider: causal decoupling is assumed here. Among other things, because of infinite distances. >Causality. Many worlds/laws of nature/George Gamov(5): One could assume that the fundamental laws of relativity, quantum mechanics and thermodynamics apply to all worlds, but the natural constants have different values. >Natural constants. II 124 Some of these worlds are perfectly imaginable, while others, which are logically possible simply because they contain no internal contradictions, elude our imagination. Many worlds/Kanitscheider: Which processes take place in worlds with any but constant legal structure can hardly be determined. But you can override individual laws in a thought experiment. Eg second law suspended: anti-entropic worlds already have such bizarre properties that we probably cannot understand them properly. Empiricism/observation/Kanitscheider: Even in very close areas there are zones that are inaccessible to measuring devices for physical reasons. E.g. the interior of the sun. We will never observe it directly. >Quantum mechanics, >Measuring. II 125 Many worlds/Kanitscheider: If there was a proof from the principles of physics that quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity are the only ones that make our world possible, the matter would have been superfluous. But there is no such proof whatsoever. Simplicity/Theory/Kanitscheider: Whether the one-world hypothesis is the simplest depends on the respective theoretical situation. For example, in chaotic inflation, where quantum fluctuations in high-dimensional superspace represent the natural state of reality, a single world would be a difficult assumption. Many Worlds Interpretation/EWG/Everett(6)(9)/Wheeler/Graham: here the wave function contains all possibilities of states in superposition. Quantum cosmology/Kanitscheider: The traditional separation of measuring device, observer and object cannot be maintained here, since there is no outside. >Quantum mechanics. Everett/Wheeler/Graham/EWG: This thesis now proposes that the state vector (the geometric counterpart of the wave function in Hilbert space) never collapses. Instead, splitting up into parallel worlds. >Wave function. II 126 Simplicity/Theory/Kanitscheider: In view of the many-worlds interpretation, one can ask which quantum mechanics of measurement should be considered simpler: 1. The one that works with an acausal, discontinuous, untimely, indeterministic collapse process, or 2. The one that is based on a more comprehensive reality, but also on a deterministic, causal, continuous, dynamically describable measurement process. >Simplicity. Elementary particle physics/today/Kanitscheider: Everything that is not forbidden actually occurs. So decays that do not violate the conservation laws. >Conservation laws. Many Worlds/Sciama(7): The theory means no violation of Occam's razor if one interprets this as the lowest number of restrictions that are compatible with the observational material. Cf. >Conservativity. II 127 Einzigigkeit/Leibniz(8): Metaphysical justification: there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God. >Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Cf. >Possible Worlds. 1. Brandon Carter (1974). Large Number Coincidence amd the Anthropic Principle in Cosmology. In: M.S. Longair (Ed): Cosmological Theories in Confrontation with Cosmological Data. In: International Astronomical Union Symposium Nr. 63. Dordrecht. pp.291-298. 2. Diogenes Laertius: LEben und Meinungen berühmter Philosophen. Buch X, 45, 2. Aufl. Hamburg: Meiner. 1967. S. 243f. 3. Giordano Bruno: De L'infinito universo et mondi. Zitiert nach: A. Koyré: Von der geschlossenen Welt zum unendlichen Universum. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. 1969. 4. Ch. Huyghens;: The Celestial Worlds discovered: or, Conjectures concerning the inhabitants, planets and productions of the worlds in the planets. London 1698. 5. George Gamov: Mr. Tompkins seltsame Reisen durch Kosmos und Mikrokosmos. Braunschweig: Vieweg 1980. 6. B. S. DeWitt: The Everett-Wheeler-Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. In: C. DeWitt/J.A. Wheeler (eds.): Bettelle Rencontres, 1967, Lectures in Mathematics and Physics. New York: W.A. Benjamin 1968, S. 318-332 7. D.W. Sciama: The Anthropic Principle and the non-uniqueness of the Universe. In: F. Bertola/U. CUri (eds.): The Anthropic Principle. Cambridge: UP 1993, pp. 107-110. 8. G.W. Leibniz: Monadologie. Hamburg: Meiner 1976 § 53. 9. Hugh Everett (1957). “Relative State” Formulation of Quantum Mechanics. In: Reviews of modern physics. Vol. 29, 1957, S. 454–462 |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Quantum Mechanics | Barrow | I 233 Quantum mechanics/QM/Atom/Uniformity/Equality/Barrow: the quantization of energy is the reason why hydrogen atoms are identical. >Energy, >Symmetries. I 235 Measurement Problem/QM/Barrow: it is about whether the quantum theory describes everything that happens in nature, including the measurement process, or not. >Measurement problem. I 237 EPR/Barrow: Paradox: we cannot predict which the two photons will move clockwise in the decay - but if we were to go to the other end of the universe, we would know instantly because of quantum mechanics that the other photon rotates in the other direction, without having measured it. - I.e. the unmeasured momentum must match reality. - It must be real, because it is predictable. Knowledge without measurement, i.e. independent of observation. >Observation, >Observation independence. Paradox: the second photon must know the direction of the other. Proof: Alain Aspect experiment, 1982. I 240 Barrow: in fact, no information is transmitted - VsEPR: simultaneity is a concept that depends on the observer. - E.g. three observers could be in motion relative to each other and to the experiment - one would see that the measurements of the spins are conducted simultaneously, while the others would first observe one or the other. I 238f John Bell/QM/Non-Locality/Barrow: (1960s): John Bell showed that every theory that describes EPR phenomena needs to have a non-local description if a simple arithmetic condition is satisfied. >Non-locality. Bell Test/Uncertainty: Uncertainty is not about the coarseness of the observer - this would be a local explanation. Bell: Each correct view of nature must be non-local. I 242 Copenhagen Interpretation/Bohr: In the traditional sense, no deeper reality can be discovered, but only a description of it. - It is useless to say that the measurement somehow changed a deeper reality. I 245 While the wave function is deterministic, linear, continuous and local, and does not know any determinate time direction, the measuring process is almost random, non-linear, discontinuous, non-local and non-reversible. >Wave function, >Measurements, >Time arrow, >Time, >Time reversal. SchrödingerVsBohr: Schrödinger's cat: is in a mixture of dead and alive, as long as we do not look. I 247 Wheeler: Problem: all astronomical measurements are made with radiation. - So according to Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation, they would only be made alive by measuring. I 253ff Copenhagen Interpretation/Many-Worlds Interpretation/MWI/Aspect/Experiment/Barrow: the assumption of non-locality was experimentally confirmed by Aspect. >Many-Worlds Theory, >Copenhagen Interpretation. Barrow: The Copenhagen and the many-worlds interpretation appear to be completely incompatible, but there is the unanimous opinion that they are experimentally indistinguishable. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Quantum Mechanics | Genz | II 118 Quantum Mechanics/Genz: quantum mechanics denies the simultaneous possibility of these three principles: 1. location, 2. possibility of independent coincidences in separate areas and 3. induction. II 235 Observation/principle/formula/equation/Genz: at the beginning of quantum mechanics there were two purely mathematical observations which could not be traced back to any principle: 1. Planck's formula for heat radiation and 2. the formula for the hydrogen spectrum. Justification: justification consisted solely of delivering correct results. Quantum Mechanics/principles/Genz: 1. principle of quantum mechanics: the first principle is entanglement. Thesis: nearly everything is interwoven with anything. Even more profoundly: there are no localizable quantum states. II 236 Remote effect/QWM/message/information/Genz: due to the "remote effect" (from the interconnection) no messages can be transmitted. 2. Principle of quantum mechanics: no message can be transmitted instantaneously. The two principles together are very close to a contradiction. It follows from this that both together are very powerful. >Stronger/weaker. Derivation/principle/Genz: so far, it has not been possible to derive quantum mechanics as the only possible realization of its two principles. >Derivation, >Derivability. II 238 John Bell/quantum mechanics/Genz: John Bell has shown that quantum mechanics does not allow a choice of the frequencies that result in what is observed. The relative frequencies come out wrong. The predictions of quantum mechanics contradict what Bell derived from principles. Quantum mechanics, however, is the best confirmed theory that exists. >Bell's inequation. II 241 Effects/transmission/transfer of effects/energy/quantum mechanics/Genz: a special feature of the transfer of effects in quantum mechanics, through which no messages (information) can be transmitted, is that no energy is transmitted. >Information, >Energy. II 245 Effect/non-locality/Genz: in quantum mechanics, effects (no messages) can be transmitted instantaneously. II 246 Principles/quantum mechanics/Genz: quantum mechanics can be derived entirely from principles that contradict everyday experience. So far, we only know which principles cannot exist together. II 286 Quantum Mechanics/classical physics/Genz: it is mainly the variables describing the states that are different: In quantum mechanics it is the: wave function In classical physics it is: places and velocities. This is not about deterministic or non-deterministic. >Determinism, >Wave function. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Quantum Mechanics | Wheeler | Genz II 291 Quantum Mechanics/Interference/Mirror/Wheeler/Genz: it is not about interference at all. N.B.: it is about the presence or absence of the second semipermeable mirror which does not allow the assumption or allow the photon to take any particular path. If the mirror is in its place, both paths must have contributed. N.B.: the experimenter can make the decision in the course of the experiment! ((s) That is, after the photon has already passed the position. >reverse causality. II 292 Gravitational lens effect/Genz: here the same principle plays a role, the photons have perhaps been traveling for millenniums, after they have passed the galaxy. Later, it is decided which way they have "taken". Wave function/quantum mechanics/Genz: the wave function states that the photon cannot be assigned a single way around the galaxy. >Wave function. Delayed choice/quantum mechanics/Genz: the delayed choice amplifies the oddities of quantum mechanics. II 293 Copenhagen interpretation/Genz: Genz does not admit any reality to the quantum world. Therefore, Wheeler's "smoky dragon" (which makes the intermediate steps unrecognizable) is not needed. Therefore, it does not allow the "ghostly remote effects" (Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen EPRVsCopenhagen interpretation) as an argument. >Copenhagen interpretation. Delayed choice/semipermeable mirrors/Wheeler/Genz: his experiment can clarify what the principle of free will forbids (see above): For example, it could be that with the decision whether the photon chooses one or the other way, also the other decision is made,... II 294 ...whether the experimenter will install one or the other device. Genz II 295 Wheeler/Natural laws/Genz: Thesis: God must roll dice, otherwise we could not understand "his" laws. >Understanding. Law/Wheeler: thesis: every law will ultimately prove to be statistical. |
Wheeler I J. A. Wheeler Quantum Theory and Measurement Princeton 2014 Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
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| Bohr, N. | Barrow Vs Bohr, N. | I 244 Measuring: Major problem with the Copenhagen interpretation: What is a measurement? Bohr: a measurement is done when the infinitely spreading wave function "collapses" at a certain place at a certain but unpredictable state. (E.g. double-slit). Question: Does the wave function of the neutron collapse when it hits the photographic plate, which plays the role of inanimate observer, or does it collapse, because a physicist observes the entire system of the interaction of the wave function of the neutron with the film? Where and when does the wave function actually collapse? VsBohr: the problem of Bohr's interpretation is that it does not really pretend to describe what quantum states and measuring devices are, but only how they relate to each other. The only thing that is clear is that the measurement process has properties that are diametrically opposed to those that are present when no measurement is made. I 245 While the wave function is deterministic, linear, continuous and local, and does not know any determinate time direction, the measuring process is almost random, non-linear, discontinuous, non-local and irreversible. Schrödinger never accepted the Copenhagen interpretation. E.g. Schrödinger's cat: a cat is locked into a steel chamber together with a Geiger counter and a weak radioactive source. If the counter registers one of these decay coincidences within an hour, it releases poisonous gas that kills the cat quickly. If during that hour no atom falls apart, the cat survives. According to the Copenhagen interpretation, as Schrödinger asserts, the cat is a mixture of dead and alive before we look into the steel chamber. When and where changes the state of neither alive nor dead to either one or the other? (Variant of the example with a space capsule in which the cat has been dead for years from one moment to another.) I 246 Schrödinger wanted to show that the quantum theory does not fully describe the reality. We should see our knowledge of the cat in a confused state, not the cat itself. BohrVsSchrödinger in contrast would have claimed that there is no such thing as "the cat itself". The only existing reality is our knowledge about the cat. In addition, the macroscopic scale reduces the importance of the example. Vs: We could argue that we do not know whether a cat is in a mixed state if we see one. Now, if lasers could be made to show us mixed states, they would not be macroscopical, however. Eugene Wigner, John v. Neumann: Thesis: only certain instruments can collapse the wave equation, namely those that have a consciousness similar to that of humans. (Somewhat surprising for logicians). This could be construed as an argument against quantum computers. Barrow: before we have those, we cannot say anything about them... +... I 247. Paradoxically, if conscious observers are split into microscopic particles, we reach levels of the quantum structure, at which only an observer can give meaning. (.. + ..>Consciousness) >Consciousness means that we do not have to learn by trial and error. I 247 Wheeler: almost all astronomical observations are made with radiation, quantum waves whose wave function is collapsed by the detectors and astronomers. Does this mean that we bring these astronomical objects and the universe itself to life, in a way, if we observe them today? VsBohr: main problem is that he attributes a special role to measurement. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Everett, H. | Wheeler Vs Everett, H. | John Gribbin Schrödingers Kätzchen Frankfurt/M 1998 III 229 Many worlds interpretation: 1957 by Hugh Everett. There are now three "Many Worlds Theories". Basic thought: before any decision is made, the universe divides itself into as many copies of itself as are necessary to realize every possible choice. III 230 N.B.: the cat was in reality either dead or alive before opening the box. There was no overlay of states! It is impossible for inhabitants of different universes to communicate with each other. III 231 Many Worlds Interpretation/WheelerVsEverett: Weak point: the number of universes expands extremely quick. Advantage: it needs neither an intelligent observer nor a measuring device "outside the system" to collapse the wave function. John Gribbin: In Search of Schrödinger's Cat, Munich, Zurich 1991 VII 260 WheelerVsEverett: too much metaphysical luggage. |
Wheeler I J. A. Wheeler Quantum Theory and Measurement Princeton 2014 |
| Hawking, St. | Wheeler Vs Hawking, St. | John Gribbin Schrödingers Kätzchen Frankfurt/M 1998 III 34 Quantum Mechanics/Observation: observing the particles at the slit causes the wave function to collapse. People like Hawking are thinking about whether an instance is not necessary that has to observe the whole universe from "outside" in order to collapse its wave function. WheelerVsHawking: the presence of conscious observers, as we are, is enough to make the wave function collapse and make the universe exist. |
Wheeler I J. A. Wheeler Quantum Theory and Measurement Princeton 2014 |
| Instrumentalism | Lewis Vs Instrumentalism | V 58 Indeterminism/Lewis: I do not say that I principally accept determinism. But: Quantum Mechanics/VsInstrumentalism: The wave function collapse shall not be represented as an observer's phenomenon or a >measurement problem. V 59 Too anthropocentric. Indeterminism/Lewis: also present in obvious radioactive decay processes without us forcing ourselves to use questionable interpretations on quantum mechanics (QM). But this would also mean that the world is not indeterministic as a whole, but that it may also have deterministic enclaves. >Determinism/Lewis. V 119 Probability/Randomness/Game/Determinism/Lewis: well-informed persons often tell us that gaming (roulette, etc.) are deterministic systems. If they were speaking as instrumentalists, they could be right. But not because these systems really are deterministic, but because they pretend to be deterministic. V 120 Instrumentalism/Lewis: If Levi spoke as an instrumentalist, a reconciliation between randomness and determinism is not that difficult: Truth simply needs to be reconciled with truth in fiction. (see example above): Holmes lived at 221b Baker Street, but nobody lived there in reality. LewisVsInstrumentalism: Roulette is deterministic in fiction, it is random in reality. (Flipping the coin.) Determinism/Lewis: No chance for a world without any randomness! If the word is deterministic, there are no chances, excepted the chances for 0 and 1. This would also be valid for deterministic enclaves in the world. When a determinist states that the coin is fair, he means something different than I when I say the same. What does he mean? This is a difficult question for him, but not for me! |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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