Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 27 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Autonomy | Feyerabend | I 43 Principle of Autonomy/Feyerabend: collecting the facts for examination purposes is the only thing left for the scientist to do. If facts exist and are available, regardless of whether alternatives to the theory under consideration are looked at. Principle of the relative autonomy of facts. (versus theories). >Theories, >Facts. The principle does not mean that the discovery and description of facts is entirely theory-independent, but that the facts belonging to the empirical content of a theory are available, regardless of whether alternatives to this theory are taken into account. >Discoveries, >Empirical content. ((s) I.e. that facts are autonomous, independent of theories.) I 44 FeyerabendVsAutonomy Principle: this principle is far too simple a point of view. Facts and theories are much more closely linked than the principle of autonomy wants to admit. E.g. it is known today that the Brownian particles are a perpetuum mobile of the second kind, and that its existence refutes the second law of thermodynamics. (Henning GenzVs: that is not true.) Could this relationship between movement and theory have been shown or directly discovered? Two questions: 1) Could the relevance of the movement have been discovered in this way? 2) Could it have been shown to disprove the 2nd law of thermodynamics? ((s) Nonsense: to »observe« relevance). >Relevance. Each thermometer is subject to fluctuations which are the same as the Brownian movement. The actual refutation came about in a completely different way: with the help of the kinetic theory and its use by Einstein in his calculation of the statistical properties of the Brownian movement. In this refutation the consistency condition was violated: the phenomenological theory was incorporated into the larger framework of statistical physics. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Circumstances | Brandom | I 316 Circumstances/Brandom: what an interpreter assumes to be the circumstances, is an essential feature of the empirical content. >Empirical content. --- II 87 Circumstances: there must be sufficient conditions for the introduction of a term -> Gentzen: Introduction Rules. - Elemination rule: necessary consequences. II 90f Circumstances: parrot, thermometer (there are no consequences). - Emphasis on the circumstances: verification, assertibility - overemphasis of episodes: pragmatism. >Pragmatism, >Vericifation, >Assertibility. II 253 Circumstances/Brandom: always lie upstream. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Climate Data | Climatology | Edwards I 406 Climate data/climatology/Edwards: The purposes, priorities, sources, and character of climate data contrast with those of weather data. The purpose of climate data is to characterize and compare patterns and trends. This requires statistics - averages, maxima, minima, etc. - rather than individual observations. And climate scientists care more about measurement quality, station stability, and the completeness and length of station records than they care about the speed of reporting. >Weather data/metereology, >Climate data/Edwars, >Models/climatology, >Weather forecasting/Edwards. Climatologists use many of the same data sources as forecasters, but they also use many others. Certain kinds of data, such as precipitation measurements or paleoclimatic proxies, are crucial to climatology yet have little relevance to forecasting. Conversely, some kinds of data useful in forecasting play little or no role in climatology. For example, Doppler radar revolutionized Edwards I 407 daily precipitation forecasting, but the data it produces are of little interest to climatologists.(1) When examining pre-twentieth century and paleoclimatic data, climatologists also use numerous “proxy” sources, including data on non-meteorological phenomena that depend strongly on climatic conditions. These data can provide indirect information about past weather conditions. Examples include ice cores, harvest records, tree rings, and species ranges.(2) Edwards I 408 Data quality: To control data quality, climatologists may compare one data set with another for the same area, perhaps taken with different instruments (e.g. radiosonde vs. satellite). Metadata - information about station or instrument history, location, etc. - are crucial to this process. Edwards I 411 Temperature changes: In an influential article published in 1953, J. Murray Mitchell dissected the many causes of “long-period” temperature changes in station records, dividing them into two principal types. “Apparent” changes, such as changes in thermometer location or shelters, were purely artifactual, stemming from causes unrelated to the actual temperature of the atmosphere. “Real” changes represented genuine differences in atmospheric conditions. These could be either “directly” or “indirectly” climatic, for example resulting from shifts in the general circulation (direct) or variations in solar output (indirect). But not all “real” temperature changes reflected actual climatic shifts, since some were caused by essentially local conditions (such as urban heat islands, industrial smoke, and local foliage cover) that had nothing to do with the climates of the region or the globe.(3) >Homogenization/climatology, >Reanalysis/climatology, >Model bias/climatology. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Doppler radar can detect falling raindrops, hail, and snow, so it is commonly used for short-term precipitation forecasts. However, the amount of precipitation actually reaching the ground can differ from what radar detects in the atmosphere. For climatological purposes, actual ground-level precipitation is usually all that matters. 2. K. R. Briffa et al., “Tree-Ring Width and Density Data Around the Northern Hemisphere: Part 1, Local and Regional Climate Signals,” The Holocene 12, no. 6 (2002): 737; H. Grudd et al., “A 7400-Year Tree-Ring Chronology in Northern Swedish Lapland: Natural Climatic Variability Expressed on Annual to Millennial Timescales,” The Holocene 12, no. 6 (2002): 657; J. Esper et al., “Low-Frequency Signals in Long Tree-Ring Chronologies for Reconstructing Past Temperature Variability,” Science 295, no. 5563 (2002): 2250–; J. R. Petit et al., “Climate and Atmospheric History of the Past 420,000 Years from the Vostok Ice Core, Antarctica,” Nature 399 (1999): 429–; T. L. Root et al., “Fingerprints of Global Warming on Wild Animals and Plants,” Nature 421, no. 6918 (2003): 57–; T. L. Root and S. H. Schneider, “Ecology and Climate: Research Strategies and Implications,” Science 269, no. 5222 (1995): 334; I. Chuine et al., “Back to the Middle Ages? Grape Harvest Dates and Temperature Variations in France Since 1370,” Nature 432 (2004): 289–. 3. 13. J. M. Mitchell, “On the Causes of Instrumentally Observed Secular Temperature Trends,” Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 10, no. 4 (1953): 244–. |
Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013 |
| Climate Data | Edwards | I 56 Climate data/Edwards: For long-term climate analyses - particularly climate change analyses - to be accurate, the climate data used must be homogeneous. A homogeneous climate time series is defined as one where variations are caused only by variations in weather and climate. Unfortunately, most long-term climatological time series have been affected by a number of non-climatic factors that make these data unrepresentative of the actual climate variation occurring over time. These factors include changes in: instruments, observing practices, station locations, formulae used to calculate means, and station environment.(1) Edwards: to decide whether you are seeing homogeneous data or “non-climatic factors,” you need to examine the history of the infrastructure station by station, year by year, and data point by data point, all in the context of changing standards, institutions, and communication techniques. >Infrastructure/Edwards. Since the 1950s, standardization and automation have helped to reduce the effect of “non-climatic factors” on data collection, and modeling techniques I 57 have allowed climatologists to generate relatively homogeneous data sets from heterogeneous sources.(2) But it is impossible to eliminate confounding factors completely. I 58 (…) only about ten percent of the data used by global weather prediction models originate in actual instrument readings. The remaining ninety percent are synthesized by another computer model: the analysis or “4-dimensional data assimilation” model, which creates values for all the points on a high-resolution, three-dimensional global grid. >Reanalysis/Climatology. I 356 Data globalization: (…) making data global is an ex post facto mode of standardization, dealing with deviation and inconsistency by containing the entire standardization process in a single place—a “center of calculation,” in Bruno Latour’s words.(3) >Weather forecasting/Edwards. I 381 Time/assimilation: Analysis produced through 4-D data assimilation thus represented an extremely complex model of data, far removed from the raw observations. With many millions of gridpoint values anchored to fewer than 100,000 observations, one could barely even call the analysis “based” on observations I 382 in any ordinary sense. As the data assimilation expert Andrew Lorenc put it, “assimilation is the process of finding the model representation which is most consistent with the observations.” >Weather forecasting/Edwards, >Homogenization/climatology, >Model bias/climatology. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. T. C. Peterson et al., “Homogeneity Adjustments of In Situ Atmospheric Climate Data: A Review,” International Journal of Climatology 18 (1998): 1493– 2. D. R. Easterling et al., “On the Development and Use of Homogenized Climate Datasets,” Journal of Climate 9, no. 6 (1996): 1429–; T. Karl et al., “Long-Term Climate Monitoring by the Global Climate Observing System (GCOS),” Climatic Change 31 (1995): 135–; Peterson et al., “Homogeneity Adjustments”; R. G. Quayle et al., “Effects of Recent Thermometer Changes in the Cooperative Station Network,” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 72, no. 11 (1991): 1718–. 3. B. Latour. 1987. Science in Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 4. Lorenc A.C. (2002) Atmospheric Data Assimilation and Quality Control. In: Pinardi N., Woods J. (eds) Ocean Forecasting. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-22648-3_5. |
Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013 |
| Conditional | Bolzano | Berka I 8 Conditional/ relationship/Conclusion/Bolzano: for Bolzano follows M, N, O..from A, B, C... only if (1) each (semantic) model of A, B, C ... is also a model of M, N, O .... That is, if each of the final sentences M, N, O, can be deduced separately from the assumptions A, B, C. and (2) the premises are the (s) content-related) reason for the conclusion. Berka: that is a very strong conclusion concept. TarskiVsBolzano: it is enough for him if the first condition is fulfilled. GentzenVsBolzano: for Gentzen it is sufficient if at least one of the final sentences is derivable from the set of premisses. Special case: if the claim quantity contains only one final sentence, the Bolzano's and the Gentzen's inference system are identical. Conclusion/Bolzano: additional condition: one must be able to decide which concepts are logical concepts. --- Berka I 20 f E.g. Entailment/Bolzano: (content-wise): if it is warmer in a place, then there are higher temperatures at the location - in reality, higher temperatures are shown, because it's warmer - the thermometer does not generate the temperatures. I.e. the entailment only exists in one direction: heat > temperature.(1) - different to Deducibility/Bolzano/(s): if the sentence "... higher temperatures" is true, the sentence "it's warmer" is true, and vice versa. Reversible relation of two true sentences. Content is not decisive here - entailment: only in one direction - derivability: goes in both directions, regardless of truth - Entailment/Bolzano: for reason - Derivability/>Mates: formal. 1. B. Bolzano, Wissenschaftslehre, Sulzbach 1837 (gekürzter Nachdruck aus Bd. II S. 113-115, S. 191 – 193; § 155; §162) |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Denotation | Rorty | VI 147 Naming/Rorty: language is more than naming. VsThermometer theory of meaning. >Thermometer, >Myth of the museum. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Derivability | Bolzano | Berka I 18/19 Derivability/Bolzano: exists, if certain ideas i, j, which make the premises A, B, C, true, also make the conclusions M, N, O... true. Namely the epitome (the totality) of the ideas is intended to make the entire conclusions and the whole premises true. ((s) >truthmaker). Comprise/include/Bolzano: Premises: are here the included, Conclusions: the comprehensive/including sentences. I 20 Derivability/Bolzano: Problem: sentences obtained through an arbitrary exchange of ideas from given true must not always be true. (s) Exchange of ideas: insert for variables. Bolzano: thus the relationship of derivability can also exist under false theorems. E.g. Follow-up relationship/Bolzano/(s): (content-related): if it is warmer in one place, a higher temperature is displayed in this place. In reality, higher temperature is displayed because it is warmer. The thermometer does not generate the temperature. That is, the follow-up relationship consists only in one direction: Heat > Temperature. Different in the derivability: E.g. derivability/Bolzano/(s): if the sentence "... higher temperature" is true, the sentence "it is warmer" is also true and vice versa. Reversible ratio of two true sentences. Content is not decisive. I 21 Follow-up relationshiop/Bolzano: is not already present when the corresponding sentences are all true. (1) 1. B. Bolzano, Wissenschaftslehre, Sulzbach 1837 (gekürzter Nachdruck aus Bd. II S. 113-115, S. 191 – 193; § 155; §162) |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Descriptions | Stegmüller | Stegmüller I 449f Statement: within the scientific difference between description and explanation. E.g. the rapid immersion of a thermometer in hot water first sinks the mercury column, and then increases rapidly. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Dispositions | Carnap | VII 119 Disposition terms / measuring / Carnap: Solution: Reduction statements / Carnap possessing the character of partial or conditional definitions: "If a thermometer x is in contact with an object, then T (x) = c if and only if the thermometer displays c degree - no counterfactual conditional but indicative - partial def: reduction statement: only in relation to the items that are in contact with the thermometer - reduction statments corredspond to operational definitions. >Reduction, >Reductionism, >Counterfactual conditionals. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Hockey Stick Controversy | Edwards | Edwards I 576 Hockey Stick Controversy/climatology/Edwards: Climate Audit emerged from a controversy over the “hockey stick” graph (…) originally published in 1998 by a group led by the University of Virginia climatologist Michael Mann. A version of the same graph featured prominently in the 2001 IPCC Second Assessment Report.(1) This graph combined data from thermometers with proxy measures of temperature from tree rings, ice cores, corals, and historical records to chart temperature changes over the past 1000 years. Stephen McIntyre, a former mining industry executive and government policy analyst with a background in mathematics and economics, and Ross McKitrick, an economist, challenged one of the statistical techniques Mann’s group had used to analyze the data. This challenge led to a long and bitter controversy involving Mann, the US Congress, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the National Science Foundation, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the National Academy of Sciences, the National Research Council, and numerous other entities and individuals. Across this period, McIntyre, McKitrick, Mann, and various other parties published a series of exchanges in peer-reviewed journals and in more partisan venues.(2) Edwards I 577 Auditing/internet activities/publicity: Essentially, Stephen McIntyre requested the original data that had been used to construct the graph. Michael Mann provided most of the data, but not all. McIntyre pursued the missing data, but Mann rebuffed him. Edwards I 578 In 2005, during the “hockey stick” controversy, McIntyre began to use his Climate Audit blog to promote the idea of “auditing” climate data and even climate models. He sought to audit, among other data, the Goddard Institute for Space Studies’ surface-temperature data set. He began to request, politely but insistently, that the institute release both the raw observations and its data-analysis model. Because McIntyre chronicled all of his requests and GISS’ responses on the Climate Audit blog, his efforts gained a degree of publicity they probably would never have received otherwise. GISS resisted McIntyre’s requests at first, but after some negative press coverage it complied. In 2007, McIntyre’s “audit” discovered an anomaly in the GISS data set involving corrections GISS had applied to records from the US Historical Climatology Network. The blog provided an unprecedented forum for any interested party to signal audit-worthy issues, and Climate Audit and other blogs uncovered further errors made by GISS in an early release of October 2008 data. GISS thanked McIntyre publicly for these contributions. In response to the calls of Climate Audit and other blogs for greater transparency, many climate centers have begun mounting data and even some climate models on public web servers. >Citizen science/Edwards. Edwards I 581 Citizen science/Edwards: (…) the value of citizens’ interventions in the “hockey stick” controversy is not clear. The National Research Council concluded that the critique by McIntyre and McKitrick helped to improve temperature-reconstruction methods. But it also noted that, in practice, the “principal-component analysis” method used by Mann et al. “does not appear to unduly influence reconstructions of hemispheric mean temperature; reconstructions performed without using principal component analysis are qualitatively similar to the original curves presented by Mann et al.”(3) Furthermore, other scientists had noted most of the issues raised by McIntyre and McKitrick; had scientific review processes been allowed to proceed normally, without public uproar, the ultimate outcome would probably have been much the same. 1. M. E. Mann et al., “Global-Scale Temperature Patterns and Climate Forcing over the Past Six Centuries,” Nature 392, no. 6678 (1998): 779–; Mann et al., “Northern Hemisphere Hemisphere Temperatures During the Past Millennium: Inferences, Uncertainties, and Limitations,” Geophysical Research Letters 29, no. 6 (1999): 759. 2. P. Huybers, “Comment on ‘Hockey Sticks, Principal Components, and Spurious Significance’ by S. McIntyre and R. McKitrick,” Geophysical Research Letters 32, no. 20 (2005): L20705; M. E. Mann et al., “False Claims by Mcintyre and McKitrick Regarding the Mann et al. (1998) Reconstruction,” www. realclimate.org; Mann and P. D. Jones, “Global Surface Temperatures over the Past Two Millennia,” Geophysical Research Letters 30, no. 15 (2003): 1820; S. McIntyre and R. McKitrick, “Corrections to the Mann et al. (1998) Proxy Data Base and Northern Hemispheric Average Temperature Series,” Energy & Environment 14, no. 6 (2003); McIntyre and McKitrick, “The M&M Critique of the Mbh98 Northern Hemisphere Climate Index: Update and Implications,” Energy and Environment 16, no. 1 (2005): 69–; H. Von Storch and E. Zorita, “Comment on ‘Hockey Sticks, Principal Components, and Spurious Significance,’ by S. McIntyre and R. McKitrick,” Geophysical Research Letters 32 (2005): 20. 3. Committee on Surface Temperature Reconstructions for the Last 2000 Years et al., Surface Temperature Reconstructions for the Last 2000 Years (National Academies Press, 2006), 113. |
Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013 |
| Homogenization | Climatology | Edwards I 401 Homogenization/climatology/Edwards: (…) observing systems and standards changed often and rapidly over time, creating temporal discontinuities and inconsistencies. These “inhomogeneities,” as meteorologists call them, rendered large quantities of weather data unusable for climatological purposes. Yet in recent decades, with fast, high-quality 4-D data assimilation, forecasting and climatology have begun to converge. Reanalysis of global weather data is producing - for the first time - consistent, gridded data on the planetary circulation, over periods of 50 years or more, at resolutions much higher than those achieved with traditional climatological data sets. Reanalysis may never replace traditional climate data, since serious concerns remain about how assimilation models “bias” data when integrated over very long periods. >Reanalysis/climatology. Edwards I 402 Nonetheless, the weather and climate data infrastructures are now inextricably linked by the “models of data” each of these infrastructures requires in order to project the atmosphere’s future and to know its past. >Models/metereology, >Weather data/metereology. Edwards I 406 Reanalysis: permits true four-dimensional assimilation, in which future observations as well as past observations can influence the state of the analysis at any point in time.(1) Edwards I 415 Inhomogeneities: Most inhomogeneities in climate data have little political valence, but there are important exceptions. As we saw in chapter 8, during the Cold War the Soviet Union withheld some data, while the People’s Republic of China withheld virtually all data. These data were not included in any Western climate data set until the mid 1980s.(2) Some recent work suggests that systematic errors may be more widespread than was previously believed. For example, nineteenth-century meteorologists throughout the Alps placed precipitation gauges on rooftops and thermometers Edwards I 416 thermometers in windows; later, they moved precipitation gauges to ground level and mounted thermometers inside screening devices placed in open areas (thus reducing the artifactual effects of buildings and pavement). Although stations modified their instrument placement at different times, precipitation measurements were systematically higher and temperature measurements lower after instrument placements were changed.(3) Satellite data: A different and much more problematic issue arises with respect to satellite data. (…) most raw sensor readings from satellites require some kind of processing to convert them into meteorological information. This can be a complex modeling process, as in the inversion of microwave radiances, but it also can be a much simpler data-reduction process. >Reanalysis/climatology, >Model bias/climatology. 1. K. E. Trenberth, “Atmospheric Circulation Climate Changes,” Climatic Change 31, no. 2 (1995), 306. 2. 15. P. D. Jones et al., A Gridpoint Surface Air Temperature Data Set for the Northern Hemisphere (US Department of Energy, Carbon Dioxide Research Division, 1985), 1. 3. R. Boehm et al., “Regional Temperature Variability in the European Alps: 1760–8 From Homogenized Instrumental Time Series,” International Journal of Climatology 21, no. 14 (2001): 1779–; Auer et al., “Metadata and Their Role in Homogenising.” |
Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013 |
| Icons | Deacon | I 71 Icon/Index/Symbol/Deacon: when we say something is iconic we think it reminds us of something, e.g. landscapes, portraits, etc. Index/indicator: here there is a physical connection to something else, e.g. thermometer, weather vane, etc. >Indexicality. Symbols: this is about social convention, e.g. wedding ring. Taken together, the words in a sentence symbolize a particular idea or set of ideas. >Symbols/Deacon. No object is intrinsically an icon, an index or a symbol. If we call something an icon or index, we are talking about the intention of its use. VsIconicity: Many people say that everything can be an icon for everything possible. Deacon: That is what you can also say about the other two cases. I 72 For example, there is a debate about whether certain sign languages such as the American Sign Language (ASL) are symbolic or iconic. Interpretation/Interpretability: it is also the question of whether interpretive skills are needed or are lost over time and are regained. >Signs, >Learning, >Interpretation. I 73 Symbol/Icon/Animal Language/Deacon: e.g. laughter/humour: there is probably a symbolic element in the term "humour" for which animals - in contrast to laughter - are not receptive. Animals are also not receptive to understand the social component of simple signals, even if they are involved in this process. Interpretation/Peirce/Deacon: Peirce distinguishes between different types of references and explains them with different levels of interpretation: Animal calls: unlike animals, humans can distinguish higher-level associations. This is about more than just increasing complexity. I 74 N.B.: if I do not recognize the symbolic reference, I can still see the same thing as an icon, i.e. I can recognize its similarity to something else. >Symbolic reference, cf. >Symbolic learning. One could assume that there would be a hierarchy of references, from iconic to index-like to symbolic reference, but it is not that simple. N.B.: it is not the likeness that creates the iconicity! Only after recognizing the iconic relation we assess the similarity of the sign with the object. >Similarity. The interpretation is something we are not doing! It is an act not to make a distinction! I 75 E.g. Mimicry, for example: whether it works depends on small things like the attention or inattentiveness of the predator. It depends on these circumstances whether we interpret the coloration of the animal as iconic or indexical. >Mimicry. I 76 Similarity/interpretation: Similarity, which is determined in the interpretation process due to external influences, decides upon whether we perceive something as an icon or an index. Interpretation: is no different in the case of sculptures or blackening of paper. I 77 Icons/Deacon: Thesis: Icons arise from the failure of the attempt to set up differentiating indices for distinguishing things. >Symptoms. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Intentions | Dennett | II 39f Intention/action/life/Evolution/Dennett: modes of action within such primitive systems (macromolecules) are similar to intentional actions. The systems are driven by information and strive for goals. Thermometers are similar "pseudo-agents"! They are "intentional systems". In order to understand them we should take the "intentional position" against them. II 57 Purpose/intention/meaning/action/Dennett: the goal of expressing exactly how the actor sees his task is erroneous, a pointless exercise, like reading poems under the microscope. >Intentional Stance/Dennett. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Meaning | Sellars | I 56 Thermometer theory/meaning/Price/Sellars: main representative: Price - thesis: meaning consists of the syntax of a predicate and the fact of a reaction. SellarsVs: error: to regard meaning as a relation between a word and a non-linguistic entity. >myth of the museum. Cf. Today's theories on >Word meaning. --- II 306 Meaning/tradition (atomism): relationship between a linguistic and non-linguistic subject is purely logical. II 307 SellarsVsTradition: Consequence: then truth would be a purely "relational property". But it is not a "real property". Meaning is no "real relationship"! - it is more complicated. >Atomism, >Objects, >Truth, >Meaning, >Relations. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Measurements | Brandom | I 317 Measuring: parrots and thermometera can have reliable dispositions. However, they have no knowledge. They do not consider their reactions as reasons for further action. >Knowledge. For reliable dispositions >RDRDs, >Reasons, >Actions. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Measurements | Duhem | I 191 Measuring/Duhem: e.g. Holism: In the beginning it was necessary to calibrate the glass tube, not only to the abstract concepts of arithmetic and geometry, but also to the abstract concept of mass, to the hypotheses of general mechanics and the ones of the sky, which justify the use of the balance for the comparison of mass. The specific gravity of the mercury had to be known at the temperature at which this calibration could be carried out, and for this purpose the specific gravity at 0 °, which cannot be used without knowing the laws of hydrostatics. It was necessary to know the law of the expansion of mercury, which is determined by means of an apparatus in which a magnifying glass is employed, that is, also certain laws of optics. >Laws, >Natural laws, >Methods. I 203 Measure/Duhem: One does not use any instrument, but a certain one, with characteristic constants. >Natural constants. I 204 The experimenter works with two different conceptions of the instrument he uses: the one is the image of the concrete instrument, the other is a schematic type of the same which is constructed with the help of the symbols provided by this theory. It is the ideal and symbolic instrument which he thinks about, to which he applies the laws and formulas of physics. >Physics. I 205 Accuracy grows not only through improved instruments, but also because the theories provide ever more appropriate methods for establishing the relations between the facts and the schematic concepts which they are intended to represent. Growing accuracy is bought by growing complexity. At the same time, one must observe secondary facts. The transformations which are made in the directly given facts of the experiment are the corrections. If the physical experiment were the simple statement of a fact, it would be absurd to make corrections to it. The experimenter constantly compares two instruments: the ideal and the real. The assistant focuses on the actual, on the second (in which, for example, ideal gases move instead of the concrete ones) the leader applies the laws of hydrostatics. The relationship between the two instruments is the quasi correction. I 206/207 E.g. the assistant states the height of the mercury column, the leader corrects it. This is due to intellectual operations. Whoever sees in the experiments only findings of facts will not understand the role of the corrections. Not even the so-called systematic errors. I 208 Systematic errors: if one leaves the cause of a systematic error in an experiment, it means that one has been satisfied with a too simple theoretical picture. >Theories, >Errors. I 277 Measuring: E.g. no thermometer can determine the highest temperature. The symbol for absolute temperature does not correspond to any of the measuring methods. What is called a perfect gas in thermodynamics is only an approximate picture of a real gas. >Observation, >Idealization. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Measurements | Poundstone | I 98-104 Duplication/ratios/knowledge/perception/Poincaré: Assumed, overnight all lengths have doubled - would we notice something? - Poincaré: No! >H. Poincaré. I 102f SchlesingerVsPoincaré: different changes: Gravity: 1/4 as strong as before, density: 1/8, air pressure: 1/8, - a mercury thermometer bursts. Pendulum: Day length is longer by √2.- The speed of light is growing by the same factor (measured by Pendulum). Other clocks: no slower (spring force). >Speed of light. Open question: whether the other conservation laws remain constant. >Conservation laws, >Symmetries/Physics. I 104 When all the atoms are increased, then the electron has to cope the uphill quantum leap with double the distance and needs a doubled energy expenditure - this will result in a huge temperature drop. I 120 The ranking of pleasure and displeasure feelings and preferences does not change. >Preferences. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Observation | Sellars | I XVII Observatory Reports: reports seem to be able to take the foundation of justification instead of the sensory data. >Sense data, >Justification. Vs: They are not independent, in the sense that they require no further knowledge Someone who always responds with "This is green" expresses no knowledge. >Thermometer, parrot). He has no position in the "logical space of reasons." >Logical space of reasons, >Fuel gauge example. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Physics | Duhem | I XXI Physics/Duhem: the work of the physicist in 4 steps: 1. Definition and measurement of the physical quantities (also combined quantities) the symbols of the theory are given a physical meaning only to the extent that measurement methods for the quantities are given. 2. Formulation of hypotheses. Here, quantities are linked together. I XXII 3. The mathematical development of the theory e.g. the slowed down motion on the inclined plane is the responsibility of the logician and the mathematician alone. 4. Review by experiment. "Consistency with experience is the only criterion of truth for a physical theory." I 150 Theoretical Physics/Duhem: cannot grasp the sensually perceptible phenomena. It cannot therefore decide whether these properties are qualitative or quantitative. Theoretical physics confines itself to representing perceptible phenomena through signs, by symbols. It does not capture the reality of things. I 275 Physics/Duhem: must respect the mathematical rules strictly. The mathematical symbols have only meaning under properly determined conditions. To define these symbols is to enumerate the conditions. E.g. because of the definition, an absolute temperature can only be positive, the mass of a body invariable. Postulates: The theory has the principle of postulates, i.e. theorems which it can express as it likes, if there are no contradictions within the postulates, or between them. Only such rules weigh on the construction of the theory. The physical theory can take any path that is logical. In particular, it is free to give no account of the experimental facts. This is no longer the case when the theory is fully developed. Then it becomes necessary to compare the group of mathematical theorems with the group of experimental data. It may then turn out that it must be discarded, although it is logically correct because it is physically false because of the observation. >Theories, >Observation, >Observation language, >Theoretical terms. I 276 It is a mistake that all the conclusions made by the mathematician have a physical meaning. Similarly, (falsely) any calculation carried out during a measurement procedure would have to have a correspondence in a property of the examined body. That is not the case. Only the concluding formulas deal with the observed objects. E.g. Dissociation of a perfect gas mixture into its elements, which were regarded as perfect gases. I 277 Measuring: e.g. no thermometer can determine the highest temperature. The symbol for absolute temperature does not correspond to any of the measuring methods. What is called a perfect gas in thermodynamics is only an approximate picture of a real gas. >Experiments, >Idealization. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Picture (Image) | Goodman | III 216f Picture/Goodman: pictures are more likely to compare with the temperature events, than with the heights of the mercury column. Because in the systems in question, the images are like the temperatures rather denoted, they do not denote themselves. Def seeing/Goodman: what properties a picture exemplifies or expresses is comparable to the use of a scale-free thermometer. >Seeing, III 217f Def saying/Goodman: to say what the picture exemplifies, is then a matter of fitting the correct words from a syntactically unlimited and semantically dense language. There will always be another expression, such that we cannot determine what is actually exemplified by the picture in question. To say what a picuture exemplifies is like measuring without giving tolerance ranges. III 218 Pictorial exemplification/Goodman: so in reality it is an inverted display or measuring system. Systems may not be equated with language. Languages have alphabets, pictorial systems do not. >Exemplification, >Terminology/Goodman. --- IV 121 Pictorial elements/Goodman: pictorial elements can never, how similar they may be, represent syntactic equivalents. Because without an alphabet we have no way to differentiate significant and insignificant differences for marks. A blurry horse-representation is certainly not a representation of a blurred horse. The blurriness belongs to the presentation or imagination. We do not have a lexicon of pictorial forms. Therefore, the theory of language cannot explain visual skills. IV 156 Photography/Goodman: a photograph of the surface of Mars reminds us that the mediumn does not provide its own scale for size and distance. >Photography. IV 169 Digital/analog/Goodman: is the picture composed of dots a digital picture? No! Because no symbol is digital or analog. IV 174 A complete scheme is only pictural if it is analog. Verbally, if it is digital. In other words, not each analog, full scheme is pictural and not each digital full scheme is verbal. Picture/Goodman: so we are unable to reach a definition of images. Cf. >Picture (mapping), >Map example. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Reference | Dretske | Brandom I 600 Reference/Triangulation: The crossing point of two chains can help understand reference: e.g., the views of teacher and learning person. >Triangulation. Also Dretske: e.g. thermostat: one cannot say whether the system reacts to the temperature of the room, to the bimetallic strip, to the curvature of the bimetallic strip, or to the closing of the contact. (> Measuring). The practical consequences do not help. If the thermostat has a second sensor, such as a mercury thermometer which closes a contact accordingly and, if necessary, turns the heater on and off, the two causal chains intersect at two points: upstream with the change of the room temperature and downstream with the reaction to turn the heater on or off. --- I 951 Since the two chains intersect at two points, one must imagine them curved. BrandomVsDretske: does that really solve the problem? Is there not still the reaction to the closest disjunctive stimulus? Closing the bimetal strip or the mercury contact? --- I 601 Concept: Mere differing ability to react (cf. > RDRD reliable differential responsive dispositions, Brandom) is not enough to recognize the use of terms! Rationalistic supplementation: the inferential role of the reaction is crucial. |
Dretske I Fred Dretske "Minimal Rationality", in: S. L. Hurley and M. Nudds (Eds.) Rational Animals?, Oxford 2005 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dretske II F. Dretske Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Sensations | Dennett | II 82 Sensation / Dennett: there was never a proper definition of "sentience" (sensitivity) , but you summed up as the lowest form of >consciousness on. II 83 Sensitivity: needs, other than feeling, no consciousness. E.g. protozoa, >thermometer, light sensitive film, plants, >fuel gauge. The question of what distinguishes sensation over the mere sensitivity, has never been satisfactorily answered. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Sense Data Theory | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 78 Sense data/Russell/Hintikka: a) given by the senses, therefore deception possible - b) at the same time they do not belong to the psychic process of perception - but they are their objects, their content. I 107 Sense data/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: no physical objects. - Much broader: he needs them for semantic purposes: as the building blocks of all logical forms - as well as the substance of all possible situations. - Subject: is itself not an object. I 109 Whether an object is simple or complex, is empirically not question the logic. I 114 Sense data/Moore/Hintikka: makes a difference between spot and its color. Only the spot belongs to the sense data. WittgensteinVsRussell: they are logical constructions - they simplify laws but are not necessary for them. - Later: (note § 498): "private object before my soul." >Colour. I 180 Sense data/Russell/Hintikka: fails to uphold a strict distinction between a sense datum as a naked individual thing and a sense datum as a complex object. I 322 Sense data/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: middle and late period: the world in which we live is the world of sense data. --- II 87 Sense data/Wittgenstein: the sentence is a judgement on the sense data, a reading of one's own sense-data, for example, this is red. Here, there is no need for further verification, that is a priori. II 92 Sense data/physical event/Wittgenstein: the physical sound has a duration, the corresponding sense datum not - Listening and remembering are quite different. - Pointless: to say that one hears something and also recalls it - as e.g. one is seeing while one uses the thermometer at the same time. >Use, >Measurements. II 100 Sense data/WittgensteinVsRealism: sense data and physical objects are not in a causal relationship with each other. II 101 The relationship between objects and sensations is linguistically - and therefore necessary. >Objects. II 101 Sense data/term/Wittgenstein: sense data is the source of our terms. II 102 The world in which we live, is the one of sense data - but the one of which we speak is that one of physical objects. II 129 Sense data/Wittgenstein: it is nonsense to speak of the relationship between object and sense datum. II 134 Senseless: to speak of the causes of my sense data. >Causes, >Causation, >Causality, >Causal relation, >Causal explanation. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Terminology | Goodman | I 88 Art: There are characteristics to define a mode of symbolization that indicates whether something is a work of art. 1. Syntactic density: syntactic density is, where certain minimal differences serve to distinguish symbols, e.g. a scale free thermometer (in contrast to a digital instrument.) 2. Semantic density: semantic density is, where symbols are available for things that differ only by minimal differences from each other, e. g. not only the scale free thermometer mentioned above, but also common German, as long as it is not syntactically dense. 3. Relative fullness: relative fullness is, where comparatively many aspects of a symbol are significant, e. g. the drawing of a mountain of Hokusai consisting of a single line, in which every property such as line, thickness, shape, etc. counts. Contrary to the same curve as a depiction of the stock market trend of a day, in which only the height of the values above the basis counts. 4. Exemplification: in the exemplification, a symbol, whether or not it is denoted, is symbolized by the fact that it serves as a sample of properties which it possesses literally or metaphorically. 5. Multiple and complex reference is also possible, where one symbol fulfils several related and interacting reference functions, some direct and others mediated by other symbols. --- III 128 Definition symbol scheme: a symbol scheme consists of characters. Definition characters: characters are certain classes of utterances or inscriptions. Characteristic of the character in a notation is that its elements can be freely interchanged without any syntactic effects (class of marks). Score requires character separation. A character in a notation is an abstraction class of character indifference among inscriptions. Definition inscriptions: inscriptions include statements. An inscription is any brand visually, auditively, etc. that belongs to a character. An inscription is atomic if it does not contain any other inscription, otherwise it is compound. For example, a letter is considered atomic, including spaces. In music, the separation in atomic/together cannot always be recognized immediately, it is more complex. The atoms are best sorted into categories: key sign, time sign, pitch sign. III 128/129 Definition mark: a mark is an individual case of a character in a notation and it includes inscriptions. Actual marks are rarely moved or exchanged. All inscriptions of a given brand are syntactically equivalent. And this is a sufficient condition that they are "genuine copies" or replicas of each other, or are spelled in the same way. No mark may belong to more than one character (disjunctiveness) a mark that is unambiguously an inscription of a single character is still ambiguous, if it has different objects of fulfillment at different times or in different contexts. Definition type (opposite: use, Peirce): the type is the general or class whose individual cases or elements are the marks. Goodman: I prefer to do without the type altogether and instead name the cases of use of the type replica. Definition case of use: the case of use the replica of a type ("genuine copy"). There is no degree of similarity necessary or sufficient for replicas. Definition genuine copy: a genuine copy of a genuine copy of a genuine copy... must always be a genuine copy of "x". If the relation of being a genuine copy is not being transitive, the whole notation loses its meaning (see below: strictly speaking, a performance may not contain a single wrong note). Score requires character separation. Definition Notation: 1. Condition is character indifference among the individual cases of each character. Character indifference is a typical equivalence relation: reflexive, symmetrical, transitive. (No inscription belongs to one character to whom the other does not belong). 2. Demand to notation: the characters must be differentiated or articulated finally. For every two characters K and K' and every mark m that does not actually belong to both, the provision that either m does not belong to K or m does not belong to K' is theoretically possible. 3. The (first) semantic requirement for notation systems is that they must be unambiguous. Definition ambiguity: ambiguity consists of a multitude of fulfillment classes for one character. Definition redundancy: redundancy consists of a multitude of characters for one fulfillment class. III 133 Definition syntactically dense: a schema is syntactically dense if it provides an infinite number of characters that are arranged in such a way that there is always a third between two. Such a scheme still has gaps. For example, if the characters are rational numbers that are either less than 1 or not less than 2. In this case, the insertion of a character corresponding to 1 will destroy the density. Definition consistently dense: if there is no insertion of other characters at their normal positions, the density is destroyed. Definition ordered syntactically: e. g. by alphabet Definition discreetly not overlapping: note how absurd the usual notion is that the elements of a notation must be discreet: first, characters of a notation as classes must be rather disjoint! Discretion is a relationship between individuals. Secondly, there is no need for inscriptions of notations to be discreet. And finally, even atomic inscriptions only need to be discreet relative to this notation. Definition disjunct/disjunctiveness: no mark may belong to more than one character. The disjunctiveness of the characters is therefore somewhat surprising since we do not have neatly separated classes of ordered spheres of inscriptions in the world, but rather a confusing mixture of marks. Semantic disjunctiveness does not imply the discreetness of the objects of fulfillment, nor do syntactic disjunctiveness of the characters imply the discreetness of the inscriptions. On the other hand, a schema can consist of only two characters that are not differentiated finally. For example, all marks that are not longer than one centimeter belong to one character, all longer marks belong to the other. III 213 Definition fullness: the symbols in the picturial schema are relatively full, and fullness is distinguished from both the general public of the symbol and the infinity of a schema. It is in fact completely independent of what a symbol denotes, as well as the number of symbols in a scheme. Definition "attenuation": for the opposite of fullness I use attenuation. Definition density: e.g. real numbers, no point delimitation possible. The opposite of dense is articulated. III 232 ff Syntactic density, semantic density and syntactic fullness can be three symptoms of the aesthetic. Syntactic density is characteristic for non-linguistic systems; sketches differ from scores and scripts. Semantic density is characteristic of representation, description and expression through which sketches and scripts differ from scores. Relative syntactic fullness distinguishes the more representational among the semantically dense systems from the diagrammatic ones, the less from the more "schematic" ones. Density is anything but mysterious and vague and is explicitly defined. It arises from the unsatisfactory desire for precision and keeps it alive. III 76ff Def scheme: a scheme implicit set of alternatives. III 128 Def symbolic scheme: a symbolic scheme consists of characters. >Symbols. III ~ 140 Def symbol system: a symbol system is a symbol diagram, which is correlated with a reference region. III 76 A description does not work in isolation, but in its belonging to a family. III 195 The text of a poem, a novel or a biography is a character in a notation scheme. As a phonetic character with comments as the satisfaction of objects it belongs to an approximately notational system. >Systems. III 195 As a character with objects as the satisfaction of objects it belongs to a discursive language. >Satisfaction. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Translation | Duhem | I 173 Translation/Measuring/Duhem: The measurement methods are the vocabulary that allows translations. Who translates, falsifies. The Italians say: Tradutore tradittore. There is never a complete consistency between two texts which are translations of one another. The difference between the concrete facts observed by the physicists and the numerical symbols that he uses is extraordinary. I 174 A theoretical fact has nothing indefinite, nothing fluctuating. The body being studied is geometrically defined. Its edges are real lines, without thickness, its corners are real points without dimensions. Each point of a body corresponds to a temperature, and this temperature is, for each point, a number which is sharply defined by every other. This theoretical fact is opposed to the practical fact whose translation it is. Here nothing more can be seen of precision. The body is no longer a geometric one, but a concrete block, its edges jagged ridges, its points more or less broad, its temperature a medium one in a certain volume. It is also not the definite number, clearly distinguished from any other number. I 175 Nor could we explain that the temperature is exactly 10°, but only that it does not exceed a certain fraction of the degree which depends on the accuracy of the instrument. An infinite number of different theoretical facts can serve as a translation of the same practical fact. >Facts. I 178 When translating into concrete language, it is possible to obtain several facts which differ from each other because of the sensitivity of our instruments. E.g. the different values given by our thermodynamic formula v for the ice melting point may have a difference of one-tenth or more of a degree, while our thermometer measures one-hundredth of an inch. >Observation, >Observation language, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Theories. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Understanding | Brandom | I 12ff Understanding/Brandom: from our way of talking - not because we would have to talk that way. I 147 Understanding: has to do with generality. Peculiarities are not immediately understandable. I 424f Definition understanding: to understand content is to capture the necessary and sufficient conditions for its truth. >Truth conditions. I 426 Brandom: what ever may be their role in the order of understanding, in the order of justification "seems red" is always before "red". I 317 Reliability: Parrots and thermometers can have reliable dispositions. they do not consider their reactions as grounds for further action - no knowledge without understanding. >Reliability theory. I 709 Understanding/Brandom: you must be able to express what I express. I 714 One must be able not only to specify de dicto, but also to specify de re contents. >de dicto, >de re. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Verification | Millikan | I 297 Verification/Knowledge/Epistemology/Realism/Naturalism/Millikan: our problem of the recognition of identities is different from the ordinary recognition problem of the realists. With us, it is not about the existence of an inner test for the correct image of the world. We just need to show that there can be tests that... I 298 ...determine whether concepts, when applied under normal conditions, can produce mapped sentences. Correspondence/Coherence/Tradition/Millikan: for the tradition it must be coherence, if correspondence is not the right one. >Correspondence/Millican, >Correspondence theory/Millikan. Test/Millikan: E.g. the heart can only be tested together with kidneys. Language/meaning/reference/world/reality/image/Millikan: we are only trying to understand how there can be a test that has historically been applied to human concepts in this world, and whose results are correlated with the world for reasons, which we can specify. Problem: we are more handicapped here than the realism. I 299 It is about the possibility of meaningfulness and intentionality at all. Holism/MillikanVsHolism: epistemic holism is wrong. >Holism/Millikan. Instead, a test for non-contradiction, if applied only to a small set of concepts, would be a relatively effective test for the adequacy of concepts. >Adequacy/Millikan. I 312 Concept/Law/Theory/Test/Review/Millikan: if a term occurs in a law it is necessary,... I 313 ...to test it together with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain conclusion rules. Concept/Millikan: since concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested. Test: does not mean that the occurrence of sense data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine). I 317 Theory/Review/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition: says that not only some, but most of our concepts are not of things we observe directly but from other things. Test/Logical Form/Millikan: if there is a thing A, that is identified by observing effects on B and C, is then the validity of the concepts of B and C together with the theory that traces back the observed effects on the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A? Millikan: No! From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts governing B and C is tested when the concept governing A is tested and vice versa. This is not the case if A is a definite description, for example, the "first president of the USA", and it does not follow if the explicit intension of A represents something causally dependent. For example, "the mercury in the thermometer rose to the mark 70" as an intension for "the temperature was 70 degrees". I 318 Concept/Millikan: Concepts are abilities - the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: e.g. my ability to make a good cake is quite independent of my ability to smash eggs, even if I have to smash eggs to make the cake. >Concept/Millikan. I 320 Test/review/theory/Millikan: That a test works can often be known regardless of knowing how it works. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Autonomy Principle | Feyerabend Vs Autonomy Principle | I 43 Autonomy Principle/Feyerabend: the collection of facts for inspection purposes is the only thing that is left to do for the scientist. If facts exist and are available, regardless of whether one takes alternatives to the theory to be tested into consideration. Principle of relative autonomy of facts. (Opposite theories). The principle does not say that the discovery and description of facts is completely independent of theories, but rather that the facts belonging to the empirical content of a theory are available, regardless of whether one considers alternatives to this theory. ((s) i.e. that facts are autonomous, regardless of the theories.) I 44 FeyerabendVsAutonomy Principle: that’s a way too simple point of view. Facts and theories are far more closely linked than the principle of autonomy will admit. E.g. it is known now that the Brownian particle is a perpetual motion machine of the second kind, and that its existence refutes the 2nd law of thermodynamics. (GenzVs.) Could this relationship between the movement and the theory have been demonstrated or discovered directly?. Two questions: 1) Could the relevance of the movement have been detected in this way? 2) Could it have been shown that it refutes the 2nd law? ((s) nonsense: "observing" relevance. Every thermometer is subject to fluctuations that are the same scale as the Brownian movement. The actual refutation came about in a different way: by means of the kinetic theory and its use by Einstein in his calculation of the statistical properties of Brownian movement. In this rebuttal, the consistency condition was violated: the phenomenological theory was incorporated into the broader framework of statistical physics. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Boyd, R. | Rorty Vs Boyd, R. | I 310 Def convergence/Boyd/Putnam/Rorty: reliability of a principle such as the following: one should examine in the light of the theoretical knowledge available, under which circumstances the causal assertions of the theory can plausibly go wrong, either because other causal mechanisms seem plausible, or because kinds of causal mechanisms already known come into conflict with the theory, namely in ways that theory can not foresee. Cf. >Reliability. Rorty: no one will have anything against that as long as Boyd does not claim we could explain why this principle leads to useful results only on the basis of a "realistic understanding of the relevant adjoining theories": I 311 Boyd: Suppose, we advise each time which theories are particularly likely to fail experimentally. And suppose further, our conjectures apply exactly where the realist would expect it. What other explanation than realism is then still possible? It certainly is not the mere effect of conventionally or arbitraryly acquired scientific traditions. If the world is not shaped by our conventions, which no empiricist would accept, then the reliability of this principle can by no means be merely a matter of convention. RortyVsBoyd: he confuses two meanings of "reliability of a method": a) the meaning, that a process is reliable in relation to an independent test (thermometer) with b) the meaning that a process is reliable, because one can not imagine an alternative to it. The examination of a new theory by old ones is not an optional procedure. How else could we verify it? Theory/Rorty: but a new theory is nothing more than a relatively minor change of a comprehensive network of convictions. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Dretske, F. | Brandom Vs Dretske, F. | I 600 Dretske: E.g. thermostat: one cannot say whether the system reacts to the room temperature, to the temperature of the bimetallic strip, to the curvature of the bimetallic strip, or the closing of the contact. (> Measuring) A look at the practical consequences will not help. If the thermostat has a second sensor, such as a mercury thermometer which closes a contact accordingly and turns the heating on and off accordingly, then the two causal chains intersect at two points: upstream at the change of the room temperature, and downstream in the reaction of turning the heater on or off. BrandomVsDretske: Does this really solve the problem? Isn’t this still the reaction to the nearest, albeit disjoint stimulus? The closing of the bimetallic strip or the mercury contact? II 12 Concept/BrandomVsDretske, Fodor, Millikan: not semantic continuity to the non- or pre-conceptual, but strict discontinuity. II 144 Semantic Theory: Dretske, Millikan, Fodor. BrandomVs: weakest where they turn to the question of what distinguisjes representations that deserve to be called beliefs from other indicator states. > Camp. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Empiricism | Sellars Vs Empiricism | Rorty VI 205 SellarsVsEmpiricism, British/Rorty: Confusion of causal conditionality and justifiable reason. Rorty I 194 QuineVsEmpiricism/SellarsVsEmpiricism/logical/Rorty: their legal doubts about the epistemic privilege: that certain assertions are used as reports of privileged ideas. Gavagai/Quine/Rorty: asks how the propositions of the natives can be distinguished in contingent empirical platitudes on the one hand and necessary conceptual truths on the other hand. For the natives it is enough to know which propositions are certainly true. They have no idea of conceptual, necessary truths. I 195 Assertibility/Rorty: if assertions are justified by their being common and not by their nature of inner episodes it makes no sense to try to isolate privileged ideas. I 196 Necessity/Quine/Rorty: necessary truth: equivalent to the fact that nobody had to offer an interesting alternative that could cause us to question it. Incorrigibility/Sellars/Rorty: until now nobody has proposed a viable method of controlling human behavior that could verify the doubt in this matter. I 196/197 Truth/justified assertibility/Rorty: (stems from Dewey). Sellars, Quine, Chisholm and many others have the intention of making truth more than this modest approach. VI 219 RortyVsEmpiricism: contains nothing that would be worth a rescue. Sellars I XVII To seem/to appear/Sellars: like Lewis and Chisholm: about how something appears to someone any error is in fact impossible! But VsLewis: by this the propositions do still not advance to the foundation of the justification. Observation reports/SellarsVsEmpiricism/Sellars: seem to be able to build instead of the sense-data the foundation of justification. Vs: they are not in the sense independent that they require no further knowledge. Someone who always only responds with "This is green" does not express with it alone any knowledge. (> Thermometer, parrot). He has no position in the "logical space of reasons". I XXI SellarsVsLogical Empiricism/SellarsVsEmpirismus/Sellars: the special wit his criticism is that the experiences of the minute taking persons that should constitute the basis of the theory in logical empiricism, are reconstructed by him as quasi theoretical postulated entities of an everyday world view. I XXII Sellars: (different than Wittgenstein and Austin): Connection between questions of classical philosophy and everyday language. Sellars I 54 Elementary word-world connections are made between "red" and red physical objects and not between "red" and a suspected class of private red single objects. (SellarsVsEmpiricism). This does not mean that private feelings are maybe not an essential part of the development of these associative connections. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Millikan Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 215 descriptive/referential/denotation/classification/Millikan: you can force a descriptive denotation to work referentially, Ex "He said that the winner was the loser." Ex (Russell) "I thought your yacht was larger than it is." I 216 Solution: "the winner" and "larger than your Yacht" must be regarded as classified according to the adjusted (adapted) sense. On the other hand: "The loser" probably has only descriptive of meaning. "Your Yacht" is classified by both: by adjusted and by relational sense, only "your" is purely referential. Quine: (classic example) Ex "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua." MillikanVsQuine: according to Quine that's not obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational sense in that context. referential/descriptive/attribution of belief/intentional/Millikan: there are exceptions, where the expressions do not work descriptively, nor purely referential, but also by relational sense or intension. Ex "the man who us drove home" is someone the speaker and hearer know very well. Then the hearer must assume that someone else is meant because the name is not used. Rule: here the second half of the rule for intentional contexts is violated, "use whichever expression that preserves the reference". This is often a sign that the first half is violated, "a sign has not only reference but also sense or intension, which must be preserved. Why else use such a complicated designation ("the man who drove us home"), instead of the name? Ortcutt/Ralph/spy/Quine/Millikan: Ex there is a man with a brown hat that Ralph has caught a glimpse of. Ralph assumes he is a spy. a) Ralph believes that the man he has caught a glimpse of is a spy. I 217 b) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. Millikan: The underlined parts are considered relational, b) is more questionable than a) because it is not clear whether Ralph has explicitly perceived him as wearing a brown hat. Quine: In addition, there is a gray-haired man that Ralph vaguely knows as a pillar of society, and that he is unaware of having seen, except once at the beach. c) Ralph believes that the man he saw on the beach is a spy. Millikan: that's for sure relational. As such, it will not follow from a) or b). Quine: adds only now that Ralph does not know this, but the two men are one and the same. d) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is not a spy. Now this is just wrong. Question: but what about e) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. f) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. Quine: only now Quine tells us the man's name (which Ralph is unaware of). Millikan: Ex Jennifer, an acquaintance of Samuel Clemens, does not know that he is Mark Twain. I 218 She says: "I would love to meet Mark Twain" and not "I'd love to meet Samuel Clemens". language-dependent: here, "Mark Twain" is classified dependent on language. So also language bound intensions are not always irrelevant for intentional contexts. It had o be language-bound here to make it clear that the name itself is substantial, and also that it is futile to assume that she would have said she wanted to meet Samuel Clemens. Ralph/Quine/Millikan: Quine assumes that Ralph has not only two internal names for Ortcutt, but only one of them is linked to the external name Ortcutt. Millikan: Description: Ex you and I are watching Ralph, who is suspiciously observing Ortcutt standing behind a bush with a camera (surely he just wants to photograph cobwebs). Ralph did not recognize Ortcutt and you think: Goodness, Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy ". Pointe: in this context, the sentence is true! ((S) Because the name "Ortcutt" was given by us, not by Ralph). referential/Millikan: Solution: "Ortcutt" is classified here as referential. referential/Millikan. Ex "Last Halloween Susi actually thought, Robert (her brother) was a ghost." ((S) She did not think of Robert, nor of her brother, that he was a ghost, but that she had a ghost in front of her). MillikanVsQuine: as long as no one has explicitly asked or denied that Tom knows that Cicero is Tullius, the two attributions of belief "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" and "... Tullius ..." are equivalent! Language-bound intension/Millikan: is obtained only if the context makes it clear what words were used, or which public words the believer has as implicit intentions. Fully-developed (language-independent) intension/Millikan: for them the same applies if they are kept intentionally: I 219 Ex "The natives believe that Hesperus is a God and Phosphorus is a devil." But: Pointe: It is important that the intrinsic function of a sentence must be maintained when one passes to intentional contexts. That is the reason that in attribution of belief one cannot simply replace "Cicero is Tullius" by "Cicero is Cicero". ((S) trivial/non-trivial identity). Stabilizing function/statement of identity/Millikan: the stabilizing function is that the listener translates "A" and "B" into the same internal term. Therefore, the intrinsic function of "Cicero is Cicero" is different from that of "Cicero is Tullius". Since the intrinsic function is different one can not be used for the other in intentional contexts. Eigenfunction: Ex "Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy": has the Eigenfunkion to be translated into an internal sentence that has a subject and two predicates. No record of this form can be found in Ralph's head. Therefore one can not say that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy you. I 299 Non-contradiction/Millikan: the test is also a test of our ability to identify something and whether our concepts represent what they are supposed to project. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. It is not the problem to decide how an exclusive class should be split up. I 300 Ex deciding when red ends and orange begins. Instead, it's about learning to recognize Ex red under different circumstances. Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: for Quine a criterion for right thinking seems to be that the relationship to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction? Agreement/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what agreement in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If you do not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree. Solution/Millikan: agreement is to say the same about the same. Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted. One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" as a sentence. He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer. Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra). Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree to a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in nature (natural necessity). I 309 Thesis: lack of Contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. agreement/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they fail to recognize the importance of the agreement in the judgment. agreement: this is not about two people getting together, but that they get together with the world. agreement/mismatch/Millikan: are not two equally likely possibilities ((s) > inegalitarian theory/Nozick.) There are many more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong, than for the same sentence to be true. Now, if an entire pattern (system) of coinciding judgments appears that represent the same area (for example color) the probability that each participant reflects an area in the world outside is stupendous. ((s) yes - but not that they mean the same thing). Ex only because my judgments about the passage of time almost always matches with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to classify my memories correctly in the passage of time. Objectivity/time/perspective/mediuma/communication/Millikan: thesis: the medium that other people form by their remarks is the most accessible perspective for me that I can have in terms of time. I 312 Concept/law/theory/test/verification/Millikan: when a concept appears in a law, it is necessary I 313 to test it along with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain rules of inference. Concept/Millikan: because concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested. Test: does not mean, however, that the occurrence of sensual data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine). Theory of sensual data/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be, thesis: that neither an internal nor an external language actually describes sensual data, except that the language depends on the previous concepts of external things that usually causes the sensual data. I 314 Forecast/prediction/to predict/prognosis/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: we project the world to inhabit it, not to predict it. If predictions are useful, at least not from experiences in our nerve endings. Confirmation/prediction/Millikan: A perceptual judgment implies mainly itself Ex if I want to verify that this container holds one liter, I don't have to be able to predict that the individual edges have a certain length.That is I need not be able to predict any particular sensual data. I 317 Theory/Verification/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition says that not just a few, but most of our concepts are not of things that we observe directly, but of other things. Test/logical form/Millikan: if there is one thing A, which is identified by observing effects on B and C, isn't then the validity of the concepts of B and C tested together with the theory that ascribes the observed effects onto the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A? Millikan. No! From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts, that govern B and C, is tested when the concept that governs A is tested and vice versa. Namely, it does not follow, if A is a specific denotation Ex "the first President of the United States" and it also does not follow, if the explicit intention of A represents something causally dependent. Ex "the mercury in the thermometer rose to mark 70" as intension of "the temperature was 70 degrees." I 318 Concept/Millikan: concepts are abilities - namely the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: Ex my ability to make a good cake is completely independent of my ability to break up eggs, even if I have to break up eggs to make the cake. Objectivity/objective reality/world/method/knowledge/Millikan: we obtain a knowledge of the outside world by applying different methods to obtain a result. Ex different methods of temperature measurement: So we come to the conclusion that temperature is something real. I 321 Knowledge/context/holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: doesn't all knowledge depend on "collateral information", as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we test individual concepts independently from the rest? Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: ~ "Our findings about the outside world do not stand individually before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body." Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction. Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs never stand before the tribunal of experience. I 322 Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other beliefs. Confirmation: single confirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my attitudes. From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well. Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Verificationism | Quine Vs Verificationism | NS I 73 Verificationism/QuineVsVerificationism/Two Dogmas/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: (verificationism: the meaning of a sentence is the empirical method of its verification): This leads to reductionism. Reductionism: every synthetic sentence is equivalent to a sentence whose terms refer to the sensory experience. QuineVsReductionism: it isolates the sentences. Instead: Quine pro holism. Verificationism/QuineVsVerificationism/Newen/Schrenk: e.g. if a thermometer is immersed in boiling water and does not show 100 °, we assume (with the holism) that it's broken. Verificationism would have to assume that the sentence was falsified. Solution: the sentence must not be isolated. That again speaks against analyticity as "true solely because of meaning". Quine V 63 QuineVsVerificationism: Problem: for most sentences there are no confirmatory observational data. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Thermometer Th. | Price, H.H. | Sellars I 56 Thermometer theory / meaning / Price / Sellars: main representative: Price - thesis: meaning consists of the syntax of a predicate and the fact of a reaction - SellarsVs: error: to see meaning as a relation between a word and a non-linguistic entity - (s)> tags -> "myth of the Museum"). |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
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