Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Animals	Feminism	Braidotti I 77 Animals/Feminism: A liberal humanist like Nussbaum (2006)⁽¹⁾ agrees to pursue species equity. Working within the classical liberal tradition, Mary Midgley (1996)⁽²⁾ does not even trust the term ‘anthropocentrism’, referring to it as ‘human chauvinism; narrowness of sympathy, comparable to national, or race or gender-chauvinism. It could also be called exclusive humanism, as opposed to the hospitable, friendly, inclusive kind’ (1996⁽²⁾: 105). The alternative Midgley supports is to admit that ‘we are not self-contained and self-sufficient, either as a species or as individuals, but live naturally in deep mutual dependence’ (1996⁽²⁾: 9-10). In her powerful analyses of the environmental crisis of reason, Val Plumwood (2003)⁽⁷⁾ also calls for a new dialogical interspecies ethics based on decentring human privilege. Ecofeminism: For radical eco-feminists, both utilitarianism and liberalism are found wanting: the former for its condescending approach to non-human others, the latter in view of the hypocritical denial of humans’ manipulative mastery over animals. This critique is expanded to the destructive side of human individualism that entails selfishness and a misplaced sense of superiority, which for feminists (Donovan and Adams, 1996⁽³⁾, 2007⁽⁴⁾) is connected to male privileges and the oppression of women and supports a general theory of male domination. Meat-eating is targeted as a legalized form of cannibalism by old and new feminist vegetarian and vegan critical theory (Adams, 1990⁽⁵⁾; MacCormack, 2012⁽⁶⁾). Speciesism is therefore held accountable as an undue privilege to the same degree as sexism and racism. The pervasiveness of a ‘sex-species’ hierarchical system tends to remain unacknowledged and uncriticized even in the framework of animal rights activism. The corrective influence of feminism is valued because it emphasizes both the political importance of the collectivity and of emotional bonding. >Ecofeminism, >Posthumanism. 1. Nussbaum, Martha C. 2006. Frontiers of Justice. Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 2. Midgley, Mary. 1996. Utopias, Dolphins and Computers. Problems of Philosophical Plumbing. London and New York: Routledge. 3. Donovan, Josephine and Carol J. Adams (eds.) 1996. Beyond Animal Rights. A Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment of Animals. New York: Continuum. 4. Donovan, Josephine and Carol J. Adams (eds.) 2007. The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics. New York: Columbia University Press. 5. Adams, Carol. 1990. The Sexual Politics of Meat: A FeministVegetarian Critical Theory. New York: Continuum. 6. MacCormack, Patricia. 2012. Posthuman Ethics. London: Ashgate. 7. Plumwood, Val. 2003. Environmental Culture. London: Routledge.	Braidotti I Rosie Braidotti The Posthuman Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 2013
Communitarianism	Political Philosophy	Gaus I 170 Communitarianism/Political Philosophy/Dagger: [Longing for community] did not find expression in the word 'communitarian' until the 1840s, when it and communautaire appeared almost simultaneously in the writings of English and French socialists. French dictionaries point to Etienne Cabet and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon as the first to use communautaire, but the Oxford English Dictionary gives the credit for 'communitarian' to one Goodwyn Barmby, who founded the Universal Communitarian Association in 1841 and edited a magazine he called The Promethean, or Communitarian Apostle. According to Ralph Waldo Emerson's essay on 'English reformers', Barmby Gaus I 171 advertised his publication as 'the cheapest of all magazines, and the paper most devoted of any to the cause of the people; consecrated to Pantheism in Religion, and Communism in Politics' (1842⁽¹⁾: 239). In the beginning, then, 'communitarian' seems to have been a rough synonym of 'socialist' and 'communist'. To be a communitarian was simply to believe that community is somehow vital to a worthwhile life and is therefore to be protected against various threats. Socialists and communists were leftists, but a communitarian could as easily be to the right as the left of centre politically (Miller, 2000c)⁽²⁾ (...) people who moved from the settled, family-focused life of villages and small towns to the unsettled, individualistic life of commerce and cities might gain affluence and personal free- dom, but they paid the price of alienation, isolation, and rootlessness. Ferdinand Tönnies (2001)⁽³⁾, with his distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (association or civil society), has been especially influential in this regard. As Tönnies defines the terms, Gemeinschaft is an intimate, organic, and traditional form of human association; Gesellschaft is impersonal, mechanical, and rational. To exchange the former for the latter then, is to trade warmth and support for coldness and calculation. Concern for community took another direction in the twentieth century as some writers began to see the centripetal force of the modern state as the principal threat to community. This turn is evident, for instance, in José Ortega y Gasset's warnings in The Revolt of the Masses against 'the gravest danger that today threatens civilisation: State intervention; the absorption of all spontaneous social effort by the State' (1932⁽⁴⁾: 120). Nisbet: Robert Nisbet's The Quest for Community (1953)⁽⁵⁾provides an especially clear statement of this position, which draws more on Tocqueville's insistence on the importance of voluntary associations ofcitizens than on a longing for Gemeinschaft. >Community/Tönnies. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in short, the longing for community took the form of a reaction against both the atomizing, anomic tendencies of modern, urban society and the use of the centripetal force of the modern state to check these tendencies. Moreover, modernity was often linked with liberalism, a theory that many took to rest on and encourage atomistic and even 'possessive' individualism (Macpherson, 1962)⁽⁶⁾. Against this background, communitarianism developed in the late twentieth century in the course of a debate with - or perhaps within - liberalism. >Liberalism/Gaus. Philosophical communitarianism: Four books published in rapid succession in the 1980s - Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981)⁽⁷⁾, Michael Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982)⁽⁸⁾, Michael Walzer's Spheres of.Justice (1983)⁽⁹⁾, and Charles Taylor's Philosophical Papers (1985)⁽¹⁰⁾ - marked the emergence of this philosophical form of communitarianism.FN7 Different as they are from one another, all of these books express dissatisfaction with liberalism, especially in the form of theories of justice and rights. The main target here was John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971)⁽¹¹⁾, but Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)⁽¹²⁾, Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously (1977)⁽¹³⁾, and Bruce Ackerman's Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980)⁽¹⁴⁾ also came in for criticism. (CommunitarianismVsRawls, CommunitarianismVsNozick, CommunitarianismVsAckerman, Bruce, CommunitarianismVsDworkin). CommunitarianismVsLiberalism: a typical complaint was, and is, that these theories are too abstract and universalistic. Walzer: In opposing them, Walzer proposes a 'radically particularist' approach that attends to 'history, culture, and membership' by asking not what 'rational individuals under universalizing conditions of such-and-such a sort' would choose, but what would 'individuals like us choose, who are situated as we are, who share a culture and are determined to go on sharing it?' (1983⁽⁹⁾: xiv, 5). >M. Walzer. Walzer thus calls attention to the importance of community, which he and others writing in the early 1980s took to be suffering from both philosophical and political neglect. For a valuable, full-length survey of this debate, see Mulhall and Swift, 1996⁽¹⁵⁾ Gaus I 172 Communitarian responesVsCriticisms: responses: 1) the first is that the communitarians' criticisms are misplaced because they have misconceived liberalism (Caney, 1992)⁽¹⁶⁾. In particular, the communitarians have misunderstood the abstractness of the theories they criticize. Thus Rawls maintains (1993⁽¹⁷⁾: Lecture I) that his 'political' conception of the self as prior to its ends is not a metaphysical claim about the nature of the self, as Sandel believes, but simply a way of representing the parties who are choosing principles of justice from behind the 'veil of ignorance'. Nor does this conception of the individual as a self capable of choosing its ends require liberals to deny that individual identity is in many ways the product of unchosen attachments and social circumstances. 2) 'What is central to the liberal view,' according to Will Kymlicka, 'is not that we can perceive a self prior to its ends, but that we understand ourselves to be prior to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination' (1989⁽¹⁸⁾ : 52). With this understood, a second response is to grant, as Kymlicka, Dworkin (1986⁽¹⁹⁾; 1992⁽²⁰⁾), Gewirth (1996⁾⁽²¹⁾, and Mason (2000)⁽²²⁾ do, that liberals should pay more attention to belonging, identity, and community, but to insist that they can do this perfectly well within their existing theories. 3) the third response, finally, is to point to the dangers of the critics' appeal to community norms. Communities have their virtues, but they have their vices, too - smugness, intolerance, and various forms of oppression and exploitation among them. The fact that communitarians do not embrace these vices simply reveals the perversity of their criticism: they 'want us to live in Salem, but not to believe in witches' (Gutmann 1992⁽²³⁾: 133; Friedman, 1992⁽²⁴⁾). 1. Emerson, R. W. (1842) 'English reformers'. The Dial, 3(2). 2. Miller, David (2000c) 'Communitarianism: left, right and centre'. In his Citizenship and National Identity. Cambridge: Polity. 3. Tönnies, Ferdinand (2001 118871) Community and Civil Society, trans. J. Harris and M. Hollis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Ortega y Gasset, José (1932) The Revolt of the Masses. New York: Norton. 5. Nisbet, Robert (1953) The Quest for Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 6. Macpherson, C. B. (1962) The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Clarendon. 7. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1981 ) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 8. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Walzer, Michael (1983) Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic. 10. Taylor, Charles (1985) Philosophical Papers, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 11. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 12. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic. 13. Dworkin, Ronald (1977) Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 14. Ackerman, Bruce (1980) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven, CT: Yale Umversity Press. 15. Mulhall, Stephen and Adam Swift (1996) Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell. 16. Caney, Simon (1992) 'Liberalism and communitarianism: a misconceived debate'. Political Studies, 40 (June): 273-89. 17. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 18. Kymlicka, Will (1989) Liberalism, Community, and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon. 19. Dworkin, Ronald (1986) Law's Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 20. Dworkin, Ronald (1992) 'Liberal community'. In S. Avinerl and A. de-Shalit, eds, ommunitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 21. Gewirth, Alan (1996) The Community of Rights. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 22. Mason, Andrew (2000) Community, Solidarity, and Belonging: Levels of Community and Their Normative Significance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 23. Gutmann, Amy (1992) 'Communitarian critics of liberalism'. In S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, eds, Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 24. Friedman, Marilyn (1992) 'Feminism and modern friendship: dislocating the community'. In S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, eds, Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Conflicts	Communitarianism	Gaus I 234 Conflicts/Communitarianism/Lamont: where there is genuine disagreement within a culture, what within the communitarian theory ensures that voices of criticism and dissent will not be drowned by the dominant, possibly oppressive, culture? If there are no independent normative standards for defining oppression, and if even the points of view of dissenting individuals are secondary to the normative primacy of cultures, how can any cultures be shown oppressive on the communitarian view? LiberalismVsCommunitarianism: Jean Hampton is one liberal theorist who believes communitarian theories lack the theoretical resources needed to answer these questions: in her words, communitarian theories lack 'critical moral distance' (1997⁽¹⁾: 188). Whether communitarians can answer this complaint in a distinctive way will determine the success of communitarian theory as a viable alternative to liberalism, and will also determine, more broadly, the success of cultural relativism for distributive justice. >Culture, >Cultural relativism, >Cultural values, >Multiculturalism, >Liberalism, >VsCommunitarianism, >Oppression, >Distributive justice. 1. Hampton, Jean (1997) Political Philosophy. Oxford: Westview. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Criminal Justice	Social Psychology	Parisi I 130 Criminal Justice/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: There are well-documented racial disparities in the enforcement of the criminal law (Sidanius and Pratto, 2001⁽¹⁾; Tyler and Huo, 2002⁽²⁾; Walker, Spohn, and DeLone, 2011⁽³⁾ and ongoing social psychological research with actual police Parisi I 131 officers has been fruitful (Goff and Kahn, 2012)⁽⁴⁾. Race/racial profiling: In one study, police offcers rated Black faces higher on criminality than White faces, and also rated stereotypically Black faces as more criminal than less stereotypically Black faces. Additionally, officers were more likely to misidentify a more stereotypically Black face as the target suspect when primed with words associated with crime (Eberhardt et al., 2004)⁽⁵⁾. For both police offcers and laypeople, race also influences decisions about whether to "shoot" a suspect in videogame-like lab studies. Both Black and White participants were quicker to shoot armed Black targets than armed White targets, and made more shooting errors when faced with unarmed Black targets or armed White targets (Correll et al., 2002⁽⁶⁾; Kahn and Davies, 2011⁽⁷⁾; Payne, 2006⁽⁸⁾). However, some research has suggested that police officers may make fewer shooter errors than laypeople, unless they have had significant negative interactions with Black citizens (Correll et al., 2007⁽⁹⁾; Plant and Peruche, 2005⁽¹⁰⁾). 1. Sidanius, J. and F. Pratto (2001). Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Tyler, T. R. and Y. J. Huo (2002). Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation With the Police and Courts. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 3. Walker, S., C. Spohn, and M. DeLone (2011). The Color of Justice: Race, Ethnicity, and Crime in America. Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning. 4. Goff, P. A. and K. Kahn (2012). "Racial Bias in Policing: Why We Know Less j.1751-2409.2011.01039.x. 5. Eberhardt,J. L., P. A. Goff, V. J. Purdie, and P. G. Davies (2004). "Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 8 7(6): 876—893. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.87.6.876. 6. Correll, J., B. Park, C. M. Judd, and B. Wittenbrink (2002). "The Police Offcer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals." Journal of Personality and social Psychology 83(6): 1314-1329. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1314. 7. Kahn, K. B. and P. G. Davies (2011). "Differentially Dangerous? Phenotypic Racial Stereotypicality Increases Implicit Bias among Ingroup and Outgroup Members." Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 14(4): 569-580. doi:10.1177/13684302103 74609. 8. Payne, B. K. (2006). "Weapon Bias Split-Second Decisions and Unintended Stereotyping.“ Current Directions in Psychaological Science 15(6): 287-291. 9. Correll, J., B. Park, C. M. Judd, B. Wittenbrink, M. S. Sadler, and T. Keesee (2007). "Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Offcers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot." Journal of Personality and social Psychology 92(6): 1006-1023. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.92.6.1006. 10. Plant, E. A. and B. M. Peruche (2005). "The Consequences of Race for Police Officers' Responses to Criminal Suspects.“ Psychological Science 16(3): 180-183. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Democracy	Mill	Rothbard II 77 Democracy/people/James Mill/Rothbard: The ‘subject Many’ Mill accurately termed ‘the people’, and it was probably Mill who inaugurated the type of analysis that pits ‘the people’ as a ruled class in opposition to the ‘special interests’. How, then, is the power of the ruling class to be curbed? Mill thought he saw the answer: ‘The people must appoint watchmen. Who are to watch the watchmen? The people themselves. There is no other resource; and without this ultimate safeguard, the ruling Few will be forever the scourge and oppression of the subject Many.’ But how are the people themselves to be the watchmen? To this ancient problem Mill provided what is by now a standard answer in the western world, but still not very satisfactory: by all the people electing representatives to do the watching. Rothbard: To Mill, the extension of democracy was more important than laissez-faire, for to Mill the process of dethroning the aristocratic class was more fundamental, since laissez-faire was one of the happy consequences expected to flow from the replacement of aristocracy by the rule of all the people. (In the modern American context, Mill's position would aptly be called ‘right-wing populism’.) Placing democracy as their central demand led the Millian radicals in the 1840s to stumble and lose political significance by refusing to ally themselves with the Anti-Corn Law League, despite their agreement with its free trade and laissez-faire. For the Millians felt that free trade was too much of a middle-class movement and detracted from an overriding concentration on democratic reform. Rothbard II 78 Granted that the people would displace aristocratic rule, did Mill have any reason for thinking that the people would then exert their will on behalf of laissez-faire? Yes, and here his reasoning was ingenious: while the ruling class had the fruits of their exploitative rule in common, the people were a different kind of class: their only interest in common was getting rid of the rule of special privilege. Apart from that, the mass of the people have no common class interest that they could ever actively pursue by means of the state. Furthermore, this interest in eliminating special privilege is the common interest of all, and is therefore the ‘public interest’ as opposed to the special or sinister interests of the few. The interest of the people coincides with universal interest and with laissez-faire and liberty for all.	Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Mill Ja I James Mill Commerce Defended: An Answer to the Arguments by which Mr. Spence, Mr. Cobbett, and Others, Have Attempted to Prove that Commerce is Not a Source of National Wealth 1808 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Dialectic	Bubner	I 40 Dialectic/Bubner: neither gadgetry nor ontology: method. It proves itself in its application, for itself it has no sense. Problem: does one know the application area before, or is it first opened by the method? So there could be the illusion of a perfect application of the method. The problem is precisely when one understands the dialectic as a method. I am referring exclusively to Plato and Hegel here. They both agree in terms of the method role. Hegel: the correct application is proof of the mastery of the method. --- I 54 Dialogue/Bubner: does not come about where the intention of the whole venture is to eliminate the difference by the predetermined identification of the one with the other. However, this fundamental equality of truth interests is nowhere present in Hegel's phenomenology. It does without the clear separation from the thing itself and external reflection as it prevails in logic. --- I 57 Dialectics/today/Bubner: today is hardly regarded as the highest form of science, rather in the form of questions of belief; one searches for its value where scientific precision is not sufficient. But this does not detract from the epochal importance of Hegel. --- I 59 Logic/dialectics/Hegel: "The course of the thing itself". He is the Absolute not against the finite, and under the oppression of its concretion, but so as to produce the concretion from itself. Without the help of others, he conveys the abstract generality of the conceptual nature with all the wealth of the content of interest to the theory. The essential point is that the method finds and recognizes the determination of the universal within itself. The absolute method is not an external reflection, but takes the particular from its object itself, since it is itself its principle and soul. (Adopted by Plato: soul as the principle of movement).	Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Emancipation	Spivak	Brocker I 711 Emancipation/Postcolonialism/Spivak: Spivak warns against a nostalgic representation of the subalterns as resistance subjects with clear intentions. It doesn't make sense to her "to romanticize individual heroes on the side of oppression." ⁽¹⁾ See History/Spivak, Classes/Gramsci. Brocker I 721 Spivak thesis: the subaltern resistance has always been tortured by the hegemonic systems of political representation (see Representation/Spivak). In this respect, the statement means that the subalterns cannot speak, even if they try, they are not heard.⁽²⁾This in no way means that the subaltern woman has no political power whatsoever. It is not about the speechlessness of the subalterns, but about the hegemonic structure of hearing. VsSpivak: with her text she again stabilizes the stereotype of the silent and passive non-western subject.⁽³⁾⁽⁴⁾ 1. G. Ch. Spivak, „Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism“ in: Critical Inquiry 12/1, 1985, S. 253 (Übersetz. v. N. Dhawan). 2. G. Ch. Spivak, The Spivak Reader. Selected Works of G. Ch. Spivak, hg. V. Donna Landry/Gerald Maclean, New York/London, 1996, S. 292. 3. Bruce Robbins, “The East is a Career. Edward Said and the Logics of Professionalism”, in: Michael Sprinker (Ed.) Edward Said. A Critical Reader, Malden/Oxford 1992, S. 50. 4. Benita Parry, Postcolonial Studies. A Materialist Critique, London/New York 2004, S. 23. Nikita Dhawan, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	PolSpiv I Gayatri Ch. Spivak Subaltern Studies. Deconstructing Historiography New York/Oxford 1988 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Family	Nussbaum	Brocker I 907 Family/Nussbaum: On the one hand, the family is a retreat from the individualistic, competitive society that liberal theories promote; on the other hand, however, families are also a (main) place of oppression of women, where they are not regarded as independent persons but as instruments and appendages of the family. Nussbaum's capabilities approach is not directed against the institution of the family itself, but against its supposedly private character. >Capabilities/Nussbaum Consequently, rights of privacy refer only to the individual person and not to the family as an institution. According to Nussbaum, neither the family nor female love and care can be regarded as natural. >Love. Brocker I 908 Family/Nussbaum: has always been legally and politically constructed, even stronger than voluntary organizations such as the church or universities.⁽²⁾ 1. Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development. The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge 2000, p. 242f 2. Ebenda p.261-264 Sandra Seubert, „Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2000)“, in:Manfred Brocker (ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Feminism	Habermas	IV 578 Feminism/Habermas: I differentiate between emancipation and resistance and retreat potentials. >Emancipation, >Civil disobedience. After the American civil rights movement, which has meanwhile led to the particularist assertion of black subcultures, only the feminist movement is in the tradition of bourgeois socialist liberation movements: the fight against patriarchal oppression and for the fulfilment of a promise long anchored in the recognized universalist foundations of morality and law gives feminism the impetus of an offensive movement, while all other movements have a rather defensive character. The resistance and retreat movement is aimed at the containment of formal-organized areas of action in favour of communicative-structured areas of action, not at conquering new... IV 579 ...territories. Of course, feminism has a particularist core in common with these movements: the emancipation of women should not only create formal equality, eliminate male prerogatives, but overturn concrete forms of life shaped by male monopolies. >Equal rights, >Equal opportunities. Moreover, women from the historical heritage of the gender division of labour to which they were subjected in the bourgeois small family have virtues of contrast, a value register that is complementary to the male world and opposite to one-sidedly rationalised everyday practice. >Division of labor.	Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Feminism	Lamont	Gaus I 234 Feminism/Lamont: Perhaps the most significant distributive change of the twentieth century has occurred as a result of the feminist movement,... Liberalism/feminism: ... yet it is surprisingly unclear whether this movement is best classified as an extension of, or a rejection of, liberalism. History: Certainly the socalled first wave of feminism, in which the focus was primarily on securing for women equal rights in the areas of education, work, pay, and political participation, seemed to extend liberal rights. The theoretical underpinnings of this movement were largely liberal in character, as evidenced in such classic works as Mary Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Women (1995)⁽¹⁾ and John Stuart Mill's The Subjection of Women (1979⁽²⁾), in which feminism is presented as a natural implication of liberalism. Theories: (...) feminists have also developed their views under Marxist, socialist, communitarian, postmodern, or radical frameworks, and have proposed creative and novel positions modelled on the distinctive reasoning and nurturing associated with relationships, especially the relationship between mother and child (Jaggar, 1983⁽³⁾; Tong, 1989⁽⁴⁾; 1993⁽⁵⁾). Politics: the feminist field has been unprecedented in its diversity, yet remarkably a common theme has emerged, usually expressed under the motto 'the personal is political'. These feminists argue that liberal theories of distributive justice are unable to address oppression which surfaces in the so-called private sphere of government non-interference. >Income/Moller Okin. 1. Wollstonecraft, Mary (1995) A nndication of the Rights of Man and Vindication of the Rights of Woman and Hints. ed. Sylvanna Tomaselli. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Mill, John Stuart (1979) Three Essays: On Liberty, Representative Government, the Subjection of Women. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Jaggar, Alison (1983) Feminist Politics and Human Nature. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. 4. Tong, Rosemarie ( 1989) Feminist Thought: A Compehensive Introduction. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 5. Tong, Rosemarie (1993) Feminine and Feminist Ethics. London: Wadsworth. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Gender Roles	Engels	Brocker I 299 Gender roles/Engels: In his book The Origin of the Family⁽¹⁾, Engels sketches the establishment of gender domination, as follows: For historical materialism, the human exists as a social-historical being in the metabolism with nature. The relationship between the sexes must therefore be explained on the basis of the state of development of production conditions and, above all, of technical means of production. For Engels, the transition from communal to private property is the pivotal point for an explanation of male gender domination. >Production forces. BeauvoirVsEngels: two questions remain unanswered: 1. Why can the institution of private property prevail? 2. Why does this lead to the oppression of women? According to Beauvoir, Engels presupposes the benefit-calculating homo oeconomicus instead of explaining it. Moreover, the motive for mastery through greed and expansionism is not sufficiently explained. Brocker I 300 Solution/Beauvoir: One has to accept an imperialist human consciousness that wants to achieve its sovereignty objectively.⁽²⁾ To this end, the "category of the other" must be introduced. ⁽²⁾ >Feminism, >Gender, >Consciousness, >Sovereignty, >Power, >Governance. 1. Friedrich Engels, Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats, Marx/Engels Werke 21, S. 25–173 2. Simone de Beauvoir, Le deuxième sexe, Paris 1949. Dt.: Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht. Sitte und Sexus der Frau, Reinbek 2005 (zuerst 1951), S.82. Friederike Kuster, „Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht (1949)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	EconEngels I Friedrich Engels Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Government	Smith	Otteson I 48 Government/Adam Smith/Otteson: Smith writes in the first chapter of WN⁽¹⁾: "It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in consequence of the division of labor, which occasions, in a well- governed society, that universal opulence which extends itself to the Iowest ranks of the people" (WN⁽¹⁾: 22). Well-governed: (…) what Smith means here by "well-governed" is articulated in his discussion of "justice" in TMS⁽²⁾ - which, as we just mentioned, comprises the protections of person, property, and promise (TMS⁽²⁾ 84). We can conclude from these two passages that Smith believes that the primary duty of government is the protection of (his conception of) justice. Moreover, (…) this conception of justice is a "negative" one, requiring only that we refrain from injuring others. Justice: A government reflecting this conception of justice would be summoned into action only upon the infringement of someone's person, property, or promise. We might consider Smith's conception of justice, then, a "negative, defensive only“ [NDO] conception of justice, or "NDO" conception, one whose core purpose is provide us defensive protection against infringements. Individualism: Finally, (…) all of the various positive duties of beneficence that we have are not, according to Smith, duties of government, but, rather, duties of us as individuals (and as voluntary and private groups). >Community/Adam Smith, >Political economy/Adam Smith, >Governance/Adam Smith, >Natural Law/Adam Smith. Liberalism: Smith actually spends far more time in WN⁽¹⁾ describing the ways that government makes mistakes, overreaches, and engages in counterproductive activities, sometimes through corruption and sometimes through incompetence, sometimes with malice and sometimes unintentionally. Anarchism/libertarianism: But Smith is not an anarchist; he is not even a principled modern-day libertarian. Instead, he articulates a positive and robust role for government, though he limits its powers and authorities to a small range of specific duties. Here is one key passage [from WN⁽¹⁾]: „All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men. The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be suficient; the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interest of the society. According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend to; three duties ofgreat importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to common understandings: first, the duty of protecting the societyfrom the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions, which it can never befor the interest ofany individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit could never repay the expence to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to agreat society.“ (WN⁽¹⁾: 687-8) Otteson I 52 Government/Adam Smith: the Smithian government is quite small by contemporary standards. 1. Smith, Adam. (1776) The Wealth of Nations. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell. 2. Smith, Adam (1982) [1759]. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie, eds. Liberty Fund.	EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Otteson I James R. Otteson The Essential Adam Smith Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2018
Imperialism	Bentham	Rothbard II 286 Imperialism/James Mill/Bentham/Rothbard: Among the British classical liberals, non-intervention and anti-imperialism were the dominant tradition. Colonialism and special privileges to investment abroad were properly seen as part of the monopoly privileges and controls imposed by mercantilism, none of which confers advantage - in fact, imposes considerable disadvantage - on the home population. Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and the others were generally solidly anti-imperialist, and advocated that Britain give up its colonies and grant them independence. Bentham originally included India in this emancipation, but was talked out ofit by James Mill, a high offcial in the governing organization of India, the British East India Company. The James Mill exception for India was based on a utilitarian 'white man's burden' argument that, even though England was Iosing economically from governing India, it must continue doing so for the sake of the Indians, Who were too savage to be able to govern themselves. In that way, James Mill was able to cast an altruist-utilitarian patina over England's often bloody repression in India and over his own role in that oppression. Land/James Mill: Mill also was able to propound his own Ricardian assault on the landlord class. Following the Ricardian doctrine that landlords were useless and nonproductive Mill advocated special taxes on ground rent; being a high offcial in India, he believed that he was more likely to influence the tax and legal system there. Hence he advocated British nationalization of Indian land, with the state then renting out the land to Indian peasants as long-term tenants; thus, in a pre-George Georgism, the state would absorb all revenues from land rent. In his turn, John Stuart Mill was happy to advocate the same scheme. Ireland: Bentham and James Mill also made an exception to their overall anti-imperialism for Ireland, here not indulging in attacks on 'savagery' but simply asserting that freeing Ireland would be politically impossible.	Benth I J. Bentham An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation Mineola, NY 2007 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Income	Okin	Gaus I 234 Income/family/politics/feminism/Okin/Lamont: the feminist field has been unprecedented in its diversity, yet remarkably a common theme has emerged, usually expressed under the motto 'the personal is political'. These feminists argue that liberal theories of distributive justice are unable to address oppression which surfaces in the so-called private sphere of government non-interference. There are many versions of this criticism, but perhaps the best developed is Susan Moller Okin's (1989⁽¹⁾: 128—30), which documents the effects of the institution of the nuclear family. She argues that the consequence of this institution is a position of systematic material and political inequality for women. Okin demonstrates, for example, that women have substantial disadvantages competing in the market because of childrearing responsibilities which are not equally shared with men. As a consequence, any Gaus I 235 theory relying on market mechanisms, including most liberal theories, will yield systems which result in women systematically having less income and wealth than men. FiminismVsLiberalism: the theoretical trouble for liberalism is that in its respect for individual liberty, and in its insistence on government neutrality, it cannot even recognize the inequalities in the economic or political positions of women as unjust, since these inequalities result from the combined effect of many individual choices (Hampton, 1997⁽²⁾: 200—8; MacKinnon, 1987⁽³⁾: 36). 1. Okin, Susan Moller (1989) Justice, Gender, and the Family. New York: Harper Collins. 2. Hampton, Jean (1997) Political Philosophy. Oxford: Westview. 3. MacKinnon, Catherine A. (1987) Feminism Unmodified: Discourses of Life and Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Interventions	Smith	Otteson I 49 Interventions/Adam Smith/Otteson: (...) Smith gives us (…) the three main roles he believes government ought to Ppay. The first two are: (1) "protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies"; and (2) "protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it." Institutions: (3) (…) [the] third duty of government: "erecting and maintaining certain publick works and certain publick institutions." This would seem to open a door to positive intervention in the economy. >Government/Adam Smith, >Governance/Adam Smith, >Society. Otteson: But hasn't Smith's entire argument been against such intervention? Here we see one consequence of Smith's decision not to rely on a conception of, say, natural law and natural rights, which might perhaps provide a principled argument against government intervention. Otteson I 51 To understand Smith's full position correctly, note first that he imposes strict qualifications on when such government intervention might be allowed: only when "it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals to erect and maintain; because the profit could never repay the expence to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society." (WN⁽¹⁾: 687-8) Thus Smith argues that to justify such intervention, the advocate of government action must meet the burden of making both of two claims: (1) the public work or public institution would have to be unable to be provided by private enterprise; and (2) it would have to benefit substantially the whole of the "great society," not merely one group at the expense of another. Problem: While Smith has not ruled out such intervention, then, he has shifted the burden of proof on to the person proposing it. And the threshold for making a compelling case is surprisingly high: if you believe the government should take positive action to provide a public work or institution, you would have to demonstrate both that private enterprise could not supply it (note: not merely is not currently supplying it, but could not supply it), and that substantially every- one would benefit. What possible government programs would meet those two criteria? >Government policy/Adam Smith, >Education/Adam Smith. Otteson I 52 Government/Adam Smith: the Smithian government is quite small by contemporary standards. 1. Smith, Adam. (1776) The Wealth of Nations. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell.	EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Otteson I James R. Otteson The Essential Adam Smith Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2018
Liberalism	Feminism	Gaus I 234 Liberalism/Feminism/Lamont: the feminist field has been unprecedented in its diversity, yet remarkably a common theme has emerged, usually expressed under the motto 'the personal is political'. These feminists argue that liberal theories of distributive justice are unable to address oppression which surfaces in the so-called private sphere of government non-interference. >Income/Moller Okin. Gaus I 235 FiminismVsLiberalism: the theoretical trouble for liberalism is that in its respect for individual liberty, and in its insistence on government neutrality, it cannot even recognize the inequalities in the economic or political positions of women as unjust, since these inequalities result from the combined effect of many individual choices (Hampton, 1997⁽¹⁾: 200—8; MacKinnon, 1987⁽²⁾: 36). 1. Hampton, Jean (1997) Political Philosophy. Oxford: Westview. 2. MacKinnon, Catherine A. (1987) Feminism Unmodified: Discourses of Life and Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications Gaus I 281 Liberalism/Feminism/FeminismVsLiberalism/Mottier: (...) on the one hand, authors such as Lister and Pateman question the gendered nature of the frontiers between the public and the private while insisting on the importance of female values and roles (Pateman, 1991)⁽¹⁾ and on the recognition by the public sphere of the work done by women in the private sphere (Lister, 1990)⁽²⁾. On the other hand, these authors propose as a solution to the domestic exploitation of women their entry into the public sphere, particularly in the labour market. Feminist theorists have been instrumental in demonstrating the particularistic rather than universal nature of citizenship. They reveal that liberal democratic theory has been based on the implicit assumption that 'political action and masculinity were congruent, whereas political action and femininity were antithetical' , as K. Jones and A. G. Jonasdottir (1988⁽³⁾:2) put it. They also take issue with the liberalist claim to universality for asking subordinated social groups such as women to subordinate their own 'partial' needs to the 'general' interest (Young, 1990)⁽⁴⁾. >Citizenship/Gender Theories, >Citizenship/Walby. 1. Pateman, Carole (1991) The Disorder of Women. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2. Lister, Ruth (1990) 'VVomen, economic dependency and citizenship'. Journal of Social Policy, 19 (4): 445-67. 3. Jones, K. and A. G. Jonasdottir (1988) 'Gender as an analytic category in political theory'. In K. Jones and A. G. Jonasdottir, eds, The Political Interests of Gender. London: Sage. 4. Young, Iris Marion (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Liberty	Buchanan	Boudreaux I 55 Def Natural Liberty/Adam Smith/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: „According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend to; three duties of great importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to common understandings: first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain…“ (Smith, 1776/1937⁽¹⁾: 651) Boudreaux I 56 Buchanan: One can see, in Smith’s vision of natural liberty, the foundation for several of Buchanan’s ideas. First, Buchanan’s functional division of government into the protective state and the productive state (…) echoes Smith, who limited the duties of the sovereign to protecting the society from outside invasion and from internal oppression - the protective state - and producing public works - the productive state. Smith saw the protective and productive state as being essential to a system of natural liberty. Buchanan: That points to the second commonality between Smith and Buchanan: the advocacy for a system of natural liberty. Smith: To quote Smith again, in this system of natural liberty, “Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest in his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men” (Smith, 1776/1937⁽¹⁾: 651). Smith’s system of natural liberty clearly encompasses free markets, and prohibits some from coercing peaceful others. Buchanan: In an article titled “The Justice of Natural Liberty,” Buchanan quotes this passage from Smith: „To hurt in any degree the interest of any one order of citizens for no other purpose but to promote that of some other, is evidently contrary to that justice and equality of treatment which the sovereign owes to all different orders of his subjects.“ (1976⁽²⁾: 6) Buchanan makes use of Smith’s idea in two ways. 1) The first is the clear notion that there is no such thing as social welfare beyond the welfare of the individuals who compose society. It is unjust to impose costs on some for the benefit of others. 2) Second, Buchanan emphasizes, drawing on Smith, that markets and market exchange have an ethical justification that supersedes any efficiency justification. Markets are grounded ethically in the fundamental principle of justice that declares that people should deal with each other through cooperative action rather than by force. >Utility/Buchanan, >Social welfare/Buchanan, >Economic ethics/Buchanan, >Liberalism/Buchanan. Boudreaux I 78 Liberty/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: The title of Buchanan’s book, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan⁽³⁾, summarizes the issue that most concerned him throughout his career. His normative goal was to preserve liberty, and he saw threats to liberty coming from two opposite directions. On one side, if government’s power is too constrained, anarchy will arise and create a society that is a war of all against all, where no one’s liberty is protected. On the other side, if government’s power is insufficiently constrained, it will grow into a Leviathan that itself violates the liberty of its citizens. The challenge, one that Buchanan explicitly took from the American founding father James Madison, is to design a government that is sufficiently powerful to protect individual rights and to produce collective goods, but one that also is sufficiently constrained that it does not violate the individual rights that it is created to protect. The limits of liberty lie between anarchy and Leviathan. >Thomas Hobbes. Buchanan felt strongly that individuals should not be compelled to live under rules that are imposed on them unilaterally by others. To be legitimate, government must enjoy the consent of everyone under its power. The requirement of this consent lies at the foundation of the idea of politics as exchange. The practical problem, of course, is that government would get nothing done if it had to get unanimous consent for every policy change. The costs of arriving at collective decisions would prevent bargains from taking place if everyone were required to agree. Boudreaux I 79 Thus, Buchanan was interested in exploring institutional arrangements to which everyone would agree if decision-making costs did not stand in the way. That is the reason he suggested the types of arrangements people would agree to in a hypothetical renegotiation of the social contract from a state of anarchy. >Agreement/Buchanan, cf. >Coercion. 1. Adam Smith. (1776). The Wealth of Nations. London: Strahan and Cadell. 2. James M. Buchanan. (1976). “The Justice of Natural Liberty,” Journal of Legal Studies 5 (January). 3. Buchanan, James M. (1975). The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. University of Chicago Press.	EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014
Liberty	Smith	Boudreaux I 55 Def Natural Liberty/Adam Smith/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: „According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend to; three duties of great importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to common understandings: first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain…“ (Smith, 1776/1937⁽¹⁾: 651) Boudreaux I 56 Buchanan: One can see, in Smith’s vision of natural liberty, the foundation for several of Buchanan’s ideas. First, Buchanan’s functional division of government into the protective state and the productive state (…) echoes Smith, who limited the duties of the sovereign to protecting the society from outside invasion and from internal oppression - the protective state - and producing public works - the productive state. Smith saw the protective and productive state as being essential to a system of natural liberty. Buchanan: That points to the second commonality between Smith and Buchanan: the advocacy for a system of natural liberty. Smith: To quote Smith again, in this system of natural liberty, “Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest in his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men” (Smith, 1776/1937⁽¹⁾: 651). Smith’s system of natural liberty clearly encompasses free markets, and prohibits some from coercing peaceful others. Buchanan: In an article titled “The Justice of Natural Liberty,” Buchanan quotes this passage from Smith: „To hurt in any degree the interest of any one order of citizens for no other purpose but to promote that of some other, is evidently contrary to that justice and equality of treatment which the sovereign owes to all different orders of his subjects.“ (1976⁽²⁾: 6) Buchanan makes use of Smith’s idea in two ways. 1) The first is the clear notion that there is no such thing as social welfare beyond the welfare of the individuals who compose society. It is unjust to impose costs on some for the benefit of others. 2) Second, Buchanan emphasizes, drawing on Smith, that markets and market exchange have an ethical justification that supersedes any efficiency justification. Markets are grounded ethically in the fundamental principle of justice that declares that people should deal with each other through cooperative action rather than by force. >Utility/Buchanan, >Social welfare/Buchanan, >Economic ethics/Buchanan, >Liberalism/Buchanan. 1. Adam Smith. (1776). The Wealth of Nations. London: Strahan and Cadell. 2. James M. Buchanan. (1976). “The Justice of Natural Liberty,” Journal of Legal Studies 5 (January).	EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014
Marxism	Feminism	Gaus I 281 Marxism/Feminism/FeminimsVsMarxism/Mottier: For feminist Marxists, the notion of individual rights is an illusion which serves to mask the capitalist Gaus I 282 and patriarchal foundations of the liberal state, as well as its domination by a male elite. They insist particularly on the necessity of recognizing the value of 'reproductive work' accomplished by women. >Capitalism. VsMarxism: However, as Mary Dietz (1992)⁽¹⁾ points out, the theme of citizenship is highly underdeveloped in the Marxist critique of capitalism and representative democracy. Marxist theorists tend to reduce feminist politics to the revolutionary struggle against the state - seen as the principal source of the oppression of women - and to reduce women to their reproductive functions. >M. Dietz. 1. Dietz, Mary (1992) 'Context is all: feminism and theories of citizenship'. In Chantal Mouffe, ed., Dimensions of Radical Democracy. London: Verso, 63—85. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Milgram Experiment	Psychological Theories	Haslam I 119 Milgram experiment/psychological theories: A. VsMilgram: For his critics (of whom there have been many; for recent discussion see Brannigan, Nicholson and Cherry, 2015)⁽¹⁾, Milgram had himself committed acts of inhumanity in the guise of studying inhumanity (>Experiment/Milgram). In an influential commentary that appeared in American Psychologist, Diana Baumrind (1964)⁽²⁾ accused Milgram of failing to treat his participants with the respect they deserved and of undermining their self-esteem and dignity. Shortly after the research was first publicized in the New York Times of 26 October 1963, an editorial in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch described Milgram’s work as ‘open-eyed torture’ (cited in Blass, 2004⁽³⁾: 121). MilgramVsVs: Milgram (1964)⁽⁴⁾ responded to such criticism by claiming that ‘no-one who took part in the obedience study suffered damage, and most subjects found the experience to be instructive and enriching’ (Blass, 2004⁽³⁾: 124). He backed up his claims with evidence taken from post-experimental questionnaires. These showed that, of the 656 people who participated in the studies, 83.7% were ‘glad’ or ‘very glad’ to have participated, 15.1% were neutral, and 1.3% were ‘sorry’ or ‘very sorry’ to have taken part. Reicher/Haslam: However, researchers have developed a number of strategies in order to surmount this considerable obstacle. One is to use alternative and less harmful behaviours in order to investigate obedience. Cf. >Obedience/Milgram. These include giving negative feedback to job applicants in order to make them more nervous (Meeus and Raaijmakers, 1986(5), 1995⁽⁶⁾), crushing bugs (Martens et al., 2007⁽⁷⁾), performing an on-line analogue task which involves applying negative labels to increasingly positive groups (Haslam, Reicher and Birney, 2014⁽⁸⁾), or simply persisting at a long and tedious task (Navarick, 2009)⁽⁹⁾. Haslam I 120 B. A second strategy has been to revisit and re-analyse Milgram’s own studies for new insights. (…) Steven Gilbert (1981)⁽¹⁰⁾ shows the importance of the gradual increase in shock intensity which deprives participants of a qualitative breakpoint that would allow them to justify breaking off and becoming disobedient. Dominic Packer (2008)⁽¹¹⁾, by contrast, highlights how the reactions of the learner can provide such a justification. This relates to the fact (noted above) that the point at which most people break off is 150 volts, where the learner first asks to be released from the study. Eight relevant factors: (Haslam, Loughnan and Perry, 2014)⁽¹²⁾: 1) the experimenter’s directiveness, 2) legitimacy 3) consistency; 4) group pressure to disobey; 5) the indirectness, 6) proximity, 7) intimacy of the relation between teacher and learner 8) distance between the teacher and the experimenter. C. Other authors have studied historical examples of obedience and disobedience form a psychological perspective: A notable example of this is François Rochat and Andre Modigliani’s (1995)⁽¹³⁾ analysis of resistance to the official oppression of minorities by the villagers of Le Chambon in Southern France during the Second World War (see also Rochat and Modigliani, 2000)⁽¹⁴⁾. >Obedience/psychological theories. 1. Brannigan, A., Nicholson, I. and Cherry, F. (2015) ‘Unplugging the Milgram machine’, Theory and Psychology (Special Issue), 25: 551—696. 2. Baumrind, D. (1964) ‘Some thoughts on ethics of research: After reading Milgram’s “Behavioral study of obedience”’, American Psychologist, 19:421—3. 3. Blass, T. (2004) The Man who Shocked the World: The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram. New York: Basic Books. 4. Milgram, S. (1964) 1lssues in the study of obedience: A reply to Baumrind’, American Psychologist, 19: 848—5 2. 5. Meeus, W.H.J. and Raaijmakers, Q.A. (1986) obedience: Carrying out orders to use psychological-administrative violence &, European Journal of Social Psychology, 16:311—24. 6. Meeus, W.H.J. and Raaijmakers, Q.A. (1995) ‘Obedience in modem society: The Utrecht studies’, Journal of Social Issues, 5 1: 155—75. 7. Martens, A., Kosloff, S., Greenberg, J., Landau, M.J. and Schmader, T. (2007) ‘Killing begets killing: Evidence from a bug-killing paradigm that initial killing fuels subsequent killing’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33: 1251—64. 8. Haslam, S.A., Reicher, S.D. and Birney, M. (2014) ‘Nothing by mere authority: Evidence that in an experimental analogue of the Milgram paradigm participants are motivated not by orders but by appeals to science’, Journal of Social Issues, 70:473—88. 9. Navarick, D.J. (2009) ‘Reviving the Milgram obedience paradigm in the era of informed consent The Psychological Record, 59: 155—70. 10. Gilbert, S.J. (1981) ‘Another look at the Milgram obedience studies: The role of a graduated series of shocks’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 7: 690—5. 11. Packer, D.J. (2008) ‘Identifying systematic disobedience in Milgram’s obedience experiments: A meta-analytic review’, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3: 301—4. 12. Haslam, N., Loughnan, S. and Perry, G. (2014) 4Meta-Milgram: An empirical synthesis of the obedience experiments’, PLoS ONE, 9(4): e93927. 13. Rochat, F. and Modigliani, A. (1995) 4The ordinary quality of resistance: From Milgram’s laboratory to the village of Le Chambon’, Journal of Social Issues, 51: 195—210. 14. Rochat, F. and Modigliani, A. (2000) ‘Captain Paul Grueninger: The Chief of Police who saved Jewish refugees by refusing to do his duty’, in T. Blass (ed.), Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. pp.91—110. Stephen Reicher and S. Alexander Haslam, „Obedience. Revisiting Milgram’s shock experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Mill	Feinberg	Gaus I 109 Mill/Feinberg/Gaus: The classic work on the harm principle, and more generally on this Millian approach to political justice, is Joel Feinberg’s masterful four-volume The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (1984–90)⁽¹⁾. (1) Precisely what is a harm (1984)⁽¹⁾? (2) Does Millian morality allow coercion to prevent acts that, while not harmful to others, are offensive to some (1985)⁽¹⁾? (3) When individuals are unable to make fully voluntary choices, can coercion then be employed to stop them from harming themselves (1986)⁽¹⁾? And (4) are there any conditions under which liberals justify coercion that Gaus I 110 do not fall into one of the above categories (1990)⁽¹⁾? Feinberg convincingly shows that, when carefully examined, Mill’s radical proposal – that only harm to others can justify social interference – is implausible, but nevertheless is plausibly construed as the core of a liberal social morality (see further Gaus, 1999⁽²⁾: Part II). Morality/Feinberg: As Feinberg points out, moralities based on the harm principle are liberal in so far as there is a presumption of liberty: if a person’s action does not constitute a harm to others, then she has the right to act as she sees fit (1984⁽¹⁾: 9). Moreover, fundamental to the harm principle is the principle that where there is consent, there is no harm: thus one may consent to acts that set back one’s interests (such as taking drugs); not only does one have the right to harm oneself, but the dealer does not harm you if you have given informed consent to the purchase. VsFeinberg: However, critics of the harm principle (e.g. de Jasay, 1991)⁽³⁾ have argued that it is a poor grounding for liberal principles as the concept of harm is so malleable: it can be interpreted to encompass the prevention of psychological and culture harms (see e.g. Kernohan⁽⁴⁾, 1997), thus justifying extensive and intrusive coercive interventions. >Actions/Benn. 1. Feinberg 1984-90 - Feinberg, Joel (1984) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. I, Harm to Others. New York: Oxford University Press. - Feinberg, Joel (1985) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. II, Offense to Others. New York: Oxford University Press. - Feinberg, Joel (1986) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. III, Harm to Self. New York: Oxford University Press. - Feinberg, Joel (1990) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. IV, Harmless Wrongdoing. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. Gaus, Gerald F. (1999) Social Philosophy. Armonk, NY: Sharpe. 3. De Jasay, Anthony (1991) Choice, Contract and Consent: A Restatement of Liberalism. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. 4. Kernohan, Andrew (1997) Liberalism, Equality, and Cultural Oppression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Minimal Group	Tajfel	Haslam I 164 Minimal group/Tajfel: Extending the earlier work of Sherif (>Robbers Cave Experiment/Sherif, >Group behavior/Sherif, >Social Groups/Sherif, [Taifel’s] minimal group studies were designed to reduce the group or category to its most minimal elements and then establish at what point conflict and discrimination between groups would rear their heads. As it turned out, the intergroup discrimination arising from the highly recognizable phenomenon of gangs of boys fighting over territory and resources also arose when all obvious features that might produce such conflict (e.g., a history of antagonism, a scarcity of resources) were stripped away. Indeed, by this means the studies provided striking evidence that boys (and later adults) would discriminate in favour of their own group in the absence of any visible signs of the groups themselves – a phenomenon typically referred to as minimal ingroup bias. Def Minimal ingroup bias: boys (and later adults) would discriminate in favour of their own group in the absence of any visible signs of the groups themselves. >Social identity theory/Tajfel. Predecessors: Sherifs boys’ camp studies (Sherif and Sherif (1967⁽¹⁾) showed that tensions arise between groups when they have to compete for scarce resources. >Robbers Cave Experiment/Sherif. TajfelVsSherif: as set out in the influential 1971 (Tajfel 1971)⁽²⁾ paper in which Tajfel and his colleagues presented the findings of the first minimal group studies, two related themes seemed to motivate Tajfel’s quest to go beyond Sherif’s ideas. First, he emphasized the importance of the social context in which behaviour was embedded and acquired meaning. Haslam I 165 Prejudice/Tajfel: The articulation of an individual’s social world in terms of its categorization in groups becomes a guide for his [or her] conduct in situations to which some criterion of intergroup division can be meaningfully applied. (Meaningful need not be ‘rational’.) An undifferentiated environment makes very little sense and provides no guidelines for action … . Whenever … some form of intergroup categorization can be used it will give order and coherence to the social situation. >Group behavior/Tajfel. Haslam I 167 Experiment 1 (see >Method/Tajfel) when allocation involved Haslam I 168 two ingroup or two outgroup members, participants displayed an overwhelming preference for a strategy of fairness. However, when it came to differential matrices that involved rewarding an ingroup versus an outgroup member, they were now more discriminatory in favour of the ingroup (although the modal response was still for fairness). In other words, these matrices produced evidence of significant ingroup bias. Moreover, participants’ support for this strategy did not change when the categorization procedure was given a value connotation that might justify discrimination (…). Experiment 2: Experiment 2 was designed to distinguish further between the different reward strategies participants were using. The clear result was that [the „Maximum Difference“ strategy; see >Method/Tajfel exerted a significant pull when opposed to the other strategies. (…) the differentiation matrices provide consistent evidence of ingroup favouritism and maximum difference strategies. >Method/Tajfel. Interpretation of the results: Initially, Tajfel and his colleagues interpreted [the support for the maximum difference strategy (biggest positive difference between ingroup and outgroup points in favor of the ingroup)] as supporting a generic social norm to discriminate. Haslam I 169] VsTajfel: many subsequent accounts interpreted this as an example of outgroup derogation (because it harms the outgroup at the expense of benefiting the ingroup). Problem/Spears/Otten: in the MD strategy, positive differentiation and derogation are confounded, and this problem has never adequately been addressed (and is rarely if ever discussed). Alternative Interpretations/Tajfel: (Tajfel et al. 1971)⁽²⁾: (a) demand characteristics (the idea that participants were responding to cues that conveyed the experimenter’s hypothesis), (b) expectations of reciprocity, and (c) anticipation of future interaction. Ad (a): Lindsay St Claire and John Turner (1982)⁽³⁾ found that if people were asked to role-play being members of the groups (rather than being categorized themselves) and then complete the matrices accordingly they did not show the same degree of ingroup bias (MD and MIP) but tended to predict fairness. Ad (b): Tajfel and colleagues admitted that they had no data that spoke to this issue and hence this explanation could not easily be ruled out. Ad (c): Tajfel proposed that the most rational strategy – given that they did not know who was in ‘their’ group – was to opt for an MJP (maximum joint points) strategy. However, (…) this strategy held little appeal. Haslam I 170 Generic norm explanation: this explanation quickly fell from favour because of the potential circularity of a normative account: if there is a competitive norm (e.g., among participants from western countries), where does it come from and what explains that? For a solution: see >Social identity theory/Tajfel. Haslam I 171 1. Problem: in the literature Tajfel’s minimal group studies are often used to warrant the conclusion that discrimination is pervasive and inevitable ((s) which is not explicitly claimed by Tajfel and Turner). 2. Problem: it is the question, whether the portrayal of Tajfel’s and Turner’s studies is always accurate: A. Social dominance theory: here evidence for ingroup favouritism is used to argue that intergroup discrimination is a generic feature of many intergroup relations (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999)⁽⁴⁾. B. System justification theory: (Jost and Banaji, 1994)⁽⁵⁾: here evidence for ingroup favouritism Haslam I 172 is used to suggest that groups (especially those with high-status) often seek to justify their position through displays of bias towards others. >Minimal group/Psychological theories. 1. Sherif, M. (1967) Group Conflict and Co-operation: Their Social Psychology. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 2. Tajfel, H., Flament, C., Billig, M.G. and Bundy, R.F. (1971) ‘Social categorization and intergroup behaviour’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 1: 149–77. 3. St Claire, L. and Turner, J.C. (1982) ‘The role of demand characteristics in the social categorization paradigm’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 12: 307–14. 4. Sidanius, J. and Pratto, F. (1999) Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression. New York: Cambridge University Press. 5. Jost, J.T. and Banaji, M.R. (1994) ‘The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false consciousness’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 33: 1–27. Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Minority Rights	Political Philosophy	Gaus I 253 Minority rights/Political Philosophy/Kukathas: [Will] Kymlicka's⁽¹⁾ defence of group-differentiated rights immediately raised a range of questions and problems, and the literature on multiculturalism over the past decade has tackled many of them. >Minority rights/Kymlicka. Group rights: The first issue to be addressed was the question of whether groups could properly be the bearers of rights. To some it was plain that they could not: only individuals could have rights (Narveson, 1991⁽²⁾; Hartney, 1991⁽³⁾). According to one view, groups were fictitious entities - and fictitious entities could not be rights bearers (Graf, 1994⁽⁴⁾: 194). Yet in spite of such reservations, political theory has in recent years (with the rise of multiculturalism) become much more sympathetic to the idea of group rights. History: Even before multiculturalism acquired its current prominence, however, some philosophers had already advanced accounts of group rights. Joseph Raz (1986⁽⁵⁾: 207—8), for example, in his influential account of rights leaves space for collective rights. Larry May (1987⁽⁶⁾: 180), while remaining cautious about the extent to which groups should be recognized as rights holders, argued that moral theorists needed to examine more closely the actions and interests of social groups as possible bearers of rights and responsibilities. And Frances Svensson (1979)⁽⁷⁾ had earlier suggested that group rights were needed to do justice to the claims of native peoples. VsMulticulturalism: Nonetheless, theorists (or critics) of multiculturalism did not always mean the same thing when they invoked group rights or 'cultural' rights. Levy: The most helpful elucidation of the different kinds of rights claims made on behalf of cultural groups was offered by Jacob Levy (1997⁽⁸⁾: 24—5), who distinguished eight categories of rights. >Cultural Rights/Levy. Group rights: The consensus of opinion is that it is quite possible for groups to have rights, or for rights to be accorded both to groups and to individuals on the basis of identity. A group may hold a right as an independently recognized entity; and individuals may hold particular rights because they are members of particular collectivities. Problems: Nonetheless, this issue has remained controversial because of the implications of granting rights on the basis of group membership. >Group rights. Freedom/oppression: As Peter Jones put it, 'Group rights are often articulated as demands for group freedom, but they are also feared as vehicles for group oppression' (1999⁽⁹⁾: 354). VsRaz: Thus Raz's view of group rights, though widely accepted (Brett, 1991⁽¹⁰⁾; Freeman, 1995⁽¹¹⁾; Margalit and Halbertal, 1994⁽¹²⁾), has been criticized for being too capacious in as much as it identifies groups as no more than collectivities of individuals who share nothing more enduring than an interest in a matter (Réaume, 1988⁽¹³⁾; 1994⁽¹⁴⁾; Jones, 1999⁽⁹⁾: 359). Content/education/problems: The demands of some groups for rights in the form of exemptions, for example, have generated a substantial debate about the implications of such special rights. This debate becomes especially vigorous, however, when particular issues become salient: religion, education, and children. Children/religion: While most liberal defenders of multiculturalism have been ready to grant cultural minorities the right to live by their own beliefs, children and education have raised special problems. For many, the limits of multiculturalism are set by the need to protect the interests of children, which override even the rights of parents or communities to inculcate their own religious beliefs. >Religion, >Religious belief, >Multiculturalism. 1. Kymlicka, Will (1995a) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Narveson, Jan (1991) 'Collective rights?' Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 4: 329—45. 3. Hartney, Michael (1991) 'Some confusions concerning collective rights'. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 4: 293-314. 4. Graf, James A. (1994) 'Human rights, peoples, and the right to self-determination'. In Judith Baker, ed., Gmup Rights. Toronto: Umversity of Toronto Press, 186—214. 5. Raz, Joseph (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. May, Larry (1987) The Morality of Gmups: Collective Responsibility, Group-Based Harm, and Corporate Rights. Notre Dame, In: University of Notre Dame Press. 7. Svensson, Frances (1979) 'Liberal democracy and group rights: the legacy of individualism and its impact on American Indian tribes'. Political Studies, 23 (3): 421-39. 8. Levy, Jacob (1997) 'Classifying cultural rights'. In Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro, eds, Ethnicity and Group Rights: NOMOS xxwx New York: New York University Press, 22—66. 9. Jones, Peter (1999) 'Group rights and group oppression'. Journal ofP01itica1 Philosophy, 7 (4): 353-77. 10. Brett, Nathan (1991) 'Language laws and collective rights'. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 4: 347_60. 11. Freeman, Michael (1995) 'Are there collective human rights?' Political Studies, Special Issue, 43: 25—40. 12. Margalit, Avishai and Moshe Halbertal (1994) 'Liberalism and the right to culture'. Social Research, 61: 491-510. 13. Réaume, Denise G. (1988) 'Individuals, groups, and rights to public goods'. University of Toronto Law Journal, 38: 1-27. 14.Réaume, Denise G. (1994) 'The group right to linguistic security: Whose right? What duties?' In Judith Baker ed., Gmup Rights. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 118-41. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Morality	Feinberg	Gaus I 110 Morality/Feinberg/Gaus: As Feinberg points out, moralities based on the harm principle are liberal in so far as there is a presumption of liberty: if a person’s action does not constitute a harm to others, then she has the right to act as she sees fit (1984⁽¹⁾: 9). >Mill/Feinberg. Moreover, fundamental to the harm principle is the principle that where there is consent, there is no harm: thus one may consent to acts that set back one’s interests (such as taking drugs); not only does one have the right to harm oneself, but the dealer does not harm you if you have given informed consent to the purchase. VsFeinberg: However, critics of the harm principle (e.g. de Jasay, 1991)⁽²⁾ have argued that it is a poor grounding for liberal principles as the concept of harm is so malleable: it can be interpreted to encompass the prevention of psychological and culture harms (see e.g. Kernohan, 1997)⁽³⁾, thus justifying extensive and intrusive coercive interventions. Moreover, the requirement that the agent give ‘informed consent’ and that her self-harming acts are ‘voluntary’ opens the way to paternalistic interventions (Kleinig, 1983)⁽⁴⁾. >Actions/Benn. 1. Feinberg 1984-90 - Feinberg, Joel (1984) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. I, Harm to Others. New York: Oxford University Press. - Feinberg, Joel (1985) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. II, Offense to Others. New York: Oxford University Press. - Feinberg, Joel (1986) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. III, Harm to Self. New York: Oxford University Press. - Feinberg, Joel (1990) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. IV, Harmless Wrongdoing. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. De Jasay, Anthony (1991) Choice, Contract and Consent: A Restatement of Liberalism. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. 3. Kernohan, Andrew (1997) Liberalism, Equality, and Cultural Oppression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Kleinig, John (1983) Paternalism. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allenhead. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Multiculturalism	Barry	Gaus I 257 Multiculturalism/Barry/Kukathas: According to Barry, multiculturalism is inconsistent with liberalism and a respect for liberal values and should therefore be rejected. (Barry 2001)⁽¹⁾ Galston: [William] Galston has termed 'Reformation liberalism'. Unlike 'Enlightenment liberalism', which emphasizes the importance of individual autonomy, 'Reformation liberalism', Galston maintains, values diversity and sees the importance of 'differences among individuals and groups over such matters as the nature ofthe good life, sources of moral authority, reason versus faith, and the like' (1995⁽²⁾: 521). BarryVsGalston: Barry rejects this distinction, but is especially critical nonetheless of those who are members of the diversity-promoting liberalism camp. Barry rejects three major arguments advanced in support of Reformation liberalism. 1) The first is that liberal theory values respect for persons and this implies respect for the cultures to which individuals belong. To this Barry replies that illiberal cultures often violate the requirement of equal respect and to that extent they do not deserve respect (2001⁽¹⁾: 128). 2) The second argument is that liberalism values diversity because it increases the range of options available to individuals. To this Barry responds that liberals prize individuality rather than diversity (2001⁽¹⁾: 129). 3) The third argument is that liberalism attaches great importance to the public/private distinction, and so should be committed to nonintervention in the private realm. To this Barry replies that liberalism has historically challenged the sanctity of parental and paternal authority, and sought to protect individuals from the groups to which they belong. Individuals/Barry: Individuals must be free to associate in any way they like (consistent with the law protecting the interests of those outside the association). But there are two important conditions: all participants in the association should be sane adults, and their participation should be voluntary (2001⁽¹⁾: 148). Group rights: Groups may then do as they please, provided those who do not like the way a group's affairs are run are able to exit without facing excessive costs (2001⁽¹⁾: 150). Problems/VsBarry: Barry's view imposes serious constraints, then, on the operation of groups. In the end, what it tolerates is only what Fish calls 'boutique multiculturalism'. (>Multiculturalism/Fish). It requires that illiberal practices not be condoned, that parents be required to send their children to school, and that generally the state ensures that children are appropriately educated and not made the victims of creationists and religious zealots - even if they are their parents. >Religion/education/Multiculturalism. Egalitarianism: In the end, Barry's view amounts to a reassertion of liberal egalitarianism as a doctrine that is simply incompatible with multiculturalism. VsBarry: (For criticisms of Barry see the papers in Kelly, 2002⁽³⁾; Per Barry: for another defence of liberal egalitarianism see Kernohan, 1998⁽⁴⁾.) 1. Barry, Brian (2001) Cultuæ and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. Oxford: Polity. 2. Galston, William (1995) 'Two concepts of Liberalism', Ethics, 105(3): 516-34. 3. Kelly, Paul, ed. (2002) Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Cultuæ and Equality and Its Critics. Oxford: Polity. 4. Kernohan, Andrew (1998) Liberalism, Equality, and Cultural Oppression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	EconBarry I Brian Barry Sociologists,economists, and democracy Chicago 1970 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
People	Mill	Rothbard II 77 People/Democracy/James Mill/Rothbard: The ‘subject Many’ Mill accurately termed ‘the people’, and it was probably Mill who inaugurated the type of analysis that pits ‘the people’ as a ruled class in opposition to the ‘special interests’. How, then, is the power of the ruling class to be curbed? Mill thought he saw the answer: ‘The people must appoint watchmen. Who are to watch the watchmen? The people themselves. There is no other resource; and without this ultimate safeguard, the ruling Few will be forever the scourge and oppression of the subject Many.’ But how are the people themselves to be the watchmen? To this ancient problem Mill provided what is by now a standard answer in the western world, but still not very satisfactory: by all the people electing representatives to do the watching. Rothbard: To Mill, the extension of democracy was more important than laissez-faire, for to Mill the process of dethroning the aristocratic class was more fundamental, since laissez-faire was one of the happy consequences expected to flow from the replacement of aristocracy by the rule of all the people. (In the modern American context, Mill's position would aptly be called ‘right-wing populism’.) Placing democracy as their central demand led the Millian radicals in the 1840s to stumble and lose political significance by refusing to ally themselves with the Anti-Corn Law League, despite their agreement with its free trade and laissez-faire. For the Millians felt that free trade was too much of a middle-class movement and detracted from an overriding concentration on democratic reform. Rothbard II 78 Granted that the people would displace aristocratic rule, did Mill have any reason for thinking that the people would then exert their will on behalf of laissez-faire? Yes, and here his reasoning was ingenious: while the ruling class had the fruits of their exploitative rule in common, the people were a different kind of class: their only interest in common was getting rid of the rule of special privilege. Apart from that, the mass of the people have no common class interest that they could ever actively pursue by means of the state. Furthermore, this interest in eliminating special privilege is the common interest of all, and is therefore the ‘public interest’ as opposed to the special or sinister interests of the few. The interest of the people coincides with universal interest and with laissez-faire and liberty for all.	Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Mill Ja I James Mill Commerce Defended: An Answer to the Arguments by which Mr. Spence, Mr. Cobbett, and Others, Have Attempted to Prove that Commerce is Not a Source of National Wealth 1808 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Politics	Lenin	Brocker I 38 Politics/LeninVsEconomism/Lenin: Lenin polemicizes against the union-oriented labor movements of Rabocere Delo and Rabocaja Mysl' and other spontaneously emerged directions of the labor movement. LeninVsTrade Unionism. ⁽¹⁾ Instead, the workers' struggle should be directed against any violence and oppression emanating from the government. Political agitation alone is capable of forming the political consciousness and revolutionary activity of the masses. >W.I. Lenin, >Revolution. 1. Lenin, W. I., »Die dringendsten Aufgaben unserer Bewegung«, in: ders., Ausgewählte Werke in sechs Bänden, Bd. 1, Berlin 1986 (a) S. 376. Jutta Scherrer, Wladimir Iljitsch Lenin, Was tun?, (1902) in: Brocker, Manfred, Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018.	Lenin I Wladimir Iljitsch Lenin Die dringendsten Aufgaben unserer Bewegung Berlin 1986 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Postcolonialism	Spivak	Brocker I 710 Postcolonialism/Spivak: Why do non-hegemonic groups agree to their own oppression? Problem: the subalterns lack the self-conception as bearers of political rights. Spivak's essay "Can he Subaltern Speak?" ⁽¹⁾ of 1988 is considered one of the founding documents of postcolonial theory. Subalterns: Spivak borrowed the term from A. Gramsci's Quaderni del Carcere (1929-1935). >Classes/Gramsci. 1. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Cary Nelson/Lawrence Grossberg (Ed.) Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Urbana Ill./Chicago 1988 271-313. Dt.: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the subaltern speak? Postkolonialität und subalterne Artikulation, Wien 2008. Nikita Dhawan, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	PolSpiv I Gayatri Ch. Spivak Subaltern Studies. Deconstructing Historiography New York/Oxford 1988 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Postsecularism	Braidotti	Braidotti I 31 Postsecularism/Braidotti: The first cracks in the edifice of self-assured secularity appeared at the end of the 1970s. As the revolutionary zeal cooled off and social movements started to dissipate, conform or mutate, former militant agnostics joined a wave of conversions to a variety of conventional monotheistic or imported Eastern religions. This turn of events raised serious doubts as to the future of secularity. The doubt crept into the collective and individual mind: how secular are ‘we’ - feminists, anti-racists, post-colonialists, environmentalists, etc. - really? The doubt was even sharper for intellectual activists. Science is intrinsically secular, secularity being a key tenet of Humanism, alongside universalism, the unitary subject and the primacy of rationality. Science itself, however, in spite of its secular foundations, is far from immune from its own forms of dogmatism. Freud was one of the first critical thinkers to warn us against the fanatical atheism of the supporters of scientific reason. In The Future of an Illusion (1928)⁽¹⁾, Freud compares different forms of rigid dogmatism, classifying rationalist scientism alongside religion as a source of superstitious belief, a position best illustrated today by the extremism with which Richard Dawkins defends his atheist faith (Dawkins, 1976)⁽²⁾. Moreover, the much-celebrated objectivity of science has also been shown to be quite flawed. Braidotti I 32 Science: The uses and abuses of scientific experimentation under Fascism and in the colonial era prove that science is not immunized against nationalist, racist and hegemonic discourses and practices. Any claim to scientific purity, objectivity and autonomy needs therefore to be firmly resisted. Where does that leave Humanism and its anti-humanist critics? >Anti-Humanism, >Humanism. Secularity: Secularity is one of the pillars of Western Humanism, thus an instinctive form of aversion to religion and to the church is historically an integral aspect of emancipatory politics. >Secularization. Socialism: The socialist humanist tradition, which was so central to the European Left and the women’s movements in Europe since the eighteenth century, is justified in claiming to be secular in the narrow sense of the term: to be agnostic if not atheist and to descend from the Enlightenment critique of religious dogma and clerical authority. >Socialism. Feminism: Like other emancipatory philosophies and political practices, the feminist struggle for women’s rights in Europe has historically built on secular foundations. The lasting influence exercised by existentialist feminism (de Beauvoir, 1973)⁽³⁾, and Marxist or socialist feminisms* on the second feminist wave, may also account for the perpetuation of this position. >About Feminism, >Feminism as author. VsSecularism: However proud twentieth-century feminism may be of its ecular roots, it is nonetheless the case that it has historically produced various alternative spiritual practices alongside and often in antagonism to the mainstream political secularist line. Braidotti I 33 Post-colonialism: Black and post-colonial theories have never been loudly secular. In the very religious context of the USA, AfricanAmerican women’s literature is filled with references to Christianity, as bell hooks (1990)⁽¹¹⁾ and Cornell West (1994)⁽¹²⁾ demonstrate. Braidotti I 35 Postsecularism: The return of religion in the public sphere and the strident tone reached by the global public debate on the ‘clash of civilizations’, not to speak of the permanent state of war on terror that ensued from this context, took many anti-humanists by surprise. Braidotti I 36 To speak of a ‘return’ of religion is inappropriate, as it suggests a regressive movement. What we are experiencing at present is a more complicated situation. The crisis of secularism, defined as the essentialist belief in the axioms of secularity, is a phenomenon that takes place within the social and political horizon of late globalized post-modernity, not in pre-modern times. It is of the here and now. Moreover, it spreads across all religions, amidst both second and third generation descendants of Muslim immigrants; (…) * Central figures in this tradition are: Firestone (1970)⁽⁴⁾, Rowbotham (1973)⁽⁵⁾, Mitchell (1974)⁽⁶⁾, Barrett (1980)⁽⁷⁾, Davis (1981)⁽⁸⁾, Coward (1983)⁽⁹⁾ and Delphy (1984)⁽¹⁰⁾. 1. Freud, Sigmund. 1928. The Future of an Illusion. London: Hogarth Press. 2. Dawkins, Richard. 1976. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. De Landa, Manuel. 2002. Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy. London: Continuum. 3. Beauvoir, Simone de. 1973. The Second Sex. New York: Bantam Books. 4. Firestone, Shulamith. 1970. The Dialectic of Sex. New York: Bantam Books. 5. Rowbotham, Sheila. 1973. Women, Resistance and Revolution. New York: Random House. 6. Mitchell, Juliet. 1974. Psychoanalysis and Feminism. New York: Pantheon. 7. Barrett, Michele. 1980. Women’s Oppression Today. London: Verso Books. 8. Davis, Angela. 1981. Women, Race and Class. New York: Random House. 9. Coward, Rosalind. 1983. Patriarchal Precedents. London and New York: Routledge. 10. Delphy, Christine. 1984. Close to Home. A Materialist Analysis of Women’s Oppression. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press. 11. hooks, bell. 1990. Postmodern blackness. In: Yearning: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics. Toronto: Between the Lines. 12. West, Cornell. 1994. Prophetic Thought in Postmodern Times. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.	Braidotti I Rosie Braidotti The Posthuman Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 2013
Psychology	Fanon	Brocker I 383 Psychology/Colonialism/Fanon: Fanon describes colonialism as a divided society in which the colonized live in a permanent tension between envy and the experience of rejection. The tension regularly discharges into feuds as a "collective form of substitution".⁽¹⁾ >Colonialism. Brocker I 392 Violence/Fanon: as a consequence of colonial rule, Fanon describes a "psychopathology directly caused by oppression" ⁽²⁾. He also ascribes pathologizing effects to the use of force in the context of colonial wars - and thus to anti-colonial liberation struggles and the state reactions that such struggles evoke. This clearly calls into question his interpretation as an apologist of violence. >Violence. 1. Frantz Fanon, Les damnés de la terre, Paris 1961. Dt.: Frantz Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde, Frankfurt/M. 1981, S. 45 2. Ibid. p. 211. Ina Kerner „Frantz Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	PolFanon I Frantz Fanon Les Damnés de la Terre, Paris 1963 - Engl Transl. The Wretched of the Earth, New York 1963 German Edition: Die Verdammten dieser Erde Reinbek 1969 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Racism	Rawls	I 149 Racism/theory of justice as fairness/Rawls: in the theory of justice as fairness, a hypothetical initial state of a society to be established is assumed, in which the persons are behind a veil of ignorance that does not allow them to know what positions they will take in the structure later on. In this situation it is clear that racism and sexual discrimination are not only unfair but also irrational. Not only are they not moral conceptions, but they are simply a means of oppression. --- I 150 However, this is not a question of definition, but rather a consequence of the conditions of the initial situation of a society to be established, in particular from the conditions of rationality. The fact that legal concepts have a certain content and exclude arbitrariness is a consequence of the theory.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Social Dominance	Psychological Theories	Haslam I 171 Def Social Dominance Theory/psychological theories: here evidence for ingroup favouritism is used to argue that intergroup discrimination is a generic feature of many intergroup relations (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999)⁽¹⁾. Problems: it is not clear whether the reference to the social identity theory of Tajfel is accurate. >Social Identity Theory/Tajfel, >Minimal group/Tajfel, >Social Identity/Tajfel. Especially for the interpretation of the results see >Method/Tajfel. 1. Sidanius, J. and Pratto, F. (1999) Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression. New York: Cambridge University Press. Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Social Movements	Habermas	Gaus I 271 Social movements/Habermas/West: (...) the expansion of state and capitalist systems increasingly organizes human life according to the instrumental logic of money and power, overwhelming any possibility of communicatively achieved consensus and reducing the lifeworld to a lifeless shell. New social movements [NSMs] are understood in these terms as an embryonic counterattack from the life- world against the colonizing force of instrumentally rationalized systems (Habermas, 1981⁽¹⁾; 1987⁽²⁾: 391—6). Lifeworld: The new conflicts are displaced from economic and state systems to the lifeworld or, more precisely, the 'seam' between system and lifeworld: 'the new conflicts arise in areas of cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization the new conflicts are not sparked by problems of distribution, but concern the grammar of forms of life'. NSMs respond to the disruption and 'colonization' of the lifeworld in either 'defensive' or 'offensive' ways according to whether it is a question of 'how to defend or reinstate endangered life styles, or how to put reformed life styles into practice' (1981⁽¹⁾: 32). Feminism: However, the women's movement is‘the only movement that follows the tradition of bourgeois-socialist liberation movements. The struggle against patriarchal oppression and for the realization of a promise that is deeply rooted in the acknowledged universalist foundations of morality and legality lends feminism the impetus of an offensive movement, whereas all other movements are more defensive in character. (1981⁽¹⁾: 34) Enviroment/peace: Environmental and peace movements - usual paradigms of new social movements - represent a more 'defensive' reaction, albeit one 'which already operates on the basis of a rationalized lifeworld and tries out new forms of co-operation and community' (1981⁽¹⁾: 35). Cf. >Postindustrial Society/Touraine. 1. Habermas, Jürgen (1981) 'New social movements'. Telos, 49: 33_7. 2. Habermas, Jürgen (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. Il, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, trans. T. McCarthy. Cambridge: Polity. West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Stanford Prison Experiment	Social Identity Theory	Haslam I 141 Stanford Prison Experiment/Social Identity Theory: [the theory] suggests that people do not automatically take on roles associated with group membership, but do so only when they have come to identify with the group in question (Tajfel and Turner, 1979)⁽¹⁾. For the Stanford prison experiment the theory suggests that the guards only came to identify with their role, and to define that role in brutal terms, because a tyrannical social identity was actively promoted by Zimbardo in his guard briefing. This suggests that the roles will only be accepted when they are seen as an expression of a person’s sense of self (i.e., the social identity of ‘us’). Moreover, the theory suggests that when members of a low-status group (e.g., prisoners) come to develop a sense of shared social identity this can be a basis for them to collectively resist oppression rather than just succumb to it (see Haslam and Reicher, 2012a)⁽²⁾. This leads to a reinterpretation of a number of key events in the Stanford prison experiment (SPE). 1) The prisoners only became passive because (and after) their social identity had been systematically broken down by the actions of the guards and the experimenters. 2) Among the prisoners there was also no evidence that they were overwhelmed by the context in which they found themselves such that they succumbed uncritically to the demands of their role. Indeed, on the contrary and as predicted by the Social Identity Theory (SIT), as their sense of shared identity increased they displayed increasing resistance to the guards. >Tyranny/psychological theories, >Tyranny/Reicher, >Method/Zimbardo, >Milgram Experiment, >Cooperation, >Conformity, >Obedience. 1. Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. (1979) ‘An integrative theory of intergroup conflict’, in W.G. Austin and S. Worchel (eds), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. pp. 33–48. 2. Haslam, S.A. and Reicher, S.D. (2012a) ‘When prisoners take over the prison: A social psychology of resistance’, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 16: 152–79. S. Alexander Haslam and Stephen Reicher, „Tyranny. Revisiting Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
State (Polity)	Gender Theory	Gaus I 278 State/Gender theory/Mottier: Initially, as Waylen (1998)⁽¹⁾ points out, gender theorists tended to view the state in primarily negative terms. Socialists: Socialist feminists in particular integrated the oppression of women within the Marxist perspective. They consequently saw the state as an instrument of domination in the hands of the ruling class, and emphasized the importance of the role of women in the reproduction of the workforce within the family for the development of capitalism. Radical feminism: like socialist feminists, radical feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon also conceptualized the liberal state as a monolithic entity which institutionalizes the interests of dominant groups, particularly through the law; only this time the latter were not the bourgeois classes described by Marxist theorists but the category of male citizens. The liberal legal system, mainstream politics and the state were seen as instruments of the subordination of women to men, and of the legitimization of male interests as the general interest. As MacKinnon put it, 'liberal legalism is thus a medium for making male dominance both invisible and legitimate by adopting the male point of view in law at the same time as it enforces that view on society' (1989⁽²⁾: 237). Institutionalization: within these approaches, the state was perceived above all as a patriarchal instrument which institutionalizes and reproduces male domination. From the late 1980s, such an understanding of the state has been challenged by a number of alternative perspectives. The latter question, 1) (...) whether the impact of the state on gender relations should be conceptualized in negative terms only; and 2) (...) whether the state is adequately theorized as a homogeneous actor. Ad 1): >Welfare state/Gender theory, Ad 2): >State/Poststructuralism. 1. Waylen, Georgina (1998) 'Gender, feminism and the state: an overview'. In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds, Gende'; Politics and the State. London: Routledge, 1—17. 2. MacKinnon, Catharine (1989) Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
State (Polity)	Kropotkin	Brocker I 29 State/Kropotkin: Thesis: In the centuries after the Middle Ages, the states on the continent and in the British Isles systematically eradicated all institutions in which the tendency towards mutual assistance had previously found its expression. […] The usurpation of all social functions by the state had to promote the development of an unbridled, mentally limited individualism.⁽¹⁾ VsKropotkin: 1. He does not identify the real enemy here: the states do not act, they are always groups of people. This leads him to an idealized and unhistorical representation of social life. >Community, >Society, >Solidarity. VsKropotkin: 2. He falls into a dualism of repressive state on the one hand and a life context based on mutual solidarity on the other. That there could also be freedom in the state and oppression in the community was obviously beyond his imagination. >Freedom, >State. 1. Pjotr Alexejewitsch Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, London 1902. Dt.: Peter Kropotkin, Gegenseitige Hilfe in der Tier- und Menschenwelt. Mit einem Nachwort neu herausgegeben von Henning Ritter, Frankfurt/M./Berlin/Wien 1975, S. 210f.	Kropot I Peter Kropotkin Gegenseitige Hilfe in der Tier- und Menschenwelt Frankfurt/Berlin/Wien 1975 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Tyranny	Psychological Theories	Haslam I 132 Tyranny/psychological theories: prior to Zimbardo’s Prison experiment (>Stanford Prison Experiment/Zimbardo) it had been common for psychologists to answer such questions by arguing that brutality and oppression are a straightforward reflection of the pathological dispositions of those who become agents of tyranny. >Dispositions, >Personality traits. A. Dispositional hypothesis: this thesis argues that pathological systems are produced by people who are themselves in some sense pathological. E.g. people who sympathetic to tyrannical regimes have an authoritarian personality type the makes them deferential to strong leaders and disdainful of weak groups. VsDispositional hypothesis: Stanford prison experiment/Zimbardo: (…) the participants in the SPE were ‘normal healthy male college students’ (Haney et al., 1973⁽¹⁾: 5) and they had been randomly assigned to their roles as guards or prisoners. Accordingly, the extreme behaviour witnessed in the study could not be explained simply as a manifestation of participants’ deviant personality. >Personality. B. Situational hypothesis/Zimbardo: peoples behavior is primarily determined by the social context in which they find themselves. >Behavior/Zimbardo, cf. >BBC Prison Study. 1. Haney, C., Banks, C. and Zimbardo, P. (1973) ‘A study of prisoners and guards in a simulated prison’, Naval Research Reviews, September: 1–17. Washington, DC: Office of Naval Research. S. Alexander Haslam and Stephen Reicher, „Tyranny. Revisiting Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Class studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017

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