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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Behavior | Lorenz | Page numbers here from the German edition: K. Lorenz, Das sogenannte Böse Wien, 1963 II 34 Aggression/Lorenz: two types: A) between different species B) within one species. (Subject of this book). II 36 "Mobbing"/"hate on"/Lorenz: crows, and other birds "hate on" the owl they have discovered by day: (s) They show their fellow-species by gestures where the enemy is. For example a jay follows the fox screeching through the forest. This is a passing on of a non-innate knowledge. II 47 Singing/Birds/Lorenz: Birds share, among others things, also the age. II 58 Aggression/Lorenz: Thesis: More than other properties, the aggressive behavior can be exaggerated by its pernicious effect in the grotesque and unsuitable. For us, it is the inheritance of the intraspecific selection, which has lasted over decades. The evil introspecific selection must be taken. II 72 Stimulus/Reaction/Behavior/Lorenz: Experiments show that (in captivity) the withdrawal of stimuli decreases the threshold for triggering reactions. At the end, a room corner is performed courtship to because it is the only visual point of view. II 81 Aggression/Evolution/Lorenz: The reorientation of the attack is probably the most ingenious source that was created by the species change, in order to divert aggression into harmless pathways. II 91 Behavior/ritualization/Lorenz: e.g. in the insect world, it may be the case that behavior is even be embodied. E.g. robbery or assassination: the suitor hands over a prey to the beloved of the right size so that he can have sexual intercourse with the female during her eating the prey without being eaten himself. II 92 Later generations react only to a corresponding symbol. Congenital understanding. II 93 Behavior/animal/ritualization/Lorenz: it would be a mistake to call ritualized "rushing" an "expression" of love "or the affiliation of the female to the spouse. The independent instinctual movement is not a by-product, not an epiphenomenon of the tie that holds the animals together, but it is itself this tie. A completely autonomous, new instinct. II 103 Rite/behavior/animal/Lorenz: the most important function is the active drive to social behavior. II 104 New function: communication. II 105 The unification of the variable variety of possibilities of action into a single rigid sequence reduces the danger of ambiguity in the communication. II 108 "Good manners" are those that characterize their own group. II 109 Any deviation causes aggression, so the group is forced to act in a unified way. >Aggression. II 123 Behavioral research/Lorenz: in the heroic time of comparative behavioral research, it was thought that only one instinct dominated this, but exclusively, one animal. J. HuxleyVs: Human and animal are like a ship commanded by many captains. Animals have this agreement that only one of them can enter the command bridge. --- Gould I 105 Lorenz's thesis: we do not react to wholenesses or shapes, but to a group of special mechanisms that act as triggers. (Lorenz, 1950 "Ganzheit und Teil") It is well known that birds, in particular, react to abstract features and not to shapes. --- Gould VIII 34 Aggression/Lorenz: (The so-called Evil): Thesis: Aggression is a species-preserving function. Thus only the most suitable individuals are propagated. DawkinsVsLorenz: Prime example for a circular reasoning. It is also contrary to Darwinism, which he does not seem to have noticed. |
Lorenz I K. Lorenz Das sogenannte Böse Wien 1963 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Behaviorism | Searle | I 57 LewisVsBehaviorism: behaviorismus consideres non-causal relationships. I 77 Beliefs and desires/Searle: beliefs and desires do not need to be postulated, they will be experienced consciously and not be in question. >Belief, >Wishes. I 48 ff Methodological behaviorism: psychology: encompases stimulus/response. >Stimulus/Reaction. Logical Behaviorism (Ryle, Hempel): only encompasses behavior. >Behavior/Ryle, >Behavior, >Hempel. SearleVsBehaviorism: the disposition is unclear. Circles: belief is only explainable by wishes and vice versa. Super SpartansVsBehaviorism. >SearleVsBehaviorism. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Internalisation | Habermas | IV 20/21 Internalisation/Mead/Habermas: Mead explains the following transition as internalisation, i.e. through the mechanism of an individual taking the attitude of the other: 1. Gestures are replaced by symbols whose meanings for the participants are identical. 2. The interpersonal relationship between speaker and addressee replaces a causal relationship between stimulus-reaction-stimulus. 3. The participants learn to distinguish between acts of communication and success-oriented actions. >Success, >Understanding, >Stimulus/Reaction, >Gestures, >Symbols. Unlike in the case of a reflexive relationship, in which a subject bends back to itself to make itself an object of itself, the model of internalisation states that the subject finds itself in an exterior by taking in and appropriating what opposes it as an object. The structure of appropriation differs from that of reflection by the opposite sense of direction: the self does not refer to itself by making itself an object, but that it recognizes the relinquished subjective in the external object, the action schema or the relationship schema. HabermasVsMead: these explanations remain attached to the model of the philosophy of consciousness. This model, which is based on an inner dialogue, can already be found in Augustine's work.(1) >Philosophy of consciousness, >Self/Habermas, >Consciousness. IV 22 Habermas: with this model the adoption of attitudes is only illuminated from one side: the intersubjective relationship of the interaction participants is only represented in the structure of the self-relation. (2) Subjectivity: a higher-level subjectivity, on the other hand, is characterized by the fact that it can only behave indirectly towards itself, namely via the complex relationships with others. In this way, it maps the structure of the entire interaction. >Subjectivity, >Subjectivity/Habermas. 1.Vgl. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969); L. S. Vygotski, Denken und Sprechen, Frankfurt, 1961. 2. Das ist der Anknüpfungspunkt für Tugendhat, Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie, Frankfurt 1979, S.245ff |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Learning | Davidson | Rorty II 21 Davidson/Rorty: There is no such thing as language, there is nothing one can learn or master. (There are rather provisional theories). There are no conventions how we communicate. Davidson I (a) 10 Stimulus/reaction/learning/Davidson: Thesis: would some selection mechanisms not be innate, nothing could be learned - stimulus is not perceptible in itself, it cannot be explained in a noncircular manner. Instead of one, two classes of events or objects: a) tables which are similar in a relevant manner b) responses that are also seen in a similar way - this relevant stimuli can be identified by triangulation: lines intersect. >Triangulation. I 16 In order for the reactions of a person to be considered thoughts, they must have the concept of an object - the concept of the stimulus. So that one of the bell or the table - identification: since the bell or the table is identified only by means of the average of two (or more) sets of similarity reactions (lines of thought), having a bell-concept consists in recognizing the presence of the triangle, of one whose vertex is oneself. Frank I 669ff Burge/Davidson/Putnam: historical learning situation. But no social community uses "twin earth water" in the evironment. The language usage is always "water". - Authority/Putnam/Burge: is thereby threatened - Davidson: one can learn "moon" correctly without ever having seen it. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Stimuli | Davidson | I (a) 10 Stimulus/Reaction/Learning/Davidson: Thesis: If some selection mechanisms were not innate, nothing could be learned. - The stimulus is not perceived in itself. Cannot be explained circulatory. - Instead of one, two classes of events or objects: a) Tables which are found similar in a relevant way - b) Reactions which are also found similar. - Thereby, relevant stimuli can be identified: by triangulation: lines intersect. >Triangulation, >similarity. I (b) 16 In order for the reactions of a person to be considered thoughts, they must have the concept of an object - the concept of the stimulus. So that of the bell or the table - identification: since the bell or the table is identified only by means of the average of two (or more) sets of similarity reactions (lines of thought), having a bell-concept consists in recognizing the presence of the triangle of one whose vertex is oneself. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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