Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
He/ He himself Perry Frank I 432f
"He*"/Perry: He* is not working without an antecedent: nonsense: E.g. "God knows that he* (Jones) is in the hospital." >Identification, >Indexicality, >Index words, >Levels/order, >Description levels.
I 439f
Extra-sense/Perry: possible solution: "s": variable that ranks above sense - E.g. Sheila thinks that an s exists so that s = Ego(Ivan) and Ivan believes that s is wanted on the telephone. Here Ivans extra sense i is not part of the proposition that Sheila believes but it is part of the proposition of which she believes that Ivan believes it.
Extra-sense/PerryVsCastaneda: we do not need one.
>H.-N. Castaneda, >Extra-sense/Castaneda.
Frank I 441
"He*"/PerryVsCastaneda: He* does not seem to be so different from "he". "F-use", "he" as a placeholder of an aforementioned object (*). In attachment to an F-using it is limited* to the meaning area on special extra sense.
Problem: that does not yet exclude believing in the evening star that it is the morning star (as long as X believes that evening star = evening star, a priori argument).
>Identity, >Trivial identity, >Self-identity.
Solution: E.g. "Albert wanted from Mary ... so he went over to her" must be "the woman on the corner" and not the one "he had seen last week".
>Anaphora.
Solution: it is not the "it/she" but the "that's why", which compels us to - "he*" not composed. - "*" Does not mean "itself".
Frank I 446ff
"He*"/Perry: not composed of "he" and "self": E.g. the dog Elwood bites himself/...bites Elwood. Difference: a) covered with wounds, b) broken teeth.
Analog: a) believes of himself, to be rich
b) thinks of Privatus that he is rich.
Problem: e.g. the Dean was surprised to find out that he considered himself to be overpaid (according to other description).
>Description, >Context, >Intension, >Extension.

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Identification Strawson I 57
Identification/Strawson: if directly due to localization then without mentioning of other particulars - E.g. death depends on living things - e.g. but flash not from something flashing. >Dependence.
I 64
Identification/Strawson: observable particulars can also be identified without mentioning their causes or the things on which they depend, - conceptual dependency does not matter - but one cannot always identify births without identifying them as the birth of a living being.
I 65
Asymmetry: we do not need necessarily a term in language for births as particulars - but for living beings, because we are living beings ourselves. >Continuant, >Person, >Subject.
I 66
Identifiability/particular/Strawson: minimum condition: they must be neither private nor unobservable. >Particulars/Strawson, >Language community, cf. >Private language, >Understanding, >Communication.
I 87
Identificaion/Strawson: we cannot talk about private things when we cannot talk about public things.
I 153
Identification/StrawsonVsLeibniz: identification requires a demonstrative element: that contradicts Leibniz monads for which there should be descriptions alone in general term. >General terms.
Then, according to Leibniz, identification (individuation) is only possible for God: the "complete term" of an individual.
That is at the same time a description of the entire universe (from a certain point, which guarantees the uniqueness).
>Complete concept.
I 245
Identification/Universal/names/particulars/Strawson: speaker/listener each must know a distinctive fact about Socrates. But it must not be the same - E.g. "That man there can lead you".
Crucial: that someone stands there - N.B.: no part introduces a single thing, but the statement as a whole presents it.
>Particulars/Strawson, >Introduction/Strawson.

VII 124
Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel by swimming through it twice" - it has the (wrong!) appearances, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or
b) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same error as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression.
E.g. "Scott is Scott".
>Waverley example.
---
Tugendhat I 400-403
Identification/Strawson: a) pointing
b) description, spacetime points.
TugendhatVsStrawson: because he had accepted Russell's theory of direct relation unconsciously, he did not see that there are no two orders.
Tugendhat like Brandom: demonstrative identification presupposes the spatiotemporal, non-demonstrative - (deixis presupposes anaphora).
>Deixis/Brandom.
Difference: specification/Tugendhat: "which of them all?"
Identification: only kind: by spacetime points.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993


Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Reference Strawson Meggle I 297
According to Hungerland: Strawson: reference rules - rules of presupposition of expressions such as e.g. "the President of the United States is ... years old".
Meggle I 297
Strawson: Lies are no correct use of language.
Meggle I 310f
Reference rules/Strawson: 1. To refer does not mean that you say you refer to something.
2. The thing must stand in a certain relation to the speaker.
3. The correct reference is not part of the utterance, in the sense in which a proper description is part of what is asserted by the utterance.
E.g. "This is black and that is white." Here is the fact that "this" is closer to me than "that" not part of the statement!, Not part of what I said about the two objects.
Meggle I 311
Reference/Strawson: not saying that one "refers to something" - R is not part of the utterance as the correct description of the statement is.
Meggle I 312
Hungry country, "this" is closer to me than "that", but not part of the statement - "S" does not require that there is only one, but that I am only referring to one. ---
Schulte III 436
Reference/Strawson: a) clearly referring expressions: the fulfillment of the conditions is not stated but implied
b) descriptive terms: here the fulfillment of the conditions is also stated by the use.
---
IV 68
Reference/Strawson: on particular without reference to properties possible. ---
VII 124
Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel twice in swimming through it". - It has the (wrong) appearance, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or
b) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same mistake as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression - E.g. "Scott is Scott".
>Waverley example.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993


Grice: > Meg I
G. Meggle (Hg)
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979

Schulte I
J. Schulte
Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001

Schulte II
J. Schulte
U. J. Wenzel
Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Frankfurt 2001

Schulte III
Joachim Schulte
"Peter Frederick Strawson"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Roles Peacocke I 109ff
Constitutive role: 1st sortal, 2nd psychic state, 3rd relation between 1 and 2. >Sortals, >Psychological states, >Roles, >Constitutive role.
Evidence: Sensitivity for evidence is dependend on terms developed for them.
>Concepts, >Language use, >Reference.
Of two descriptions the constitutive role is the uninformative one.
>Description.
Constitutive role: "the person who has these perceptions" explains immunity to misidentification.
>Incorrigibility, >Cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception.
Constitutive role of" now": "the time when this attitude (belief, idea, etc.) occurred".
>Localisation.
Instead of trivial identity "I am I ":
Constitutive role: "I am the person with these states".
>Predication.
I 122
Constitutive role/I/Peacocke: the constitutive role brings just the difference to the trivial identity: "I am the person with these states" instead of "I am I". >Identity, >Self-identification.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976


The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Hegel, G.W.F. Wessel Vs Hegel, G.W.F. I 221
Identity/Hegel: rejected the sentence "a = a". "No object remains the same to itself". WesselVsHegel: Error: confusion of word and object.
I 222 ...+... Z.
Numbers/Wessel: In mathematics numbers are objects which are introduced by definition. They exist only if one introduces signs for them. A distinction is made between digits and numbers, but without designations (digits) numbers do not exist as abstract objects either.
As a result, numbers and number terms are often indistinguishable.
Identity/Hegel: for example "The tree is the tree" expresses "not the view of it", because it "does not represent it as something reflected in itself". (WesselVs).
Identity/WesselVsHegel: 3. Error by Hegel: to not regard identity and difference as two-digit predicates (relation) but on the one hand as a subject term and on the other as a one-digit predicate. Diversity is simply the negation of identity!
WesselVsHegel: is also wrong in limiting himself to the trivial identity a = a in his discussion. This identity would be the only one really superfluous. We cannot draw any conclusions from it or describe any change.
I 365
Being/Nothing/Hegel: tries to define the concept of "becoming" through the words "being" and "nothing". WesselVsHegel: that is doomed to failure: without any recourse to the empirically given, terms of change cannot be introduced. (>Change/Hegel).
I 365/366
Similar to the existential predicate, change terms cannot be introduced purely logically. Empirical conception of change is already assumed to be known in logic. For example, concepts of time are defined by change.
I 366
Change/Wessel: can be introduced in two ways, 1. using time terms - 2. without using time terms.
I 367
Problem: two possibilities: properties on an object can modify themselves, disappear completely or emerge anew. Accordingly, one can also distinguish between transition states or static states.
s(s~E(a) => sE(a)) an emergence of a
s(sE(a) => s~E(a)) a vanishing of a
s(S~A => sA) an emergence of sA
s(sP(a) => s -i P(a) a loss of the property P.
Paradox of change/Wessel: "a changing body possesses a property p and does not possess it at the same time".
Dialectical Identity/Hegel/Wessel: logical form:
there is a property P such that P(a1) u P(a2) applies, and there is a property Q such that Q(a1) u -i Q(a2) or -i Q(a1) u Q(a2) applies. ((s) Something remains and something changes).
Change/Predicate/Wessel: so far we have considered the two-digit predicate =>: something becomes something else.
But there is also the one-digit predicate llv (arrow down) "something changes", "something becomes true" or untrue.
Example: "The water is moved".
WesselVsHegel: this makes it clear how unfounded the opposition of being and becoming terms is.
Change/event/predicate/Wessel: with the change predicate sA => sB subject terms can now be formed: s(SA => sB). This is what events are called!
(s) Event: singular term, which is formed from a predicate for change.
Wessel: for such predicates, however, it must be proved in each case whether they may link with subject terms of this type.

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Quine, W.V.O. Millikan Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 215
descriptive/referential/denotation/classification/Millikan: you can force a descriptive denotation to work referentially, Ex "He said that the winner was the loser." Ex (Russell) "I thought your yacht was larger than it is."
I 216
Solution: "the winner" and "larger than your Yacht" must be regarded as classified according to the adjusted (adapted) sense. On the other hand:
"The loser" probably has only descriptive of meaning.
"Your Yacht" is classified by both: by adjusted and by relational sense, only "your" is purely referential.
Quine: (classic example) Ex "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua."
MillikanVsQuine: according to Quine that's not obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational sense in that context.
referential/descriptive/attribution of belief/intentional/Millikan: there are exceptions, where the expressions do not work descriptively, nor purely referential, but also by relational sense or intension.
Ex "the man who us drove home" is someone the speaker and hearer know very well. Then the hearer must assume that someone else is meant because the name is not used.
Rule: here the second half of the rule for intentional contexts is violated, "use whichever expression that preserves the reference". This is often a sign that the first half is violated, "a sign has not only reference but also sense or intension, which must be preserved. Why else use such a complicated designation ("the man who drove us home"), instead of the name?
Ortcutt/Ralph/spy/Quine/Millikan: Ex there is a man with a brown hat that Ralph has caught a glimpse of. Ralph assumes he is a spy.
a) Ralph believes that the man he has caught a glimpse of is a spy.
I 217
b) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. Millikan: The underlined parts are considered relational, b) is more questionable than a) because it is not clear whether Ralph has explicitly perceived him as wearing a brown hat.
Quine:
In addition, there is a gray-haired man that Ralph vaguely knows as a pillar of society, and that he is unaware of having seen, except once at the beach.
c) Ralph believes that the man he saw on the beach is a spy.
Millikan: that's for sure relational. As such, it will not follow from a) or b).
Quine: adds only now that Ralph does not know this, but the two men are one and the same.
d) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is not a spy.
Now this is just wrong.
Question: but what about
e) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.
f) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy.
Quine: only now Quine tells us the man's name (which Ralph is unaware of).
Millikan: Ex Jennifer, an acquaintance of Samuel Clemens, does not know that he is Mark Twain.
I 218
She says: "I would love to meet Mark Twain" and not "I'd love to meet Samuel Clemens". language-dependent: here, "Mark Twain" is classified dependent on language. So also language bound intensions are not always irrelevant for intentional contexts. It had o be language-bound here to make it clear that the name itself is substantial, and also that it is futile to assume that she would have said she wanted to meet Samuel Clemens.
Ralph/Quine/Millikan: Quine assumes that Ralph has not only two internal names for Ortcutt, but only one of them is linked to the external name Ortcutt.
Millikan: Description: Ex you and I are watching Ralph, who is suspiciously observing Ortcutt standing behind a bush with a camera (surely he just wants to photograph cobwebs). Ralph did not recognize Ortcutt and you think: Goodness, Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy ".
Pointe: in this context, the sentence is true! ((S) Because the name "Ortcutt" was given by us, not by Ralph).
referential/Millikan: Solution: "Ortcutt" is classified here as referential.
referential/Millikan. Ex "Last Halloween Susi actually thought, Robert (her brother) was a ghost." ((S) She did not think of Robert, nor of her brother, that he was a ghost, but that she had a ghost in front of her).
MillikanVsQuine: as long as no one has explicitly asked or denied that Tom knows that Cicero is Tullius, the two attributions of belief "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" and "... Tullius ..." are equivalent!
Language-bound intension/Millikan: is obtained only if the context makes it clear what words were used, or which public words the believer has as implicit intentions.
Fully-developed (language-independent) intension/Millikan: for them the same applies if they are kept intentionally:
I 219
Ex "The natives believe that Hesperus is a God and Phosphorus is a devil." But:
Pointe: It is important that the intrinsic function of a sentence must be maintained when one passes to intentional contexts. That is the reason that in attribution of belief one cannot simply replace "Cicero is Tullius" by "Cicero is Cicero". ((S) trivial/non-trivial identity).
Stabilizing function/statement of identity/Millikan: the stabilizing function is that the listener translates "A" and "B" into the same internal term. Therefore, the intrinsic function of "Cicero is Cicero" is different from that of "Cicero is Tullius". Since the intrinsic function is different one can not be used for the other in intentional contexts.
Eigenfunction: Ex "Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy": has the Eigenfunkion to be translated into an internal sentence that has a subject and two predicates. No record of this form can be found in Ralph's head. Therefore one can not say that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy you.

I 299
Non-contradiction/Millikan: the test is also a test of our ability to identify something and whether our concepts represent what they are supposed to project. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. It is not the problem to decide how an exclusive class should be split up.
I 300
Ex deciding when red ends and orange begins. Instead, it's about learning to recognize Ex red under different circumstances.
Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: for Quine a criterion for right thinking seems to be that the relationship to a stimulus can be predicted.
MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction?
Agreement/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what agreement in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If you do not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree.
Solution/Millikan: agreement is to say the same about the same.
Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted.
One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" as a sentence. He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer.
Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra).
Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree to a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in nature (natural necessity).

I 309
Thesis: lack of Contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. agreement/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they fail to recognize the importance of the agreement in the judgment.
agreement: this is not about two people getting together, but that they get together with the world.
agreement/mismatch/Millikan: are not two equally likely possibilities ((s) > inegalitarian theory/Nozick.) There are many more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong, than for the same sentence to be true.
Now, if an entire pattern (system) of coinciding judgments appears that represent the same area (for example color) the probability that each participant reflects an area in the world outside is stupendous. ((s) yes - but not that they mean the same thing).
Ex only because my judgments about the passage of time almost always matches with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to classify my memories correctly in the passage of time.
Objectivity/time/perspective/mediuma/communication/Millikan: thesis: the medium that other people form by their remarks is the most accessible perspective for me that I can have in terms of time.

I 312
Concept/law/theory/test/verification/Millikan: when a concept appears in a law, it is necessary
I 313
to test it along with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain rules of inference. Concept/Millikan: because concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested.
Test: does not mean, however, that the occurrence of sensual data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine).
Theory of sensual data/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be, thesis: that neither an internal nor an external language actually describes sensual data, except that the language depends on the previous concepts of external things that usually causes the sensual data.
I 314
Forecast/prediction/to predict/prognosis/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: we project the world to inhabit it, not to predict it. If predictions are useful, at least not from experiences in our nerve endings. Confirmation/prediction/Millikan: A perceptual judgment implies mainly itself Ex if I want to verify that this container holds one liter, I don't have to be able to predict that the individual edges have a certain length.That is I need not be able to predict any particular sensual data.
I 317
Theory/Verification/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition says that not just a few, but most of our concepts are not of things that we observe directly, but of other things.
Test/logical form/Millikan: if there is one thing A, which is identified by observing effects on B and C, isn't then the validity of the concepts of B and C tested together with the theory that ascribes the observed effects onto the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A?
Millikan. No!
From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts, that govern B and C, is tested when the concept that governs A is tested and vice versa.
Namely, it does not follow, if A is a specific denotation Ex "the first President of the United States" and it also does not follow, if the explicit intention of A represents something causally dependent. Ex "the mercury in the thermometer rose to mark 70" as intension of "the temperature was 70 degrees."
I 318
Concept/Millikan: concepts are abilities - namely the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: Ex my ability to make a good cake is completely independent of my ability to break up eggs, even if I have to break up eggs to make the cake.
Objectivity/objective reality/world/method/knowledge/Millikan: we obtain a knowledge of the outside world by applying different methods to obtain a result. Ex different methods of temperature measurement: So we come to the conclusion that temperature is something real.
I 321
Knowledge/context/holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: doesn't all knowledge depend on "collateral information", as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we test individual concepts independently from the rest? Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: ~ "Our findings about the outside world do not stand individually before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body."
Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction.
Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs never stand before the tribunal of experience.
I 322
Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other beliefs. Confirmation: single confirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my attitudes.
From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well.
Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005