Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Animals | Bateson | I 246 Signs/deception/animal/Bateson: For example, a jackdaw can imitate its own mood signs. >Animals, >Animal language, >Fake, >Lie, >Emotion, >Signs, >Symbols, >Signal language. 1.K. Lorenz, King Solomon's Ring, NY 1952. |
Bt I G. Bateson Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology, San Francisco 1972 German Edition: Ökologie des Geistes. Anthropologische, psychologische, biologische und epistemologische Perspektiven Frankfurt 1985 |
| Animals | Mayr | I 309 Language/Animals/Mayr: There is no language among animals. Their communication systems consist in the exchange of signals. There are no syntax and grammar. >Animal language, >Thinking without language, >Language, >Communication, >Signals, >Signal language, >Syntax, >Grammar. I 311 Mind: conceptual confusion: false limitation to the mental activities of the human. >Mind, >Thinking. Animal/Mind: it has been shown that there is no categorial difference between the mental activities of certain animals (elephants, dogs, whales, primates, parrots) and those of humans. I 312 Consciousness/Animal: the same applies to the consciousness, a basic version of which is even to be found in invertebrates and possibly protozoa. Mind/Mayr: there was simply no sudden emergence of the mind. >Consciousness, >Emergence. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Behaviorism | Tugendhat | I 204 ~ Behaviorism/Tugendhat: similarity only identifiable by behavior (also for oneself) - does without notions - hence also without similarity. >Behavior, >Equality, >Similarity, >Imagination. Behaviorism: uses no (abstract) concepts. >Abstractness. Introspection: non-sensual notion of similarity, abstract concepts (conceptualism) (BehaviorismVs). >Introspection. VsIntrospection: does not find concepts either, merely postulates them. I 215f Language/Behaviorism/Tugendhat: purpose fundamental, pure signal language, circumstances important (TugendhatVsCircumstances). >Circumstances/Tugendhat. "Conditional rules": Use according to the circumstances. TugendhatVs. Behaviorism: Behaviorism has no place for declarative sentences. >Assertions. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Brain/Brain State | Mayr | I 112 Brain/Mayr: the human brain acquired its still existing skills about 100,000 years ago. All the achievements we are looking back at today were made with a brain that was not developed for them by the selection! Three brain regions: 1) For reflexes ("closed programs"). 2) Information intake ("open programs"): languages, norms, behavior. What was once learned is difficult to forget; "simple coinage". 3) Regions are not yet defined; "memory", "storage". I 309 Brain/Evolution/Mayr: Australopithecus: 400-500 cm³ ((like a anthroid ape) Homo erectus 750-1250 significantly larger brains only in the last 150,000 years. Language/Animals/Mayr: There is no language among animals. Their communication systems consist in the exchange of signals. There are no syntax and grammar. >Animals, >Animal language, >Signals, >Signal language, >Grammar, >Syntax. I 310 Language/brain: could the absence of language be a reason why the Neandertals did not exploit their brain better? Language: evolved from about 300,000 - 200,000 years ago in small groups of hunters and collectors due to a selection advantage. Good location for brain enlargement. >Language, >Language evolution, >Thinking without language. I 311 Brain: a factor that led to a halt in brain development was perhaps the enlargement of the group. In larger groups, the reproductive superiority of a better-equipped leader is lower, while those with smaller brains enjoy better protection, longer life and greater reproductive success. Stagnation: social integration of people contributed enormously to the evolution of culture, but may have initiated a period of stagnation in the evolution of the genome. >Evolution. Mind: conceptual confusion: false limitation to the mental activities of humans. >Mind, >Thinking, >Humans, >Intentionality, >Action. Animal/Mind: it has been shown that there is no categorial difference between the mental activities of certain animals (elephants, dogs, whales, primates, parrots) and those of humans. >Animals, >Animal language. I 312 Consciousness/Animal: the same applies to the consciousness, a basic version of which is even to be found in invertebrates and possibly protozoa. >Consciousness. Mind/Mayr: there was simply no sudden emergence of the mind. >Emergence. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Communication | Deacon | I 31 Communication/Human/Animal/Deacon: we underestimate the enormous complexity and subtlety of non-human communication(1). Animal signals: show only superficial resemblance to human language learning, reference and syntax (in that order). But no animal species has developed these facets into a rule-based system. Animal signals do not have what is equal to the noun/verb distinction,... I 32 ...neither do they differentiate between grammatical and ungrammatical connections, nor tense formation, nor do they differentiate between singular and plural. >Animals, >Animal language. Animal language/non-human language: what qualities should an animal language have? Whereupon do astronomers search the sky for extraterrestrial intelligences? I 466 Note Signal language: Some languages based on signs are not based on the human language, but differ considerably from it(2). >Signal language. 1. See Marc D. Hauser (1996). The evolution of communication. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Pp. xiii+760. 2. U. Bellugi und E.S. Klima (1982). From gesture to sign: Deixis in a visual gestural language in context. New York: John Wiley, 297-313. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Correctness | Tugendhat | I 430 Correct/True/Truth/Correctness/Reference/Tugendhat: a speech event is only called a right (correct), when another one is called correct. - Then it has the sense of "true" - that constitutes the reference to objects. >Reference, >Truth. I 441 Correctness/Language/Tugendhat: E.g. signal language of animals or humans, rules causal or conventional, then the use is considered "right" - then classification expressions = quasi-predicates (only in presence of the object). >Predicates/Tugendhat, >Terminology/Tugendhat, >Animals, cf. >Animal language. I 442 Regardless of the situation: when the perceptual situation is specified by spatio-temporal localization and is thus objectified. I 444 If the observer speaks a situation-independent language, he can respond to a situation-dependent language (e.g. of measuring instruments) with the attribution of truth/falsehood. >Observation language, >Objectivity. I 445 Truth: if the speaker only has quasi-predicates, he would have to be able to distinguish between regulatory compliance and situation conformity - then correcting errors about verification rules. I 446 But by definition not if only quasi-predicate available - Solution: singular term, then constancy of an identifiable. I 519 "right"/Tugendhat: is a basic concept. >Basic concepts. I 448 Truth/Correctness/Tugendhat: the false use of a term (lie) presupposes that it is used in a rule-compliant way. >Truth. Therefore it is necessary to separate correctness and truth. - It must be possible to refer to other situations with singular terms and quantifiers. >Singular terms, >Quantifiers. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Deceptions | Bateson | I 246 Signs/deception/animal/Bateson: For example, a jackdaw can imitate its own mood signs. >Animals, >Animal language, >Fake, >Lie, , >Emotion, >Signs, >Symbols, >Signal language. 1.K. Lorenz, King Solomon's Ring, NY 1952. |
Bt I G. Bateson Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology, San Francisco 1972 German Edition: Ökologie des Geistes. Anthropologische, psychologische, biologische und epistemologische Perspektiven Frankfurt 1985 |
| Icons | Morris | Eco I 79 Definition iconic/Morris/Eco: a sign is iconic to the extent that it possesses the properties it describes itself. >Signs, >Symbols, >Signals, >Communication, >Communication/Morris, >Symbolic communication, >Signal language, >Symbolic language, >Sign language, >Interpretation, >Meaning. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Language | Habermas | Rorty II 94 Language/Habermas/Rorty: Habermas distinguishes between a strategic and a genuinely communicative use of language. Scale of confidence levels. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas Rorty II 94/95 Rorty: if we cease to interpret reason as a source of authority, the Platonic and Kantian dichotomy dissolves between reason and feeling. >Authority, >Reason, >I. Kant, >Reason/Kant, >Plato. Rorty II 96 RortyVsHabermas: the idea of the "better argument" is only useful if one can find a natural, transcultural relevance relation. >Argumentation, >Ultimate justification. --- Habermas IV 41 Language/Habermas: we have to choose between a) Language as a medium of communication and b) Language as a medium for the coordination of action and socialization of individuals between them. IV 42 The formation of identities and the emergence of institutions can be imagined in such a way that the extra-linguistic context of behavioral dispositions and behavioral schemas is, so to speak, linguistically permeated, i.e. symbolically structured. >Identity/Henrich, >Institutions. IV 43 Language functions as a medium not of understanding and the transmission of cultural knowledge, but of socialisation and social integration. These processes do not sediment themselves, like communication processes, in cultural knowledge, but in the symbolic structures of self and society, in competencies and relationship patterns. >Cultural tradition/Habermas, >Background/Habermas, >Competence, >Capabilities. The signal language develops into a grammatical speech, as the medium of communication simultaneously moves away from the symbolically structured self of the interaction participants and the society condensed into normative reality. >Signal language. IV 100 Language/medium/socialization/Habermas: Speech acts are only a suitable medium of social reproduction if they can simultaneously assume the functions of tradition, social integration and socialization of individuals. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act They can only do this if the propositional, illocutionary and expressive elements are integrated into a grammatical unit in each individual speech action in such a way that the semantic content does not break down into segments but can be freely converted between the components. >Content, >Semantic content. IV 135 Religion/Holy/Language/Habermas: in the grammatical speech the propositional elements are combined with the illocutionary and expressive elements in such a way that the semantic content can fluctuate between them. Everything that can be said can also be represented as a statement. This makes it clear to oneself what a connection of religious world views to communicative action means. The background knowledge goes into the situation definitions (...). >Religion/Habermas, >Holiness/Durkheim. Since the semantic contents of sacred and profane origin fluctuate freely in the medium of language, there is a fusion of meanings: the moral-practical and expressive contents are combined with the cognitive-instrumental in the form of cultural knowledge. This is a) as cultural knowledge - b) as a basis for instrumental action. This latter makes religion a world view that demands totality. >Background/Habermas. IV 273 Language/media/control media/communication media/Habermas: the conversion from language to control media (money, power (influence, reputation)) means a decoupling of the interaction from lifeworld contexts (see Lifeworld/Habermas). Media such as money and power begin with the empirically motivated ties; they code a purpose-rational handling of calculable amounts of value and enable a generalized strategic influence on the decisions of other interaction participants, bypassing linguistic consensus-building processes. >Control media, >Communication media. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Language Evolution | Mead | Habermas IV 15 Language Evolution/Communication/Mead/Habermas: Mead develops a theory of language evolution from a "sign language" assumed by him for vertebrates, which initially leads to a signal language stage of symbolic mediated interaction and later to propositionally differentiated speech. ((s) For the current status, see Language Evolution/Deacon). |
Mead I George Herbert Mead Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967 German Edition: Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Mentalese | Mentalese: Mentalese is a language of which is assumed that it is used for information processing in the brain. It is supposed to differ from the everyday language, which would require a twofold translation. Critics argue that this makes the explanations simply complicated, or the brain requires a higher work performance than necessary. The homunculus argument has become known against the language of thought. J. Fodor: Signal language of the brain: for internal processing - H. PutnamVs: Mentalese explains nothing, shifts the problem. R. SearleVs: Regress of homunculi. - Rorty's solution is a hierarchy of dumber homunculi. |
||
| Signals | Deacon | I 32 Signals/Sign language/Signal language/Non-human language/Deacon: Characteristics: a language-like signal should have a combinatorial structure with distinguishable elements, which in turn must be able to occur in new combinations. It should enable creative production of new outputs with little redundancy. Although there are a large number of possible combinations, most of these combinations would be excluded. Cf. >Language, >Words, >Signs, >Symbols, >Syntax, >Meaning. I 466 Note Signal language: Some languages based on signs are not based on the human language, but differ considerably from it (see Bellugi and Klima, 1982)(1). I 32 The correlations between signals and events and objects should not be a simple 1:1 mapping. >Reference, >Objects, >Events. I 33 These correlations should be radically but systematically different from case to case. These characteristics have a syntax, even if it is no syntax that corresponds to human language. Games, mathematics and even cultural habits have such characteristics. >Play. However, an extraterrestrial signal with such features would still not be decipherable. Animal signals: since they are isolated or little organised, they are described in summary rather than through formal rules. It is highly unlikely that an existing system would have been overlooked here, especially in the case of cosmic signals. Cf. >Language rules. Non-human communication/Deacon: Conclusion: it is not about the fact that human communication is somehow better, but about the fact that it is simply not comparable. >Communication. Social communication: does not simply replace words with gestures. >Gestures. 1. U. Bellugi und E.S. Klima (1982). From gesture to sign: Deixis in a visual gestural language in context. New York: John Wiley, 297-313 |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Signs | Morris | Tugendhat III 212 Sign/Ch. W. Morris: E.g. triangle: a) One or more signs(syntax) b) A signified (semantics) c) A being for which the sign is sign of the signified. (Pragmatics). (TugendhatVs). >E. Tugendhat, >Signs/Tugendhat, >Syntax; >Semantics, >Pragmatics. Morris: Thesis: signs are true when they determine the users' expectations correctly. >Expectation, >Symbols, >Icons, >Signals, >Signal language, >Symbolic language, >Sign language. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Symbolic Reference | Deacon | I 43 Symbolic Reference/Deacon: Thesis: Symbolic reference is reserved for the human species only, while many animals have complex non-symbolic reference. >Reference, >Symbols/Deacon, >Symbolic communication, >Symbolic learning. Grammar: Grammatical rules and categories are symbolic rules and categories. Syntax: syntactical structures are only physical regularities if they are not regarded as symbolic operations that need to be decoded. >Syntax. Language theories must therefore first explain symbolic references. >Regularities. I 44 The fact that linguists have not paid much attention to the symbolic reference is explained by the fact that grammar and syntax can be explained by comparing languages. The correlations of speech processes and brain functions can also be explained without a symbolic reference. Language acquisition: can be explained largely without relation to symbolic reference. >Language Acquisition. Animal/human/language/Deacon: but theories that explain the differences between human and non-human communication cannot do without relation to symbolic references. This also applies to theories that compare human and animal minds. >Animals, >Animal language. I 82 Symbolic reference/Deacon: remains intact even if one stimulus is erased by another, e. g. if the coupling between a signal and a subsequent event is interrupted. An index-like association would not survive this correction. Learning symbols/animals: if one of several learned characters is erased, this has virtually no effect on the association with other characters. This is quite different in the case of words. >Learning, >Language Acquisition. Words: unlike symbols, words are related to all other words of a language. >Words, >Word meaning. I 83 Symbolic reference/Deacon: arises from combinatorial possibilities and impossibilities. This is the difference to the simple correlation of signals with stimuli. Cf. >Signals/Deacon, >Signal Language. I 88 Symbolic reference/Deacon: no single symbol defines its reference. >Reference. Reference arises from the hierarchical relationship between the two levels of the sign-like (index-like) reference: a) no interaction or correlation between the elements, neither at the level of the objects nor at the level of the signs, merely association of sign and object. b) no interaction (correlation) on the level of the objects - but on that of the signs (meaningful patterns) >Meaning, >Meaningless, >Sense. Symbol: It is only at the third level that symbolic representation takes place: here there is interaction (or the distinction of meaningful and pointless patterns) on both levels: that of the objects and that of the signs. >Symbolic Representation. New: this makes logical and categorical generalization possible, which is not possible with the generalization of stimuli (stimulus generalization). Animal experiments: (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1978; 1980 and Savage-Rumbaugh 1986): showed with monkeys that new symbols were classified relatively quickly in an already established scheme with different categories of meaning. In this context, an understanding of the functions of the relations between the signs obviously played a role. The attention of the animals was not only focused on the objects, but also on the signs and their relationship to each other. Categories: the ability to categorize and recognize logical relationships is an essential part of learning symbolic reference. >Categorization, >Classification. I 89 Symbolic learning: after learning the difference between symbols for edible and non-edible objects, the animals learned to sort the objects into different containers. Later on, they learned something new: they learned how to assign symbols for the respective objects to symbols for the respective containers. In doing so, they showed that they were able to make a symbolic generalization. >Understanding, >Animal/Deacon. I 322 Symbolic Reference/Brain/Deacon: Thesis: The emergence of the symbolic reference in our distant ancestors fundamentally changed the way natural selection processes changed the human brain since then. Ultimately, the use of language changed something that was reflected in the anatomy and structure of our brain. One could say, "The Word became flesh". >coevolution of language and brain. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Behaviorism | Tugendhat, E. | I 216 Behaviorism: thesis that our language is a signal language and only understood according to the the pattern of conditioned reactions. Their rules are conditional rules. |
|
| |||