Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absoluteness | Hegel | Bubner I 182 Absolute Mind/Hegel: the eternal and self-contained idea operates as an absolute mind, creates and enjoys. (According to Aristotle, who distinguishes the self-thought as the highest activity of reason.) >Absolute Spirit. I 183 Absolute/HegelVsAristoteles: for him, the Absolute fits in with the categories of a self-uniting unity that seamlessly fits into systematic philosophies. He goes beyond this, in that he does not reserve the theory of goodness to a sub-domain of metaphysics. Thus, the doctrine of God means philosophizing in an encyclopaedically comprehensive dimension. There is no longer a supreme object. >Aristotle. HegelVsAristotle: Furthermore: parting with the teleology of nature. >Teleology, >Nature/Aristotle, >Nature. Instead: subjectivity principle. Heartbeat of the whole. The energeia, which permeates all things, is attributed to thought activities. I 184 Absoluteness/Hegel/Bubner: Absoluteness of the idea presents itself as the method of logic, and fulfills the condition of self-reference with this typically modern trick. >Self-reference, >Idea, >Logic/Hegel. Adorno XII 115 Absoluteness/Consciousness/Hegel/Adorno: by adopting an absolute identity of being and mind, Hegel tried to save the ontological proof of God. This assumption is actually the content of his philosophy. >Absolute spirit, >Proof of God. KantVsHegel: denies such an identity between what is and our consciousness. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Dialectic | Schmitt | Brocker I 172 Dialectic/Schmitt: in his Parliamentarism paper (1), Schmitt argues "intellectual-historically". His form of intellectual history resembles more the type of Hegelianism than Wilhelm Dilthey's historiography of the humanities, accentuated in cultural and literary studies, which around 1900 stood out from the strong "dialectical" construction of a self-logical "absolute spirit" of the Hegelians. However, Schmitt does not construct his intellectual history as a Hegelian. He knows no dialectic of his own logic, no dialectical determinism. However, his sketch also seems to characterize what Schmitt writes about Marx's relationship to "Hegel's Dialectic of History". His brochure also shows: "The dialectical construction of rising consciousness forces the constructing thinker to think of himself with his thinking as the peak of development" (2). >Dialectic/Hegel, >Philosophy of History/Hegel. 1. Carl Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, in: Bonner Festgabe für Ernst Zitelmann zum fünfzigjährigen Doktorjubiläum, München/Leipzig 1923, 413-473. Separatveröffentlichung in der Reihe: Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen und Reden zur Philosophie, Politik und Geistesgeschichte, Bd. 1, München/Leipzig 1923. Zweite, erweiterte Auflage 1926 2. Ibid. p. 73. Reinhard Mehring, Carl Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus (1923), in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Schmitt I Carl Schmitt Der Hüter der Verfassung Tübingen 1931 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Historical Consciousness | Dilthey | Gadamer I 233 Historical Consciousness/Dilthey/Gadamer: Is there also an absolute spirit for Dilthey? (...) [i.e.] a complete self-transparency, complete erasure of all strangeness (...)? For Dilthey it is not a question that there is and that it is historical consciousness that corresponds to this ideal, and not speculative philosophy. It sees all the phenomena of the human-historical world only as objects by which the mind recognizes itself more deeply. Insofar as it understands them as objectivations of the spirit, it translates them back "into the spiritual vitality from which they emerged"(1). The formations of the objective mind are thus objects of self-knowledge of that spirit for the historical consciousness. Historical consciousness extends itself into the universal, provided that it understands all the circumstances of history as an expression of the life from which they originate; "life grasps life here"(2). In this respect, the entire tradition becomes a self-encounter of the human spirit for the historical consciousness. It thus draws to itself what seemed to be reserved for the special creations of art, religion and philosophy. Not in the speculative knowledge of the concept, but in the historical consciousness; the knowledge of the spirit of itself is completed Gadamer I 234 by itself. It preserves historical spirit in everyting. Even philosophy is only an expression of life. As long as it is aware of this, it thereby gives up its old claim to be knowledge through concepts. It becomes philosophy of philosophy, a philosophical justification of the fact that there is philosophy in life - besides science. Dilthey has in his latest works drafted such a philosophy of philosophy, in which he attributed the types of worldview to the multi-sidedness of life that is interpreted in them(3). Dilthey himself has pointed out that we only recognize historically because we ourselves are historical. That should be an epistemological relief. Gadamer I 235 GadamerVsDilthey: But can it be? Is Vico's often mentioned formula correct at all? Doesn't it transfer an experience of the human artistic spirit to the historical world, in which one cannot speak of "doing", i.e. planning and executing in the face of the course of events? Where is the epistemological relief to come from here? Isn't it in fact a complication? Must not the historical conditionality of consciousness represent an insurmountable barrier for its completion in historical knowledge? Hegel/Gadamer: Hegel might have thought that by abolishing history in absolute knowledge this barrier had been overcome. But if life is the inexhaustible-creative reality as which Dilthey thinks it is, must not the constant change of the context of meaning of history exclude a knowledge that reaches objectivity? So is historical consciousness in the end a utopian ideal and contains a contradiction in itself? >Understanding/Dilthey, >Consciousness/Dilthey. Gadamer I 238 What is the distinction of the historical consciousness (...) that its own conditionality cannot abolish the fundamental claim to objective recognition? Knowledge/Absolute Knowledge: His distinction cannot be that it is really in the sense of Hegel's "absolute knowledge", that is, that it unites in a present self-consciousness the whole of the becoming of the spirit. Truth: The claim of the philosophical consciousness to contain in itself the whole truth of the history of the spirit is just denied by the historical world view. That is rather the reason why historical experience requires that human consciousness is not an infinite intellect for whom everything is simultaneously and equally present. Absolute identity of consciousness and object is in principle unattainable to finite-historical consciousness. Gadamer I 239 Dilthey/Gadamer: [one can summarize his view like this]: Historical consciousness is not so much self-extinction ((s) as in Hegel) as an increased possession of itself, which distinguishes it from all other forms of the spirit. It no longer simply applies the measures of its own understanding of life to the tradition in which it stands and thus further forms in naive appropriation of the tradition ("tradition" as in handing down sth) the tradition ("tradition" as in heritage). It knows itself rather to itself and to the tradition in which it stands, in a reflected relationship. It understands itself from its history. Historical consciousness is a way of self-knowledge. >Life/Dilthey. 1. Ges. Schr. Vll V, 265 2. Ges. Schr. Vll VII, 136 3. Ges. Schriften V, 339ff u. Vlll. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Life | Dilthey | Gadamer I 71 Life/Dilthey/Gadamer: The meanings that we encounter in the humanities - as strange and incomprehensible to us as they may be - can be traced back to the last units of what is given in consciousness, which themselves no longer contain anything foreign, objective or in need of interpretation. They are the units of experience, which are themselves units of meaning. Gadamer: This is how a concept of life emerges in the epistemology of the humanities, which restricts the mechanistic model. This concept of life is conceived teleological: Dilthey: for him, life is productivity par excellence. As life objectifies itself in sense formations, all understanding of sense is "a retranslation of the objectivations of life into the spiritual vitality from which they have emerged". Thus the concept of experience forms the epistemological basis for all knowledge of the objective. >Experience/Dilthey, >Experience/Gadamer, >Experience/Husserl. Gadamer I 232 Life/Dilthey/Gadamer: As is well known, [Dilthey] speaks of the "thought-forming work of life"(1). What distinguishes this phrase from Hegel is not easy to say. Life, however much it may show an "unfathomable face"(2), Dilthey may mock the all too friendly view of life, which sees in it only progress of culture - as long as it is understood in terms of the thoughts it forms, it is subjected to a teleological interpretation scheme and is conceived as a spirit. Spirit/Hegel/Dilthey: It is true that Dilthey in his later years leaned more and more about Hegel and talked about spirit where he used to say "life". He is just repeating a conceptual development that Hegel himself had also taken. In the light of this fact that we owe Dilthey the knowledge of the so-called "theological" youth writings of Hegel seems remarkable. In these materials on the history of the development of Hegelian thought, it becomes quite clear that the Hegelian concept of the spirit is based on a pneumatic concept of life.(3) Dilthey himself has tried to account for what connects him to Hegel and what separates him from Hegel(4). But what does his criticism of Hegel's belief in reason say, of his speculative construction of world history, of his aprioristic derivation of all concepts from the dialectical self-development of the absolute, when he too gives the concept of the "objective mind" such a central position? DiltheyVsHegel: (...) Dilthey turns against the ideal construction of this Hegelian term. "Today we must start from the reality of life". He writes: "We seek to understand it and to present it in adequate terms. By thus separating the objective spirit from the one-sided reasoning in the general reason that expresses the essence of the world spirit, and also from the idealistic construction, a new concept of the same becomes possible. There are several things included in it: language, custom, every kind of way of life, every style of life, as well as family, civil society, state and Gadamer I 233 right. And now also that which Hegel distinguished as the absolute spirit from the objective one - art and religion and philosophy - falls under this term.(5) >Spirit/Dilthey, >Comparison/Dilthey. Gadamer I 239 Understanding/Historical Consciousness/Dilthey/Gadamer: Dilthey starts from life. Life itself is designed for contemplation. [Dilthey's life philosophical tendency] (...) is based on that very thing, that in life itself there is knowledge. >Lebensphilosophie/Dilthey. Already the inner being, which characterizes the experience, contains a kind of turning back of life to itself. "Knowledge is there, it is connected with experience without reflection" (V Il, 18). But the same immanent reflexivity of life also determines the way in which, according to Dilthey, meaning is absorbed in the context of life. For meaning is only experienced by stepping out of the "hunt for goals". >Meaning/Dilthey. It is a distance, a distance from the context of our own actions that makes such reflection possible. Gadamer I 240 In both directions, contemplation and practical contemplation, the same tendency of life, a striving for firmness(6), shows itself according to Dilthey. From there it is understood that he could consider the objectivity of scientific knowledge and philosophical self-reflection as the completion of the natural tendency of life. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften Vll, 136. 2. Ges. Schriften Vlll, 224. 3. Dilthey's fundamental treatise: "Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels", first published in 1906 and multiplied in the 4th volume of the Collected Writings (1921) by estate manuscripts, opened a new epoch of Hegel studies, less by its results than by its task. It was soon (1911) accompanied by the publication of the "Theologische Jugendschriften" by Hermann Nohl, which were opened up by the vivid commentary of Theodor Haering (Hegel 1928). Cf. from the author: "Hegel und der geschichtliche Geist" and Hegels Dialektik IGes. Werke Bd. 31 and Herbert Marcuse, Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit, 1932, who proved the model-forming function of the concept of life for the "Phenomenology of the Spirit". 4. in detail in the records of the bequests on the "youth history of Hegel" (IV, 217-258), more deeply in the 3rd chapter of the "Aufbau" (146ff.). 5. Dilthey, Ges. Schr. Vll, 150. 6. Ges. Schriften Vll, 347. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Spirit | Dilthey | Gadamer I 232 Spirit/Dilthey/DiltheyVsHegel/Gadamer: Dilthey opposes the idealistic construction of [the Hegelian concept of the absolute spirit]: "Today we must start from the reality of life". He writes: "We seek to understand it and to present it in adequate terms. By thus separating the objective spirit from the one-sided foundation in the general reason that expresses the essence of the world spirit, and also from the ideal construction, a new concept of it becomes possible. Several things are included in it: language, custom, every kind of way of life, every style of life, as well as family, civil society, state and Gadamer I 233 right. And now, what Hegel distinguished as the absolute spirit from the objective spirit: art and religion and philosophy, also fall under this term. Spirit/DiltheyVsHegel: Undoubtedly this is a reshaping of the Hegelian concept. What does it mean? To what extent does it reflect the reality of life? Most significant is apparently the extension of the concept of the objective spirit to art, religion and philosophy. Because this means that Dilthey does not see in them immediate truth but expressions of life. By equating art and religion with philosophy, he also rejects the claim of the speculative concept. In doing so, Dilthey does not deny at all that these figures take precedence over the other figures of the objective spirit, provided that "precisely in their powerful forms" the spirit is objectified and recognized. Now, it was this primacy of a completed self-knowledge of the spirit that led Hegel to conceive of these figures as those of the absolute spirit. There was nothing foreign in them and the spirit was therefore completely at home with itself. For Dilthey too, as we saw, the objectivations of art represented the real triumph of hermeneutics. Gadamer: So the contrast to Hegel is reduced to this one thing: according to Hegel, the return of the spirit is completed in the philosophical concept, whereas for Dilthey the philosophical concept has not a meaning of recognition but of expression. Absolute Spirit/Dilthey/Gadamer: is there an absolute spirit for Dilthey too? (...) [i.e.] a complete self-transparency, complete erasure of all strangeness (...)? For Dilthey it is not a question that there is and that it is the historical consciousness that corresponds to this ideal and not speculative philosophy. It sees all phenomena of the human-historical world only as objects by which the spirit recognizes itself more deeply. Insofar as it understands them as objectivations of the spirit, it translates them back "into the spiritual vitality from which they came"(2). The formations of the objective mind are thus objects of self-knowledge of that mind for the historical consciousness. Historical consciousness extends itself into the universal, insofar as it understands all the circumstances of history as an expression of the life from which they originate; "life grasps life here"(3). 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schr. Vll, 150. 2. Ges. Schr. Vll V, 265 3. Ges. Schr. Vll VII, 136 |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Spirit | Husserl | Gadamer I 247 Spirit/Husserl/Gadamer: [It becomes clear] that with the topic of intentionality an increasingly radicalizing critique of the "objectivism" of previous philosophy - also of Dilthey(1) - began, which was to culminate in the claim of philosophy: "that intentional phenomenology for the first time made the spirit as a spirit a field of systematic experience and science and Gadamer I 248 thereby achieved the total conversion of the task of knowledge. The universality of the absolute spirit encompasses all being in an absolute historicity, which nature classifies itself as a mental entity"(2). >Intentionality. Gadamer: It is no coincidence that here the spirit is contrasted as the only absolute, i.e. irrelative of the relativity of everything that appears to him; indeed, Husserl himself acknowledges the continuity of his phenomenology with Kant's and Fichte's transcendental question: "It must be added, however, in fairness that the German idealism emanating from Kant was already passionately endeavored to overcome the already sensitive naivety" (sc. of objectivism)(3). HusserlVsPhilosophy of Consciousness/Psychology/Gadamer: This is (...) the consequence of his own criticism of objectivist psychology and the pseudo-Platonism of the philosophy of consciousness. This is completely clear after the publication of "Ideas II" (4). >Consciousness/Husserl, >Objectivism/Husserl, >Way of Givenness/Husserl. 1. Husserliana VI, 344. 2. Husserliana VI, 346. 3. Husserliana VI, 339 and VI, 271. 4. Husserliana Vol. IV, 1952. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Heidegger Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | I 16 HeideggerVsHegel: the Absolute, God, is accessible only for the individual . II 87 VsHegel: destroyed the last remnants of the concealment of the absolute self-knowledge of the absolute spirit. Rorty III 196 HeideggerVsNietzsche/HeideggerVsHegel: understood the difficulty of throwing away the ladder at the end of a story very well. He himself did not want to give a narrative, but a litany. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Metaphysics | Heidegger Vs Metaphysics | II 84 HeideggerVsMetaphysik: basically no "behind" - because not asking about Sein ". II 86 Metaphysics / Heidegger: all attempts to understand Sein as Stay, eternal equality, extantness, presence, ie to think as an independent presence, are for Heidegger metaphysics. Also: Eternal recurrence of the same, Hegel s absolute spirit, etc. II 120 Metaphysics: time as presence (HeideggerVs). Time / Heidegger: not "is" but ecstasy. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 |
| Spinoza, B. | Hegel Vs Spinoza, B. | Leibniz I 31 Substance/HegelVsSpinoza: who starts from the thinking requirement of substantial unity of the world and the experience requirement of the qualitative diversity of beings (the manifold), can comprehend this manifold only as manifestations or aspects of a substance in which "all which was thought to be true, has gone down." However, with this the the actual condition of thinking, the distinctiveness of thought content, is exposed!Leibniz saw the danger. --- I 32 Hegel: one must not "let the multiplicity disappear in unity". If the deduction was only possible as a reduction (as in Spinoza), that would be the self-destruction of the world in thinking. Kant: draws the consequence to establish the unity of the world in the priority of thought. The unit is then justified only transcendentally or subjectively idealistic. HegelVsKant: attempts to renew the metaphysics of substance that would justify the unity of being in the unity of a being: the self-development of the absolute spirit in world history. Rorty II 112 Truth/HegelVsSpinoza/Rorty: relinquishes the belief of Spinoza, that we recognize the truth when we see it. Truth/Spinoza: Thesis: W. we recognize when we see it. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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