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The author or concept searched is found in the following 24 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Atoms | Quine | IX 7f Atomic schemas: E.g. "Fxy", "Gx" etc: can represent any number of complex statements. I 218 Atomic Facts/Quine/Cresswell: "Quine has no interest in a theory that would turn atomic facts into simple facts about our experience that are logically independent of all others. Quine: correct. See also >Atomism/Quine. XIII 12 Atom/Atoms/Quine: Worlds/Possible Worlds/Best World/Leibniz/Quine: according to Leibniz we are blessed with the "best of the worlds". But "the best" according to what criteria? He gives a hint: Def Perfection/perfect/Leibniz/Quine: wealth of purposes and economy of means. The number of components and forces with which the observed wealth of the world is attainable must be as small as possible. Science: similar procedure. Theory/Quine: is always more complicated than you want, but the scientist is committed to his/her stubborn data and does what he/she can. Leibniz/Quine: was himself a scientist, so he came up with it. Atomism/Atom/Democritus/Leukipp/Quine: also their atomism was motivated by the pursuit of economy. They limited the possible variability of the building blocks of nature. The atoms differed only in shape and size. XIII 13 Point event/four-dimensionalism/space-time points/Quine: pro: 1. because it turned out that the basic building blocks (quarks, etc.) are not as uniform as one had hoped from the atoms. 2. because there are problems identifying a particle from one moment to another (identity in time, temporal identity, elementary particles). Individuality/Particle Physics/Quine: the statistical interchangeability of particles threatens their individuality. Atom/Atomism/Quine: but which decisive move should make a theory atomistic anyway? XIII 14 Solution/Quine: Thesis: there are an infinite number of particles, but not an infinite number of types of particles. Identity/elementary particles/species/Quine: particles of the same species play an identical role within the laws of theory. Only this allows the theory to be suitable for measuring information. Def point event/Quine: are atoms whose types are the different states in which a point can be, according to prevailing physics. The atoms are the minimal space-time localizations and the species are the few things that can happen in such a place. Point/Linguistics/Atom/Quine: for linguists the point is the phoneme. Not the phonemes themselves, (their sound is individual to each speaker) but their classifiability! Def Phonem/Quine: is not a single sound, but a type of sound. They are then equivalent for all purposes in the particular language, even if they are not phonetically identical! Atoms/Speeche/Quine: Atoms fall under phonemes. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Causality | Rorty | VI 128f Causality/Davidson/Rorty: (implicitly found in Davidson's writings): a causal effect occurs only at the level of microstructure, so just where strict laws apply and no "ceteris paribus molecules or space-time points clauses" interfere. >Causality/Davidson, >Microstructure, >Causal laws. VI 129f Causality/Rorty: you should always be able to recognize exactly the same causal relations between these same, but arbitrarily described things: e.g. between dinosaurs and eggs, you should realize the same causal relations like between the respective molecules or space-time points. (Like Davidson). This has nothing to do with "intrinsical" or "thing in itself". >Causal relation, >Description levels, >Intrinsicness. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Comparisons | Field | III 121 Nominalization/Field: we use two topologies on the same set (the amount of space-time points) instead of topologies on two different sets, which are connected by a function. - Therefore, we do not have to quantify on functions. a) temperature-based region (warmer, colder or similar to) (region as a set of points) b) the amount of space-time points - thus we get temperature continuity. - Here: purely affine geometry. I.e. only intermediate relation without simultaneity relation or spatial congruence relation. This then applies for all physical theories that have no Newtonian space-time, but a space-time with flat four-dimensional space R4. - Also the special theory of relativity. - (Special theory of relativity: few changes because of gradients and Laplace equations that involve non-affine Newtonian space-time). III 64 Field Thesis: for the General Theory of Relativity we can get more general affine structures. >Relativity Theory. Product/Field/(s): Products of differences: = distances between = points = distance. - Pairs of intervals can only be multiplied if they are of the same kind (scalar or spatial-temporal). Solution: with "mixed multiplication" we can still say that a result is greater than the result of another multiplication with the same components. - That is possible when the spatio-temporal intervals themselves are comparable, i.e. that they lie on the same line or on parallel in affine space. III 68 Product/Comparison/Field: so far we have only spoken of products of absolute values. New: now we also want products with signs. Platonist: this is easy: with new representation functions. Suppose we only have points on a single line L. >Platonism. Old: φ is a coordinate function (representation function) attributing points of R4 (four dimensional space) points on line L. New: φL assigns real numbers to points of L - that's "comparable" with the old φ in the same sense that for each point x and y on L, I φL (x) - φL (y) I = dφ(x, y) are represented. - ((s) Space distance). - The comparison is invariant under choice of orientation. III 68f Product/Equality/Between/Field: we can now define equality and "between" for products with signs. >Definability, >Spacetime, >Spacetime points. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Description Levels | Field | II 345 Indefiniteness 2nd order: it is unclear whether an undecidable sentence has a particular truth value. >Platonism. II 354 Logic/second order logic/Field/(s): excludes non-standard models better than theory 1st order. - 2nd order has no impredicative comprehension scheme. >Second order logic, >Comprehension, >Unintended models, >Models, >Model theory. --- III 33 Theory of the 1st order/Field: E.g. the theory of the space-time points. - (s) E.g.a theory which only uses functions but does not quantify over them. >Quantification. Theory 2nd order/Field: E.g. theory of real numbers, because it quantifies over functions. - Quantities of higher order: are used for the definition of continuity and differentiability. III 37 Theory of 1st order/2nd order/Hilbert/Field: Variables 1st order: for points, lines, surfaces. 2nd order: Quantities of ... Solution/Field: quantification 2nd order in Hilbert's geometry as quantification over regions. Only axiom 2nd order: Dedekind's continuity axiom. III 95 f Logic 2nd order/Field: E.g. Quantifiers like "there are only finitely many". - Also not: E.g. "There are less Fs than Gs". >Quantifiers. III 98 Extension of the logic: preserves us from a huge range of additionally assumed entities. - E.g., what obeys the theory of gravity. QuineVs: we should rather accept abstract entities than to expand the logic. (Quine in this case pro Platonism). III 96 Platonism 1st order/Field: accepts abstract entities, but no logic 2nd order. Problem: but it needs this (because of the power quantifiers). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Fields | Field | III 35 Fields/H. Field: space-time points as causal agents. - According to Platonism the behavior of space without matter is to describe by electromagnetic properties (non-empty). >Field theory, >Empty space, >Platonism, cf. >Relationism, >Substantivalism, >Absoluteness/Field. Empty space/field: empty space would be without space time points: useless. >Senseless. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Four-Dimensionalism | Field | III 36 Space/quantification/four-dimensionalism/time slices/Field: we can quantify over points or regions, without obligation to absolute rest: Solution: We consider a statement about the space as an abbreviation for a statement about each time slice. Time slice/Field: is generated by the relation of simultaneity. - Example: the sentence that the space is Euclidean, is a sentence about the fact that each time slice of space-time is Euclidean. Punch line: then the objects in the range of quantifiers are really space-time points and no longer mere space points. >Scope, >Domains, >Spacetime, >Spacetime points, >Quantifiers, >Quantification, >Ontology, >Mathematical entities. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Geometry | Feynman | I 247 Measuring/Geometry/Feynman: there are properties that are independent of the particular type of measurement. For example, the distance between two points in a rotated coordinate system when one of the two points is in the origin. The square of the distance is x² + y² + z². What about space-time? Space-Time/Geometry/Feynman: it is easy to show that there is also an invariance here: I 248 The combination c²t² x² y² z² is the same before and after the transformation: c²t' ² x' ² y' ² z' ² = c²t² x² y² z². Ontology/Feynman: this quantity is something that like distance is "real" in a sense. It is called the Def "interval" between two space-time points. >Space, >Time, >Space-time, >Space-time points, >Reality, >Absoluteness, >Invariance. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Geometry | Field | III 25 Axioms/geometry/Hilbert: geometry can do without real numbers. Quantifiers: go beyond regions of the physical space. Predicates: among others: "is a point"- "x is between y u z", "inclusive betweenness": i.e. it is permissible that y = x or y = z. >Quantifiers. III 26 Segment congruence/congruence: (instead of distance) four-digit predicate "xy cong zw" intuitively: "the distance between point x and point y is the same as that from point z to point w". Angle congruence: six-digit predicate "xyz-" W-Comg tuv-": the angle xyz (with y as the tip) has the same size as the angle tuv (with u as a tip). N.B./Field: Distance and angle size cannot be defined at all because it is not quantified using real numbers. III 32 Addition/multiplication: Addition and multiplication is not possible in Hilbert's geometry - (only with arbitrary zero point and arbitrary 1). Solution: intervals instead of points. III 32 f Hilbert/Geometry/Axioms/Field: Multiplication of intervals: not possible because we need an arbitrary "unity-interval". Solution: comparison of products of intervals. Generalization/Field: is then possible on products of space-time intervals with scalar intervals ((s) E.g. temperature difference, pressure difference). Field: therefore space-time points cannot be regarded as real numbers. >Spacetime points, >Real numbers. III 42 Geometry/Field: a) metric: platonistic, quantification via real numbers (> functions) b) synthetic: without real numbers: E.g. Hilbert, also Euclid (because he had no theory of real numbers). (This is also possible without functions). Advantage: no external, causally irrelevant entities. >Mathematical entities, >Theoretical entities. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Ideology | Field | I 194 Ideology/Newton/Field: what is needed for the Newtonian physics? Kinematics/Newton/S/Field: here the substantivalism needs only the following primitive predicates: 2-digit: "is a part of" 3-digit: "is between" 4-digit: congruence between space-time points. >Substantivalism, >Ontology, >Physics, >Theoretical entities, >Mathematical entities. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Individuals | Lewis | IV 40 Individual/Lewis: can e.g. be the union of myself and all my counterparts - that is a mereological sum. - On the other hand: something else: a cross world individual that is a maximum counterpart-related sum of possible individuals, of whom I am one. It’s only forbidden that an individual is entirely in several worlds - therefore there could be modal continuants. (Lewis ultimately Vs). >Counterparts/Lewis, >">Counterpart relation/Lewis, >Counterpart theory/Lewis, >Continuants/Lewis. --- Schwarz I 60 Individual/Lewis/Schwarz/(s): points in time and space and space-time points are not individuals. - E.g. Leibniz: it is pointless to imagine the whole world moved three feet to the left. E.g. ((s) if it was now 5 o’clock instead of 6 o’clock, it would only be a different name.) - If time was to be lost, then there would have to be other processes, which would not be affected by the "jump", then shifting of processes, not of points in time - ((s)> Davidson:> "If everything was different...", >Skepticism/Davidson). - ((s) pointless: e.g. "this point in space is different".) - It only makes sense: this object is somewhere else, then show object, not point to point in room. Pointless: this space-time point could have been different. - But makes sense: "this object could have been somewhere else." |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Loewenheim | Field | I 131 Löwenheim-Skolem/downward/Field: says that there must be no uncountable models for 1st order consistent theories. Compactness theorem/Löwenheim-Skolem/upward: says that each 1st order space-time theory, according to which there are infinitely many space-time points, will have models, in which the set of the space-time points is mightier than the set of real numbers. Problem: then the representation theorem does not apply. >Representation theorem. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Motion | Deutsch | I 199ff Change/Motion: discrete variables do not occur in classical physics. How can you get from zero to one? In classical physics you have to jump unsteadily, this is not compatible with how forces and movements work in mechanics. Discontinuous change is not necessary in quantum physics. Before the change it has the value zero in all universes. After the change, it has the value 1 in all universes. During the change, the fraction of universes in which the value is zero decreases steadily from 100 percent to 0, and vice versa. At the level of the multiverse, the motion is objectively continuous - subjectively, from the perspective of a single universe, it is unsteady. >Time, >Past, >Present, >Future, >Change, >Processes, >Space-time, >Space-time points. I 200 Motion: the idea that something moves through a diagram in which time is already represented is simply wrong. The diagram shows all these universes at all times. They do not move anywhere. Cf. >Four dimensionalism. I 253 Change: Time flow exists only in connection with causes and effects. Change: one part of space-time can change another as little as one part of a solid three-dimensional object can change another part of that same object. ((s) So no cause and effect?) I 260 Moment: it is pointless to say that one moment after the other has been "laid down". That would be the flow of time. So we see that space-time itself is incompatible with the existence of cause and effect. >Cause, >Effect. |
Deutsch I D. Deutsch Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997 German Edition: Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 |
| Nominalism | Field | I 132 Theory/Nominalism/strong/weak/stronger/weaker/(s): strong theory: has more consequences - if mathematical entities (mE) are to be dispensed with, a Platonist theory can have no (physical) consequences which a nominalistic (only physical entities entities) does not have. >Stronger/weaker, >Platonism, >Mathematical entities. l 159 Equivalence/Platonism/Nominalism/Field: Question: in what sense are Platonist (e.g. "direction 1 = direction 2") and nominalistic statement (c1 is parallel to c2) equivalent? Problem: if there are no directions, the second cannot be a consequence of the first. >Ontology. --- III 12 Nominalism/Field/N.B.: we will not claim N* (without mathematical entities), but the stronger N. III 34 Nominalism/Field: is compatible with the assumption of space-time points and empty regions. Nominalism pro substantivalism. >Substantivalism. III 36 Regions/Points/Field: Solution for the nominalists: Individual calculus/Goodman: Regions as sums of points. - But then there are no empty regions. - The region then does not need to be connected or measurable. >Individual calculus, cf. >Relationism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Object | Quine | I 102 Goodman: "Rabbitness": is a discontinuous space-time segment, which consists of rabbits. --- I 372f Objects of propositional attitude eliminated: "Thomas believes (Cicero has): no longer the form" Fab" a = Thomas, b = () - but: "Fa" where "F" is a complex expression - no longer "believes" term, but operator. I 402 Existence: does not arise from dichotomy "single thing" - "universal" - it does not matter whether they do exist. "Equator", "North Pole" - linking with stimuli is weak argument for primacy of physical objects, but makes terms accessible for all positions. >Existence/Quine. I 412 Object: name which is denoted by singular terms, accepts it as values - (but the singular term is eliminated!) - E.g. "glimmer", but not "glimmeriness". I 438 Ideal objects are not permitted - geometric objects are permitted (no identity without localization). I 435 Relativity: additional dimension: space-time: point moments are absolutely different, independent of relative movement of the viewpoint. II 30 Object/Quine: space-time piece can also be distributed or scattered. (Nominalism, Goodman). II 23 Physical object is deceptive - better space-time pieces - "space" and "places as such" untenable, otherwise there would be absolute standstill and absolute movement - 4-digit coordinates suffice - ontology of pure set theory - no more physical object. II 156 ff Object (physical)/Quine: arbitrarily scattered and arbitrarily singled out - pocket contents, single coin at various points in time, combination with the Eiffel Tower, space-time points, anything - are not so strongly body-oriented - identification like from one possible world to another: without content as long as no instructions are given - value of a variable. VI 32 Object/Ontology/Quine: bodies constitute themselves as ideal nodes in the centers of overlapping observation sentences - problem: observation sentences are not permanent - therefore the objectification (reification) is always already a theory. VI 34 Question: what should be considered real objectification and not just a theoretically useful one (like classes). VI 35 Abstract objects: it is pointless to speak of permanent stimulus phases - solution: pronouns and bound variables - Vs singular term: are often not referring - there must be unspecifiable irrational numbers - Solution: bound variable instead of singular term. VI 38f Objectification/Reification/Quine: for the first time in predicative connection of observation sentences - instead of their mere conjunction - "This is a blue pebble": calls for embedding pebble into the blue. VI 41 Abstract objects/Modal/Putnam/Parsons: modal operators can save abstract objects - QuineVsModal logic: instead quantification (postulation of objects) - so we can take the slack out of the truth function. >Modal Logic/Quine. VII (d) 69 Object/Quine: may be unconnected: E.g. USA Alaska. XII 36 Properties/Identity/Quine: Problem: (unlike objects) they are ultimately based on synonymy within a language - more language-specific identity. >Properties/Quine. V 39 Ultimately we do without rigorous individuation of properties and propositions. (different term scheme) - Frege dito: (Basic Laws): do not extend identity to terms. XII 68 Object/Theory/Quine: what is an object, ultimately, cannot be stated - only in terms of a theory - (ultimately overall theory, i.e. language use) - but wrong: to say that talk about things would only make sense within a wider range - that would correspond to the false thesis that no predicate applied to all things - there are universal predicates. >Mention, >use, >word, >object. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Ontology | Feynman | I 246 Ontology/Feynman: The "reality" of an object is a little bigger (roughly and intuitively spoken) than its "width" and "depth", because they depend on how we look at it. >Perception, >Seeing. Relativity theory: our brain has never had any experiences with speed close to c so that we could not integrate any experience, of the type that time and space are of the same kind. >Experience. It is as if we could always stand in a position and not turn in the other direction. If we could, we would see a little of the other man's time. We would "look back" a little. Space-Time/Feynman: In a world where space and time are "mixed" (this is actually our world, seen close to speed of light), objects are more like a kind of "blob", viewed from different perspectives when we move at different speeds. I 247 Measuring/Geometry/Feynman: there are properties which are independent of the particular type of measurement. For example, the distance between two points in a rotated coordinate system when one of the two points is in the origin. The square of the distance is x² + y² + z². What about space-time? Space-Time/Geometry/Feynman: it is easy to show that there is also an invariance here: I 248 The combination c²t² x² y² z² is the same before and after the transformation: c²t' ² x' ² y' ² z' ² = c²t² x² y² z². ( 17.3?) Ontology/Feynman: this quantity is something that is "real" like the distance in a sense. It is called the Def "interval" between two spacetime points. >Space, >Time, >Space-time, >Space-time points, >Reality, >Absoluteness, >Invariance. I 448 Existence/Ontology/Feynman: if the polarization changes faster than we can measure it, we call it light. This is unpolarized, because all polarization effects are eliminated. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Possible Worlds | Bigelow | I 138 Definition Possible World/Bigelow/Pargetter: a possible world e, in which a sentence a is true, is then defined as the maximum consistent set containing a as an element. >Modalities/Bigelow. Possible world/(s): Possible worlds are then completely described in all details, nothing is unmentioned and no detail is described contradictory. N.B./Bigelow/Pargetter: the wit is that then every non-theorem in any possible world is wrong. It will be wrong in a maximum consistent extension. There will be a maximum consistent extension in which the sentence is wrong, i.e. a world in which it is wrong. Theorem: is then a sentence that is true in all possible worlds. And that is what a completeness theorem is supposed to show. >Completeness. Maximum Consistent Extension/Bigelow/Pargetter: a consistent set of sentences is extended by adding either a or ~a if it does not become inconsistent as a result. The extension is maximally consistent if a (or ~a) was the last sentence that could be added. >Maximum consistent. ((s) there may be many extensions depending on whether an individual is described differently in the sentence added. This provides equivalence classes. I 206 Definition Possible World/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a maximum consistent property that includes all the things and properties of a world. World/Properties/Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: how do the previous theories in philosophy history look like, in which one tried to describe the world as an aggregate of properties? E.g. Wittgenstein, Tractatus E.g. Carnap, The logical structure of the world. .... >L. Wittgenstein, >Tractatus, >R. Carnap, >Properties, >Facts, >Circumstances, >World, >Reality, >Ontology, >Atomism. Bigelow/Pargetter: we could consider the space-time points as the last individuals of the world. Each of them can either have a certain property or not. >Space-time points. Then we can construct sets of ordered pairs ‹assigned, x› Democritus' world/Terminology/Cresswell/Bigelow/Pargetter: that is how Cresswell called worlds constructed from such points. (Cresswell 1972(1), 1973(2)) >M. J. Cresswell. That is roughly the same as Russell's logical atomism. An n-digit predicate, followed by n individuals. >B. Russell, >Predicates. Atomism: we should assume that such atomic sentences are logically independent of each other. >Atomism. I 207 If it is only a question of whether a point is occupied or not, the corresponding sentence set will surely be consistent. Book: a complete "book of the world" would not be a world, but only a representation. Properties: then arise from books as follows: instead of the atomic sentences, we form longer sentences from combinations of descriptions of points by ordered pairs. This simply leads to a longer book. I 208 Points: instead of them we could also take waves, or elementary particles. Properties: instead of the property of a space-time point to be occupied we could also choose properties such as charge, mass, and so on. From these we can make sequences: ‹P^1, P2,... x› this represents a point with several properties. Mass: is of course a determinable (see above).), i. e. we still need real numbers to indicate the proportion that determines the D-able. >Determinates/determinables. Therefore, we are dealing with a sequence that relates an individual to its properties: ‹r1, r2,... x› wherein ri is a real number. Def possible world/Bigelow/Pargetter: a lot of such sequences... {‹r1, r2,... x›, ‹r' 1, r' 2,... y›,... }} I 209 ...then represent a possible world (which is much richer than a Democritical world). >Democritus. 1. Cresswell, M. J. (1972). The world is everything that is the case. Australasen Journal of Philosophy 50, pp.1-13. 2. Cresswell, M. J. (1973). ogic and languages. London: Methuen. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Possible Worlds | Lewis | IV 147 Centered possible worlds/De re/de se/Quine/Lewis: (Ontological Relativity, Propositional Objects): E.g., A cat that is being chased by a dog wants to get onto the roof to be safe - de dicto: it wants a state that is the class of all possible worlds where it reaches the roof. Problem: cross-world identity: Question: which of the many counterparts in many possible worlds is the cat itself? Solution/Quine: centered world: Pairs of a world and a designated time-space point in it, the desired state is then a class of centered worlds - no centered world belongs to two classes (desired and dreaded possible worlds). >Centered world, >Counterpart/Lewis, >Counterpart relation/Lewis, >Counterpart theory/Lewis, >Identity across worlds. QuineVs: ultimately better divided theory: here are the objects of simple settings, classes of stimulus patterns that are more complex are linguistic. Property/Lewis: corresponds to a class of centered worlds, more specifically to a property of space-time points, but also a property of cats. IV 148 Possible world/Quine/Lewis: Lewis: large particulars (concrete) - Quine: abstract entities - certain classes of classes of quadruples of real numbers - (space-time points) - Stalnaker: pro Quine: corresponds better to our everyday language: What it could have been like. IV 149 Situation/Possible world/Lewis: Thesis: there can also be alternatives within a possible world - thus distinction situation/Possible world - LewisVsStalnaker: not propositions as belief objects (objects of desire) but attitudes de se - E.g. Lingens with memory loss finds out in the book that there are two people who could be identical with him - a) on the 6th floor at Stanford - b) in the basement of a different library 3km away - two possible situations (possibilities) in the same possible worlds - solution: property instead proposition - the propositions apply to both people in the same way. >Properties/Lewis, >Proposition/Lewis. --- V 42 Centering assumption/Possible world/Lewis: If it was violated, worlds that differed in a non-observed way would be considered to be the same as the actual world. V 262 Possible world/Equality/Identity/Lewis: it is an independent and difficult question whether two possible worlds that exactly match their history also match in all other aspects - e.g. in their probabilities, laws, modal truths, counterfctual conditionals. >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis. Lewis: this is not of interest here. Overall history/Supervenience: supervenes on the history of events, whatever else may in turn supervene on the overall history. >Supervenience/Lewis. --- Schwarz I 216 Possible world/Lewis: no set of ordinary sentences - of which there are not enough in the language. Lewis: counterparts, possible worlds are real (KripkeVs) (PutnamVs). --- Lewis I 59 Possible world/Lewis: you can speak pretty freely and metaphysically guileless and without special ontological reservations about possible worlds. --- II 214 Possible world save separation of object/meta languange - Truth and analyticity cannot be defined in the same language. II 214 Definition Possible World (VsLewis): The concept of a possible world can be explained even by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds are models of the analytical sentences of a language or diagrams or theories of such models. II 214 LewisVs: possible worlds cannot be explained by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds exist and should not be replaced by their linguistic representations. 1) Such a replacement does not work properly: two worlds that are indistinguishable in the representative language are (falsely) assigned one and the same representation. >ersatz world/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Rational Reconstruction | Quine | XII 91 Definition Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: is a construction of physicalist statements of observation, of logical and set-theoretic terms. - QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions, and each would seem equally satisfactory, if it was only shown that the physicalist statements are true. Rational reconstruction was to show that all other scientific concepts are superfluous. Vs: Problem: assignment of sense qualities to space-time points does not work. Carnap later: only reduction sentences instead of context definition. XII 94 Vs: the rational reconstruction would have to provide whole theories instead of translated sentences or translated terms. XII 99 Rational Reconstruction/Naturalized Epistemology/Quine: the rational reconstruction survives by giving clues to psychological processes as an imaginative construction. New: that we can make free use of empirical psychology. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Reality | Goodman | I 18ff Reality/world/Goodman: the many materials from which one generates worlds - matter, energy, waves, phenomena - are produced together with the worlds. But not from nothing, but from other worlds. Our creation is re-creation. The beginning should be left to theology. There is no hope of firm foundation. The talk of unstructured content or the given contradicts itself, because speech cannot be unstructured. I 18 Kant: the concept of a pure content is empty. I 34 ... should we stop speaking of right versions as if each world would be its own and should all be recognized as versions of one and the same neutral, underlying world? Goodman/thesis: the world which is regained like this is, as noted earlier, a world without kinds, without order, without movement, without peace and without structure. A world fighting for or against is not worth it. >Structure, >Motion, >Objects, >World, >World/Thinking, >Possible worlds, >Nature. --- II 70f Reality/Goodman: the whole reality, as well as space and time are dependent on description (VsKant, VsSalmon, VsRead). Conceivable: space-time points do not exist all the time. Solution: sum object p + t. >Conceivability, >Space-time, >Endurantism, >Perdurantism. --- IV 44 Reality/Goodman: nothing is realized by a mere decision. The admission that there are many standards of accuracy, can therefore not collapse the distinction between right and wrong. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Relations | Quine | I 272f Opaque verb: "hunts lions" is nothing in relation, does not refer to a lion - relative term police chasing a man. --- I 361 Abstraction of relations, propositions and properties: opaque (> planets-example). --- I 295 Properties, relations: are meaning of timeless open sentences - is unidentifiable (like >propositions). --- I 362 Elimination of relations and properties in favor classes of ordered pairs, open sentences, general terms - even scattered objects (in the case of colors) Relativity: additional dimension: space-time: Point moments are absolutely different, independent of relative movement of the viewpoint. --- I 439 Abstract term "Equator", etc: can and should be reformulated. "Closer to the equator than": Relative Term - Or: by position of the sun - four-dimensional Space-Time coordinates (quintuple, hyper bodies, not Cartesian)>reintroduction of geomtretric object at the space-time points. --- I 462 Nominalism: cannot use relations, classes, etc. ("ancestor", "successor", "greater than", "the same number of", quantification) - but there are stages of renunciation. --- IX 17 IX 17 Relations/Quine: connex: ∀x∀y[x,y ε (R U ^R)''ϑ › x(R U ^R U I)y, - ((s) (R U ^R U I): E.g. "greater or smaller or equal". (>Law of comparability, trichotomy).) reflexive: ∀x∀y[x,y e(R n U ^R)''ϑ > xRx irreflexive: R <≤_I, symmetric: R = ^R asymmetric: R =_^R antisymmetric: R ∩ ^R ≤ I transitive: R I R ≤ R intransitive: R I R ≤ _R. IX 43 Relations/Quine: classes of classes. - Namely simulated by the class of all ordered pairs with Fxy. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Relative Terms | Quine | I 270 Opaque verb: hunting lions puts nothing in relation, does not denote a lion. Relative Term: the police chases a man. >Opacity. --- I 370 ~ E.g. Paul and Elmer: believing does not produce sentences like saying. - This cannot be decided: that Paul believes true and Elmer does not. If truth value does not matter, believing is not a relative term - w believes x is no predicate - w believes p: p is no term. >Beliefs, >Predicates. --- I 439 Abstract term equator etc.: can and must be rephrased: closer to the equator than: relative term. Or by position of the sun. Four-dimensional coordinates space-time (quintuple, Hyper bodies, not Cartesian) > reintroduction of geometrical objects to the space-time points. --- V 86 Relative general term: smaller than, mother of (no observation term) - relative mass term/(material term): darker than, redder than - points are taken in pairs - absolute mass term: is dark. - Absolute general term: is small. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Space | Field | III 35 Empty Space/Field: would be one without space-time points: senseless! - ((s) only for Platonism). >Platonism, >Spacetime, >Spacetime points. III 35 Space/time/Field: quantification over space-time points is something other than mere quantification over space points when a space point should be something that exists in time. Because that leads to the wrong question: whether a space point is identical to the same point in time - which in turn leads to the wrong question, if there was absolute rest. >Absolute rest, >Absoluteness, >Time. III 36 Regions/points/Field: solution for the nominalist: individual calculus/Goodman: Regions as sums of points. Then there are no empty areas! Regions then need not be contiguous, or can be measured. >Relationism, >Substantivalism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Time | Deutsch | I 243 ff There is no flow of time, but the idea of it is highly reasonable. Even subjectively, "now" does not move through time. - Motion: nothing can move from one moment to another. If something exists in a certain moment, then it always exists. Moment: the snapshots of the observer are not successively in the present. They are not successively aware of their presence. They are all conscious, and subjectively they are all in the present. Objectively there is no present. - We also do not perceive time as flowing or transitory. - ...that the universe changes over time. But it does not move through time. I 250 There is nothing that can move, stop or flow. Since there is no time outside of it, it is not coherent to imagine that it can be changed or that it exists in several versions. Moment: a certain moment does not change. Therefore it cannot become present, or stop being present, because these would be changes. Flow of time: if we say when something happened, we do not need a "flow of time" any more than we need a "flow of space" if we say where something happened. >Time, >Past, >Present, >Future, >Change, >Processes, >Space-time, >Space-time points. I 265 In the multiverse, snapshots have no "time stamps". Other times are merely special cases of other universes. "Other moments in our universe" differ from "other universes" only from our point of view. >Quantum mechanics. I 265 Future: relative to an observer, the future is indeed open and the past is fixed. I 279 Does an acceleration lead into the past, if a deceleration would lead into the future? No. The outside world would only appear to be slowing down. Even if the brain was working at infinite speed, the outside world would appear to be frozen at a certain moment. I 284 Time machine: would be a place, not a vehicle. >Time travel. I 299 But here, changing the past is no different from changing the future, as we always do. Gribbin III 236 Time/Deutsch/Gribbin: if time "flows", we would need a second type of time, which idles, as the "now" passes from one moment to the next - and a third to measure this time, and so on. Gribbin III 236 Time/Deutsch: there is no difference between snapshots from different times and from different worlds - past and future would be special cases of Everett's worlds. >Many Worlds Interpretation/Everett. |
Deutsch I D. Deutsch Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997 German Edition: Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 Gribbin I John Gribbin Schrödinger’s Kitten and the Search for Reality, London 1995 German Edition: Schrödingers Kätzchen und die Suche nach der Wirklichkeit Frankfurt/M. 1998 Gribbin II John Gribbin In Search of Schrödinger’s Cat, London 1984 German Edition: Auf der Suche nach Schrödingers Katze. Quantenphysik und WIrklichkeit München 1987 |
| Time | Geach | I 303 Time/GeachVsQuine: Vs time cuts, Vs "hours-thick sclices". >four dimensionalism). Space and time are not equal axes - otherwise temperature curves would be the same as "world lines" in the "temperature-time continuum". It is not true that quantifiers can only be applied to four-dimensional space-time points. ((s) This is not what Quine asserts: "Sometimes"/Quine: "there are some points of time...">Logical form/Quine.) I 314 Space/time/Geach: Space and time are radically different: that the expression "between" is used in both, is misleading - spatial order: affects individual objects. - Temporal order: what is ordered here is represented by complex sentences. Geach: in the temporal, ever more complex structures can be built, not in the spatial. - e.g. "x is between (y is over w) and z" makes no sense. I 316 Time/Modal logic/Geach: I am convinced that the basic time determinations "before", "after", etc. belong to the formal logic. I think they have to do with "possible" and "necessary". >Possibility, >Necessity, >Modal logic, >Modalities. One has claimed that a world in which the modus ponens no longer applies can be described as a world in which the time is two-dimensional or the past can be changed. If the basic truths about time are logical, then a differently temporal world would be a chimera. >Space/Geach, >Time, >Spacetime. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Field, H. | Nominalism Vs Field, H. | Field III 92 Nominalism/VsField: one could doubt that everything is purely nominalistic because we would partly need 2nd stage logic. 1) Question: could we make do with 1st stage logic? 2) Question: If not, is nominalism threatened? Ad 1: we can probably do that for the theory of gravity, but that would be beyond the scope. Ad 2: We have 2nd stage logic at two locations: 2nd Stage Logic/Field: We have it in two places: 1) in the axiomatization of space-time geometry and the scalar order of space-time points we have III 93 The "full logic of the part-whole relation" (see above Chapter 4) or the "full logic of the Goodman sums" 2) (in section B, chapter 8): the binary quantifier "less than". But we do not need this if we have Goodman sums: Goodman Sum/Field: its logic is sufficient to provide comparisons of widths. For heuristic reasons we want to keep an extra logic for widths ("less than"). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Quine Vs Kripke, S. A. | Putnam I 247 Def "Small Realism"/Putnam: ( "realism with a lower case r"): here, to say what we say and do what we do means being a "realist". But that brings problems with realism and "reality": Reality/Realism/Wittgenstein: (trees and chairs), "the this and that to which we can point" are paradigms for what we call real. (1971, Lecture 25). Realism/Reality/Objects/Space-Time Points/Putnam: here Kripke, Quine, Lewis disagree: what is the relationship between the chair and the space-time region it occupies? Quine: the chair and the electromagnetic and other fields that constitute it are one and the same. The chair is the spacetime region. KripkeVsQuine: both are numerically different objects, but have the same mass (e.g. statue/clay). The chair could have occupied a different space-time region! QuineVsKripke: this proof is worthless, because modal predicates are hopelessly vague. Lewis: Quine is right as far as the chair is concerned, but wrong in terms of the modal predicates. LewisVsKripke: not the chair but a counterpart to this chair could have been somewhere else. (Not "exactly this chair" within the meaning of the logical concept of identity (=).). Putnam: so there are three questions: 1) is the chair identical with the matter or does the chair somehow coexist with the matter in the space-time region? 2) Is the matter identical to the fields? 3) Are the fields identical with the space-time regions? Putnam: these questions are probably all three nonsense, but at least the first one is! Quine II 209 ff Replica on Saul Kripke The concept of possible worlds contributed to the semantics of modal logic. Kripke: meaningful model theory of modal logic. Def Models/Quine: allow for proof consistency. They also have heuristic value, but they do not offer an explanation. >Models. II 210 They can as clear as they want, nevertheless they can leave us completely in the dark regarding the primary, intended interpretation. QuineVsKripke: following questions regarding possible worlds: 1) When can objects between different worlds be equated 2) When is a designation expression rigid, 3) where is metaphysical necessity to testify? The way in which Kripke refers to Bishop Butler is startling: "As Bishop Butler said," Everything is what it is and not another thing." I.e. " heat is molecular motion" will not be contingent, but necessary." (Kripke p. 160) QuineVsKripke: I can also interpret the bishop according to my own purposes: Everything is what it is, do not ask what it may be or must be. Possible World/QuineVsKripke: allow proofs of consistency, but no unambiguous interpretation when objects are equal? Bishop Butler ("no other thing"): identity does not necessarily follow. Kripke on the identity of mind and body: The identity theorist who thinks pain is a brain state ... has to claim that we are mistaken if we think it is conceivable that pain could have existed without brain states. ... The materialist therefore faces a very tricky objection: he has to prove that something whose possibility we deem to imagine is not possible in reality. QuineVsKripke: the materialist will only feel the intricacy of Kripke's objection as far as he believes in metaphysical necessity. I can gratefully read Kripke in a way that he supports me in my desire to show what an intricate network the representative of the modality concept is spinning. II 210f KripkeVsIdentity Theory: imagine: Pain without a brain state - for materialists difficult to exclude. QuineVsKripke: only difficult if materialist believes in metaphysical necessity. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Lewis Vs Quine, W.V.O. | IV IX LewisVsQuine: Realism in relation to unrealized possibilities. IV 27 Possibility/Quine: Vs unrealized possibilities: the identity criteria are not clear. LewisVsQuine: But identity is not a particular problem for us. Individuation/possible worlds: in every world, things in every category are as individual as in the actual world. Identity/Possible World: Things in different worlds are never identical. (Because of P2) The counterpart relation is the correspondence of identity across worlds (cross world identity). Lewis: while some authors say they can do different things in different worlds and have different properties, I prefer to say that they are only in the actual world and in no other worlds but that they have counterparts in other worlds. IV 32 Essentialism/LewisVsQuine: we actually have the ability to say which properties are essential regardless of description. And also regardless of whether the attribute follows analytically from any other descriptions of the thing. For example, the single-digit sentence φ and an object that is designated by the singular term ζ To say that this attribute is essential means to claim the translation of N φ ζ (N = necessary). IV 147 Centered possible worlds/de re/de se/Quine/Lewis: (Ontological Relativity, "Propositional Objects"): For example, a cat that is chased by a dog wants to go to the roof to be safe. de dicto: the cat wants a state of affairs, which is the class of all possible worlds in which it is on the roof. It fears the class of all possible worlds where the dog catches her. Problem: Crossworld Identity. Question: which of the many similar cats in the many possible worlds (with many dogs and roofs) is it? Some cats are on roofs, some in the dog's claws. Does the cat belong to both the desired and the feared conditions? Solution: centered possible world: pairs consisting of a world and a designated time in space, the desired state is then a class of centered worlds. In fact, the gravitational center is the cat's pineal gland. No centered world belongs to two classes (desired and feared). It would be problematic if the wish were fulfilled under one centering and not fulfilled under another. Quine: does not accept this solution in the end. He prefers the shared theory that the objects of "simple settings" are classes of stimulus patterns, while the more complex settings are linguistic. LewisVsQuine: the benefits of unified objects (properties only) should not be given away. Property/Lewis: corresponds to a class of centered worlds, more precisely a property of space-time points, but also a property of cats. Let X be a class of centered worlds, Y be a property. Then the class corresponds exactly to the centered worlds that are centered on a cat with the property Y. It cannot be centered on two different cats. To rule that out, we can redefine centered worlds as pairs of a world and a designated inhabitant in it. Quine/Lewis: he has actually replaced propositions by properties through centering. IV 148 I'm not sure what his reasons are. They are not the same in relation to Catilina and the Great Pyramid (> ontological relativity) (here he wants to avoid the counterpart relation) but certainly in the cat example. Possible World/LewisVsQuine: big difference: by possible world I simply mean big individual things, of which our actual world is one. Possible Worlds/Quine: means certain abstract entities, certain classes of classes of quadruples of real numbers. ((s) space-time points). Quine/Lewis: I suspect that he at least distinguishes our concrete world from the abstract "replacement world" that it represents! Let's call it "updated ersatz world" to distinguish it from the world itself. Lewis: Variety of concrete worlds. Quine: Variety of abstract ersatz worlds, one of which represents our special one. Stalnaker: pro Quine: corresponds better to everyday language than "how it could have been". Lewis: the actual ersatz world is special only because it represents our concrete real world. And it is special not only from its own point of view, but from every world. One could assume the following now: therefore it is not contingent special, because contingency is variation from one possible world to another. LewisVs: in this way it looks like it is a non-contingent fact, which is updated by the many possible worlds. And that is wrong! ((s) Then every fact in the actual world would be necessary, every movement. >Determinism.) Schwarz I 46 Possibility/LewisVsQuine: there must be a theory of what would be true under these or other conditions. But not only because they are needed for the analysis of dispositions and causality. Schwarz I 132 Def Event/Quine/Schwarz: (1960b(1),171): Suggestion: to identify them with the space-time region in which they occur. Vs: this is too coarse-grained for effects and causes. For example, if a ball flies through the air and rotates, then flight and rotation occupy the same region, but only flight causes the window to break. Counterfactual analysis/counterfactual conditional/CoCo/Possible World/Similarity/Lewis: the next possible world in which rotation does not take place are not the next possible worlds in which flight does not take place. The two events correspond to the same space-time region in the real world, but not in all possible worlds. ((s) "Next" is not decisive here). Event/Identity/LewisVsQuine: Modification: Events are identical if they occupy the same space-time region in all possible worlds. Def Event/Lewis: is then the class of all regions (in all possible worlds) in which it happens. (1986d(2)). Schwarz I 220 Def Analytical Truth/LewisVsQuine/Schwarz: a sentence is analytical when its primary truth conditions cover all situations. Schwarz: More interesting is his thesis that practically every sentence can empirically prove to be wrong. Our theories cannot be divided into a revisable empirical and an unrevisable analytical component. 1. Willard Van Orman Quine [1960b]: Word and Object. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press 2. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Various Authors | Platonism Vs Various Authors | Field III 32 Real Numbers/Space-Time Points/Platonism/PlatonismVsNumber Line/Field: no Platonist will identify real numbers with dots on a physical line. 1) it would be completely arbitrary which of such lines should be identified with them 2) which point should be zero and which should be 1 3) it is wrong to identify real numbers with something that you can only know empirically. |
Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Various Authors | Kanitscheider Vs Various Authors | Kanitscheider I 433 Infinity/Material Existence/Physics: some models require physical infinity: the hyperbolic world of general relativity theory (AR), the steady astate theory (SST). Infinity/Mathematics/Physics: Gauss: is skeptical about actual infinite quantities. LucretiusVsArchimedes: is infinity mere possibility of an object to traverse new space-time points? (remains a discussion until today). Bolzano: the objective existence of infinite sets cannot fail due to the impossibility of imagining every single object. I 434 NewtonVsDescartes: not "indefinite" but actual infinite space! KantVsNewton: the infinite is unimaginable! NewtonVsKant: not imaginable, but conceptually comprehensible! Riemann: Differentiation infinite/unlimited (new!). Solution for the problem of the "beyond space". Three-ball (S³) conceptually analytically easy to handle. I 435 Sets/infinity: here the sentence: "The whole is larger than the parts" is no longer applicable. (But extensional determination is also not necessary, intensional is enough). Space: Question: Can an open infinite space contain more than Aleph 0 objects of finite size? Solution: "densest packing" of spatially convex cells: this set cannot be larger than countable. Thus no a priori obstacle that the number of galaxies in an unlimited Riemann space of non-ending volume is the smallest transfinite cardinal number. II 102 Measurement/Consciousness/Observer/Quantum Mechanics/QM: Psychological Interpretation: Fritz London and Edmund Bauer, 1939 >New Age Movement. II 103 Thesis: the observer constitutes the new physical objectivity through his consciousness, namely the rotation of the vector in the Hilbert space. 1. KanitscheiderVsBauer: Problem: then there is no definite single state of matter without the intervention of a psyche. 2. KanitscheiderVsBauer: on the one hand consciousness is included in the quantum-mechanical laws, on the other hand it should possess special properties within the observer, namely those which transfer the combined system of object, apparatus and observer without external impulse from the hybrid superposition state into the single state in which the partial elements are decoupled. 3. KanitscheiderVsBauer: strange that the Schrödinger equation, the most fundamental law of quantum mechanics, should not be applicable to consciousness. 4. KanitscheiderVsBauer: also doubt whether the consciousness can really be in the superposition of different completely equal soul states. (Bauer had adopted his thesis from Erich Becher's interactionalistic body soul dualism II 104). I 423 Space Curvature/Empirical Measurement/Schwarzschild/Kanitscheider: Schwarzschild: Distortion of the triangle formed by the Earth's orbit parallax. Although the curvature factors are not known, one can conclude that if the space is hyperbolic (K < 0), the parallax of very distant stars must be positive. I 424 If you now observe stars with a vanishing parallax, the measurement accuracy provides an upper limit for the value of negative curvature. If the space is spherical - the parallax must be negative. Schwarzschild: in the hyperbolic case, the radius of curvature should be at least 64 light years, in the elliptical at least 1600 light-years. KanitscheiderVsSchwarzschild: such theory-independent experiments are today rightly regarded as hopeless. I 296 Time Travels/Kanitscheider: VsTime Machine/VsWells: H.G. Wells makes the mistake that he lets the traveler ascend and descend the world line of the earth on the same earthly space point. Exactly this leads to the conceptual impossibility of forward and backward movement in time. Time Travel/General Relativity Theory/Kanitscheider: this changes when matter comes into play. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
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