Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Externalities | Coase | Kiesling I 23 Transaction cost/externalities/Coase/Pigou/Kiesling: (…) when defining property rights is prohibitively costly or not feasible (as in, say, air pollution), bargaining to negotiate transfers of rights cannot happen. Property rights definition and enforcement costs are a category of transaction costs. Low transaction cost: Situations with low transaction costs are more likely to see welfare-enhancing bargaining, while … High transaction cost: …high transaction costs can prevent such conflict resolution. Example: An example of Pigou’s that Coase discusses for other reasons illustrates the challenge of transaction costs: the operation of a railroad through rural land in the 19th century. Railroad companies purchased land and built rail networks to run trains pulled by coal-fired steam locomotives, which threw off sparks that could cause fires that destroyed some adjoining crops or woodlands. In a situation such as the transcontinental railroad in the United States, the railroad company operated over thousands of miles and could potentially emit sparks on land owned by thousands of different farmers. This situation and others like it present a considerable transaction cost challenge, one that is common in many situations where there is a conflict in resource uses. Bargaining: In order for the farmers to bargain with the railroad over the rights to emit sparks and the rights to unharmed crops enough farmers would have to gather together to represent the interests of all affected farmers - in other words, the transaction costs would be high. In situations like these, the courts determine which party has legal liability for harms created, and enforce compensation if necessary. Pervasiveness: An overarching theme of Coase’s work on social cost is that transaction costs are pervasive. Because of that pervasiveness courts are important institutions whose decisions have implications for both the efficiency of outcomes and the distribution of profits across parties. >Law/Coase, >Social cost/Coase. Landsburg I 47 Externalities/Coase/Landsburg: [Ronald] Coase's(1) radical take on the matter was that just as your smoking harms me, my complaining about it (and convincing my government to tax it) harms you. CoaseVsTradition: So if the textbook logic were correct, we'd have to tax you for smoking, tax me for making that tax necessary, tax you for making that tax necessary, and thereby descend into madness. [Ronald] Coase therefore proposed an entirely novel analysis of the externality problem, the details of which are fascinating (…).* * The key to that novel analysis is to recognize that your smoking imposes a cost on me, my attempts to restrain your smoking impose a cost on you, and that a well-designed policy should aim to minimize the total of all such costs. >Government policy. 1. Coase, Ronald. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics,1960. Mause I 157 Externality/External Effects/Coase: as long as individuals can negotiate the exchange of goods and rights free of charge, the initial distribution of rights of disposal is irrelevant. This means that there are no external effects. Externality/Coase: Thesis: an externality always has two "injuring parties": the author of an impairment suffers because he is required to cease or reduce his activity. |
Kiesling I L. Lynne Kiesling The Essential Ronald Coase Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2021 Landsburg I Steven E. Landsburg The Essential Milton Friedman Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2019 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Externalities | Buchanan | Boudreaux I 45 Externalities/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: An externality exists when the actions of some people impose costs or convey benefits to others not involved in those actions. One common example is smoke from a factory that pollutes the air that nearby individuals breathe. The typical remedy suggested by economists is to tax the externality-generating activity, or if that is not feasible, to impose a regulation that reduces the external cost - the cost that’s imposed on third parties. Buchanan’s views on the existence of externalities conform to those of mainstream economists, but he departed from those scholars on the desirable remedies for externalities. He maintained that when externalities cause resources to be used inefficiently, individuals have an incentive to find ways to remedy these inefficiencies on their own. If some people impose external costs on others, both parties have an incentive to negotiate to remedy those inefficiencies on their own. Boudreaux I 46 Clubs/Buchanan: There is a parallel between Buchanan’s views on externalities and his theory of clubs - the latter being, (…) an explanation of how people voluntarily form clubs to produce collectively consumed goods. >Clubs/Buchanan. In both cases there is the prospect that resources can be allocated more efficiently, with all parties able to adjust their actions to create mutual gains. Because externalities are rarely global in nature, Buchanan’s discussion of federalism reveals that it is possible for people to have the option of moving out of jurisdictions where external costs are high and into jurisdictions where these costs are lower. Taxation: Also important to keep in mind is that using taxes or regulation to mitigate externalities brings its own problems. Buchanan noted that the theoretical remedies recommended by economists would work only if industries are what economists call “perfectly competitive.” >Taxation/Buchanan, >Perfect competition/Buchanan. Externalities might result in inefficiencies, but there is no guarantee that matters would be improved by a government-directed remedy. (…) this fact did not lead Buchanan to advocate against all government responses to pollution and other externalities, but it did prompt him to advise politicians and the public to temper their enthusiasm about governments’ abilities to improve matters with interventions. Costs: Of course, the problem with externalities, as the name suggests, is that resources are used in ways that some affected persons don’t bargain for - as happens, for example, when a factory emits pollutants into the air that is breathed by all the town’s residents and, thus, harms these residents. Boudreaux I 47 If (say) the town council had a clear property right in the town’s airspace, the factory could negotiate with the council and offer to pay to it a sum to compensate the town for whatever amount of pollution the factory emits. Such a bargain would benefit both the town and factory. Property: But if there is no clear definition of property rights in the air, then the factory will be reluctant to negotiate with the town council. It will likely simply continue to pollute without the town being compensated to bear the cost of the pollution. Clearly defined property rights thus promote bargaining to mutual advantage -that is, toward greater efficiency of resource use - while the absence of such rights stymies such bargaining. Buchanan/Tullock: In The Calculus of Consent, Buchanan and Tullock say „If property rights are carefully defined, should not the pure laissez-faire organization bring about the elimination of all significant externalities? … After human and property right are initially defined, will externalities that are serious enough to warrant removing really be present? Or will voluntary co-operative arrangements among individuals emerge to insure the elimination of all relevant external effects?“ (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962/1999(1): 44) Boudreaux I 48 Politics: A central reason for Buchanan’s caution in recommending government intervention to remedy externalities was his recognition that democratic politics carries with it a built-in externality. If one thinks of an externality as a third-party effect - that is, some people impose costs unilaterally on others - one should then see that when collective decisions are made by majority rule, the majority imposes external costs on the minority. The majority gets what it wants, forcing the minority to accept what it, the minority, does not want. This reality further reinforced Buchanan’s reluctance to recommend government remedies for externalities. Government action would replace one externality with another. This point warrants emphasis: politics contains a built-in externality. Government policies apply to everyone, whether or not they agree, unlike market exchange which only takes place if and when all parties to the exchanges agree. The nature of government means that whatever it does, it unilaterally imposes costs on some people. As Buchanan explains, „The minimum-size effective or dominating coalition of individuals, as determined by the voting rule, will be able to secure net gains at the expense of other members of the political group.… In the simple majority-rule model, this involves, in the limit, fifty plus percent of the total membership in the dominating coalition and fifty minus percent, of the total membership in the losing or minority coalition.“ (Buchanan, 1999(2): 64-65) Buchanan’s point is partly theoretical. This outcome could happen. But his point is also partly practical. If democratic political institutions could be used in this way, individuals then in fact have incentives to use them this way because they can. It is naïve to think that some people can possess the power to manipulate the political process for their own gain without understanding that some people actually will exercise this power in that way. Boudreaux I 49 Government action/Buchanan: This reasoning points directly to Buchanan’s overall approach to analyzing political action. Economists, even in the twenty-first century, tend to evaluate government action as if government officials apolitically implement optimal public policies. Economists derive the theoretical optimal allocation of resources and then assume that government will act to achieve this optimal allocation. BuchananVsTradition: Buchanan’s fundamental contribution was to note that just as resources are not typically allocated in markets with perfect efficiency, neither are they typically allocated by government with perfect efficiency. >Government policy/Buchanan. Boudreaux I 51 In drawing a parallel between market failure and government failure, Buchanan’s insight is that democratic political systems create their own inevitable externalities. Some people can use the system to impose costs on others. >Government failure/Buchanan. 1. Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock (1962/1999). The Calculus of Consent. Liberty Fund. 2. Buchanan, James M. (1999). The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty. Liberty Fund. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 |
| Externalities | Demsetz | Mause I 157 Externalities/Demsetz: External effects (influencing the market by decisions of the uninvolved) cause costs for the procurement of information and time for negotiations. Money: Under these circumstances, the implementation of the exclusion principle will have to satisfy a rational cost-benefit consideration - rational individuals will only enforce the exclusion of third parties, that are unwilling to pay, to the extent that their net benefit is positive, so that it can be expected that there will always be an optimal degree of externality that will be below the full internalisation of the external effect. (1) 1. H. Demsetz, Toward a theory of property rights. American Economic Review 57 (2), 1967, p. 347-359. |
EconDems I Harold Demsetz Toward a theory of property rights 1967 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Externalities | Pigou | Kiesling I 20 Externalities/Pigou/Kiesling: [Ronald] Coase’s impetus to explore [the] question [of social costs] arose from the work of A.C. Pigou (1920)(1), who in the 1920s developed much of the theory of welfare economics, which is still in use today. In the paper mill situation, Pigou’s “external cost theory” would start from the point that the paper mill is creating a cost and imposing it on others who are not party to the paper-making transaction. Therefore, the paper mill should pay for the harm associated with that cost. Solution/Pigou: Pigou’s analysis implied a specific policy recommendation, specifically, a tax on paper to reflect the per-unit cost of the discharge into the river, or a regulation on the paper mill to induce it to incorporate the cost of its discharge into its accounting. Kiesling I 21 This logic has come to be known as “polluter pays,” or that a party that creates a cost should be the one to bear it. CoaseVsPigou. > Kiesling I 23 Transaction cost/externalities/Coase/Pigou/Kiesling: (…) when defining property rights is prohibitively costly or not feasible (as in, say, air pollution), bargaining to negotiate transfers of rights cannot happen. Property rights definition and enforcement costs are a category of transaction costs. Low transaction cost: Situations with low transaction costs are more likely to see welfare-enhancing bargaining, while … High transaction cost: …high transaction costs can prevent such conflict resolution. Example: An example of Pigou’s that Coase discusses for other reasons illustrates the challenge of transaction costs: the operation of a railroad through rural land in the 19th century. Railroad companies purchased land and built rail networks to run trains pulled by coal-fired steam locomotives, which threw off sparks that could cause fires that destroyed some adjoining crops or woodlands. In a situation such as the transcontinental railroad in the United States, the railroad company operated over thousands of miles and could potentially emit sparks on land owned by thousands of different farmers. This situation and others like it present a considerable transaction cost challenge, one that is common in many situations where there is a conflict in resource uses. Bargaining: In order for the farmers to bargain with the railroad over the rights to emit sparks and the rights to unharmed crops enough farmers would have to gather together to represent the interests of all affected farmers - in other words, the transaction costs would be high. In situations like these, the courts determine which party has legal liability for harms created, and enforce compensation if necessary. Pervasiveness: An overarching theme of Coase’s work on social cost is that transaction costs are pervasive. Because of that pervasiveness courts are important institutions whose decisions have implications for both the efficiency of outcomes and the distribution of profits across parties. >Law/Coase. 1. Pigou, Arthur Cecil (1920/2013). The Economics of Welfare. Palgrave Macmillan. |
EconPigou I Arthur C. Pigou The Economics of welfare London 1920 Kiesling I L. Lynne Kiesling The Essential Ronald Coase Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2021 |
| Externalities | Rothbard | Rothbard III 1064 Externalities/Rothbard: The problem of "external costs," usually treated as symmetrical with external benefits, is not really related: it is a consequence of failure to enforce fully the rights of property. If As actions injure B's property, and the government refuses to stop the act and enforce damages, property rights and hence the free market are not being fully defended and maintained. Hence, external costs (e.g., smoke damage) are failures to maintain a fully free market, rather than defects of that market.(1) >External Benefit/Rothbard, >Free market/Rothbard, >Free market/Economic theories. 1. See Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 650-53; and de Jouvenel, "Political Economy of Gratuity“. Virginia Quarterly Review (Autumn 1959). pp. 522-26. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Realism | Berkeley Vs Realism | Chisholm II 33 Reality/Review/Berkeley: the experiences and their progressions provide verifiers for the acceptance of externalities. There are no specific experiences for such reviews. We can make the same predictions when they deny the outside world. We cannot invoke any instance other than our order of experience. II 34 In order to show that things are causers, we would have to be able to show that we could have an experience of the outside things without our experiences. But that is impossible. The same order of experience could exist if there were no external things at all. BerkeleyVsRealism: with this, realism becomes superfluous! VsBerkeley: but the same applies now also to spiritualism, which Berkeley does not seem to see! (That it is superfluous like realism). |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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