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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Speech Act Theory | Searle | II 25 Sincerity condition: the sincerity condition is internal to the speech acts. --- Husted IV 251 Speech act/Searle: speech acts are rule-determined actions. They always have constitutive (not regulatory) rules. Searle: the speech act is key to the meaning. VsSearle: this is controversial because language rules for e.g. singular term have a fundamentally different nature than for actions. J. Husted "Searle" in: Hügli/Lübke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993S. 251 --- V 68 The speech act is an unequal game. An explanation must presuppose rules. Rules are not equal. Convention: speaking rules are governed by behavior. For rules, behavior is not crucial. >Language game, >Convention. V 207 Traditional Speech Act Theory/Austin/Strawson/Hare: the word W is needed to perform speech act A, then e.g. "good" recommends, "true" reaffirms, "knowledge" guarantees something. SearleVs: this only works with performative verbs such as "promise" but not with judgmental ones. This does not satisfy the adequacy condition for semantic analysis: a word must mean in all grammatically different sentences the same; it cannot, if the meaning is supposed to be the execution of various acts. V 213 Wrong: to assume that the conditions for the execution of a speech act follow from the meanings of the words ( "fallacy of assertiveness"). --- IV 27 Speech Act Theory/SearleVsAustin: Austin accepts verbs for acts but one has to differentiate this, e.g. the announcement of a command is not the command. IV 78 Speech Act Theory/Searle: the speech act theory differs from other philosophical approaches in that it gives no set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the explicable phenomenon (e.g. linguistics: structural rules). >Structural rules. IV 86 The illocutionary act is the function of the meaning of the sentence. IV 86 Fiction/speech acts/Searle: fiction has no other speech acts but is a predetermined act, e.g. in literature it is no other act than in the newspaper. No semantic or syntactic property proves a text as fictional. IV 204 Speech Act TheoryVsChomsky, VsRules, instead of semantics/pragmatics. --- VII 99 Speech Act/proposition/Searle: difference: from the propositional content does not follow that the assertion conditions are satisfied - the proposition rather implies that the speaker implies within the act that they are satisfied. --- VIII 435 Speech Act/Searle: the speech act is hold together by the semantic intentions of the speaker. VsChomsky: Chomsky does not see the essential connection of meaning and speech acts. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
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