Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 69 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appearance | Sellars | I 24 Sellars: thesis: seeming prima facie = to be. I 26 Seeming/Appearance/Tradition: Being is more basal than seeming. Seeming is not a relationship between a person, a thing and a property. Tradition: Sense data should explain seeming.> >Sense data theory. Sellars: this is unnecessary. Experience/Sellars thesis: "is green" and "seems to be green" are identical. Only the first one is affirmed. cf. Ryle: >Success word). Seeming to be green presupposes the concept of being green. Seeming/Sellars: is not a relationship at all. >Appearance, >Perception, >Belief, >Language use, >Predicate, >Property, >Seeing, >Experience, >Stimuli, >Relation. I 30 ff Experience/Experience History/Sellars: not the result of impressions, but of appearances. >Sensory impressions. Phenomena are conceptual (to resettle them in a rational relationship to beliefs). >Phenomena. Appearance: Evidence for the experience differs just as little as the experiences. I 32 Appearance: the concept of green translucence, the ability to recognize that something appears to be green, presupposes the concept of being green. >Concept/Sellars. I 36 Seeming/Appearing/Sense Data/Sellars: there can be no dispositional analysis of physical redness on the basis of the red-seeming. - We must distinguish between qualitative and existential appearance. >Dispositions. --- I 38 Seeming/appearing/being/Sellars: Problem: if it is asserted that physical objects cannot appear red without experiencing something that is red, the question of whether the redness that has this something is this redness that the physical object appears to have. Solution: a) on the basis of empirical generalization b) theory of perception which refers to "direct experience". Brandom I 425 Appearance: Sellars: two uses of "seems" or "looks like": Generic "seems"-statements: E.g. the chicken seems to have a number of spots, but there is no specific number that it seems to have. E.g. there seem to be a lot of crumbs on the table. But it does not seem that 998 crumbs are on the table or 999. --- Rorty VI 147/48 Appearing/seeming/explanation/SellarsVsNagel: the "appearances" that need to be rescued by scientific explanation, in turn, are language-relative. What appears to someone dependends on how one normally speaks. >Thomas Nagel, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Language use, >Word meaning. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Assertibility | Strawson | Nagel I 71 Crispin Wright: considers the view that truth could range further than assertibility to be too extreme: how can a sentence be unrecognizably true? (VsRealism) >Realism, >Assertibility, >Truth. StrawsonVs this draws the image of what Wittgenstein has reportedly asserted: it simply does not correspond with our most evident experience. We understand the meaning of what we say and hear well enough to at least occasionally recognize inconsistencies and conclusions in what was said which are attributable solely to the sense or the meaning of what was said. >Sense, >Meaning, >Understanding, >Language community. Wright I 77 Wright: Assertibility/Strawson: the assertibility-conditional conception has "no explanation for what a speaker actually does when he utters the sentence". >Language behavior, >Behavior, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. StrawsonVsSemantic Anti-Realists: it only makes sense to consider an assertion to be justified if this assertion supports the commitment to something that lies beyond its justification. ((s) "background", single, isolated sentences are not assertible but neither are they sensibly debatable.) cf. >Background. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Attributive/referential | Searle | IV 101 Attributive/Tradition/Grammar: attributive includes relative expressions such as "large" or "hot". Searle: we require background. All tall women are similar in terms of height. Attributive/Searle: what is meant and the sentence meaning are the same thing. IV 161 Referential/Donnellan/Searle: S talked about e, no matter if e is actually F. You can then also report with other expressions than "the F". Attributive: here there is no entity e, the speaker would not even have had in mind that they existed. Attributive: the statement can then not be true. IV 164 Donnellan: E.g. "The winner, whoever it is": here, in the attributive sense nothing is actually talked about. Referential/attributive: there is no distinction between beliefs. IV 165ff Referential/Attributive/SearleVsDonnellan: instead: aspects: you can choose the aspect under which you speak about an object. Primary A: if nothing satisfies it, the speaker had nothing in mind (hallucination). Secondary A: any aspect for which it is true that S tried to talk with it about the object, that fulfils its primary A, without being meant to belong to the truth conditions. >">Truth condition, >Aspects/Searle. The Champagne example even works if water is in the glass. Searle: then the statement may also be true. The meaning does not change if no other aspect could assume the role of the primary one. IV 175 Referential/Searle: the referential brings the secondary aspect. Attributive: brings the primary aspect. IV 176 Both readings can be intensional and extensional. >Intension, >Extension. IV 175 What is meant is decisive. Difference sentence/finding: finding is decided, a sentence is not (what was said literally). >Meaning(Intending), >Intention, >Speaker intention. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Beliefs | Grice | Hungerland I 279 Circumstances/Hungerland: e.g. there are circumstances under which I would say that my gardener, an uneducated man, believes that the "Nandina Domestica" (whose name he does not even know) should be set up in a different location. And there are circumstances under which I would not say it. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Reference. Grice II 38ff Belief/Grice: there are three possible cases: 1) one neither believes nor thinks that p, 2) one does believe, but it is not the case that one is just thinking of it and 3) one does not believe, but is just thinking p. Def "Activated Belief"/Grice: H is to see that Waterloo was 1815. Cf. >Learning. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Hungerland I Isabel C. Hungerland Contextual Implication, Inquiry, 3/4, 1960, pp. 211-258 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Circumstances | Cavell | II 187 Circumstances/Cavell: before we know whether our examples are a priori, we must justify our (or my) extraordinary confidence in the context. >Context, >Situation, >Intention, >Intentionality, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. This is not only the linguistic context, but desires, intentions, beliefs, etc., but one does not have to go into an infinite investigation here. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Circumstances | Grice | HungerlandI 266f Hungerland/Grice/Circumstances: e.g. there are circumstances under which I would say that my gardener, an uneducated man, believes that the "Nandina Domestica" (whose name he does not know) should be set up in a different location. And there are circumstances under which I would not say that. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Reference. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Circumstances | Kripke | I 119 Circumstances/conditions: are there really circumstances under which Hesperus would not have been Phosphorus? E.g. suppose someone comes along, and he/she names two different stars Hesperus. >Morning star/Evening star. That could even happen if the same conditions prevail as when both names were introduced by us. But are they conditions under which Hesperus is not Phosphorus or would not have been Phosphorus? That does not seem to be the case. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Speaker reference. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Competence | McDowell | II 63 Language competence/McDowell: Thesis: competence must be expressed via the components (constituents) and are expressed only secondarily via whole sentences. >Language behavior, >Communication, >Understanding/McDowell, cf. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Private language, >Idiolect. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Content | Kripke | Stalnaker I 186 Content/Kripke/Stalnaker: Kripke's thesis is that the content of speech acts and mental attitudes can be seen as a function of certain individual things and types with which speakers interact. No matter what metaphysics you represent, you will agree that content and reference are determined by facts, in a way that is contextual. This is influenced by general beliefs, purposes and assumptions. >Speech acts, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Speaker reference, >Reference/Kripke, >Meaning/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Conventions | Bennett | I 155 Convention/Lewis: convention is more than mere behavior regularity - no agreement necessary - not even implied agreement. 170 Conventional meaning is more than the usual meaning, because it contains common knowledge about a regularity. >Regularity, >Intersubjectivity, >Community, >Language community, >Actions. I 167f Convention/Lewis: conventions are mutual knowledge. Cargile: this is useful only up to fourth reflection. David Lewis: only actions are coordinated. BennettVsLewis: do not imparting any action on a meaning I 189 Searle: there is no "conventional meaning"; instead: rules that apply for an expression. >Rules, >Language Rules, >Utterances, >Utterances/Searle, >Meaning/Searle. I 191 Convention/Meaning/Bennett: a speaker can only ever give an expression a conventional meaning if it already has a meaning. >Lemons example, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. Wittgenstein: I cannot say "hot" while I mean "cold". >Meaning/intending, >Meaning/intending/Wittgenstein. SearleVsWittgenstein: the meaning exceeds the intention, it is sometimes also a matter of convention. Bennett: conventional meaning effective circumstance. >Circumstances. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Conventions | Grice | I 2 Meaning/convention: it may be that someone who has changed a habit falls back into the old habit. Even in non-verbal cases. I 2 f Deviations/communication: deviations must have good reasons. Walker I 419 f Conventions (Walker, Grice Doc 10): you cannot find out whether a statement transmits a relationship between antecedent and consequent due to a special convention or whether this relationship is transmitted conversationally. >Implication, >Implicature, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Meaning (Intending). |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Walker I Ralph C. S. Walker "Conversational Inmplicatures", in: S. Blackburn (ed) Meaning, Reference, and Necessity, Cambridge 1975, pp. 133-181 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Conventions | Strawson | II 257 Convention/StrawsonVsAustin: does not create truth: Relation between the Prime Minister and the expression "the Prime Minister" is conventional, but those who use the expression speak no truth without the context. >Context dependence, >Statement/Strawson, >Utterance/Strawson, >Speaker intention, >Speaker meaning. II 260 StrawsonVsAustin: Austin confuses semantic conditions with what was stated. >Assertibility, >Assertibility conditions. II 268 E.g. the fact that a statement is exaggerated does not depend on a convention, but on a difference to a fact. II 269 Existential statements and limited general statements do not make use of conventions. >Existence statement. II 257 Truthmaker/Strawson: E.g. a language with "plate" (Wittgenstein, PI) would be just as conventional, but those alleged pseudo-entities that make statements true (facts), would not be among the non-linguistic correlates. - (s) But the world would be more empty because of it |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Deceptions | Avramides | I 51 Deception/Counter-Example/VsGrice: patterns are always important. - We move away from the speaker's intention to the meaning-bearing property of the utterance. >Utterance meaning, >Speaker intention, >Speaker meaning, >Context, >Situation. We should always accept an intention more. Solution: patterns - (Distribution of intentions). Problem: infiniteness: tjere are always infiniteley many possible intentions. Solution: something that forces the speaker's intention to the line of the utterance. To prevent the intent to deceive. Ultimately communication is something ideal. >Communication, cf. >Ideal speech community/Habermas. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Deceptions | Schiffer | Avr I 57 Deception/HarmanVsGrice: we might need self-referential facts ((s) these are certainly true, because they are about themselves). Problem: 1) why not from the start? 2) If not possible, then the whole analysis gets problematic. Solution/Harman: the speaker intends that the hearer responds for the proper reason: recognizing the speaker’s intention. >Speaker intention, >Paul Grice. Schiffer/Grice: Grice wants to avoid self-referring facts. Problem: the resulting complexity. >Self-reference, >Facts, >Complexity. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Demonstratives | Shoemaker | Frank I 47f This/demonstrative: the use rules do not determine by themselves what the reference in every possible use case is. - It is determined by the speaker’s intention. >Index words, >Indexicality, >Speaker intention, >Speaker meaning, >Circumstances, >Context/Context dependence, >Language rules. I/Shoemaker: is no more a demonstrative such as a name or a hidden description. - ((s) No body is identified). >I, Ego, Self, >Self-identification, >Body. Sydney Shoemaker (I968): Self-Reference and Self-Awareness, in: Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), 555-578 |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Descriptions | Grice | I 13 Intention/description/Grice: a description of what the other should do in my opinion, cannot deliver the meaning of my statement. >Meaning, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Intentions, |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Dispositions | Kripke | Stegmüller IV 41 Disposition/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/VsKripke/Stegmüller: the function can be read from the disposition - then the disposition for errors must be part of the overall disposition. >Meaning (Intending)/Kripke. KripkeVs: this again requires facts relating to the correct table or correct function. Kripke: but the function does not exist before the disposition. Competence cannot explain rules, because it presupposes rules. Competence is normative, not descriptive. >Competence. Stegmüller IV 47 Kripke’s Wittgenstein/KripkeVsDisposition Theory: if one understands "meaning" as what I am currently meaning determines what I am to mean in the future, then it is normative, not descriptive. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. Disposition Theory: the disposition theory claims to be descriptive but it is not. Language/Kripke: strictly speaking, we must not problematize the language because we could then no longer formulate our question understandably. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Disquotationalism | Field | II 105 Purely disquotational true: 1. Generalization possible only like this - for example: not every axiom is true - (but one does not yet know which) 2. "True-like-I-understand-it" 3. The concept is use-independent E.g. to say "Snow is white" is true is the same as to call snow white - no property is attributed which would not have it if one uses the sentence differently - everyday language: here we seem to use a different truth-predicate. Use-independency of the truth-predicate: neccessary for the generalization for infinite conjunctions/disjunctions - contingently true: E.g. Euclidean geometry. The axioms could have been wrong - we do not want to say with this, that the speakers could have used their words differently. Ad II 105 Definition disquotational/(s): "literal". Field: heuristic: disquotation means "truth-like-he-understands-it". ((s) So referring to the speaker - this is not a definition of truth in terms of understanding - merely heuristic.) Deflationism: this leads to cognitive equivalence. >Deflationism. Disquotational true/Field: "true, as I understand it". Cf. >Principle of charity, >Understanding. II 123 Field: Disquotational true is unlike Tarski-true. >Tarski-scheme, >Truth definition/Tarski, >Thruth theory/Tarski, >Truth/Tarski. ad II 135 Deflationism/Field/(s): contrast: semantic/disquotational: semantic: not simply repeating something literal, but finding truth, depending on the situation E.g. for index words. Disquotational: only repeating literally; this does not work for indices and demonstratives.# >Index words, >Indexicality. II 152 Disquotational truth: Problem: untranslatable sentences are not disquotationally true. >Translation. II 164 Disquotational true/disquotational reference: corresponds to the thesis that Tarskian truth is not contingently empirical. Necessary: both "p" is true iff p" and "it is true that p iff p" because the equality between possible worlds is not defined. - Truth is here always related to the actual world. >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity, >Actual world, >Actualism, >Actuality. II 223 Radical deflationism/narrow: does not allow interpersonal synonymy - only purely disquotational truth - it is about how the listener understands the sentence, not the speaker. Cf. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. II 259 Definition disquotationalism/Field: the thesis that the question by which facts e.g. "entropy" refers to entropy, is meaningless. >Reference. II 261 Non-disquotational view/indeterminacy/VsDisquotationalism: the non-disquotational view must assume an indeterminacy of our concepts on a substantial level. >Indeterminacy. II 269 Disquotational view/truth/Reference/Semantics/Logic/Field: N.B.: Truth and reference are not really semantic concepts here, but logical ones. - Because they are applied primarily to our idiolect. >Logic, >Semantics, >Idiolect. Here they function as logical concepts. - (E.g. "true" for generalization) N.B.: that "rabbit" refers to rabbits is then a logical truth, not a semantic truth. - Then there is still indeterminacy in translation. II 272 Disquotational view/disquotationalism: for it, the relevant structure of a language is not to be understood in referential terms, but in terms of stimulus meaning, inferential role and indication relation. >Stimuli, >Stimulus meaning, >Pointing, >Ostension, >Inference, >Inferentialism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Existence | Grice | Hungerland I 300 f Existence/Hungerland: the talk about "the S" does not require that there be only a single S in the world! Rather, it should be only a single S, to which I am referring in context. >Reference, >Speaker intention, >Identification, >Individuation, >Intention, >Existence statements. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Hungerland I Isabel C. Hungerland Contextual Implication, Inquiry, 3/4, 1960, pp. 211-258 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Explanation | McDowell | Rorty VI 211 Understanding/explanation/RortyVsMcDowell: we should not talk about comprehensibility. It is very easy to get: if we train two people to have the same manner of speaking. >Language behavior, >Communication, >Understanding/McDowell, cf. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Private language, >Idiolect. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Grice | Avramides | I 26 Grice/Avramidis: Grice view should be understood as a conceptual analysis, not as reductionism. - Not as physicalism. - Grice wants a reconciliation with Frege and Davidson. >Philosophy of mind, >Gottlob Frege, >Donald Davidson, >Paul Grice. I 42f Grice/Avramides: Thesis: the problem of sentence meaning (meaning of the whole utterance) takes precedence over the meaning of partial statements. >Sentence meaning, >Word meaning, >Clauses, >Compositionality, >Frege-Principle, >Subsententials. Statement/Grice: is understood broadly, also signals etc. Important argument: thus, the analysis ranges in a situation meaning before the timeless meaning (the standard meaning). >Situation, >Situation/Psychology, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. Only so can he equate"x means something" with "S means something (in a situation) with x". 1st Version; ... A response from the listener is induced ... 2nd Version: ... in addition: the listener must recognize the intention of the speaker. I 44 3rd Version: in addition: the recognition of the speaker's intention must act as a reason for the belief of the listener. Vs: there are still many counterexamples. I 45 GriceVsGrice: counter-E.g. it is a difference whether I spontaneously frown in a situation or in order to express my displeasure to a person. Important argument: exactly the same information is transmitted, no matter if the speaker has the intention to communicate or not. Then there is no reason to distinguish between natural and non-natural meaning. >Natural meaning/non-natural meaning. The difference has to do with what the frowning person can expect the listener to believe - but without intention no meaning - non-natural meaning (without intention) never sufficient for response. I 46 E.g. thumbscrews mean nothing. I 67 Grice/Avramides: so far, the analysis is not sufficient for timeless (linguistic meaning. - Only for speaker-meaning. Meaning/Grice: meaning is to be found both outside language and within. I 68 Timeless meaning/Grice: disjunction of findings and about what people want to achieve with x. - This is also an effect etc. but not a practice. It is not sufficient (because it may have a second meaning), and not necessary (it may have alternatives). - But it is a "procedure in the repertoire". >Practise, >Language behavior, >Language community, >Convention. I 111 Reductionist Gricean/Loar: This position risks to accept thinking without language. >Thinking without language. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Grice | Black | I 61f BlackVsGrice: Grice's theory is 1) too complicated - 2) does not cover self-talk (you do not intend to give yourself a reason...). Speaker's intention: cannot always be to produce belief in the other person: E.g. test candidate. >Knowledge paradox. Liar paradox: the liar must always tell the truth according to Grice: he has to mean "yes" when he says "no". >Paradoxes. I 64 Grice Thesis: S (speaker) means something when he intends to achieve a certain effect in L (listener), for example, that L believes that p. I 65 BlackVsGrice: that requires modifications: negative conjunctions or corresponding positive disjunctions. I 66 E.g,. there is no need to explain all infinite chess moves, but to say: "he intended the consequences of chess" is not an explanation - E.g. "keeping the king from moving", in turn, does require an explanation - that is exactly Grice's problem. - ((s) Because he assumes speaker intention which cannot be found in the rules) BlackVsSpeaker's intention - BlackVsIntended Effect. I 67 BlackVsGrice: his theory is inadequate: 1) Relying on standard effects - 2) Trust that speaker's intention brings about such effects. >Speaker's meaning, >Utterance meaning. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Grice | Cresswell | I 26 Grice/Cresswell (Grice 1968)(1): does not refer to truth conditions and says nothing about how the listener can predict the meanings of new sentences by his language skills (competence, understanding). >Understanding, >Competence, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Meaning, >Sentence meaning, >Conventions. 1. Grice, H.P. (1968). Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning and word-meaning. Foundations of Language, Vol 4, pp. 225-242. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Grice | Grice | Graeser I 119f Grice/thesis: statement meanings in total as well as situation-independent sentence meanings and situation-independent word meanings go back to what the speaker means ((s) proposition) regardless of the language. Implicature: most of what is also intended is not stated, nor does it follow from what has been said (non-implication). >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Meaning (intending). Grice II 19 Grice/thesis: the speaker-situation meaning can be made explicit by recourse to speaker intentions. Time-independent meaning and applied meaning can be made explicit by recourse to the concept of speaker-situation meaning. Cf. >Connotation. II 21 Trouble is only possible when a specific intention is assumed in others. Assumed intention: the assumed intention is the cause, not the reason. >Reason/cause, >Intention. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Grice | Millikan | I 52 Language/Millikan: in this chapter: what are the relations between 1. the stabilizing function of a speech pattern 2. their literal use 3. the speaker's intentions. Stabilization function/Millikan: next chapter thesis: one aspect of the word meaning, the syntactic form is the focused stabilization function. >Terminology/Millikan. Literary use/Millikan: the literary use does not correspond to any stabilizing function (see below). Gricean Intention/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: Thesis: the Gricean intentions are not at all what drives language usage and understanding. >Grice. Stabilization function/language/Millikan: if speech patterns such as words or syntactic forms have a stabilizing function, then these direct eigenfunctions of reproductively determined families (rfF) are 1st level, of which these patterns are also elements. Functions: of words etc. are historically acquired by expressing both utterances and reactions of the listener. Intention/Speaker's intention/N.B.: these functions do not depend on the speaker's intentions! Direct eigenfunction: has a word token even when it is produced by a parrot. The token is an element of a reproductively determined family in that it has a direct eigenfunction. >Speaker intention. Intention/purpose: the intention or purpose provides a derived eigenfunction. Derived eigenfunction: however, lies above and beyond the direct or stabilizing function. It can be the same as the direct function, but it does not have to be. In any case, it is not its own function of the speech pattern, it is not its eigenfunction. Stabilization Function/Language/Millikan: although the stabilization function is independent of purpose and speaker's intention, it is not independent of purposes that speakers can have in general. I 53 Here again there will be a "critical mass" of cases of use. I 63 Imperative/Millikan: now it is certainly the case that a listener, if asked if the speaker intended to obey the command, will surely immediately answer "yes". I 64 But that does not mean that he used this belief in obedience. Gricean intentions/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: Gricean intentions are thus superfluous. And they also do not help to distinguish unnatural meaning from less interesting things. In any case, we need not pay attention to Gricean intentions, which are subject only to potential and not actual modifications of the nervous system. >Intention/Grice, >Intentionality/Grice. I 65 VsMillikan: one could object that you could have reasons for an action without these reasons being activated in the anatomy. Millikan: if I stop believing something, I will refrain from certain actions. Gricean Intentions/Millikan: the only interesting question is whether they are realised actually inside while one is speaking. E.g. Millikan: the Sergeant says: "When I say 'stop' the next time, do not stop!" A similar example is given by Bennett. Problem: the training was so effective that the soldier did not manage to stop. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Grice | Schiffer | Avramides I 114 Grice/Schiffer: (= intention-based approach) Grice is obliged to deny logical functions of meanings. - Instead: dependence on a (causal) fact (which is non-semantically specified). >Intention-based semantics, >Facts, >Situations, cf. >Situation semantics. --- Schiffer I 13 Grice/Schiffer: Problem: the meaning must not determine the content. - Because semantic vocabulary must be avoided - therefore VsRelation Theory. The belief objects would have to be language independent. >Relation theory, >Objects of belief. I 241 Intention-based approach/Grice/Schiffer: works without Relation Theory and without compositional semantics. - Extrinsic explanation is about non-semantically describable facts of use. SchifferVsGrice: his theory has not enough to say about the semantic properties of linguistic units. I 242 Grice/Schiffer: (Grice 1957)(1): attempts to define semantic concepts of public language in terms of propositional attitudes (belief, wishing, wanting). With that nothing is assumed about the meaning itself. Def speaker-meaning/Grice: (1957)(1) Is non-circular definable as a kind of behavior with the intention to trigger a belief or an action in someone else. Def expression meaning/Grice: (1957)(1) that means the semantic features of expressions of natural language. - Is non-circular definable as certain types of correlations between characters and types of exercise of speaker-meaning. - Statement/extended: every act, that means something. >Speaker intention, >Speaker meaning. Schiffer: thus questions of meaning are reduced to questions about propositional attitudes. I 243 A character string has to have a particular feature, so that the intention is detected. >Intentions. I 245 Grice/Schiffer: Problem: Falsifying evidence is not a meaning-problem. Common knowledge is necessary, but always to refute by counter-examples. >Language community. Solution: to define common knowledge by counterfactual conditions. >Counterfactual conditional. Problem: not even two people have common knowledge. SchifferVsGrice: no one has set up a lot of reasonable conditions for speaker-meaning. Problem: a person can satisfy the conditions of (S) when he merely says that A intended to cause it, that A believes that p ((S) = lies). SchifferVsGrice: this approach is hyper-intellectual, presupposes too much intentions and expectations, that will never be divided. - The normal speaker knows too little to understand the expression-meaning by Grice. >Utterance meaning. I 247 E.g. I hope you believe me, but not on the basis of my intention. - A necessary condition to tell something is not a necessary condition to mean it as well. >Meaning/Intending. 1. H. Paul Grice (1957). Meaning. Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388 |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Grice | Tugendhat | I 269f TugendhatVsGrice: the speaker does not want to cause that.., or he would say "I want to cause... - He does not mean anything, he claims something. Vs: Grice does not consider self-talk. - Absurd: that self talk would have other truth conditions. - The communication function does not belong to the meaning, otherwise self-talk impossible. >Paul Grice, >Meaning, >Self-talk, >Communication. Meaning/TugendhatVsGrice: two possibilities: (a) correlative to understanding: then it is false that what a speaker wants to say with "p" is that he wants to effect...etc. that would rather want to say if he said "I want to effect etc." what he wants to say with "p" is assert that p. b) if you give Grice his terminology, so to speak, then you have to say that the function of an assertoric sentence, or the intention with which it is used, is not to mean something, but to assert something. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Assertions, >Intention, >Intentionality, >Speaking. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Imperatives | Grice | Millikan I 2 Words/Tarski/Davidson/Millikan: the tradition of Tarski and Davidson speaks of words in terms of their impact on truth conditions. >Truth conditions, >Words, >Tarski, >Davidson. Austin/Searle/Millikan: Austin describes other types of words as "illocutionary" or "performative" in terms of conventional rules. >Austin, >Searle, >Millikan, >Speech act theory. Grice/Schiffer/Lewis/Millikan: this tradition speaks about indicative and imperatives in terms of intertwined speaker intentions. >Schiffer, >Lewis, >Speaker intention. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Imperatives | Lewis | Millikan I 2 Words/Tarski/Davidson/Millikan: This tradition speaks of words in terms of their effects on truth conditions. >Truth conditions. Austin/Searle/Millikan: the speech act theory describes other kinds of words as "illocutionary" or "performative" in terms of conventional rules. >Speech act theory, >Illocutionary act. Grice/Schiffer/Lewis/Millikan: the tradition of Grice, Schiffer and Lewis speaks about indicatives and imperatives in terms of convoluted speaker intentions. >Speaker intention. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Intensions | Jackson | Stalnaker I 16 Definition Propositional concepts/Stalnaker: propositional concepts are functions of possible worlds on truth values. When an utterance in a possible world is associated with a propositional idea, one can define with it two different propositions: A-Intension and C-Intension (Terminology by Jackson). C: The propositional thought X: The possible world U: The utterance >Utterances, >Possible worlds, >Propositional content, >Thoughts. Definition C-Intension/Jackson: is c (x), expressed by u in x. ((s) whereby the semantics in world x causes the content c to be expressed, which may differ from what can be meant in another world). So relative to the possible world. Definition A-Intension/Jackson: the A-Intension is defined solely by the propositional idea. ((s) that what is meant.) (Independent of possible worlds). >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Intentionality | Grice | III 105 Intentionality/Grice: thesis: intentionality already seems to be included in the essential foundations of a theory of language. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Speaker reference, >Meaning (Intending). |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Intentionality | Kripke | I 113 Causal chain: if the name is passed "from link to link", then the receiver of the name must probably intend to use it with the same reference. When I hear "Napoleon" and decide that this would be a nice name for my aardvark, then I do not fulfil this condition. It allows me to set up a new link and transmit it to other people. But otherwise it is not a link of the required type. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Speaker reference, >Reference/Kripke, >Causal theory of reference, >Use, >Naming/Kripke, >Language behavior. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Intentions | Bennett | Avramides I 17 BennettVsGrice: instead of intentions (these are too complicated): simply assume "Plain Talk": the speaker relies on the faith of the listener whenever an utterance U is expressed a particular proposition p is true. >Intentionality, >Utterances, >Statements, >Sentences, >Truth, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. GriceVsVs: instead: "background-fact" - the assuption of a background eliminates troublesome propositional attitudes. >Background, >Propositional attitudes. Avramides: pro intentions - and why should they be easy? >Intentions, >Content, >Thought, >Thinking, >Simplicity, >Complexity. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Intentions | Black | I 72 Intention/meaning/speaker intention/Grice: Grice presupposes no act of intending. >Acts of Will. I 73 Speaker's intention/BlackVsGrice: the speaker's intention cannot be inferred by the hearer. - Otherwise the meaning would have to be already given. >Speaker's meaning |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Intentions | Donnellan | Bennett I 195 Intention/to mean something/Donnellan: It is not about what someone was going to say - otherwise you could take every description. (DonnellanVsGrice). Nevertheless the intention decides about referential or attributive use. >Attributive/referential, >Speaker intention, >Speaker reference, >Speaker meaning, >Meaning/Grice, >Meaning (Intending). |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Intentions | Millikan | I 61 Intention/Grice/Millikan: there is an argument that even infinite intricate intentions are subject to the normal language usage. E.g. Imperative. "Do A!": E.g. listener: if the listener thought the speaker did not intend it, he would not do A. Therefore, if the listener H agrees with speaker S, he must believe that S intends that H should do A. Speaker: If S expected that H believes that S did not intend that he was supposed to do A, then he could not rationally intend that H should do A. MillikanVs: the argument is wrong. It does not follow from the fact that a belief P would be incompatible with an action, so that if one were to perform the action, then one would have to believe that non-P. For example, if I thought that Jack the Ripper would be under my bed, I would not fall into my bed and immediately fall asleep. But from the fact that I fall in and fall asleep immediately does not follow that I believe Jack is not under my bed. Solution: it may be that I have never heard of Jack The Ripper. Normality/Millikan: I cannot conclude that agreement is intended from the fact that there is agreement in normal cases. >Speaker intention, >Speaker meaning, >Agreement. I 62 But that an argument is wrong does not show that its conclusion is wrong! Belief/Millikan: we have to distinguish here between having and using. There is also a distinction between the A) Having beliefs and B) The mere having of eigenfunctions or normal conditions for an action. I 148 Intension/Millikan: A) Definition explicit Intension/Millikan: an expression has an explicit intension when it is repeated, according to a rule derived from earlier sentences in which the expression itself did not occur. This often takes the form of certain descriptions. E.g. "the current President of the USA". B) Definition implicit Intension/Millikan: corresponds to methods in which the application of a term depends directly on perceptual data. But they are no stimulus meanings! 1. Perception/Millikan: perception is not passive, but an active activity. 2. Implicit intensions: unlike stimulus meanings, implicit intensions are not sets of stimulus patterns that elicit an utterance, but implicit intensions are certain abilities. For example, the ability to identify an object by one sense alone, e.g. by smell or touch. ( > Observation/Millikan). Intension/Sense/Millikan: if so, there is no reason to assume that intensions (implicitly or explicitly) determine the meaning. Meaning: is a question of the mapping rules, Intension: is a normal method of repetition of expressions... I 149 ...if the repeat programs may be different in different people as well. Intension/Millikan: it is unlikely that there is always only one intension (a repetition method) for a unique term. Nevertheless, the term would have a clear Fregean sense. For example, a chemist may have different methods of determining a substance. Meaning: to make it unambigous, it is not necessary that the intension (method of repetition) is infallible. "Bill's oldest brother" has an unambigous meaning for me, although I do not know that Bill still has an older brother than the one I think of. The intension does not help me. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Intentions | Schiffer | I 156 Meaning/intentionality/Schiffer: when people have no intentions or no beliefs, symbols and sounds have no meaning, or any semantic properties. >Speaker intention, >Speaker meaning, >Utterer's meaning, >Utterance meaning, >Intentionality. Quine pro Brentano/Schiffer: you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary - but it does not belong to the canonical schema. >Canonicalness/Quine. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Intentions | Strawson | Meggle I 24ff Intention/StrawsonVsGrice: may be hided complicatly by courtesy, nevertheless can hint at something etc. - modification: the n-th part-intention of S is that H should recognize that S has the (n-1)th part-intention. Meggle I 30 Re-definition: 1. H shows R (reaction) 2. H believes that S (1) intends 3. Hs fulfillment of (1) is based on Hs' fulfilment of (2). Meggle I 31 SearleVsGrice: (> >Convention. Meggle I 33 Grice E.g.: An Arab trader invites a tourist who doesn't speak Arab to enter his shop: "You damned ...": one can say that the trader thinks the customer should come in, but the sentence does not mean it. Lemon example: not the sentence but the situation is decisive. >Situation, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Intentions. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 |
| Interpretation | Millikan | I 99 Interpretation/listener/Millikan: unlike the bees in the bee dance: listeners have different internal structuring, which does not make the interpretation uniform from the outset. >Understanding, >Communication, >Language, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Lemons Example | Bennett | I 190 Lemon-Example/Searle/Bennett: Grice: Conditional (intend p) > (mean p) SearleVsGrice: it is possible to (intend p) and ~(mean p). BennettVsSearle: Searle has not refuted Grice. - The antecedent is not satisfied. - S does not literally mean what he/she says. >Meaning, >Literal meaning, >Meaning/intending, >Reference, >Sense, >Utterances, >Speech acts, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Logical Constants | Grice | Cohen I 397 Logical Constants/particles/logic/everyday language/Cohen: e.g. the inference from "q" to "p>q" has no equivalent in natural language. Cohen I 402 "And" asserts more than the truth of two subsentences. The order here is important. E.g. A republic is proclaimed and the king died or vice versa - the second truth should be part of the same kind. Cohen I 407 Logical constants/meaning/if then/conversationalistic hypothesis/Grice: the assertion of a conditional clause is truth-functional regarding the linguistic meaning, but it is associated with a (redeemable) implication that there are indirect, i.e. non-truth-functional reasons for the truth, e.g. assumptions which cards the other player has - can be the truth function in bridge (strict rules). Cohen I 410 If/truth-functional/Cohen: e.g. if he/she was surprised, he/she did not show it - if that is truth-functional, it would be acceptable, because the consequent is true, but you do not have to accept the conversion yet: if he/she was not surprised, he/she also showed no surprise - although the sentence after would be true here too. Reason: here, "if" has the meaning of "even if" and not of "if-then". >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Meaning (Intending), >Speaker reference. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen I Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Some Remarks on Grice’s Views about the Logical Particals of Natural Languages", in: Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed), Pragmatics of Natural Languages, Dordrecht 1971, pp. 50-68 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen II Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Mr. Strawson’s Analysis of Truth", Analysis 10 (1950) pp. 136-140 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Meaning | Field | II 161 Def Quasi-translation/Def quasi-meaning/FieldVsChurch/FieldVsSchiffer/Field: Quasi-translation is what most authors mean by meaning. - Not a literal translation but the use of the words by the interpreter in his own language at the time in his actual world. >Actual world, >Possible worlds. Comparability is preserved even in the quasi-translation, not in a literal. >Comparability, >Translation. Sententialism/sententionalism/Field: Thesis: When we say someone says that snow is white, we express a relation between the person and the set of 1st quasi- translation and quasi- meaning rather than literal 2nd "La neige est blanche" quasi-means the same as #snow is white#. ((#): What stands between #, is to be "quasi-translated".) In the quasi-translation, the quasi-meaning is obtained. II 167 Intentional meaning/Field: Intentional meaning is completely empty – E.g. Suppose we wanted a theory of intentional meaning, then we also needed one of their combinations. – We also need a theory of the corresponding truth conditions. >Speaker intention, >Intention-based semantics, >Truth conditions. Problem: if we set up a theory here, it is not completely trivial, that the intentional meaning of "Plato" is just Plato! - We need an extra explanation. - That would solve nothing. – It would only bring problems. >Meaning (Intending). Better instead: a compositional theory of expressions (not of meanings). >Compositionality, >Expressions. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Meaning (Intending) | Bennett | I 193 Meaning / Wittgenstein: 1. only possible with utterances 2. you can not choose what you mean 3 you can usually only give a statement the meaning that it already has conventionally. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Conventions, >Utterances. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Meaning (Intending) | Grice | I 2 Meaning/denoting: a) from meaning follows a fact (but not a name): e.g. "These spots mean measles". Denote/mean: other cases: b) a fact does not follow from signifying: e.g. ringing a bell three times means: the bus is full. But today it is not full. I 2 Here you cannot say that it was not measles, although the significance was such. b) From meaning does not follow a fact: I 3 E.g. Ringing a bell three times means that the bus is full. But today it is not full. III 90ff Meaning/convention/saying/Grice: it shall be necessary and sufficient for the truth that "S meant" that p, even though it said for S that #p is not sufficient. >Meaning, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Intention. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Meaning (Intending) | Kripke | Nagel I 63 ff Meaning/Kripke/Nagel: problem: there is a gap between the normative and non-normative. Meaning implies the difference between right and wrong answers. Behavior, beliefs, dispositional or experience-based facts imply no such consequences. Therefore, these cannot consist in those. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Speaker reference, >Reference/Kripke, >Semantic facts, >Norm, >Experience. --- McGinn I 117 ff McGinn: irreducibility theory: Kripke: intended sense should be an undefined fundamental part of the world while the semantic expressions in analytical terms are considered to be as fundamental as the basic concepts of geometry. Words and concepts are in a representational relationship to the world but it is impossible that an explanation would indicate what the relationship is and on what it depends on. It is a simple fact that we mean things as we do because we digest and kick them. --- II 210 Meaning/Russell/KripkeVsDonnellan: it is about the fact that something is the only thing that fulfils the designation "the φ-er "ψ-s: ""φ(x) ∧ (y)(φ(y) > y = x)". --- Stegmüller IV 50 Kripke’s Wittgenstein: not a fact: even an "omniscient" being could not know what we mean - there is no fact of meaning -> Non-factualism. Important argument: the skeptical problem is not epistemic, it is ontologic. Vs "best explanation": it would also falsely recognize the problem as epistemic. >Kripke's Wittgenstein, >Rule following, >Private language. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Meaning (Intending) | Millikan | I 154 To mean/parrot/Millikan: the parrot cannot mean the question of course. To mean/Millikan: I can mean something with "monotreme", because I intend that the word has an eigenfunction, even if I cannot specify it in detail. >Terminology/Millikan. Expert/Layman/to mean/understanding/knowing/knowledge/Millikan: the paradox does not come from the fact that I cannot mean the same as the expert, but that there is a sense in which the expert knows what he means with "monotreme". And in this sense I do not know it ((s) not what I mean and not what the expert means). >Elm/beech example, >Idiolect, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Meaning Change | Rorty | I 293f Meaning Change/Rorty: Question: Did the Greeks refer to prudence with the expression Sophrosyne? >Reference. Rorty: This question can be rejected with the hint that there is for expectation; in a completely different culture this expression would be implantable; no particular reason. We have to make ourselves familiar with the exotic language game. >Relativism, >Cultural relativism, >Context dependence. In the case of science, however, such an attitude seems unnatural. Here we want to say that out there is something, laws to which one should refer or at least one has referred to. Rorty: "whiggistic" winner perspective: tells us, Aristotle spoke in reality of gravity, when he spoke of a natural settling movement, sailors would have, when they spoke of unicorns, referred to the horns of narwhals in reality, "heat flow" is a misleading description of the energy transfer between dancing molecules. >Theory change. I 301 Meaning/truth/existence/Change of Theories/Meaning Change/Quine/Rorty: Quineans would say, the question, whether they meant the same back then, is not raised. - It's more about the truth values. >Truth values, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Meaning/Intending, >Assertibility. Rorty: a) Aristotle said something wrong about movement, or b) He said something true, but that was not movemnt. RortyVsAyers: with this, one will not get far if one does no longer believe in concepts like intellectual property etc. Ayers exaggerates the contrast between our and his concepts. I 315 ff Semantic change/change of theory/reference/Rorty: solution: the functioning of an expression should be better seen as the picking out of objects, than as the description of reality. - So either a) reference as a basis, or b) also accepting reference as conventional. - Searle-trawson-Criterion: "What would make most of his opinions true." I 318 Solution: distinction reference: a) philosophical - b) "Speaking about" (common sense) - Rorty: it is only about existence. - Therefore, no criterion for reference possible. I 321 RortyVsReference Theory/Theory of Reference: 1. Semantic search for the objects is hopeless. - 2. Hopeless: to strive for an epistemological refutation of skepticism. >Skepticism. --- III 103 Meaning change: Adorno/Horkheimer/Rorty: pro - PutnamVs. --- IV 131 Term/Meaning change/Conceptual change/Change of theories/Rorty: terms that got a new twist through a thinker: E.g. Aristotle: ousia Descartes: res Hume: impression. Wittgenstein: game Einstein: simultaneity. Bohr: Atom. >Theory Change, >Incommensurability. --- VI 361 Interpretation/Rorty: in such approximation efforts, the procedure is obviously anachronistic. But when that happens consciously, there is no objection. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Necessity | Putnam | Kripke I 141 Necessity/needed/Putnam: "cats are animals" is less necessary than "bachelors are unmarried". --- Putnam V 72 Metaphysically Necessary/Kripke: Putnam: it is "metaphysically necessary" that water is H20, but that is explained by earthly chemistry and earthly facts about speaker intentions regarding reference. When describing a hypothetical liquid which is not H20 and merely resembles water, one does not describe any possible worlds, in which H2O is not water. V 274 Metaphysically Necessary/heat/Kripke/Putnam: possible Worlds, where heat does not corresponds with molecular motion, are possible. Language: but then we say that there is a different mechanism that triggers heat sensation. Identity/heat/molecular motion/Kripke: the identity is necessary, but not a priori. The statement is empirical, but necessary. >Necessary a posteriori. Molecular motion is an essential property of the temperature. KripkeVsMoore: then equating goodness with utility maximization cannot only be contingently wrong. KripkeVsNon-Cognitivism: from the fact that the words are not synonymous, one cannot conclude that the characteristics are not identical. >Non-cognitivism, >Synonymy. V 279 Pro Moore: Moore was right that our concepts of natural science are more neutral as opposed to ethical ones. VsMoore: but that does not mean that the good did not exist. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Necessity | Wiggins | II 285 Necessity/QuineVsAristotle/QuineVsEssentialism: the essence not independent of our specification of the objects. >Essentialism, >Essence, >Necessity/Quine. II 292 Wiggins: An Operator "it is necessary that ..." creates opaque contexts: E.g. to be taken for Jekyll is not the same as to be taken for Hyde, although Jekyll = Hyde. >Opacity, >Beliefs, >Speaker intention. Also rigid designators in contexts with "it is possible that .." are not interchangeable (and probably not even in "necessary..."). >Operators, >Rigidity. II 301 Necessary/Wiggins: analog to inner/outer negation: Tradition: to blurr the difference after the first method: E.g. "necessarily Socrates is a human" and "Socrates is necessarily a human". Wiggins pro second method -> Definition satisfaction for sentences with "necessary": Wiggins pro existence as necessary feature -> Existence generalization. II 303 Necessary/de dicto/Wiggins: simply wrong: E.g. necessarily (x)(x = Cicero)> (x is a human). de dicto: is it true? If so, we get the wrong thing: necessarily (Ez)(x)(x = z > (x is a human). |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Non-Existence | Foucault | II 128ff Non-existence/fiction/reference/statement: E.g. The current king of France is bald. It is necessary to know what the statement refers to and whether the proposition has a speaker. >Reference, >Proposition, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Statement, >Context dependence. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Order | Saussure | I ~ 31 Def Symbolic order/Saussure: in a symbolic ordering the meaning is only settled by the subject. >Meaning, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Symbols. Contrast: would be a natural element order. |
F. de Saussure I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius) |
| Pragmatics | Montague | Cresswell II 148 Definition Pragmatics/Montague: pragmatics investigates the role of contexts such as times and speakers. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Contexts, >Meaning, >Time, >Circumstances, >Meaning change. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Proper Names | Donnellan | I 18 Proper names/denotation/use/Donnellan: E.g., the man who killed Smith is insane. a) Referential use: the reference can succeed, even if the description does not apply: e.g. The man on trial is not the murderer, but he is rightly determined as the one who seems to be insane. b) Attributive use: "whoever it was": is used when we have no specific person in mind. Maybe at the sight of Smith's body. >Referential/attributive, >Reference, >Speaker intention, >Speaker meaning. |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Proper Names | Searle | II 288 Names/Searle: names presuppose any other representation. They have no explicit intentional content.< >Intentional content. II 291 ff Names: SearleVsKripke: VsCausal Theory: Kripke exaggerates the analogy between reference and perception. He overweights parasitic cases and presupposes an omniscient observer. Meteorology baptizes future events. >Causal theory of proper names. II 291 ff Names/Mill: names have no connotation, only denotation. Frege: the meaning of a name is detected by description. >Descriptions, >Connotation. II 292 Names/SearleVsKripke: a causal chain can only be detected intentionally: by speaker's intention. The causal chain is not pure, self-descriptive. Baptism itself cannot be causal, otherwise a successful reference is explained by successful reference (circular). >Speaker intention. II 311 Names/meaning/reference/Searle: e.g. Goedel/Schmidt: intentional content determines reference: "discoverer, no matter what his name is". We speak of the person who has been recognized by his contemporaries. >Description/Kripke. E.g. swapped spots: identification: "the spot that causes the experience". Variant: forgotten: "the one I was formerly able to identify as A." Wolf II 168 Names/Searle: the meaning stays ambigious, half of the descriptions could be true. We cannot determine in advance what characteristics apply to Aristotle (Strawson ditto). >Bundle theory. Zink: but then we would say that we do not know the name. Solution/Zink: localisation. >Zink. Searle V 145 Names/SearleVsMill: it is wrong, that proper names would be "meaningless characters" that they were "denotative" but not "connotative". >Names/Mill. V 145 There can be no facts about an independently identified object by facts - otherwise one is approaching traditional substance. Identification/SearleVsTractatus: objects cannot be identified, regardless of facts. V 245 Names/SearleVsRussell: if they should not contain any description, we must unfortunately assume substances. From the supposed distinction between names and descriptions the metaphysical distinction is derived between object and properties. Tractatus: the name means the object, the object is its meaning. - SearleVsWittgenstein. V 247 Names/Mill: names have no sense. FregeVsMill: e.g. then Mt. Everest would be = Gaurisankar. This is not more informative than Everest = Everest. FregeVs, SearleVs - Searle: names do not describe properties of objects. Identity Everest = Tschomolungma provided no other information. V 256 Names/SearleVsFrege: names are not entirely clear, e.g. morning star/evening star are actually on the border to description. SearleVsKripke: names are not rigid, otherwise they are like logical equivalents. Searle: names are there, because it is necessary, to seperate the indicative from the predicative function. >Predication, >Ostension. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Propositional Attitudes | Schiffer | Avr. I 24 Propositional Attitudes/Schiffer: (early): Thesis: mental states such as beliefs and desires should not be construed as attitudes towards sentences. >Beliefs, >Desire, >Propositional attitudes. But it does not follow that the Gricean approach is wrong. At most, the speaker-meaning has no logical priority over the utterance meaning. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Utterance meaning. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Reference | Kripke | I 71 Reference/Kripke: the reference of the name is not determined by a description, but by a "causal" chain of communication. I 109 Kripke: the relevant element is the actual chain of communication, not the way the speaker came about his reference. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Speaker reference, >referential/attributive. I 123 Baptism: baptism has a correct causal chain, but: it has added conditions and no personal knowledge. It is generally not the case that the reference of a name is determined by identifying the specific characteristics, through certain properties that the referee alone meets and of which the speaker knows or believes that they apply. I 147f Reference: "water is H2O", "light is a photon flux" or "heat is the motion of molecules": if I refer to heat, then I do not refer to an inner sensation someone may have, but to external phenomenon which we perceive through our sense of perception. It caused the characteristic sensation that we call the sensation of heat. I 149 Reference: we determine what light is by the fact that it is the one thing in the outside world that affects our eyes in a certain way. I 154 In the case of proper names, the reference can be defined in various ways. Establishing reference: is done a priori (contingent) - not synonymous. Meaning: meaning is analytic (and required). Definition: the definition specifies reference and expresses truth a priori. --- II 211 Reference: e.g. "Her husband is kind to her"/Kripke: variant: the (absent) husband is not nice. Then the statement is false for all authors (because of the absent husband). There is a distinction between speaker reference and semantic reference. II 221 Goedel-Schmidt Case/Kripke: description does not determine the reference - we would not withdraw the name when we learn something new. II 231f Kripke thesis: Donnellan's distinction referential/attributive. Generalized: a speaker can believe that his/her specific intention coincides with his/her general intention in a situation for one of two reasons: a) "simple" case: his/her specific intention is to refer to the semantic referee, (by definition)(that is Donnellan's attributive use), b) "complex" case: the intentions are different, but the speaker believes that they refer to the same object (referential). VsDonnellan: one must not understand the referential as proper names. The distinction simple/complex is equally applicable to descriptions and names. >Description/Kripke, >Names/Kripke. --- Newen I 111 Direct reference/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: Kripke calls the object theory of names the theory of direct reference. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Roles | Cresswell | I 106 Semantical Role/"say"/Lycan/Cresswell/(s): in idiosyncratic language ( "birds" means in L*, what "pigs" means in L) - Solution: The sentence with "pigs" plays in L* the same semantic role such as the sentence with "birds" in L. Problem: one cannot isolate a class of sentences if this class is in any way relative to the language that is in question ((s) circular). Saying/Cresswell: becomes a three-digit relation between person, sentence and interpreted language. (Cresswell pro). CresswellVsRelation theory. >Relation-theory, >Context-dependence, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Language dependence. I 107f Semantical Role/Conceptual Role/Lycan/Boer: E.g. Cicero/Tullius play the same semantic role but different conceptual roles. >Conceptual role. E.g. Hb and Gc play the same sR, iff DEN(b) = DEN(c) and DEN(H) = DEN(G). This is only relative to DEN. DEN: if H is a predicate, DEN H is the property (the denotated). >Denotation. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Signs | Luhmann | AU Cas 4 Definition mark/Luhmann: difference of signifier and signified. - Not "the designated"! Character: a form with two sides: one always uses the inner side of the form. > G. Spencer-Brown 1969(1). 1. Spencer-Brown, George (1969). Laws of Form. London: Allen & Unwin. --- AU Cass 12 Character/world/ontology/Saussure/Luhmann: signs and signified are both linguistically internal. One could not have words, if one does not mean something with them. >Words, >Language/Luhmann, >Communication/Luhmann, >Information/Luhmann. On the other hand: you can make any decisions without anything getting doubled. The sign means what it means in use, so the meaning of apple, is not the apple itself. - That is ambiguous. Sense of the apple or speaker's intention? >Sense/Luhmann, >Speaker intention, >Speaker meaning. AU Cass 12 Sign/re-entry/Luhmann: Re-entry: the distinction between signifier and signified as a distinction is the sign. - The sign is the unity of distinction. - The signifier is not the sign. This corresponds with a 2nd order observation. >Observation/operation/Luhmann, >Blind spot. I designate characters. - I designate my distinction - blind spot: the user of the sign cannot really use the unit as a unit. - For this he would need the concept of the sign. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Speaker Meaning | Grice | II 38 Speaker meaning/Grice: the speaker meaning may be different for one and the same sentence. >Meaning, >Speaker intention, >Intention, >Communication, >Implication, >Implicature. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Speaker Meaning | Kripke | II 226 Meaning/to mean/Grice: there is a distinction between what the words of the speaker mean on a certain occasion and what he meant. Kripke: what words mean on a certain occasion is determined on this occasion by these conventions together with the intentions of the speaker and various factors of the context. >Speaker intention, >Speaker reference, >referential/attributive, >Context, >Meaning (Intending). II 230 Irony/Kripke: irony does not change the meaning, "a great friend" does not have a "quote-sign meaning", but is determined by the speech act. >Convention, >Speech act. II 237 KripkeVsDonnellan: English is not so ambiguous, e.g. ambiguous language: could confuse "der" and "ter" "der"/Kripke: a corresponding statement is true iff an object is the only one to satisfy it. "ter": here it is crucial what the speaker means. Conclusion: in English there can be a distinction: "ter" is probably rigid. >Rigidity. The speaker meaning in all possible worlds is always what the speaker believes. Then "Jones said ter man she married is nice to her" is actually not an appropriate representation. Therefore Donnellan says that in the referential case it is difficult to speak of a "statement" ("problem of statement"). |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| That-Clauses | Field | II 157 That-clause/Field: does not require a literal representation - e.g. "that snow is white" can be expressed in every language; it is speech-independent. Then a language (Ms) with ""p" means that p" is a special case of the language (M) with ""e" (whereby e is a subsentential expression and means, for example, "dog." That is, "<>" is a formal representation of our normal means of meaning attribution. ((s) the expression in tip brackets is our own.) Scheme characters: "p" and "e" here in relation to an individual, i.e. idiolect. >Idiolect, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. II 158 Then "that p as I understand it now" must not be a literal representation. Tip bracket: it cannot be shown that "metacompact" does not mean II 159 ...that it means the same as "rabbit" as I understand it in the actual moment. - ((s) In the actual world, in my idiolect). >Possible worlds, >Actual world, >Language community. II 160 Tip brackets: instead, for sentences, we can also assume that-clauses. II 171 Understanding: For example, if I do not understand "grug", I will not accept the following: "grug" means |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Translation | Field | II 147ff Untranslatable/Translation/Extension/Deflationism/Field: Problem: Incorporation of untranslatable sentences. - Solution: potential extension of one's own language by accepting truth-preservation in conclusion. >Truth transfer, >Extensions, >Deflationism, >Language dependence. II 148 Names by index: "Georg-i": the George, to which Mary refered at the occasion of Z. Cf. >Situation semantics. II 149 Per sentence theory: "UTT Guru, Z": the sentence the Guru uttered at Z. - The special sentence is then superfluous. II 152 Disquotational truth: Problem: untranslatable sentences are not disquotational true. >Disquotational truth, >Disquotationalism. II 161 Def Quasi-translation/Def Quasi-meaning/FieldVsChurch/FieldVsSchiffer/Field: this is what most understand as meaning: not literal translation but reproduction as the interpreter understands the use of the corresponding words in his own language at the point of time in his actual world. >Stephen Schiffer. Comparison: is preserved in the quasi-translation at the moment, not in a literal translation. >Comparisons, >Comparability. Sententialism/Sententionalism/Field: Thesis: If we say that someone says that snow is white, we express a relation between the person and the sentence. 1. Quasi-translation and quasi-meaning instead of literal. 2. "La neige est blanche" quasi-means the same as #Snow is white# - (#) what stands between #, should be further translated (quasi-). - In quasi-translation, the quasi-meaning is preserved. >Speaker intention, >Intention-based semantics, >Truth conditions. II 273 Translation/Parameter/Field: in many cases, the relativization of the translation to a parameter is necessary to make it recognizable as a translation. - E.g. "finite": the non-standard argument tells us that there are strange models, so that "is in the extension of "finite" in M" functions as a "translation" of "finite" which maintains the inferential role of all what we say in pure mathematics. N.B.: "Is in the extension of "finite" in M" is a parameterized expression. Solution: what we are doing is to "translate" the one-digit predicate "finite" into the two-digit predicate "is in the extension of "finite" in x", along with the statements to determine the value of x on a model M with the necessary characteristics. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth | Ramsey | III 67 Truth/Ramsey: we cannot distinguish truth from falsehood if we only know what the word "true" means - true: we use the word a) for mental states b) for statements c) for "propositions" (as objects of belief). >Propositions, >Belief objects, >Thought objects. III 68 Truth/Ramsey/(s): Truth is not a property of sentences, but of meanings of sentences - (ultimately states of consciousness). >Sentences, >Utterances, >Meaning/Intending, >Speaker Intention, >Speaker Meaning, >Mental States, >Beliefs, >Beliefs. III 70 Truth/Ramsey: does not have to be well-founded or comprehensive. For example, true belief: the name of the Prime Minister starts with B - that is correct, even if false belief that Lord Birkenhead is the Prime Minister. Problem: the propositional reference of beliefs can be arbitrarily complex. We must avoid a list of truth definition for all individually - Solution: formalization: "p": a variable sentence - "A", "B": variable words (terms). Def true/Ramsey/logical form/Russell: B is true ⇔ (Ep)(B is a belief that p & p). Vs: Problem: "p" does not seem to contain a verb, but it should - Wrong solution: "is true" to add: circular. III 71 Solution/Ramsey. In reality, "p" contains a verb: e.g. "A is B". III 73 Truth/Ramsey. Example 1. the earth is round. 2. it is true that the earth is round, are equivalent, but 1 does not involve the idea of truth. Cf. >Redundancy theory. III 74 Truth without reference/Ramsey: Example "Belief at 10 o'clock": such a belief cannot yet be called true or false. >Sentences, >Statements. III 75 Truth/Ramsey: truth must be defined by reference, not vice versa. >Reference, >Truth definition. III 77 There cannot be any other kind of reference for true or false beliefs. Otherwise the future would be readable, from example "False reference" on tomorrow's rain. Therefore reference is simple, even if not unanalysable. Truth and reference are not independent expressions. >Simplicity, >Analysis, >Basic concepts. Truth must be defined by reference, not vice versa. >Dependence. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Understanding | Cavell | II 181 Understanding/Cavell: I guess, only if nothing is implied, understanding can be guaranteed. >Implication/Grice, >Implicature, >Language use, >Convention, >Meaning, >Sentence meaning, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. Formal logic cannot be presented as a guarantor of understanding, but as its substitute. (Compare Quine: "Mr. Strawson on Logical Theory")(1). Cavell: where understanding is necessary, there can be misunderstanding. >Errors, >Deceptions, >Reference. 1. W.V.O. Quine (1953), Mr. Strawson on Logical Theory. Mind 62 (248):433-451 |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Use Theory | Cavell | II 215 Meaning/Uses/Cavell's Use Theory: what the technical terms of mathematics and sciences mean, cannot be deduced by us from the way we use e.g. "mass" commonly. II 216 To mean/Meaning/Use theory/Cavell: one could still say: "Some actions are voluntary, others are involuntary, so I can call them as I want!" >"voluntarily"/Ryle. CavellVs: what we have to ask ourselves here is: in what kind of situation does it make no difference how I call a thing? It is a difference whether we ask: "What does x mean?" qnd "What does x really mean?". The second is not a profound version of the first, but is expressed in another situation. II 217 The most normal and the most profound utterances can only be understood when expressed in their natural contexts. >Context dependence, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Utterances | Cresswell | I 98 Utterance/Cresswell: (unlike sentence): carries its semantics with itself. >Utterance meaning, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Expressions, >Situations, >Context, >Externalism. Utterance: means in a given situation what it is. That is, that we cannot do the same for expressions what we have done for synonymy classes of sentences: we cannot imagine a class of predictions that has a class of meanings in one interpretation and another in another interpretation. >Paratactic analysis, >Sentences, >Propositions. New: now classes of utterances are the sentence meanings. - then we will have, for example, ""the earth moves" Galilei said this" in any language. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Vocabulary | Avramides | I 92 Vocabulary/PeacockeVs "actual language relation". Supposedly this approach does not need semantic vocabulary. Peacocke later: Gricean intentions cannot be used as evidence for the radical interpretation, but that is not VsGrice. >Christopher Peacocke, >Intentions/Grice, >Radical Interpretation, >Speaker intention. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Words | Austin | II 39 Words/Austin: words are no things. Millikan I 2 Words/Tarski/Davidson/Millikan: this tradition speaks of words in terms of their effects on truth conditions. Austin/Searle/Millikan: Austin describes other kinds of words as "illocutionary" or "performative" in terms of conventional rules. >Rules, >Conventions. Grice/Schiffer/Lewis/Millikan: this tradition speaks about indicatives and imperatives in terms of convoluted speaker intentions. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Words | Davidson | Millikan I 2 Words/Tarski/Davidson/Millikan: the tradition of Tarski and Davidson discusses words in terms of their impact on truth conditions. >Truth conditions. Austin/Searle/Millikan: this tradition describes other types of words as "illocutionary" or "performative" in terms of conventional rules. >Speech act theory. Grice/Schiffer/Lewis/Millikan: this tradition discusses indicative and imperatives in terms of intertwined speaker intentions. >Speaker meaning, >Word meaning, >Meaning, >Sentence meaning, >Subsententials. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Grice, P.H. | Field Vs Grice, P.H. | II 223 Radical Deflationism/RD/Terminology/Field: within Deflationism it is disputed whether the W concept must always be disquotational. Narrow Deflationism/Radical Deflationism/Field: Deflationism is uninteresting if it is not considered narrowly (radically). Radical Deflationism only permits purely disquotational truth and Vsinter personal synonymy. Truth/Translation/Radical Deflationism/Field: yet "true" and "satisfied" can be applied to other languages as well. Non-Radical Deflationism/Field: can remain non-trivial if it explains inter-personal synonymy as equality of the computational role. FieldVsSpeaker Intention/Understanding/Truth/Deflationism/Field: the radical deflationism which I favor declares it to be meaningless to ask whether a proposition is true in the sense that the speaker understands it. It’s all about how the listener understands it. II 224 Ambiguity/Deflationism/Solution: according to this, a sentence is true in some uses, but not in others. Translation/RD/Field: the concept of a "good translation" makes sense, but strongly interest-relative and contextual. It should not be understood as a correct translation. Correctness/Translation/Deflationism: the question of the correctness of inter-personal translation is useless. Non-Radical Deflationism/Translation/Field: thinks here that there is an objective concept of synonymy for good translation. VsDeflationism/Utility Theory/Field: it could be argued that it is a contingent fact that we use "snow is white" in a way that the sentence is true if snow is white. So our use of "true" is not purely disquotational. (Because of (2)). VSVs: It’s true that we could have used the sentence differently! ((s) But we do not do it. And it’s about actual use in the actual world). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Grice, P.H. | Schiffer Vs Grice, P.H. | Avramides I 56 Deception/SchifferVsGrice: the recognition of the speaker's intention by the listener must at least partly be the reason for the reaction - Problem: distinguishing primary intention, "with" which something is expressed - secondary: "in" which something is expressed - primary intention to cause the reaction is important - secondary: E.g. "by expressing a, he means b" - primary/(s): "with a he means x". Avramides I 60 VsGrice: Counter-E.g.:examination, learning, memory, inference, reckless speech, indifference with respect to the listener reaction, accusation - solution / Grice: "active belief" or belief that the speaker believes .. "(= activated belief, not querying learning material) - SchifferVs: problem: speaker often intend no belief in the listener - problem: then the analysis is no longer enough - solution: for real communication is necessary that belief is not caused but justified. Schiffer I XIX Expression meaning/intention based semantics (IBS)/SchifferVsIBS/SchifferVsIntention based semantics/intention supported: not only requires compositionality and relation theory, but also implies that Understanding/IBS: Thesis: is an inferential process (conclusions) SchifferVs: that's dubious. This in turn requires propositional knowledge that one clearly does not have! ((s) in relation to or as a "belief objects"). SchifferVsGrice: so by that the whole project is brought into disrepute. I 248 Speaker Meaning/SchifferVsGrice: depends also from the fact that the speaker himself is willing to describe himself accordingly. And the complex conditions of (S) are just not realistic. They make each utterance to a falsehood when you replace "to mean" in each pattern by "to say". Paradox of the Analysis/Schiffer: revenges here: IBS can maybe say what meaning is but by that it does cover nobody's notion of meaning. The IBS-analysis cannot replaced its analysandum by a that-proposition on a propositional attitude. IBS/Schiffer: of course it is about an analysis of "S believes that p" and not of "x believes that S means that p". Nevertheless, this can be seen as an obstacle to a reductive analysis. E.g. "It is snowing": is irreducible semantically. Point: in the end we can omit all speaker intentions here! It is not of interest, if it does not help to deliver the base I 249 For the semantic features of the expressions of natural language. Expression Meaning/SchifferVsIBS/SchifferVsGrice: IBS has much to say about speaker-meaning, but too little (surprisingly little) about expression meaning. And for good reason, as we shall see. I 264 Schiffer: Thesis: ultimately it is the way in which we use signs and sounds - described non-semantic and non-psychological - which explains our semantic knowledge (given the conceptual roles of our neural terms). SchifferVsGrice: Problem: the fact remains that we cannot formulate this semantic knowledge in non-semantic terms. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Grice, P.H. | Millikan Vs Grice, P.H. | I 3 Speech patterns/language device/terminology/Millikan: by that I mean words, syntactic forms, accentuation, accents, punctuation, etc. Thesis: such patterns have survived only because stable overt and covert responses of a cooperative partner are also handed down (have prevailed). Standardization/Millikan: the (voice) pattern exerts its own function only with a partner, but with anyone. Therefore, it must be standardized. Stabilization/Millikan/(S): (in time) with recurring token resemblance to earlier ones must be given. Stabilization/standardization/Millikan: two sides of a coin. Speech patterns/Millikan: can often be used in a parasitic way (diverted use). I 4 Ex metaphor, sarcasm, lying, irony. Standard: even if they are not being used in a deviating way the pattern may yet fail in use. Standardization/stabilization: therefore, they are not an "average function", but have to do with a "critical mass" of cases; they form a "center of gravity". Solution: can not be found by forming an "average" of idiolects. I 5 Characteristic function/language/meaning/MillikanVsGrice: we therefore do not take the meaning of the speaker as the fundamental concept. Meaningfulness/Millikan: we do not it explain with typical use. belief/wishes/intention/Millikan: thesis: can be explained without reference to language. I 51 quotation from Stevenson's "Kidnapped". I 52 Literature/Millikan: there are more ((S) fine) differences within the literature as many philosophers have opened up. Language/Millikan: in this chapter: what are there relations between 1. the stabilizing function of a speech pattern 2. its literal use 3. the speaker's intentions. Stabilizing function/Millikan: thesis of next chapter: an aspect of the meaning of words, of the syntactic form is the focused stabilizing function. literal use/Millikan: corresponds to no stabilizing function (see below). Intention according to Grice/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: thesis: Grice's intentions are not what drives usage and understanding. I 61 Understanding/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: thesis: is a direct perception of what a speech is about (aboutness), not a conclusion from the clauses heard! And certainly not a conclusion on speaker intentions. I 62 Conviction/Millikan: 1. arises partly from the internal composition of the subject (nerves, interconnection, etc.) but two people with the same interconnections need not have the same beliefs. I 63 2. not all the internal hardware is in use if you believe something. Belief/having/use/Millikan: I may have a conviction but not use is, Ex I almost never need the conviction that Columbus discovered America, especially not when I'm brushing my teeth. Discovery/Conviction/Millikan: Ex a mathematician who is awake and looking for a proof and finally finds it: one can not say of him_her that he_she has previously believed it! Imperative/Millikan: now, it is certainly the case that a listener when asked if the speaker had intended that s_he obeys the command, certainly will immediately answer "yes". I 64 But that does not mean that s_he has used this belief during obedience. Intentions according to Grice/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: are therefore superfluous. And they also can not help to distinguish non-natural meaning from less interesting things. Anyway, we do not need to consider Grice's intentions that are subject the only potential and not actual modifications of the nervous system. I 65 VsMillikan: it could be argued that one might have reasons for an act without these reasons being activated in the anatomy. Millikan: when I stop to believe in something, I'll refrain from the corresponding actions. Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: the only interesting question is whether they are actually realized inside while speaking. Ex Millikan: the sergeant says, "the next time I say 'stop' do not stop!" There is a similar Ex by Bennett. Problem: the training was so effective that the soldier is not able not to stop. I 66 Bennett: the conclusion is made in a non-Grice manner. Rationality/Bennett/Millikan: it seems that as a rational person one should not choose "shortcuts". That is, one must not only take account of positive evidence, but also of negative. ((S) The idea is that what has been rationally learned covers what is rationally demanded. But both times it is about speaker intentions, one time past ones, another time present ones). generally/formally: Ex Suppose John believes "Usually: if A then B" and also: "Non- (usually: if A-and-not-C, then B)" rational: then would follow that John had to believe. a) "usual: if A then C" and b) if A and C, then B. Then there are the following possible cases. 1. the only evidence of C comes from the fact that John knows that usually, if A then C. Then he should just move from A to B. 2. John has independent ways to believe C on the basis of evidence. And he encounters A, while he already has evidence of non-C. I 67 Then, rationally, he should also believe that non-C and not conclude from A to B. 3. John has independent evidence according to which he could know C, but this time he does not know beforehand, whether C. Question: to be rational, does he have to check beforehand whether C? Millikan: we assume that he has to. Problem: if again, that only depends on him believing: "Usually, if D, then C" etc. Rationality/Millikan: Problem: the more knowledge one then acquires, the more of an effort one must make to be rational at all. Would it not be better to omit all this verifying? |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Newen Vs Kripke, S. A. | NSI 106 Causal Chain/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: is formed a) by successive uses b) through a series of speaker intentions Names/Devitt/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis: the standard meaning of a name is the causal network which is formed by the sketched causal chain of communication. VsKripke/Newen/Schrenk: his theory, like all object theories, leads to the dilemma that informative identity sentences and negative existential statements and empty names cannot be treated adequately. Solution/Searle: mixed theory between object theory and description theory. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning | Grice, P.H. | Avramides I 10 Meaning/Grice/Avramides: Thesis: We begin with speaker meaning in a situation and deliver an analysis in terms of psychic states of the speaker and listener. We then reconstruct these terms as timeless meaning, word meaning and sentence meaning. I 11 The following sentence form is assumed as fundamental: "S means in a situation that p". To mean/Avramides: Grice has sufficiently clarified the concept of "meaning". I 43 Meaning/Speaker-Meaning/Grice: Thesis: "x means something" (in a situation) is roughly equivalent to: "S means something (in a situation) with x". (Grice 1957). I 46 Non-natural meaning/Grice: thesis: is never sufficient for an utterance to have a tendency to evoke a specific response. The utterance must be produced with a certain intention. I 95 Def Meaning/Grice/Avramides: Grice's access to meaning is precisely that that thesis meaning is a particular configuration of belief and intentions. Fod/Lep IV 166 Grice: thesis: meanings are inherited from contents of propositional attitudes. Meggle I 7 Thesis Grice: x means something (time-independent), S means something with x (time-independent). In explication from "means the same" follows "understands". I 19 Thesis: The speaker-situational meaning can be explained with recourse to speaker intentions. Time independent meaning and applied meaning can be explained with recourse to the concept of speaker-"situation"-meaning. Newen/Schrenk I 77 Meaning/Grice/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis: the crucial feature is the speaker's subjective meaning (intention). He does not elaborate on the background assumption that this can ultimately be reduced naturalistically to brain states. 5 stages of the treatment of speech behavior: 1. A description of the behaviour of the members of a linguistic community. 2. Psychological theory about the members, attribution of desires, beliefs, etc. thus a theory of propositional attitudes. I 78 3. Theory of subjective meanings a) for the listener, b) for the speaker. This leads to an interpretative meaning theory. 4. Intersubjective meaning, the so-called conventional meaning of utterance. Problem: Grice has no theory about conventions. I 79 5. Sentence meanings of complex sentences are deduced from the meanings of the parts. (>Compositionality). |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 |
| Meaning Theory | Quine, W.V.O. | Newen / Schrenk I 68 Def naturalistic BT / Newen / Schrenk: thesis that sentence meanings and word meanings are entirely attributable to natural phenomena. So behavior, but also ultimately brain states. Representatives. Quine Grice:> speaker intention, brain states. |
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