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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3627 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| A priori | Quine | McGinn I 161 There are two different views on a priori knowledge. Some authors say there is no a priori knowledge. >Elimination/Quine. A less radical view comprises that there is probably mathematical knowledge, but it is not a priori that there is a continuous transition to the empirical knowledge. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| A priori | Schopenhauer | Korfmacher Schopenhauer zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 I 17 A priori knowledge/Schopenhauer: 1st Law of inertia: every change needs a cause. 2nd Law of Perseverance: matter is eternal. Matter: is mere imagination. On the other hand, the brain is a product of matter. Solution: metaphysics. The organism is not just an idea, but something else. >Metaphysics, cf. >a posteriori, cf. >Mind Body Problem, >Imagination. |
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| A priori | Wittgenstein | II 96 A Priori/Wittgenstein: that would have to be a set whose meaning guaranteed its truth - but the meaning requires that we verify the sentence. - ((s) verificationism: can then not accept analytic truths). II 96/97 A Priori/Wittgenstein: expressions that look a priori must be explained. >Explanation. - The same expression can be a sentence or a hypothesis - thus, the same expression may be equation or hypothesis. >Sentences, >Hypotheses. Equation: is necessary. >Equations. Geometry: in visual space, it is a priori that an equilateral triangle is equiangular - you cannot see one without seeing the other. Physical space: here it is not a priori, because the triangle may be inclined. II 98 A Priori/Seeming/Appearing/Wittgenstein: "This chair looks green" here, our certainty is of logical nature and a priori. --- III 233 A Priori/Necessity/Wittgenstein/Late/Flor: Wittgenstein does not concede the a priori grammatical sentences a form of absolute necessity. >Necessity. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| A-not B Error | Psychological Theories | Upton I 55 A-not B Error/Psychological theories/Upton: according to Piaget the infant is assumed to reason that ‘if I wish to find the toy again I must do what I did before’. BaillargeonVsPiaget: This evidence is clearly incompatible with the findings of researchers such as Baillargeon (2002)(1), which suggest that the understanding that objects continue to exist even when not visible develops in the first few months of life. Other authors: Why would children aged eight to nine months, who understand that objects still exist when hidden, continue to search for an object in the wrong place when they have watched that object being hidden in a specific location? >Object permanence, >R. Baillargeon, >J. Piaget. A number of explanations have been put forward for this intriguing behaviour, including the fragility of infant memory (Harris, 1989)(2), habit perseveration (Diamond, 1985)(3), and changes in neurological functioning (Munakata, 1998)(4). However, none of these has been found to explain the A-not-B error adequately. According to Smith et al. (1999)(5), this is because the search for a single causal factor is mistaken. Arguing from a dynamic systems perspective, they assert that this behaviour can only be explained by considering multiple causes. The ability to search for the toy under the correct cloth is the result of a number of skills coming together at once. These different skills, such as knowledge of the task, perceptual and motor abilities, unfold over time at different rates. According to Smith et al. (1999)(5), it is the real-time integration of all these skills that will allow an infant to search in the right place, not the development of a single mental structure such as ‘understanding of object permanence’. >Object permanence/Developmental psychology, >Knowledge/Developmental Psychology. 1. Baillargeon, R. (2002) The acquisition of physical knowledge in infancy: a summary in eight lessons, in Goswami, U (ed.) Handbook of Child Cognitive Development. Oxford: Blackwell. 2. Harris, P.L. (1989) Object permanence in infancy, in Slater, A. and Bremner, J.G. (eds) Infant Development: Recent advances. Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum. 3. Diamond, A.D. (1985) Development of the ability to use recall to guide action as indicated by infants’ performance on AB. Child Development, 56: 868–83. 4. Munakata, Y .(1998) Infant perseveration and implications for object permanence theories: a PDP model of the AB task. Developmental Science, 1(2): 161–84. 5. Smith, L.B., Thelen, .E, Titzer, R. and McLin, D. (1999) Knowing in the context of acting: the task dynamics of the A-not-B error. Psychological Review, 106(2): 235–60. Available online at www.indiana.edu/~cogdev/labwork/SmithThelen1999.pdf (accessed 12 March 2011). |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Abduction | Abduction: (Charles S. Peirce) procedure of inference, which - unlike induction and deduction - expands knowledge. See also Inference to the Best Explanation. |
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| Abduction | Armstrong | III 104 Abduction/Peirce: conclusion to the best explanation. - E.g. on >hidden parameters - e.g. velocity faster than light, etc. - HolismVsAbduction. >Best explanation, >Holism. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Ability | McGinn | I 228 Philosophy/ability/Gene/McGinn: It could be that the genes have already unconsciously solved some real philosophical problems. - E.g. explanation of reason. >Reason. Genes save information, but are almost non-trainable. - >Information. This explains specific knowledge skills. - They almost never change. - They embody the blueprint for the body and the brain. >Knowledge. I 230 Their construction assets is a proof of their representation capacity. >Representation. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Absoluteness | Field | III 48 Absolute Point of Rest/Newton/Field: Newton considers absolute rest possible and necessary to define absolute acceleration (bucket experiment). Absolute Acceleration/Newton: uses the laws of mechanics for explanation - acceleration can only be explained by absolute speed. For this we need an absolute point of rest. FieldVs: that does not work, because the theory itself cannot pick out a reference system. >Reference systems. III 49 MachVsNewton: theory change, does not need a resting point. FieldVsMach/FieldVsTheory Change: better: define acceleration without numerical speed and resting point. FieldVsTensors: they are arbitrary. Solution/Field: simultaneity. Point: sameness of place over time is absolute rest. Vs: that does not work within Newton's theory! Solution: concept of space without structure (intrinsic). Solution: affine geometry - (this also for Newton). IV 419 Relativism/Absolute/Field: statements about justification relative to a system are absolutely true or false. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Abstinence Theory | Rothbard | Rothbard II 137 Abstinence Theory/interest/Rothbard: If profit were perhaps related to risk, what then accounts for the long-run ‘interest’ component of business profits? The dominant explanation for long-run interest in British economics soon became the abstinence theory of interest. The first presentation of time as the determinant of interest came from a theory related but superior to abstinence: Samuel Bailey's pioneering time-preference theory. Bailey's discussion came in the course of his brilliant demolition of Ricardo's labour theory of value and his championing of an alternative utility theory. Bailey begins his discussion of time and value by noting that if one commodity takes more time than another for its production, even using the same amount of capital and labour, its value will be greater. Ricardo: While Ricardo admits a problem here, James Mill in his Elements of Political Economy indefatigably asserts that time, being ‘a mere abstract word’, could not possibly add to anything's value. VsAbstinence theory: VsMill, James: Rebutting Mill, Bailey points out that ‘every creation of value’ implies a ‘mental operation’ - in short, a subjective analysis of value. Given a particular pleasure, Bailey went on, ‘We generally prefer a present pleasure or enjoyment to a distant one’ – in short, the omnipresent fact of time-preference for human life. >Time-preference. Rothbard II 138 Nassau William Senior: But the locus classicus of the abstinence theory was the lectures of Nassau W. Senior. It is true that they were not published until 1836, when they were published as the Outline of the Science of Political Economy (and also as the article on ‘Political Economy’ for the Encyclopedia Metropolitana), but they were delivered earlier as lectures at Oxford in 1827-28. Senior pointed out that savings and the creation of capital necessarily involve a painful present sacrifice, an abstinence from immediate consumption, which would only be incurred in expectation of an offsetting reward. Unfortunately, Senior lacked the concept of time-preference, so he was fuzzy about the specific motivation that would lead people to prefer present to future consumption. But he came to very similar conclusions, relating the degree of abstinence-pain (or, as the Austrians would later put it, time-preference for the present over the future) to ‘the least civilized’ peoples and the ‘worst educated’ classes, who are generally ‘the most improvident, and consequently the least abstinent’. >Capital/Senior. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Abstraction | Bigelow | I 380 Abstractions/Figures/Armstrong/Bigelow/Pargetter: Numbers are causally inactive. Mathematics/Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: some mathematical entities are even observable. >Mathematical entities, >Theoretical entities. I 381 Causation/Mathematics/BigelowVsArmstrong/Bigelow/Pargetter: in fact, people are not causes, but they are involved in causal processes. Numbers: they are also involved in causal processes. If objects did not instantiate the quantities they instanced, other changes would have occurred. Thus at least proportions are causally involved. ((s) FieldVsNumbers as causal agents, but not Vs proportions). >Propositions, >Hartry Field, >Causality. I 382 Counterfactual dependence/Bigelow/Pargetter: one can again set up consequences of counterfactual conditionals, e.g. For the lever laws of Archimedes. This also provides why-explanations. >Dependence/Bigelow, >Counterfactual dependence. I 383 Numbers/causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: this shows that numbers play a fundamental role in causal explanations. >Platonism, >Causal explanations. BigelowVsField: (ad Field, Science without numbers)(1): he falsely assumes that physics first starts with pure empiricism, in order to convert the results into completely abstract mathematics. Field/Bigelow/Pargetter: wants to avoid this detour. BigelowVsField: his project is superfluous when we realize that mathematics is only a different description of the physical proportions and relations and no detour. >Proportions. 1. H. Field, Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Abstraction | Quine | I 286 Intensional abstraction means "the act of being a dog", "the act of baking a cake", "the act of erring". I 289 Class abstraction re-traced to singular descriptions: (iy)(x)(x from y iff ..x..) - instead of: x^(..x..) - is not possible for intensional abstraction. I 295 Abstraction of relations, propositions and properties is opaque (E.g. of the planet). I 322 Property abstraction (elimination) instead of "a = x(..x..)". New is the irreducible two-digit Operator "0": "a0x(..x..)". Variables are the only thing that remains. The pronoun has primacy. IX 12ff Class Abstraction/Quine: class abstraction "{x:Fx}" refers to "the class of all objects x with Fx". In the eliminable combination that we have in mind "ε" appears only in front of a class abstraction term and class abstraction terms appear only after "ε". The whole combination "y ε {x: Fx}" is then reduced according to a law: Concretization Law/Quine: reduces "y ε {x: Fx}" to "Fy". Existence/Ontology: thus no indication remains that such a thing as the class {x:Fx} exists at all. Introduction: it would be a mistake, e.g. to write "*(Fx)" for "x = 1 and EyFy". Because it would be wrong to conclude "*(F0) *(F1)" from "F0 F1". Therefore we have to mistrust our definition 2.1 which has "Fx" in the definiendum, but does not have it in the definiens. IX 16 Relations Abstraction/Relation Abstraction/Quine: "{xy:Fxy}" is to represent the relationship of a certain x to a certain y such that Fxy. Relation/Correctness/Quine: parallel to the element relationship there is the concept of correctness for relations. Definition concretization law for relations/Quine: is also the definition correctness/relation: "z{xy: Fxy}w stands for "Fzw". IX 52 Function Abstraction/lambda operator/Quine: before terms one must generate terms (expressions). (Frege/Church: is here also valid of statements and thus a second time class abstraction, but both group statements are under terms and classes under functions (QuineVsFrege,QuineVsChurch). Definition lambda operator/Quine: if "...x..." contains x as a free variable, λx (...x...) is that function whose value is ...x... for each argument x - therefore λx(x²) the function "the "square of" - general: "λx(...x...)" stands for "{ : y = ...x...}" - identity: λx x{: y = x } = λ. - λx {z: Fxy} = {: y = {z: Fxz}} -. "λx a" stands for "{: y = a}". The equal sign now stands between variable and a class abstraction term. IX 181 Abstraction/Order/Quine: the order of the abstracting expression must not be less than that of the free variables. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Abstractness | Dennett | I 497 f Abstraction/Explanation/Dennett: Dan Sperber(1): You must not proceed too abstract intentionally. Abstract objects do not enter directly into the causal relationships. E.g. the excitement of a child is not caused by the abstract story of Little Peter's Journey to the Moon, but by the fact that he understands his mother's words. Dennett: this is no obstacle for science, on the contrary: it can cut the Gordian knot of tangled causal relationships by using an abstract formulation and ignoring all those complications. (>Intentional stance), >Propositional attitudes. I 498 E.g. the excitement of the child does not result from the abstract story, but from the understanding of the words of its mother. 1. Sperber, Dan 1985."Anthropology and Psychology: Towards an Epidemiology of Representations." Man, vol. 20, pp. 73-99. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Abstractness | Prior | I 5 Abstract/Prior: objects are sometimes abstract, but what we think about them is always abstract. >Abstract objects, >Thinking, >World/thinking. I 31 Abstracts/abstract/Prior: "3 is greater than 4" even if not true. - It is not eliminable. >Elimination. Adverbs and connections can be eliminated if we introduce nominators. >Adverbs. E.g. "that" in "that P comes implies that Q stays away". - E.g. "that P is wrong"- e.g. instead of "everything moves": "Movement is universal". Problem: there are still links (abstractions) needed. These links must be meaningful because they can be true or false. >Truth, >Truth values, >Connectives, >Logical constants. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Accelerator Theory | Keynes | Rothbard III 868 Accelerator Theory/Keynes/Rothbard: The "acceleration principle" has been adopted by some Keynesians as their explanation of investment, then to be combined with the "multiplier" to yield various mathematical "models" of the business cycle. >Investment Multiplier/Keynes, >Investments/Keynes. Before Keynes: The acceleration principle antedates Keynesianism, however, and may be considered on its own merits. It is almost always used to explain the behavior of investment in the business cycle. Rothbard: The essence of the acceleration principle may be summed up in the following illustration: Let us take a certain firm or industry, preferably a first-rank producer of consumers' goods. Assume that the firm is producing an output of 100 units of a good during a certain period of time and that 10 machines of a certain type are needed in this production. If the period is a year, consumers demand and purchase 100 units of output per year. The firm has a stock of 10 machines. Suppose that the average life of a machine is 10 years. Equilibrium: In equilibrium, the firm buys one machine as replacement every year (assuming it had bought a new machine every year to build up to 10).(1) Rothbard III 869 Demand: Now suppose that there is a 20-percent increase in the consumer demand for the firm's output. Consumers now wish to purchase 120 units of output. Assuming a fixed ratio of capital investment to output, it is now necessary for the firm to have 12 machines (maintaining the ratio of one machine: 10 units of annual output). In order to have the 12 machines, it must buy two additional machines this year. Add this demand to its usual demand of one machine, and we see that there has been a 200-percent increase in demand for the machine. A 20-percent increase in demand for the product has caused a 200-percent increase in demand for the capital good. Capital goods/demand: Hence, say the proponents of the acceleration principle, an increase in consumption demand in general causes an enormously magnified increase in demand for capital goods. Or rather, it causes a magnified increase in demand for "fixed" capital goods, of high durability. Stagnation: Now suppose that, in the next year, consumer demand for output remains at 120 units. There has been no change in consumer demand from the second year (when it changed from 100 to 120) to the third year. And yet, the accelerationists point out, dire things are happening in the demand for fixed capital. For now there is no longer any need for firms to purchase any new machines beyond what is necessary for replacement. Needed for replacement is still only one machine per year. As a result, while there is zero change in demand for consumers' goods, there is a 200-percent decline in demand for fixed capital. Causality/Keynesianism: And the former is the cause of the latter. Business cycles/crises: To the upholders of the acceleration principle, this illustration provides the key to some of the main features of the business cycle: the greater fluctuations of fixed capital-goods industries as compared with consumers' goods, and the mass of errors revealed by the crisis in the investment goods industries. Rothbard III 870 1. VsAccelerator theory/Rothbard: The acceleration principle is rife with error. An important fallacy at the heart of the principle has been uncovered by [W.H.] Hutt.(2) We have seen that consumer demand increases by 20 percent; but why must two extra machines be purchased in a year? What does the year have to do with it? If we analyze the matter closely, we find that the year is a purely arbitrary and irrelevant unit even within the terms of the example itself. We might just as readily take a week as the period oftime. Then we would have to say that consumer demand (which, after all, goes on continuously) increases 20 percent over the first week (…). Rothbard III 871 2.Vs: Secondly, the acceleration principle makes a completely unjustified leap from the single firm or industry to the whole economy. A 20-percent increase in consumption demand at one point must signify a 20-percent drop in consumption somewhere else. Comsumption demand: For how can consumption demand in general increase? Consumption demand in general can increase only through a shift from saving. But if saving decreases, then there are less funds available for investment. If there are less funds available for investment, how can investment increase even more than consumption? In fact, there are less funds available for investment when consumption increases. Consumption and investment compete for the use of funds. Explanation/physics/economics: The acceleration principle simply glides from a demonstration in physical terms to a conclusion in monetary terms.(3) RothbardVs: Furthermore, the acceleration principle assumes a constant relationship between "fixed" capital and output, ignoring substitutability, the possibility of a range of output, the more or less intensive working of factors. It also assumes that the new machines are produced practically instantaneously, thus ignoring the requisite period of production. 1. It is usually overlooked that this replacement pattern, necessary to the acceleration principle, could apply only to those firms or industries that had been growing in size rapidly and continuously. 2. See his brilliant critique of the acceleration principle in W.H. Hutt, Co-ordination and the Price System (unpublished, but available from the Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y., 1955), pp. 73-117. 3. Neglect of prices and price relations is at the core of a great many economic fallacies. |
EconKeyn I John Maynard Keynes The Economic Consequences of the Peace New York 1920 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Acceptability | Habermas | III 400/401 Acceptability/communicative action/Habermas: a speech act should be called "acceptable" if it fulfils the conditions so that a listener can say "yes". These conditions cannot be fulfilled unilaterally, neither speaker nor listener relative. Rather, they are conditions for the intersubjective recognition of a linguistic claim, which constitutes a content-specified agreement on liabilities that are relevant for the consequences of the interaction. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act. Within the theory of communicative action we start from the special case that the speaker literally means his statements. I call this case the standard conditions. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. III 406 A speaker can rationally motivate a listener to accept if, due to an internal connection between validity, validity claim and redemption of the validity claim, he/she can guarantee to give convincing reasons, if necessary, which stand up to criticism of the validity claim. The binding force of illocutionary success does not then stem from the validity of what has been said, but from the coordination effect of the guarantee it offers to redeem the validity claim if necessary. This applies in cases where there is no claim to power but a validity claim. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Accessibility | Cresswell | Hughes I 67f Accessibility/possible worlds/Hughes/Cresswell: many authors: From conceivability or imaginability. >Conceivability. E.g. game: the visibility relation between players. - Invisible worlds are not taken into account. Conceivability of worlds is always considered from the actual world: corresponding system T. >Actual world, cf. >Actuality. Necessity/T: Truth in a selected set of worlds. System T: necessity: only considers worlds that we can imagine. System S4: Transitivity of conceivability: what could be conceivable in other worlds. - (i.e. conceivable in a possible world, which in turn can be imagined from the actual world). - Then we have another necessity: truth in all worlds. System S5: all are visible to all, not a question of imagination. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Hughes I G.E. Hughes Maxwell J. Cresswell Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978 |
| Accuracy | Funder | Corr II 212 Accuracy/Personality Rating/Funder/Biesanz: Funder (1995)(1) argues that a complementary programme of research focusing on accuracy is needed – when and for whom are perceptions more accurate? The key to understanding this argument and perspective is that accuracy and bias can be unrelated conceptually and empirically. Eliminating bias may not change accuracy as they are not flip sides of the same coin. (…) all combinations of high and low accuracy and bias can coexist. The mere existence of bias – or the magnitude of it – does not inform us of the existence or magnitude of accuracy except at the extreme theoretical limits. Thus the existence of reliable and replicable biases and errors in judgments and impressions does not inform us of the accuracy of our impressions of others. Personality psychologists need to systematically examine and document the levels of accuracy in impressions of personality traits and dimensions. II 2013 (…) the constructivist perspective examines accuracy as a social construction (e.g., consensus among observers) and the actual personality of the person in question is, in a certain manner, irrelevant. If everyone agrees that Jack is annoying, then he is truly and really annoying. If Jack would be friendly and sociable and a pleasure to have around (…) those alternative and unobserved realities are not considered under this perspective. The pragmatic perspective defines accuracy in relation to how well assessments allow one to function and successfully interact with that person. Jack’s personality is, in a certain sense, not relevant as the only concern is how well do judgments of Jack’s personality allow one to interact successfully with Jack. In contrast, Funder defined realistic accuracy as a broader construct. >Realistic Accuracy Model/Funder. 1.Funder, D. C. (1995). On the accuracy of personality judgment: A realistic approach. Psychological Review, 102, 652–670. Biesanz, Jeremy C.: “Realistic Ratings of Personality Revisiting Funder (1995)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 209-223. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Acquaintance | Peacocke | I 180ff Acquaintance/Russell: via sense-data, resulting in complexes (aRb), immediate memory, universals. Objects are found as a component in thought. >Objects of thought, >Complexes, >Relation, >Picture theory, >Sense data, >Universals, >Memory. PeacockeVsRussell: we reinterpret that: the object specifies the type of the way of givennes. Objects appear intensionally in thought, not extensionally. >Objects (material things), >Thoughts, >Content, >Intensions, >Extensions, >Way of givenness. We think of objects as a characteristics of a type of a way of givenness in causal antecedents and consequences of thoughts. >Type/Token, >Causality, >Perception, >World/thinking. A descriptive explanation of action or a possible world requires no acquaintance. ((s) E.g. the winner has won the prize.) >Possible worlds, >Truth, >Logical knoledge. Demonstrative: requires acquaintance: ((s) The winner has a beard.) Aquaintance/Peacocke: Aquaintance is something quite different from identification between worlds. >Cross world identity, >Identification, >Individuation. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Action Systems | Parsons | Habermas IV 322 Action system/Parsons/Habermas: after Parsons got to know Malinowski's Freudian personality theory and cultural anthropology, his theoretical perspective shifted: action systems are no longer built up elementarily from their units, they are the starting point. For Parsons, the starting point is now the concept of culture; the systems of action society and personality are declared as institutional embodiments and motivational anchoring of cultural patterns. Elementary units are no longer units of action, but cultural patterns and symbolic meanings. These form configurations, systems of cultural values and interpretations that can be handed down. >S. Freud. Habermas IV 323 Problem: 1. How should the cultural determination of action systems be thought of? 2. How can the three concepts of order in the cultural, social and personality system be combined with the concept of action from which it could not be built? Habermas IV 326 Ad 1: Solution/Parsons: Value standards are no longer attributed to individual actors as subjective properties; culturally value patterns are introduced from the outset as intersubjective property. However, they are initially only regarded as components of cultural tradition and do not have normative binding force by their very nature. Habermas IV 327 Ad 2: From the conceptual perspective of communication-oriented action, the interpretative appropriation of traditional cultural contents presents itself as the act through which the cultural determination of action takes place. Habermas IV 328 HabermasVsParsons: this way of analysis is blocked by Parsons, because he sees the orientation towards values as an orientation towards objects. >Objects/Parsons. Habermas IV 358 Action System/Society/System/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons defined society as an action system from the mid-sixties of the 20th century, whereby culture and language give way to constitutive provisions instead of value-oriented purposive action. (1) In systems of action, the traditional cultural patterns penetrate through the medium of language with the genetically propagated organic equipment of the individual members of society. Collectives, which are composed of socialized individuals, are the carriers of the systems of action. Moreover, each action system is a zone of interaction and mutual penetration of four subsystems: Culture, society, personality and organism. Each of these subsystems is specialized in a basic function. (2) Habermas IV 359 Subsystems: since they have a relative autonomy, they are in contingent relationships with each other. However, these are determined to a certain extent by their membership of the common system of action. The subsystems form environments for each other. Control: for superior control of these basic functions, Parsons postulates a control hierarchy. (3) Habermas IV 381 At the end of his complex path of thought, Parsons is confronted with the epistemological model of the recognizing subject based on Kant for the action system. HabermasVsParsons: for the purposes of the foundation of social theory, however, the communication-theoretical model of the subject with its ability to speak and act is better suited than the epistemological one. 1. T. Parsons, Societies, Englewood Cliffs, 1966, p. 5. 2. Ibid. p. 7. 3. Ibid. p. 28 |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Action Theory | Habermas | III 369 Action Theory/Analytical Philosophy/Habermas: the analytical action theory ((s) following Grice, Austin) is limited to the atomistic action model of a solitary actor and neglects mechanisms of action coordination through which interpersonal relationships are formed. >P. Grice, >J.L. Austin. III 370 Therefore, it finds hardly any connection to the formation of social scientific concepts. The philosophical problems it creates are too non-specific for the purposes of social theory. >Sociology, >Method. HabermasVsAnalytical Philosophy/HabermasVsAnalytical Theory of Action: it goes back to Kant by asking about causality, intentionality and the logical status of explanations without penetrating into the basic questions of a sociological theory of action. >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Explanation. Instead, questions of coordination of action should be taken as a starting point.(1) >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas. III 371 HabermasVsGrice/HabermasVsBennett/HabermasVsLewis, David/HabermasVsSchiffer: the intentional semantics developed by these authors are not suitable for clarifying the coordination mechanism of linguistically mediated interactions, because it analyses the act of communication itself according to the model of consequence-oriented action. >Intentional Semantics, >St. Schiffer, >D. Lewis, >J. Bennett. Intentional Semantics/HabermasVsGrice: Intentional semantics is based on the contraintuitive idea that understanding the meaning of a symbolic expression can be traced back to the speaker's intention to give the listener something to understand. III 373 Solution/Habermas: Karl Bühler's organon model (see Language/Bühler), ((s) which distinguishes between symbol, signal and symptom and refers to sender and receiver) leads in its theoretical meaning to the concept of an interaction of subjects capable of speech and action mediated by acts of communication. >Interaction, >Subjects. III 384 Action Theory/Habermas: HabermasVsWeber: unlike Weber, who assumes a monological action model, Habermas considers a model that takes into account the coordination of several action subjects. He differentiates between action types according to situation and orientation: Action Orientation: success-oriented - or communication-oriented Action Situation: social - or non-social Instrumental Action/Habermas: is then success-oriented and non-social Strategic action: success-oriented and social (it takes into account the actions and interests of others). >Interest. Communicative Action: is social and communication-oriented (without being success-oriented). >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas, >Agreement, >Success. 1.S. Kanngiesser, Sprachliche Universalien und diachrone Prozesse, in: K. O. Apel (1976), 273ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Action Theory | Parsons | Habermas IV 301 Action Theory/System Theory/Parsons/Habermas: Parson's initial question is how society is possible as an ordered relationship of actions. IV 302 Action Theory: starts with the orientations of those acting. The theory assumes a coordination of the actors System theory: examines the integration that goes through action orientations. The theory here assumes a functional networking of action sequences that remain latent, i.e. can extend beyond the orientation horizon of the participants. An orientation towards values and norms that is relevant in action theory is not constitutive for system integration. Habermas IV 303 Problems: 1) the theoretical framework for action is too narrow to develop a concept of society. 2) In system theory, the theory of action cannot be reinterpreted and assimilated without reservation. 3) HabermasVsParsons, Talcott: Parson's theory of modernity is too harmonizing because it does not have the means for a plausible explanation of pathological development patterns. >Modernism. Habermas IV 304 HabermasVsParsons: his theory of action is not complex enough to win a concept of society. >Action Theory/Habermas, >Society/Habermas. Solution/Parsons: at the transition from the level of the action to the level of the context of action, he must change the perspective and the terms. Problem: then it looks as if this transition on its own accord refers to the concept of society as a self-directed system. Solution/Habermas: with the term "lifeworld" as a complement to the term "communicative action", the reproduction of the lifeworld can already be analysed under various functional aspects. This makes a change of perspective superfluous. >Lifeworld, >Communicative Action. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Action Theory | Weber | Habermas III 378 Action Theory/Communicative Action/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: since Weber assumes a monological model of action, "social action" cannot be explained by the concept of meaning. It is based on the concept of purposive action and must extend it by two provisions to explain social interaction: a) Orientation towards the behaviour of other subjects b) The reflective relationship between the orientations of several interaction participants. >Purposive action, >Purpose rationality, >Action, >Interaction, >Cooperation. Habermas III 379 Act/Action/Weber/Habermas: Weber distinguishes between procedural rational value rational emotional and traditional action. Weber therefore does not start with the social relationship. >Value rationality, >Rationality, cf. >Rationalization. Habermas III 380 Purpose rational action/Weber: the subjective sense here extends to: Means, purposes, values, consequences Value rational action: on means, purposes, values Emotional action: on means and purposes Traditional action: only on the means. Cf. >Purpose-means-rationality, >Purposes, >Goals, >Values, cf. >Consequentialism. Habermas III 381 Habermas: "Inofficial version" of Weber's theory of action ((s) this is a position not explicitly represented by Weber, which could, however, be deduced from his texts): here mechanisms of coordination of action are distinguished, depending on whether only interests or also social agreement are taken as a basis. (1) >Action Theory/Habermas. 1.Vgl. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, S.246f. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Actions | Austrian School | Coyne I 7 Human Action/Austrian School/Coyne/Boettke: The human scientist can assign purpose to the phenomena under discussion. In fact, she must assign human purpose if she wishes to render those phenomena under investigation intelligible. >Purpose, >Means and ends, >Understanding. We can understand that paper is not just being stuffed into boxes for no reason, but rather that a postman is delivering mail to individuals who reside at specific addresses. This understanding is available because the human scientist can rely upon the knowledge of ideal types of other human beings. We know some human beings because of our daily face-to-face relations with them (…). Other humans we know through the functions they perform or beliefs they supposedly hold (…). The majority of other people, however, we simply know in anonymity as “human” - that is, beings who freely choose and strive to obtain their goals by arranging and rearranging the means available. We can understand the purposeful behaviour of “the other” because we, ourselves, are human. >Intersubjectivity, >Objectivity. This knowledge, referred to as “knowledge from within,” is unique to the human sciences, and it creates fundamental issues of analysis when it is eliminated by importing the methods of the natural sciences to the social sciences to create “social physics.” >Sociology. Coyne I 8 For Austrian economists, the subjective nature of human beings permeates all aspects of economics. The “facts” of the human sciences are not objective, as in the natural sciences, but rather consist of how people perceive the world. All phenomena are filtered through the human mind. MengerVsWalras/MengerVsJevons: This understanding distinguished Menger from his co-revolutionaries (Jevons and Walras) in the marginal revolution. All three thinkers appreciated the idea of marginalism and the role of marginal utility. But Menger stressed that the evaluations of the desired ends, as well as the determination of the best means to achieve those ends, are uniquely subjective to the individual chooser. >Marginalism, >Marginal utility. |
Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020 |
| Actions | Davidson | Glüer II 108 Actions/Davidson: Action depends on description (Example: Mary) - Events are independent of description. >Events/Davidson. E.g. Mary shoots the burglar and kills her father. Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation. Glüer II 109 f Davidson can argue precisely on the basis of the anomalism thesis (cf. >anomalous monism) in favor of a monism 1: monism results from the combination of two other premises of the theory of action: (Causal Interaction) principle of causal interaction. At least some mental events interact causally with physical events. (Undeniable) (Nomological Character) principle of the nomological character of causality: events that are in cause-effect relation fall under strict laws. Brandom I 724 Action/Davidson: is an act if there is a description under which it is intentional - Brandom: there are two kinds of intentional explanation: a) what was intended - b) what was achieved I 726 Success/Problem: Nicole successfully killed the animal in front of her (cow instead of stag) - is description dependent. Brandom I 727 She believed of a cow (de re) that it was a stag - incorrect de dicto: she believed "the cow was a stag" (that the cow). I 728 Reference: she had (without realizing it) the intention, in relation to the cow, to shoot it - it is about the content of the commitment, not about the type of commitment. - as in beliefs. Brandom I 957 Accordion Effect/success/Davidson: Example: even though the powder was wet, she succeeded in bending her finger - so there is success in every action. - Example Mountain Climber. I 958 Solution/Brandom: Reference to VURDs: there needs to be nothing that I intend and in which I succeeded. I 729 Example: I reach for the bread and spill the wine. I 957 Intention: is not wanting that a sentence becomes true (de dicto). Intentions do not correspond to the specifications agreed on, but to the ones recognized - Davidson: muscle contraction does not need to be part of the intention - Brandom: but intentionally I can only contract my muscles in this way by reaching for the bread - the content of the intention can thus be specified as de re - thus success or failure can be established. Glüer II 92 Quine: ontology is only physical objects and classes - action is not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action event and reference object. Glüer II 96 Action/Event/Adverbial Analysis/Davidson/Glüer: Problem: there are 2 types of adverbs resist: 1) Example "almost" hit: syncategorematic, not removable 2) Example "good", "large", "small" can possibly be omitted. MontagueVsDavidson: Events are superfluous, "modifier theory" - KimVsDavidson: to not identify events with individuated individuals, but with properties - ((s) i.e. inversely) Glüer II 110 Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation - ((s) Because the example of the differing causal chain superimposes an intention and makes it ineffective - Example Mountain Climbers.) ((s) Something does not yet become action, because it is intentional, proper causation must be added.) >Intentions, >Explanations, >Meaning, >Language. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Actions | Frith | I 99 Action/consciousness/Daniel Wegner/Frith: Thesis: we have no direct knowledge that we are the originators of our actions. >Knowledge, >Intentionality, >Intentions. I 100 E.g. There is a second test partner, who actually works with the experimental director, and who moves the mouse in a computer test almost in unison to you, but sometimes not, or with time delay. N.B.: then you will think you are the one who moves the mouse (or cursor). This is also true vice versa. I 102 Action/Frith: for example, a person on a treadmill should perform various responses to changes in the resistance or the speed increase, e.g. maintaining the energy, the tempo, etc. N.B.: the people changed their way of walking several seconds before they had noticed the change in the resistance of the treadmill! I 202 Originator/action/movement/foreign psychological/sovereignty/Frith: something that is as private as pain is the experience that we are the originators of our actions. >Authorship, >Libet experiment. Cause/effect/Frith: cause and effect are connected here to units, as, for exampe, color, form and movement are connected to form objects. Object/thing/Frith: thesis: the object arises from a combination of form, color and movement. I 252 Action/freedom/freedom of will/Frith: why does my brain make me feel like a free acting being? Thesis: it is beneficial for us to feel like free actors. Why this is the case, I can only answer very speculatively: I 253 It has to do with altruism. Altruism/Frith: altruism is one of the most difficult problems in evolutionary biology. J. B. S. Haldane: "I would sacrifice my life for two brothers or eight cousins." Def Dictator Game/Frith: e.g. a player gets a hundred dollars and can decide how much of it he/she gives to another player, which he/she does not know and of which he/she knows that this person will never meet him/her again. Most people give about $30. Def Ultimatum Game/Frith: here the other players can influence the result: if the one rejects the offer, both will leave with empty hands. If a player gives less than 30 dollars, he is usually punished by the other players. Thesis: we have a strong sense of fairness. >Fairness, >Ultimatum game. Def altruistic punishment/Frith: sometimes we even pay to punish someone else, e.g. free riders. With them we have no compassion. Our brain rewards us for the punishment of free riders. >Free rider. Def 2n level free rider/Frith: free riders are people who rely on others carrying out the punishment and never do it themselves. Freedom/freedom of will/Frith: freedom is a consequence of the fact that we are experiencing ourselves as free actors, that we also assume this of other people. >Intersubjectivity. Child: differs between intentional and unintentional action already at the age of three years. >Stages of development. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Actions | Lewis | IV 158 Action/explanation/unrealized possibilities/possibilia/Lewis: problem: how can unrealized possibilities explain our actions? Solution: brain states are characterized by belief. These are associated with thought objects, i.e. with quantities that are partially made of un-updated individuals. They are in these relations because they bear these interpretations and they bear the interpretations through the causal powers - not vice versa. >Objects of Belief, >Objects of Thought, >Possibilia. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Actions | Peacocke | I 158 Action/Peacocke: Actions are explicable only by intension of the goal. - demonstrative givenness of the item must be included in the declaration (cf. "indispensability thesis"). - ((s) Action is always intensional.) >Intension, >Extension, >Intensionality, >Intentions, >Intentionality, >Desire, >Planning, >Goals, >Purposes, >Explanations. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Actions | Stigler | Rothbard III 326 Action/Stigler/Böhm-Bawerk/Rothbard: (…) the mathematics of simultaneous equations, dealing in physics with unmotivated motion, stresses mutual determination. In human action, however, the known causal force of action unilinearly determines the results. This gross misconception by mathematically inclined writers on the study of human action was exemplified during a running attack on Eugen Böhm-Bawerk, one of the greatest of all economists, by (…) George Stigler: StiglerVsBöhm-Bawerk: „. . . yet the postulate of continuity of utility and demand functions (which is unrealistic only to a minor degree, and essential to analytic treatment) is never granted. A more important weakness is Böhm-Bawerk’s failure to understand some of the most essential elements of modern economic theory, the concepts of mutual determination and equilibrium (developed by the use of the theory of simultaneous equations). Mutual determination is spurned for the older concept of cause and effect.“(1) RothbardVsStigler: The “weakness” displayed here is not that of Böhm-Bawerk, but of those, like Professor Stigler, who attempt vainly and fallaciously to construct economics on the model of mathematical physics, specifically, of classical mechanics.(2) 1. George J. Stigler, Production and Distribution Theories (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1946), p. 181. For Carl Menger's attack on the concept of mutual determination and his critique of mathematical economics in general, see T.W. Hutchison, A Review of Economic Doctrines, 1870-1929 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 195 3), pp. 147-48, and the interesting article by Emil Kauder, "Intellectual and Political Roots of the Older Austrian School," Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie XVII, 4 (1958), 412 ff. 2. Stigler appends a footnote to the above paragraph which is meant as the coup de grace to Böhm-Bawerk: "Böhm-Bawerk was not trained in mathematics." Stigler, Production and Distribution Theories. Mathematics, it must be realized, is only the servant oflogic and reason, and not their master. "Training" in mathematics is no more necessary to the realization of its uselessness for and inapplicability to the sciences of human action than, for example, "training" in agricultural techniques is essential to knowing that they are not applicable on board an ocean liner. Indeed, training in mathematics, without adequate attention to the epistemology of the sciences of human action, is likely to yield unfortunate results when applied to the latter, as this example demonstrates. Böhm-Bawerk's greatness as an economist needs no defense at this date. For a sensitive tribute to Böhm-Bawerk, see Joseph A. Schumpeter, "Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, 1851-1914" in Ten Great Economists (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), pp. 143-90. For apurely assertive and unsupported depreciation of Böhm-Bawerk's stature as an economist, see Howard S. Ellis' review of Schumpeter's book in theJournal of Political Economy, October, 1952, p. 434. |
EconStigler I George J. Stigler Gary S. Becker De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum 1977 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Active/passive | Chomsky | Lyons I 258 Active/Passive/Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: although subject and object are interchanged, identity or similarity prevails between the two corresponding sentences in the deep structure. However, this is also a prerequisite for determining that subject and object can be exchanged. >Transformational grammar, >Subject, >Object, >Grammar, >Syntax. Problem: there is disagreement about whether dissimilation prevails here or not. For example, suppose that "the shooting of the hunters" is not ambiguous. Problem: then we would still require the grammar to be written in the following way that a) between "the shooting of the hunters" and the transitive sentence NP1 "shoot the hunters", and b) between "the hunters shooting" and the intransitive "the hunters shoot" relationships are established. Lyons I 261 Active/Passive/Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: (N. Chomsky, Syntactic Structures, Berlin, New York 1957) Passive (optional) Structural descriptions: NP – Aux – V NP Structural change: X1 – X2 - X3 – X4 > X4 – X2 + be + en – V – by + X1 (Notation: concatenation: sometimes „+“, sometimes “–„ (is not explained here). different: (formally more precise): NP1 – Aux – V – NP2 > Aux + be + en – V – by + NP1 T-rule: contains two parts: the description (analysis, notation: SA, SB) and the change (structural change, notation: SC, SV). By definition, T-rules are only effective in chains that can be analyzed by means of the elements indicated in their structural description. Transformation: its result is exactly what has already been described in the alternative representation of the rule: NP1 – Aux – V – NP2 > Aux + be + en – V – by + NP1 What does it mean that the chain can be analyzed using four elements (NP, Aux, V and NP)? I 262 The following chains resulted from the rules: from (1): NP + VP (2): NP + Verb + NP (3) : NP sing + Verb + NP sing (4): T + N + 0 + Verb + T + N + 0 (6): T + N + 0 + Aux+ V + T + N + 0 (7) T + N + 0 + C + M + have + en + V + T ü N + 0. Rule (3) n d(4) was applied twice (4), because NP sing f both positions were selected in the output of rule (2). Rule (5) was not applicable. Rule (7): Au has been replaced by C + M + have + en. The edition of (7) is a core chain which is underlied by the type of corresponding active and passive sentences, e.g. "The man will have read the book" and "The book will have been read by the man". Passive transformation: now we apply them to the chain: where none of the elements specified in the structural description with respect to the passive transformation occur in the core chain. Furthermore, we did not come across the chain NP + Aux + V + Np at any stage of deriving the core chain through the PS rules. Therefore, we review the rules again to create the constituent structure of the desired core chain: By rule (1): ∑ (NP + VP) (2): ∑ (NP + VP)(Verb + NP)) (3): ∑ (NP (NP sing) + VP(Verb + NP(NP sing))) (4): ∑ (NP (NP sing (T + N + 0)) + VP(Verb + NP(NP sing(T + N + 0)))) (6): ∑ (NP (NP sing (T + N + 0)) + VP(Verb (Aux + V)+ NP(NP sing(T + N + 0)))) (7): ∑ (NP (NP sing (T + N + 0)) + VP(Verb (Aux (C + M + have + en) + V)+ NP(NP sing(T + N + 0)))). This is the constituent structure of sentences that is the basis of sentences such as "The man will have read the book" and "The book will have been read by the man." (active/passive). Lyons I 262 Definition Phrase Marker/P-Marker/Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: if a chain is represented with constituent parentheses and parentheses indices (labelled-bracketing), this is referred to as a formation marker or P-marker. Def parenthesis index: labelled-bracketing/terminology: Designation of a node in the tree diagram or symbol in front of a parenthesis. I 263 Def Dominate/Dominance/Chomsky/Lyons: a symbol dominates an entire parentheses expression when the parentheses in the P marker is opened immediately after this symbol. In the tree diagram: The symbol dominates everything that is derived from the node indicated by the symbol. Def (structural) analyzability/grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: (is a condition for the application of T-rules): if a chain without residual elements can be broken down into subchains, each of which is dominated by a symbol given in the structural description of the T-rules, then the chain satisfies the conditions defined by the structural description (SB). Passive transformation/Chomsky/Lyons: (is optional) and looks like this: {T + N + 0} + {C + M + have + en} + {V} + {T + N + 0} NP1 - Aux - V - NP2 Transformation: due to the operation of the actual T-Rule (in the structural change), a further chain (no more core chain) results as output, which then serves with its P-marker as input for further T-Rules. >Unambiguity. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Acts of Will | Geach | I 251f Vs"Acts of Will"/Geach: attribution of responsibility instead of causality (GeachVs)-Vs: "ascription theory" ("ascriptivism", Oxford). Ascriptivism/Oxford: Thesis: saying that an action is voluntary is not a description of the action, but an attribution. "All he said"/Oxford: Thesis: this would not be about description but about "confirmation". >Everything he said is true. GeachVs: such theories can be invented by the dozen. - The actual distinction to be observed is the one between naming and predication. >Naming, >Predication. VsAscription Theory: condemning a thing by calling it "bad" must be explained by the more general concept of predication, and such predication can also be done without condemnation. Neither can "done deliberately" be characterized by attribution of responsibility or "being imposed" without describing the act as such first. Cf. >Prescriptivism, cf. >"voluntarily"/Austin. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Adam Smith Problem | Economic Theories | Otteson I 24 Adam Smith Problem/economic theories/Otteson: [There is a] historical and scholarly issue known as the “Adam Smith Problem,” which alleges a rift between the account of morality Smith gives in TMS(1), on the one hand, and the seemingly different account of political economy Smith gives in his Wealth of Nations(2), on the other. Can the two accounts be reconciled? Otteson: (….) both accounts could be reconciled by a proper understanding of Smith’s “political economy” project. >Political economy/Smith, >Morality/Adam Smith, >Stages of Development/Adam Smith, >Justice/Adam Smith. Spontaneous order: The explanation Smith offers for the development of moral standards holds the process to create what we today might call "spontaneous order." A spontaneous order is a system that arises, as Smith's contemporary Adam Ferguson put it, as "the result ofhuman action, but not the execution of any human design" (Ferguson, 1996(3) [1767]: 119). As this theory was developed by twentieth-century thinkers like Michael Polanyi and Friedrich Hayek, it referred to the development of an orderly system that arose from the decentralized actions of individuals but without their intending to design any overall system. Language is a good example. The English language is a relatively orderly system: it contains rules of grammar, definitions of words, and accepted or acceptable pronunciations, but there was no single person or group of persons who invented or designed it. It lives and changes according to the purposes and desires of the users of the language, and its rules are generated and enforced by the users themselves. Another prime example of spontaneous order is ecosystems. Otteson I 25 One more example of spontaneous order: an economic market. As Smith would go on to describe in his Wealth of Nations(2), the individual actors in economic markets certainly have intentions - they all want, in his words, to "better their own condition" (WN(1) 345) - but they nevertheless typically do not have any larger intentions in mind regarding an overall system of market order. They just want to achieve their localized purposes in cooperation with other willing individuals. Yet individuals' decentralized attempts to achieve their purposes lead to the development of patterns and even principles of behavior that can look as if some wise person designed it all. Adam Smith Problem/Solution/Spontaneous order/Smith:. Smith's argument is that human morality is a social system that arises – (…) like markets - on the basis of countless individual decisions, actions, and interactions but without any overall plan and with no overall designer. >Rules/Adam Smith. 1. Smith, Adam (1982) [1759]. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie, eds. Liberty Fund. 2. Smith, Adam. (1776) The Wealth of Nations. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell. 3 Ferguson, Adam (1996) [1767]. An Essay on the History of Civil Society. Edited by Fania Oz-Salzberger. Cambridge University Press. |
Otteson I James R. Otteson The Essential Adam Smith Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2018 |
| Adaption | Ecological Theories | Norgaard I 331 Adaption/Climate Change/Climate Justice/Ecological Theories: The logic of adaptation as a matter of justice is, at one level, quite straightforward: if a person or community has been put at risk from anthropogenic climate change, and that risk can be reduced or eliminated by some kind of proactive investment supported by those who have caused the risk, there is a moral obligation to make that investment. (…) the obligations implied by ‘adaptation’ could be justified by an ‘ability to help’ principle, even in the absence of causal responsibility for the imposition of risk (Jamieson 1998(1); Caney 2009(2)). VsAdaption: (…) because the populations most at risk from anthropogenic climate change are by and large the same populations most at risk from ‘normal’ climatic variability and extreme weather events, it is conceptually very difficult if not impossible to separate investments that address only the ‘additional’ risk from anthropogenic change. (…) where it is possible to separate those who are most vulnerable to anthropogenic climate change, offering them protection through pro‐active adaptation implies directing assistance not to those who are most vulnerable to climate‐mediated harm, but to those whose vulnerability is increased by anthropogenic warming. Adaption/Development: It is widely recognized that ‘adaptation’ looks very similar to ‘development’. Indeed, it is one of the ironies that the logic of effective adaptation implies integrating adaptation funding and activities with existing development planning, policies, and projects (so‐ called ‘mainstreaming—e.g. Huq et al. 2004(3); Yamin 2005(4)), while the desire of developing countries Norgaard I 332 to increase the level of transfers and their control over it has led to demands for adaptation assistance to be separated from and demonstrably ‘additional’ to existing development aid, and under the control of new, UNFCCC‐directed institutions. >Climate justice, >Environmental ethics. 1. Jamieson, D. 1998. Global responsibilities: Ethics, public health and global environmental change. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 5: 99–120. 2. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Huq, S. et al. 2004. Mainstreaming adaptation to climate change in Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Climate Policy 4(1): 25–43. 4. Yamin, F. 2005. The European Union and future climate policy: Is mainstreaming adaptation a distraction or part of the solution? Climate Policy 5: 349–61. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Adequacy | Millikan | I 14 Adequacy/Millikan: by making our judgments interact with those of others in a community, we have additional evidence that they are appropriate. Thus new concepts are developed, which can be tested independently of theories, or not. >Community, >Judgment, >Truth, >Coherence, >Concept. I 299 Concepts/Adequacy/Millikan: when they are adequate, concepts exercise their eigenfunction in accordance with a normal explanation. Their eigenfunction is to correspond to a variant of the world. An adequate term produces correct acts of identification of the referents of its tokens. >Terminology/Millikan. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Adjectives | Gärdenfors | I 116 Adjective/Noun/Word Classes/Gärdenfors: Thesis: the main semantic difference between adjectives and nouns is that adjectives such as "red", "big" and "round" typically refer to a single area and thus represent properties, while nouns such as "dog", "apple" and "city" contain information on several areas and therefore... --- I 117 ...represent object categories. But this is only a rule of thumb. > Categories/Gärdenfors. --- I 135 Adjectives/Word Classes/Functions/Gärdenfors: can A) be regarded as a means of specifying objects B) on a second level (for the coordination of similarities), the adjective has an informative function: e.g. The oven is hot. Logical form: in this case, the adjective is a complement to the copula "is". Problem: it is not clear that these two functions (specification and information) can be exercised by the same word class. (Dixon 2004, p. 30)(1). There are adjectives that can only be used specifically (e.g., alive), and those that are used only informatively (predicatively), e.g. "absolute". (Paradis, 2005)(2) Specification: can also be performed by nouns. --- I 136 Gärdenfors: Thesis on Adjectives: the meaning of an adjective can be represented in a convex region of a single area. E.g. colour words: no language has only one word for what is called "green" and "orange" in German. Conceptual Space/Colour words/Gärdenfors: for my thesis that there is a single area for adjectives, evidence has been found: I 137 See Taft and Sivik (1997)(3), Sivik & Taft (1994)(4), Jäger (2010)(5), Cook, Kay & Regier (2005)(6) Problem: Adjectives like "healthy" are at the limit of many dimensions e.g. having no pain,... --- I 138 ...having no infection, etc. Therefore, the importance of "healthy" of the one-area thesis for adjectives does not seem to apply here. Solution Gärdenfors: a) one can assume an area disease-health. This is how doctors proceed. Vs: Problem: we cannot create a product room here. B) A "health dimension" can be assumed as a diagonal in the product space, which covers all dimensions involved in disease and health. GärdenforsVs: I find this less attractive. 1. Dixon (2004) Dixon, R. M. W. (2004). Adjective Classes in typological perspective. In R. M. W. Dixon & A. Y. Aikhenvald (Eds.) Adjective classes: A cross-linguistic typology (pp. 1-49) Oxford. 2. Paradis, C. (2005) Ontologies and construals in lexical semantics. Axiomathes, 15, 541-573. 3. Taft, C., & Sivik, L. (1997). Salient color terms in four languages. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 38, 26–31. 4. Sivik, L., & Taft, C. (1994). Color naming: A mapping in the NCS of common color terms. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 35, 144–164. 5. Jäger, G. (2010). Natural color categories are convex sets. Amsterdam Colloquium 2009, LNAI 6042 (pp. 11–20). Berlin: Springer. 6. Cook, R. S. Kay, P., & Regier, T. (2005) The World Color Survey database: History and use. In H. Cohen & C. Lefebvre (Eds.) Handbook of categorization in cognitive science (pp. 223-242). Amsterdam. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Adolescence | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 112 Adolescence/Developmental psychology/Upton: current evidence suggests that ‘storm and stress’ does not describe the typical experience of an adolescent. Puberty is a period of rapid physical change, involving hormonal and bodily changes. However, it is not a single sudden event, but rather an extended set of changes that take place over time (Dorn et al., 2006)(1). These changes include increases in height and weight, and reaching sexual maturity. The specific changes are different for boys and girls, as are the timings at which such changes occur. In general, girls enter puberty approximately two years before boys. Initial changes are associated with increased height and weight. On average, for girls this growth spurt begins at the age of nine years, while for boys this is closer to 11 years of age. The peak of this growth spurt happens approximately three years later, so girls are growing fastest between 12 and 13 years of age, while boys are growing fastest between the ages of 14 and 15 years. During the growth peak, girls grow by around 9cm a year and boys by 10cm. Upton I 113 The adolescent growth spurt starts on the outside of the body and works inwards, so the hands and feet are the first to expand, followed by arms and legs, which then grow longer. Following this the spine elongates. The last expansion is a broadening of the chest and shoulders in boys, and a widening of the hips and pelvis in girls. Hormonal changes: This growth spurt is triggered by a flood of hormonal changes, which is set off by the hypothalamus and pituitary gland. The main hormones associated with pubertal changes are testosterone and oestrodiol. Both of these chemicals are present in the hormonal make-up of both boys and girls, but testosterone dominates in male pubertal changes and oestrodiol in female pubertal changes. In boys, increases in testosterone are associated with an increase in height, a deepening of the voice and genital development. For girls, increasing levels of oestrodiol are linked to breast, uterine and skeletal development (e.g. widening of the hips). It has been suggested that these same hormones may contribute to psychological develop ment in adolescence (Rapkin et al.. 2006)(2). For example, studies have shown links between testosterone levels and perceived social competence in boys (Nottelmann et al., 1987)(3), and between oestrodiol levels and the emotional responses of girls (Inoff-Germain et al., 1988)(4). (…) there is evidence that the link between behaviour and hormones may work in the opposite direction as well, since behaviour and mood have been found to influence hormone levels (Susman. 2006)(5). Indeed, it seems unlikely that hormones alone can account for the psychological changes that occur in adolescence (Rowe et al.. 2004)(6). In general, (…), it seems that all adolescents show some body dissatisfaction during puberty (Graber and Brooks Gunn, 2001)(7). The evidence suggests that girls tend to become increasingly dissatisfied as they move through puberty, while boys become increasingly satisfied. (McCabe et al. 2002)(8). At 11 to 12 years of age, early-maturing girls tend to have greater satisfaction with their body shape than late-maturing girls. However, this changes as girls reach 15 to 16 years of age, when late-maturing girls start to Upton I 114 Report greater satisfaction with their body shape (Simmons and Blyth, 1987)(9). Early-maturing girls have also been found to be more vulnerable to emotional and be havioural problems, including depression, eating disorders and engaging in risky health be haviours such as smoking, drinking and drug taking, and early sexual behaviours (Wiesner and Ittel. 2002)(10). These girls are also more likely to have lower educational and occupational attainments (Stattin and Magnusson, 1990)(11). It seems that girls who physically mature at a younger age spend more time with their older peers and are easily drawn into problem behaviours, because they do not have the emotional maturity to recognise the long-term effects of such behaviours on their development (Sarigiani and Petersen. 2000)(12). However, there is evidence to suggest that the negative psychosocial consequences of early puberty may not last into later adolescence or adulthood (Blumstein Posner. 2006)(13). >Self-description/Developmental psychology. Upton I 122 Cognitive skills/adolescence: There is also evidence that changing cognitive skills reflect ongoing structural and functional brain development. Structural MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) studies, for example, have demonstrated that the brain undergoes considerable development during adolescence, particularly in the prefrontal cortex (e.g. Huttenlocher et al.. 1983)(14). It is thought that the production of synapses in the prefrontal cortex continues up until puberty, followed by synaptic pruning during adolescence. This is accompanied by an increase in myelination in this area of the cortex. These structural changes are believed to represent the fine-tuning of this brain circuitry, so increasing the efficiency of the cognitive systems it serves (Blakernore and Choudhury, 2006)(15). There is also some suggestion that functioning in the frontal cortex increases with age (e.g. Rubia et al.. 2000)(16), although this has been challenged by some researchers (e.g. Durston et al., 2006)(17). Upton I 123 (…), the ability to engage in abstract reasoning (…) increases; adolescent thinking is no longer tied to specific concrete examples as it was during late childhood, meaning that they can engage in hypothetical deductive reasoning. >Egocentrism/Psychological theories, >Egocentrism/Elkind, >Self-Consciousness/Developmental psychology, >Risk perception/Developmental psychology, >Morality/Developmental psychology, >Egocentrism/Elkind, >Youth Culture/Developmental psychology, >Self/Developmental psychology, >Friendship/Developmental psychology, >Peer Relationship/Developmental psychology, >Self-Esteem/Developmental psychology, >Identity/Marcia. 1. Dorn. LD. Dahi, RE. Woodward, HR and Biro. F (2006) Defining the boundaries of early adolescence: a user’s guide to assessing pubertal status and pubertal timing in research with adolescents. Applied Developmental Science, 10: 30-56. 2. Rapkin A, Tsao, JC, Turk, N Anderson, M and Zelter, LK (2006) Relationships among self -rated tanner staging, hormones, and psychosocial factors in healthy female adolescents. Journal of Pediatric Adolescent Gynecology, 19: 181-7. 3. Nottelmann, ED, Susman, EJ, Blue,JH, Inoff-Germain, G and Dorn, LD (1987) Gonadal and adrenal hormone correlates of adjustment in early adolescence, in Lerner, RM and Foch, TT (eds) Biological-psychosocial Interactions in Early Adolescence. Hifisdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 4. Inoff-Germain, G, Chrousos, G, Arnold, G, Nottelmann, E, and Cutler, G (1988). Relations between hormone levels and observational measures of aggressive behavior of young adolescents in family interactions. Developmental Psychology, 24: 1 29-39. 5. Susman, EJ (2006) Puberty revisited: models, mechanisms and the future. Paper presented at the Society for Research on Adolescence, San Francisco. 6. Rowe, R, Maughan, B, Worthman, C, Costello, E and Angold, A (2004) Testosterone, antisocial behaviour, and social dominance in boys: pubertal development and biosocial interaction. Biological Psychiatry, 55: 546-52. 7. Graber, JA and Brooks-Gunn, J (2001) Body image, in Lerner, RM and Learner, JV (eds.) Adolescence in America. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. 8. McCabe, MR Ricciardelli, LA and Finemore, ¡(2002) The role of puberty, media, and popularity with peers as strategies to increase weight, decrease weight and increase muscle tone among adolescent boys and girls. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 52: 145-53. 9. Simmons, RG and Blyth, DA(1987)Moving into Adolescence: The impact of pubertal change and school context. New York: Aldine De Gruyter. 10. Wiesner, M and Ittel, A (2002) Relations of pubertal timing and depressive symptoms to substance use in early adolescence. Journal of Early Adolescence, 22: 5-23. 11. Stattin, H and Magnusson, D (1990)Paths Through Life, Vol.2: Pubertal Maturation in Female Development. Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 12. Sarigiani, AC and Petersen, PA (2000) Adolescence: puberty and biological maturation, in Kazdin, A (ed.) Encyclopedia of Psychology. Washington, DC, and New York: American Psychological Association/Oxford University Press. 13. Blumstein Posner, R (2006) Early menarche: a review of research on trends in timing, racial differences, etiology and psychosocial consequences. Sex Roles, 5 4(5-6): 315-22. 14. Huttenlocher. PR and Kubicek. L (1983) The source of relatedness effects on naming latency. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 9(3): 486-96. 15. Blakemore, ST and Choudhury. S (2006) Development of the adolescent brain: implications for executive function and social cognition. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 47: 296-312. 16. Rubia, K, Overrnever, S, Taylor, E, Brammer, M, Williams, SC R, Simmons, A, Andrew, C and Bullmore, ET (2000) Functional frontalisation with age: mapping neurodevelopmental trajectories with fMRI. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 24 (1): 13-19. 17. Durston, S, Davidson. MC, Tottenham, N, Galvan, A, Spicer, J, Fossella, JA and Casey, BJ (2006) A shift from diffuse to focal cortical activity with development. Developmental Science, 9(1): 1-8. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Adoption Studies | Behavioral Genetics | Corr I 290 Adoption Studies/behavioral genetics/Munafò: Analyses of the heritability of personality traits based on twin samples alone have consistently indicated higher heritability coefficients than those based on twin, adoption and family samples, with sibling-sibling correlations of 0.17 and parent-offspring correlations of 0.14 (Bouchard and Loehlin 2001)(1). These values suggest heritability coefficients of the order of approximately 30 per cent, compared to those of 50 per cent suggested by twin studies. One possible explanation for this is the presence of non-additive genetic effects (i.e., gene × gene interactions) which would result in higher levels of similarity between MZ (monozygotic) twins than DZ (dizygotic) twins, but would not contribute to the similarity of offspring to parents (Bouchard and McGrue 2003)(2). >Heritability, >Twin studies. 1. Bouchard, T. J., Jr and Loehlin, J. C. 2001. Genes, evolution, and personality, Behavioural Genetics 31: 243–73 2. Bouchard, T. J., Jr and McGue, M. 2003. Genetic and environmental influences on human psychological differences, Journal of Neurobiology 54: 4–45 Marcus R. Munafò,“Behavioural genetics: from variance to DNA“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.)2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Advertising | Galbraith | Rothbard III 977 Advertising/Galbraith: An informal poll taken among the people, asking whether they would accept, or know what to do with, an extra few thousand dollars of annual (real) income, would find almost no one who would refuse the offer because of excessive affluence or satiety - or for any other reason. Few would be at a loss about what to do with their increased wealth. Rothbard: Professor Galbraith, of course, has an answer to all this. These wants, he says, are not real or genuine ones; they have been "created" in the populace by advertisers, and their wicked clients, the producing businessmen. The very fact of production, through such advertising, "creates" the supposed wants that it supplies. Galbraith's entire theory of excess affluence rests on this flimsy assertion that consumer wants are artificially created by business itself.(1) Rothbard III 978 Advertising/RothbardVsGalbraith: There are many fallacies in Galbraith's conventional attack on advertising. 1) In the first place, it is not true that advertising "creates" wants or demands on the part of the consumers. It certainly tries to persuade consumers to buy the product; but it cannot create wants or demands, because each person must himself adopt the ideas and values on which he acts - whether these ideas or values are sound or unsound. Galbraith here assumes a naive form of determinism - of advertising upon the consumers, and, like all determinists, he leaves an implicit escape clause from the determination for people like himself, who are, unaccountably, not determined by advertising. If there is determinism by advertising, how can some people be determined to rush out and buy the product, while Professor Galbraith is free to resist the advertisements with indignation and to write a book denouncing the advertising? 2) Secondly, Galbraith gives us no standard to decide which wants are so "created" and which are legitimate. By his stress on poverty, one might think that all wants above the subsistence level are false wants created by advertising. Of course, he supplies no evidence for this view. But (…) is hardly consistent with his views on public or governmentally induced wants. 3) Thirdly, Galbraith fails to distinguish between fulfilling a given want in a better way and inducing new wants. Unless we are to take the extreme and unsupported view that all wants above the subsistence line are "created," we must note the rather Odd behavior attributed to businessmen by Galbraith's assumptions. Why should businessmen go to the expense, bother, and uncertainty of trying to create new wants, when they could far more easily look for better or cheaper ways of fulfilling wants that consumers already have?(2) >Marketing research/Rothbard. 1. In addition to wicked advertising, wants are also artificially created, according to Galbraith, by emulation of one's neighbor: "Keeping up With the Joneses." But, in the first place, what is wrong With such emulation, except an unsupported ethical judgment of Galbraith's? Galbraith pretends to ground his theory, not on his private ethical judgment, but on the alleged creation of wants by production itself. Yet simple emulation would not be a function of producers, but of consumers themselves- unless emulation, too, were inspired by advertising. But this reduces to the criticism of advertising discussed in the text. And secondly, where did the original Jones obtain his wants? Regardless of how many people have wants purely in emulation of others, some person or persons must have originally had these wants as genuine needs of their very own. Otherwise the argument is hopelessly circular. Once this is conceded, it is impossible for economics to decide to what extent each want is pervaded by emulation. 2. On the alleged powers of business advertising, it is well to note these pungent comments of Ludwig von Mises: „It is a widespread fallacy that skillful advertising can talk the consumers into buying everything that the advertiser wants them to buy.... However, nobody believes that any kind of advertising would have succeeded in making the candlemakers hold the field against the electric bulb, the horse-drivers against the motorcars, the goose quill against the steel pen and later against the fountain pen.“ (Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. p. 317) |
Galbraith I John Kenneth Galbraith The Affluent Society London 1999 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Aesthetics | Fichte | Gadamer I 63 Aesthetics/Schlegel/Fichte/Gadamer: Kant's justification of aesthetics on the concept of taste cannot (...) be entirely satisfactory. It is far more obvious to use the concept of genius, which Kant developed as a transcendental principle for artistic beauty, as a universal aesthetic principle. Far better than the concept of taste, it fulfils the demand to be invariant to the changes of time. The Kantian phrase "beautiful art Gadamer I 64 is art of genius" becomes (...) the transcendental principle for aesthetics in general. In the end, aesthetics is only possible as a philosophy of art. Schlegel/Fichte/Gadamer: It was German idealism that drew this conclusion. Just as Fichte and Schelling otherwise followed Kant's doctrine of the transcendental imagination, they also made a new use of this term for aesthetics. In contrast to Kant, the standpoint of art as that of unconsciously ingenious production thus became all-embracing and also encompassed nature, which is understood as a product of the mind(1). But this has shifted the foundations of aesthetics. Like the concept of taste, the concept of natural beauty is devalued or understood differently. The moral interest in the beauty of nature, which Kant had described so enthusiastically, now takes second place to the self-encounter of man in the works of art. >Beauty of nature/Hegel. Gadamer I 65 Aesthetics/Fichte/Gadamer: (...) Kant's essential concern to provide an autonomous foundation of aesthetics, freed from the criterion of the concept, and not to pose the question of truth in the field of art at all, but to base the aesthetic judgement on the subjective a priori of the attitude to life, the harmony of our capacity for "knowledge in general", which constitutes the common essence of taste and genius, [came] to meet the irrationalism and the cult of genius of the 19th century. Genius/Fichte: Kant's doctrine of the "increase of the feeling of life" in aesthetic pleasure promoted the development of the term "genius" into a comprehensive concept of life, especially after Fichte raised the standpoint of genius and ingenious production to a universal transcendental standpoint. Thus it came about that Neo-Kantianism, in that it sought to derive all representational validity from transcendental subjectivity, used the term Gadamer I 66 experience as the actual fact of consciousness.(2) >Experience/Gadamer. 1. To what extent the change that occurred between Kant and his successors, which I try to characterize by the formula "standpoint of art", has obscured the universal phenomenon of the beautiful, can be taught by the first Schlegelfragment (Friedrich Schlegel, Fragmente, From the Lyceums 1797): "One calls many artists who are actually works of art of nature". This turn of phrase echoes Kant's justification of the concept of genius in terms of the favor of nature, but it is so little appreciated that it becomes, on the contrary, an objection against an artistic nature that is too little aware of itself. 2. It is the merit of Luigi Pareyson's 1952 book, L'estetica del idealismo tedesco, to have highlighted the importance of spruce for the idealist aesthetic. Accordingly, the secret influence of Fichte and Hegel could be recognized within the whole of the Neo-Kantianism. |
Fichte I Johann Gottlieb Fichte Zur Politik, Moral und Philosophie der Geschichte Berlin 1971 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Aesthetics | Kant | Gadamer I 47 Aesthetics /"Urteilskraft"/Kant/Gadamer: What Kant for his part legitimized and wanted to legitimize through his critique of aesthetic judgement was the subjective generality of aesthetic taste, in which there is no longer any knowledge of the object, and in the field of the "fine arts" the superiority of genius over all rule aesthetics. Thus, Romantic hermeneutics and history find a point of reference for their self-understanding only in the concept of genius, which was brought to bear by the Kantian aesthetics. >Urteilskraft/ Kant. That was the other side of the Kantian effect. The transcendental justification of aesthetic judgement established the autonomy of the aesthetic consciousness, from which the historical consciousness should also derive its legitimation. The radical subjectivation that included Kant's re-foundation of aesthetics has thus truly made epoch. By discrediting any theoretical knowledge other than that of the natural sciences, it pushed the self-contemplation of the humanities into following the methodology of the natural sciences. At the same time, however, it facilitated this dependence by providing the "artistic moment", the "feeling" and the "attitude" as a subsidiary achievement. See >Method/Helmholtz, >Humanities/Gadamer. Truth/knowledge/episteme/art/Kant/GadamerVsKant: The transcendental function that Kant assigns to aesthetic judgement is capable of distinguishing it from conceptual knowledge. and in this respect to satisfy the definition of the phenomena of beauty and art. But is it possible to reserve the concept of truth for conceptual knowledge? Should one not also acknowledge that the work of art has truth? We shall see that an acknowledgement of this side of the matter puts not only the phenomenon of art but also that of history in a new light. >Truth of art/Gadamer. Gadamer I 48 Knowledge/Taste/Gadamer: one will be able to recognize that Kant's reasoning of aesthetics is based on the judgement of taste Gadamer I 49 does justice to both sides of the phenomenon, its empirical non-generality and its a priori claim to generality. But the price he pays for this justification of criticism in the field of taste is that he denies taste any meaning of knowledge. It is a subjective principle to which he reduces the public spirit. In it nothing is recognized of the objects that are judged beautiful, but it is only asserted that a priori a feeling of pleasure in the subject corresponds to them. Purposefulness/"Zweckmäßigkeit"/Kant: As is well known, this feeling is Kant was founded on expediency (...). This is the principle that Kant discovers in aesthetic judgment. It is here itself law. In this respect it is an a priori The effect of beauty, which is somewhere between a merely sensual-empirical agreement in matters of taste and a rationalistic generality of rules in the middle. The taste is "taste of reflection". Content/taste/Kant/Gadamer: (...) the culture of moral feeling [is] described as the way in which genuine taste can take a certain unchanging form(1). The content-related determination of taste thus falls outside the scope of its transcendental function. Kant is interested only in so far as there is a principle of aesthetic judgement of its own, and therefore pure taste judgement alone is important to him. >Beauty/Kant. 1.Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, S. 264. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Aesthetics | Schlegel | Gadamer I 63 Aesthetics/Schlegel/Fichte/Gadamer: Kant's justification of aesthetics on the concept of taste cannot (...) be entirely satisfactory. It is far more obvious to use the concept of genius, which Kant developed as a transcendental principle for artistic beauty, as a universal aesthetic principle. Far better than the concept of taste, it fulfils the demand to be invariant to the changes of time. The Kantian phrase "beautiful art Gadamer I 64 is art of genius" becomes (...) the transcendental principle for aesthetics in general. In the end, aesthetics is only possible as a philosophy of art. Schlegel/Fichte/Gadamer: It was German idealism that drew this conclusion. Just as Fichte and Schelling otherwise followed Kant's doctrine of the transcendental imagination, they also made a new use of this term for aesthetics. In contrast to Kant, the standpoint of art as that of unconsciously ingenious production thus became all-embracing and also encompassed nature, which is understood as a product of the mind(1). But this has shifted the foundations of aesthetics. Like the concept of taste, the concept of natural beauty is devalued or understood differently. The moral interest in the beauty of nature, which Kant had described so enthusiastically, now takes second place to the self-encounter of man in the works of art. >Natural Beauty/Hegel. 1. To what extent the change that occurred between Kant and his successors, which I try to characterize by the formula "standpoint of art", has obscured the universal phenomenon of the beautiful, can be taught by the first Schlegelfragment (Friedrich Schlegel, Fragmente, From the Lyceums 1797): "One calls many artists who are actually works of art of nature". This turn of phrase echoes Kant's justification of the concept of genius in terms of the favor of nature, but it is so little appreciated that it becomes, on the contrary, an objection against an artistic nature that is too little aware of itself. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Aesthetics | Vischer | Pfotenhauer IV 100 Ästhetik/Vischer/NietzscheVsVischer/Pfotenhauer: Friedrich Theodor Vischer, who at an early stage had provoked Nietzsche's disgust as a "renowned aesthete from the Hegelian school of reason"(1) had already made his mark with the relevant publication "Über das Erhabene und Komische", 1837(2). It was about how the initially unaesthetic, the ugly, could be absorbed in the medium of art. Vischer considered "the interest of the senses" as a challenge to aesthetics(2), the disharmony in the "quarrel of indignant forces", the acridness of tragic discord (ibid. p. 69), but also the isolated, the "substance-like atoms" that are present to us in their "massiveness" as an experience of nature (ibid. p. 64). The question was how these elements, which endanger the aesthetic harmony, could be overcome. Solution/Vischer: the key to the solution of the problem lies in Kant's definition of the sublime. The sublime proves "a capacity of the mind that surpasses every measure of the senses." (ibid. p. 71; on Kant's criticism of the power of judgement §25ff, p. 333ff, especially p. 336). >Sublime. Sublime/Vischer: what appears to our sensual imagination to be excessive and monstrous, awakens in us the feeling of a supernatural capacity. The finite in its form, incommensurable to the senses, need not offend our aesthetic sensibility, but can awaken in us the idea of the infinite ex negativo. Ugliness becomes a mere occasion. Beauty/Vischer: beauty produces turbulences, "fermentations" (ibid. p. 69) from within itself in order to be able to lift itself to a higher level because of its own opposition. Sublime/Vischer: the sublime thus becomes a necessary and essential component of the idea of beauty. It proves its increasing ability and superiority. NietzscheVsVischer/Pfotenhauer: Nietzsche could not embrace this belief in referencing and transcending. 1. F. Nietzsche Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen, 2, KGW III, 1, S. 167. 2. F. Th. Vischer, Über das Erhabene und Komische und andere Texte zur Ästhetik, (Ed.) Willi Oelmüller, Frankfurt/M. S. 71. |
Vischer I Friedrich Theodor Vischer Über das Erhabene und Komische und andere Texte zur Ästhetik Frankfurt/M. 1967 Pfot I Helmut Pfotenhauer Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985 |
| Affectional Bond | Psychological Theories | Slater I 17 Affectional Bond/psychological theories: studies of early experience in rodents further qualified the nature of separations that can have enduring negative effects. Cf. >Affectional bond/Bowlby, >Behavior/Harlow, >Experiments/Harlow. Daily separations are a normal part of the developing attachment bond in humans and the young child’s ability to re-establish contact with the caregiver following separation is critical for the maintenance of the bond. This point was illustrated by Seymour Levine’s work with rodents. He developed an “early handling” paradigm in which it was discovered that rat pups who experienced brief 15-minute separations from their mothers performed better as adults in an avoidance learning paradigm than pups who had not been separated from their mothers (Suomi & Levine, 1998)(1). This finding illustrated how exposure to normally occurring or “intermittent stressors” early in development results in the development of effective coping strategies later in life. Levine’s early handling paradigm and the effects of intermittent stressors has consistently been replicated in both rodent and monkey models (Lyons et al., 2010)(2). >Animal models, >Animal studies. 1. Suomi, S., & Levine, S. (1998). Psychobiology of intergenerational effects of trauma: Evidence from animal studies. In Y. Daneli (Ed.), International handbook of multigenerational legacies of trauma (pp. 623–637). New York: Plenum Press 2. Lyons, D. M., Parker, K. J., & Schatzberg, A. F. (2010). Animal models of early life stress: Implications for understanding resilience. Developmental Psychobiology, 52, 616–624. Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Affirmation | Gadamer | I 136 Affirmation/Tragedy/Aristotle/Gadamer: The tragic melancholy reflects (...) a kind of affirmation, a return to oneself, and if, as is not uncommon in modern tragedy, the hero is tinged with such tragic melancholy in his own consciousness, then he has a little part in such affirmation himself by accepting his fate. >Tragedy/Aristotle, >Catharsis/Aristotle. But what is the actual object of this affirmation? What is affirmed? Certainly not the justice of a moral world order. The notorious tragic theory of guilt, which hardly plays a role in Aristotle, is not an appropriate explanation even for modern tragedy. For tragedy is not where guilt and atonement correspond to each other as in a just assessment, where a moral account of guilt is resolved without remainder. Even in modern tragedy there cannot and must not be a full subjectivation of guilt and fate. Rather, the excess of tragic consequences is characteristic of the nature of tragedy. Despite all the subjectivity of the debt, even in modern tragedy there is still a moment of that ancient supremacy of fate that is revealed as the same for all in the inequality of guilt and fate. I 137 (...) what is affirmed by the viewer there? Obviously it is precisely the inappropriateness and terrible size of the consequences of a culpable act that represent the actual an unreasonable demand on the viewer. The tragic affirmation is the mastery of this unreasonable demand. It has the character of a real communion. It is a truly common experience of such an excess of tragic disaster. The viewer recognizes him- or herself and his or her own finite being in the face of the power of fate. What happens to the great ones has exemplary significance. The approval of tragic melancholy does not apply to the tragic course of events as such or to the justice of the fate that befalls the hero, but means a metaphysical order of being that applies to all. The "so is it" is a kind of self-awareness of the viewer, who comes back from the delusions in which he or she lives like everyone else. The tragic affirmation is insight by virtue of the continuity of meaning into which the viewer places him- or herself back. >Recognition/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Affluent Society | Galbraith | Rothbard III 973 Affluent Society/Galbraith/Rothbard: At the present time growing abundance and prosperity have greatly dimmed the poverty and unemployment theme (…) Let it not be thought, however, that criticism of capitalism has died. Two seemingly contradictory charges are now rife: (a) that capitalism is not "growing" fast enough, and (b) that the trouble With capitalism is that it makes us too "affluent." Excess wealth has suddenly replaced poverty as the tragic flaw of capitalism. (1) At first sight, these latter charges appear contradictory, for capitalism is at one and the same time accused of producing too many goods, and yet of not increasing its production of goods fast enough. The contradiction seems especially glaring when the same critic presses both lines of attack, as is true of the leading critic of the sin of affluence, Professor Galbraith.(2) VsGalbraith/Rothbard: But, as the Wall Street Journal has aptly pointed out, this is not really a contradiction at all; for the excessive affluence is all in the "private sector," the goods enjoyed by the consumers; the deficiency, or "starvation," is in the "public sector," which needs further growth.(3) RothbardVsGalbraith: Although The Affluent Society is replete with fallacies, backed by dogmatic assertions and time-honored rhetorical devices in place of reasoned argument, the book warrants some consideration here in view of its enormous popularity. Rothbard III 974 Economics/History/RothbardVsGalbraith: As in the case of most "economists" who attack economic science, Professor Galbraith is an historicist, who believes that economic theory, instead of being grounded on the eternal facts of human nature, is somehow relative to different historical epochs. GalbraithVsTradition: "Conventional" economic theory, he asserts, was true for the eras before the present, which were times of "poverty"; now, however, we have vaulted from a centuries-long state of poverty into an age of "affluence," and for such an age, a completely new economic theory is needed. Methodology/RothbardVsGalbraith: Galbraith also makes the philosophical error of believing that ideas are essentially "refuted by events"; on the contrary, in human action, as contrasted with the natural sciences, ideas can be refuted only by other ideas; events themselves are complex resultants which need to be interpreted by correct ideas. Poverty/affluence/definitions/definability/method: One of Galbraith's gravest flaws is the arbitrariness of the categories, which pervade his work, of "poverty" and "affluence." Nowhere does he define what he means by these terms, and therefore nowhere does he lay down standards by which we can know, even in theory, when we have passed the magic borderland between "poverty" and "affluence" that requires an entirely new economic theory to come into being. Wealth: (…) most (…) economic works make it evident that economic science is not dependent on some arbitrary level of wealth; the basic praxeological laws are true of all men at all times, and the catallactic laws of the exchange economy are true whenever and wherever exchanges are made. >Praxeology/Rothbard, >Catallactics/Rothbard. Rothbard III 975 Marginal utility/Galbraith: Galbraith makes much of his supposed discovery, suppressed by other economists, that the marginal utility of goods declines as one's income increases and that therefore a man's final $ 1,000 is not worth nearly as much to him as his first- the margin of subsistence. RothbardVsGalbraith: But this knowledge is familiar to most economists, and this book, for example, has included it. The marginal utility of goods certainly declines as our income rises; but the very fact that People continue to work for the final $ 1,000 and work for more money when the opportunity is available, demonstrates conclusively that the marginal utility of goods is still greater than the marginal disutility of leisure forgone. RothbardVsGalbraith: Galbraith's hidden fallacy is a quantitative assumption: from the mere fact that the marginal utility of goods falls as one's income and wealth rise, Galbraith has somehow concluded that it has already fallen to virtually, or really, zero. The fact of decline, however, tells us nothing whatever about the degree of this decline, which Galbraith arbitrarily assumes has been almost total. Leisure/labour/wealth: All economists, even the most "conventional," know that as incomes have risen in the modern world, workers have chosen to take more and more of that income in the form of leisure. And this should be proof enough that economists have long been familiar with the supposedly suppressed truth that the marginal utility of goods in general tends to decline as their supply increases. But, Galbraith retorts, economists admit that leisure is a consumers' good, but not that other goods decline in value as their supply increases. Yet this is surely an erroneous contention; what economists know is that, as civilization expands the supply of goods, the marginal utility of goods declines and the marginal utility of leisure forgone (the opportunity cost of labor) increases, so that more and more real income will be "taken" in the form of leisure. There is nothing at all startling, subversive, or revolutionary about this familiar fact. Rothbard III 976 Consumption/Galbraith/Rothbard: According to Galbraith, economists willfully ignore the spectre of the satiation of wants. Yet they do so quite properly, because when wants - or rather, wants for exchangeable goods - are truly satiated, we shall all know it soon enough; for, at that point, everyone will cease working, will cease trying to transform land resources into final consumers' goods. There will be no need to continue producing, because all needs for consumers' goods will have been supplied - or at least all those which can be produced and exchanged. At this point, everyone will stop work, the market economy - indeed, all economy - will come to an end, means will no longer be scarce in relation to ends, and everyone will bask in paradise. I think it self-evident that this time has not yet arrived and shows no signs of arriving; if it some day should arrive, it will be greeted by economists, as by most other people, not with curses, but with rejoicing. Despite their venerable reputation as practitioners of a "dismal science," economists have no vested interests, psychological or otherwise, in scarcity. Rothbard III 977 Advertising/Galbraith: An informal poll taken among the people, asking whether they would accept, or know what to do with, an extra few thousand dollars of annual (real) income, would find almost no one who would refuse the offer because of excessive affluence or satiety - or for any other reason. Few would be at a loss about what to do with their increased wealth. Rothbard: Professor Galbraith, of course, has an answer to all this. These wants, he says, are not real or genuine ones; they have been "created" in the populace by advertisers, and their wicked clients, the producing businessmen. The very fact of production, through such advertising, "creates" the supposed wants that it supplies. Galbraith's entire theory of excess affluence rests on this flimsy assertion that consumer wants are artificially created by business itself.(4) Rothbard III 978 Advertising/RothbardVsGalbraith: There are many fallacies in Galbraith's conventional attack on advertising. 1) In the first place, it is not true that advertising "creates" wants or demands on the part of the consumers. It certainly tries to persuade consumers to buy the product; but it cannot create wants or demands, because each person must himself adopt the ideas and values on which he acts - whether these ideas or values are sound or unsound. Galbraith here assumes a naive form of determinism - of advertising upon the consumers, and, like all determinists, he leaves an implicit escape clause from the determination for people like himself, who are, unaccountably, not determined by advertising. If there is determinism by advertising, how can some people be determined to rush out and buy the product, while Professor Galbraith is free to resist the advertisements with indignation and to write a book denouncing the advertising? 2) Secondly, Galbraith gives us no standard to decide which wants are so "created" and which are legitimate. By his stress on poverty, one might think that all wants above the subsistence level are false wants created by advertising. Of course, he supplies no evidence for this view. But (…) this is hardly consistent with his views on public or governmentally induced wants. 3) Thirdly, Galbraith fails to distinguish between fulfilling a given want in a better way and inducing new wants. Unless we are to take the extreme and unsupported view that all wants above the subsistence line are "created," we must note the rather Odd behavior attributed to businessmen by Galbraith's assumptions. Why should businessmen go to the expense, bother, and uncertainty of trying to create new wants, when they could far more easily look for better or cheaper ways of fulfilling wants that consumers already have?(5) >Marketing research/Rothbard. 1. John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958). 2. "Fable for Our Times," Wall Street Journal, April 21, 1960, p. 12. Thus Galbraith, ibid., deplores the government's failure to "invest more" in scientists and scientific research to promote our growth, while also attacking American affluence. It turns out, however, that Galbraith wants more of precisely that kind of research which can have no possible commercial application. 3. Galbraith's major rhetorical device may be called "the sustained sneer," which includes (a) presenting an opposing argument so sardonically as to make it seem patently absurd, with no need for reasoned refutation; (b) coining and reiterating Veblenesque names of disparagement, e.g., "the conventional wisdom"; and (c) ridiculing the opposition further by psychological ad hominem attacks, i.e., accusing opponents of having a psychological vested interest in their absurd doctrines - this mode of attack being now more fashionable than older accusations of economic venality. The "conventional wisdom" encompasses just about everything with which Galbraith disagrees. 4. In addition to wicked advertising, wants are also artificially created, according to Galbraith, by emulation of one's neighbor: "Keeping up With the Joneses." But, in the first place, what is wrong With such emulation, except an unsupported ethical judgment of Galbraith's? Galbraith pretends to ground his theory, not on his private ethical judgment, but on the alleged creation of wants by production itself. Yet simple emulation would not be a function of producers, but of consumers themselves- unless emulation, too, were inspired by advertising. But this reduces to the criticism of advertising discussed in the text. And secondly, where did the original Jones obtain his wants? Regardless of how many people have wants purely in emulation of others, some person or persons must have originally had these wants as genuine needs of their very own. Otherwise the argument is hopelessly circular. Once this is conceded, it is impossible for economics to decide to what extent each want is pervaded by emulation. 5. On the alleged powers of business advertising, it is well to note these pungent comments of Ludwig von Mises: „It is a widespread fallacy that skillful advertising can talk the consumers into buying everything that the advertiser wants them to buy.... However, nobody believes that any kind of advertising would have succeeded in making the candlemakers hold the field against the electric bulb, the horse-drivers against the motorcars, the goose quill against the steel pen and later against the fountain pen.“ (Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. p. 317) |
Galbraith I John Kenneth Galbraith The Affluent Society London 1999 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| African Countries | Acemoglu | Acemoglu I 53 African countries/Acemoglu/Robinson: (...) the orientation of continents cannot provide an explanation for today’s world inequality. Though the Sahara Desert did present a significant barrier to the movement of goods and ideas from the north to sub-Saharan Africa, this was not insurmountable. The Portuguese, and then other Europeans, sailed around the coast and eliminated differences in knowledge at a time when gaps in incomes were very small compared with what they are today. Since then, Africa has not caught up with Europe; on the contrary, there is now a much larger income gap between most African and European countries. >Inequalities/Diamond, >Inequalities/Acemoglu. Acemoglu I 58 Historically, sub-Saharan Africa was poorer than most other parts of the world, and its ancient civilizations did not develop the wheel, writing (with the exception of Ethiopia and Somalia), or the plow. Though these technologies were not widely used until the advent of formal European colonization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, African societies knew about them much earlier. Europeans began sailing around the west coast in the late fifteenth century, and Asians were continually sailing to East Africa from much earlier times. In West Africa there was rapid economic development based on the export of palm oil and ground nuts; throughout southern Africa, Africans developed exports to the rapidly expanding industrial and mining areas of the Rand in South Africa. Yet these promising economic experiments were obliterated not by African culture or the inability of ordinary Africans to act in their own self-interest, but first by European colonialism and then by postindependence African governments. Colonialism: The real reason that the Kongolese did not adopt superior technology was because they lacked any incentives to do so. They faced a high risk of all their output being expropriated and taxed by the all-powerful king, whether or not he had converted to Catholicism. Acemoglu I 463 Literature: a seminal political economy interpretation of African underdevelopment was developed by Bates (1981(1), 1983(2), 1989(3)), whose work heavily influenced ours. Seminal studies by Dalton (1965)(4) and Killick (1978)(5) emphasize the role of politics in African development and particularly how the fear of losing political power influences economic policy. 1.Bates, Robert H. (1981). Markets and States in Tropical Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2. - (1983). Essays in the Political Economy of Rural Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press. 3. - (1989). Beyond the Miracle of the Market. New York: Cambridge University Press. 4.Dalton, George H. (1965). “History, Politics and Economic Development in Liberia.” Journal of Economic History 25: 569–91. 5. Killick, Tony (1978). Development Economics in Action. London: Heinemann. |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| African Countries | Robinson | Acemoglu I 53 African countries/Acemoglu/Robinson: (...) the orientation of continents cannot provide an explanation for today’s world inequality. Though the Sahara Desert did present a significant barrier to the movement of goods and ideas from the north to sub-Saharan Africa, this was not insurmountable. The Portuguese, and then other Europeans, sailed around the coast and eliminated differences in knowledge at a time when gaps in incomes were very small compared with what they are today. Since then, Africa has not caught up with Europe; on the contrary, there is now a much larger income gap between most African and European countries. >Inequalities/Diamond, >Inequalities/Acemoglu. Acemoglu I 58 Historically, sub-Saharan Africa was poorer than most other parts of the world, and its ancient civilizations did not develop the wheel, writing (with the exception of Ethiopia and Somalia), or the plow. Though these technologies were not widely used until the advent of formal European colonization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, African societies knew about them much earlier. Europeans began sailing around the west coast in the late fifteenth century, and Asians were continually sailing to East Africa from much earlier times. In West Africa there was rapid economic development based on the export of palm oil and ground nuts; throughout southern Africa, Africans developed exports to the rapidly expanding industrial and mining areas of the Rand in South Africa. Yet these promising economic experiments were obliterated not by African culture or the inability of ordinary Africans to act in their own self-interest, but first by European colonialism and then by postindependence African governments. Colonialism: The real reason that the Kongolese did not adopt superior technology was because they lacked any incentives to do so. They faced a high risk of all their output being expropriated and taxed by the all-powerful king, whether or not he had converted to Catholicism. Acemoglu I 463 Literature: a seminal political economy interpretation of African underdevelopment was developed by Bates (1981(1), 1983(2), 1989(3)), whose work heavily influenced ours. Seminal studies by Dalton (1965)(4) and Killick (1978)(5) emphasize the role of politics in African development and particularly how the fear of losing political power influences economic policy. 1. Bates, Robert H. (1981). Markets and States in Tropical Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2. Bates, Robert H. (1983). Essays in the Political Economy of Rural Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press. 3. Bates, Robert H. (1989). Beyond the Miracle of the Market. New York: Cambridge University Press. 4. Dalton, George H. (1965). “History, Politics and Economic Development in Liberia.” Journal of Economic History 25: 569–91. 5. Killick, Tony (1978). Development Economics in Action. London: Heinemann. |
EconRobin I James A. Robinson James A. Acemoglu Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 Robinson I Jan Robinson An Essay on Marxian Economics London 1947 Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Aggregate Capital | Economic Theories | Harcourt I 155 Aggregate capital/Economic theories/Harcourt: (…) once heterogeneity of capital goods is introduced, the parables based on jelly no longer necessarily apply. ((s) Here the (neoclassical) „parables“ again:) Harcourt I 122 (1) an association between lower rates of profits and higher values of capital per man employed; (2) an association between lower rates of profits and higher capital-output ratios; (3) an association between lower rates of profits and (through investment in more 'mechanized' or 'round-about' methods of production) higher sustainable steady states of consumption per head (up to a maximum); (4) that, in competitive conditions, the distribution of income between profit-receivers and wage-earners can be explained by a knowledge of marginal products and factor supplies. Harcourt I 156 In particular, it may no longer be argued that r equals the marginal product of 'capital' (even in an equilibrium situation), nor may the distribution of income be deduced from a knowledge of the elasticity of the FpF envelope alone. >Elasticity. Furthermore, we are now unable in general to start from the FpF envelope and derive an *as if, well-behaved, production function from it. This has led some writers to look elsewhere than to the concept and properties of an aggregate production function ('as if or real) and marginal productivity concepts to explain the distribution of income (…). Harcourt I 157 The backlash to this argument has been the contention that the existence or not of an aggregate production function (in the sense of a unique relationship between value capital per head and output per head) and marginal productivity relations in distribution theory are not one and the same thing, as Champernowne [1953-4](1) showed long ago. Bliss [1968b](2), for example - but he is only the leading species of a large genus - argues that if we assume equilibrium (a most important proviso) and price-taking, cost-minimizing, profit-maximizing behaviour under perfectly competitive conditions in linear models, factors as a matter of logic must receive their marginal products, suitably defined, even though an aggregate production function may not be shown to exist. The key points of the argument are two: 1) first, that we impose strict equilibrium assumptions; 2) secondly, that businessmen are profit-maximizers and price-takers. A subsidiary point is that in linear models, marginal products at points (corners) may only be defined as lying within a range that is given by the partial derivatives that lie on either side of them. Factors/revenues/costs: Within this range of indeterminancy, it is obvious that if any factor was not paid the value of its marginal product, a change in output consequent upon using more or less of it would add more to (or subtract less from) revenues than to (from) costs, so violating the assumptions that profits are maximized and that the economy is at equilibrium. (That the economy may not in fact get to an equilibrium position even if one can be shown to exist, that these relationships do not apply in out-of-equilibrium positions and that the real world is usually in the latter state, no one would deny.) Solow: Solow makes the same point as Bliss in several of his papers cited earlier, Solow [1962a(3), 1963b(4)] and Solow, Tobin, von Weizsacker, and Yaari [1966](5), where typical marginal productivity results are obtained without any reference to aggregate capital - or its marginal product. His latest statement may be found in his reply [1970(6)] to Pasinetti [1969](7). Having stated that he does not hold 'a peculiar version of "marginal-productivity" theory' - 'peculiar because it seems to insist (as a matter of principle, not of convenience) on aggregating the whole stock of capital into one number, and because it means by marginal productivity the derivative of net output with respect to the value of this stock of capital' (Solow [1970](6), p. 424) - he concludes his article as follows: Harcourt I 158 „. . . nobody is trying to slip over on [Pasinetti] a theory according to which the rate of profits is higher or lower according to whether the existing 'quantity of capital' is lower or higher, and as such represents a general technical property of the existing 'quantity of capital'. That is just what neoclassical capital theory in its full generality can do without.“ (pp. 427-8.) Garegnani/Pasinetti: Garegnani [1966(8), 1970a(9), 1970b](10) and Pasinetti [1969(7), 1970(12)] in particular, have come back strongly on this one (no suggestion of reswitching is implied). Garegnani points out that, in their formulation of marginal productivity theory, not all the neoclassical economists (early, late, or neo-neo) were either groping for or using an aggregate production function which could be interpreted 'as if it behaved like a well-behaved, one-commodity one. Thus its destruction both at an economy and at an industry level (which he demonstrates in his paper [1970a](10)) is not a conclusive refutation of the marginal productivity theory of value and distribution. 'Expressing the conditions of production of a commodity in terms of a production function with "capital" as a factor is a feature of only some versions of the traditional theory . . .' (Garegnani [1970a](10), p. 422.) He mentions Marshall and J. B. Clark 'who thought that the principle of substitution, drawn from a reformulation of the Malthusian theory of rent in terms of homogeneous land and "intensive" margins, could be applied without modification to labour and "capital".' But this transition foundered on the fact that 'capital' cannot be measured in a physical unit but must be measured as a value, one which, moreover, changes whenever r and w change, i.e. one which is not independent of distribution. Moreover, it changes in such a way as not to allow us to say that the marginal products of 'capital' and labour are equal to their respective rates of remuneration. All is not yet safe, because, Garegnani argues, 'traditional theory - reduced to its core as the explanation of distribution in terms of demand and supply-rests in fact on a single premise', what Pasinetti [1969](12), p. 519, calls 'an unobtrusive postulate': „This premise is that any change of system brought about by a fall in r must increase the ratio of 'capital' to labour in the production of the commodity: 'capital' being the value of the physical capital in terms of some unit of consumption goods, a value which is thought to measure the consumption given up or postponed in order to bring that physical capital into existence.“ (Pasinetti [1969](12), S. 519) >Capital demand/Garegnani. 1. Champernowne, D. G. [1953-4] 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital: A Comment', Review of Economic Studies, xxi, S. 112-35 2. Bliss, C. J. [1968b] 'Rates of Return in a Linear Model', Cambridge: unpublished paper. 3. Solow, R. M. [1962a] 'Substitution and Fixed Proportions in the Theory of Capital', Review of Economic Studies, xxrx, pp. 207-18. 4. Solow, R. M. [1963b] 'Heterogeneous Capital and Smooth Production Functions: An Experimental Study', Econometrica, xxxi, pp. 623-45. 5. Solow, R. M., Tobin, J., von Weizsacker, C. C. and Yaari, M. [1966] 'Neoclassical Growth with Fixed Factor Proportions', Review of Economic Studies, xxxm, pp. 79-115. 6. Solow, R. M [1970] 'On the Rate of Return: Reply to Pasinetti. Economic Journal, LXXX, pp.423-8. 7. Pasinetti, L. L. [1969] 'Switches of Technique and the "Rate of Return" in Capital Theory', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 508-31. 8. Garegnani, P. [1966] 'Switching of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics,LXXX, pp. 554-67. 9. Garegnani, P. [1970a] 'Heterogeneous Capital, the Production Function and the Theory of Distribution', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVII (3), pp. 407-36. 10. Garegnani, P. [1970b] 'A Reply', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVII (3), p. 439. 11. Pasinetti, L. L. [1970] 'Again on Capital Theory and Solow's "Rate of Return" ', Economic Journal, LXXX, pp. 428-31. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Aggregate Production Function | Robinson | Harcourt I 11 Measurements/capital/Aggregate Production Function/RobinsonVsNeoclassical Economics/Robinson/Harcourt: In 1953 Joan Robinson wrote The Production Function and the Theory of Capital' (Robinson [1953-4])(1) in which she made a number of specific complaints about the state of economic theory and the state of some economic theorists, who soon were to become identified as the latter-day neoclassical whose [headquarter] is now Cambridge, Mass. Her complaints related to the ambiguity concerning the unit in which capital was measured in the neoclassical aggregate production function, the concentration on factor proportions and the neglect of factor supplies and technical progress in the explanation of distributive prices and shares, and what she saw as the deficiencies of the neoclassical definition of equilibrium. >Equilibrium, >Capital, >Measurements. Harcourt I 15 RobinsonVsWicksell: Joan Robinson's first complaint related to the fuzzy nature of the capital variable in the aggregate production function, the concept of which, she argued, was used by the neoclassicals to explain the distribution of income between profit-receivers and wage-earners in capitalist economies, taking as given the stocks of labour and capital and the knowledge of how one may be substituted for the other, so that their respective marginal productivities were known. >Capital/Wicksell. Harcourt I 16 Robinson(2): „The dominance in neoclassical economic teaching of the concept of a production function, in which the relative prices of the factors of production are exhibited as a function of the ratio in which they are employed in a given state of technical knowledge, has had an enervating effect upon the development of the subject, for by concentrating upon the question of the proportions of factors it has distracted attention from the more difficult but more rewarding questions of the influences governing the supplies of the factors and of the causes and consequences of changes in technical knowledge. Moreover, the production function has been a powerful instrument of miseducation. The student of economic theory is taught to write Q = f(L,K) where L is a quantity of labour, K a quantity of capital and Q a rate of output of commodities. He is instructed to assume all workers alike, and to measure L in man-hours of labour; he is told something about the index-number problem involved in choosing a unit of output; and then he is hurried on to the next question, in the hope that he will forget to ask in what units K is measured. Before ever he does ask, he has become a professor, and so sloppy habits of thought are handed on from one generation to the next.“(2)* Harcourt I 17 RobinsonVsNeoclassical economics: The neoclassical way of looking at the problem, Joan Robinson argues, directed interest away from the forces that determine the growth of capital and labour, and how technical advances affect growth, accumulation and income shares. Robinson/Harcourt: By contrast, her own interest in capital theory was in order to analyse what she regarded as a secondary factor in the list of factors which explain growth and distribution over time, namely, the role of the choice of techniques of production in the investment decision. The main propositions of The Accumulation of Capital, Robinson [1956](3), are established in a model in which there is only one technique of production available at any moment of time;(…) >Capital/Robinson. Harcourt I 25 Aggregate production function/Robinson/Harcourt: The costing and valuation process is repeated for all equipments, ws and rs and then the relationship between output per head and real capital is plotted to give Joan Robinson's version of the aggregate production function - her pseudo-production function - which has (…) a rather bizarre appearance relative to the smooth curves of the textbooks. RobinsonVsSolow: „It is an absurd, though unfortunately common, error to suppose that substitution between labour and capital is exhibited by a movement from one point to another along a pseudo-production function (see, for example, Solow [1970](4)). Each point represents a situation in which prices and wages have been expected, over a long past, to be what they are today, so that all investments have been made in the form that promises to yield the maximum net return to the investor. The effect of a change in factor prices cannot be discussed in these terms. Time, so to say, runs at right angles to the page at each point on the curve. To move from one point to another we would have either to rewrite past history or to embark upon a long future.“ (Robinson [1971(5)], pp. 103-4. Harcourt I 25/26 Harcourt: Moreover (…) neither the wage rate nor the reward to capital can be obtained by suitable partial differentiation of the factor ratio relationship. Harcourt I 29 Equilibrium: It has been stressed that an implication of Joan Robinson's definition of equilibrium is that points on the pseudo-production function are equilibrium positions and that comparisons between points are just that, comparisons of one equilibrium position with another. >Equilibrium/Robinson. Time/process/accumulation/Harcourt: The comparisons are certainly not a description of a process - a change - whereby accumulation occurs and new, or, rather, different techniques (technical progress is ruled out by assumption) replace old ones as a result, for example, of changes in relative factor prices. >Factor price. Neo-Keynesianism: Moreover, a point which has been reiterated again and again in the literature by neo-Keynesians, especially by Joan Robinson, is that the application of results obtained from such equilibrium comparisons to long-period analyses of actual changes can be, at the least, most seriously misleading and, usually, just plain wrong. Neo-neoclassical economics: This fact vitiates many analyses of the past and, to be fair, has been countered in recent years by an enormous growth of models in which out-of-equilibrium processes are explicitly analysed, often (but not exclusively) by neo-neoclassical economists equipped with the appropriate techniques to do so. *Harcourt: I have changed the notation of the original article in order to make it consistent with the notation of this book. 1. Robinson, Joan (1953-4). 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital', Review of Economic Studies, xxi, pp. 81-106. 2. Ibid. p. 81 3. Robinson, Joan [1956] The Accumulation of Capital (London: Macmillan). 4. Solow, R.M. [1970] 'On the Rate of Return: Reply to Pasinetti. Economic Journal, LXXX, pp.423-8. 5. Robinson, J. [1971] Economic Heresies: Some Old-fashioned Questions in Economic Theory (New York: Basic Books). |
EconRobin I James A. Robinson James A. Acemoglu Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 Robinson I Jan Robinson An Essay on Marxian Economics London 1947 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Aggregation | Boudreaux | Boudreaux I 8 Aggregation/economics/Boudreaux: [this kind of thinking] assumed that the interest of the state is identical to that of society. Thus, any policy that strengthened the state was believed to strengthen society. (…) aggregative thinking lumps together a great many individuals into large categories such as “the nation” or “the government” and then treats each of these categories as if it is a unitary thinking, choosing, and acting individual. Keynesianism/Boudreaux: This manner of analysis, the spirit of which was revived by Keynesians, renders unnecessary the kind of economic analysis that was inspired by the work of Adam Smith (1723-1790)(1). Adam Smith: Analysis done in the tradition of Smith examines how multitudes of individuals, all pursuing their own individual interests and possessing only their own unique bits of knowledge, come to have their plans and actions coordinated - chiefly by adjustments in market prices and the resulting profits and losses - in ways that are not only economically orderly and highly productive of material goods and services, but also unplanned and unplannable. Keynesianism/Boudreaux: With aggregative thinking, “the social welfare” is promoted by “the government,” with the latter treated as if it’s an organism possessing a brain, and as if that brain’s main interest lies not in serving itself but, rather, in serving the nation. Overlooked are the processes (…) that lead individuals with diverse interests to undertake actions such as forming governments, becoming government officials, and dealing with government both as citizens who receive benefits from it and who incur costs to sustain it and to affect its activities. BuchananVsAggregative thinking: Buchanan called such aggregative thinking the “organismic” notion of collectives - that is, the collective as organism. Boudreaux I 9 Democracy: In the immediate post-WW II free world, widespread acceptance of the organismic conception of state and society was almost certainly encouraged by the use in those countries of regular elections - a key feature of democracy - as the means of choosing government leaders. The thinking was this: Because in a democracy the People choose government officials (and, thus, ultimately government policies), and because each voter has just as much say as every other voter, governments chosen democratically reflect the will of the People. Such governments, therefore, are good because they embody the general will. >People, >General will, >Government policy, >Nations, >Democracy, >State. 1. Smith, Adam. (1776). An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. |
Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 |
| Aggression | Patterson | Slater I 181 Aggression/Patterson: Patterson’s early vs. late starter model differs from Moffitt’s in the factors hypothesized to place individuals on the different antisocial paths. Patterson argues that the early starter path is initiated by poor family management practices, particularly unskilled discipline that is characterized by negative reinforcement of children’s coercive and non-compliant behavior. (Patterson, Capaldi, & Bank, 1991)(1). Cf. >T. Moffitt, >Aggression/Moffitt. In Patterson’s model, “training” and support for antisocial behavior by a deviant peer group leads late starting youth to become involved in aggression. Unlike early starters, however, these adolescents have generally acquired the social and academic skills that enable them to desist from antisocial behavior when shifting environmental contingencies make other options more attractive. Thus, Patterson’s explanation for desistance among later starters is similar to Moffitt’s account of desistance in her adolescence-limited group. Currently, there is some disagreement among researchers as to whether the development of aggression requires a separate explanation from the development of antisocial behavior more broadly defined. Patterson and his colleagues (Patterson, Reid, & Dishion, 1992)(2) argue that serious aggression is generally preceded by a variety of antisocial acts during childhood and adolescence rather than a distinct developmental pathway that is unique to aggression. LoeberVsPatterson: Loeber and Stouthamer-Loeber(1998)(3) believe it is important to preserve the distinction between overt (i.e., aggression) and covert (i.e., property crime) forms of antisocial behavior and note that orderly developmental progressions of each type have been identified (Loeber et al., 1993)(4). >Aggression/Loeber, >Socialization, >Social learning, >Social behavior, >Social identity, >Stages of development, >Conflicts, >Agreeableness, >Personality traits. 1. Patterson, G. R., Capaldi, D., & Bank, L. (1991). An early starter model for predicting delinquency. In D. J. Pepler & K. H. Ruhm (Eds), The development and treatment of childhood aggression (pp. 139— 168). Hillsdale, NJ: Eribaum. 2. Patterson, G. R., Reid, J. B., & Dishion, T. J. (1992). Antisocial boys. Eugene, OR: Castalia. 3. Loeber, R., & Stouthamer-Loeber, M. (1998). Development of juvenile aggression and violence: Some common misconceptions and controversies. American Psychologist, 53, 242—259. 4. Loeber, R., Wung, P., Keenan, K., Giroux, B., Stouthamer-Loeber, M., Van Kammen, W. B., & Maughan, B. (1993). Developmental pathways in disruptive child behavior. Development and Psychopathology, 5, 101—132. Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Aggression | Prevention Programs | Slater I 182 Aggression/Prevention programs: the Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies curriculum has been demonstrated to reduce aggression by teaching children problem-solving skills, self-control strategies, and emotional awareness (Greenberg, Kusche, Cook, & Quamma, 1995)(1). Olweus’s Bullying Prevention Program reduces bullying and victimization in schools through school-wide, classroom, and individual components that focus on raising awareness regarding the problem of bullying, enforcing rules against bullying, and increasing supervision of students in areas where bullying frequently occurs (Olweus, Limber, & Mihalic, 1999)(2). The Fast Track Project has been successful in reducing aggression among high-risk children through a combination of parent training, home visits, social skills training, academic tutoring, and classroom interventions (Conduct Problems Prevention Research Group, 2007)(3). These programs are among several interventions selected as model or promising approaches to violence prevention from a review of over 900 violence prevention programs (Blueprints for Violence Prevention, 2011). 1. Greenberg, M. T., Kusche, C. A., Cook, E. T., & Quamma, J. P. (1995). Promoting emotional competence in school-aged children: The effects of the PATHS curriculum. Development and Psychopatholog 7,117—136. 2. Olweus, D., Limber, S., &Mihalic, S. F. (1999). Bullying prevention program: Blueprints for violence prevention, book nine. Blueprints for violence prevention series. Boulder Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado. 3. Conduct Problems Prevention Research Group (2007). Fast track randomized controlled trial to prevent externalizing psychiatric disorders: Findings from grades 3 to 9 .Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 46, 1250—1262. Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Aging | Cognitive Psychology | Upton I 139 Aging/Cognitive psychology/Upton: (…) elderly adults have been found to perform more poorly than younger adults on Piagetian cognitive tasks (>Stages of development/Piaget), for example (Blackburn and Papalia, 1992)(1). However, there is some debate about the extent to which this decline is an inevitable part of ageing. It has been proposed, for example, that this difference is actually caused by a cohort effect, brought about because the older adults who participated in these studies generally had less formal schooling than most younger adults today. (…) other studies that have taken a longitudinal approach have found that cognitive skills either stay stable or improve over time (Salthouse. 2009)(2). This idea is also supported by studies that have shown that older adults in college perform as well as their younger classmates on cognitive tests (Blackburn. 1985)(1). However, it has also been suggested that cognitive decline actually begins in early adulthood (Salthouse, 2009)(2), although not all aspects of cognitive functioning are thought to show early age-related declines. Upton I 140 Decline of cognitive skills: ttraining studies, (…) have shown that cognitive decline in older people can be reversed in many cases (Blaskewicz Boron et al., 2007)((3). Perhaps cognitive decline is caused by a lack of use? This is what Bielak (2010)(4) calls the fuse it or lose it’ hypothesis of cognitive ageing. Def crystalized abilities: the information, knowledge and skills that are acquired through experience in a cultural environment. [They] are consistently found to increase until at least the age of 60. Def fluid abilitites: fluid abilities fluid intelligence or fluid reasoning is the ability to think logically and solve problems in novel situations, independent of acquired knowledge. It is the ability to analyse novel problems, identify patterns and relationships that underpin these problems and so find a solution using logic. One of the largest studies of age-related changes in functioning, the Seattle Longitudinal Study (e.g. Schaie, 2006(5); Willis and Schaie, 2006)(6), has suggested that there is no uniform pattern of age-related changes across all intellectual abilities. The study findings suggest that both cohort and age effects are important in determining changes in cognitive ability across the lifespan. This body of work also confirms the trend observed by Salthouse (2009)(2) that, in general, crystallized abilities tend to decline later than fluid abilities in intelligence. Upton I 141 A number of factors have also been shown to reduce the risk of cognitive decline in old age, including the absence of cardiovascular and other chronic diseases (Wendell et al., 2009)(7); higher socio-economic status (Fotenos et al., 2008)(8); and involvement in a complex and intellectually stimulating environment (Valenzuela et al., 2007)(9). It has also been suggested that the modern sedentary lifestyle may increase the ageing process; evidence from the British cohort study has shown that maintaining an active lifestyle can help to slow the process of cognitive decline linked to ageing (Richards et al.. 2003)(10). 1. Blackburn, JA and Papalia, DE (1992) The study of adult cognition from a Piagetian perspective, in Sternberg, RJ and Berg, CA (eds) Intellectual Development. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2. Salthouse, TA (2009) When does age-related cognitive decline begin? Neurobiology of Aging, 30: 507-14. 3. Blaskewicz Boron, J, Turiano, NA, Willis, SL and Schaie, KW (2007) Effects of cognitive training on change in accuracy in inductive reasoning ability. Journal of Gerontology, 6 2(3): 179-86. 4. Bielak, AM (2010) How can we not ‘lose it’ if we still don’t understand how to use it’? Unanswered questions about the influence of activity participation on cognitive performance in older age: a mini-review. Gerontology, 56: 507-19. 5. Schaie. KW (2006) Inteffigence, in Schultz, R (ed.) Encyclopedia of Aging (4th edn). New York: Springer. 6. Willis, SL and Schaie, KW (2006) Cognitive functioning among the baby boomers: longitudinal and cohort effects, in Whitbourne, SK and Willis, SL (eds) The Baby Boomers. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum. 7. Wendell, C, Zonderman, A, Metter, J, Najjar, SS and Waldstein, SR (2009) Carotid intimal medial thickness predicts cognitive decline among adults without clinical vascular disease. Stroke,40: 3-180. 8. Fotenos, AF, Mintun, MA, Synder, AZ, Morris,JC and Buckner, RL (2008) Brain volume decline in aging: evidence for a relation between socioeconomic status, preclinical Alzheimer disease, and reserve. Neurology, 6 5(1): 113-20. 9. Valenzuela, M, Breakspear, M and Sachdev, P (2007) Complex mental activity and the aging brain: molecular, cellular and cortical network mechanisms. Brain Research Reviews, 56: 198- 213. 10. Richards, M, Hardy, R and Wadsworth, ME (2003) Does active leisure protect cognition? Evidence from a national birth cohort. Social Science and Medicine, 56:785-92. Further reading: Kitchener, KS, Lynch, CL, Fischer, KW and Wood, PK (1993) Developmental range of reflective judgment: the effect of contextual support and practice on developmental stage. Developmental Psychology, 29:893-906. Available online at https :/ /gseweb.harvard.edu/ -ddl/articles Copy! Kitchener-etal 1993 DevRangeReflectjudgem.pdf. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Agreeableness | Neuroimaging | Corr I 315 Agreeableness/Neuroimaging/Canli: Agreeableness can be viewed as a trait associated with affective processing (readers interested in Impulsivity are referred to Congdon and Canli (2005)(1)). For example, Agreeableness is associated with greater effort to regulate negative affect (Tobin, Graziano, Vanman et al. 2000)(2). >Affects, >Information processing. This tendency to minimize negative affect is even on display in implicit processing paradigms, suggesting that the regulation of negative affect can be automatic (Meier, Robinson and Wilkowski 2006)(3). >Regulation, >Self-Regulation. One key region appears to be the right lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) in the conscious regulation of negative affect (Ochsner, Knierim, Ludlow et al. 2004(4)). However, it was unknown whether this region also activates during implicit emotion regulation, and whether it does so as a function of Agreeableness. We tested this hypothesis using the standard gender discrimination emotional face processing task (Haas, Omura et al. 2007b)(5). >Emotion. 1. Congdon, E. and Canli, T. 2005. The endophenotype of impulsivity: reaching consilience through behavioural, genetic, and neuroimaging approaches. Behavioural and Cognitive Neuroscience Review 4: 262–81 2. Tobin, R. M., Graziano, G., Vanman, E. J. et al. 2000. Personality, emotional experience, and efforts to control emotions, Journal of Personal and Social Psychology 79: 656–69 3, Meier, B. P., Robinson, M. D. and Wilkowski, B. M. 2006. Turning the other cheek: Agreeableness and the regulation of aggression-related primes, Psychological Science 17: 136–42 4. Ochsner, K. N., Knierim, K., Ludlow, D. H. et al. 2004. Reflecting upon feelings: an fMRI study of neural systems supporting the attribution of emotion to self and other, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 16: 1746–72 5. Haas, B. W., K. Omura, et al. 2007b. Is automatic Haas, B. W., K. Omura, et al. 2007b. Is automatic emotion regulation associated with agreeableness? A perspective using a social neuroscience approach, Psychological Science 18: 130–2 Turhan Canlı,“Neuroimaging of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Alienation | Arendt | Brocker I 356 Alienation/Arendt: According to Arendt, the origin of world alienation in thought lies at the beginning of modernism. >Modernism. The Frenchman René Descartes had philosophically carried out this break by terminating a traditional agreement according to which the human is part of the cosmos and not his ruler. >R. Descartes. Descartes, from a position of universal doubt, has classified the world as a product of the imagining mind. In so doing, he had broken with the relationship between the human and the environment: the "world" had from then on been regarded as an object of human activity. >Doubt, >Skepticism, >World, >World/Thinking. Antonia Grunenberg, „Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder Vom tätigen Leben“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Arendt I H. Arendt Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics. Civil Disobedience. On Violence. Thoughts on Politics and Revolution Boston 1972 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Alienation | Beauvoir | Brocker I 304 Alienation/Beauvoir: Background: the relationship between men and women: there is no struggle for recognition. The woman remains "the unessential that never becomes the essential, [...] the absolute other without reciprocity" (1). >Gender Roles/Beauvoir. The price the woman has to pay for the man's dream is her objectification, her renunciation of transcendence and thus her imprisonment in immanence. It describes her fate to exist as the and the "other" of the male subject. >Immanence/Beauvoir, Transcendence/Existentialism. Governance/Question: why is this gender relationship so permanent? Solution/Beauvoir: Each governance is the more stable, the more the ruled can find their advantage in it. It is a relationship of domination for mutual benefit, which nevertheless distorts both sides. Beauvoir: "The woman pursues a dream of self-abandonment and the man a dream of alienation"(2). There is a "secret agreement.“(3). 1. Simone de Beauvoir, Le deuxième sexe, Paris 1949. Dt.: Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht. Sitte und Sexus der Frau, Reinbek 2005 (zuerst 1951), S. 192. 2. Ibid p. 885. 3. Ibid. Friederike Kuster, „Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht (1949)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Alienation | Eco | Eco I 238 Alienation/MarxVsHegel/Eco: Hegel does not differentiate between externalization and alienation (voluntary/unvoluntary). Eco: Hegel could not do this because as soon as the human objectifies himself/herself in the world of the things he/she has created in nature which he/she has changed, a kind of inevitable tension arises, whose poles on the one hand are the control of the object and on the other hand the complete getting lost in it in a balance that can only be dialectical, i.e. in a permanent struggle. >G.W.F. Hegel, >Alienation/Hegel, >Object/Hegel, >Dialectic, >Contradiction, >Change. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Alienation | Flusser | I 107 Alienating/Estrangement/Distancing/Flusser: Alienation 1: the human being is expelled from the "world", tries to bridge the abyss with pictures (Magic Consciousness). >Pictures/Flusser, >Techno-image/Flusser. Alienation 2: The mediation performance of the image is disturbed, the human leaves the world of images and tries to bridge the abyss with texts. >Texts/Flusser, >World/Thinking. I 109 New point of view: historical awareness. Over time, the texts become opaque, unimaginable (>Alienation 3). Our texts no longer mediate, because behind them we no longer see images, but ourselves as creators. >Mediation, >Conceivability. I 110 E.g. there is no image of nature behind classical physics, but Newton, behind Hegel's philosophy is not an image of the human, but Hegel, behind the Karamazov brothers not an image of the human soul, but Dostoyevsky. We are alienated from the world of texts because we see them as a world created by us. Cf. >Constructivism. I 133 Alienation 3/Flusser: the madness of living within an impenetrable wall of books is nothing less terrible than the madness from which the books wanted to free us. >Literature. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
| Alienation | Hegel | Gadamer I 352 Alienation/Reconciliation/Hegel/Gadamer: The life of the spirit consists (...) in recognizing oneself in otherness. The spirit, directed towards its self-knowledge, sees itself divided with what is foreign and must learn to reconcile with it by recognising it as its own and home. By dissolving the hardness of positivity, he is reconciled with himself. Insofar as such reconciliation is the historical work of the spirit, the historical behaviour of the spirit is neither self-reflection nor the mere formal-dialectical suspension of the self-alienation that has happened to it, but an experience that experiences reality and is itself real. >Experience/Gadamer, >Mind/Hegel, >Subject/Hegel, >Subject-Object-Problem. Eco I 238 Alienation/MarxVsHegel/Eco: Hegel does not distinguish between externalization and alienation. (voluntary/unvoluntary). Eco: he could not, because as soon as the human objectifies himself in the world of the things he has created, in nature, which he has changed, a kind of inevitable tension arises, whose poles on the one hand are the control of the object and on the other hand the complete losing onself in it in a balance that can only be dialectical, i.e. in a permanent struggle. >G.W.F. Hegel, >Alienation/Hegel, >Object/Hegel, >Dialectic, >Contradiction, >Change. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Alienation | Marx | Eco I 238 Alienation/MarxVsHegel/Eco: Hegel does not distinguish between externalization and alienation(voluntary/involuntary). >Alienation/Hegel. Eco: he could not, because as soon as the human objectifies himself in the world of the things he has created, in nature, which he has changed, a kind of inevitable tension arises, whose poles on the one hand are the control of the object and on the other hand the complete losing oneself in it in a balance that can only be dialectical, i.e. consists in a permanent struggle. Habermas IV 501 Alienation/Marx/Habermas: in Marx and in the Marxist tradition, the concept of alienation has been applied above all to the way of life of wage workers. With the transition to value theory, however, Marx has already freed himself from the educational ideal determined by Herder and Romanticism(1). Value theory only retains the concept of exchange and thus a formal aspect of distributive justice. With the concept of transforming concrete labour into abstract labour, the concept of alienation loses its certainty. He no longer refers to the deviations from the model of an exemplary practice, but to the instrumentalization of a life presented as an end in itself. >Life/Marx. 1.Ch.Taylor, Hegel, Cambridge1975, S. 5-29; deutsch Frankfurt 1977. Höffe I 364 Alienation/Marx/Höffe: (...) the Paris manuscripts(1) [expand] the critique of national economy into a philosophical anthropology about the nature of the human and his/her work. >National Economy/Marx. Anthropology/Marx: The guiding concept is the concept of alienation known from Rousseau's social contract and Hegel's phenomenology of the mind: that the human becomes alien to his/her nature. Alienation/Hegel: For Hegel, the alienation that the slave experiences in confrontation with the master, nature and him- or herself is a necessary phase in the formation of consciousness. Marx: Marx, on the other hand, plays through Hegel's complex dialectic for the "material", basic economic relationship, for the "hostile struggle between capitalist and worker". Like Hegel, >Master/Slave/Hegel), Marx also ascribes to the first inferior, the slave, now the worker, the greater possibility of liberating him- or herself from alienation. In a captivating analysis, he blames the main obstacle to a better society, the private ownership of the means of production, for a fourfold alienation: alienation from the product of work, from the nature of work, from oneself as a worker and from society: 1) First, the worker -and in a modified form also the owner of capital- is alienated from his/her product, since the worker does not enjoy the commodity him- or herself; moreover, nature faces the worker as a hostile world. 2) Second, the laborers alienate themselves from themselves, from their life activity, for, since he/she does not affirm labor, he/she feels " with him- or herself when he/she is apart from labor and apart from him- or herself when he/she is working; his/her work is in essence forced labor. Höffe I 365 3) (...) Thirdly, (...) the human alienates him- or herself from his/her being generic, since he/she does not find himself in the work of the genus, the worked nature. 4) (...) he/she still alienates him- or herself from his/her fellow humans, since they do not meet him/her as a human, but merely as laborers, and thus as means for his/her own individual life. 1. K. Marx, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (1844) (Pariser Manuskripte) |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Allais Paradox | Norvig | Norvig I 619 Allais Paradox/Irrationality/Norvig/Russell: The evidence suggests that humans are “predictably irrational” (Ariely, 2009)(1). Norvig I 620 Allais paradox: The best-known problem is the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953). People are given a choice between lotteries A and B and then between C and D, which have the following prizes: A : 80% chance of $4000 C : 20% chance of $4000 B : 100% chance of $3000 D : 25% chance of $3000 Most people consistently prefer B over A (taking the sure thing), and C over D (taking the higher expected maximum value, EMV). The normative analysis disagrees! We can see this most easily if we use the freedom implied by Equation (16.2) to set U($0) = 0. In that case, then B -> A implies that U($3000) > 0.8 U($4000), whereas C -> D implies exactly the reverse. In other words, there is no utility function that is consistent with these choices. One explanation for the apparently irrational preferences is the certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)(2): people are strongly attracted to gains that are certain. >Certainty effect/Kahneman/Tversky, >Ambiguity/Kahneman/Tversky, >Rationality/AI research, >Preferences/Norvig, >Utility/AI research. Norvig I 638 The Allais paradox, due to Nobel Prize-winning economist Maurice Allais (1953)(3) was tested experimentally (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982(4); Conlisk, 1989(5)) to show that people are consistently inconsistent in their judgments. 1. Ariely, D. (2009). Predictably Irrational (Revised edition). Harper. 2. Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. econometrica, pp. 263–291. 3. Allais, M. (1953). Le comportment de l’homme rationnel devant la risque: critique des postulats et axiomes de l’´ecole Am´ericaine. Econometrica, 21, 503–546. 4. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1982). Causal schemata in judgements under uncertainty. In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (Eds.), Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. 5. Conlisk, J. (1989). Three variants on the Allais example. American Economic Review, 79(3), 392–407. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Allais Paradox | Russell | Norvig I 619 Allais Paradox/Irrationality/Norvig/Russell: The evidence suggests that humans are “predictably irrational” (Ariely, 2009)(1). Norvig I 620 Allais paradox: The best-known problem is the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953). People are given a choice between lotteries A and B and then between C and D, which have the following prizes: A : 80% chance of $4000 C : 20% chance of $4000 B : 100% chance of $3000 D : 25% chance of $3000 Most people consistently prefer B over A (taking the sure thing), and C over D (taking the higher expected maximum value, EMV). The normative analysis disagrees! We can see this most easily if we use the freedom implied by Equation (16.2) to set U($0) = 0. In that case, then B -> A implies that U($3000) > 0.8 U($4000), whereas C -> D implies exactly the reverse. In other words, there is no utility function that is consistent with these choices. One explanation for the apparently irrational preferences is the certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)(2): people are strongly attracted to gains that are certain. >Certainty effect/Kahneman/Tversky, >Ambiguity/Kahneman/Tversky, >Rationality/AI research, >Preferences/Norvig, >Utility/AI research. Norvig I 638 The Allais paradox, due to Nobel Prize-winning economist Maurice Allais (1953)(3) was tested experimentally (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982(4); Conlisk, 1989(5)) to show that people are consistently inconsistent in their judgments. 1. Ariely, D. (2009). Predictably Irrational (Revised edition). Harper. 2. Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. econometrica, pp. 263–291. 3. Allais, M. (1953). Le comportment de l’homme rationnel devant la risque: critique des postulats et axiomes de l’´ecole Am´ericaine. Econometrica, 21, 503–546. 4. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1982). Causal schemata in judgements under uncertainty. In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (Eds.), Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. 5. Conlisk, J. (1989). Three variants on the Allais example. American Economic Review, 79(3), 392–407. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Allocation | Cosmopolitanism | Norgaard I 329 Allocation/Emissions/Individuals/Cosmopolitanism: [A] relatively recent development is the emergence of allocation principles which take the cosmopolitan approach even further by focusing on individuals rather than countries. Two recent proposals which look at inequality within countries (and thus implicitly at individuals) are Norgaard I 330 the Greenhouse Development Rights framework (Baer et al. 2008(1), 2010(2)) and the proposal of Chakravarty et al. (2009(3)). The former allocates obligations on the basis of a combined indicator of responsibility and capacity, exempting both income and emissions below a threshold; the latter focuses only on emissions and would require high‐emitting individuals to reduce while low emitters are allowed to increase emissions. Both are thus compatible with the long‐standing recognition of the distinction between ‘luxury’ and ‘subsistence’ emissions (Agarwal and Narain 1991(4); Shue 1993(5)), but both still conclude that obligations, even if derived from looking at individuals, would still be incumbent on countries. (…) Paul Harris (2010)(6) develops the cosmopolitan focus on individuals in much greater detail, focusing at length on the wealth and emissions of the middle and wealthy classes in developing countries, and arguing for a more direct assessment of obligations on individuals. This approach is implicitly backed up by Simon Caney (2009)(7), who argues against collective notions of responsibility but includes capacity and recent (e.g. since 1990) historical emissions in his account of individually based obligations. 1. Baer, P. et al. 2008. The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework. 2nd edn., Heinrich Böll Stiftung, EcoEquity, Stockholm Environment Institute and Christian Aid. Available at (http://gdrights.org/wp‐content/uploads/2009/01/thegdrsframework.pdf) (Link does not work as of 14/04/19) 2. Bear, P. et al. 2010. Greenhouse development rights: A framework for climate protection that is ‘more fair’ than equal per capita emissions rights. Pp. 215–30 in S. M. Gardiner, S. Caney, D. Jamieson, and H. Shue (eds.), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Chakravarty, S., Chikkatur, A., de Coninck, H., Pacala, S., Socolow, R., and Tavoni, M. 2009. Sharing global CO2 emission reductions among one billion high emitters. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 106:11885–8. 4. Agarwal, A., and S. Narain, S. 1991. Global Warming in an Unequal World: A Case of Environmental Colonialism. New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment. 5. Shue, H. 1993. Subsistence emissions and luxury emissions. Law and Policy 15: 39–59. 6. Harris, P. G. 2010. World Ethics and Climate Change: From International to Global Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 7. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Allport | Psychological Theories | Corr I 92 Allport/personality/traits/psychological theories/Deary: John and Robbins 1993(1) p. 224): ‘The Big Five' structure was derived through purely empirical and purposely atheoretical procedures; theoretical considerations, such as questions about the existence and explanatory status of traits, were deemed unimportant.’ There are two views: A. There are those who hold to traits as merely descriptive: the summary view. B. On the other hand, there are those who hold the causal view. The causal view seems irresistible, if only to try to test it and to think how. When discussing the causal view one gets various reiterations of what this means to people: ‘unknown neuropsychiatric structures’, ‘entities that exist “in our skins” ’, ‘underlying causal mechanisms’, ‘some neurophysiological or hormonal basis for personality’, and ‘causal and dynamic principles’ (John and Robins 1993, pp. 227–8). Most of this is hand-waving. ((s) For the philosophical discussion on causal explanation see >Causal explanation.) >Personality traits, >G. Allport, >Lexical hypothesis, >Lexical studies. 1. John, O. P. and Robbins, R. W. 1993. Gordon Allport: father and critic of the five-factor model, in K. H. Craik, R. Hogan and R. N. Wolfe (eds.), Fifty years of personality psychology, pp. 215–36. New York: Plenum |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Altruism | Gould | II 56 Altruism/behavior/evolution/Gould: definition Haplodiploid: the males develop from unfertilized eggs and have no father. Fertilized eggs, on the other hand, produce diploid females. This can be used to control the number of females. II 57 This fascinating system can help explain the origin of social systems in ants. Or also, for example, that a male mite dies before its own birth after fertilising its sisters in the womb. At least 10% of all known animal species are haplodiploid. This leads to problems from the Darwinian point of view: in a world where every individual works for personal reproductive success, why should a large number of females give up their own reproduction in order to help their mother (the queen) to bring in more sisters? The ingenious explanation is based on the asymmetric relationship between the sexes of haplodiploid animals. In both diploid and haplodiploids, the mother gives half of her genetic material to her offspring (other half the father). Therefore, she is related to her sons and daughters in equal measure. A diplo female also shares half of its genes with its brothers and sisters. A haplo female, on the other hand, shares three quarters of the genes with the sisters but only one quarter with the brothers. If the Darwinian imperative causes organisms to maximize the number of their own genes in future generations, then the females of haplodiploids would do better to help their mothers raise their sisters than to produce their own offspring. In fact, such developments have occurred several times independently of each other. II 59 Causality: the biologists were so fascinated by these observations that a subtle reversal of causality has crept into many descriptions: the very existence of haplodiploidism is elegantly associated with the decision "for" a better social system such as ants. >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Explanations. II 61 GouldVs: haplodiploid ancestors were certainly not completely social, this has only developed as a "phylogenetic additional thought" in some independent tribes. Environment of such tribes: the environment of such tribes is created by every single female! Even a non-full-grown one becomes a possible founder of new colonies, as it is able to produce a generation of males, with which it can mate to create a new generation of females. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Alzheimer’s Disease | Geriatric Psychology | Upton I 142 Alzheimer’s disease/Geriatric psychology/Upton: Individuals with dementia often lose the ability to look after themselves. They may also no longer recognize familiar places or people, including close family members such as their children or a spouse (Clark, 2006)(1). The most common form of dementia, accounting for between 50 and 70 per cent of all dementia, is Alzheimer’s disease. Alzheimer’s is progressive, meaning that it involves a gradual decline in skills. It is also irreversible. The disease is characterized by a gradual deterioration in memory, reasoning, language and eventually physical functioning. >Dementia. Most people with Alzheimer’s are 65 and older, making it predominantly a disease of old age. However, up to 5 per cent of people with the disease have what is known as early-onset Alzheimer’s: this form of the disease often appears when someone is in their forties or fifties. Many of the risk factors for Alzheimer’s are ones we cannot change, such as age and genetics. (…) it is now commonly believed that Alzheimer’s disease occurs as a result of complex interactions among genes and other risk factors such as diet and lifestyle choices. This is another example of the diathesis-stress model (…). Def diathesis-stress model/Upton: a model that hypothesizes that abnormal behaviour patterns are due to a combination of genetic susceptibility and a stressful environment. This means that, in individuals with the genetic potential for Alzheimer’s disease, certain environmental factors such as lifestyle choices may trigger the disease. (…) it has been found that there is a link between obesity and Alzheimer’s disease. >Aging. Kivipelto et al. (2005(2), 2006(3)) found obesity in middle age to be associated with an increased risk of dementia and Alzheimer’s disease later in life. Other studies have suggested that health problems in middle age, such as high blood pressure and type 2 diabetes, also increase the risk for dementia, including Alzheimer’s disease. Obesity, high blood pressure and diabetes are all health problems that can affect the heart and blood vessels and it is thought that, if the vessels in the brain are affected, this can result in dementia. It has also been found that older adults with Alzheimer’s disease are more likely to have heart disease than individuals without Alzheimer’s (Hayden et al.. 2006)(4). 1. Clark, R, Hyde, ¡S, Essex. MJ and Klein, MH (2006) Length of maternity leave and quality of mother- infant interactions. Child Development, 68,2: 364-83. 2. Kivipelto, M. Ngandu. T and Fratiglioni. L et al. (2005) Obesity and vascular risk factors at midlife and the risk of dementia and Alzheimer disease. Archives of Neurology, 62: 1556-60. 3. Kivipelto, M, Ngandu, T and Laatikainen T et al. (2006) Risk score for the prediction of dementia risk in 20 years among middle aged people: a longitudinal, population-based study. Lancet Neurology, 5: 735-41. 4. Hayden, KM, Zandi, PP, Lyketsos, CG, Khachaturian, AS and Bastian, LA et al. (2006) Vascular risk factors for incident Alzheimer disease and vascular dementia: the Cache County study. Alzheimer Disease and Associated Disorders, 20(2): 93-100. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Ambiguity | Kahneman | Norvig I 620 Ambiguity/Kahneman/Tversky/Norvig/Russell: One explanation for (…) apparently irrational preferences (>Allais paradox/Norvig) is the certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)(1): people are strongly attracted to gains that are certain. >Certainty effect/Kahneman/Tversky. Ambiguity aversion: It seems that people have ambiguity aversion: A gives you a 1/3 chance of winning, while B could be anywhere between 0 and 2/3. Similarly, D gives you a 2/3 chance, while C could be anywhere between 1/3 and 3/3. Most people elect the known probability rather than the unknown unknowns. >Ellsberg paradox/Norvig, >Allais paradox/Norvig, >Rationality/AI research, >Preferences/Norvig, >Utility/AI research. 1. Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. econometrica, pp. 263–291. |
EconKahne I Daniel Kahneman Schnelles Denken, langsames Denken München 2012 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Ambiguity | Quine | I 231 Ambiguity: The name Paul is not ambiguous. It is not a general term but a singular term with dissemination. Ambiguity Action/Habit: are ice skaters, delivery (action, object). I 232 Truth is not ambiguous but general. A true confession is as true as math. Law: There is a difference between laws and confessions! Also, "existence" is not ambiguous. I 233 Circumstances/Quine: circumstances are important for ambiguities. I 236 Ambiguities: "a" (can be "any"). "Nothing" and "nobody" are undetermined singular terms (E.g. Polyphemus). I 244 An ambiguous scope cannot be decided by parentheses. Undetermined singular terms are: a, any, every member - "not a"/"not every" - "I think one is so that ..." / "one is so that I think ... ". IX 184 "Systematic (or type-wise) ambiguity/Russell: a solution for the problem are relations: the type is only fixed when we state the type of things from the left end of the range and from the right end of the range. There is one problem however: the two-dimensionality can add up to growths: E.g. type of a relation of things of type m to things of type n: (m, n). The type of a class of such relations should be called ((m, n)), then [((m,n))] is the type of a relation of such classes to such classes. Orders were obviously even worse. IX 194 Systematic Ambiguity/theoretical terms/Quine: (context: polyvalent logic, 2nd order logic) Systematic ambiguity suppresses the indices and allows to stick to the simple quantifier logic. A formula like "∃y∀x(xεy)", which is treated as a type-wise ambiguous, can simply be equated with the scheme ∃yn + 1 ∀xn (xn ∃yn + 1), where "n" is a schematic letter for any index. Its universality is the schematic universality that it stands for any of a number of formulas: ∃y1 "x0 (x0 ε Y1), ∃y2 "x1(x1 ε y2). It does not stand for the universality that consist in the fact that it is quantified undivided over an exhaustive universal class. A formula is meaningless if it cannot be equipped with indices that comply with the theoretical terms. Problem: then also the conjunction of two meaningful formulas can become meaningless. Systematic ambiguity/theoretical terms: we can always reduce multiple variable types to a single one if we only take on suitable predicates. "Universal variables" that we restrict to the appropriate predicate are: "Tnx" expresses that x is of type n. The old formulae: "∀xnFxn" and "∃xnFxn". New is: "x(Tnx > Fx)", e.g.(Tnx u Fx). >Indeterminacy/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Ambiguity | Tversky | Norvig I 620 Ambiguity/Kahneman/Tversky/Norvig/Russell: One explanation for (…) apparently irrational preferences (>Allais paradox/Norvig) is the certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)(1): people are strongly attracted to gains that are certain. >Certainty effect/Kahneman/Tversky. Ambiguity aversion: It seems that people have ambiguity aversion: A gives you a 1/3 chance of winning, while B could be anywhere between 0 and 2/3. Similarly, D gives you a 2/3 chance, while C could be anywhere between 1/3 and 3/3. Most people elect the known probability rather than the unknown unknowns. >Ellsberg paradox/Norvig, >Allais paradox/Norvig, >Rationality/AI research, >Preferences/Norvig, >Utility/AI research. 1. Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. econometrica, pp. 263–291. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Analog/Digital | Dyson | Brockman I 35 Analog/digital/Dyson, George: Electronics underwent two fundamental transitions over the past hundred years: from analog to digital and from vacuum tubes to solid state. That these transitions occurred together does not mean they are inextricably linked. Just as digital computation was implemented using vacuum tube components, analog computation can be implemented in solid state. Analog computation is alive and well, even though vacuum tubes are commercially extinct. There is no precise distinction between analog and digital computing. Many systems operate across both analog and digital regimes. A tree integrates a wide range of inputs as continuous functions, but if you cut down that tree, you find that it has been counting the years digitally all along. In analog computing, complexity resides in network topology, not in code. Information is processed as continuous functions of values such as voltage and relative pulse frequency rather than by logical operations on discrete strings of bits. Brockman I 36 Digital computing, intolerant of error or ambiguity, depends upon error correction at every step along the way. Analog computing tolerates errors, allowing you to live with them. Nature uses digital coding for the storage, replication, and recombination of sequences of nucleotides, but relies on analog computing, running on nervous systems, for intelligence and control. The genetic system in every living cell is a stored-program computer. Brains aren’t. Analog computers also mediate transformations between two forms of information: structure in space and behavior in time. There is no code and no programming. (…) nature evolved analog computers known as nervous systems, which embody information absorbed from the world. They learn. Dyson, G. “The Third Law”. In: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Dyson I Esther Dyson Release 2.1: A Design for Living in the Digital Age New York 1998 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Analog/Digital | Goodman | III 163ff Many topology diagrams, for example, only need to have the correct number of points or joints connected by lines according to the correct scheme. Here, the points and lines act as characters in a notational language. These diagrams, as with electrical circuits, are purely digital. It does not depend on a vague idea of the analog as something similar, but solely on technical requirements. III 165 Models of this type are in reality diagrams. Or: diagrams are flat and static models. A molecular model of sticks and table tennis balls is digital. A working model of a windmill can be analog. --- IV 168 A schema can be called digital in which two characters are effectively differentiated. Analog: a schemata is analog in which a path consisting of pairs of non-differentiated characters exists between two characters in the schema. (Warning: misleading notions in connection with the expression.) IV 169 "Digital" and "analog" do not apply to isolated symbols but only to schematas. Since schematas are not images and pictures, the question of how the pictorial and the analog are related can cause us some trouble. For example, a unicorn or Lincoln picture is a card with a pattern of white and black squares. IV 170 We are now assuming a pack A, a stack of cards, some of which are pictures, some are inscriptions of letters, words, numbers, etc., and some cards are not supposed to belong to a known category. Since the cards are effectively differentiated, the schema is digital. E.g. now we add A by adding many more cards of the same size, one for each pattern, so that not only all the patterns composed of dots, but also all shades of any kind are included. In this extended pack A' each card is indistinguishable from many others. The schema is analog and even completely tight. But although A' is analog, it includes A and many other digital schemata! Such digital sub-schemata can be thought to have arisen through elimination from A'. However, a digital schema does not need to consist of characters composed of dots, but can consist of several nuanced images. IV 171 Images that are not composed of dots belong to as many digital schemes as images composed of dots. An analog scheme generally contains many digital schemata and a digital schema is included in many analog schemata. But obviously no digital schema includes an analog one. IV 174 A symbol only works as an image if it is considered a character in the complete pictorial scheme. A complete schema is pictorial only if it is analog. Verbal, if it is digital. In other words, not every analog, complete schema is pictorial and not every digital complete schema is verbal. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Analogies | Cartwright | I 94 Analogy/Duhem/Cartwright: It is a raw fact that some things sometimes behave like certain other things - that gives us indications. Explanation/Duhem: provides a scheme for these indications. Unification: is fictitious - it is intended to simplify the theory. E.g. Maxwell treated light and electricity as the same. I 111 Analogy/RussellVsAnalogy: the principle "same cause, same effect" is futile - if the antecedent (the circumstances represents) is accurate enough, the same case will never happen again -> per >fundamental laws. >Effects, >Causes, >Causality, >Description levels, cf. >Singular Terms. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Analogies | Gould | II 241 Analogies/science/Gould: GouldVsSociobiology: zoocentrism is the primary fallacy of sociobiology: if animals develop with primary mechanisms and structures as products of natural selection, then human behaviour must have a similar basis! Sociobiology is about the idea that a behaviour in humans must also be "natural" if it looks similar in animals. These are misleading similarities. For example, sociobioligists associate human names with the actions of other beings and speak of enslavement in the ants, rape in the wild ducks and adultery in the mountain bluethroat. Since these "character traits" exist in the "lower" animals, they can be derived as "natural" genetic and adaptive for humans. GouldVsSociobiology: but these traits never existed outside a human context of meaning. No one can claim that two behaviours are really homologous: that is, are based on the same genes! (> Behavior). If the similarity is significant, it can only be analogous, i. e. it reflects different phylogenetic (phylogenetic: concerning the phylogeny) origins, but serves the same biological function. Different origins - the same function. GouldVsZoocentrism: zoocentric systems fail mainly because they are never what they pretend to be. The "objective" animal behaviour is from the very beginning an imposition of human preferences. >Explanation, >Similarities. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Analogies | Kant | Strawson V 102 Analogies of Experience/Kant: We do not find them in the axioms of intuition. "Experiences are only possible with the idea of a necessary connection of perceptions". - Transcendental Aesthetic/Kant: Principles of sensibility a priori. Transcendental Analytic: comprises the deduction of the categories, the schematism and the principles. Strawson V 104 Analogy: Shows how the order of the perceptions must be represented with the terms - Kant brilliantly reduces it on temporal relations - 1. between the objects 2. between the experiences. Strawson V 105 1. Analogy/Kant: the quantum of substance in nature can be neither reduced nor increased. >Substance. V 106 Time/Kant: All determination of time presupposes something permanent. Only space is persistent. Strawson V 107 StrawsonVsKant: That is not a reason for the objective order to be spatial. Strawson V 108 StrawsonVsKant: There is no need for a conservation principle! Only a re-identification principle for loci (objects). - Nowadays: We see that something burns while no substance remains. Strawson V 112 2./3. Analogy/Kant: Question: Could perceptions also have occurred reversely? a) Events: No time indifference b) Object: time difference Strawson V 115 2. Analogy: The order of the sequence is not only necessary, but also specific, bound by our apprehensions. Causality: If the order is necessary, the change itself is necessary. StrawsonvsKant: He unconsciously uses two terms of necessity here: conceptual/causal Strawson V 116/117 3. Analogy/Kant: the interaction of simultaneously existing objects corresponds to a time indifference of perceptions. Strawson: unlike causality. >Causality/Kant, >Perception/Kant, >Principles/Kant, >Experience/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Analogies | Nagel | I 142 Analogies of Experience/Kant/Nagel: the transfer to the unobserved is also drawn from the conditions of possible experience. >Imagination/Kant, >Analogies of experience/Kant, >Experience/Kant. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Analogies | Sokal | I 28 Analogies/Sokal/Bricmont: we criticize the use of scientific concepts by authors who have not understood the scientific meaning of these terms themselves. The recognition of a conclusive analogy between two existing theories can often be very useful for the further development of both theories. In our opinion, however, the authors we are investigating are analogies between generally accepted theories (from the natural sciences) and theories that are too vague to be empirically verifiable (e. g. Lacanian psychoanalysis). >J. Lacan, >Psychoanalysis. I 150 Analogies/Lacan/Latour/BricmontVsLacan/BricmontVsLatour/SokalVsLacan/SokalVsLatour: Latour - just like Lacan (see A. Sokal and J. Bricmont 1999(1), p. 38) insist on the literal validity of a comparison, which at best should be provided as a vague metaphor. For example, the enunciator (the didactic trick of Einstein to explain the theory of relativity) is assumed to be a real person whose privileges must be fought against. Afterwards, Latour says:.... Fighting against privileges in economics or physics is literally the same, but not in metaphorical terms. (B. Latour 1988(2) p. 23.) I 154 Assuming that Latour's sociological concepts can be defined as precisely as those of relativity theory, and someone who is familiar with both theories could establish a formal analogy between the two. This analogy could perhaps contribute to explain relativity theory to a sociologist who is familiar with Latour's sociology, or to explain Latour's sociology to a physicist, but what sense should it have in explaining the sociology of Latour to other sociologists on the basis of the analogy to relativity theory? >Explanations, >Relativity, >Comparisons, >Comparability. 1. A. Sokal und J. Bricmont. (1999) Eleganter Unsinn. München. 2. B. Latour, „A relativistic account of Einstein’s relativity“, Social Studies of Science, 18, 1988. |
Sokal I Alan Sokal Jean Bricmont Fashionabel Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science, New York 1998 German Edition: Eleganter Unsinn. Wie die Denker der Postmoderne die Wissenschaften missbrauchen München 1999 Sokal II Alan Sokal Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science New York 1999 |
| Analysis | Gould | I 95 Analysis/science/Gould: the fascination that Richard Dawkins's theory exerts is due to some of the bad habits of Western science: atomism, reductionism, determinism; in other words, the notion that wholeness is understood by breaking it down into its "basic" units. GouldVsDawkins: in addition, Dawkins assumes that genes have an influence on the body. Selection cannot see them if they do not translate into parts of the morphology, physiology or behavior that are important for the survival of an organism. Ironically, Dawkin's theory came to light just as pan-selectionist theories were increasingly rejected, according to which all parts of the body are formed in the crucible of natural selection. If most genes fail to be checked, they cannot be the units of selection. >Explanation, >Selection. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Analysis | Moore | Avramidis I 2o Analysis/Moore: two types of analysis: 1) eliminate confusion over a concept (>Quine (1960) Word and Object(1) §53) 2) Make our thoughts clearer. Broad: per 1) - Moore per 2) WisdomVsMoore: new level of concept: asymmetry: E.g., the analysis of nations discovers something about individuals. MooreVsWisdom: we have to stay on the same level! (Symmetry). Ad 1) Avramides: understanding a concept through other concepts. ad 2) Location of a concept in the network. - These are two interpretations of the same biconditional. >Interpretation, >Levels, >Description levels, >Biconditional. 1. Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press. |
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| Analysis | Sellars | I 24 Explanation/analysis/Sellars: difference between explanation and analysis: Explanation/Sellars: with some observations you can be convinced of a fact without being convinced of the explanation. Analysis/Sellars: In the case of analysis you cannot. >Observation, >Facts, >Beliefs, >Explanation, >Analysis. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Analysis | Stalnaker | I 35 Analysis/Stalnaker: usually a more structured set of entities is analyzed in terms of a less structured set in order to explain the structure. >Explanations, >Structures, >Complexes/Complexity, >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Lewis | II 238 f Analyticity, blurred: a better explanation: that our language conventions, as previously assumed here, are not a precise convention of truth and trust in one language. It is, rather, for an arbitrarily selected language from a whole bunch of similar languages. >Convention/Lewis. II 239f Of a bundle of similar languages that contain more or less the same sentences that have more or less the same truth values in the worlds that are close to our real world. We can eliminate the uncertainties that arise here as we want. Analyticity is then sharp in each language of our bundle. II 239 Blurred analyticity/Lewis: thesis: our language is selected at random from a bunch of similar languages that contain more or less the same sentences. They have more or less the same truth value in similar possible worlds. Then we have a space of languages. Analyticity is then sharp in each language. If different languages do not match regarding the analyticity, the sentence is not just analytical. --- Schwarz I 220 Analytical/analyticity/Lewis/Schwarz: neither theories nor their individual sentences are analytic, but rather their >Carnap Conditional. Analyticity: you could try further to explain blurred analyticity by the fact that it reminds us that we do not know whether certain worlds are indeed possible. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Schurz | I 106 Analytic/Synthetic/SchurzVsQuine: his discarding of the distinction is problematic: the relation between language and world contains a conventional element. E.g. if it is not clear what "raven" means, one cannot hypothesize. And this conventional element is supposed to capture just the analytic. Analytic/Schurz/(s): is the result of the conventional determination of meaning in a language. Quine/Schurz: Quine's problem is that this conventional moment operates predominantly in an ostensive way. >Ostension, >Conventions, >Meaning, >Sense. I 171 Analytic/Synthetic/QuineVsCarnap/Schurz: Quine's insight into local indistinguishability brought a profound upheaval. Carnap accepted it late. >Analyticity/Quine. However, he had recognized that several reduction theorems together produce empirical content. (see above). ((s) if one has observed that something dissolves in water, one has thereby "empirically inferred" that it does not dissolve in oil?). Reduction/Schurz: but with the term "reduction theorem" he just remained true to his reductionist program. Assignment law/terminology/Schurz: Carnap (1956)(1) calls it "correspondence rules" (K). I 172 Total theory/Carnap: "T u K". ("theory and assignment laws"). Assignment law/SchurzVsCarnap: this cannot be, because assignment laws are consequences of a theory T, which follow from the interaction of all theorems. ((s) circular). Analyticity/Carnap: sums up in (Carnap 1963(2), 964) that he failed to formulate an appropriate notion. Solution/Carnap: decomposition of theory into Ramsey-theorem and Carnap-theorem: Ramsey-theorem/Carnap: synthetic Carnap-theorem/Carnap: analytic. Analytic/synthetic/Ernest Nagel: (Nagel 1961)(3) the analytic content of mechanics is not localizable! 1. Carnap, R. "The Methological Character of Theoretical Concepts". In: Feigle,H./Scriven, M(eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol I, Menneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, pp. 38-76. 2. Carnap, R. (1963) "Carl G. Hempel on Scientific Theories". In: Schilpp, P. A. (ed.) The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, La Salle, pp. 958-965. 3. Nagel, E. (1961). The Structure of Science, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Anarchism | Kropotkin | Brocker I 19 Anarchism/Kropotkin: Kropotkin's turn towards anarchism goes back to his personal experiences with the egalitarian coexistence of watchmakers on a farm in Switzerland in 1872. Brocker I 20 However, the associated basic concept of communist anarchism existed even before Kropotkin. With his essays and books, he primarily contributed to their historical and scientific foundation, since Kropotkin wanted to provide a scientific explanation for anarchism. It was about free cooperation of individuals without regulation by the institution of the state. >Cooperation. The central organisational principle should be free agreement. Kropotkin saw the prerequisite for this in the formation of small and manageable groups, which would be formed by working together, local proximity or private interests. Work should be carried out in small decentralised businesses in order to overcome the negative impact of the division of labour. In the social order he was striving for, the distribution of goods should no longer take place via the individual work performed in each case. Rather, a generally equal consumption must be possible according to the formula "Everyone according to his/her needs". KropotkinVsCounsils: instead, a decentralized federation of autonomous groups in a stateless society. >Community, >Society, >Organization. Armin Pfahl-Traughber Pjotr Alexejewitsch Kropotkin, Gegenseitige Hilfe in der Tier- und Menschenwelt (1902) in: Brocker 2018. |
Kropot I Peter Kropotkin Gegenseitige Hilfe in der Tier- und Menschenwelt Frankfurt/Berlin/Wien 1975 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Animal Language | Deacon | I 34 Animal language/Deacon: the communication of other species is never a "simpler form" of human language. It is not language at all. >Communication. Biological explanation/Deacon: is always evolutionary and tries to show continuity. However, there are no animal precursors to the emergence of human language, let alone an ascending scale of complexity. (See Robin Dunbar, Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language, 1997(1); and Dunbar 1992 a(2), b(3)). I 54 Animal language/animals/Deacon: the misconception that animal calls and gestures are like words or phrases can be traced back to misunderstandings about the concept of reference. >Reference, >Gestures. Behaviorism: some behaviorists have suggested that animal cries are just external expressions of internal states and therefore have nothing to do with reference. >Behaviorism. Cognitive behaviorists saw calls as equivalent to words. One study played a central role in this. Seyfarth/Cheney: Thesis: Warning calls of guenons are like names for predators in the distance. (See Seyfarth, Cheney and Marler 1980(4)). I 56 In response to various calls, the monkeys left the trees (warning of eagles) or jumped on trees (leopards) or peeked into bushes (snake). Deacon: this is evolutionary easy to explain. Since the saving behaviour cannot always look the same and is even mutually exclusive, different calls have to be distinguished. (See also Hauser, 1996(5)). Animal calls/Cheney/Seyfarth/Deacon: Cheney and Seyfarth initially assumed that the animal calls were names for the predators. These were accepted instead of a complete sentence, i.e. as "holophrastic" utterances. Holophrastic utterances/Deacon: it is disputed how much syntactic potential lies in them. >Wittgenstein language game "Platte", cf. >Subsententials. Animal communication: the thesis was put forward that warning cries were different from cries of pain or grimaces by referring to something else... I 57 ...than the inner state of the animal. Reference/DeaconVsCheney/DeaconVsSeyfarth: it was implicitly assumed that pain cries, for example, could not be referring. Such assumptions give rise to the idea of a "proto-language" with calls as "vocabulary". >Vocabulary, >Words, >Signs, >Signals. Then you could imagine an animal language evolution with grammar and syntax that emerged later. This whole house of cards is falling apart however. (See also Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990(6)). Reference/Deacon: is not limited to language. Symptoms can refer to something other than themselves. For example, laughter: is congenital in humans. It does not have to be produced intentionally and can be simulated in social contexts. But laughter can also refer to things, even to absent ones. In this way alarm calls also refer. >Innateness. I 58 Language/DeaconVsSeyfarth/DeaconVsCheney: e.g. laughter differs from speech by the fact that it is contagious. In a room full of laughing people, it is hard to be serious. The idea of a room full of people repeating just one sentence is absurd. Intentionality/Intention/animal calls/Deacon: Animal calls do not fulfil the Grice criterion for messages either: "I think you believe that I believe x". Animal calls are involuntary and contagious. >Language, >P. Grice. I 59 Solution/Deacon: it is more about spreading excitement than sharing information. Reference/Deacon: therefore, reference is not the distinguishing feature between animal calls and words. Both can refer to inner states and things in the outer world. We must therefore distinguish between different types of reference rather than distinguish between referring and allegedly non-referring signals. >Reference/Deacon. I 65 Animal language/Herrnstein/Deacon: (Herrnstein 1980(7)): Experiments with pigeons who had successfully learned an arbitrary sign language and cooperation. I 66 Symbolic reference/Deacon: this simple form of reference with the characteristic learned association, randomness of characters, transmission of information between individuals are not sufficient to define symbolic reference. A symbolic reference system does not simply consist of words without syntax. >Symbolic reference, >Syntax. I 67 Animal calls: in one sense their understanding is innate, on the other hand the connection to the referent is not necessary. The reference is somewhat flexible. Some connections are built in prenatal, others are learned. I 68 Symbolic competence: is that which goes beyond parrot-like expressions. For this purpose, one has to distinguish between contextually determined causes of expression and memorized dictations. >Symbolic communication, >Symbolic learning, >Symbolic representation. 1. Dunbar, R. (1997). Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Dunbar, R. (1992a). Co-evolution of neocortex size, group size and language in humans. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 3. Dunbar, R. (1992b). Neocortex size as a constraint on group sizes in primates. Journal of Human Evolution 20, 469-493. 4. Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L., & Marler, P. (1980): Vervet monkey alarm calls: Semantic communication in a free-ranging primate. Animal Behaviour, 28(4), 1070–1094. 5. Hauser, M. D. (1996): The evolution of communication. The MIT Press. 6. Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990): How monkeys see the world: Inside the mind of another species. University of Chicago Press. 7. Herrnstein, R. (1980). Symbolic communication between two pigeons (Columba domestica). Science 210. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Animals | Feminism | Braidotti I 77 Animals/Feminism: A liberal humanist like Nussbaum (2006)(1) agrees to pursue species equity. Working within the classical liberal tradition, Mary Midgley (1996)(2) does not even trust the term ‘anthropocentrism’, referring to it as ‘human chauvinism; narrowness of sympathy, comparable to national, or race or gender-chauvinism. It could also be called exclusive humanism, as opposed to the hospitable, friendly, inclusive kind’ (1996(2): 105). The alternative Midgley supports is to admit that ‘we are not self-contained and self-sufficient, either as a species or as individuals, but live naturally in deep mutual dependence’ (1996(2): 9-10). In her powerful analyses of the environmental crisis of reason, Val Plumwood (2003)(7) also calls for a new dialogical interspecies ethics based on decentring human privilege. Ecofeminism: For radical eco-feminists, both utilitarianism and liberalism are found wanting: the former for its condescending approach to non-human others, the latter in view of the hypocritical denial of humans’ manipulative mastery over animals. This critique is expanded to the destructive side of human individualism that entails selfishness and a misplaced sense of superiority, which for feminists (Donovan and Adams, 1996(3), 2007(4)) is connected to male privileges and the oppression of women and supports a general theory of male domination. Meat-eating is targeted as a legalized form of cannibalism by old and new feminist vegetarian and vegan critical theory (Adams, 1990(5); MacCormack, 2012(6)). Speciesism is therefore held accountable as an undue privilege to the same degree as sexism and racism. The pervasiveness of a ‘sex-species’ hierarchical system tends to remain unacknowledged and uncriticized even in the framework of animal rights activism. The corrective influence of feminism is valued because it emphasizes both the political importance of the collectivity and of emotional bonding. >Ecofeminism, >Posthumanism. 1. Nussbaum, Martha C. 2006. Frontiers of Justice. Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 2. Midgley, Mary. 1996. Utopias, Dolphins and Computers. Problems of Philosophical Plumbing. London and New York: Routledge. 3. Donovan, Josephine and Carol J. Adams (eds.) 1996. Beyond Animal Rights. A Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment of Animals. New York: Continuum. 4. Donovan, Josephine and Carol J. Adams (eds.) 2007. The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics. New York: Columbia University Press. 5. Adams, Carol. 1990. The Sexual Politics of Meat: A FeministVegetarian Critical Theory. New York: Continuum. 6. MacCormack, Patricia. 2012. Posthuman Ethics. London: Ashgate. 7. Plumwood, Val. 2003. Environmental Culture. London: Routledge. |
Braidotti I Rosie Braidotti The Posthuman Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 2013 |
| Answers | AI Research | Norvig I 471 Answer/Answer sets/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Answer set programming can be seen as an extension of negation as failure or as a refinement of circumscription; >Negation. Norvig I 472 the underlying theory of stable model semantics was introduced by Gelfond and Lifschitz (1988)(1), and the leading answer set programming systems are DLV (Eiter et al., 1998)(2) and SMODELS (Niemel¨a et al., 2000)(3). The disk drive example comes from the SMODELS user manual (Syrj¨anen, 2000)(4). Lifschitz (2001(5)) discusses the use of answer set programming for planning. Brewka et al. (1997)(6) give a good overview of the various approaches to nonmonotonic logic. Clark (1978)(7) covers the negation-as-failure approach to logic programming and Clark completion. Van Emden and Kowalski (1976)(8) show that every Prolog program without negation has a unique minimal model. Recent years have seen renewed interest in applications of nonmonotonic logics to large-scale knowledge representation systems. >Knowledge Representation. 1. Gelfond, M. and Lifschitz, V. (1988). Compiling circumscriptive theories into logic programs. In Non- Monotonic Reasoning: 2nd International Workshop Proceedings, pp. 74–99. 2. Eiter, T., Leone, N., Mateis, C., Pfeifer, G., and Scarcello, F. (1998). The KR system dlv: Progress report, comparisons and benchmarks. In KR-98, pp. 406–417. 3. Niemela, I., Simons, P., and Syrj¨anen, T. (2000). Smodels: A system for answer set programming. In Proc. 8th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning. 4. Syrjanen, T. (2000). Lparse 1.0 user’s manual.saturn.tcs.hut.fi/Software/smodels. 5. Lifschitz, V. (2001). Answer set programming and plan generation. AIJ, 138(1–2), 39–54. 6. Brewka, G., Dix, J., and Konolige, K. (1997). Nononotonic Reasoning: An Overview. CSLI Publications. 7. Clark, K. L. (1978). Negation as failure. In Gallaire, H. and Minker, J. (Eds.), Logic and Data Bases, pp. 293–322. Plenum. 8. Van Emden, M. H. and Kowalski, R. (1976). The semantics of predicate logic as a programming language. JACM, 23(4), 733–742. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Answers | Russell | Norvig I 471 Answer/Answer sets/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Answer set programming can be seen as an extension of negation as failure or as a refinement of circumscription; Norvig I 472 the underlying theory of stable model semantics was introduced by Gelfond and Lifschitz (1988)(1), and the leading answer set programming systems are DLV (Eiter et al., 1998)(2) and SMODELS (Niemel¨a et al., 2000)(3). The disk drive example comes from the SMODELS user manual (Syrj¨anen, 2000)(4). Lifschitz (2001(5)) discusses the use of answer set programming for planning. Brewka et al. (1997)(6) give a good overview of the various approaches to nonmonotonic logic. Clark (1978)(7) covers the negation-as-failure approach to logic programming and Clark completion. Van Emden and Kowalski (1976)(8) show that every Prolog program without negation has a unique minimal model. Recent years have seen renewed interest in applications of nonmonotonic logics to large-scale knowledge representation systems. 1. Gelfond, M. and Lifschitz, V. (1988). Compiling circumscriptive theories into logic programs. In Non- Monotonic Reasoning: 2nd International Workshop Proceedings, pp. 74–99. 2. Eiter, T., Leone, N., Mateis, C., Pfeifer, G., and Scarcello, F. (1998). The KR system dlv: Progress report, comparisons and benchmarks. In KR-98, pp. 406–417. 3. Niemela, I., Simons, P., and Syrj¨anen, T. (2000). Smodels: A system for answer set programming. In Proc. 8th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning. 4. Syrjanen, T. (2000). Lparse 1.0 user’s manual.saturn.tcs.hut.fi/Software/smodels. 5. Lifschitz, V. (2001). Answer set programming and plan generation. AIJ, 138(1–2), 39–54. 6. Brewka, G., Dix, J., and Konolige, K. (1997). Nononotonic Reasoning: An Overview. CSLI Publications. 7. Clark, K. L. (1978). Negation as failure. In Gallaire, H. and Minker, J. (Eds.), Logic and Data Bases, pp. 293–322. Plenum. 8. Van Emden, M. H. and Kowalski, R. (1976). The semantics of predicate logic as a programming language. JACM, 23(4), 733–742. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Anthropic Principle | Kanitscheider | II 174 Supernatural/Embedding/Geometry/Dimension/Kanitscheider: a 4-dimensional curved Riemannian manifold can be embedded in a 10-dimensional flat Euclidean space. Def Embedding/Kanitscheider: the formal embedding into a more comprehensive structure.(1) >Space-time/Kanitscheider, >Space/Kanitscheider, >Space curvature/Kanitscheider. Embedding/Theology/Kanitscheider: Analogously, the theologian can say that natural science can explain in principle every inner-worldly connection, but cannot establish that the (observable) world is everything that exists. >Theology. Quantum mechanics/Kanitscheider: Quantum mechanics limits by its laws the number of dynamic variables which can be complementary to each other and thus also the kinds of the conceivable aspects in which matter can appear. >Quantum mechanics. For an analogy of the complementarity of nature and supernature, no comparable limitation of the ways of seeing or levels exists. >Levels of description, >Levels (order). II 174/175 Supernature/theology/embedding/Kanitscheider: for the relation of supernature to nature, therefore, embedding offers itself as a formal structure. Vs: problem: ontology "runs away": i.e. God is really the "last principle" of all being. To prevent this, the embedding must break off after the first step. For this the theologian has to find reasons! This difficulty is a consequence of the abandonment of the principle of parsimony, not to admit more entities than necessary for the explanation of the phenomena. >Conservativity, >Explanation. If one understands the universe as "thoughts of God", one needs a rational reason, why this process is not covered again by a further, higher numinous entity. (Regress). >Regress. The embedding, however, would have the advantage that world and superworld would be absolutely separated ontologically and causally. >Causality, >Ontology. II 177 Supernatural/Religion/Theory/Kanitscheider: also an only partially transcendent, hidden entity comes into conflict with the causal closure of the world. One cannot make several causes responsible for an event, if one is already enough. E.g. If a goblin exerted a real additional force on the falling stone, it would have to fall faster. >Hidden variable, >Hidden parameter. 1. J.C. Graves: The conceptual foundations of contemporary relativity theory. Cambridge: MIT-Press 1971, p. 192. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Anthropic Principle | Lyell | Gould I 140 Anthropic Principle/Predecessor/Lyell/Gould: the thesis that the history of the Earth so far represents only a preparation for the appearance of the human, (1) is highly doubtful. GouldVs: just as well the human could exist due a stupid coincidence, completely unpredictable and yet embody something new and powerful. Charles Lyell held the view that the earth had longed for the appearance of the human to come (2) (comparable to the strong anthropic principle). Gould I 141 Gould: The modern version of this theory dispenses with predetermination in favor of predictability. It gives up the idea that the first bacterium was already endowed with the germ to a human mind and that some spiritual power supervised organic evolution in order to fill the first body worthy of it with mind. Instead, it (erroneously) takes the view that the full development process is producing ever more successful designs that compete with earlier ones. In their opinion, there are few opportunities for development, and if it were repeated again, it would take place in the same way. There is only one way to e.g. sort out the best swimmers, that's what you would imagine as a kind of pawl, and not as currents of water on a wide slope. A type of locking device in which each development step takes the process one step forward and is a necessary prerequisite for the next. Gould I 143 GouldVs: if this were the case, fossil finds would have to demonstrate a more directed development. That it is not the case, is the most impressive proof against this thesis of the pawl. 1. Lyell 2. ibd. |
GeoLyell I Charles Lyell Principles of Geology, Volume 1 Chicago 1990 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Anthropic Principle | Wallace | Gould I 140 Anthropic Principle/Predecessors/Wallace/Gould: the thesis that the earth's history to date is only a preparation for the appearance of humans is highly doubtful. GouldVs: just as well the human could exist by a stupid coincidence, completely unpredictable and yet embody something new and powerful. Alfred Russell Wallace: was a metaphysical idealist towards the end of his life: he argued that a pre-existent mind was connected to a body capable of using it. (1) I 141 Gould: the modern version of this theory dispenses with predetermination in favor of predictability. It gives up the idea that the first bacterium was already endowed with the germ of the human mind and that some mental power supervised organic evolution in order to fill the first body worthy of it with mind. Instead, it (erroneously) takes the view that the full development process is producing ever more successful designs that compete with earlier ones. In their opinion, there are few opportunities for development, and if it were repeated again, it would take place in the same way. There is only one way to e.g. sort out the best swimmers, that's what you would imagine as a kind of pawl, and not as currents of water on a wide slope. A type of locking device in which each development step takes the process one step forward and is a necessary prerequisite for the next. >Progress, >Change. I 143 GouldVs: if this were the case, fossil finds would have to demonstrate a more directed development. The fact that this is not the case, is the most impressive proof against this thesis of the pawl. ((s) Gould thesis: Progress is not irreversible.) >Evolution, >Darwinism, >Selection. 1. A. R. Wallace (1895). Natural Selection and Tropical Nature. London: MacMillan. |
WallaceAR I Alfred Russell Wallace The Malay Archipelago London 2016 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Anthropocentrism | Braidotti | Braidotti I 56 Anthropocentrism/Braidotti: A ‘monistic universe’ refers to Spinoza’s central concept that matter, the world and humans are not dualistic entities structured according to principles of internal or external opposition. The obvious target of criticism here is Descartes’ famous mind-body distinction, but for Spinoza the concept goes even further: matter is one, driven by the desire for self-expression and ontologically free. >R. Descartes, >Mind-body problem, >res cogitans. The absence of any reference to negativity and to violent dialectical oppositions caused intense criticism of Spinoza on the part of Hegel and the Marxist-Hegelians. >B. Spinoza, >K. Marx, >G.W.F. Hegel. Spinoza’s monistic worldview was seen as politically ineffective and holistic at heart. This situation changed dramatically in the 1970s in France, when a new wave of scholars rehabilitated Spinozist monism precisely as an antidote to some of the contradictions of Marxism and as a way of clarifying Hegel’s relationship to Marx.* The main idea is to overcome dialectical oppositions, engendering nondialectical understandings of materialism itself (Braidotti, 1991(1); Cheah, 2008(2)), as an alternative to the Hegelian scheme. >Dialectic, >Materialism. The ‘Spinozist legacy’ therefore consists in a very active concept of monism, which allowed these modern French philosophers to define matter as vital and self-organizing, thereby producing the staggering combination of ‘vitalist materialism’. >Vitalism. Because this approach rejects all forms of transcendentalism, it is also known as ‘radical immanence’. >Immanence. Monism results in relocating difference outside the dialectical scheme, as a complex process of differing which is framed by both internal and external forces and is based on the centrality of the relation to multiple others. >Monism, >Dualism. BraidottiVsAnthropocentrism: These monistic premises are for me the building blocks for a posthuman theory of subjectivity that does not rely on classical Humanism and carefully avoids anthropocentrism. >Post-anthropocentrism/Braidotti, >Subjectivity/Braidotti. * The group around Althusser started the debate in the mid-1960s; Deleuze’s path-breaking study of Spinoza dates from 1968 (in English in 1990(3)); Macherey’s Hegel–Spinoza analysis came out in 1979 (in English in 2011(4)); Negri’s work on the imagination in Spinoza in 1981 (in English in 1991(5)). 1. Braidotti, Rosi. 1991. Patterns of Dissonance. Cambridge: Polity Press. 2. Cheah, Pheng. 2008. Nondialectical materialism. Diacritics, 38 (1), 143–57. 3. Deleuze, Gilles. 1990. The Logic of Sense. New York: Columbia University Press. 4. Macherey, Pierre. 2011. Hegel or Spinoza. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 5. Negri, Antonio. 1991. The Savage Anomaly. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. |
Braidotti I Rosie Braidotti The Posthuman Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 2013 |
| Anti-dumping Policy | Winters | Krugman I 217 Anti-dumping policy/Winters: It is virtually impossible to assess whether firms do see surveillance as the precursor to antidumping actions, but several factors suggest that it may not be a very plausible view: the frequency with which antidumping actions are introduced without previous surveillance, which suggests no constraint on the European Community to introduce the policies in sequence, the separate legislative bases of the two approaches, and the fact that antidumping actions entail more detailed information collection than surveillance. (…) in only one of our cases below have antidumping actions followed the imposition of surveillance, in three cases anti-dumping actions have preceded surveillance (by several years), and in a number of cases antidumping actions have been taken against closely related but not identical products to those suffering surveillance. All this seems to indicate a substantial degree of independence between the two forms of trade policy. >Import surveillance, >Trade policy, >Strategic trade policy, >International trade, >Tariffs, >Optimal tariffs, >Sales ban. If surveillance is seen as the harbinger of inevitable quantitative restrictions, no firm will have an incentive to reduce its exports and most will wish to expand them immediately. Expansion may merely reflect an intertemporal shift in sales-an attempt to get the goods in before the door is shut or before tariffs are imposed. It may also, however, have a strategic dimension. Quantitative restrictions(QR) /voluntary export restraint (VER): The rents which quantitative restrictions (QRs)-especially voluntary export restraints (VERs)-create are proportional to sales, and sales quotas for individual firms are more often than not related to past sales. >Voluntary export restraint(VER). Thus a firm expecting to face a QR will believe itself likely to do better the higher its base-year exports. Moreover, this is likely to be so regardless of whether the quota allocation is made by the importing or the exporting countries. Given that the majority of new protectionism has taken the form of discriminatory QRs, this jockeying for position seems a strong possibility. Yoffie (1983)(1), for example, reports such behavior on the part of Taiwanese and Korean exporters of footwear to the United States in 1976: protection seemed inevitable, but a principal policy objective was to postpone it long enough to build up base levels from which to negotiate. Yoffie tells the story more from the point of view of the trade associations and governments than from that of individual firms, but the principle is the same. Under these circumstances surveillance is likely to be greeted by booming import volumes and stable or decreasing import unit value from the surveyed sources.* >Prisoner‘s dilemma/Winters, >Cooperation. * Since nearly completing this work, I have seen Hoekman and Leidy (1989)(2) and Anderson (1989)(3) which formalize some of the ideas of this paragraph. The latter, which my discussant is too modest to mention below, shows that if the probability of a VER is exogenous any industry will seek to increase its exports while it has the chance. If, on the other hand, the probability is endogenous and the industry is imperfectly competitive, self-restraint may be optimal. 1. Yoffie, D. 1983. Power and protectionism. New York: Columbia University Press. 2. Hoekman, B. M., and M. P. Leidy. 1989. Dealing with “market disruption”: Designing a system of emergency protection. Geneva: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Mimeograph. 3. Anderson, J. E. 1989. Domino dumping, I: Competitive exporters. Worlung Paper no. 186, Department of Economics, Boston College. L. Alan Winters. „Import Surveillance as a Strategic Trade Policy.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Anti-Liberalism | Holmes | Krastev I 5 Anti-Liberalism/Krastev/Holmes: no single factor can explain the simultaneous emergence of authoritarian anti-liberalisms in so many differently situated countries in the second decade of the twenty-first century. Krastev 6 It is a story, among other things, of liberalism abandoning pluralism for hegemony. The striving of ex-communist countries to emulate the West after 1989 has been given an assortment of names – Americanization, Europeanization, democratization, liberalization, enlargement, integration, harmonization, globalization, and so forth – but it has always signified modernization by imitation and integration by assimilation. Krastev I 42 Anti-Liberalism/Krastev: Contrary to many contemporary theorists,(1) populist rage is directed less at multiculturalism Krastev I 43 than at post-national individualism and cosmopolitanism. (...)it implies that populism cannot be combatted by abandoning identity politics in the name of liberal individualism. For the illiberal democrats of Eastern and Central Europe, the gravest threat to the survival of the white Christian majority in Europe is the incapacity of Western societies to defend themselves. They cannot defend themselves because liberalism’s bias against communitarianism allegedly blinds its adherents to the threats they face. (...) the anti-liberal consensus today is that the rights of the threatened white Christian majority are in mortal danger. To protect this besieged majority’s fragile dominance (...) Europeans need to replace the watery post-nationalism foisted on them by cosmopolitan liberals with a muscular identity politics or group particularism of their own. This is the logic with which Orbán and Kaczyński have tried to inflame the inner xenophobic nationalism of their countrymen, creating an anti-liberal R2P (Right to Protect) targeting exclusively white Christian populations allegedly at risk of extinction. 1. Mark Lilla, The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics (Harper, 2017). |
LawHolm I Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The Common Law Mineola, NY 1991 Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Anti-Liberalism | Krastev | Krastev I 5 Anti-Liberalism/Krastev: no single factor can explain the simultaneous emergence of authoritarian anti-liberalisms in so many differently situated countries in the second decade of the twenty-first century. Krastev 6 It is a story, among other things, of liberalism abandoning pluralism for hegemony. The striving of ex-communist countries to emulate the West after 1989 has been given an assortment of names – Americanization, Europeanization, democratization, liberalization, enlargement, integration, harmonization, globalization, and so forth – but it has always signified modernization by imitation and integration by assimilation. Krastev I 42 Anti-Liberalism/Krastev: Contrary to many contemporary theorists,(1) populist rage is directed less at multiculturalism Krastev I 43 than at post-national individualism and cosmopolitanism. (...)it implies that populism cannot be combatted by abandoning identity politics in the name of liberal individualism. For the illiberal democrats of Eastern and Central Europe, the gravest threat to the survival of the white Christian majority in Europe is the incapacity of Western societies to defend themselves. They cannot defend themselves because liberalism’s bias against communitarianism allegedly blinds its adherents to the threats they face. (...) the anti-liberal consensus today is that the rights of the threatened white Christian majority are in mortal danger. To protect this besieged majority’s fragile dominance (...) Europeans need to replace the watery post-nationalism foisted on them by cosmopolitan liberals with a muscular identity politics or group particularism of their own. This is the logic with which Orbán and Kaczyński have tried to inflame the inner xenophobic nationalism of their countrymen, creating an anti-liberal R2P (Right to Protect) targeting exclusively white Christian populations allegedly at risk of extinction. 1. Mark Lilla, The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics (Harper, 2017). |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Anti-Realism | Habermas | III 425 Anti-Realism/Dummett/Habermas: in many cases the knowledge of the truth conditions that make a statement come true is problematic. >Truth conditions, >Truth. Solution/Dummett: we must distinguish between truth conditions and claimability conditions. We must be able to indicate a procedure by which the truth of a statement could be established.(1) >Assertibility, >Assertibility conditions. Habermas: understanding then includes the ability to give reasons with which the claim that the truth conditions are fulfilled could be redeemed. The theory thus explains the meaning of a sentence only indirectly with the knowledge of the conditions of validity and directly with the knowledge of reasons for the redemption of a truth claim. Dummett/Habermas: the speaker could not carry out the verification monologically in order to avoid the transition from the semantic to the pragmatic level. >Verification, >Pragmatics, >Semantics. III 426 Problem: verification cannot be performed deductively according to final rules. The set of available reasons is described by internal relationships of a universe of linguistic structures that can only be measured by argument. In the end, the idea of verificationism must be completely abandoned. >Reasons, >Justification, >Explanation, >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. HabermasVsDummett: it would be more consistent not to commit oneself either to falsificationist or to verificationist ideas. >Falsification. Instead, the discursive redemption of claims of validity should be interpreted fallibilistically. What is important is that the speaker's illocutionary claim can be criticized. >Discourse, >Discourse theory. 1.M. Dummett, What is a Theory of Meaning? In: G. Evans, J. McDowell (Eds) Truth and Meaning, Oxford 1976, (EMD) S. 67ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Anxiety | Eysenck | Corr II 119 Fear/Anxiety/study/reward/punishment/Arousability/Gray/Eysenck/GrayVsEysenck/McNaughton/Corr: Gray’s intellectual starting point is the biological component of Hans Eysenck’s theory of introversion–extraversion and neuroticism–stability. II 120 Eysenck saw introverts and extraverts as differing primarily in general conditionability (whether with reward or punishment as the reinforcer) resulting from arousability (…). In contrast, Gray suggested that they differ, instead, in specific conditionability (…), related to sensitivity to punishment (sometimes he said fear) but not reward. (…) for both theories, the most important consequence of introversion for psychiatry is high conditioning of fear. Both theories presumed that these introversion-/extraversion-based differences in socialization would lead to psychiatric disorder when combined with high levels of neuroticism, which acts like an amplification factor. [However,] the two theories differ in their predictions about conditioning via reward. Gray’s key modification (…) is to attribute variations in fear conditioning to differing sensitivities to punishment, whereas Eysenck attributes it to variations in general arousability (in the ascending reticular activating system, ARAS) and so, as a consequence, conditionability in general. Gray located punishment sensitivity (in the sense of susceptibility to fear; see Gray, 1970a, p. 255(1)) in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the septo-hippocampal system (SHS) (…). He connected PFC, SHS and ARAS in a feedback loop, controlled by ‘theta’ rhythm, and impaired by extraverting (anti-anxiety) drugs such as amylobarbitone. High arousal could generate punishment (with effects similar to those proposed by Eysenck). Conversely, high punishment sensitivity would generate high arousal in punishing situations (…) due to interaction of PFC + SHS with ARAS. II 123 Susceptibility to fear (although not always due to conditioning (…)) fitted well with a number of facts (p. 255)(1). We can easily see internalizing disorders (‘dysthymias’, e.g., phobia, anxiety and obsession) as excessive fear of one form or another. (…) trait-anxious people (neurotic introverts) condition better only if there is threat. At the other end of the scale, we can view externalizing disorders (e.g., psychopathy) as insufficient sensitivity to punishment. II 126 Reward/Punishment/Arousability/Sensitivity/Gray/McNaughton/Corr: According to Gray, arousability is a general concept that should apply to both reward and punishment. To explain activity in a ‘system whose chief function appears to be that of inhibiting maladaptive behaviour’ (p. 260)(1), general arousability needs explanation. For Gray, if we invert the causal order, it seems perfectly reasonable that higher susceptibility to the threats that abound in everyday life would lead to higher levels of arousal effects. For Gray, arousal, however it is produced, serves to invigorate behaviour (…), unless it is so intense it becomes punishing. This can give rise to paradoxical effects: for example, mild punishment will induce arousal and may invigorate reward-mediated reactions – so long as the punishment-inducing effects are smaller than the reward-inducing effects. II 127 Neuroticism/Anxiety: Taking an explicitly two-process learning approach, Gray first recasts the combination of neuroticism with introversion. If reward and punishment sensitivities are distinct, and we employ only two factors for our explanations, then high neuroticism/emotionality as normally measured must represent a combination of high reward and high punishment sensitivity. Gray’s initial equation of introversion with punishment sensitivity means that the neurotic introvert will be particularly sensitive to punishment. II 129 VsGray: The paper’s complexity may seem a trivial issue [but] even half a century later, readers (…) struggle with it. The biggest problem is that the theory spans multiple disciplines – with each integral to the whole. Gray’s detailed exposition also has some specific problems that we discuss here. At the theoretical level, his use of the terms ‘punishment’ and ‘fear’ were ambiguous: blurring key points when he shifted between one and the other conceptually. At the measurement level, while proposing a rotation of Eysenck’s axes, he did not tell us how to assess his proposed reward and punishment sensitivities (…). [Moreover] his paper focused on ‘reward’ and ‘punishment’ in the context of conditioning. He, therefore, did not discuss the third case of escape/withdrawal in any detail. However, it is via fight/flight that he included obsessive–compulsive disorder, with its compulsive rituals and obsessive rumination, within the dysthymic disorders. >Terminology/Gray, >Fear/Eysenck. 1. Gray, J. A. (1970a). The psychophysiological basis of introversion–extraversion. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 8, 249–266. McNaughton, Neil and Corr, John Philip: “Sensitivity to Punishment and Reward Revisiting Gray (1970)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 115-136. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Apartheid | Hazlett | Henderson I 35 Apartheid/Hazlett/Henderson/Globerman: UCLA graduate Thomas W. Hazlett tells the fascinating story in “Apartheid,” in David R. Henderson, ed., The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics(1). Hazlett notes that the conventional view of apartheid was that it was devised by affluent whites to suppress poor blacks. VsTradition: But the conventional view is wrong. Instead, apartheid, like the colour bar that preceded it, catered to white workers who didn't want to have to compete with black workers. Indeed, white mine owners were among the strongest opponents of apartheid because it prevented them from hiring Iower-wage, but productive, black workers. Hazlett notes that the white mine owners' self-interest "was so powerful that it led the chamber [of mines] to finance the first lawsuits and political campaigns against segregationist legislation.“(1) >Discrimination/Alchian, >Discrimination/Becker, >Racism/Alchian, >Rent control/Alchian/Demsetz, >Racism, >Thomas Hazlett. 1.David R. Henderson (ed). (2007). The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. Liberty Fund. |
Hazlett I Thomas W. Hazlett The Fallacy of Net Neutrality New York: Encounter Books 2011 Henderson I David R. Henderson Steven Globerman The Essential UCLA School of Economics Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2019 |
| Apologies | Experimental Psychology | Parisi I 108 Apologies/Experimental Psychology/Wilkinson-Ryan: Apologies are a particularly apt area of study for psychologists because they are crucial to how we deal with interpersonal conflicts outside of the law but are often discouraged in legal conflicts because of their admissibility in court as something like an Parisi I 109 admission of culpability. In Robbennolt (2003)(1), subjects read about a personal injury claim in which a pedestrian was injured in a collision with a bicycle (and its rider). Subjects were asked to indicate how they, in the position of the injured pedestrian, would respond to a particular settlement offer. When there was no apology, 43% reported that they would reject. When a full apology was offered, though, only 14% said they would reject, a significant difference. In follow-up work, Robbennolt (2006)(2) found that apologies affect settlement because they change how plaintiffs understand both the incident and the defendant. When plaintiffs had received an apology, they had lower reservation prices and more defendant-friendly perceptions of the fair outcome. >Settlement bargaining/Experimental Psychology. 1. Robbennolt, Jennifer K. (2003). “Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination.” Michigan Law Review 102: 460–516. 2. Robbennolt, Jennifer K. (2006). “Apologies and Settlement Levers.” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 3: 333–373. Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess. „Experimental Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Apologies | Social Psychology | Parisi I 138 Apologies/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: Some common elements include an admission of wrongdoing and/or an acknowledgment of the rule that was violated, expression of responsibility, expression of regret or remorse, a promise to forbear, and an offer to repair (Dhami, 2012(1); O'Hara and Yarn, 2002(2)). Responsibility: Empirically, taking responsibility for one's actions, offering to repair damage, and promising to forebear in the future have been shown to be essential elements (Scher and Darley, 1997)(3). Punishment/blame: Apologies that contain none of these characteristics lead to increased blame and punishment. Future behavior: A wrongdoer whose apology omits an expression of responsibility is perceived to be more likely to cause harm in the future (Robbennolt, 2003)(4). Moral character: In some circumstances, a wrongdoer who issues an apology is viewed more favorably, serving to reduce the inference of negative moral character (Gold and Weiner, 2000(5); Ohbuchi, Kameda, and Agarie, 1989)(6). As a result of an apology, people perceive the wrongdoer as less likely to offend in the future (Etienne and Robbennolt, 2007(7);Gold and Weiner, 2000(5)). Court proceedings: In another study, judges who evaluated a hypothetical about a defendant who threatened a fellow judge imposed a lower sentence when the defendant apologized at the sentencing hearing, compared to when he did not (Rachlinski, Guthrie, and Wistrich, 2013)(8). Judges who evaluated a hypothetical robbery case imposed a lower sentence when the defendant apologized (Rachlinski et al., 2013)(8). These effects were small but reliable. Settlement: (...) there is experimental evidence that a defendant who apologizes to the plaintiff can increase the likelihood of out-of-court settlement by making the plaintiff more amenable to coming to the negotiation table, and by lowering the dollar amount that the plaintiff would be willing to accept in settlement (Robbennolt, 2006)(9). Parisi I 139 Punishment: (...) motorists who apologize to a police omcer issuing a traffc ticket might incur a lower fine (Day and Ross, 2011)(10) but motorists who apologize to an administrative law judge in court might find themselves incurring a higher fine (Rachlinski et al., 2013)(8). >Attractiveness/Social Psychology, >Punishment/Social Psychology. 1. Dhami, M. K. (2012). "Offer and Acceptance of Apology in Victim-Offender Mediation." Critical Criminology 20(1): 45-60. doi:10.1007/s10612-011-9149-5. 2. O'Hara, E. and D. Yarn (2002). "On Apology and Consilience." Washington Law Review 77: 1121. 3. Scher, S. J. andJ. M. Darley (1997). "How Effective Are the Things People Say to Apologize? Effects of the Realization ofthe Apology Speech Act." Journal of Psycholinguistic Research 26(1): 127-140. 4. Robbennolt, J. K. (2003). "Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination." Michigan Law Review doi:10.2307/3595367. 5. Gold, G. J. and B. Weiner (2000). "Remorse, Confession, Group Identity, and Expectancies About Repeating a Transgression." Basic and Applied Social Psychology 22(4): 291-300. 6. Ohbuchi, K., M. Kameda, and N. Agarie (1989). "Apology as Aggression Control: Its Role in Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Harm." Journal of Personality and Social Psychol- ogy doi:10.1037/0022-3514.56.2.219. 7. Etienne, M. and J. K. Robbennolt (2007). "Apologies and Plea Bargaining." Marquette Law Review 91:295. 8. Rachlinski, J. J., C. Guthrie, and A. J. Wistrich (2013). "Contrition in the Courtroom: Do Apologies Affect Adjudication?" Cornell Law Review 98(5): 13-90. 9. Robbennolt, J. K. (2006). "Apologies and Settlement Levers." Journal of Empirical Legal studies 3(2): 333-373. 10. Day, M. V. and M. Ross (2011). "The Value of Remorse: How Drivers' Responses to Police Predict Fines for Speeding." Law and Human Behavior 3 5(3): 221-234. doi:10.1007/ s10979-010-9234-4. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Appearance | Peacocke | I 29 Being/seeming/appearance/Sellars: seeming red is more fundamental than being red. >Appearance/Sellars, >Psychological nominalism. PeacockeVs: "looks red" is not semantically unstructured in contrast to "red". - Therefore it should not be the fundamental concept. >Basic concepts, >Simplicity, cf. >Complexity, >Explanation. Three solutions: 1) physically red as fundamental (anti-perception theory / representative: Shoemaker). >S. Shoemaker. 2) "No priority theory": nothing is fundamental. 3) Red must be explained in terms of perception (perception theory). >Perception, >Perception theory. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Appearance | Sellars | I 24 Sellars: thesis: seeming prima facie = to be. I 26 Seeming/Appearance/Tradition: Being is more basal than seeming. Seeming is not a relationship between a person, a thing and a property. Tradition: Sense data should explain seeming.> >Sense data theory. Sellars: this is unnecessary. Experience/Sellars thesis: "is green" and "seems to be green" are identical. Only the first one is affirmed. cf. Ryle: >Success word). Seeming to be green presupposes the concept of being green. Seeming/Sellars: is not a relationship at all. >Appearance, >Perception, >Belief, >Language use, >Predicate, >Property, >Seeing, >Experience, >Stimuli, >Relation. I 30 ff Experience/Experience History/Sellars: not the result of impressions, but of appearances. >Sensory impressions. Phenomena are conceptual (to resettle them in a rational relationship to beliefs). >Phenomena. Appearance: Evidence for the experience differs just as little as the experiences. I 32 Appearance: the concept of green translucence, the ability to recognize that something appears to be green, presupposes the concept of being green. >Concept/Sellars. I 36 Seeming/Appearing/Sense Data/Sellars: there can be no dispositional analysis of physical redness on the basis of the red-seeming. - We must distinguish between qualitative and existential appearance. >Dispositions. --- I 38 Seeming/appearing/being/Sellars: Problem: if it is asserted that physical objects cannot appear red without experiencing something that is red, the question of whether the redness that has this something is this redness that the physical object appears to have. Solution: a) on the basis of empirical generalization b) theory of perception which refers to "direct experience". Brandom I 425 Appearance: Sellars: two uses of "seems" or "looks like": Generic "seems"-statements: E.g. the chicken seems to have a number of spots, but there is no specific number that it seems to have. E.g. there seem to be a lot of crumbs on the table. But it does not seem that 998 crumbs are on the table or 999. --- Rorty VI 147/48 Appearing/seeming/explanation/SellarsVsNagel: the "appearances" that need to be rescued by scientific explanation, in turn, are language-relative. What appears to someone dependends on how one normally speaks. >Thomas Nagel, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Language use, >Word meaning. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Appraisal Theory | Psychological Theories | Corr I 55 Appraisal theory/emotions/psychologcal theories/Reisenzein/Weber: The appraisal of an event determines not only whether or not this event elicits an emotion, but also which emotion it elicits. Hedonically positive (i.e., experientially pleasant) emotions occur if an event is evaluated as motive-congruent, whereas hedonically negative (experientially unpleasant) emotions occur if an event is evaluated as motive-incongruent. Emotions are distinguished by a) on the kind of evaluation made, for example, on whether an event is evaluated as just personally undesirable or as morally wrong (Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988)(1). b) they depend on particular factual (non-evaluative) appraisals, including the appraisal of the event’s probability, unexpectedness, controllability, and the appraisal of one’s own or other people’s responsibility for bringing it about (see Ellsworth and Scherer 2003)(2). The relations between appraisals and specific emotions have been spelled out in several structural appraisal models (e.g., Lazarus 1991(3); Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988(1); Roseman, Antoniou and Jose 1996(4); Scherer 2001(5)). Information-processing models for appraisal theories: (for overviews, see e.g., Power and Dalgleish 1997(6); Scherer, Schorr and Johnstone 2001(7); Teasdale 1999(8)). Corr I 56 Modes of appraisal: a) non-automatic: non-automatic appraisal processes are conscious inference strategies, b) automatic appraisals are unconscious and are ‘triggered’ fairly directly by the perception of eliciting events. >Emotion. Like other mental processes, initially non-automatic, conscious appraisals can become automatized as a result of their repeated execution (e.g., Reisenzein 2001(9); Siemer and Reisenzein 2007(10)). Automatic appraisals can explain why emotions frequently follow eliciting events rapidly. They may also explain moods, that is, emotional experiences which seem to lack concrete objects (for further discussion of moods, see Schwarz and Clore 2007(11); Siemer 2005(12)). >Appraisal theory/Reisenzein. 1. Ortony, A., Clore, G. L. and Collins, A. 1988. The cognitive structure of emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press 2. Ellsworth, P. C. and Scherer, K. R. 2003. Appraisal processes in emotion, in R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer and H. H. Goldsmith (eds.), Handbook of affective sciences, pp. 572–95. Oxford University Press 3. Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press 4. Roseman, I. J., Antoniou, A. A. and Jose, P. E. 1996. Appraisal determinants of emotions: constructing a more accurate and comprehensive theory, Cognition and Emotion 10: 241–77 5. Scherer, K. R. 2001. Appraisal considered as a process of multilevel sequential checking, in K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr and T. Johnstone (eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research, pp. 92–120. Oxford University Press 6.Power, M. and Dalgleish, T. 1997. Cognition and emotion: from order to disorder. Hove: Psychology Press 7. Scherer, K. R., Schorr, A. and Johnstone, T. 2001. Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research. Oxford University Press 8. Teasdale, J. D. 1999. Multi-level theories of cognition-emotion relations, in T. Dalgleish and M. Power (eds.), Handbook of cognition and emotion, pp. 665–81. Chicester: Wiley 9. Reisenzein, R. 2001. Appraisal processes conceptualized from a schema-theoretic perspective: contributions to a process analysis of emotions, in K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr and T. Johnstone (eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research, pp. 187–201. Oxford University Press 10. Siemer, M. and Reisenzein, R. 2007. The process of emotion inference, Emotion 7: 1–20 11. Schwarz, N. and Clore, G. L. 2007. Feelings and phenomenal experiences, in A. W. Kruglanski and E. T. Higgins (eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles, 2nd edn, pp. 385–407. New York: Guilford Press 12. Siemer, M. 2005. Moods as multiple-object directed and as objectless affective states: an examination of the dispositional theory of moods, Cognition and Emotion 19: 815–45 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Archeology | Foucault | II 193ff History of ideas/Foucault: It is now possible to reverse the procedure (after examining the discourse). >Discourse/Foucault. One can walk downhill. The general theory is sketched, now we can reach the possible fields of application. It is about separating oneself from it. Instead: archeology. FoucaultVsHistory of ideas: indefinite object, ill-drawn boundaries, history of secondary positions. Rather, the history of alchemy than of chemistry. Analysis of the opinions more than knowledge, the errors more than the truth, not the thought forms, but the mentality types. Also analysis of the silent origin, the distant correspondences, the permanences. Archeology/Foucault: the attempt to write a completely different history: four differences: 1. With regard to the determination of novelty 2. Analysis of contradictions 3. The comparative descriptions 4. Finding the Transformations. Archeology: 1. Does not try to define thoughts, ideas, images, themes that are hidden or manifest in discourses. But those discourses themselves. Discourse not as a sign for something else but as a monument. No interpretative discipline, it does not seek a "different discourse." It is not "allegorical". 2. Archeology does not seek to find a continuous transition. 3. It is not ordered according to the sovereign form of the work. The authority of the creative subject as a principle of its unity is alien to it. 4. It is not looking for the restoration of what people have thought, wanted, felt, desired. It does not seek that volatile core. Archeology: creates the tribe of a discourse. E.g. the natural history: 1. As leading statements, it will set the statements concerning the definition of the observable structures and the field of possible objects. 2. Those who prescribe the forms of the description. 3. Those who make the most general characterization possibilities appear, and thus open up a whole range of terms. 4. Those who, by making a strategic choice, leave room for a very large number of later options. This is not a deduction from axioms. Nor is it a general idea or a philosophical core. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Argumentation | Habermas | III 38 Argumentation/Habermas: We call argumentation the type of speech in which the participants thematize controversial claims of validity and try to redeem or criticize them with arguments. An argument contains reasons that are systematically linked with the claim to validity of a problematic statement. The "strength" of an argument is measured, in a given context, by the validity of the reasons; this is shown, among other things, by whether an argument can convince the participants of a discourse, i. e. can motivate them to accept the respective claim to validity. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Justification, >Reasons, >Persuasion. Rationality: against this background, can be judged according to how a subject behaves as a participant in argumentation. Rational statements can also be improved due to their critical nature. >Rationality. III 45 The logic of argumentation does not refer to the formal, consequent connections between semantic units (sentences) but to internal, also non-deductive relations between pragmatic units (speech acts) from which arguments are composed. III 47 Three aspects: 1. resembles an argumentation of a communication under ideal conditions, which represents a situation to be characterized as an ideal speech situation. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. General symmetry conditions must be reconstructed here, which every competent speaker must presume to be sufficiently fulfilled. III 48 2. The procedure is a specially regulated form of interaction of the division of labour between the proponent and the opponent. A claim of validity is discussed here in a situation that is relieved of the pressure of action and experience, in which claims are examined with reasons and only with reasons. Cf. >Dialogical logic. 3. Argumentation is designed to produce valid arguments. Definition Argument/Habermas: Arguments are those means by means of which intersubjective recognition for the initially hypothetically raised claim of validity of a proponent can be achieved and thus opinion can be transformed into knowledge. See Arguments/Toulmin, >Intersubjectivity. III 55 HabermasVsKlein, Wolfgang (1): Klein wants to draw up the logic of argumentation as a nomological theory and must therefore assimilate rules to causal regularities and reasons to causes. III 56 HabermasVs: on the other hand, with Toulmin we have to allow a plurality of claims of validity without at the same time denying the critical, space-time and social restrictions transcending sense of validity. >St. Toulmin. III 57 We cannot judge the strength of arguments (...) if we do not understand the meaning of the respective action. (2) III 339 Argumentation/Reason/Justification/Habermas: Arguments or reasons have at least these in common that they, and only they, can unfold the power of rational motivation under the communicative prerequisites of a cooperative examination of hypothetical claims to validity. However, in typical forms of argumentation (depending on the claim to validity of propositional truth, normative correctness, truthfulness and authenticity). >Truthfulness. 1. W. Klein, Argumentation und Argument in. Z. f. Litwiss. u. Ling. H, 38/39, 1980, p. 49f. 2. St. Toulmin, R. Rieke, A. Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning, N.Y. 1979, p.15. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Argumentation | Minsky | I 190 Arguments/Strength of theories/Artificial Intelligence/Minsky: When people disagree, we often say that one side's position seems stronger than the other. But what has strength to do with reasoning? In logic, arguments are simply either right or wrong, since there is not the slightest room for matters of degree. But in real life, few arguments are ever absolutely sure, so we simply have to learn how various forms of reasoning are likely to go wrong. Then we can use different methods to make our chains of reasoning harder to break. a) [stronger]: Parallelism: One method is to use several different arguments to prove the same point — putting them in parallel. Then, though no one of these tricks is perfectly secure, the combination cannot fail unless [all] things go wrong at once. b) [weaker]: Chain: all those parts form a long and slender chain no stronger than its weakest link. I 191 Here are two different strategies for deciding whether one group of reasons should be considered stronger than another. 1. The first strategy tries to compare opposing arguments in terms of magnitudes, by analogy to how two physical forces interact: Strength from Magnitude: When two forces work together, they add to form a single larger force. But when two forces oppose each other directly, their strengths subtract. 2. Our second strategy is simply to count how many different reasons you can find for choosing each alternative: Strength from Multitude: The more reasons we can find in favor of a particular decision, the more confidence we can have in it. This is because if some of those reasons turn out to be wrong, other reasons may still remain. Strength: Whichever strategy we use, we tend to speak of the winning argument as the stronger one. But why do we use the same word strong for two such different strategies? It is because we use them both for the same purpose: to reduce the likelihood of failure. >Strength of theories, >Stronger/weaker, >Reasons, >Justification, >Ultimate justification. What makes us so prone to formulate our reasoning in terms of conflicting adversaries? Cf. >Dialogical Logic. It must be partly cultural, but some of it could also be based on inheritance. >Culture, >Cultural tradition. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Arousal | Cognitive Science | Corr I 416 Arousal/Cognitive Science/Matthews: Cognitive scienceVsArousal theory: The hope of the early psychobiologists (e.g., Eysenck 1967)(1) that a small number of arousal mechanisms might explain personality effects in all their diversity has not been fulfilled. It appears that personality is distributed across an extensive set of mechanisms. I have proposed previously (e.g., Matthews 2000(2), 2008a(3)) that the various types of effect may be differentiated within a cognitive science framework that allows for three qualitatively different levels of explanation (Pylyshyn 1999(4)). >Explanation//Cognitive science. 1. Eysenck, H. J. 1967. The biological basis of personality. Springfield, IL: Thomas 2. Matthews, G. 2000. A cognitive science critique of biological theories of personality traits, History and Philosophy of Psychology 2: 1–17 3. Matthews, G. 2008a. Personality and information processing: a cognitive-adaptive theory, in G. J. Boyle, G. Matthews and D. H. Saklofske (eds.), Handbook of personality theory and testing, vol. I, Personality theories and models, pp. 56–79. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 4. Pylyshyn, Z. W. 1999. What’s in your mind?, in E. Lepore and Z. W. Pylyshyn (eds.), What is cognitive science?, pp. 1–25. Oxford: Blackwell Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Arousal | Matthews | Corr I 406 Arousal/Matthews: There is (…) growing evidence that subjective energetic arousal relates to superior performance on demanding sustained and selective attention tasks just as the theory predicts (Matthews, Davies and Lees 1990(1); Warm, Mathews and Finomore 2008(2)). >Selective attention, >Performance. Arousal/personality traits/Matthews: Evaluation of the hypothesized role of personality is more difficult because both Extraversion and trait anxiety operate in concert with other variables: arousal factors in the case of Extraversion, and motivational factors in the case of anxiety. High impulsives (similar to extraverts) are hypothesized to be lower in arousal in the early part of the day (the theory aims to accommodate time of day effects). It follows that Extraversion should be negatively correlated with attentionally demanding tasks, such as vigilance, but positively correlated with short-term memory. >Working memory, >Extraversion, >Anxiety. There is indeed considerable evidence that Extraversion relates to poorer vigilance (Beauducel, Brocke and Leue 2006(3); Koelega 1992(4)), and to superior recall on traditional, verbal short-term memory tasks (e.g., Eysenck 1981(5); Matthews 1992(6)). 1. Matthews, G., Davies, D. R. and Lees, J. L. 1990. Arousal, Extraversion, and individual differences inresource availability, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59: 150–68 2. Warm, J. S., Matthews, G. and Finomore, V. S. 2008. Workload and stress in sustained attention, in P. A. Hancock and J. L. Szalma (eds.), Performance under stress, pp. 115–41. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing 3. Beauducel, A., Brocke, B. and Leue, A. 2006. Energetical bases of Extraversion: effort, arousal, EEG, and performance, International Journal of Psychophysiology 62: 212–23 4. Koelega, H. S. 1992. Extraversion and vigilance performance: 30 years of inconsistencies, Psychological Bulletin 112: 239–58 5. Eysenck, M. W. 1981. Learning, memory and personality, in H. J. Eysenck (ed.), A model for personality. Berlin: Springer 6. Matthews, G. 1992. Extraversion, in A. P. Smith and D. M. Jones (eds.), Handbook of human performance, vol. III, State and trait, pp. 95–126. London: Academic Press Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Arousal | Neurobiology | Corr I 416 Arousal/Neurobiology: The traditional paradigm for biological explanations of personality effects on performance is Eysenck’s (1967)(1) arousal theory. According to the Yerkes-Dodson Law, cortical arousal is linked to processing efficiency and performance by an inverted-U function. Moderate levels of arousal are optimal for performance; extremes of both low arousal (e.g., fatigue) and high arousal (e.g., anxiety) are damaging. The theory specifies that a cortico-reticular circuit controlling alertness and arousal is more easily activated in introverts than in extraverts. Hence, introverts are prone to performance deficits due to over-arousal, whereas extraverts are vulnerable to under-arousal. The prediction has been confirmed in a number of studies e.g., Revell, Amaral and Turriff 1976)(2). VsArousal Theory/VsEysenck: the Yerkes-Dodson Law fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for Extraversion-Introversion effects. >Extraversion, >Introversion.Psychophysiological findings suggest that Extraversion is only weakly linked to indices of arousal (Matthews and Amelang 1993(3); Matthews and Gilliland 1999(4)). >Psychological Stress/Neurobiology. (VsYerkes-Dodson). VsArousal Theory: Other biologically-based theories may do a better job of explanation. For example, Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST) (Philip J. Corr 2004(5), links the impulsivity and anxiety traits to the sensitivity of brain systems for reward and punishment. >Reinforcement sensitivity/Corr, >Anxiety, >Punishment, >Conditioning. 1. Eysenck, H. J. 1967. The biological basis of personality. Springfield, IL: Thomas 2. Revelle, W., Amaral, P. and Turriff, S. 1976. Introversion/Extraversion, time stress, and caffeine: effect on verbal performance, Science 192: 149–50 3. Matthews, G. and Amelang, M. 1993. Extraversion, arousal theory and performance: a study of individual differences in the EEG, Personality and Individual Differences 14: 347–64 4. Matthews, G. and Gilliland, K. 1999. The personality theories of H. J. Eysenck and J. A. Gray: a comparative review, Personality and Individual Differences 26: 583–626 5. Corr, P. J. 2004. Reinforcement sensitivity theory and personality, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 28: 317–32 Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Arrow’s Theorem | D’Agostino | Gaus I 242 Arrow’s Theorem/pluralism/diversity/D’Agostino: Consider a collection of individuals, each of whom has well-behaved preferences (or judgements) over a domain of alternative social arrangements. The problem of collective choice is to specify a procedure, meeting (at least) minimal conditions of fairness, that will deliver a rating of these alternative arrangements, based on individuals' assessments, that is sufficiently determinate to warrant the selection of one of them as the collectively binding arrangement for this group. Arrow: What Arrow shows, and what much subsequent tinkering has confirmed, is that there is no formal procedure of amalgamation that can be relied on for this purpose (see Arrow, 1979(1); and, for helpful commentary, see Mueller, 1989(2), and Sen, 1970(3)). In so far as a procedure fairly recognizes the antecedent assessments of the various individuals, it will, on certain profiles of assessments, fail to achieve determinacy, and, hence, will fail to identify a collectively binding social arrangement. D’Agostino: I tried elsewhere (D' Agostino, 1996)(4) to show that this result provides a model for theorizing about ideals, such as 'public reason', that are, at least nowadays, directly associated with liberalism per se (see also Gaus, 1996(5); and D' Agostino and Gaus, 1998(6)). Democracy/diversity/procedures/Arrow/D’Agostino: the point of Arrow's Theorem is not that formal procedures never work, but rather that they don't always work. And this point is ethico-politically significant for two reasons. 2) When we apply a procedure in concrete circumstances, we typically will not be able to tell, antecedently, whether or not it will work in these circumstances. 2) Even if we can determine that it will not work in these circumstances, we have, according to Arrow's Theorem, no alternative procedure (of the same type) to use instead, except, of course, another that also will not work. Example: e.g., Three Individuals (A, B, C) Gaus I 243 and three possible social arrangements (S1 , S2, S3), and (...) individuals' assessments of these arrangements. Given [a specific problematic] 'profile' of preferences (or deliberative judgements) [chosen for the sake of the argument], no merely 'mechanical' procedure of combination will produce a non-arbitrary (and hence legitimately collectively binding) ranking of the alternative social arrangements: Table I of preferences S1: A 1st – B 3rd – C 2nd S2: A 2nd – B 1st – C 3rd S 3: A 3rd – B 2nd - C 1st Procedures: S1/S2 then S3: Winner: S3 S1/S3 then S2: Winner: S2 S2/S3 then S1: Winner S1 Problem/D’Agostino: (...) it is clear that, on this profile of preferences, a collectively binding choice can be determined mechanically only on an ethico-politically arbitrary basis - e.g. by fixing the order in which alternatives are compared. (The alternative to such arbitrariness is simple indeterminacy: none of the options can be identified as the collectively binding best for the group.) Cf. >Chaos Theorem/Social Choice Theory. Elections/democracy/solutions: (...) once such diversity among individuals' assessments is 'managed', exactly the indeterminacy of such formal procedures as voting (and other modes of amalgamation) disappears. Suppose, for instance, that through some programme of socialization and education, individuals' assessments are sufficiently 'homogenized' that one of the alternative social arrangements that individuals are assessing is 'dominant' in the sense that it is best from all relevant points of view. In this case, we might have the configuration in Table II of preferences. Table II of preferences S1: A 1st – B 1st – C 1st S2: A 2nd – B 3rd – C 3rd S 3: A 3rd – B 2nd - C 2nd Given this configuration, there would be no difficulty with collective choice, either statically or dynamically. There is a unique collectively best option whose identification as such is not dependent on arbitrary factors and whose selection as such cannot be destabilized (so long as individuals' assessments themselves remain constant). Value monism/pluralism//D‘Agostino: Of course, Arrow's Theorem, and its extensions, can be read as an argument for monism. Arrow courts chaos in providing, as pluralists would insist, for the recognition of diversity. (For D’Agostino’s solution see >Diversity/Liberalism.) 1. Arrow, Kenneth (1979) 'Values and collective decision making'. In Frank Hahn and Martin Hollis, eds, Philosophy and Economic Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Mueller, Dennis (1989) Public Choice 11. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Sen, Amartya (1970) Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco: Holden-Day. 4. D'Agostino, Fred (1996) Free Public Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Gaus, Gerald (1996) Justificatory Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 6. D' Agostino, Fred and Gerald Gaus, eds (1998) Public Reason. Aldershot: Dartmouth. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Art | Eco | I 48 Science/Art/Eco: in the open work of art you can see the resonance of some tendencies in modern science: the concept of the field comes from physics: it is a new understanding of the relationship between cause and effect: it has a more complex interaction of forces. There is a departure from a static and syllogistic view of order. It has an indefinite relation and is complementarity. I 55 Reception/Eco: the work of art offers the interpreter a work to be completed. I 105 Openness and disorder are relative terms. Something is more in order in comparison to a previous disorder. I 138 Definition openness of the first degree: integration and knowledge mechanisms are characteristic for every process of knowledge. I 139 Definition second-degree openness: second-degree openness corresponds to the grasping that constantly open process, it allows us to perceive new contours and new possibilities for a form. I 149 Openness: openness means that the recipient has freedom of choice. I 160 Art/Science/Eco: certain structures in art appear as epistemological metaphors, as structural decisions of a diffuse theoretical consciousness (not of a particular theory, but cultural belief). Art and science are mirroring certain achievements of modern scientific methodology in categories of uncertainty and statistical distribution. Bivalent logic, causality and the principle of the excluded middle are called into question. I 163 Art/Science/Cubism: art exhibits parallels to non-Euclidean geometry. There is a parallel between Hilbert's attempts to axiomatize geometry and neoplasticism and constructivism. I 165 Eco thesis: in a world where the discontinuity of phenomena has called into question the possibility of a unified and definitive view of the world, open art shows us a way of seeing and recognizing this world and of integrating our sensitivity. This discontinuity is not narrated but it is art. ((s)VsEco: Eco shows a strongly affirmative attitude: that it is about recognizing the world.) I 260 Alienation/Art/Eco: Epigones have become alienated from a habit that now fixes them without allowing them to move in an original and free way. >Artworks, >Alienation. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Art | Flusser | Rötzer I 58 Art/Flusser: Art making is about making something that has never been there before and therefore cannot be foreseen by any given program. Rötzer I 59 Rome is the seed that was planted by auctor Romulus in a wide field, Latium. The man (vir) dug a hole in the camp with his cane (aratrum). His masculine act (actio), i. e. the rape of the field leads to the possibility (virtualitas) of semen (semen) to develop into the reality of Rome (augere)... etc. The transfer of this myth to art brought a lot of things like genius, inspiration and uniqueness. Artists as all kinds of Romulusses. >Artists, >Genius, >Creativity. Rötzer I 64 Art/Flusser: Ghettos: Museums, Academies. The more untheoretical, empirical and more on good luck these people proceed, the better they are. At present, the craftsmen's revolution has come to an end. Division into capitalists and workers resigns. The meaning of life is no longer work but consumption. In contrast to the Middle Ages, leisure no longer serves to acquire wisdom; it is pointless, and therefore the whole of life is absurd. We expect art (which we understand as a creator of experience models) to give meaning to our leisure, but this task cannot be accomplished by theory-less authors. Rötzer I 65 As long as art could not be taken seriously, the authors could not only be tolerated, but their nonsense also came in handy. But now, when art has to be taken seriously, as in television, and because leisure is more and more recognized as a goal and the main component of life, the authors become dangerous to the public. --- Flusser I 11 Art/Flusser: for a Christian, everything is art (namely God's work). >Christianity, >Artifacts. For an enlightened philosopher of the 18th century, everything is nature (namely, in principle, explainable). >Enlightenment, >Explanation. I 11ff Art/Flusser: Separation of art and technology is the result of printing. Pictures become works of art as soon as they cease to be the dominant code. They only become "beautiful" because they can no longer be "good", "true". >Beauty, >Truth, >Images. This makes them opaque. Even if they hang on walls, they are also more than just "beautiful" they are models of different ways to experience the world. You do not have to accept the romantic ideology of art as a "revelation of reality" to see that when you look at a Goya, you get a different view of the world than when you look at Matisse. They are different ways of living. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 Rötz I F. Rötzer Kunst machen? München 1991 |
| Art | Weber | Habermas III 229 Art/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber counts not only science, but also autonomous art among the manifestations of cultural rationalization. >Rationalization. The artistically stylized patterns of expression became independent with the conditions of art production, initially courtly patronage and later bourgeois-capitalist: "Art now constitutes itself as a cosmos of always consciously grasped independent intrinsic values."(1) >Artworks, >Artists, >Autonomy, >Value spheres. Habermas: Weber does not concentrate primarily on the art business and art critique, but on III 230 the effects of consciously capturing aesthetic intrinsic values for the techniques of art production. >Aesthetics, >Society. III 231 For Weber, however, the development of art plays as little of a role in the sociological explanation of social rationalization as the history of science. Art cannot even accelerate these processes like a science that has become productive. III 251 Progress/Art/Weber/Habermas: Weber emphasizes that "the use of a certain technique, however 'advanced', does not mean the least about the aesthetic value of the work of art.(2) >Technology, >Progress. 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I. 1963, S. 555. 2. M. Weber Methodologische Schriften, Hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Frankfurt 1968 |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Articles | Kamp | Cresswell I 175 Definite descriptions/Cresswell: so far we have only spoken about undefined descriptions! Undefined descriptions/Russell. Thesis: a man means "at least a man". Certain descriptions/Russell. Thesis: the man means "this particular man". Anaphora/HintikkaVsRussell: the tradition has no explanation for the anaphoric use of certain descriptions. Article/Cresswell: recent attempts to integrate the old linguistic idea into the traditional logic that the indefinite article introduces new objects in the speech while the definite article refers to already introduced entities. This corresponds to: Article/Kempson: (1975, 111)(1): thesis: definite/indefinite article should be distinguished not semantically but only pragmatically. Article/old/new/file change semantics/Heim/Cresswell: the distinction between old and new entities in connection with the article is also found in Heim (1983). I 176 There it leads to the file change semantics/Kamp/Heim: Thesis: as entities in the world the objects are not new, but only within the speech, therefore "files". (Files, "new in the files"). Definiton file/Heim/Cresswell: a file represents facts about objects for the speaker. >File change semantics, (1) Ruth M. Kempson (1975): Presupposition and the delimitation of semantics (Cambridge Studies in Linguistics, 15). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Kamp I Kamp From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy) Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Articles | Millikan | I 176 Indefinite article/Millikan: an indefinite article causes a name plus modification (description) to function purely descriptive. E.g. Henry was bitten by a poisonous snake, not by toxicity or the property of being a snake. Truth value/Truth: to have a truth value, the sentence must map a situation that involves a particular individual, that is, it must have a real value. (> Terminology/Millikan). N.B.: but it is not important which snake it was exactly, so that the sentence works properly ((s) i.e., performs its >eigenfunction). I 189 Definite article/description/Millikan: if it is used with necessary identifying descriptions, it is actually superfluous. It only develops its power with other descriptions. Unambiguous/determinateness/MillikanVsRussell: the definite article does not have the function of establishing unambiguousness. Exception: necessarily identifying dsignations, which are purely descriptive. But even then a translation into an inner name is always possible. I 189 Randomly identifying/description/definite article/Millikan: randomly identifying descriptions with "the" are indexical. And relative to the identification function, these are also necessary identifying descriptions. >Identification, >Description. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Artificial Intelligence | Chalmers | I 185 Artificial Intelligence/Chalmers: Suppose we had an artificial system that rationally reflects what it perceives. Would this system have a concept of consciousness? It would certainly have a concept of the self, it could differ from the rest of the world, and have a more direct access to its own cognitive contents than to that of others. So it would have a certain kind of self-awareness. This system will not say about itself, that it would have no idea how it is to see a red triangle. Nor does it need access to its elements on a deeper level (Hofstadter 1979 1, Winograd 1972 2). N.B.: such a system would have a similar attitude to its inner life as we do to ours. Cf. >Artificial consciousness, >Self-consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Knowing how. I 186 Behavioral explanation/Chalmers: to explain the behavior of such systems, we never need to attribute consciousness. Perhaps such systems have consciousness, or not, but the explanation of their behavior is independent of this. >Behavior, >Explanation. I 313 Artificial Intelligence/VsArtificial Intelligence/Chalmers: DreyfusVsArtificial Intelligence: (Dreyfus 1972 7): Machines cannot achieve the flexible and creative behavior of humans. LucasVsArtificial Intelligence/PenroseVsArtificial Intelligence/Chalmers: (Lucas 1961 3, Penrose, 1989 4): Computers can never reach the mathematical understanding of humans because they are limited by Goedel's Theorem in a way in which humans are not. Chalmers: these are external objections. The internal objections are more interesting: VsArtificial intelligence: internal argument: conscious machines cannot develop a mind. >Mind/Chalmers. SearleVsArtificial Intelligence: > Chinese Room Argument. (Searle 1980 5). According to that, a computer is at best a simulation of consciousness, a zombie. >Chinese Room, >Zombies, >Intentionality/Searle. Artificial Intelligence/ChalmersVsSearle/ChalmersVsPenrose/ChalmersVsDreyfus: it is not obvious that certain physical structures in the computer lead to consciousness, the same applies to the structures in the brain. >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 314 Definition Strong Artificial Intelligence/Searle/Chalmers: Thesis: There is a non-empty class of computations so that the implementation of each operation from this class is sufficient for a mind and especially for conscious experiences. This is only true with natural necessity, because it is logically possible that any compuation can do without consciousness, but this also applies to brains. >Strong Artificial Intelligence. I 315 Implementation/Chalmers: this term is needed as a bridge for the connection between abstract computations and concrete physical systems in the world. We also sometimes say that our brain implements calculations. Cf. >Thinking/World, >World, >Reality, >Computation, >Computer Model. Implementation/Searle: (Searle 1990b 6): Thesis is an observational-relativistic term. If you want, you can consider every system as implementing, for example: a wall. ChalmersVsSearle: one has to specify the implementation, then this problem is avoided. I 318 For example, a combinatorial state machine has quite different implementation conditions than a finite state machine. The causal interaction between the elements is differently fine-grained. >Fine-grained/coarse-grained. In addition, combinatorial automats can reflect various other automats, like... I 319 ...Turing-machines and cellular automats, as opposed to finite or infinite state automats. >Turing-machine, >Vending machine/Dennett. ChalmersVsSearle: each system implements one or the other computation. Only not every type (e.g., a combinational state machine) is implemented by each system. Observational relativity remains, but it does not threaten the possibility of artificial intelligence. I 320 This does not say much about the nature of the causal relations. >Observation, >Observer relativity. 1. D. R. Hofstadter Gödel, Escher Bach, New York 1979 2. T. Winograd, Understanding Natural Language, New York 1972 3. J. R. Lucas, Minds, machines and Gödel, Philosophy 36, 1961, p. 112-27. 4. R. Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind, Oxford 1989 5. J. R. Searle, Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 1980: pp. 417 -24 6. J. R. Searle, Is the brain an digital computer? Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical association, 1990, 64: pp. 21-37 7. H. Dreyfus, What Computers Can't Do. New York 1972. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Artificial Intelligence | Russell | Brockman I 22 Artificial Intelligence/Stuart Russell: The goal of AI research has been to understand the principles underlying intelligent behavior and to build those principles into machines that can then exhibit such behavior. Brockman I 23 In the 1960s and 1970s, the prevailing theoretical notion of intelligence was the capacity for logical reasoning (…). More recently, a consensus has emerged around the idea of a rational agent that perceives, and acts in order to maximize, its expected utility. AI has incorporated probability theory to handle uncertainty, utility theory to define objectives, and statistical learning to allow machines to adapt to new circumstances. These developments have created strong connections to other disciplines that build on similar concepts, including control theory, economics, operations research, and statistics. Purpose: For example, a self-driving car should accept a destination as input instead of having one fixed destination. However, some aspects of the car’s “driving purpose” are fixed, such as that it shouldn’t hit pedestrians. Putting a purpose into a machine (…) seems an admirable approach to ensuring that the machine’s “conduct will be carried out on principles acceptable to us!” Brockman I 24 Problem: neither AI nor other disciplines (economics, statistics, control theory, operations research) built around the optimization of objectives have much to say about how to identify the purposes “we really desire.” >Artificial Intelligence/Omohundro, >Superintelligence/Stuart Russell. Brockman I 29 Solution/Stuart Russell: The optimal solution to this problem is not, as one might hope, to behave well, but instead to take control of the human and force him or her to provide a stream of maximal rewards. This is known as the wireheading problem, based on observations that humans themselves are susceptible to the same problem if given a means to electronically stimulate their own pleasure centers. Problem: This idealization ignores the possibility that our minds are composed of subsystems with incompatible preferences; if true, that would limit a machine’s ability to optimally satisfy our preferences, but it doesn’t seem to prevent us from designing machines that avoid catastrophic outcomes. Solution/Stuart Russell: A more precise definition is given by the framework of cooperative inverse-reinforcement learning, or CIRL. A CIRL problem involves two agents, one human and the other a robot. Because there are two agents, the problem is what economists call a game. It is a game of partial information, because while the human knows the reward function, the robot doesn’t—even though the robot’s job is to maximize it. Brockman I 30 Off-switch Problem: Within the CIRL framework, one can formulate and solve the off-switch problem - that is, the problem of how to prevent a robot from disabling its off switch. A robot that’s uncertain about human preferences actually benefits from being switched off, Brockman I 31 because it understands that the human will press the off switch to prevent the robot from doing something counter to those preferences. Thus the robot is incentivized to preserve the off switch, and this incentive derives directly from its uncertainty about human preferences.(1) Behavioral learning/preferences/Problems: There are obvious difficulties, however, with an approach that expects a robot to learn underlying preferences from human behavior. Humans are irrational, inconsistent, weak willed, and computationally limited, so their actions don’t always reflect their true preferences. 1. Cf. Hadfield-Menell et al., “The Off-Switch Game,” https:/Jarxiv.orglpdf/ 1611.0821 9.pdf. Russell, Stuart J. „The Purpose put into the Machine”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. Norvig I 27 Artificial general intelligence/Norvig/Russell: Artificial General Intelligence or AGI (Goertzel and Pennachin, 2007)(1), (…) held its first conference and organized the Journal of Artificial General Intelligence in 2008. AGI looks for a universal algorithm for learning and acting in any environment, and has its roots in the work of Ray Solomonoff (1964)(2), one of the attendees of the original 1956 Dartmouth conference. Guaranteeing that what we create is really Friendly AI is also a concern (Yudkowsky, 2008(3); Omohundro, 2008)(4). >Human Level AI/Minsky; >Artificial general intelligence. 1. Goertzel, B. and Pennachin, C. (2007). Artificial General Intelligence. Springer 2. Solomonoff, R. J. (1964). A formal theory of inductive inference. Information and Control, 7, 1–22, 224–254. 3. Yudkowsky, E. (2008). Artificial intelligence as a positive and negative factor in global risk. In Bostrom, N. and Cirkovic, M. (Eds.), Global Catastrophic Risk. Oxford University Press 4. Omohundro, S. (2008). The basic AI drives. In AGI-08 Workshop on the Sociocultural, Ethical and Futurological Implications of Artificial Intelligence |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Artworks | Valéry | Gadamer I 100 Artworks/Work of Art/Valéry/Gadamer: But how should one conceive the standard for the completion of a work of art? No matter how rational and soberly one looks at the artistic, much of what we call a work of art is not intended for use, and none at all receives the measure of its completion from such a purpose. Does the being of the work then only represent itself like the termination of a creative process that virtually points beyond it? Is it in itself not at all "completable"? Valéry: Paul Valéry did indeed see things that way. Nor has he shied away from the consequence that results for those who face a work of art and try to understand it. For if it is to be true that a work of art is not perfect in itself, then what is to be the yardstick by which the appropriateness of reception and understanding is to be measured? The accidental and arbitrary termination of a design process cannot contain anything binding(1). Reception/Understanding: It follows from this that it must be left to the recipient to decide what he/she in turn makes of what is present. One way of understanding a structure is then no less legitimate than the other. There is no standard of appropriateness. Not only that the poet himself does not possess one - the aesthetics of the genius movement would also agree with that. >Genius/Gadamer. Rather, each encounter with the work has the rank and right of a new production. GadamerVsValéry: That seems to me an untenable hermeneutic nihilism. Whenever Valéry has occasionally drawn such conclusions(2) for his work in order to escape the myth of the unconscious production of the genius, it seems to me that he has in fact become even more entangled in it. For now he transfers to the reader and interpreter the authority of absolute creation, which he himself does not want to perform. Aesthetic experience/Gadamer: The same aporia results if one starts from the concept of aesthetic experience instead of the concept of genius. >Aesthetic experience/Erlebniskunst/Lukacs. 1. Gadamer: Es war das Interesse an dieser Frage, das mich in meinen Goethe-Studien leitete. Vgl. »Vom geistigen Lauf des Menschen«, 1949; auch meinen Vortrag »Zur Fragwürdigkeit des ästhetischen Bewußtseins«, in Venedig 1958 (Rivista di Estetica, Ill-Alll 374-383). Vgl. den Neudruck in „Theorien der Kunst“ hrsg. von D. Henrich und W. Iser, Frankfurt 1982, dort S. 59—691. 2. Valéry, Variété Ill, Commentaires de Charmes: »Mes vers ont le sens qu'on leur prete«. |
Valéry I P. Valéry Cahiers Vol. I Frankfurt/M. 1987 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Aspects | Searle | VI 169 Def Primary Aspect/Searle: if nothing fulfills the primary aspect, the speaker had nothing in mind (he/she just thought he/she had it), e.g. hallucination. The statement cannot be true. Def Secondary Aspect/Searle: a secondary aspect is any aspect expressed by the speaker to which the following applies: the speaker tries to talk to him/her about the object that fulfills his/her primary aspect, but is not himself/herself meant to be part of the truth conditions that the speaker wants to make. There must be a primary aspect to each secondary aspect. VI 169/170 Example: the man with the champagne in the glass over there. Even if it is water, the man is still standing over there. >Champagne example. The secondary aspect does not appear in the truth conditions. For example, we both look at the same man, even if he is not Smith's murderer. For example, even if Shakespeare did not exist at all, I can say: "Shakespeare did not design the figure of Ophelia as convincingly as the Hamlets." (Secondary aspect). Searle: this statement can also be true. II 75 Aspect/Searle: an aspect has no intermediate instance like sensory data. ((s) Therefore, there is also no risk of regress as with all intermediate instances.) Searle: there is a morning star aspect and an evening star aspect of Venus. If it is not a case of perception, the intentional object is always represented under some aspect, but what is represented is the object and not the aspect! II 76 ff Rabbit-Duck-Head: Wittgenstein: the rabbit-duck-head exhibits various uses of the word "see". SearleVsWittgenstein: we see not only objects but also aspects. We love people, but also aspects. III 185 Representation: each representation is bound to certain aspects, not to others. >Rabbit-Duck-Head. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Assertibility | Brandom | Brandom I 197 VsJustified Assertibility: Assertibilty conditions do not contain the entire meaning. >Assertibility conditions. --- Rorty I ~ 325 (According to Rorty): assertible/Brandom/Rorty: in addition to the term "assertible" for the pure philosophy of language we still need "true". Especially for understanding how the language works as opposed to understanding how it spreads to the world. (Semantics/epistemology). Also naive: distinguishing the assertibility conditions of a statement as "descriptive meaning" and the consequences as "evaluative" importance, and thus abandon any need for harmony. --- Brandom II 238 Assertibility Theories/Brandom: Thesis semantics must be oriented towards pragmatics (Brandom pro). >Pragmatics. II 240 Two tasks: 1. assertive force, i.e. declaring accuracy, i.e. making a distinction between traits at all 2. saying when those traits are allowed. II 241 a) what are the reasons, evidence b) directly ask whether a statement is true - "semantic assertibility"/Sellars: assertibility under ideal conditions. II 242 BrandomVsSellars: hopeless: you cannot specify ideality; either it remains circular with recourse to the notion of truth, or trivial. (Also BrandomVsHabermas). II 243 Brandom's own approach: Thesis rule-governed language game that allows to combine propositional contents that are objective in the sense that they detach from the settings of the speaker with declarative sentences - which splits assertibility into two parts: determination and authorization (two normative statuses) - goes beyond Behth, because it allows the distinction between right and wrong use. - (> Dummett:> chess). II 254f Semantic Theories/Assertibility/Brandom: Pro: Advantage: close connection to use - Problem: Dilemma: either a) linked to attitude or b) to the object - N.B.: Same assertibility conditions, but different truth conditions - the object could be red without me being able to say it. >Truth conditions II 259 Solution: Conditional: "If the pattern is red, it is red" - Tautology: this is correct because it codifies a definition preserving inference - but not: II 260 "If I am entitled to the assertion that the pattern is red, it is red"- not definition preserving. II 261 Distinction between authorization and definition does not need the notion of truth. II 261 BrandomVsAssertibility: does not distinguish between the status of the definition/authorization without the aid of incompatibilities (negation). Distinction between sentences that share the assertibility conditions and those that share the truth condition is not possible without the notion of truth. >Truth. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Assertibility | Putnam | Rorty I 307 Justified Assertibility/Putnam: (according to Rorty): if you retreat to that, you may say that e.g. "X is gold" can be justifiably asserted at Archimedes' times, and is no longer justifiably assertible today. But he would have to dismiss the statement that X was in the extension of gold, just like the statement that "X is Gold" was true, as meaningless (> de re / de dicto). Putnam: (according to Rorty): Putnam follows 3 trains of thought: 1) Against the construction of 'true' as meaning the same as "justified assertibility" (or any other "soft" concept that had to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can provide a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth. 2) A certain kind of sociological facts requires an explanation: the reliability of the normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can only be explained on the basis of realism. 3) Only the realist can avoid the conclusion from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is highly probable that none of the terms that are used today refers". Wright/truth/justified assertibility/Putnam: (Reason, Truth and History): PutnamVsEquating truth and assertibility ("rational acceptability"), but for other reasons: 1) Truth is timeless, assertibility is not. 2) Truth is an idealization of rational acceptability. E.g. idealization: an idealization is not to achieve friction-free surfaces, but talking about them pays off, because we come very close to them. >Idealisation, >Meanging change, >Realism, >Internal realism, >Observation, >Obervation language, >Truth. --- Rorty VI 30 Rorty: "justified assertibility" (pragmatism, Dewey) PutnamVs: "naturalistic fallacy": a given belief can satisfy all such conditions and still be wrong. >Pragmatism, >Dewey. PutnamVsRorty et al.: Rorty et al. ignore the need to admit the existence of "real directedness" or "intentionality". >Intentionality. Putnam: an "ideal audience" (before which a justification is sufficient) cannot exist. A better audience can always be assumed. --- Putnam I (c) 96 Ideal Assertibility/PutnamVsPeirce: no "ideal limit" can be specified sensibly - not to specify any conditions for science (PutnamVsKuhn). >Truth/Peirce. If you do not believe in convergence, but in revolutions, you should interpret the connectors intuitionistically and understand truth intra-theoretically. >Incommensurability/Kuhn. I (e) 141 Truth/assertibility/Tarski/Putnam: from Tarski's his truth-definition also follows assertibility. The probability of a sentence in the meta-language is equivalent to that in the object language. >Truth definition/Tarski, >Object language, >Meta language. I (i) 246 Truth/justified assertibility/Kripke's Wittgenstein: that would only be a matter of general agreement. PutnamVsKripke: that would be a wrong description of the concepts that we actually have - and a self-contradictory attempt at taking an "absolute perspective". >Kripke's Wittgenstein. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Assertibility | Strawson | Nagel I 71 Crispin Wright: considers the view that truth could range further than assertibility to be too extreme: how can a sentence be unrecognizably true? (VsRealism) >Realism, >Assertibility, >Truth. StrawsonVs this draws the image of what Wittgenstein has reportedly asserted: it simply does not correspond with our most evident experience. We understand the meaning of what we say and hear well enough to at least occasionally recognize inconsistencies and conclusions in what was said which are attributable solely to the sense or the meaning of what was said. >Sense, >Meaning, >Understanding, >Language community. Wright I 77 Wright: Assertibility/Strawson: the assertibility-conditional conception has "no explanation for what a speaker actually does when he utters the sentence". >Language behavior, >Behavior, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. StrawsonVsSemantic Anti-Realists: it only makes sense to consider an assertion to be justified if this assertion supports the commitment to something that lies beyond its justification. ((s) "background", single, isolated sentences are not assertible but neither are they sensibly debatable.) cf. >Background. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Assertions | Dummett | II 124 Assertion/Dummett: By asserting something, the speaker excludes certain possibilities. II 125 But he does not rule out the possibility that the antecedent of the conditional is false. - Thus, its falsity does not make the assert. >Paradox of implication, >Conditional. III (e) 203 Meaning/assertion/Dummett: In general, no specific response is associated with an assertion - how the listener responds will depend on indefinitely many things - FregeVsWittgenstein: hence the meaning cannot be determined in the context of non-linguistic activities. Cf. >Use Theory. Tugendhat I 253 Meaning/assertion/game/Dummett/Tugendhat: (benefit) new: on the other hand it is said: if the expression is used, which then are the conditions under which it is right - Tugendhat: this requires the following: 1) that the circumstances for the accuracy of the use don’t matter 2) that the conditions on which the accuracy depends are such that their fulfillment is guaranteed by the use of the expression itself. What the expression guarantees is that the conditions for its correctness (truth) are met - correctness is always implied (by the speaker). Listeners: separate the conditions and their presence. >Assertibility conditions. Tugendhat I 256f TugendhatVsDummett: 1) That does not state the truth conditions yet - possible solution: thruth conditions in turn by sentence - then a metalanguage is needed. >Metalanguage. TugendhatVsMeta language. Solution/Tugendhat: the explanation must lie in the usage rule of the first sentence. 2) Vs: Giving a guarantee in turn presumes the use of an assertive sentence (circular). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Assertions | Frege | II 29 Asserting sentence/assertion/Frege: as an equation the assertion has two parts: one is saturated, the other one is unsaturated. >Equation, >Unsaturated. Function: the function is the meaning of the unsaturated part: e.g. "conquered Gaul". Argument: Caesar - (sic without quotation marks) - Quotation Marks/(s): the argument is not put in quotation marks ((s) the person is the argument, not the name) - ((s)>Russell: the object itself occurs in the sentence. See Substitutional Quantifikation/Hintikka). II 32 Assertion/Designating/Frege: with a judging stroke: an assertion designates nothing! But it asserts something - either assert or designate. >Judgment. IV 52 Thought/Frege: there is no complete thought without time determination. But then it is also timelessly true or false. Expression/Assertion/Frege: difference: time determination: is part of the expression - truth: is part of the assertion and timeless. Timeless things do not belong to the outer world. >Thought. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Association | Cartwright | I 28f Association/Association Law/Hume/Cartwright: one factor explains the other, if there is only a certain privileged relation between them - Symmetry. Problem: >reference class problem - unlike causality: Asymmetry: cause and effect cannot be interchanged. I 32 E.g. Symmetry: conditional probability: it's growth is symmetric: P(E I C) > P(E) iff. P(C I E) > P(C). >Symmetries, Reference classes, >Reference Systems, >Probability, >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Causality. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Association | Hume | I 13 Association/Hume: association is a natural law. Ideas: the effect of the association of ideas has three forms: 1. general idea (similarity) 2. procedure/regularity (through idea of "substance" or "mode") 3. relation: an idea draws another to itself. Thereby ideas do not acquire new quality. >Ideas. I 126f Association/principle/Hume: problems: 1. Association only explains the form of thought, not the content. 2. Association does not explain the individual contents of the individual. Solution: the explanation lies in the circumstances of the perception - also substances, general ideas and modes require the circumstances. >Circumstances, >Perception, >Thoughts. I 137f Associations/KantVsHume/Deleuze: the "Law of Reproduction" (frequent consecutive ideas set a connection) assumes that the phenomena actually follow such a rule (Kant pro). There must be a reason a priori -> synthesis of the imagination (not of the senses!). >Imagination, >Senses, >a priori, >Principles., >Principles/Hume. KantVsHume: Hume's dualism (relations are outside of things ) forces him to grasp that as the accordance of subject with nature. But this cannot be a priori, otherwise it would remain unnoticed. I 154 Association/Hume: association cannot select. If the mind was only determined by principles, there would be no morality. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Asymmetry | Habermas | IV 405 Asymmetry/Legitimation/Power/Money/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons ignores the asymmetry, which is that trust in the power system must be secured at a higher level than trust in the monetary system. The institutions of private civil law should ensure the functioning of money transactions conducted via markets in the same way as the office organisation should ensure the exercise of power. >Power, >Money, >T. Parsons. However, this also requires an advance of trust, which means not only "compliance" (actual compliance with the law) but "obligation" (obligation based on recognition of normative validity claims). This asymmetry has always been linked to socialist concerns about the organisational power of capital owners, which is only secured under private law. The explanation of this asymmetry leads to the question of the conditions for the institutionalisation capacity of media. >Institutionalisation/Parsons. Solution: The disadvantage of one side in standard situations, which is reflected in the power code, can be compensated by the reference to collectively desired goals. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Atoms | Feynman | I 270 Atom/Laws of Nature/Law/Analogies/Feynman: the atom behaves differently than all other objects, it is a completely different object. It cannot be compared with anything. Why should it behave like great objects? Why should the electrons circulate around the core like planets? The atom is like nothing we are familiar with! >Analogies/Feynman, >Explanations, >Laws of Nature, >Principles, >Quantum Mechanics. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Attachment Theory | Bowlby | Corr I 29 (XXIX) Personality/attachment theory/Bowlby: Bowlby’s insight was that the child’s pattern of relationships with its primary care-giver affected adult personality; secure attachment to the care-giver promoted healthy adjustment in later life. The theory references many of the key themes of this review of personality. Attachment style may be measured by observation or questionnaire; a common distinction is between secure, anxious and avoidant styles (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall 1978)(1). It also corresponds to standard traits; for example, secure attachment correlates with Extraversion and Agreeableness (Carver 1997)(2). Attachment likely possesses biological aspects (evident in ethological studies of primates), social aspects (evident in data on adult relationships), and cognitive aspects (evident in studies of the mental representations supporting attachment style). >Relationships, >Social relations, >Extraversion, >Affectional bond. 1. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E. and Wall, S. 1978. Patterns of attachment: a psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 2. Carver, C. S. 1997. Adult attachment and personality: converging evidence and a new measure, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23: 865–83 Corr I 228 Attachment theory/Bowlby/Shaver/Mikulincer: Bowlby’s attachment theory (Bowlby 1973(1), 1980(2), 1982/1969(3)) was then elaborated and empirically tested by Mary Ainsworth and her colleagues (e.g., Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall 1978(4)). See also Attachment theory/Ainsworth. Question: why separations from mother early in life causes so much psychological difficulty for children, adolescents and adults later in life (e.g., Bowlby 1951(5), 1958(6)). 1. Bowlby, J. 1973. Attachment and loss, vol. II, Separation: anxiety and anger. New York: Basic Books 2. Bowlby, J. 1980. Attachment and loss, vol. III, Sadness and depression. New York: Basic Books 3. Bowlby, J. 1982. Attachment and loss, vol. I, Attachment, 2nd edn. New York: Basic Books (original edn 1969) 4. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E. and Wall, S. 1978. Patterns of attachment: assessed in the Strange Situation and at home. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 5. Bowlby, J. 1951. Maternal care and mental health. Geneva: World Health Organization 6. Bowlby, J. 1958. The nature of the child’s tie to his mother, International Journal of Psychoanalysis 39: 350–73 Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Attention | Minsky | I 224 Attention/Artificial Intelligence/Minsky: When several objects move at once, it's hard to keep track of them all. We're forced to focus on a few while losing track of all the rest. What causes these phenomena? I'll argue that they're aspects of the processes we use to control our short-term memories. Machines: The ability to focus attention could start with some machinery for keeping track of simple polynemes for object-things. In later stages, an IT could represent more complex processes or scripts that keep track of entire Trans-actions with their various pronomes for Objects, Origins, Destinations, Obstacles, Trajectories, and Purposes. >Terminology/Minsky, >Trans-frames/Minsky. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Attitudes and Behavior | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 31 Attitudes and behavior/psychological theories: are attitudes and action related? LaPiere’s 1934 study(1) was widely interpreted as showing that attitudes do not always predict behavior. LaPiere found a strong divergence in the rejection of strangers depending on whether he asked hotels for rooms in writing or spoke in person at hotels accompanied by Chinese. Alan Wicker (1969)(2) reviewed 42 experimental studies and found that the average correlation between attitudes and behaviour was only very low (r ≈ .15). On this basis, he concluded that ‘taken as a whole, these studies suggest that it is considerably more likely that attitudes will be unrelated or only slightly related to overt behaviours than that attitudes will be closely related to actions’ (1969(2): 65). At the same time, however, other researchers maintained that attitudes did predict behaviour and sought to understand the weak relations identified in the literature. Some researchers highlighted methodological issues related to the measurement of attitudes and behaviour. More specifically, researchers argued that there was no simple attitude–behaviour relationship and that in order to predict behaviour accurately it is necessary to take other variables into account. The most dominant of these ‘other variables’ approaches are the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975(3)) and the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991)(4). According to both these theories, the most immediate determinant of behaviour is a person’s intention to engage in that behaviour. Intention, in turn, is determined by attitudes (i.e., the person’s evaluation of the target behaviour), subjective norms (i.e., the person’s perception that others would approve of the behaviour), and, in the theory of planned behaviour, Haslam I 32 perceived behavioural control (i.e., the person’s perception that the behaviour is under his or her control). See meta-analyses by Albarracin et al., 2001(5); Armitage and Conner, 2001(6); Hagger et al., 2002(7)). Attitudes correlate well with intentions (the average correlation, r, ranges between .45 and .60). The same is true for correlations between subjective norms and intentions (.34 < r < .42), and between perceived behavioural control and intentions (.35 < r < .46). Indeed, overall, in combination, attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control turn out to be very good predictors of intentions (.63 < r < .71). Furthermore, Sheeran (2002)(8) observes that intentions are themselves good predictors of behaviour (average r = .53). Scheme: Attitude/Subjective norm/Perceived behavioral control > Intention > Behavior (With an additional direct influence of perceived behavioral control on behavior). Haslam 33 VsLaPiere: LaPiere’s study (>Attitudes and behavior/LaPiere) was criticized for several reasons: First, there is the issue of the six-month interval between the two assessment points. Practically, we have no way of knowing whether the same individual responded to both the face-to-face request for service and the questionnaire request. (Schwarz 1978)(9). Other researchers have argued that the two measures of ‘attitude’ that LaPiere administered did not actually address the same attitude object. In particular, Ajzen and colleagues (1970)(10) note that a different result might have been obtained if the verbal attitude measure more accurately reflected the behaviour of interest. Haslam I 34 People who hold negative attitudes towards particular groups may be reluctant to express these attitudes in their public behaviour because they also adhere to widely held norms of tolerance or politeness. Haslam I 35 VsLaPiere: LaPiere (1934)(1) assessed behavior and then attitudes rather than assessing attitudes and the behavior. Had LaPiere been interested in testing whether attitudes predict behaviour, then this would constitute a serious limitation to his work. Haslam I 36 VsLaPiere: LaPiere believed that one could only truly assess attitudes by looking at individuals’ behaviour because verbal and behavioural responses to an attitude object arise from a single ‘acquired behavioural disposition’ (Campbell, 1963(11): 97). In these terms, attitudes and behaviour are seen to be formally rather than causally related – that is, they are related because they are reflections of the same underlying state, not because one leads to the other. Contemporary social psychologists tend to conceptualize attitudes as evaluative dispositions (e.g., Eagly and Chaiken, 1993)(12), and this conceptualization has driven, and continues to drive, the way in which attitudes are measured. >Attitudes/psychological theories. 1. LaPiere, R.T. (1934) ‘Attitudes versus actions’, Social Forces, 13: 230–7. 2. Wicker, A.W. (1969) ‘Attitudes versus actions: The relationship of verbal and overt behavioural responses to attitude objects’, Journal of Social Issues, 25: 41–78. 3. Fishbein, M. and Ajzen, I. (1975) Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behaviour: An Introduction to Theory and Research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 4. Ajzen, I. (1991) ‘The theory of planned behaviour’, Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, 50: 179–211. 5. Albarracin, D., Johnson, B.T., Fishbein, M. and Muellerleile, P.A. (2001) ‘Theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour as models of condom use: A meta-analysis’, Psychological Bulletin, 127: 142–61. 6. Armitage, C.J. and Conner, M. (2001) ‘Efficacy of the theory of planned behaviour: A meta-analytic review’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 40: 471–99. 7. Hagger, M.S., Chatzisarantis, N.L.D. and Biddle, S.J.H. (2002) ‘A meta-analytic review of the theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour in physical activity: Predictive validity and the contribution of additional variables’, Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 24: 3–32. 8. Sheeran, P. (2002) ‘Intention–behaviour relations: A conceptual and empirical review’, European Review of Social Psychology, 12: 1–36. 9. Schwartz, S. (1978) ‘Temporal stability as a moderator of the attitude–behaviour relationship’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36: 715–24. 10. Ajzen, I., Darroch, R.K., Fishbein, M. and Hornik, J.A. (1970) ‘Looking backward revisited: A reply to Deutscher’, The American Sociologist, 5: 267–73. 11. Campbell, D.T. (1963) ‘Social attitudes and other acquired behavioural dispositions’, in S. Koch (ed.), Psychology: A Study of a Science, Vol. 6. New York: McGraw-Hill. pp. 94–172. 12. Eagly, A.H. and Chaiken, S. (1993) The Psychology of Attitudes. Belmont, CA: Thomson. Joanne R. Smith and Deborah J. Terry, “Attitudes and Behavior. Revisiting LaPiere’s hospitality study”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Attributes | Quine | VII (d) 75ff Attribute/Quine: an attribute may eventually be introduced in a second step: e.g. "squareness" according to geometrical definition, but then the name also requires substitutability, i.e. an abstract entity > Universals. X 7ff Attribute/Quine: an attribute corresponds to properties, predicates are not the same as attributes. >Predicates/Quine. IX 178ff Attribute/(s): an attribute corresponds to the quantity of those x for which a particular condition applies: {x: x ε a} all objects that are mortal. Predicate: "x is mortal", is not a quantity, but a propositional function. The denomination forms refer "φx", "φ(x,y)" to the attribution. >Propositional Function/Quine. XII 38 Attributary Attitude/Quine: E.g. hunting, needing, catching, fearing, missing. Important to note here is that e.g. "lion hunt" does not require lions as individuals but as a species - > Introduction of properties. IX 177 Attributes/Ontology/Russell: for Russell, the universe consisted of individuals, attributes and relations of them, attributes and relations of such attributes and relations, etc. IX 178f Extensionality/Quine: extensionality is what distinguishes attributes and classes. >Extensionality/Quine So Russell has more to do with attributes than with classes. Two attributes can be of different order and are therefore certainly different, and yet the things that each have one or the other attribute are the same. For example the attribute "φ(φ^x <> φy) where "φ" has the order 1, an attribute only from y. For example the attribute ∀χ(χ^x <> χy), where "χ" has order 2, again one attribute only from y, but one attribute has order 2, the other has order 3. (> Classes/ >Quantities/ >Properties). XIII 22 Class/set/property/Quine: whatever you say about a thing seems to attribute a property to it. Property/Attribute/Tradition/Quine: in earlier times one used to say that an attribute is only called a property if it is specific to that thing. (a peculiarity of this object is...). New: today these two expressions (attribute, property) are interchangeable. "Attribute"/Quine: I do not use this term. Instead I use "property". Identity/equality/difference/properties/Quine: if it makes sense to speak of properties, then it also makes sense to speak of their equality or difference. Problem: but it does not make sense! Problem: if everything that has this one property, also has the other. Shall we say that it is simply the same quality? Very well. But people do not talk like that. For example to have a heart/kidney: is not the same, even if it also applies to the same living beings. Coextensivity/Quine: two properties are not sufficient for their identity. Identity/properties/possible solution: is there a necessary coextensiveness? >Coextensive/Quine Vs: Necessity is too unclear as a term. Properties/Quine: We only get along so well with the term property because identity is not so important for their identification or differentiation. XIII 23 Solution/Quine: we are talking about classes instead of properties, then we have also solved the problem e.g. heart/kidneys. Classes/Quine: are defined by their elements. That is the way of saying it, but unwisely, because the misunderstanding might arise that the elements cause the classes in a different way than objects cause their. Def Singleton/Singleton/Single Class: class with only one element. Def Class/Quine: (in useful use of the word): is simply a property in the everyday sense, without distinguishing coextensive cases. XIII 24 Class/Russell/Quine: it struck like a bomb when Russell discovered the platitude that each containment condition (condition of containment, element relationship) establishes a class. (see paradoxes, see impredictiveness). Russell's Paradox/Quine: applies to classes as well as to properties. It also shatters the platitude that anything said about a thing attributes a property. Properties/Classes/Quine: all restrictions we impose on classes to avoid paradoxes must also be imposed on properties. Property/Quine: we have to tolerate the term in everyday language. Mathematics: here we can talk about classes instead, because coextensiveness is not the problem. (see Definition, > Numbers). Properties/Science/Quine: in the sciences we do not talk about properties. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Attributive/referential | Brandom | I 681 Attributive/Referential/Brandom: It is about the listener, not the speaker. - That is a matter of the significance which is assigned to a Tokening, not the significance based on its type. - Champagne e.g.: there must be an expression from the perspective of the listener, which the speaker might have used as well. - > de re / de dicto. --- II 52/53 Verb: e.g. "to march": semantic interpretant: Function of object on possible worlds - adverb: E.g. "slow" function of (functions of objects on possible worlds) to (functions of objects on possible worlds) - then attributive: here the inference from "aF!" to "aF slow" is alright - not attributive: not alright e.g. "in someone's imagination". |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Attributive/referential | Searle | IV 101 Attributive/Tradition/Grammar: attributive includes relative expressions such as "large" or "hot". Searle: we require background. All tall women are similar in terms of height. Attributive/Searle: what is meant and the sentence meaning are the same thing. IV 161 Referential/Donnellan/Searle: S talked about e, no matter if e is actually F. You can then also report with other expressions than "the F". Attributive: here there is no entity e, the speaker would not even have had in mind that they existed. Attributive: the statement can then not be true. IV 164 Donnellan: E.g. "The winner, whoever it is": here, in the attributive sense nothing is actually talked about. Referential/attributive: there is no distinction between beliefs. IV 165ff Referential/Attributive/SearleVsDonnellan: instead: aspects: you can choose the aspect under which you speak about an object. Primary A: if nothing satisfies it, the speaker had nothing in mind (hallucination). Secondary A: any aspect for which it is true that S tried to talk with it about the object, that fulfils its primary A, without being meant to belong to the truth conditions. >">Truth condition, >Aspects/Searle. The Champagne example even works if water is in the glass. Searle: then the statement may also be true. The meaning does not change if no other aspect could assume the role of the primary one. IV 175 Referential/Searle: the referential brings the secondary aspect. Attributive: brings the primary aspect. IV 176 Both readings can be intensional and extensional. >Intension, >Extension. IV 175 What is meant is decisive. Difference sentence/finding: finding is decided, a sentence is not (what was said literally). >Meaning(Intending), >Intention, >Speaker intention. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Attributive/referential | Tugendhat | I 503 attributive adjectives/truth conditions/ugendhat: Problem: the truth definition for "huge fly". Explanation: it must be told how to determine whether something is a huge F. >Relativity, >Classification, >Identification, >Truth conditions. Analog: modal adverbs e.g. "Peter runs fast": cars are always faster. cf. >Adverbial analysis. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Auctions | Economic Theories | Kiesling I 31 Auctions/Economic theories/Kiesling: Exampel spectrum allocation: Early auctions covered mobile phone frequencies, and mobile operators interested in building a network would bid on several licenses. Depending on which licenses they got, the subjective value of other licenses could change, and efficient allocation entailed changing their bids to reflect that changing value. Moreover, as a new market, price discovery was important yet there were few comparable markets, so an information-rich auction design helped facilitate price discovery (it could also facilitate collusion, but Cramton (1996)(1) found little evidence of meaningful collusion). Several auction theorists collaborated to design a new auction for these early spectrum auctions, called a “simultaneous multiple round auction” (SMRA) (McMillan, 1994)(2). SMRA: In an SMRA, participants bid simultaneously on the set of available licenses, and bids are observable to all participants. Each round is timed, and licenses with multiple offers have their prices increased in the next round. Bidding continues until all licenses have no further bidding activity. Simultaneous bids combined with multiple rounds enable participants to move among licenses to create the license combinations to build their networks. The SMRAs were successful at efficiently allocating licenses, getting licenses in the hands of operators who could build out the cellular networks that helped transform our economy into a digital one. Since 1994, spectrum auctions have created new, valued products and services, enhancing economic welfare and enabling communications firms to profit from creating innovative uses of the radio spectrum. They have also created considerable revenue for the federal government (see Hazlett, Porter, and Smith, 2011(3), and Hazlett, 1990(4) for overviews of Coase’s influence on spectrum license property rights). >Property rights/Coase. Kiesling I 32 Problem: VsSMRA: The SMRA is prone to a problem called the exposure problem. Many licenses are complements to each other in creating a viable network, and at the end of the auction an operator might lack some essential licenses to enable business viability. That complementarity means that the licenses have interdependent values. Clock auction: In 2006 Ausubel, Cramton, and Milgrom (2006)(5) introduced a combinatorial clock auction that enabled participants to incorporate these complementarities and reduce the exposure problem while retaining the beneficial features of the SMRA. Revised combinatorial clock auction designs are now used widely worldwide (Milgrom, 2019(6): 392). >Spectrum allocation/Coase, >Auctions/Coase. 1. Cramton, Peter (1997). The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 6, 3: 431-495. 2. McMillan, John (1994). Selling Spectrum Rights. Journal of Economic Perspectives 8, 3: 145-162. 3. Hazlett, Thomas W., David Porter, and Vernon L. Smith. “Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Ronald Coase.” Journal of Law and Economics, 54.4 part 2 (2011): S125-S165. doi: 10.1086/662992 4. Hazlett, Thomas W. (1990). The Rationality of U. S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum. The Journal of Law and EconomicsVolume 33, Number 1 5. Ausubel, Lawrence M., Peter Cramton, and Paul Milgrom. (2006). The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design. Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design: 120-140. 6. Milgrom, Paul (2019). Auction Market Design: Recent Innovations. Annual Review of Economics 11: 383-405. |
Kiesling I L. Lynne Kiesling The Essential Ronald Coase Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2021 |
| Auctions | Holt | Parisi I 81 Auctions/Economic theories/Sullivan/Holt: Experiments without control group: (...) economic experiments are sometimes designed simply to measure and document how subjects behave in a given market structure or incentive environment without reference to any control group. Examples include experiments that test the efficiency of an auction structure, such as an innovative proposal to allow bidding for combinations of spectrum licenses in a way that protects firms from overpaying for pieces of a fragmented network.* >Experimental economics/Economic theories. Parisi I 83 At a more macro scale of observation, economic experiments can be used to think outside the box by considering rules and policies that have yet to be implemented. This approach to experimentation has been particularly fruitful in guiding the design of new types of auctions for fishing rights, emissions permits, or combinations of frequency bands in spectrum auctions.** * See Goeree and Holt (2010)(1) for a set of experiments used by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission to design and implement a major auction for spectrum licenses for the provision of wireless communications services in a geographic network. Even this paper, however, had a control treatment without package bidding opportunities, which showed problems that could arise if bidders were not permitted to submit "all or nothing" bids for combinations of licenses. >Experiments/Experimental economics. ** For example, see Holt et al. (2007)(2) for a report in which laboratory experiments were used to design the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative auctions that have been run quarterly since 2008. Similarly, Cummings, Holt, and Laury (2004)(3) used experiments in the lab and the field prior to implementing a special auction in which farmers would bid for payments to be received in exchange for irrigation reduction in a drought year. More recently, a special issue of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Review (vol. 39, number 2, April 2010)(4) contains articles that used laboratory experiments to study the allocation of fishery rights, water rights, emissions permits, and common pool resources. 1. Goeree, J. K. and C. A. Holt (2010). “Hierarchical Package Bidding: A Paper & Pencil Combinatorial Auction.” Games and Economic Behavior 70: 146 - 169. 2. Holt, C. A., W. Shobe, D. Burtraw, K. Palmer, and J. K. Goeree (2007). Auction Design for Selling CO2 Emission Allowances Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (pp. 1–130), available at 3. Cummings, R. G., C. A. Holt, and S. K. Laury (2004). “Using Laboratory Experiments for Policymaking: An Example from the Georgia Irrigation Reduction Auction.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 23(2): 341–363. 4. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/agricultural-and-resource-economics-review/issue/724AAC3551E63C1ADC9A1A129B0DEF66 - (17.12.2020) Sullivan, Sean P. and Charles A. Holt. „Experimental Economics and the Law“ In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Augustine | Höffe | Höffe I 96 Augustine/Höffe: In Augustine's intellectual development the transition from the pagan philosophy of antiquity, with him: the Stoa, even more so of New Platonism, to the Christian Middle Ages takes place. His work literally shapes the spirit of a new epoch. Probably a Berber by origin, his literary and intellectual development, like that of other North African Fathers of the Church, such as Tertullian (150-um 225) and Cyprian (200-258), lives entirely from Latin culture. Höffe I 97 In (...) the year 373, "seduced" by the "cunning and flattering eloquence" of Bishop Faustus, he joined the Manicheans for almost a decade. In Milan, Augustine heard the learned sermons of Ambrose (340-397), a bishop and ecclesiastical teacher born in Trier, which brought Christianity closer to him again, but did not free him from a Manichaean inclination towards dualistic thinking. >Manichaeism/Höffe. Conversion experience: In August 386 the now 32-year-old has a dramatic experience. Following his confessions (VIII, 12), Augustine takes up the repeated request of a voice: "Take and read" according to the book that is ready and opens a passage from the Epistle to the Romans: "Not in feasting and drunkenness, not in bedchambers and fornication, not in strife and envy; but go to the Lord Jesus Christ."(1) Höfe I 98 Works: In addition to the two dialogues De beata vita (On the happy life, 386) and De ordine (On the order, 386), five other texts are particularly important: the three books De libero arbitrio (On Free Will, Book I 388, Books II and III 391-395), the Confessiones (Confessions, 396-400), the systematic main work De trinitate (On the Trinity, c. 400-425), for political thinking trend-setting De civitate dei (On the State of God, c. 412-426), finally a comprehensive critical commentary on the own complete work, the Retractationes (426). Assessment/Höffe: In his "baptized" New Platonism, reformed from the spirit of Christianity, the pre-Christian, "pagan" knowledge loses all inherent value. Only what serves the Christian culture may remain. Höffe I 99 Enlightenment/Illumination: One of Augustine's highly influential thoughts is the doctrine of illumination, the doctrine of divine enlightenment (illuminatio), without which the human mind cannot recognize anything. This includes the view that, in contrast to ancient Eudaimonism, the guarantor of lasting happiness is not man himself and his polis, but rather only God. VsEudaemonism: In contrast to the Hellenistic, "pagan" philosophers the perfect happiness and highest good (...) is determined religiously, as the eternal peace in God(2). This is where the Christian revolution comes to light: the inherent right of the world, the intrinsic value of worldly goods, is abolished; (...). Höffe I 100 Secular life/state: In relation to the personal salvation that is ultimately to be expected in the hereafter (...) the concern for just political institutions of the world of this world appears to be clearly secondary, as if it were extremely subordinate. Even more: Under Augustinian premises a pragmatic-realistic political thinking is as good as impossible. Höffe I 117 Aftermath: (...) [Augustine] influenced in modern times and in Höffe I 118 the present humanists such as Erasmus of Rotterdem (1469-1536). (...) Luther was particularly influenced by his Pauline exegesis and the theology of grace. In the 17th century the doctrine of grace played a role in Jansenism (according to the Dutch theologian Cornelius Jansen: 1585-1638), whose French centre, the monastery of Port-Royal, was close to Blaise Pascal (1623-1662). Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) (...) adopted Augustine's literary pattern for his autobiography, the Confessions. Karl Jaspers appreciates Augustinus as the only "founder of philosophising between Plato and Kant". Cf. VsAugustine: >Augustine/Voltaire. 1. Paul, Letter to the Romans 13:13 f 2. Augustinus, De civitate dei, On the State of God, Book XIX, e.g. Chapter 27 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Austrian School | Mises | Rothbard IV 13 Austrian School/MisesVsBöhm-Bawerk/Mises/Rothbard: (…) Mises came to realize that Böhm-Bawerk and the older Austrians had not gone far enough: that they had not pushed their analysis as far as it could go and that consequently important lacunae still remained in Austrian School economics. Money: In particular, the major lacuna perceived by Mises was the analysis of money. It is true that the Austrians had solved the analysis of relative prices, for consumer goods as well as for all the factors of production. But money, from the time of the classical economists, had always been in a separate box, not subjected to the analysis covering the rest of the economic system. For both the older Austrians and for the other neo-classicists in Europe and America, this disjunction continued, and money and the “price level” were increasingly being analyzed totally apart from the rest of the market economy. We are now reaping the unfortunate fruits of this grievous split in the current disjunction between “micro” and “macro” economics.(1) Microeconomics: “Microeconomics” is at least roughly grounded on the actions of individual consumers and producers; but when economists come to money, we are suddenly plunged into a never-never land of unreal aggregates: of money, “price levels,” “national product,” and spending. Cut off from a firm basis in individual action, “macro-economics” has leaped from one tissue of fallacies to the next. Irving Fisher: In Mises’s day in the first decades of the twentieth century, this misguided separation was already developing apace in the work of the American, Irving Fisher, who built elaborate theories of “price levels” and “velocities” with no grounding in individual action and with no attempt to integrate these theories into the sound body of neo-classical “micro” analysis. >Microeconomics, >Macroeconomics, >Neoclassical Economics. 1. Ludwig von Mises. 1912. The Theory of Money and Credit (Theorie des Geldes und der Umlaufsmittel, Translated by H.E. Batson in 1934; reprinted with “Monetary Reconstruction» (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953). Reprinted by the Foundation for Economic Education, 1971; reprinted with an Introduction by Murray N. Rothbard, Liberty Press Liberty Classics, 1989. |
EconMises I Ludwig von Mises Die Gemeinwirtschaft Jena 1922 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Authoritarianism | Krastev | Krastev I 196 Authoritarianism/Krastev/Holmes: (...) authoritarianism, unlike communism, is not an ideology shareable across borders. It is an oppressive, non-consultative and arbitrary style of rule. >Governance, >Communism. The concentration of all power in the hands of a single lifetime president is profoundly illiberal, but it does not constitute an anti-liberal ideology confronting Western liberalism on the plane of ideas. The same can be said of press censorship and the incarceration of regime critics. >Power. Russia/China/Krastev: What unites Putin and Xi is a general belief in the ultimate value of political stability, hostility to the democratic idea that wielders of power should be time- or term-limited, and general mistrust of political competition, accompanied by a firm conviction that the US is covertly plotting regime change for their countries. Beyond these commonalities, Putin and Xi have no shared conception of what a good society looks like. Their actions are driven by national Krastev I 197 interest and national dreams, shaped by pride and resentment at the humiliations inflicted by Western hands, rather than by a universally exportable ideology defining a shared world-view. >International relations. |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Authors/Titles | Carnap | Rudolf Carnap I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik aus Wahrheitstheorien, Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996 "Wahrheit und Bewährung" (1930 in: )Wahrheitstheorien, Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996 II R. Carnap. Philosophie als Syntax in: A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts Reinbek 1993 V "Carnap" aus W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie, Vol. I, Stuttgart 1989 VI R. Carnap Der logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 VII R. Carnap "Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen" in: J. Sinnreich (ed) Philosophie der idealen Sprache, München 1982 VIII R. Carnap "Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik" in: J. Sinnreich (ed) Philosophie der idealen Sprache, München 1982 IX J. Sinnreich: Einleitung: Philosophie der idealen Sprache, München 1982 IX Rudolf Carnap "Wahrheit und Bewährung“. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In: Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Authors/Titles | International Institutions | International Institutions |
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| Authors/Titles | International Policies | International Policies |
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| Authors/Titles | International Political Theory | International Political Theory |
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| Authors/Titles | International Trade Theory | International Trade Theory |
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| Authors/Titles | Nozick | R. Nozick I Stefansen: Nozick "Der Minimalstaat" aus Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993 II Nozick Philosophical explanations Oxford 1981 |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Authors/Titles | Self-Determination Theory | Self-Determination Theory |
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| Authors/Titles | Tarski | A. Tarski Literature: Skirbekk I A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 in: K. Berka/L. Kreiser (eds.) Logik-Texte, Berlin 1983: Berka I A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935 A.Tarski, „Grundlegung der wissenschaftlichen Semantik“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, Vol. III, ASI 390, Paris 1936, pp. 1-8 A.Tarski, „Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den Sprachen der deduktiven Disziplinen“, in: Anzeiger der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, mathematisch-naturwissenschaftliche Klasse 69 (1932) pp 23-25 A.Tarski, „Über den Begriff der logischen Folgerung“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, Bd. VII, ASI 394, Paris 1936, pp 1-11 Horwich I A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 in: P. Horwich (ed.), Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 |
| Autism | Baron-Cohen | Slater I 150 Autism/ToM/Theory of Mind/Baron-Cohen: In order to test their hypothesis that children with autism lack a theory of mind (>Theory of Mind/Dennett, >False-Belief Task/psychological theories), Baron-Cohen et al. (1985)(1) presented this task to 20 children with autism, 14 children with Down’s syndrome (DS), and 27 typically developing (TD) children. In line with their predictions, they found that as many as 16 of the 20 children with autism failed the task whereas children with Down’s syndrome and TD children passed it 86% and 85% of the time, respectively. The results were all the more striking given that average intelligence levels in the autism group exceeded both that of the DS and of the TD group and that every participant in the autism group succeeded in answering both control questions. The authors interpreted these results as evidence for a selective impairment in mentalistic reasoning in autism, independently of general intelligence or general reasoning abilities. In other words, the reason why participants in the autism group fail the belief question is that they are unable to grasp that Sally’s belief about where the marble is hidden is different from their own knowledge of where the marble really is: they lack the ability to represent other people’s mental states. >False-Belief Task/Happé. Slater I 152 VsBaron-Cohen: 1) The ToM account does not provide a full account auf autism. 2) ToM deficits are not specific to autism, 3) ToM deficits are not universal in autism. There are now theories about the non-social features of autism, including restricted repertoire of interests, insistence on sameness, and peaks of abilities (e.g., enhanced rote memory, higher prevalence of savant skills, increased perception of pitch etc.). >Autism/psychological theories. It is important to note, however, that these first two criticisms are problematic only If one considers that there ought to be a single explanation for all the symptoms found in ASD. Slater I 153 If (…) one considers, that such a unitary explanation is unlikely to exist, absence of specificity and lack of explanatory power for non-social features of autism are no longer issues. >Theory of Mind/Baron-Cohen, >Autism/psychological theories. 1. Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind.” Cognition, 21, 13—125. Coralie Chevallier, “Theory of Mind and Autism. Beyond Baron-Cohen et al’s. Sally-Anne Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Autism | Bettelheim | Slater I 148 Autism/Bettelheim: Bettelheim’s theory of the “refrigerator mother,” (…) posited that emotionless parenting style causes autism to develop. VsBettelheim: This theory, which notoriously turned out to be unfounded, went on having an important impact on families and patients alike and influenced research on autism for a significant number of years. >Autism research, >S. Baron-Cohen, >F. Happé. Concomitantly though, researchers influenced by the cognitive revolution strove to find cognitively based explanations of autism through rigorous experimentations on perception, memory, and language (for a review of these early cognitive studies, see Prior, 1979)(1). Until the mid-1980s however, such approaches remained relatively scarce and there were virtually no cognitive theories accounting for autistic symptomatology. As Baron-Cohen et al. themselves put it in 1985: “So far, nobody has had any idea of how to characterise [underlying cognitive] mechanisms of autism in even quasi-computational terms” (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, U. 1985(2) , p. 38). >Autism/psychological theories. 1. Prior, M. R. (1979). Cognitive abilities and disabilities in infantile autism: A review.Journa! of Abnormal Child Psychology, 7,357—380. 2. Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind.” Cognition,21, 13—125. Coralie Chevallier, “Theory of Mind and Autism. Beyond Baron-Cohen et al’s. Sally-Anne Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Autism | Psychological Theories | Slater I 148 Autism/psychological theories: Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) are characterized by a triad of symptoms: impaired social development, impaired communication skills and a narrow repertoire of interests and activities. Over the last three decades, a number of theories have been put forward to explain this unique combination of impairments. Kanner: The disease was first described in 1943 by child psychiatrist Leo Kanner who reported the case of 11 children presenting a combination of symptoms that was unique enough to call it a separate syndrome: the fundamental disorder, he explained, “is the children’s inability to relate themselves in the ordinary way to people and situations from the beginning of life” (Kanner, 1943)(1). Asperger: Hans Asperger reported a similar condition in a group of four children observed in his Vienna practice and concluded his paper in similar ways to Kanner: “the fundamental disorder of autistic individuals” he argued, “is the limitation of their social relationships” (Asperger, 1944)(2). Slater I 150 Autism/psychological theories: the hypothesis, of a lack of theory of mind (ToM: “How does one demonstrate that an individual has the capacity to conceive mental states?”) in autism has had a significant impact on the way cognitive researchers view the architecture of the mind Slater I 151 and it has been taken as strong support for the idea that the human brain is equipped with a ToM (Theory of Mind) module. >Theory of Mind/Premack/Woodruff, >Theory of Mind/Dennett. In fact, following Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1985)(3) findings, autism soon became a test case for many theories of typical development where the ToM module is thought to play a central role (see e.g., Frith & Happé, 1995(4); Happé, 1993(5)). >False-Belief Task/Happé. The “mindblindness” hypothesis prompted an enormous amount of research designed to assess the scope of the theory and to derive further predictions from it. Happé/Frith: (Happé and Frith 1995)(4) the model put forward by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985)(1) is useful to the study of child development (…) because it allowed for a systematic approach to the impaired and unimpaired social and communicative behavior of people with autism. >VsBaron-Cohen. Slater I 152 Two important cognitive accounts of non-social deficits in ASDs, which have been mainly construed as compatible with the ToM account but offer additional explanatory power, were put forward. These are: 1) the executive dysfunction hypothesis, referring to a difficulty in planning how to achieve a goal and a tendency to become fixated on one activity or object, which accounts more specifically for the stereotypes (including repetitive and stereotyped motor activities), planning difficulties, and impulsiveness (Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991(6)) often found in the condition; and 2) Weak Central Coherence, (a difficulty in combining several pieces of information to form an overall understanding of an issue), which provides an interesting account for the peaks of abilities observed in tasks requiring detail-focused rather than holistic processing (Frith & Happé, 1995(4); Happé, 1999(7)). Slater I 153 It has been argued that autism ought to be tackled by a multiple-deficit approach and that “it is time to give up on a single explanation for autism” (Happé, Ronald, & Plomin, 2006(8); see also Pennington, 2006(9)). Construed within this multiple deficit framework, neither the fact that ToM deficits can be found in other conditions, nor the fact that ToM deficits do not explain the third element of the triad 1) The ToM account does not provide a full account auf autism. 2) ToM deficits are not specific to autism, 3) ToM deficits are not universal in autism; (or, for that matter, many other features of autism like motor clumsiness, sensory sensitivities, and so on) are relevant to assess the validity of the account. 1. Kanner, L. (1943). Autistic disturbances of affective contact. Nervous Child, 2, 217—2 50. 2. Asperger, H. (1944). Die “Autistischen Psychopathen” im Kindesalter. European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 117,76—136. 3. Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind.” Cognition, 21, 13—125. 4. Frith, U., & Happé, F. (1995). Autism: Beyond ‘theory of mind.” In: J. Mehler& S. Franck (Eds), Cognition on cognition (pp. 13—30). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 5. Happé, F. (1993). Communicative competence and theory of mind in autism: A test of relevance theory. Cognition, 48, 101—119. 6. Ozonoff, S., Pennington, B. F., & Rogers, S. J. (1991). Executive function deficits in high-functioning autistic individuals: Relationship to theory of mind. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 32, 1081—1105. 7. Happé, F. (1999). Autism: cognitive deficit or cognitive style? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3, 216— 222. 8. Happé, F., Ronald, A., & Plomin, R. (2006). Time to give up on a single explanation for autism. Nature Neuroscience, 9, 1218—1220. 9. Pennington, B. F. (2006). From single to multiple deficit models of developmental disorders. Cognition, 101,385—413. Coralie Chevallier, “Theory of Mind and Autism. Beyond Baron-Cohen et al’s. Sally-Anne Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Autism | Social Psychology | Slater I 157 Autism/social psychology: it turned out, that studies maintaining difficulties of autists in ToM tests are not always replicated. >Theory of Mind/ToM/psychological theories, >Theory of Mind/Baron-Cohen, >Theory of Mind/developmental psychology, >VsBaron-Cohen. Researchers have argued, that there is less of a deficit in social cognition than previously thought (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985(1)) and that some of the poorer performances in Slater I 158 social cognition tasks may be imputed to diminished social orientation (Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi, & Brown, 1998(2); Schultz, 2005)(3). If this is the case, performances in these tasks should be boosted when social orienting is enhanced by extrinsic factors. Speaking to this idea, Wang and collaborators (Wang, Lee, Sigman, & Dapretto, 2007)(4) compared neutral instructions (“Pay close attention”) and explicit social instructions (“Pay close attention to the face and voice”) in a recent study on the neural correlates of irony comprehension in autism. A similar effect of explicit instructions was also recently found in a task where participants heard both speech and non-speech sounds. In line with previous research (Ceponiene et al., 2003)(5), children with autism had atypical ERP (Event Related Potentials) profiles in response to speech sounds, but not to non-speech sounds. However, this difference disappeared when participants were explicitly required to pay attention to the sound stream. In other words, what performance in social tasks might primarily reveal may not be so much what participants are able to do but rather what they are spontaneously inclined to do (see also Chevallier, Noveck, Happé, & Wilson, 2011)(6). 1. Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind.” Cognition, 21, 13—125. 2. Dawson, G., Meitzoff, A., Osterling, J., Rinaldi, J., & Brown, E. (1998). Children with autism fail to orient to naturally occurring social stimuli. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 28,479— 485. 3. Schultz, R. (2005). Developmental deficits in social perception in autism: the role of the amygdala and fusiform face area. International Journal of Developmental Neuroscience, 23, 125—141. 4. Wang, A., Lee, S., Sigman, M., & Dapretto, M. (2007). Reading affect in the face and voice: Neural correlates of interpreting communicative intent in children and adolescents with autism spectrum disorders. Archives of General Psychiatry, 64, 698—708. 5. Ceponiene, R., Lepisto, T., Shestakova, A., Vanhala, R., Alku, P., Naatanen, R., & Yaguchi, K. (2003). Speech-sound-selective auditory impairment in children with autism: They can perceive but do not attend. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 100, 5567—5572. 6. Chevalier, C., Noveck, I., Happé, F., & Wilson, D. (201 1). What’s in a voice? Prosody as a test case for the Theory of Mind account of autism. Neuropsychologia, 49,507—517. Coralie Chevallier, “Theory of Mind and Autism. Beyond Baron-Cohen et al’s. Sally-Anne Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Automation | Feenstra | Feenstra I 4-33 Automation/computers/Feenstra: Measuring computer services and other high-tech capital as a share of the capital stock using ex post rental prices, we see they account for 13% of the shift towards nonproduction labor. Measuring these shares using ex ante rental prices, we see that that computers and other high-tech capital explain only 8% of this shift. >Skilled labour, >Relative wage, >Wage gap. Feenstra I 4-34 In both cases, the contribution of computers and other high-tech capital is less than the contribution of outsourcing. In contrast, when computers are measured by their share of investment (and the high-technology capital share is also included), we see that these variables account for 31% of the shift toward nonproduction labor, which exceeds the contribution of outsourcing. Thus, whether outsourcing is more or less important than computers depends on whether the latter are measured as a share of the capital stock, or as a share of investment. >Capital, >Capital stock, >Capital structure. Regardless of the specification, however, it is fair to conclude that both outsourcing and expenditure on computers and other high technology capital are important explanations of the shift towards nonproduction labor in the U.S., with their exact magnitudes depending on how they are measured. >Outsourcing. Feenstra I 4-43 (…) both outsourcing and capital upgrading contributed to rising wage inequality in the 1980s. Ex ante/ex post: For example, when the share of the capital stock devoted to computers is measured using ex post rental prices, then outsourcing accounts for 15% of the increase in the relative wage of nonproduction workers while computers account for 35% of this increase; thus, computers are twice as important as outsourcing. Feenstra I 4-44 When instead the computer share of the capital stock is measured using ex ante rental prices, then outsourcing explains about 25% while computers explain about 20% of the increase in the relative wage. However, when the computer share of investment is used, then the contribution of outsourcing falls to about 10%, while the contribution of computers rises so much that it explains the entire increase in the relative wage. So as with our results when examining the change in the nonproduction labor share, when we now consider the factors influencing the relative wage, we find that both outsourcing and computer expenditure are important, with their exact magnitudes depending on how these variables are measured. >Nontraded Goods. |
Feenstra I Robert C. Feenstra Advanced International Trade University of California, Davis and National Bureau of Economic Research 2002 |
| Autonomy | Chalmers | I 49 Autonomy/explanation/Chalmers: the autonomy of phenomena consists in the fact that, e.g. every physical phenomenon has a physical explanation. >Phenomena, >Explanation, >Causal explanation. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Autonomy | Deci | Corr I 443 Autonomy/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Psychology/Deci/Ryan: the relative autonomy continuum includes amotivation and intrinsic motivation at the extreme ends. >Motivation/Deci/Ryan, >Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan, >Universals/Deci/Ryan, >Needs/Deci/Ryan. Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Autonomy | Feyerabend | I 43 Principle of Autonomy/Feyerabend: collecting the facts for examination purposes is the only thing left for the scientist to do. If facts exist and are available, regardless of whether alternatives to the theory under consideration are looked at. Principle of the relative autonomy of facts. (versus theories). >Theories, >Facts. The principle does not mean that the discovery and description of facts is entirely theory-independent, but that the facts belonging to the empirical content of a theory are available, regardless of whether alternatives to this theory are taken into account. >Discoveries, >Empirical content. ((s) I.e. that facts are autonomous, independent of theories.) I 44 FeyerabendVsAutonomy Principle: this principle is far too simple a point of view. Facts and theories are much more closely linked than the principle of autonomy wants to admit. E.g. it is known today that the Brownian particles are a perpetuum mobile of the second kind, and that its existence refutes the second law of thermodynamics. (Henning GenzVs: that is not true.) Could this relationship between movement and theory have been shown or directly discovered? Two questions: 1) Could the relevance of the movement have been discovered in this way? 2) Could it have been shown to disprove the 2nd law of thermodynamics? ((s) Nonsense: to »observe« relevance). >Relevance. Each thermometer is subject to fluctuations which are the same as the Brownian movement. The actual refutation came about in a completely different way: with the help of the kinetic theory and its use by Einstein in his calculation of the statistical properties of the Brownian movement. In this refutation the consistency condition was violated: the phenomenological theory was incorporated into the larger framework of statistical physics. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Autonomy | Parsons | Habermas IV 306 Autonomy/Parsons/Habermas: Problem: rationalistic and empirical concepts of action cannot grasp the autonomy of action any more than materialistic and idealistic concepts of order can grasp the legitimacy of a context of action based on interests. >Action, >Rationality, >Empiricism. Solution/Parsons: Parsons develops a voluntaristic concept of action and a normativistic concept of order. >Norms, >Voluntarism. Habermas IV 310 This moral compulsion, which is reflected in feelings of obligation as well as in the reactions of guilt and shame - a force that is not only compatible with the autonomy of action, but in a certain way even constitutes it; this force is no longer perceived as external violence but from within by penetrating the motives. >Coercion, >Responsibility, >Duties. Habermas IV 314 Freedom of Choice/Parsons/Habermas: is characterized by moral fallibility for Parsons. Solution/Parsons: normative standards receive the status of non-instrumentalizable value stand ards or end uses; corresponding value orientations can regulate the determination of purpose themselves. >Values, >Purposes. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Autonomy | Ryan | Corr I 443 Autonomy/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Psychology/Deci/Ryan: the relative autonomy continuum includes amotivation and intrinsic motivation at the extreme ends. >Motivation/Deci/Ryan, >Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan, >Universals/Deci/Ryan, >Needs/Deci/Ryan. Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Aviation | Klepper | Krugman III 104 Aviation/Klepper: Aircraft producers compete in essentially two ways. There is first the long-run decision about product choice and capacity. The demand in each segment even over a long time horizon is small in terms of the number of aircraft: 3,000 to 4,000 units each in the short- and medium-range markets and around 2,000 units in the long-range market are the expected market sizes over the next 20 years. Since learning effects are embodied in the work force, capacity choice becomes the crucial long-run decision variable. In each of the market segments-short-range narrow-bodied, short- and medium-range wide-bodied, and long-range aircraft-Airbus and Boeing offer competing generic aircraft, with possible derivatives. Long run/short run: Once capacity is determined, aircraft producers have limited choice over short-run output levels. They essentially produce at full capacity; that is, their time profile of deliveries is determined. A decision to increase capacity is then comparable to a new start on the learning curve.' The producers then bargain with airlines in their day-to-day marketing activities over the price of aircraft. >Long run/short run. Bargaining/negotiations: Airlines seem to make extensive use of repeated negotiations with the suppliers of an aircraft for a specific market segment. Competition takes the form of a price game at given capacity levels, where the outcome of the long-run quantity game then becomes a restriction in the short-run price game. Demand/price: If demand turns out to be larger than expected, firms will produce at their capacity limit and choose prices which maximize profits. For unexpectedly low demand, the price game may drive prices down to marginal cost levels. Krugman III 121 Subsidies/competition: The same logic according to which it is advantageous to subsidize Airbus applies, of course, to subsidizing Boeing, even more so since Boeing has lower unit cost because of learning effects from prior production. Both governments therefore have an incentive to subsidize their respective industries. Whether any government has a dominant strategy depends on the outcome of subsidization with retaliation. In Brander and Spencer (1985)(1) a Nash equilibrium in export subsidies exists. It is a prisoner’s dilemma, since both countries could be better off by jointly reducing subsidy levels but would be worse off by unilaterally reducing subsidies. >Nash equilibrium, >Prisoner’s dilemma, >Subsidies, >Interventions, >Interventionism, >Government policy, >Market entry/Klepper, >Industrial policy. 1. Brander, James A, and Barbara J. Spence. 1985. Export subsidies and international market share rivalry. Journal of International Economics 18:83-100. Gernot Klepper. „Industrial Policy in the Transport Aircraft Industry.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Axioms | d’Abro | A. d'Abro Die Kontroversen über das Wesen der Mathematik 1939 in Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 35 Axiomatics/d'Abro: This new science was developed mainly by the formalists Hilbert and Peano. >Formalism. 37 Hilbert/d'Abro: Examples of Hilbert's typical claims: 1. Two different points, A and B, always form a straight line. 2. Three different points, A, B, and C, which do not lie on a straight line, always form a plane. 3. Of three points lying on a straight line, there is one and only one between the other two. 4. If the segment AB is equal to the segments A'B 'and A''B'', then A'B' is equal to A''B''. The N.B. of Hilbert's postulates: points, lines, and planes are not the only quantities which satisfy these relations: with some imagination others can be found. E.g It originally refers to plane geometry and can be given a different meaning: circles as new lines, with angles as distances. All relations are fulfilled, so the new model and the old (Euclidean) model can be regarded as different models or so-called "concrete representations", both corresponding to the postulates. >Models. 38 It may seem absurd, but Hilbert warns against assigning a priori certain characteristics to the points and lines which he mentions in his postulates. We can replace the words point, straight, plane, in all postulates by letters a, b, c. If we then employ points, lines, and planes, we obtain the Euclidean geometry, if we employ others, whose relations, however, must be the same, we have a new model between point, lines and planes. They are isomorphic. >Isomorphism. For example, the new elements are expressed by a group of three of numbers and by algebraic terms which relate these numbers to one another. He had this idea when he chose cartesian coordinates instead of points, lines and planes. The fact that the new elements, here numerical, satisfied Hilbert's postulates, proves only that the simple geometrical ways of concluding and the Cartesian method are equivalent to analytical geometry. 39 This proves the logical equivalence of the geometric and arithmetic continuum. Long before Hilbert, mathematicians had realized that mathematics has to do with relationships, and not with content. With Hilbert's postulates, we can create the Euclidean geometry, even without knowing what is meant by point, line and plane. 49 The achievements of axiomatics: 1. They are of invaluable value, from the analytical as well as from the constructive point of view. 2. It has shown that mathematics is about relationships and not about content. 3. It has shown that logic itself cannot confirm the consistency. 4. It has also shown that we have to go beyond axiomatics and have to show their origin. >Ultimate justification, >Foundation, >Axiom systems. |
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| Axioms | Hilbert | Berka I 294 Definition/Axiom/Hilbert: the established axioms are at the same time the definitions of the elementary concepts whose relations they regulate. ((s) Hilbert speaks of relationships, not of the use of concepts). >Definitions, >Definability, >Basic concepts. Independence/Axiom/Hilbert: the question is whether certain statements of individual axioms are mutually dependent, and whether the axioms do not contain common components which must be removed so that the axioms are independent of each other(1). >Independence. 1. D. Hilbert: Mathematische Probleme, in: Ders. Gesammelte Abhandlungen (1935), Vol. III, pp. 290-329 (gekürzter Nachdruck v. S 299-301). --- Thiel I 262 We consider the first three axioms of Hilbert: 1. There are exactly two straight lines at each of two distinct points P, Q, which indicate(2) with P and Q. 2. For every line g and to any point P, which does not indicate with it, there is exactly one line that is indicated with P, but with no point of g. 3. There are three points which do not indicate with one and the same straight line. In Hilbert's original text, instead of points one speaks of "objects of the first kind" instead of straight lines of "objects of the second kind" and instead of the incidence of "basic relation". Thus, the first axiom is now: For each of two different objects of the first kind, there is precisely one object of the second kind, which is in a basic relation with the first two. Thiel I 263 If the axioms are transformed quantifier-logically, then only the schematic sign "π" (for the basic relation) is free for substitutions, the others are bound by quantifiers, and can no longer be replaced by individual names of points or lines. >Quantification, >Quantifiers. They are thus "forms of statements" with "π" as an empty space. >Propositional functions. They are not statements like those before Hilbert's axioms, whose truth or falsehood is fixed by the meanings of their constituents. >Truth values. In the Hilbert axiom concept (usually used today), axioms are forms of statements or propositional schemata, the components of which must be given a meaning only by interpretation by specifying the variability domains and the basic relation. The fact that this can happen in various ways, shows that the axioms cannot determine the meaning of their components (not their characteristics, as Hilbert sometimes says) themselves by their co-operation in an axiom system. Thiel I 264 Multiple interpretations are possible: e.g. points lying on a straight line, e.g. the occurrence of characters in character strings, e.g. numbers. Thiel I 265 All three interpretations are true statements. The formed triples of education regulations are models of our axiom system. The first is an infinite, the two other finite models. >Models, >Infinity. Thiel I 266 The axioms can be combined by conjunction to form an axiom system. >Conjunction. Through the relationships, the objects lying in the subject areas are interwoven with each other in the manner determined by the combined axioms. The regions V .. are thereby "structured" (concrete and abstract structures). >Domains, >Structures (Mathematics). One and the same structure can be described by different axiom systems. Not only are logically equivalent axiom systems used, but also those whose basic concepts and relations differ, but which can be defined on the basis of two systems of explicit definitions. Thiel I 267 Already the two original axiom systems are equivalent without the assumption of reciprocal definitions, i.e. they are logically equivalent. This equivalence relation allows an abstraction step to the fine structures. In the previous sense the same structures, are now differentiated: the axiom systems describing them are not immediately logically equivalent, but their concepts prove to be mutually definable. For example, "vector space" "group" and "body" are designations not for fine structures, but for general abstract structures. However, we cannot say now that an axiom system makes a structure unambiguous. A structure has several structures, not anymore "the" structure. Thiel I 268 E.g. body: the structure Q has a body structure described by axioms in terms of addition and multiplication. E.g. group: the previous statement also implies that Q is also e.g. a group with respect to the addition. Because the group axioms for addition form part of the body axioms. Modern mathematics is more interested in the statements about structures than in their carriers. From this point of view, structures which are of the same structure are completely equivalent. >Indistinguishability. Thiel: in algebra it is probably the most common to talk of structures. Here, there is often a single set of carriers with several links, which can be regarded as a relation. Thiel I 269 E.g. relation: sum formation: x + y = z relation: s (x, y, z). In addition to link structures, the subject areas often still carry order structures or topological structures. Thiel I 270 Bourbaki speaks of a reordering of the total area of mathematics according to "mother structures". In modern mathematics, abstractions, especially structures, are understood as equivalence classes and thus as sets. >N. Bourbaki, >Equivalence classes. 2. Indicate = belong together, i.e. intersect, pass through the point, lie on it. |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Axioms | Tarski | Berka I 400 Axiom System/Tarski: problem: the choice of axioms is arbitrary and depends on the level of knowledge.(1) Berka I 530 Axiom System/Tarski: methodological problem: to simply assume that an axiom system is complete and therefore can solve every problem in its domain.(2) >Arbitrariness, >Truth theory, >Method, >Truth definition. 1. A.Tarski, Grundlegung der wissenschaftlichen Semantik, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, Bd. III, ASI 390, Paris 1936, S. 1-8 2. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Balance of Payment | Rothbard | Rothbard III 821 Balance of payment/Rothbard: (…) an individual's income can be called his exports, and the physical sources of his income his goods exported; while his expenditures can be termed his imports, and the goods purchased his goods imported.(1) >Cash balance/Rothbard, >Consumption/Rothbard. We also saw that it is nonsensical to call a man's balance of trade "favorable" if he chooses to use some of his income to add to his cash balance, or "unfavorable" if he decides to draw down his cash balance, so that expenditures are greater than income. Every action and exchange is favorable from the point of view of the person performing the action or exchange; otherwise he would not have engaged in it. A further conclusion is that there is no need for anyone to worry about anyone else's balance of trade. Rothbard III 822 Balance of trade/balance of payments: A person's income and expenditure constitute his "balance of trade," while his credit transactions, added to this balance, comprise his "balance ofpayment." Credits: Credit transactions may complicate the balance, but they do not alter its essentials. When a creditor makes a Ioan, he adds to his "money paid" column to the extent of the Ioan - for purchase of a promise to pay in the future. He has purchased the debtor's promise to pay in exchange for transferring part of his present cash balance to the debtor. The debtor adds to his "money receipts" column - from the sale of a promise to pay in the future. These promises to pay may fall due at any future date decided upon by the creditor and the debtor; generally they range from a day to many years. On that date the debtor repays the Ioan and transfers part of his cash balance to the creditor. This will appear in the debtor's "money paid" column - for repayment of debt - and in the creditor's "money received" column - from repayment of debt. Interest: Interest payments made by the debtor to the creditor will be similarly reflected in the respective balances of payments. Rothbard: More nonsense has been written about balances of payments than about virtually any other aspect of economics. Problem: This has been caused by the failure of economists to ground and build their analysis on individual balances of payments. Rothbard III 823 National balance of payment: Instead they have employed such cloudy, holistic concepts as the "national" balance of payment without basing them on individual actions and balances. Solution/Rothbard: Balances of payments may be consolidated for many individuals, and any number of groupings may be made. In these cases, the balances of payments only record the monetary transactions between individuals of the group and other individuals, but fail to record the exchanges of individuals within the group. Rothbard III 824 Consolidated balance of payments: The consolidated balance tells less about the activities of the members of the group than do the individual balances, since the exchanges within the group are not revealed. This discrepancy grows as the number of people grouped in the consolidated balance increases. The consolidated balance of the citizens of a large nation such as the United States conveys less information about their economic activities than is revealed by the consolidated balance of the citizens of Cuba. World balance of payment: Finally, if we lump together all the citizens of the world engaged in exchange, their consolidated balance of payments is precisely zero.(2) 1. To say that "exports pay for imports" is simply to say that income pays for expenditures. 2. For an excellent and original analysis of balances of payments along these lines, see Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 44--49. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Balance of Power | Social Choice Theory | Gaus I 291 Balance of Power/political realism/social choice theory/Brown: to be punished one way or another. The imperatives imposed by a self-help system will drive states to behave rationally and selfishly: states are obliged to treat each other as potential enemies, although, if a balance of power can be sustained, a degree of stability may emerge. The beauty of this approach is that by marginally recasting its assumptions, a version of liberal internationalism can also be defended. Neorealists argue that rational egoists cannot co-operate under anarchy, while neoliberals argue that, given a degree of institutionalization and improved information flows, co-operation is possible, albeit at suboptimal levels (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985(1); Keohane, 1989;(2) Mearsheimer, 2001(3)). >Balance of Power/Waltz, >State/Waltz. Brown: The shift from Augustinian to 'rational choice realism' has had important consequences. (Cf.>International relations/Niebuhr). 1)On the positive side, it has undermined the assumption that international relations theory is, in some strong sense, sui genens, unconnected with the other social sciences and based on a kind of ethnomethodology of diplomatic practice to which social theory more generally cannot contribute. 2)On the other hand, the dominance of neorealist/ neoliberal thought has significantly narrowed the range of questions that theorists of international relations deem appropriate or answerable. Whether states pursue relative gains or absolute gains (one way of distinguishing between neorealist and neoliberal assumptions) is an interesting question, but can hardly form a satisfactory basis for an examination of the foundations of the current international order (Grieco, 1988)(4). 1. Axelrod, R. and R. O. Keohane (1985) 'Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions'. World Politics, 38: 226-54. 2. Keohane, R. O. (1989) International Institutions and State Power. Boulder, CO: Westview. 3. Mearsheimer, J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. 4. Grieco, J. M. (1988) 'Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism'. International Oganisation, 42:485—508. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Balance of Power | Waltz | Brocker I 634 Balance of Power/WaltzVsTradition/Waltz: the central assumption of a Balance-of-Power theory is that states are unitary actors whose minimum goal is their own survival and whose maximum goal is universal dominance. To this end, states have two means of power: increasing internal power (arming, strengthening the economy) or increasing external power (forming alliances or conquering). Since increasing external power requires a system of at least three states, the traditional theory is based on at least three actors. >Power. WaltzVs: this assumption is wrong (1). Two or more states coexist in a self-help system without superordinate central power, which can rush to the aid of a weak state or deter a state from using the means of power it could use to pursue its interests. >Equilibrium. In such a system, the expected result is a balance of power. According to Waltz, the primary goal of states is to maintain their position in the international system (2). Therefore, they will prefer balancing the powers over bandwagoning to stronger states. Waltz's thesis: this applies not only to the relationship between great powers, but to any constellation of two states in competition. >Competition. WaltzVsTradition/WaltzVsMorgenthau: older authors (including Hans J. Morgenthau) had adopted a will of state actors to create systems of balance, Waltz considers this superfluous.(3) Waltz: not the motives of the actors, but the system structure ensures that balance occurs. (4) >H.J. Morgenthau. 1. Kenneth N. Waltz, „Theory of International Relations“, in: Fred Greenstein/Nelson W. Polsby (Hg.) International Politics: Handbook of Political Science, Reading, Mas. 1975, p. 36 2. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mas. 1979, p. 126. 3. Hans J. Morgenthau, Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der internationalen Politik, Gütersloh 1963, p. 219-220. 3. Waltz 1979, p. 128. Carlo Masala, „Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolWaltz I Kenneth N. Waltz Man,the State and War New York 1959 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Bank Reserve | Mises | Rothbard III 1010 Bank reserve/credit expansion/Mises/Rothbard: How does the narrow range of a bank's clientele limit its potentiality for credit expansion? The newly issued money-substitutes are, of course, Ioaned to a bank's clients. The client then spends the new money on goods and services. The new money begins to be diffused throughout the society. Eventually - usually very quickly - it is spent on the goods or services of people who use a different bank. Money-substitutes: Thus, while gold or silver is acceptable throughout the market, a bank's money-substitutes are acceptable only to its own clientele. Clearly, a single bank's credit expansion is limited, and this limitation is stronger (a) the narrower the range of its clientele, and (b) the greater its issue of money-substitutes in relation to that of competing banks. Rothbard III 1011 Bankruptcy: (…), the greater the degree of relative credit expansion by any one bank, the sooner will the day of redemption - and potential bankruptcy - be at hand and they are impelled to spend a great proportion of the new money. (…) clients are impelled to buy more from nonclients and less from one another; while nonclients buy less from clients and more from one another. The result is an "unfavorable" balance of trade from clients to nonclients.(1) Bank reserve: The purpose of banks' keeping any specie reserves in their vaults (assuming no legal reserve requirements) now becomes manifest. It is not to meet bank runs - since no fractional-reserve bank can be equipped to withstand a run. It is to meet the demands for redemption which will inevitably come from nonclients. Mises/Rothbard: Mises has brilliantly shown that a subdivision of this process was discovered by the British Currency School and by the classical "international trade" theorists of the nineteenth century. These older economists assumed that all the banks in a certain region or country expanded credit together. Prices: The result was a rise in the prices of goods produced in that country. Balance of trade: A further result was an "unfavorable" balance of trade, i.e., an outflow of standard specie to other countries. Currency drain: Since other countries did not patronize the expanding country's banks, the consequence was a "specie drain" from the expanding country and increased pressure for redemption on its banks. International trade: Like all parts of the overstressed and overelaborated theory of "international trade," this analysis is simply a special subdivision of "general" economic theory. And cataloging it as "international trade" theory, as Mises has shown, underestimates its true significance.(2)(3) Free banking: Thus, the more freely competitive and numerous are the banks, the less they will be able to expand fiduciary media, even ifthey are left free to do so. (…) such a system is known as "free banking“.(4) VsMises: A major objection to this analysis of free banking has been the problem ofbank "cartels." If banks get together and agree to expand their credits simultaneously, the clientele limitation vis-ä-vis competing banks will be removed, and the clientele of each bank will, in effect, increase to include all bank users. MisesVsVs: Mises points out, however, that the sounder banks with higher fractional reserves will not wish to lose the goodwill of their own clients and risk bank runs by entering into collusive agreements with weaker banks.(5) Banks/Rothbard: This consideration, while placing limits on such agreements, does not rule them out altogether. For, after all, no fractional-reserve banks are really sound, and if the public can be led to believe that, say, an 80-percent-specie reserve is sound, it can believe the same about 60-percent- or even 10-percent-reserve banks. Indeed, the fact that the weaker banks are allowed by the public to exist at all demonstrates that the more conservative banks may not lose much good will by agreeing to expand with them. >Central banks/Rothbard. 1. In the consolidated balance ofpayments of the clients, money income from sales to nonclients (exports) will decline, and money expenditures on the goods and services of nonclients (imports) will increase. The excess cash balances of the clients are transferred to non-clients. 2. Older economists also distinguished an "internal drain" as well as the "external drain," but included in the former only the drain from bank users to those Who insist on standard money. 3. See Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 434-35. 4. For various views on free and central banking, see Vera C. Smith, The Rationale of Central Banking (London: P.S. King and Son, 1936). 5. Mises, Human Action, p. 444. |
EconMises I Ludwig von Mises Die Gemeinwirtschaft Jena 1922 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Bargaining | Rothbard | Rothbard III 363 Bargining/Rothbard: (…) [in] the theory of bargaining [,] [w]e are in a very analogous situation to the two-person barter (…). For what we have is not relatively determinate prices, or proportions, but exchange ratios with wide zones between the “marginal pairs” of prices. The maximum price of one is widely separated from the minimum price of the other. >Price, >Costs, >Costs of production, >Opportunity cost. What the final decision will be cannot be indicated by praxeology. >Praxeology/Rothbard. There is, for all practical purposes, no theory of bargaining; all that can be said is that since the owner of each factor wants to participate and earn some income, all will most likely arrive at some sort of voluntary contractual arrangement. >Factors of production/Rothbard. This will be a formal type of partnership agreement if the factors jointly own the product; or it will be the implicit result if a pure capitalist purchases the services of the factors. Economists have always been very unhappy about bargaining situations of this kind, since economic analysis is estopped from saying anything more of note. We must not pursue the temptation, however, to condemn such situations as in some way “exploitative” or bad, and thereby convert barrenness for economic analysis into tragedy for the economy. Whatever agreement is arrived at by the various individuals will be beneficial to every one of them; otherwise, he would not have so agreed.(1) Factors of production/Rothbard: It is generally assumed that, in the jockeying for proportionate shares, labor factors have less “bargaining power” than land factors. The only meaning that can be seen in the term “bargaining power” here is that some factor-owners might have minimum reservation prices for their factors, below which they would not be entered in production. In that case, these factors would at least have to receive the minimum, while factors with no minimum, with no reservation price, would work even at an income of only slightly more than zero. Now it should be evident that the owner of every labor factor has some minimum selling price, a price below which he will not work. >Production/Rothbard, >Production theory/Rothbard, >Production costs/Rothbard. Labor/Rothbard: In the real world, labor, (…) is uniquely the nonspecific factor, so that the theory of bargaining could never apply to labor incomes.(2) Rothbard III 365 Not only is bargaining theory rarely applicable in the real world, but zones of indeterminacy between valuations, and therefore zones of indeterminacy in pricing, tend to dwindle radically in importance as the economy evolves from barter to an advanced monetary economy. The greater the number and variety of goods available, and the greater the number of people with differing valuations, the more negligible will zones of indeterminacy become.(3) 1. Little of value has been said about bargaining since Böhm-Bawerk. See Böhm-Bawerk, Positive Theory of Capital, pp. 198–99. This can be seen in J. Pen’s “A General Theory of Bargaining,” American Economic Review March, 1952, pp. 24 ff. Pen’s own theory is of little worth because it rests explicitly on an assumption of the measurability of utility. Ibid., p. 34 n. 2. Contrast the discussion in most textbooks, where bargaining occupies an important place in explanation of market pricing only in the discussion of labor incomes. 3. Any zone of indeterminacy in pricing must consist of the coincidence of an absolutely vertical supply curve with an absolutely vertical market demand curve for the good or service, so that the equilibrium price is in a zone rather than at a point. As Hutt states, “It depends entirely upon the fortuitous coincidence of . . . an unusual and highly improbable demand curve with an absolutely rigid supply curve.” W.H. Hutt, The Theory of Collective Bargaining (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 90, and 79 - 109. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Basic Concepts | Basic Concept: theories differ in what terms they choose as the basic concepts, which are not further defined. A definition of these concepts within the theory would be circular and may cause > paradoxes. E.g. The theory of mind by G. Ryle is based on the concept of disposition, other theories presuppose mental objects. See also paradoxes, theories, terms, definitions, definability, systems, explanations. |
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| Basic Concepts | Field | I 32 Basic concept/Field/(s): it is impossible to say of a basic concept if it is, e.g., semantical or proof theoretical. E.g. implication as a basic concept. I 33 This is the case with natural deduction (ND, Gentzen). Implication: cannot be considered proof-theoretical innatural deduction, in terms of the derivation procedure, because it occurs in it itself (circular). Nevertheless, natural deduction is more proof theoretical than semantic. - It is often quite reasonable to consider implication a basic concept. >Implication. I 34 Basic Concept/Field: (E.g. implication as basic concept) may be two things: a) primitive predicate b) primitive operator. >Predicates, >Operators. I 197 Theory/Basic Concept/Predicate/Infinity/Davidson/Field: (Davidson, 1965)(1): no theory can be developed from an infinite number of primitive predicates. >Method, >Theories. I 198 Solution/Field: we can characterize an infinite number of predicates recursively instead by using a final number of axiom schemes. >Recursion. II 334 Quinean Platonism/Field: as the basic concept we can have a certain concept of quantity from which all other mathematical objects are constructed. - So natural numbers and real numbers would actually be sets. >W.V.O. Quine. 1. Davidson, D. 1965. "Theories of meaning and learnable languages". In: Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (ed.), Proceedings of the 1964 International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Amsterdam: North-Holland. pp. 383-394 |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Basic Concepts | Tugendhat | I 205 Basic Concepts/Tugendhat: if one refers to similarity as a psychological basis, this is only possible behavioristically - (without ideas). >Similarity, >Equality, >Behaviorism, >Imagination. I 519 Basic Concept/method/theory/Tugendhat: "right" is not explained and it is always presupposed. >Correctness. Other authors / (s): success as a basic concept >Success. Understanding/Tugendhat: understanding is ultimately unexplained. >Understanding. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Bayesianism | Frith | I 161 Bayesian Theorem/formula/Frith: P(A I X) = P(X I A) * P(A) P(X) The Bayesian theorem says to what extent we should update our knowledge about A with respect to the new information. I 162 P(A): prior knowledge: 1% of women over 40 get breast cancer. New information: good test proving breast cancer. P(XI A): 80% of all women with breast cancer are tested positive in the test. P(X ~ A): 9.6% of women without breast cancer are tested positive in the test. P(A I X): what is the proportion of those with a positive test result who actually have breast cancer? Common mistake: most consider the proportion of women who actually have breast cancer to be very high. I 163 Solution: e.g. 10,000 women are examined Group 1: 100 with cancer Group 2: 9,900 without cancer. P(A): 1%. After the examination one has 4 groups: A: 80 women with cancer and with a positive test result B: 20 with cancer but with a false negative result In A, the 80% with a correct-positive result are: p(X I A) C: 950 without cancer but with a false-positive result D: 8950 without cancer and with a negative result. Question: What is the percentage of women with a positive outcome who actually have cancer? Solution: Group A is divided by the sum of A and C. This is 7.8% N.B.: more than 90% of positively tested women have no cancer. Although the test is a good test, the Bayesian theorem says that the new information is not particularly helpful. I 164 Bayesian Theorem/Frith: the Bayesian theorem tells us precisely how much new information should influence our ideas about the world. Def ideal Bayesian observer/Frith: the ideal Bayesian observer always uses information in an optimal way. Problem: we can classify information badly when it comes to rare events and large numbers. >Ideal observer, >Observation, >Measurement, >Method. Brain: although we as persons are not ideal observers, there is much evidence that our brain is an ideal observer. I 165 For example, if an object is very rare, an observer needs more information to believe that it is actually there. Therefore, in the case of bombs, we are not an ideal observer. Brain: has the task of combining the information from the different sensory channels. >Brain, >Brain states, >Brain/Frith, >Thinking, >Cognition, >Problem solving, >Information processing. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Bayesianism | Norvig | Norvig I 503 Bayesianism/Norvig/Russell: Bayes’ rule allows unknown probabilities to be computed from known conditional probabilities, usually in the causal direction. Applying Bayes’ rule with many pieces of evidence runs into the same scaling problems as does the full joint distribution. Conditional independence brought about by direct causal relationships in the domain might allow the full joint distribution to be factored into smaller, conditional distributions. The naive Bayes model assumes the conditional independence of all effect variables, given a single cause variable, and grows linearly with the number of effects. Norvig I 505 Bayesian probabilistic reasoning has been used in AI since the 1960s, especially in medical diagnosis. It was used not only to make a diagnosis from available evidence, but also to select further questions and tests by using the theory of information value (…) when available evidence was inconclusive (Gorry, 1968(1); Gorry et al., 1973(2)). One system outperformed human experts in the diagnosis of acute abdominal illnesses (de Dombal et al., 1974)(3). Lucas et al. (2004)(4) gives an overview. These early Bayesian systems suffered from a number of problems, however. Because they lacked any theoretical model of the conditions they were diagnosing, they were vulnerable to unrepresentative data occurring in situations for which only a small sample was available (de Dombal et al., 1981)(5). Even more fundamentally, because they lacked a concise formalism (…) for representing and using conditional independence information, they depended on the acquisition, storage, and processing of enormous tables of probabilistic data. Because of these difficulties, probabilistic methods for coping with uncertainty fell out of favor in AI from the 1970s to the mid-1980s. The naive Bayes model for joint distributions has been studied extensively in the pattern recognition literature since the 1950s (Duda and Hart, 1973)(6). It has also been used, often unwittingly, in information retrieval, beginning with the work of Maron (1961)(7). The probabilistic foundations of this technique, (…) were elucidated by Robertson and Sparck Jones (1976)(8). Independence: Domingos and Pazzani (1997)(9) provide an explanation Norvig I 506 for the surprising success of naive Bayesian reasoning even in domains where the independence assumptions are clearly violated. >Bayesian Networks/Norvig. 1. Gorry, G. A. (1968). Strategies for computer-aided diagnosis. Mathematical Biosciences, 2(3-4), 293- 318. 2. Gorry, G. A., Kassirer, J. P., Essig, A., and Schwartz, W. B. (1973). Decision analysis as the basis for computer-aided management of acute renal failure. American Journal of Medicine, 55, 473-484. 3. de Dombal, F. T., Leaper, D. J., Horrocks, J. C., and Staniland, J. R. (1974). Human and omputeraided diagnosis of abdominal pain: Further report with emphasis on performance of clinicians. British Medical Journal, 1, 376–380. 4. Lucas, P., van der Gaag, L., and Abu-Hanna, A. (2004). Bayesian networks in biomedicine and health-care. Artificial Intelligence in Medicine 5. de Dombal, F. T., Staniland, J. R., and Clamp, S. E. (1981). Geographical variation in disease presentation. Medical Decision Making, 1, 59–69. 6. Duda, R. O. and Hart, P. E. (1973). Pattern classification and scene analysis. Wiley. 7. Maron, M. E. (1961). Automatic indexing: An experimental inquiry. JACM, 8(3), 404-417. 8. Robertson, S. E. and Sparck Jones, K. (1976). Relevance weighting of search terms. J. American Society for Information Science, 27, 129-146. 9. Domingos, P. and Pazzani, M. (1997). On the optimality of the simple Bayesian classifier under zero–one loss. Machine Learning, 29, 103–30. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Bayesianism | Russell | Norvig I 503 Bayesianism/Norvig/Russell: Bayes’ rule allows unknown probabilities to be computed from known conditional probabilities, usually in the causal direction. Applying Bayes’ rule with many pieces of evidence runs into the same scaling problems as does the full joint distribution. Conditional independence brought about by direct causal relationships in the domain might allow the full joint distribution to be factored into smaller, conditional distributions. The naive Bayes model assumes the conditional independence of all effect variables, given a single cause variable, and grows linearly with the number of effects. Norvig I 505 Bayesian probabilistic reasoning has been used in AI since the 1960s, especially in medical diagnosis. It was used not only to make a diagnosis from available evidence, but also to select further questions and tests by using the theory of information value (…) when available evidence was inconclusive (Gorry, 1968(1); Gorry et al., 1973(2)). One system outperformed human experts in the diagnosis of acute abdominal illnesses (de Dombal et al., 1974)(3). Lucas et al. (2004)(4) gives an overview. These early Bayesian systems suffered from a number of problems, however. Because they lacked any theoretical model of the conditions they were diagnosing, they were vulnerable to unrepresentative data occurring in situations for which only a small sample was available (de Dombal et al., 1981)(5). Even more fundamentally, because they lacked a concise formalism (…) for representing and using conditional independence information, they depended on the acquisition, storage, and processing of enormous tables of probabilistic data. Because of these difficulties, probabilistic methods for coping with uncertainty fell out of favor in AI from the 1970s to the mid-1980s. The naive Bayes model for joint distributions has been studied extensively in the pattern recognition literature since the 1950s (Duda and Hart, 1973)(6). It has also been used, often unwittingly, in information retrieval, beginning with the work of Maron (1961)(7). The probabilistic foundations of this technique, (…) were elucidated by Robertson and Sparck Jones (1976)(8). Independence: Domingos and Pazzani (1997)(9) provide an explanation Norvig I 506 for the surprising success of naive Bayesian reasoning even in domains where the independence assumptions are clearly violated. >Bayesian Networks/Norvig. 1. Gorry, G. A. (1968). Strategies for computer-aided diagnosis. Mathematical Biosciences, 2(3-4), 293- 318. 2. Gorry, G. A., Kassirer, J. P., Essig, A., and Schwartz, W. B. (1973). Decision analysis as the basis for computer-aided management of acute renal failure. American Journal of Medicine, 55, 473-484. 3. de Dombal, F. T., Leaper, D. J., Horrocks, J. C., and Staniland, J. R. (1974). Human and omputeraided diagnosis of abdominal pain: Further report with emphasis on performance of clinicians. British Medical Journal, 1, 376–380. 4. Lucas, P., van der Gaag, L., and Abu-Hanna, A. (2004). Bayesian networks in biomedicine and health-care. Artificial Intelligence in Medicine 5. de Dombal, F. T., Staniland, J. R., and Clamp, S. E. (1981). Geographical variation in disease presentation. Medical Decision Making, 1, 59–69. 6. Duda, R. O. and Hart, P. E. (1973). Pattern classification and scene analysis. Wiley. 7. Maron, M. E. (1961). Automatic indexing: An experimental inquiry. JACM, 8(3), 404-417. 8. Robertson, S. E. and Sparck Jones, K. (1976). Relevance weighting of search terms. J. American Society for Information Science, 27, 129-146. 9. Domingos, P. and Pazzani, M. (1997). On the optimality of the simple Bayesian classifier under zero–one loss. Machine Learning, 29, 103–30. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Beauty | Ancient Philosophy | Gadamer I 481 Beauty/Ancient Philosophy/Gadamer: The Greek word for the German "schön" (engl. beautiful) is kalon. There are no complete equivalents in German, not even when we use the mediating pulchrum but Greek thinking has exerted a certain determination on the history of meaning of the German word, so that essential moments of meaning are common to both words. With the addition "beautiful" we distinguish from what we call technology, i.e. from "mechanical" arts that produce useful things. It is similar with words such as: beautiful morality, beautiful literature, beautiful spirit/belletristic (German: "schöngeistig") and so on. In all these uses the word is in a similar contrast to the Greek kalon to the term chresimon ((s) useful). Everything that does not belong to the necessities of life, but the "how" of life that concerns eu zen, i.e. everything that the Greeks understood by Paideia, is called kalon. Practicality: The beautiful things are those whose value for themselves is obvious. You cannot ask what purpose they serve. They are excellent for their own sake (di' hauto haireton) and not like the useful for the sake of something else. Already the use of language thus reveals the elevated rank of being of what is called kalon. Ugly: But also the ordinary contrast that defines the concept of the beautiful, the contrast to the ugly (aischron), points in the same direction. Aischron (ugly) is that which cannot stand the sight. Beautiful: Beautiful is that which can be seen, the handsome in the broadest sense of the word. "Handsome" is also a German term for greatness. And indeed, the use of the word "beautiful" - in Greek as in German - always requires a certain stately greatness. Morality: By pointing the direction of meaning to the respectable in the whole sphere of the outwardly pleasing, the custom approaches at the same time the conceptual Gadamer I 482 articulation that was given by the contrast to the useful (chresimon). The good: The concept of the beautiful therefore enters into the closest relationship with that of the good (agathon), in so far as it subordinates itself as an end to be chosen for its own sake, as an end that is anything but useful. For what is beautiful is not seen as a means to something else. >Beauty/Plato. Measure/Order/Proportion: The basis of the close connection between the idea of beauty and the teleological order of being is the Pythagorean-Platonic concept of measure. Plato determines the beautiful by measure, appropriateness and proportion; Aristotle names as the moments (eide) of the beautiful order Gadamer I 483 (taxis), well-proportionedness (symmetria) and determination (horismenon) and finds the same given in mathematics in an exemplary way. >Beauty/Aristotle. Nature/Beauty/Gadamer: As one can see, such a determination of beauty is a universal ontological one. Nature and art do not form any contrast here, which means of course that especially with regard to beauty the primacy of nature is undisputed. Art may perceive within the "gestalt" whole of the natural order recessed possibilities of artistic design and in this way makes the beautiful nature of the order of being perfect. But that does not mean at all that "beauty" is primarily to be found in art. As long as the order of being is understood as being divine itself or as God's creation - and the latter is valid up to the 18th century - also the exceptional case of art can only be understood within the horizon of this order of being. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Beauty | Aristotle | Gadamer I 482 Beauty/Aristotle/Gadamer: The basis of the close connection between the idea of beauty and the teleological order of being is the Pythagorean-Platonic concept of measure. Plato determines the beautiful by measure, appropriateness and proportion; Aristotle(1) names as the moments (eide) of the beautiful order Gadamer I 483 (taxis), well-proportionedness (symmetria) and determination (horismenon) and finds the same given in mathematics in an exemplary way. The close connection between the mathematical orders of essence of the beautiful and the celestial order further means that the cosmos, the model of all visible well-being, is also the highest example of beauty in the visible. Dimensional adequacy, symmetry is the decisive condition of all being beautiful. >Beauty/Plato, >Beauty/Ancient Philosophy. 1. Arist. Met. M 4, 1078 a 3—6. Cf. Grabmann's introduction to Ulrich of Strasbourg De pulchro, p. 31 (Jbø bayer. Akad. d. Wiss. 1926), as well as the valuable introduction by G. Santinello to Nicolai de Cusa, Tota pulchra es, Atti e Mem. della Academia Patavina LXXI. Nicolaus goes back to Ps. Dionysios and Albert, who determined medieval thinking about beauty. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Beauty | Gadamer | I 481 Beauty/Gadamer: Philosophy: The concept of the beautiful, which in the eighteenth century had to share the central position within the aesthetic problem with that of the sublime and which was to be completely eliminated in the course of the nineteenth century by the aesthetic criticism of classicism, was, as is well known, once a universal metaphysical concept and had a function within metaphysics, i.e. the general doctrine of being, that was by no means limited to the aesthetic in the narrower sense. >Metaphysics, >Aesthetics, >Being. Hermeneutics/Gadamer: It will be shown that this old concept of beauty can also serve a comprehensive hermeneutics, as it has grown for us from the criticism of the methodologism of the intellectual world. >Hermeneutics. Etymology: The Greek word for the German "schön" is kalon. Admittedly, there are no complete equivalents in German, even if we use the mediating pulchrum. But Greek thought has exercised a certain determination on the history of meaning of the German word, so that essential moments of meaning are common to both words. With the addition "beautiful" we distinguish from what we call technology, i.e. from "mechanical" arts that produce useful things. It is similar with word combinations such as: beautiful morality, beautiful literature, beautifully intellectual/belletristic (German: "schöngeistig") and so on. In all these uses, the word is in a similar contrast to the Greek kalon to the term chresimon. Everything that does not belong to the necessities of life, but the how of life that concerns eu zen, i.e. everything that the Greeks understood by Paideia, is called kalon. The beautiful things are those whose value for themselves is obvious. One cannot ask about the purpose they serve. I 483 Nature/Beauty/Gadamer: As one can see, such a determination of beauty is a universal ontological one. Nature and art do not form any kind of contrast here, which of course means that the primacy of nature is undisputed, especially with regard to beauty. Art may perceive within the "gestalt" whole of the natural order recessed possibilities of artistic design and in this way perfect the beautiful nature of the order of being. But that does not mean at all that "beauty" is primarily to be found in art. As long as the order of being is understood as being divine itself or as God's creation - and the latter is valid up to the 18th century - also the exceptional case of art can only be understood within the horizon of this order of being. (...) it is only with the 19th century that the aesthetic problem (...) is transferred to the standpoint of art (...). (...) this [is] based on a metaphysical process (...). Such a transfer to the standpoint of art ontologically presupposes a shapelessly conceived mass of being or a mass of being governed by mechanical laws. The human artistic spirit, which forms useful things from mechanical construction, will ultimately understand all that is beautiful from the work of its own spirit. I 484 Order/Measurement/Rationality/Aesthetics/KantVsSubjectivism: As unsatisfactory as the development towards subjectivism initiated by Kant seemed to us in the newer aesthetic, Kant has convincingly demonstrated the untenability of aesthetic rationalism. >Aesthetics/Kant. GadamerVsKant: It is just not right to base the metaphysics of beauty solely on the ontology of measure and the teleological order of being, on which the classical appearance of rationalist rule aesthetics ultimately refers to. The metaphysics of the beautiful does not actually coincide with such an application of aesthetic rationalism. Rather, the decline to Plato reveals a quite different side to the phenomenon of the beautiful, and it is this side that interests us in our hermeneutical questioning. >Beauty/Plato. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Beauty | Kant | Gadamer I 50 Beauty/Kant/Gadamer: Kant's teaching of free and affectionate beauty(1) [is] strange and much disputed.Kant discusses here the difference between "pure" and "intellectual" taste judgement, which corresponds to the opposition of "free" and "attached" beauty (attached to a concept). Pure beauty of pure taste judgement/Kant: For example, the free beauty of nature and - in the field of art - ornament. "Attached" (conceptually defined) beauty/Kant: e.g. human, animal, building. Gadamer I 51 Gadamer: (...) this is an indirect description of what an "object under a certain concept" represents and therefore belongs to the conditional, unfree beauty: the whole realm of poetry, the fine arts and architecture, as well as all natural things that we do not look at for their beauty alone like the ornamental flower. >Art Beauty/Kant, >Natural Beauty/Hegel. Gadamer I 52 Conceptual beauty/Kant/Gadamer: (...) certainly there is no talk of beauty where a certain concept of understanding is schematically sensitized by the imagination, but only where the imagination is in free agreement with the understanding, i.e. where it can be productive. But this productive formation of the imagination is richest not where it is absolutely free, (...) but where it lives in a latitude which the unifying striving of the intellect does not so much erect as a barrier to it as it does to stimulate its play. Ideal of Beauty/Kant: An ideal of beauty exists (...) only of the human form: in the 'expression of morality' "without which the object would not generally be pleasing". Judgement according to an ideal of beauty is then, as Kant says, of course not merely a judgement of taste. Gadamer I 53 Only of the human form, precisely because it alone is capable of a beauty fixed by a concept of purpose, is there an ideal of beauty! This doctrine, established by Winckelmann and Lessing(2), gains a kind of key position in Kant's foundation of aesthetics. For it is precisely this thesis that shows how little a formal aesthetic of taste (arabesque aesthetics) corresponds to Kant's thought. Normal idea/ Kant: The doctrine of the ideal of beauty is based on the distinction between the normal idea and the idea of reason or ideal of beauty. The aesthetic normal idea can be found in all genres of nature. How a beautiful animal (...) has to look (...), that is a guideline for judging the individual specimen. This normal idea is thus a single view of the imagination as the "image of the genus floating between all individuals". But the representation of such a normal idea does not please by beauty, but only because "it does not contradict any condition under which alone a thing of this genre can be beautiful". It is not the archetype of beauty, but merely of correctness. Human Gestalt: This also applies to the normal idea of the human figure. But in the human form, there is a real ideal of beauty in the "expression of the moral". (...) take this, together with the later teaching of aesthetic ideas and beauty, as a symbol of morality. Then one realizes that with the teaching of the ideal of beauty, the place is also prepared for the essence of art. Gadamer I 54 Gadamer: What Kant obviously wants to say is this: in the depiction of the human Gestalt, the depicted object and that which speaks to us as artistic content in this depiction are one. There can be no other content of this representation than that which is already expressed in the form and appearance of the portrayed person. Gadamer I 55 Ideals/Kant/Gadamer: It is precisely with this classicist distinction between the normal idea and the ideal of beauty that Kant destroys the basis from which the aesthetic of perfection finds its incomparably unique beauty in the perfect meaningfulness of all being. Only now is "art" able to become an autonomous phenomenon. >Art/Kant, >Art/Hegel. Gadamer I 492 Beauty/Kant/Gadamer: Kant's fundamental definition of aesthetic pleasure as an uninterested pleasure does not only mean the negative, that the object of taste is neither used as useful nor desired as good, but it means positively that "existence" cannot add anything to the aesthetic content of pleasure, to the "pure sight", because it is precisely the aesthetic being that is representing itself. Morality: Only from the moral point of view there is an interest in the existence of the beautiful, e.g. in the song of the nightingale, whose deceptive imitation is something morally offensive according to Kant. Truth/GadamerVsKant: Whether it really follows from this constitution of aesthetic being that truth must not be sought here because nothing is recognized here, is of course the question. In our aesthetic analyses, we have described the narrowness of the concept of knowledge that causes Kant's question here, and from the question of the truth of art we had found our way into hermeneutics, in which art and history merged for us. >Hermeneutics/Gadamer. 1. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, § 16ff. 2. Lessing, Entwürfe zum Laokoon Nr. 20 b; in Lessings Sämtl. Schriften ed. Lachmann, 1886ff., vol. 14, p. 415. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Beginning | Democritus | Adorno XIII 201 Beginning/World/Democritus/Adorno: Because everything that is heavy falls, the big atoms should bounce on the small atoms, and because of this and through certain side-to-side-movements there should arise constant vortexes. Cosmogony/World Creation/Democritus/Adorno: the concept of world creation is included here - and this is a tremendous progress of the Enlightenment moment in thought. In the domain of natural explanations as opposed to any transcendental act of creation. This is something like the beginning of a scientific cosmogony, in the attempt to completely separate it from the mythologies. >World/Democritus, >Necessity/Democritus, >Existence/Democritus, cf. >Being/Ancient philosophy. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Beginning | Hegel | Bubner I 61 Beginning/End/Hegel/Bubner: just like in a symphony the first note does not say that it is the beginning of a piece of music, the last note does not show that it is the end. The determination of the beginning and the end of a systematically developed context always requires external mediation. In Hegel, this mediation is done by Method Reflection. >Mediation, >Mediation/Hegel. The first insight concerns the unfoundedness of the assumption made in each case. I 62 External Mediation/Hegel: for him the method reflection plays this role. The assumption made in each case is unfounded! Last chapter of logic: What is still to be considered here is not a content as such, but the general nature of its form, that is the method. >Logic/Hegel. Content/Form/Generality/Hegel/Bubner: However, throughout the entire logic, Hegel emphasized that the content cannot be separated from the form. >Form/Content. The general nature of form must not be simply the form in which the concept with its manifold provisions was the content of the logical sciences. >Generality, >Generalization. On the contrary, the general formality is rather one which befits all those forms, under which the unified concept allowed for the topic of logic. ((s) Form of thought: is befitting). This generality then applies to only one position outside the logic. Cf. >Circularity, >Levels/order, >Levels of Description, >Perspective. An overview of the whole becomes possible as soon as the absolute immanence is abandoned, and you know that nothing is left out. >Wholes, >Totality. Beginning/End/Hegel: consequently, the beginning and the conclusion can only be established by a mediation which creates a transition between the systematic connection and the exterior. I 63 Method/Science/Hegel/Bubner: where science is practiced there is no question of method, because the "thing itself" guarantees the law of action. (Unlike with the symphony). ((s) Thus there is no "inner necessity" of art for Hegel as Kandinsky propagated.) >Science, >Art/Hegel. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Behavior | Attachment Theory | Corr I 230 Behavior/Attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: In the case of the attachment behavioural system, Bowlby (1982/1969)(1) focused on the fundamental need for care and protection and the innate predisposition to search for and maintain proximity to protective and caring others in times of need. The set-goal of the attachment system is the attainment of actual or perceived protection and security; hence, the system is automatically activated when a potential or actual threat to one’s sense of security is noticed. Under these conditions, a person tends automatically to turn for protection and comfort to supportive others (whom Bowlby called attachment figures), and to maintain proximity to these ‘stronger and wiser’ figures until a state of protection and security is attained. Corr I 239 Behavior/attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: Both anxiety and avoidance are (…) associated with negative expectations concerning a partner’s behaviour (e.g., Baldwin, Fehr, Keedian et al. 1993)(2). >Anxiety, >Fear. Similar attachment-style differences have been found when research participants are asked to explain other people’s behaviour. For example, Collins (1996)(3) asked people to explain hypothetical negative behaviours of a romantic partner and found that more anxious and avoidant people were more likely to provide explanations that implied lack of confidence in the partner’s love, attribute partner’s negative behaviours to stable and global causes, and view these behaviours as negatively motivated. >About the Attachment theory. 1. Bowlby, J. 1982. Attachment and loss, vol. I, Attachment, 2nd edn. New York: Basic Books (original edn 1969) 2. Baldwin, M. W., Fehr, B., Keedian, E., Seidel, M. and Thompson, D. W. 1993. An exploration of the relational schemata underlying attachment styles: self-report and lexical decision approaches, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 19: 746–54 3. Collins, N. L. 1996. Working models of attachment: implications for explanation, emotion and behaviour, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71: 810–32 Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Behavior | Corr | Corr I 365 Behavior/Corr: [there is] a more fundamental aspect of the BIS (Behavioural Inhibition System; >Terminology/Corr), namely that it is sensitive to goal conflict (e.g., approach-avoidance; e.g., an animal will approach a threat only if there is some possibility of a rewarding outcome, such as food). However, threats (as opposed to primary punishment itself) are only one source of aversion. Revised RST (>Reinforcement Sensivity Theory/Corr) argues that, in principle, approach-approach and avoidance-avoidance conflicts also involve activation of the same system and have essentially the same effects as the classic approach-avoidance. The aversive element resides in the possibility of making a mistake, thus we typically spend time weighing up all the possibilities, and searching for potential downsides to each decision. >Anxiety/Corr. Corr I 366 BAS/Behavioral Approach System: it may be assumed that the BAS is more complex than conventionally thought – and, indeed, may be more complex than either the FFFS or the BIS.6 I (Corr 2008a)(6) developed the concept of sub-goal scaffolding, which reflects the separate, though overlapping, stages of BAS behaviour, Corr I 367 consisting in a series of appetitively-motivated sub-goals. Sub-goal scaffolding reflects the fact that, in order to move along the temporo-spatial gradient to the final primary biological reinforcer, it is necessary to engage a number of distinct processes. Complex approach behaviour entails a series of behavioural processes, some of which oppose each other. Such behaviour often demands restraint and planning, but, especially at the final point of capture of the biological reinforcer, impulsivity is more appropriate. (…)’Impulsivity’ may not be the most appropriate name for the personality dimension that reflects BAS processes (Franken and Muris 2006(1); Smillie, Jackson and Dalgleish 2006)(2). There is evidence that, at the psychometric level, the BAS is multidimensional. For example, the Carver and White (1994)(3) BIS/BAS scales measure three aspects of BAS: Reward Responsiveness, Drive and Fun-Seeking – these scales have good psychometric properties in both adolescents and adults (e.g., Caci, Deschaux and Baylé 2007(4); Cooper, Gomez and Aucute 2007(5)). >Drives/Corr, >Anxiety/fear/Corr. Corr I 368 Extraversion/CorrVsEysenck: in the revised RST (>Reinforcement SensivityTheory/Corr) we have to assume that Eysenck’s Extraversion factor reflects the balance of reward and punishment systems (a central assumption in RST) for a viable explanation as to why Extraversion and arousal are so often associated in experimental studies of personality. 1. Franken, I. H. A. and Muris, P. 2006. Gray’s impulsivity dimension: a distinction between Reward Sensitivity versus Rash Impulsiveness, Personality and Individual Differences 40: 1337–47 2. Smillie, L. D., Jackson, C. J. and Dalgleish, L. I. 2006. Conceptual distinctions among Carver and White’s (1994) BAS scales: a reward-reactivity versus trait impulsivity perspective, Personality and Individual Differences 40: 1039–50 3. Carver, C. S. and White, T. L. 1994. Behavioral inhibition, behavioral activation, and affective responses to impending reward and punishment: the BIS/BAS scales, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67: 319–33 4. Caci, H., Deschaux, O. and Baylé, F. J. 2007. Psychometric properties of the French versions of the BIS/BAS and the SPSRQ, Personality and Individual Differences 42: 987–98 5. Cooper, A., Gomez, R. and Aucute, H. 2007. The Behavioural Inhibition System and Behavioural Approach System (BIS/BAS) scales: measurement and structural invariance across adults and adolescents, Personality and Individual Differences 43: 295–305 6. Corr, P. J. 2008a. Reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST): Introduction, in P. J. Corr (ed). The reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality, pp. 1–43. Cambridge University Press Philip J. Corr, „ The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Behavior | Harlow | Slater I 16 Behavior/Harlow: The finding that rearing with age-mates could compensate for the effects of maternal deprivation on developing peer relationships was the most controversial and tentative finding in the 1962 paper(1). Working with small numbers of monkeys, Harlow observed few differences between mother-raised and peer-raised monkeys on play, defensive, or sexual behavior with peers during the juvenile period of development. This finding led Harlow to conclude that play with agemates was “more necessary than mothering to the development of effective social relations” (Harlow & Harlow, 1962(1), p. 495). However, Harlow remained tentative about his conclusions noting that they were limited to outcomes only up to two years of age. Follow-up studies of peer-reared monkeys by Harlow’s former graduate student, Steve Suomi, suggested a less sanguine view of peer-raised monkeys even during the juvenile period of development (Suomi, 2008)(2). When (…) peer-raised monkeys were grouped with mother-raised monkeys, they dropped to the bottom of the peer dominance hierarchies (Bastian, Sponberg, Sponberg, Suomi, & Higley, 2002)(3). Slater I 17 VsHarlow: Research has advanced from the social deprivation paradigms in several respects. 1) Researchers have examined more subtle variations in early caregiving environments by considering the effects of temporary separations from caregivers as well as variations in the quality of maternal care provided to offspring (Suomi & Levine, 1998)(4). 2) Researchers have begun to examine individual differences in offsprings’ susceptibility to environmental influences (Lyons, Parker, & Schatzberg, 2010)(5). 3) The trends toward examining a continuum of caregiving environments and individual differences in children’s susceptibility to caregiving environments have been advanced by efforts to identify the genetic, neural, and physiological mechanisms through which early experience affects later outcomes (Weaver et al., 2004)(6). Cf. >Affectional bonds/psychological theories. 1. Harlow, H. F., & Harlow, M. (1962). Social deprivation in monkeys. Scientific American, 207, 137–146. 2. Suomi, S. J. (2008). Attachment in rhesus monkeys. In J. Cassidy & P. Shaver (Eds), Handbook of attachment: Theory, research and clinical applications (pp. 173–191). New York: Guilford Press. 3. Bastian, M. L., Sponberg, A. C., Suomi, S. J., & Higley, J. D. (2002). Long-term effects of infant rearing condition on the acquisition of dominance rank in juvenile and adult rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). Developmental Psychobiology, 42, 44–51. 4. Suomi, S., & Levine, S. (1998). Psychobiology of intergenerational effects of trauma: Evidence from animal studies. In Y. Daneli (Ed.), International handbook of multigenerational legacies of trauma (pp. 623–637). New York: Plenum Press. 5. Lyons, D. M., Parker, K. J., & Schatzberg, A. F. (2010). Animal models of early life stress: Implications for understanding resilience. Developmental Psychobiology, 52, 616–624. 6. Weaver, I. C. G., Cervoni, N., Champagne, F. A., D’Alessio, A. C., Sharma, S., Seckl, J. R., Dymov, S., et al. (2004). Epigenetic programming by maternal behavior. Nature Neuroscience, 7, 847–854. Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Behavior | Lorenz | Page numbers here from the German edition: K. Lorenz, Das sogenannte Böse Wien, 1963 II 34 Aggression/Lorenz: two types: A) between different species B) within one species. (Subject of this book). II 36 "Mobbing"/"hate on"/Lorenz: crows, and other birds "hate on" the owl they have discovered by day: (s) They show their fellow-species by gestures where the enemy is. For example a jay follows the fox screeching through the forest. This is a passing on of a non-innate knowledge. II 47 Singing/Birds/Lorenz: Birds share, among others things, also the age. II 58 Aggression/Lorenz: Thesis: More than other properties, the aggressive behavior can be exaggerated by its pernicious effect in the grotesque and unsuitable. For us, it is the inheritance of the intraspecific selection, which has lasted over decades. The evil introspecific selection must be taken. II 72 Stimulus/Reaction/Behavior/Lorenz: Experiments show that (in captivity) the withdrawal of stimuli decreases the threshold for triggering reactions. At the end, a room corner is performed courtship to because it is the only visual point of view. II 81 Aggression/Evolution/Lorenz: The reorientation of the attack is probably the most ingenious source that was created by the species change, in order to divert aggression into harmless pathways. II 91 Behavior/ritualization/Lorenz: e.g. in the insect world, it may be the case that behavior is even be embodied. E.g. robbery or assassination: the suitor hands over a prey to the beloved of the right size so that he can have sexual intercourse with the female during her eating the prey without being eaten himself. II 92 Later generations react only to a corresponding symbol. Congenital understanding. II 93 Behavior/animal/ritualization/Lorenz: it would be a mistake to call ritualized "rushing" an "expression" of love "or the affiliation of the female to the spouse. The independent instinctual movement is not a by-product, not an epiphenomenon of the tie that holds the animals together, but it is itself this tie. A completely autonomous, new instinct. II 103 Rite/behavior/animal/Lorenz: the most important function is the active drive to social behavior. II 104 New function: communication. II 105 The unification of the variable variety of possibilities of action into a single rigid sequence reduces the danger of ambiguity in the communication. II 108 "Good manners" are those that characterize their own group. II 109 Any deviation causes aggression, so the group is forced to act in a unified way. >Aggression. II 123 Behavioral research/Lorenz: in the heroic time of comparative behavioral research, it was thought that only one instinct dominated this, but exclusively, one animal. J. HuxleyVs: Human and animal are like a ship commanded by many captains. Animals have this agreement that only one of them can enter the command bridge. --- Gould I 105 Lorenz's thesis: we do not react to wholenesses or shapes, but to a group of special mechanisms that act as triggers. (Lorenz, 1950 "Ganzheit und Teil") It is well known that birds, in particular, react to abstract features and not to shapes. --- Gould VIII 34 Aggression/Lorenz: (The so-called Evil): Thesis: Aggression is a species-preserving function. Thus only the most suitable individuals are propagated. DawkinsVsLorenz: Prime example for a circular reasoning. It is also contrary to Darwinism, which he does not seem to have noticed. |
Lorenz I K. Lorenz Das sogenannte Böse Wien 1963 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Behavior | Peacocke | I 51 Perception/behavior explanation/behavior/Peacocke: Our perceptions are always much finer than the possibly resulting actions. >Overdetermination, >Indeterminacy, >Behavioral explanation, >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Perception, >World/Thinking. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Behavior | Pinker | I 60 Behavior/selection/Pinker: the selection generates behavior only very indirectly: by the fact that it creates the producers of behavior. >Selection. Today any action is the consequence of of dozens of causes - neither adultery nor any other behavior may be rooted in the genes. >Genes, >Evolution, >Explanation, >Action, >Motivation/Psychology. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Behavior | Rawls | I 5 Behavior/Social Behavior/Rawls: Because of the problems of the coordination, efficiency and stability of a society, the plans of the individuals must be comparable to each other in order to be coordinated with each other without any expectations being seriously disappointed. >Comparability/Rawls, >Efficiency/Rawls, >Society/Rawls, >Expectations/Rawls. I 6 Cooperation/Rawls: cooperation must be stable. >Cooperation. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Behavior | Sellars | I 91 Theoretical Terms/observation/Sellars: theoretical terms are defined in behaviorist psychology not only not in terms of open behavior, but neither in terms of nerves, synapses, neuron irritations, etc. A behaviorist theory of behavior is not as such already a physiological explanation of behavior. For a structure of theoretical concepts to be suitable to provide explanations for behavior, it must be impossible to identify the theoretical concepts with the concepts of neurophysiology. >Neuroscience, >Theoretical terms, >Behaviorism, >Observation sentences, >Observation language. However, you operate under a certain regulative ideal, the ideal of a coherent system. The behavioral theory is not fixed from the outset to a physiological identification of all its concepts. >Physical/psychic. --- II 325 Action>Sellars: fundamental beliefs are expressed in uniformity of behavior. >Regularities. This does not mean that no deviations are possible, but only that the representation of a principle is in any case also characterized by uniformity of behavior. >Principles. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Behavior | Sterelny | I 371 Behavior/prediction/control/mind/representation: a) simple case: the attribution and prediction of the behavior of other animals is initially more efficient if instead of an explicit representation only a "hidden variable" is assumed. b) complex case: if the behavior becomes more complex however, the representation of foreign mental states is more efficient! >Theory of mind, >Explanation. If one can trace the inner state, one no longer needs to trace every single connection between stimulus and behavior. I 372 Attention/Animal/Sterelny: it seems that the representation of attention is not very demanding. However, it turns out that chimpanzees in the experiment do not differ significantly between attentive and inattentive coaches. E.g. coach with bucket over his head, or constantly turned away, etc. The chimpanzees solved all the tasks by chance. I 374 Sterelny: you should not just explain this with input/output behavior, you have to ask whether sounds or gestures were involved. I 375 Overall, the whole problem will be a knowledge rather than a knowledge of acting. Attention happens on many channels. >Experiments, >Method. Reaction range/Behavior/Sterelny: I doubt that any behavior is absolutely necessary, because the motivational state of a mind reader also plays a role. The reaction range depends on: 1. Spectrum of the other characteristics of the actor which are pursued by the mind reader. 2. The extent to which the reaction is also dependent on the other environment. 3. Under certain circumstances, the ability to imitate. >Reaction range. Environment/Animal/Sterelny: how does an animal categorize its environment? Are the categories concrete, sensuous or functional? >Environment/Psychology. |
Sterelny I Kim Sterelny "Primate Worlds", in: The Evolution of Cognition, C. Heyes/L. Huber (Eds.) Cambridge/MA 2000 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Sterelny II Kim Sterelny Dawkins vs. Gould: Survival of the Fittest Cambridge/UK 2007 |
| Behaviorism | Behaviorism: presupposes observable and observed behavior and derives predictions of further behavior from them. As few assumptions as possible about a mental inner life are used for explanation. See also mentalism, behavior, consciousness. |
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| Behaviorism | Pauen | Pauen I 36 Logical behaviorism and eliminative materialism: empirical exploration of consciousness is superfluous because mentalistic statements can be completely replaced by physicalist statements. >Materialism, >Eliminative Materialism, >Physicalism, >Reductionism, >Reduction, >Elimination. Identity theory: consciousness is as important as the brain, only one domain, but different description, or access. >Identity theory, >Type/token identity, >Token physicalism, >Consciousness. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Behaviorism | Tugendhat | I 204 ~ Behaviorism/Tugendhat: similarity only identifiable by behavior (also for oneself) - does without notions - hence also without similarity. >Behavior, >Equality, >Similarity, >Imagination. Behaviorism: uses no (abstract) concepts. >Abstractness. Introspection: non-sensual notion of similarity, abstract concepts (conceptualism) (BehaviorismVs). >Introspection. VsIntrospection: does not find concepts either, merely postulates them. I 215f Language/Behaviorism/Tugendhat: purpose fundamental, pure signal language, circumstances important (TugendhatVsCircumstances). >Circumstances/Tugendhat. "Conditional rules": Use according to the circumstances. TugendhatVs. Behaviorism: Behaviorism has no place for declarative sentences. >Assertions. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Being | Heidegger | Gadamer I 261 Being/Heidegger/Gadamer: The ontological lack of a basis of transcendental subjectivity, which Heidegger accused Husserl's phenomenology of, was indeed what seemed to be overcome by the reawakening of the question of being. What being means should be determined by the horizon of time. The structure of temporality thus appeared as the ontological determination of subjectivity. But it was more. >Seinsfrage/question of being, >Being, >Ontology, >Time, >Time/Heidegger, >Temporality, >Horizon. Heidegger's thesis was: Being itself is time. Gadamer: With this, the entire subjectivism of newer philosophy - as was soon to become apparent, the entire question horizon of metaphysics, which is occupied by the being as the present, was eliminated. >Metaphysics, >Subjectivism, >Philosophy. That existence (German: "Dasein", Cf. Dasein/Heidegger) is concerned with being, that it is distinguished, above all, by the understanding of being, does not, as it seems to be the case in "Being and Time", represent the last basis from which a transcendental questioning has to proceed. Rather, there is talk of a completely different reason that makes all understanding of being possible in the first place, and this is that there is a "there", a clearing Gadamer I 262 in being, i.e. the difference between "being" (German: "Seiendem") and "to be" (German: "sein"). >Nothingness/Heidegger, >Dasein/Heidegger. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Being a Bat | Bat example, philosophy: (Literature Th Nagel, What is it like to be a bat, Philosophical Review 83 (October). 435-50 (1974).) While most people believe to be able to imagine how it would be for them to be a bat, according to Nagel this is not the point. The problem is that we cannot imagine what it is like for a bat to be a bat. See also subjectivity, objectivity, privileged access, introspection, imagination. |
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| Belief Congruence | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 172 Belief Congruence Theory/similarity attraction principles/psychological theories: an alternative interpretation of [Tajfel’s] minimal ingroup bias (>Minimal group/Tajfel, >Group behavior/Tajfel, >Social identity theory/Tajfel; Tajfel et al. 1971(1)) was that, rather than categorization (>Categorization/Tajfel) driving discrimination, this was simply caused by participants’ perception that other ingroup members were similar to themselves. This meshed with belief-congruence theory (Rokeach, 1969)(2) and similarity-attraction principles, which suggest that we are prone to dislike others (and by extension other groups) who have different views and values to our own. (RokeachVsTajfel). >Similarity. 1. Tajfel, H., Flament, C., Billig, M.G. and Bundy, R.F. (1971) ‘Social categorization and intergroup behaviour’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 1: 149–77. 2. Rokeach, M. (1969) Beliefs, Attitudes and Values. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Belief Degrees | Field | II 257 Belief Degree/BD/Conditional/Field: the classic laws of probability for belief degrees do not apply with conditionals. - Disquotational Truth/Conditional: refers to the complete: "If Clinton dies, Gore becomes President" is true iff Clinton dies and Gore becomes President. Non-disquotational: behaves like disquotational truth in simple sentences. With conditionals: simplest solution: without truth value. >Disquotationalism, >Truth values, >Conditionals. II 295 Belief Degree/Probability/Field: the classic law of the probability of disjunctions with mutually exclusive disjuncts does not apply for degrees of belief when vagueness is allowed. >Probability, >Probablilty law. II 296 Probability Function/Belief Degree: difference: for probability functions the conditional probability is never higher than the probability of the material conditional. >Probability function. II 300 Indeterminacy/Belief Degree/Field: the indeterminacy of a sentence A is determined by the amount for which its probability and its negation add up to less than 1. ((s) i.e. that there is a possibility that neither A nor ~A applies.) II 302 Indeterminacy/Belief/Field: some: E.g. "belief" in opportunities is inappropriate, because they are never actual. Solution: Acceptance of sentences about opportunities. - Also in indeterminacy. Solution: belief degrees in things other than explanation. II 310 Non-classical Belief Degrees/Indeterminacy/Field: E.g. that every "decision" about the power of the continuum is arbitrary, is a good reason to assume non-classical belief degrees. Moderate non-classical logic: that some instances of the sentence cannot be asserted by the excluded middle. >Excluded middle, >Non-classical logic. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Beliefs | Appraisal Theory | Corr I 63 Beliefs/appraisal theory/Reisenzein/Weber: There is (…) evidence that appraisal-related, general beliefs influence emotional reactions to events. The two general beliefs that have been most extensively researched in this regard are (a) optimism (versus pessimism), defined as a generalized expectancy for positive (versus negative) outcomes (Scheier, Carver and Bridges 2001)(1); and (b) general self-efficacy, defined as a person’s generalized belief in her ability to reach her goals and to master difficult or stressful situations (Bandura 1997(2); Schwarzer and Jerusalem 1995(3)). >Optimism, >Self-efficacy. General self-efficacy has been found, for example, to be associated with lower state anxiety during a stressful cognitive task (Endler, Speer, Johnson and Flett 2001)(4) and lower levels of depression and anxiety in medical patients (e.g., Luszczynska, Gutiérrez-Doña and Schwarzer 2005)(5). These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that optimism and general self-efficacy affect emotional states at least partly by influencing the appraisals of events; it should be noted, however, that direct evidence for this mediating path is so far scarce (e.g., Kaiser, Major and McCoy 2004(6); Schwarzer and Jerusalem 1999)(7). >Emotion, >Behavior. 1. Scheier, M. F., Carver, C. S. and Bridges, M. W. 2001. Optimism, pessimism, and psychological well-being, in E. C. Chang (ed.), Optimism and pessimism: implications for theory, research, and practice, pp. 189–216. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association 2. Bandura, A. 1997. Self-efficacy: the exercise of control. New York: Freeman 3. Schwarzer, R. and Jerusalem, M. 1995. Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale, in J. Weinman, S. Wright and M. Johnston (eds.), Measures in health psychology: a user’s portfolio. Causal and control beliefs, pp. 35–7. Windsor: NFER-Nelson 4. Endler, N. S., Speer, R. L., Johnson, J. M. and Flett, G. L. 2001. General self-efficacy and control in relation to anxiety and cognitive performance, Current Psychology: Developmental, Learning, Personality, Social 20: 36–52 5. Luszczynska, A., Gutiérrez-Doña, B. and Schwarzer, R. 2005. General self-efficacy in various domains of human functioning: evidence from five countries, International Journal of Psychology 40: 80–9 6. Kaiser, C. R., Major, B. and McCoy, S. K. 2004. Expectations about the future and the emotional consequences of perceiving prejudice, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30: 173–84 7. Schwarzer, R., and Jerusalem, M. 1999. Skalen zur Erfassung von Lehrer- und Schülermerkmalen [Scales for the assessment of teacher and student characteristics]. Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Beliefs | Benacerraf | Field II 373 Belief/empiricism/rules/irrefutability/Benacerraf(1973)(1): if our system of rules were independent of any evidence for a particular physical theory, this would make our belief causally and counterfactually independent of the facts. This would, however, thwart the epistemic value of considerations based on this belief. >Evidence, >Rules, >Knowledge, >Certainty, >Theories, cf. >Empiricism, >Causal explanation, >Causality. Logic/Apriority/Field: it looks at first as if one could also use the argument for a priori belief in logic. >a priori, >Logic. FieldVs: but it is pointless to ask whether logical beliefs depend on logical facts. >Beliefs, >Facts, >Dependence. 1. Benacerraf, P. Mathematical Truth, The Journal of Philosophy 70, 1973, S. 661–679. |
Bena I P. Benacerraf Philosophy of Mathematics 2ed: Selected Readings Cambridge 1984 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Beliefs | Dennett | Field II 36 Def Core Belief/Dennett/Field: simplest explanation for dispositions: the organism has explicitly only a certain number of representations saved. What a person believes, are just the obvious consequences of this core belief. - Solution to the problem that one would otherwise have stored infinitely many sentences. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Beliefs | Dummett | III (c) 124 Def Belief/Dummett: Belief stems from the gap between truth conditions of a sentence and the conditions under which something is held to be true. >Truth conditions, >Understanding. Rorty IV 23 Dummett: (Plato ditto): some of our true beliefs are related to the world in a way, in which others are not related to it. - ((s) Explanation: that means not to define a basic attitude per or VsRealism.) |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Beliefs | Esfeld | I 50 ~ Belief/Quine/Esfeld: a foundation is not possible because of the fundamental revisability of each belief. Confirmation holism: because individual belief can be justified only through experience, each belief can be revised (Type B). >Foundation, >Experience. Confirmation holism refers to the belief-system of an individual - that is justification holism. No belief can be a foundation (type A or B). >Confirmation. I 95ff Intra-personnel problem: the changes of beliefs are a problem here. An inter-personnel problem is the communication (same meanings?). Inferential context: the inferential context is the linguistic use in the community. Contents: content will therefore not be determined in the system of beliefs, but externally. One should not ask which other beliefs the persons have but what they should have. Therefore, belief is not in the head. There are identity conditions for them (for intentional content there are no identity conditions). >Content, >Identity conditions. I 132ff Beliefs/Esfeld: beliefs are a basic linguistic unity because they are the only ones which have the dual character: one can ask for reasons for them and they can even be given as reasons. >Justification, >Reasons. I 161ff Belief/Esfeld: beliefs can result in determinations that go beyond what we are ready for -> answer dependence of our terms: something is only red if it appears red for normal observers under normal circumstances: "it belongs to the concept that ... ": is not a reduction on appearance. However answer dependence does not include characteristics in the recipient. >Terminology/Esfeld, >Qualities/Esfeld. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Beliefs | Hume | I 114 Belief/Hume: belief is perceived, not merely imagined - a vivid imagination. >Imagination/Hume. --- Peacocke I 78 Belief/Hume: belief is a mere habit. Peacocke: this is not applicable for us. >Beliefs/Peacocke. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Beliefs | Rorty | III 84 Beliefs/Rorty: a belief that can be justified before anyone is not interesting for anybody! The traditional distinction between "rational conviction" and "belief, which is brought about by causes rather than reasons" should be abolished! In the end, the replacement of vocabularies is what counts and not of beliefs! The replacement of truth value candidates, not the determination of a truth value. >Reason/Cause. III 89 Belief/Rorty: a belief that could be justified to anyone would interest no one. III 90 In the end, the replacement of vocabularies is what counts and not of beliefs! - The replacement of truth value candidates, not the determination of a truth value. >Vocabulary/Rorty, >Description/Rorty, >Truth values. VI 63ff Truth/Rorty: there is no cause of the truth of beliefs. >Truthmakers, >Facts. VI 144 Belief/existence/Dennett/Rorty: sometimes you do not accept the existence of an entity, but concede that we must have faith in this entity. E.g. belief in qualia and the phenomenological. >Ontology. VI 187 Belief/Davidson: thesis: most of our beliefs must be true - beliefs are no more or less accurate representations, but they are states that are attributed to people for the purpose of explaining their behavior. - One cannot determine first the belief and then its cause, but rather the reverse. - Rorty: (like Davidson) we are interested in the beliefs of the others, because we want to be able to deal with their behavior. VI 214 Beliefs/Davidson/Sellars/Brandom/Rorty: are imposed on us by the world, and that happens in the course of causal interactions between the program forced upon us in the educational process and the sensual organs. >DavidsonVsMcDowell. VI 231 Belief/Davidson/Rorty: self-attribution of experiences presuppose the self-attribution of intentional states. - That’s only possible for someone who already believes many true things of about the world. - That is about the causal link between beliefs and world. >World/thinking, >Causal theory of knowledge. VI 233 Belief/Davidson. we can only know the content of our intentional states if we know about their causes. >Causality. M. WilliamsVsDavidson: this is just the foundation thought that he rejects. VI 426f Belief/experience/Rorty: the spirit of the adult is more complex than that of the child. - Thus, the distinction between causation and justification of beliefs disappears. - (> Beliefs/Davidson). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Beliefs | Schiffer | I 273 Def subdoxastic/Stich: (1978): a subdoxastic state is not a religious state, but an information-bearing state. You are unconscious and inferentially insulated from beliefs. >Unconsious, >Belief state, >Beliefs, >Inference. E.g. if there is a transformational grammar, then the states they would represent would be subdoxastic. Schiffer thesis: language processing is done through a series of internal subdoxastic states. 1. Stephen P. Stich (1978). Beliefs and subdoxastic states. In: Philosophy of Science 45 (December):499-518 --- I 26 Belief/Schiffer: problem: such a psychological theory does not create the meaning of beliefs. - Solution: functionalist reduction. >Psycho functionalism. Ultimately: "Bel = def 1st element of an ordered pair of functions that satisfies T (f,g) "... ((s) from which the theory says that it is belief) ...) - ((s) "Loar-style"). >Meaning theory/Loar. I 28 Schiffer: It is already presupposed that one forms beliefs and desires as functions of propositions on (sets of) internal Z-types. >Functional role/Schiffer. The criterion that a Z-token is n a belief, that p is, that n is a token of a Z-type which has the functional role, that correlates the definition of bel T with p. I 150 Belief property/SchifferVs: if belief properties existed, they would not be irreducible (absurd). - ((s) It is already proven for Schiffer that there is a neural proposition for E.g. stepping back from a car.) This is the cause - then we have a mental proposition in addition. This is then not supported by any counterfactual conditional. Counterfactual conditional/(s): indicates whether something is superfluous - or whether it is then sufficient as an explanation. >Counterfactual conditionals. I 155 Belief properties/Schiffer: presumed they existed (language-independent), then they should be simple (non-assembled), i.e. no function of other things. Vs: E.g. the proposition, to love Thatcher is composed of love and Thatcher - but belief is no such relation (see above). Problem: if belief properties are semantically simple, then there is an infinite number of them. - Then language learning is impossible. >Language acquisition, >Learning. I 163 Belief predicates: less problematic than belief properties: irreducibility out of conceptual role. >Conceptual role. E.g. Ava would not have stepped back if she did not have the belief property that a car is coming. Conceptually and ontologically independent of the singular term "The EC of the belief that a car comes" This is a benign predicate-dualism (in terms of conceptual roles). It has no causal power. Pleonastic: Ava stepped back because she had the belief property... I 164 Belief/(s): Where, Ava believes that a car is coming, she believes this in every possible world that is physically indistinguishable from the actual world. Problem: that cannot be proven - but is probably true. Then ultimately, she stepped back, because she was in the neural state... SchifferVsEliminativism/SchifferVsChurchland: the eliminativism should then have the result that nobody believes anything. >Eliminativism, >Reductionism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Beliefs | Sellars | Rorty VI 179 ff Belief/Sellars: every belief is revisable. Rorty: Belief/SellarsVsEmpiricism: can only be justified by concepts. (s) Not through "direct perception", "intuition", "experience", etc.). >Perception, >Empiricism. --- I XXXIII Ryle: had suggested to conceive mental predicates like "being convinced", "believing", etc. as expressions of dispositions, however without accounting for the fact that, again, there is an explanation instance, be it in the nature of the Freudian ego or superego. >Gilbert Ryle, >Dispositions/Ryle, >Behavior/Ryle. Ryle: being convinced means to behave in a certain way. Sellars: goes one step further than Ryle by asking how the behavioral dispositions themselves can also be explained. E.g., His tie retailer John developed a kind of theory which specifically refers to the verbal behavior of a community of Rylean ancestors. >Rylean ancestors. --- II 325 Action: fundamental beliefs are expressed in uniformity of behavior. This does not mean that no deviations are possible, but only that the representation of a principle is in any case also characterized by uniformity of behavior. >Regularity, >Behavior/Sellars. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Bentham, Jeremy | Rothbard | Rothbard II 49 Jeremy Bentham/Rothbard: Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) began as a devoted Smithian but more consistently attached to laissez-faire. During his relatively brief span of interest in economics, he became more and more statist. His intensified statism was merely one aspect of his major - and highly unfortunate - contribution to economics: his consistent philosophical utilitarianism. This contribution, which opens a broad sluice-gate for state despotism, still remains as Bentham's legacy to contemporary neoclassical economics. Bentham's first and enduring interest was in utilitarianism (which we shall examine further below), and which he launched with his first published work at the age of 28, the Fragment on Government (1776)(1). Rothbard II 54 VsBentham: James Mill and David Ricardo have been considered loyal Benthamites, and this they were in utilitarian philosophy and in a belief in political democracy. In economics, however, it was a far different story, and Mill and Ricardo, sound as a rock on Say's law and the Turgot-Smith analysis, were firm in successfully discouraging the publication of the ‘The True Alarm’(2). RicardoVsBentham: Ricardo scoffed at almost all of later Benthamite economics and, in the case of money and production, asked the proper questions: ‘Why should the mere increase of money have any other effect than to lower its value? How would it cause any increase in the production of commodities... Money cannot call forth goods... but goods can call forth money.’ Bentham's major theme... ‘that money is the cause of riches’ - Ricardo rejected firmly and flatly. 1. Bentham, J. 1776. Fragment on Government. Being an Examination of What Is Delivered, on the Subject of Government in General, in the Introduction to Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries. London. 2. Bentham, J. 1801. The True Alarm. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Bertrand Competition | Norman | Krugman III 95 Cournot Competition/Victor D. Norman: To see whether our assumption(1) that the oligopoly equilibrium involves Bertrand price competition* is important, we also simulate the effects of entry assuming Cournot competition in the number of seats offered on each flight. >Cournot Competition, >Bertrand Competition, >Sensitivity analysis, >Models, >Economic models, >Model theory, >Equilibrium, >Oligopolies. Equilibrium: As is seen, the simulated equilibria are virtually identical, except as regards the degree of price discrimination between Euroclass and tourist-class passengers: As should be expected, Cournot competition (being less aggressive than Bertrand) involves greater price discrimination; consequently, the relative price of Euroclass tickets falls more in the case of Bertrand than in the Cournot case. 1.Victor D. Norman and Siri P. Strandenes. „Deregulation of Scandinavian Airlines: A Case Study of the Oslo-Stockholm Route.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Victor D. Norman and Siri P. Strandenes. „Deregulation of Scandinavian Airlines: A Case Study of the Oslo-Stockholm Route.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Best Explanation | Best explanation: preference for one hypothesis over others. The choice can be done within a theory or result in the transition to another theory. See also explanation. |
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| Best Explanation | Bigelow | I 341 Best explanation/BE/Bigelow/Pargetter: behind it different kinds of realism are concealed. (> realism) >Realism, >Explanations. I 344 Explanation/BE/Bigelow/Pargetter: if we accept the realism due to conclusions on the best explanation, we must ask what kind of explanation it is. It may e.g. be about various kinds of (Aristotelian) causes (see above). The most convincing are surely those which are concerned with "efficient" causes: e.g. Cartwright, Hacking: Realism/Cartwright/Hacking: is best supported by causal explanations. >Realism/Cartwright, >N. Cartwright, >Realism/Hacking, >I. Hacking. Quine/Two Dogmas/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quine has caused many philosophers not only to stay in the armchair, but also to question the experiments that scientists have carried out in real terms. We reject this. >Two Dogmas, >W.O.V. Quine. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: but we also reject the other extreme that realism would have to arise solely from causal explanations. >Causal explanations. I 345 There can also be formal reasons (formal causes/Aristotle) for realism. Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: so it is also a legitimate question as to what modalities are constituted in science. Modal realism is the best explanation here for such matters. >Modalities, >Modal realism. Metaphysics/Platonism/Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: can be supported by the best explanation: by means of conclusions on the best explanation we show that we need modalities and universals in the sciences. >Universals, >Abduction. Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: their primary source is mathematics. Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: our metaphysics allows a realistic view of mathematics (BigelowVsField). >Mathematics/Field. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Best Explanation | Cartwright | I 6 Best Explanation/CartwrightVsBest Explanation: instead: probable causes. I 85 Best Explanation/Cartwright: here we infer probable causes, not laws or explanation schemes. >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Causality, >Abduction, >Probability. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Best Explanation | Field | I 15 Best explanation/Field: the best explanation wants to maintain certain beliefs about phenomena - these phenomena are then accepted as naked truth. >Naked truth, >Phenomena. Problem: best explanation also leads to belief in unobservables - then observation should not make a difference! >Observation, >Unobservables. As-if statements: may not travel piggyback on real explanation. >As if. Restriction of the best explanation on observable: would cripple our beliefs. I 92 Best explanation/Field: solution: best explanation instead of enumarative induction - then modal completeness is irrelevant. >Completeness. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Best Explanation | Fraassen | I 20 Best explanation/BE/Harman/Fraassen: not committed to adopting unobservable entities. >Unobserables. I 22 FraassenVsBest explanation: even if I am obliged to say that a theory is either true or false, I am not obliged to conclude it! - I am when I’m determined not to remain neutral. Simplicity: does not commit me on a theory that I do not believe. >Simplicity. False solution: to assume just a second (false) theory, and then to use the Best explanation in order to choose the other. - To follow normal patterns of inference does not make realists of us all - ((s) otherwise the anti-realism would have to be logically false). >Inferences, >Anti-realism. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Best Explanation | Hacking | I 96 Best Explanation/Hacking: For the best explanation you will need: 1st simplicity, 2nd an argument of the cosmic coincidence and 3rd success (HackingVs). >Simplicity, >Coincidence/Hacking, >Coincidence, >Success. HackingVsExplanations: explanations do not belong to the existence of the universe. >Explanations, >Universe. I 98 Existence is not actually part of the explanation. ((s) It is not a good explanation if the possibility of the existence of the objects arises within the explanation itself.) >Existence, >Circular reasoning, >Ontology. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Best Explanation | Wright | I 146 Best Opinion/Wright, Crispin: The best opinion is an optimal judgment. - It forms a conceptual basis of truth. - Then the best opinion is necessarily true.- Then follows: Projectivism/Wright: projectivism is committed to the basic equation: e.g.: "Square" only when noted under standard conditions by standard observers. >Standard conditions. Contrary to this: Detectivism: here, the best opinion only reflects: Then it should be possible that certain best opinions are not causally properly come about. - Then the basic equations are only contingently true. >Beliefs, >Theories, >Observation, >Method, >Truth, >Assertibility. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Bible Criticism | Spinoza | Gadamer I 184 Bible Criticism/Bible/Hermeneutics/Spinoza/Gadamer: The actual problem of understanding obviously breaks open when the question of reflection arises in the effort to understand the content: How does he come to his opinion? For it is clear that such a question poses a strangeness of quite different species and ultimately means a renunciation of common meaning. >Understanding, >Sense, >Hermeneutics. Spinoza's Bible criticism is a good example of this (and at the same time one of the earliest documents). In Chapter 7 of the "Tractatus theologico-politicus"(1), Spinoza develops his method of interpreting Sacred Scripture on the basis of the interpretation of nature. From the historical data one must infer the meaning (mens) of the authors - to the extent that in these books things are told (history of miracles as well as revelations) that cannot be deduced from the principles known to natural reason. Even in these things, which are in themselves incomprehensible (imperceptibiles), everything that matters can be understood, notwithstanding the fact that the Scripture unquestionably has a moral sense as a whole, if we only recognize the spirit of the author "historically", that is to say, by overcoming our prejudices, we can think of no other things than those that the author could have in mind. Gadamer I 185 Euclid would not be interpreted by anyone as to mean that the life, studies and customs (vita, studium et mores) of the author were to be taken into account, and this also applied to the spirit of the Bible in moral matters (circa documenta moralia). Just because there are incomprehensible things (res imperceptibiles) in the narratives of the Bible, their understanding is dependent on the fact that we determine the understanding of the author's meaning from the whole of his writing (ut mentem auctoris percipiamus). And there it indeed does not matter whether what is meant corresponds to our insight, for we only want to recognize the meaning of the sentences (the sensus orationum), but not their truth (veritas). This requires the elimination of all bias, even the bias caused by our reason (all the more so, of course, by our prejudices).(§ 17). Gadamer I 185 Gadamer: The "naturalness" of the understanding of the Bible is thus based on the fact that the insightful (German: "Einsichtige") can be seen and the undiscerning (German: "Uneinsichtige") becomes "historically" understandable. >Bible. 1. Spinoza: Theologisch-politische Abhandlung. Berlin 1870 Höffe I 238 Bible Criticism/Spinoza/Höffe: Spinoza is also an “enlightener” regarding the critical analysis of the Holy Scriptures. Historical-critical biblical scholarship was already well advanced at that time, so that Spinoza's method, compared with Calvin's, for example, is not new. What is new, perhaps even revolutionarily new, is the political mandate given to the hermeneutics of the Bible: It must submit to the political goal of peace, which in turn must be philosophised in the service of freedom. To this end, Spinoza undermines the authority of the learned theologians and declares every person free to interpret Sacred Scripture for himself - provided the person fulfils a political condition: that his interpretation strengthens obedience to (secular) law. For otherwise neither insurrections nor civil wars can be cut short. VsRevelation: To the extent that Spinoza engages with the content of the Holy Scriptures, it takes away the rank of a timeless revelation from their basic idea. Rather, the scripture consists primarily of pictorial speeches that are directed at the imagination and the capacity of the contemporaries of the time. Insofar as the texts are merely pictorial speeches, a further-reaching hermeneutics, a second-level exegesis, seeks out their hidden subtext, the rational core. According to Spinoza, it is moral and only moral: the commandments of Scripture are meant to guide to righteousness, namely to justice and charity. Religion/Spinoza: Here, religion appears as a means of moral cultivation of people, which results in a perfecting tolerance: Whoever, like Spinoza, commits religion to the moral cultivation of man can remain faithful to his or her own religion and denomination, while at the same time recognizing those of others, for their differences have become irrelevant. |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Biconditional | Tarski | Horwich I 124 Biconditional/iff/if and only if/Tarski: no relation between sentences. - No names of sentences emerge. Contrary to that: Equivalence relation between sentences: combination of names of sentences. (1) >Names of sentences, >Equivalence, >Sentences. 1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Bimetallism | Rothbard | Rothbard III 898 Bimetallism/Rothbard: Price control/relative prices: Whenever the State sets an arbitrary value or price on one money in terms of another, it thereby establishes an effective minimum price control on one money and a maximum price control on the other, the "prices" being in terms of each other. >Relative price/Rothbard. Bimetallism: This, for example, was the essence of bimetallism. Under bimetallism, a nation recognized gold and silver as moneys, but set an arbitrary price, or exchange ratio, between them. When this arbitrary price differed, as it was bound to do, from the free-market price (and this became ever more likely as time passed and the free-market price changed, while the government's arbitrary price remained the same), one money became overvalued and the other undervalued by the government. Thus, suppose that a country used gold and silver as moneys, and the government set the ratio between them at 16 ounces of silver : 1 ounce of gold. >Price control/Rothbard, >Gresham’s Law/Rothbard. Rothbard III 899 VsBimetallism: The market price, perhaps 16:1 at the time of the price control, then changes to 15:1. What is the result? Silver is now being arbitrarily undervalued by the government and gold arbitrarily overvalued. In other words, silver is fixed cheaper than it really is in terms of gold on the market, and gold is forced to be more expensive than it really is in terms of silver. The government has imposed a price maximum on silver and a price minimum on gold, in terms of each other. The same consequences now follow as from any effective price control. With a price maximum on silver, the gold demand for silver in exchange now exceeds the silver demand for gold (conversely, With a price minimum on gold, the silver demand for gold is less than the gold demand for silver). Problem: Gresham’s Law: Gold goes begging for silver in unsold surplus, while silver becomes scarce and disappears from circulation. Silver disappears to another country or area where it can be exchanged at the free-market price, and gold, in turn, flows into the country. World: If the bimetallism is worldwide, then silver disappears into the "black market," and offcial or open exchanges are made only with gold. VsBimetallism: No country, therefore, can maintain a bimetallic system in practice, since one money will always be undervalued or overvalued in terms of the other. The overvalued always displaces the other from circulation, the latter being scarce. >Gresham’s Law. Fiat money: Similar consequences follow from such price control as setting arbitrary exchange rates on fiat moneys and in setting new and worn coins arbitrarily equal to one another when they discernibly differ in weight. >Exchange rates/Rothbard. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Bivalence | Dummett | II 103 Principle of Bivalence/Truth/Dummett: PoB already presumes the concept of truth. - And that is transcendental in the case of undecidable sentences. - It goes beyond our ability to recognize what a manifestation would be. >Decidability. II 103f Undecidability/anti-realism/Dummett: (without bivalence) The meaning theory will then no longer be purely descriptive in relation to our actual practice. III (a) 17 Sense/Frege: Explanation of sense by truth conditions. - Tractatus: dito: "Under which circumstances...". >Truth conditions, >Circumstances. DummettVsFrege/DummettVsWittgenstein: For that one must already know what the statement that P is true means. Vs: if they then say P is true means the same as asserting P. VsVs: then you must already know what sense it makes to assert P! But that is exactly what should be explained. VsRedundancy theory: we must either supplement it (not merely explain the meaning by assertion and vice versa) or abandon the bivalence. >Redundancy theory. III (b) 74 Sense/Reference/Bivalence/Dummett: bivalence: Problem: not every sentence has such a sense that in principle we can recognize it as true if it is true (e.g. >unicorns, >Goldbach’s conjecture). But Frege’s argument does not depend at all on bivalence. III (b) 76 Bivalence, however, works for elementary clauses: if here the semantic value is the extension, it is not necessary to be possible to decide whether the predicate is true or not - perhaps application cannot be effectively decided, but the (undefined) predicate can be understood without allocating the semantic value (truth value) - therefore distinction between sense and semantic value. >Semantic Value. Cf. >Multi valued logic. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Blockchain | Congressional Research Service (CRS) | CRS IV 4 Blockchain/CRS/Tierno: Cryptocurrency is built on blockchain technology. The blockchain is a type of database that - in its application in cryptocurrencies - operates as a ledger, recording the various transactions of its participants. In the context of cryptocurrency, transactions are grouped together in blocks and, once approved, added to the chain of previously approved blocks. According to a National Institute of Standards and Technology report, blockchains “enable a community of users to record transactions in a shared ledger within that community, such that under normal operation of the blockchain network no transaction can be changed once published.”(1) Computer scientists define blockchains thus as append-only, which means once published they can be added to but not otherwise amended. This append-only nature of blockchains, also often referred to as immutability, is crucial because system participants, including network nodes and miners, can identify attempted tampering. The fact that blockchains are shared and immutable allows there to be no central intermediary responsible for approving transactions or confirming their veracity before they are added to the blockchain. There is also not a central body that approves which entities may approve transactions. Cryptocurrencies instead rely on what is commonly referred to as decentralized consensus model, in which many network participants (referred to as mining or validator nodes) compete with each other to authorize blocks of transactions for the promise of compensation (a block reward), usually in currency native to a specific network or blockchain. >Cryptocurrency risks, >Cryptocurrency, >Crypto transactions, >Fake transactions, >Cross-border payments, >Money laundry, >Crypto regulation, >Blockchain, >Bitcoin, >Crypto Firms, >Crypto and Banking, >Payment systems, >Stablecoins, >Ethereum, >Wash trade, >Crypto and Energy. 1. Dylan Yaga et al., Blockchain Technology Overview, National Institute of Standards and Technology, October 2018, p. iv, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2018/NIST.IR.8202.pdf. |
CRS I Congressional Research Service (CRS) Marc Labonte Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? Washington: Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress 2007 CRS II Congressional Research Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Marc Labonte, Banking and Cryptocurrency: Policy Issues. CRS Congressional research Service Report R48430. Washington, DC. 2025 CRS III Congressional Research Service (CRS) Corrie E. Clark Heather L. Greenley, Bitcoin, Blockchain, and the Energy Sector. Washington, DC. 2019 CRS IV Congressional Reserch Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Cryptocurrency: Selected Policy Issues Congressional Reserch Service CRS Report R47425 Washington, DC. 2023 |
| Blogs | Morozov | I 154 Blogs/Morozov: the assumption that bloggers - who can come from very different areas - have a central property in common is a sign of "internet centrism" (see Terminology/Morozov). No one benefits more from the idea that "online" is an independent intellectual space than the public relations industry, which cleverly exploits this digital duality to dress up boring press releases as exciting and autonomously generated "memes". I 155 Meme/Morozov: are mostly made and not "born". Ryan Holiday: Thesis: it's about suggesting that the meme already exists and all the reporter (or music editor or promoter) has to do is popularize it. (1) Morozov: blogs serve this purpose according to Holiday. >Music industry. I 165 Blogs/intermediates/Morozov: When the first generation of bloggers went online in the late 1990s, the only intermediaries between them and the rest of the world were their hosting companies and Internet service providers. People starting a blog in 2012 are likely to end up on a commercial platform like Tumblr or WordPress, with all their blog comments running through a third-party company like Disqus. But that is not all: Disqus itself cooperates with the company Impermium, which relies on various machine learning programs to check whether the posted comments are spam. It is the dissemination - not elimination - of intermediaries that has made blogging so widespread. Impermium goes even further and searches content for violence, racism, hate speech, etc. (2) 1. Ryan Holiday, Trust Me, I’m Lying: Confessions of a Media Manipulator, Kindle ed. (New York: Portfolio Hardcover, 2012), 23. 2. Mark Risher, “The Dark Side of Social: Protect Your Brand from Abusive Social Spam,” The Allied Front (Impermium’s corporate blog), October 10, 2012, http:// www.impermium.com/ blog/ 2012/ 10/ 10/ the-dark-side-of-social-protect-your-brand-from-abusive-social-spam. |
Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Bolsheviks | Schmitt | Brocker I 170 Fascism/Bolshevism/Schmitt: Schmitt regarded these movements as complex movements in which motives and energies of Marxism, anarchism and nationalism became effective in different ways, and he imputed to them an irrationalist "philosophy of concrete life" (1), which Sorel had captured in a prototype. >Marxism, >Anarchism, >Nationalism. Schmitt thus moved away from the self-image of the movements and developed his own strong and speculative interpretation. His view of "Moscow" was influenced by a typical contemporary Slavophilia (after Tolstoy and Dostoevsky). >Dostoevsky. Schmitt quoted Sorel and Mussolini for his assessment that "the energy of the national is greater than that of the class struggle myth" (2). In the end, he played Mussolini off against liberal parliamentarianism like Bolshevism. >Parliamentary system. 1. Carl Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, in: Bonner Festgabe für Ernst Zitelmann zum fünfzigjährigen Doktorjubiläum, München/Leipzig 1923, 413-473. Separatveröffentlichung in der Reihe: Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen und Reden zur Philosophie, Politik und Geistesgeschichte, Bd. 1, München/Leipzig 1923. Zweite, erweiterte Auflage 1926, S. 76. 2.Ebenda S. 88. Reinhard Mehring, Carl Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus (1923), in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Schmitt I Carl Schmitt Der Hüter der Verfassung Tübingen 1931 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Brain | Deacon | I 45 Brain/Deacon: in the co-evolution of language and brain, the relationship between cause and effect was reversed in that the new ability of the symbolic reference (which is reserved exclusively for the human species) was decoupled from genetic transmission. >Symbolic Reference, >Symbols/Deacon. If it is true that there has been a pressure in selection on symbolic organisms, our unique mental ability must also be understood in these terms. Then the architecture of our brains should also show systematic deviations from the architecture of monkey brains. >Animals, >Animal language. Size: is only an insignificant feature. What is more important is the transformation, the re-engineering of the architecture. I 146 - 164 Brain/Learning/Deacon: Brain size has probably something to do with intelligence, but there are many other factors to consider, such as the proportion of brain capacity required to control the musculoskeletal system. Learning. I 164 Second level learning, i.e. the development of new reactions to new situations only occurs in organisms that live longer. In more short-lived species, such an ability would not pay off. >Behavior. I 166 Small dogs with correspondingly small brains are very similar to big dogs in their brain performances. Their cerebralization (i.e. their brain performance relative to their weight) is even slightly greater than that of their larger conspecifics. I 170 Cerebralisation/encephalisation: the origin of their increase in primates is not in the head! It is in the relatively slower growth of their bodies. I 183 To compare the brains of animals with those of humans, we do not need to compare sizes in general, but we need to compare the sizes of the individual parts of the brain. The structure of the brain or the control of the relative growth of individual body parts at all. Is controlled by homeotic genes. I 194 The brain adapts to the rest of the body during evolution. This explains the otherwise extremely improbable result that adding further components of this extremely networked structure leads to an increase in functions and does not restrict them. Solution: the brain itself plays a systemic role in the design of its parts. Neurons - unlike other cell types - are designed for communication and thus for tuning the function with remote cells. Cf. Learning, >Learning/Hebb. I 195 In this way, the nervous system itself can participate in the process of its construction. Cf. >Neural Networks. I 199 Xenotransplantation of brain parts between different animal species showed that growth and interconnection with foreign tissue is possible. The molecular processes are identical in the different animal species. I 202 In foreign tissue, neurons begin to produce an increased number of axons, some of which turn out to be less suitable and are then used less frequently. This is a Darwin-like process of selective elimination. I 474 Deacon thesis: the initial unspecific connectivity and subsequent competition of the connections influences cognitive processes through tendencies in neural computation resulting from superior patterns due to regional distribution. This is how differences between the species develop. Cf. >Computation, >Information Processing/Psychology. I 205 Cells in different brain regions have not previously gotten their compounds dictated and can specialize in different directions. Literally every developing brain region adapts to the body in which it is located. I 207 Displacement/Deacon: if a genetic variation strengthens the relative size of a population of nerve cells, the axons will shift from smaller to larger regions. I 212 We do not have to speculate about special brain functions, which are reserved solely for humans when we understand the shift that does not depend on the sheer size of the brain. The course for the division of regions for individual brain functions is set shortly after birth. I 213 The formation and differentiation of the brain regions of the human being takes place along the formation of the functions of its body parts and other bodily functions such as eyes, ears, musculoskeletal system. This formation is very different to the formation of small and large dogs. I 214ff Thought experiment: Assuming that a human embryonic brain is transplanted into a gigantic monkey body. It is possible to predict quite accurately which brain regions develop and how, adapted to the body functions and their relative expression. Factors such as the deviating size of the retina or the competition of the brain cells for the control of muscle cells are decisive. These changes are not isolated adaptations. I 220 Langauge/Brain/Deacon: Thesis: Increasing vocalization can be traced back to motor projections of the midbrain and brain stem, while symbolic learning can be traced back to the extension of the prefrontal cortex and competition for synapses throughout the brain. DeaconVsTradition: early on it was assumed that musicians, for example, have a particularly large brain region for processing auditory signals. That turned out to be wrong. I 221 There is competition between central and peripheral regions of the brain as well as between neighbouring regions. A selection is made not only with regard to regions, but also in terms of functions. >Selection. I 253 Language/mammals/Deacon: most mammals are unable to speak because the connection between motor cortex and vocal control instances in the brain stem has been cut during early development. I 267 In the brain, the operations for organizing the combinatorial relations, which regulate the use of symbols and associations, are located in the prefrontal cortex. I 277 The cerebellum is very fast in the formation of predictions. Linking to the cerebellum is, for example, beneficial for fast conjugations that are used in the formation of sentences. The prefrontal cortex is then responsible for filtering out the right associations. I 343 Brain/Human/Evolution: What is decisive is not an absolute growth in the size of the brain, but a growth in size relative to an increase in body height within species. And we can see that, in addition to this relative growth in size in the case of the human being, it has led to an increase in the size of the prefrontal cortex. This corresponds to a shift in learning disposition. I 345 This development can only be understood in terms of Baldwin's evolution (Baldwin effect). Cf. >Evolution/Deacon. I 346 Tool use/Deacon: passed on from individual to individual, i.e. learned and is not a characteristic that is reflected in the brain structure. >Culture, >Nature, >Evolution. I 347 The first tools were used by living beings whose brains were not well adapted for the use of symbols. However, experiments with monkeys such as Kanzi show that even such brains with considerable social training are able to learn to use symbols. >Symbols/Deacon. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Brain | Gershenfeld | Brockman I 166 Brain/computers/Gershenfeld: (…) both brains and computer chips are hard to understand by watching their inner workings; they’re easily interpreted only by observing their external interfaces. We come to trust (or not) brains and computer chips alike based on experience that tests them rather than on explanations for how they work. >Review, >Verification, >Function, >Functional explanation. Brockman I 167 What’s interesting about amino acids is that they’re not interesting. They have attributes that are typical but not unusual, such as attracting or repelling water. But just twenty types of them are enough to make you. In the same way, twenty or so types of digital-material part types - conducting, insulating, rigid, flexible, magnetic, etc. - are enough to assemble the range of functions that go into making modern technologies like robots and computers. >Life, >Computers, >Robots, >Technology, >Computer model, >Computation. Gershenfeld, Neil „Scaling”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Brain Development | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 70 Brain development(Developmental psychology/Upton: between the ages of two and five years the changes that occur in the brain enable children to plan their actions, pay greater attention to tasks and increase their language skills. The brain does not grow as rapidly during this time period as it did in infancy, but there are still some dramatic anatomical changes that take place (Thompson et al., 2000)(1). During early childhood, children’s brains show rapid growth in the prefrontal cortex in particular. The prefrontal cortex is an area of the frontal lobes that is known to be involved in two very important activities: planning and organising new actions, and maintaining attention to tasks (Blumenthal et al., 1999)(2). Other important changes include an increase in myelination of the cells in the brain. This myelination speeds up the rate at which information travels through the nervous system (Meier et al., 2004)(3). E.g.myelination of the area of the brain that controls hand–eye coordination is not completed until around four years of age. Brain-imaging studies have shown that children with lower rates of myelination in this area of the brain at four years of age show poorer hand–eye coordination than their peers (Pujol et al., 2004)(4). Upton I 71 Language/right hemisphere: Handedness has traditionally been thought to have a strong link to brain organisation. Paul Pierre Broca first described language regions in the left hemisphere of right-handers in the nineteenth century and, from then on, it was accepted that the reverse, that is, right-hemisphere language dominance, should be true of left-handers (Knecht et al., 2000)(5). However, in reality the left-hand side of the brain dominates in language processing for most people: around 95 per cent of right-handers process speech predominantly in the left hemisphere (Springer and Deutsch, 1985)(6), as do more than 50 per cent of left-handers (Knecht et al., 2000)(5). According to Knecht et al., left-handedness is neither a precondition nor a necessary consequence of right-hemisphere language dominance (Knecht et al., 2000(5), p. 2517). >Learning, >Learning theory, >Language acquisition, >Brain, >Lateralization of the brain, >Language. 1. Thompson, P.M., Giedd, J. N., Woods, R. P., MacDonald D. Evans, A. C. & Toga, A. W. 2000. Growth patterns in the developing brain detected by using continuum mechanical tensor maps. Nature, 404, 190-3. 2. Blumenthal, J. A., Babyak M. A., Moore, K.A., Craighead, W.E:, Herman, S. Khatri, P., Waugh, R, Napolitano, M.A., Forman, L.M., Appelbaum, M., Doraiswamy, P.M. & Krishnan, K.R. 1999. Effects of exercise training on older patients with major depression, Archives of internal Medicine, 159: 2349-56. 3. Meier, B.P. and Hinsz, V.B. (2004) A comparison of human aggression committed by groups and individuals: an interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40: 551–59. 4. Pujol,J, López-Sala, A., Sebastiá-Gallés, N, Deus, J, Cardoner, N., Soriano-Mas, C, Moreno, A. and Sans, A. (2004) Delayed myelination in children with developmental delay detected by volumetric MRI. NeuroImage, 22 (2): 897–903. 5. Knecht, S., Dräger, B., Deppe, M., Bobe, L. and Lohmann, H. (2000) Handedness and hemispheric language dominance in healthy humans. Brain, 123(12): 2512–18. 6. Springer, S.P. and Deutsch, G. (1985) Left Brain, Right Brain. New York: W.H. Freeman. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Brain Development | Geriatric Psychology | Upton I 141 Brain Development/Geriatric psychology/Upton: Between the ages of 20 and 90, the brain shrinks, losing 5—10 per cent of its weight (Enzinger et al., 2005)(1). A decrease in volume has also been observed; in one study the volume of the brains of older adults was around 15 per cent less than that of younger adults (Shan et al., 2005)(2). Upton I 142 In one study it was found that brain volume reduces by 0.22 per cent every year between the ages of 20 and 65, then by 0.40 per cent per year from 65 to 80 years of age (Fotenos et aL, 2008)(3). This is thought to be because of a combination of loss of dendrites, damage to myelin and the death of brain cells. Some areas of the brain shrink more than others as we age: the prefrontal cortex is one area that reduces in size and this has been linked to a decrease in cognitive function such as working memory (Grady et al.. 2006)(4). Recent evidence has supported the idea that it is the structural changes in the brain that cause the loss of functioning (Fan et al.. 2008)(5). However, we do not really know whether brain shrinkage leads to cognitive decline or vice versa. It is possible that this cause and effect model is too simplistic, as it fails to consider a number of environmental factors that may influence the impact of any biologically based changes in brain structure. Fotenos et al. (2008)(3) have found, for example, that there is a complex relationship between socio-economic status, structural changes in the brain and cognitive decline. The study found that, in older adults with no cognitive decline, those of higher socio-economic status showed more loss of brain volume when compared to individuals of lower socio-economic status. This does not mean that high socio-economic status is related to greater loss of brain volume, but rather that older adults from higher socio-economic groups respond differently to the same loss of brain volume than individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds. >Social Status, >Dementia. 1. Enzinger, C, Fazekas F, Matthews, PM and Ropele S et al. (2005) Risk factors for progression of brain atrophy in aging: six-year follow-up of normal subjects. Neurology, 64(10): 1704-11. 2. Shan, Z, Liu, ¡Z, Sahgal, V, Wang, B, and Yue, GH (2005) Selective atrophy of left hemisphere and frontal lobe of the brain in old men.Journal of Gerontology: Series A, biological sciences and methcal sciences, 60(2): 165-74. 3. Fotenos, AF, Mintun, MA, Synder, AZ, Morris, JC and Buckner, RL (2008) Brain volume decline in aging: evidence for a relation between socioeconomic status, preclinical Alzheimer disease, and reserve. Neurology, 6 5(1): 113-20. 4. Grady, CL, Springer, MV, Hongwanishkul, D, McIntosh, AR and Winocur, G (2006) Age-related changes in brain activity across the adult lifespan.Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18:227-41. 5. Fan, Y, Batmanghelich, N, Clark, CM, Davatzikos, C and Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging Initiative (2008) Spatial patterns of brain atrophy in MCI patients, identified via high-dimensional pattern classification, predict sub sequent cognitive decline. Neuro image, 39: 1731-43. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Brain/Brain State | Bieri | I 65 Brain/Bieri: e.g. suppose there is a tour guide through our brain, who explains everything to us during a visit. "It is a principle of nature that, when certain processes take place here, the human feels certain things". Bieri: that is not our problem, we do not doubt that there are laws and necessities. What we do not understand is why they exist. We cannot see what makes it necessary in the brain for the human being to experience something. >Consciousness/Chalmers. The tour guide asks, what do you want to know? (a) why a particular happening here just brings about this experience, or (b) why there is an experience at all? Bieri: the two questions are the same problem I 69 Brain/consciousness/Bieri: our guide could give us a detailed circuit diagram of the brain. "Functional architecture". "They could also be realized with a different material". (Turing machine). >Turing machine, >Consciousness, >Thinking, >Brain. So: I 70 There is no more inner connection between the function and the quality of experience than between material structure and quality of experience. Tour guide: "one must not look at the brain in isolation from the body" Bieri: then one could say VsLeibniz: 1. the happening in the "factory" gets a cognitive content in that it is legally connected to events outside, which represents it by virtue of this connection 2. by the fact that the event in question assists the whole human being in a situation-appropriate behavior. But: our problem is not meaning, not cognitive content, but experience content! I 71 Brain/Consciousness/Experience/Bieri: cannot we be satisfied with what we have: covariance, dependency, determination? >Covariance, >Dependence, >Determinism. No, if we do not reach the questionable understanding, then we do not understand how our experience can be causally effective in our behavior, so we do not understand our own subject-being. >Understanding, >Causal explanation, >Subjectivity, >Subjects. The physiological process is causally complete. There is no place in the clockwork where episodes of experience would be necessary for it to continue. That is, there is a complete causal explanation for everything that takes place in our brain, in which we as subjects and humans do not occur at all! Therefore, consciousness seems to be of no importance to any causation. It could just as well be missing, and we would stumble through the world just as we do. ((s) We need to recognize the consciousness on something else). Our whole behavior could be alienated. This cannot be excluded because of the causal completeness. I 72 Causation/Bieri: If we build it purely physiologically, we know how to continue it, that is, always becoming smaller. This is not possible, however, when the explanation begins with an experience. Then we have to change somewhere on the physiological level. But then we have changed the subject! I 74 Brain/Bieri: the problem is not that we do not see something in the "factory". From this one could conclude that it is caused by something else ... Vs: but nothing else is conceivable! But that is precisely the hypothesis that we cannot think otherwise. We cannot disprove this hypothesis. But it would sound adventurous that the facts which are relevant for the experience have nothing to do with the facts which are otherwise relevant for the functioning of the brain. >Experiences. We have considered: Causal understanding, Structural understanding, Functional understanding, Understanding the whole from parts. >Understanding, >Function, >Structure, >Parts, >Causality, >Causal explanation. |
Bieri I Peter Bieri Was macht Bewusstsein zu einem Rätsel? In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Bieri III P. Bieri Analytische Philosophie des Geistes Weinheim 2007 |
| Brain/Brain State | Chalmers | I XI Brain/Chalmers: how could a physical system such as a brain also be an experiencer? Why should there be something like how it is to be such a system? >Experience, >Knowledge how, >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 115 Brain/Neurobiology/Neurophysiology/Awareness/Explanation/Chalmers: There are approaches by Francis Crick and Christof Koch (1990) (1) on 40 Hertz oscillation... I 116 ...and by Gerald Edelman (1989) (2) who explain the phenomenal side of consciousness just as little as cognitive models. >Cognition/Chalmers. I 238 Brain state/Chalmers: what are the physical correlations to conscious experiences? Crick and Koch (1990): Thesis: 40 Hertz oscillations in the cortex are the neural correlates of the experience. Baars (1988) (3): thesis: a global "work space" is the basis for information processing of experiences in which the contents correspond directly to the contents of the work space. Farah (1994) (4) Thesis: Consciousness is associated with high-quality representations in the brain. Libet (1993) (5) Thesis: Consciousness is associated with neuronal activities that last long enough, with the minimum duration being about 500 milliseconds. 1. F. H. C. Crick and C. Koch, Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. Seminars in the Neurosciences 2, 1990: pp. 263-75 2. G. Edelman, The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness. New York 1989. 3. B. J. Baars, A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness, Cambridge 1988 4. M. Farah, Visual perception and visual awareness after brain damage. In: C. Umilta and M. Moscovitch (Eds) Conscious and Nonconsious Information Processing: Attention and Performance 15, Cambridge 1994 5. B. Libet, The neural time factor in conscious and unconscious events. IN: Experimental and Theoretical studies of Consciousness. Ciba Foundation Symposium 174. New York 1993. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Brain/Brain State | Frith | I 12 Brain/brain research/Frith: brain research is the examination of the structure by measuring the energy that the brain consumes. I 59 Brain/consciousness/Frith: brain scanners showed that an object can cause a change in brain activity without the person being aware of it (in the Amygdala). I 61 Thesis: "Our brain does not tell us everything it knows." >Unconscious. I 88 Brain/Frith: thesis: "My brain can get along easily without me". I 89 It can initiate actions that are not the ones that you consider appropriate. I 90/91 Brain/Frith: our brain does not tell us when our body moves differently than we have intended (for normal people). I 131 Brain/world/Frith: thesis: the brain embeds us into the world and conceals the world from us at the same time. I 149 Building Block/basic building block/brain/neuron/Cajal/Frith: the basic building block of the brain is the neuron, the nerve cell with all its extensions. Reason: the extensions grow out of the cells and approach the extensions of other cells, but never unite with them. I 242 Brain/Frith: the brain works like science: it designs ever better models that are tested and improved. I 246 I/self/Frith: thesis: the "I" is created by my brain. >I, >Self, >Subject. I 249 Isolation/Frith: isolation is bad for people and for brains. I 250 Communication/Frith: in communication you should always examine two brains at the same time. >Communication. I 251 Homunculus/Frith: it is a common mistake to assume a smaller brain inside the brain. >Homunculus. Part/parts/brain/Frith: nevertheless the brain consists of parts, because there are actions that we can regret. >Emotion, >Actions. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Brain/Brain State | Mayr | I 112 Brain/Mayr: the human brain acquired its still existing skills about 100,000 years ago. All the achievements we are looking back at today were made with a brain that was not developed for them by the selection! Three brain regions: 1) For reflexes ("closed programs"). 2) Information intake ("open programs"): languages, norms, behavior. What was once learned is difficult to forget; "simple coinage". 3) Regions are not yet defined; "memory", "storage". I 309 Brain/Evolution/Mayr: Australopithecus: 400-500 cm³ ((like a anthroid ape) Homo erectus 750-1250 significantly larger brains only in the last 150,000 years. Language/Animals/Mayr: There is no language among animals. Their communication systems consist in the exchange of signals. There are no syntax and grammar. >Animals, >Animal language, >Signals, >Signal language, >Grammar, >Syntax. I 310 Language/brain: could the absence of language be a reason why the Neandertals did not exploit their brain better? Language: evolved from about 300,000 - 200,000 years ago in small groups of hunters and collectors due to a selection advantage. Good location for brain enlargement. >Language, >Language evolution, >Thinking without language. I 311 Brain: a factor that led to a halt in brain development was perhaps the enlargement of the group. In larger groups, the reproductive superiority of a better-equipped leader is lower, while those with smaller brains enjoy better protection, longer life and greater reproductive success. Stagnation: social integration of people contributed enormously to the evolution of culture, but may have initiated a period of stagnation in the evolution of the genome. >Evolution. Mind: conceptual confusion: false limitation to the mental activities of humans. >Mind, >Thinking, >Humans, >Intentionality, >Action. Animal/Mind: it has been shown that there is no categorial difference between the mental activities of certain animals (elephants, dogs, whales, primates, parrots) and those of humans. >Animals, >Animal language. I 312 Consciousness/Animal: the same applies to the consciousness, a basic version of which is even to be found in invertebrates and possibly protozoa. >Consciousness. Mind/Mayr: there was simply no sudden emergence of the mind. >Emergence. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Brains in a Vat | Putnam | VI 391 Brains in a vat/BIV/metaphysical realism/Putnam: brains in a vat is a part of metaphysical realism, not of internal realism. Then "verified" does not imply "true". >Internal realism, >Metaphysical realism. --- V 21f Brains in a vat/Reference/Putnam: the language of brains in the vat does not refer to anything in the outside world. There is no reference. They cannot even think "We are brains in a vat". V 77ff Bracketing/Putnam: parenthetical thoughts have no reference conditions that would make them true. Internalism: (existential questions only within a theory:) as brains in a vat we cannot think here that we are in the vat, except the bracketed sense. V 179 Brains in a vat/PutnamVsBrains in a vat: our worldview is coherent, because, taken as a whole, it includes an explanation of our activity of coping and developing a world theory. --- I (a) 21 Brains in a vat/Putnam: brains in a vat cannot refer to brains in a vat. Meanings are not in the head. I (f) 156f Brains in a vat/Putnam: brains in a vat is no problem for internalism, there are no possible worlds. Externalism: here it is possible that some brains are outside the vat. >Internalism, >Externalism. Realism: realism asserts extrinsic connections between signs and things that help explain the nature of the reference. PutnamVs: e.g. textbooks are the main cause of my beliefs about electrons, but my use of the word "electron" does not refer to these books. VsRealism: realism cannot determine the "right kind of causality". >Reference. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Bretton Woods System | Congressional Research Service (CRS) | CRS I 15 Bretton Woods System/Marc Labonte/CRS: One may ask why the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system that fixed the currencies of the major western economies from 1945 to 1971 was not prone to crisis (at least before it collapsed). The reason is that capital mobility was largely curtailed under the Bretton Woods system.29 Without capital mobility, central banks could use their reserves to accommodate small changes in fundamentals and could respond to large changes in fundamentals with a (relatively) orderly devaluation. As long as capital remains mobile - and almost nobody has supported a return to permanent capital controls - the Bretton Woods arrangement cannot be replicated. It was not long after capital controls were removed that the Bretton Woods system experienced a growing number of currency crises in the 1960s and 1970s, leading to its eventual demise. Some economists argue that if short-term, foreign-currency denominated debt is the real culprit in recent crises, then it makes more sense to address the problem directly, rather than through the indirect approach of making it more costly through a floating exchange rate. The problem could be addressed directly through various forms of capital controls, financial regulations, or taxes on capital flows. They argue that capital controls are necessary until financial markets become well enough developed to cope with sudden capital inflows and outflows. Capital controls would also allow countries to operate an independent monetary policy while maintaining the trade-related benefits of a fixed exchange rate, similar to how the Bretton Woods system operated. Yet capital controls deter capital inflows as well as capital outflows, and rapid development is difficult without capital inflows. Capital controls may make crises less likely, but they are also likely to reduce a country’s long run sustainable growth rate. >Currency crises, >Capital controls, >Fixed exchange rates, >Floating exchange rates, >International trade, >Currency. Congressional Research Service of the Library of congress (CRS) Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? RL31204 (2007) https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL31204 |
CRS I Congressional Research Service (CRS) Marc Labonte Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? Washington: Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress 2007 CRS II Congressional Research Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Marc Labonte, Banking and Cryptocurrency: Policy Issues. CRS Congressional research Service Report R48430. Washington, DC. 2025 CRS III Congressional Research Service (CRS) Corrie E. Clark Heather L. Greenley, Bitcoin, Blockchain, and the Energy Sector. Washington, DC. 2019 CRS IV Congressional Reserch Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Cryptocurrency: Selected Policy Issues Congressional Reserch Service CRS Report R47425 Washington, DC. 2023 |
| Bridge Laws | Cartwright | I 15 CartwrightVsBridge Laws: this is too simple a view of how explanations work; we must first provide a description of the situation before we can figure out the mathematical requirements of the theory. >Description, >Facts, >Situations, >Experiments. I 132 Bridge Principles/BP/Cartwright: Tradition (Hempel, Grünbaum, Ernest Nagel): the propositions of a theory consist of two types: a) internal principles: content of the theory, laws about the behavior of the objects b) bridge principles: connect the theory with more accessible aspects of reality (> "prepared description") Early: connection with monitoring reports. >Observation, >Theory ladenness. Vs: that does not work because of the theory ladenness of the observation new: connection of the the theory with already understood vocabulary. >Vocabulary, >Observation language, >Theoretical terms. Hempel/late: (1979)(1) this kind of explanation is not really deductive - HempelVsBridge-Principles: Problem: not invariably valid. I 135 Bridge principle: saying which equations are to be chosen - (how we get into the mathematical language and out of it again). I 205 CartwrightVsBridge Principles: instead of it we need insights on which operator is the right one for each problem. ((s) Operators/Cartwright/(s): represent the energies that are relevant in a situation within the equations.) 1.C. Hempel 1979, “Scientific Rationality: Analytic vs. Pragmatic Perspectives”, in Théodore F. Geraets (ed.), Rationality To-Day, Ottawa, Canada: The University of Ottowa Press, 46–58. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Bridge Laws | Chalmers | I 107 Bridge Laws/Explanation/Awareness/Chalmers: The fact that consciousness accompanies a given physical process is an additional fact, it is not explainable by telling the physical facts. >Explanation, >Causal explanation. I 107 Bridge laws/Bridge principles/Chalmers: can they help in the explanation of consciousness? No, they are not reductive themselves. And the fact that we need them would just show again that consciousness cannot be explained reductively. >Consciousness, >Reduction, cf. >Reductionism. Physical Facts: nothing I've said here implies, incidentally, that the physical side would be irrelevant to consciousness! Perhaps they can also help to understand the structure of consciousness: patterns of similarity and dissimilarity of experiences. >Experience, >Similarity. I 108 VsChalmers: one could argue that bridge laws are always involved when it comes to higher and lower-level phenomena. In such cases, these bridge principles are not additional facts about the world. >Phenomena, >Levels/order, >Levels of Description, >Facts. 1. ChalmersVsVs: We can refute this with arguments that come from the domain of twins and possible worlds with an identical physical structure: it is inconceivable that a being which physically resembles me would not be alive, yet it does not follow logically that it has an awareness, too. >Twin Earth, >Possible Worlds, >Consciousness, >Zombies. 2. ChalmersVsVs: There is no "inverted life" as there are inverted spectra. 3. If one has all the physical facts, one has also all biological ones. 4. With regard to life, there is no epistemic asymmetry. >Asymmetry/Chalmers, >Asymmetry/Avramides. 5. Life is - unlike consciousness - analysable in functional terms. >Life, >Functions, >Analysis/Chalmers. I 237 Bridge Principles/Chalmers: Between physical processes and experience can serve as a criterion for the presence of consciousness in a system. The bridge principles are then an epistemic lever, which, however, cannot be tested. >Experience. Bridge principles are not conclusions themselves from experiments. They preceed them and control them. >Experiments. Cognition/Consciousness/Chalmers: according to my proposal, there is a coherence between these two and for this we need bridge principles: here the accessibility to global control. >Cognition. The most common bridge principle is the possibility to report as a criterion for experience. Experience is conscious when you can report on it. Problem: experience without language in animals. Solution: behavioral control, Logothetis and sound (1989) 1. >Animals, >Animal language. 1. N. Logothetis and J. D. Schallk, Neuronal correlates of subjective visual perception, Science 245, 1989: pp 761-63. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Broadcasting | Kranton | Kranton I 426 Broadcasting/Public Broadcast Model/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: The “public broadcast model” represents an environment where individuals communicate through broad-based media, such as Web sites and newspapers. Although the message is communicated, the actual identity of the individual who creates the message is hidden, and his or her type is not known. Kranton I 425 In the “public broadcast model”, the recipient agent broadcasts his message directly to all other agents. >Network Models/Kranton, >Communication Models/Kranton, >Communication Filters/Kranton, >Misinformation/Economic Theories. Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448. |
Kranton I Rachel E. Kranton Francis Bloch Gabrielle Demange, Rumors And Social Networks 2018 Kranton II Rachel E. Kranton George A. Akerlof Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011 |
| Buchanan, James M. | Boudreaux | Boudreaux I 8 Buchanan/Boudreaux: Keynesianism/Boudreaux: With aggregative thinking, “the social welfare” is promoted by “the government,” with the latter treated as if it’s an organism possessing a brain, and as if that brain’s main interest lies not in serving itself but, rather, in serving the nation. BuchananVsKeynesianism: Buchanan called such aggregative thinking the “organismic” notion of collectives - that is, the collective as organism. From the very start, nearly all of Buchanan’s lifetime work was devoted to replacing the organismic approach with the individualistic one - a way of doing economics and political science that insists that choices are made, and costs and benefits are experienced, only by individuals. (…) Buchanan wrote his first sole-authored book to debunk a myth about government debt that had become widely accepted only because of Keynesianism’s organismic assumptions. >Keynesianism, >Methodological individualism, >James M. Buchanan as Author. Boudreaux I 10 From its start, Buchanan’s entire career can be understood as a constructive scholarly reaction to the analytical errors of Keynesianism on the one hand, and excessively romantic beliefs about democracy on the other. >Democracy/Buchanan. |
Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 |
| Burden Sharing | Climate Policy | Norgaard I 329 Burden sharing/Resource Sharing/Emissions/Climate Policy: (…) ‘burden sharing’ (like Kyoto‐style percentage reduction targets) focuses on dividing the total costs or total amount of emissions reductions, whereas ‘resource sharing’ (like equal per capita allocations) focuses on the right to make use of global carbon sinks as an economic resource, and how to share those rights. (…) resource‐sharing formulae are not necessarily more favorable to poor countries than burden‐sharing formulae; for example, a resource‐sharing formula which transitions from grandfathering to equal per capita allocations over time can be significantly less generous to many developing countries than (for example) a burden‐sharing formula like ‘Greenhouse Development Rights’ (Baer et al. 2008(1), 2010(2)) (…). VsResource Sharing: [Resource‐sharing formulae] offer no good solution to the problem of funding adaptation or liability for climate damages. Under equal per capita allocations, revenue from surplus permit sales would (for at least some countries) provide a source of funds for adaptation activities, but there is no reason to think that this would be sufficient in total or appropriately distributed. (...) using these funds for adaptation would reduce the ability to use them to supply low‐carbon energy sources needed in the future when permit allocations become scarce. (…) resource‐sharing approaches do not usually address the wide variation in income levels across parties with similar levels of emissions. Since some high emitters are poor and some low emitters are rich, equal per capita allocations can be criticized as ‘treating the unequal equally’, and thus as unfair. >Climate justice, >Environmental ethics. 1. Baer, P. et al. 2008. The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework. 2nd edn., Heinrich Böll Stiftung, EcoEquity, Stockholm Environment Institute and Christian Aid. Available at (http://gdrights.org/wp‐content/uploads/2009/01/thegdrsframework.pdf) (Link not available as of 12/04/19) 2. Baer, P. 2010. Greenhouse development rights: A framework for climate protection that is ‘more fair’ than equal per capita emissions rights. Pp. 215–30 in S. M. Gardiner, S. Caney, D. Jamieson, and H. Shue (eds.), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Business Cycle | Ostry | Ostry I 19 Business cycle/tariff policy//Furceri/Hannan/Ostry/Rose: Does the effect of tariff changes vary with the stage of the business cycle? Trade reforms, insofar as they induce resource shifts between industries, occupations and firms, might lead to larger output losses during slack periods of weak domestic economic activity. To test whether the effect of tariff changes is symmetric between expansions and recessions, we use the following setup, which permits the effect of tariff changes to vary smoothly across different stages of the business cycle: Ostry I 20 yi,t+k - yi,t-1 = αi + γt + βL kF(zi,t) iΔTi,t + βH (1- F(zi,t)ΔTi,t + φZi,t + εi,t with F(zi,t) = exp(-θzi,t)/(1+ exp(-θzi,t), θ>0, where zi,t is an indicator of the state of the economy (such as GDP growth or unemployment) normalized to have zero mean and unit variance, and Zit is the same set of control variables used in the baseline specification but now also including F(zit). F(.) is a smooth transition function used recently by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012)(1) to estimate the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy shocks in expansions as opposed to recessions. This transition function can be interpreted as the probability of the economy being in a recession; F(zit)=1 corresponds to a deep recession, while F(zit)=0 corresponds to strong expansion - with the cutoff between expansions and contractions being 0.5. Like Auerbach and Gorodichencko, we use θ = 1.5, which corresponds to assume that the economy spends about 20 percent of times in recessions.(2) >Economic cycles, >Tariffs, >Tariff impacts. Ostry I 21 (…) the response of both output and productivity to rises in the tariff is more dramatic during expansions. When tariffs increase by a standard deviation and the economy is enjoying good times, the medium-term loss in output is higher than the baseline by about 1%; the productivity decline is also larger. Consistently, tariff increases during recession seem to increase output and productivity in the mediumterm, though the effects are not statistically significant; protection during recessions may have a mild stimulating effect.(4) Overall, we find that tariff changes have more negative consequences for output and productivity when: tariffs increase (rather than decrease); for advanced economies (not emerging markets and developing economies); and during good economic conditions. While more work needs to be done to understand the channels for these effects better, they do not bode well for the present protectionist climate. One of the reasons why the impact of tariffs depends on the state of the business cycle could be related to the effect of tariffs on inflation and the role of monetary policies. To the extent that the increases in tariffs lead to an increase in inflation during expansions and that monetary policies are tightened in response, the negative impact of tariffs ismagnified due to the contractionary policy shock. Inflation: Our results* on inflation seem to support this reasoning; using the same regression-framework as for the other macroeconomic variables, we find that higher tariffs lead to an increase in inflation after two years (…) Ostry I 22 Furthermore, the effect on inflation is stronger during economic expansions than in recessions (…). These results are consistent with Barattieri, Cacciatore, and Ghironi (2018)(5) who find that protectionism acts as a supply shock by decreasing output and increasing inflation in the short run. They also find that protectionism leads to higher inflation which, in turn, prompts central banks to respond with a contractionary impulse. >Protectionism. * Davide Furceri, Swarnali A. Hannan, Jonathan D. Ostry, and Andrew K. Rose. (2019). Macroeconomic Consequences of Tariffs. IMF Working Paper. WP/19/9. International Monetary Fund. 1. Auerbach, Alan J., and Yuriy Gorodnichenko, 2012, “Measuring the Output Responses to Fiscal Policy,” American Economic Journal, vol. 4(2), pp. 1-27. 2. This approach is equivalent to the smooth transition autoregressive model developed by Granger and Terävistra (1993)(3). The results are robust different value of θ, and to substitute F(zit) with a dummy variable which takes value for F(zit) greater than 0.5. 3. Granger, Clive W. J., and Timo Terasvirta, 1993, Modelling Nonlinear Economic Relationships (New York: Oxford University Press). 4. In line with Rose (2013), we find no statistically significant correlation between changes in tariffs and the measure of state of economy used in the paper. In particular, the correlation between changes in tariffs and the smooth transition function F(z,it) is -0.001. 5.Barattieri, Alessandro, Matteo Cacciatore, and Fabio Ghironi, 2018, “Protectionism and the Business Cycle,” NBER Working Paper No. 24353. |
Ostry I Jonathan D. Ostry Davide Furceri Andrew K. Rose, Macroeconomic Consequences of Tariffs. IMF Working Paper. WP/19/9.International Monetary Fund. Washington, D.C. 2019 |
| Business Cycle | Schumpeter | Sobel I 23 Business cycle/Schumpeter/Sobel/Clemens: „Capitalism is essentially a process of (endogenous) economic change ... The atmosphere of industrial revolutions - of "progress" is the only one in which capitalism can survive ... In this sense stabilized capitalism is a contradiction in terms.“ Joseph A. Schumpeter (1939), Business Cycles(1): 405. „The recurring periods of prosperity of the cyclical movement are the form progress takes in capitalistic society.“ Joseph A. Schumpeter (1927), The Explanation of the Business Cycle(2): 30. Sobel/Clemens: As was the case with many of Schumpeter's contemporaries, he showed great interest in understanding the nature and causes of business cycles, that is, the ebb and flow of the economy from expansion and prosperity to recession, and at times, economic crisis and depression. Schumpeter's work in the Theory of Economic Development (TED)(3) coupled with his later two-volume masterpiece Business Cycles (BC1)(1) focused on the broad issue of how and why economies progress. One of the many contributions of Schumpeter's work in the field of business cycles was the introduction ofinnovation as a causal explanation. A subtle aspect of his argument, but one that needs to be recognized, is that the business cycle or the fluctuation between expansion and contraction is natural or, as Schumpeter put it "like the beat of the heart" (BC1(1): v). Sobel/Clemens: This evolutionary approach to understanding business cycles and their role in the general upward progress of economies placed Schumpeter in contrast to many of his peers during this time Who believed economic fluctuations could and should be managed by the government. Schumpeter's views also put him at odds with the broad Austrian School of Economics, within which much of his training took place. >Austrian School. To understand Schumpeter's conception of the business cycle, we need to first recall his definition of innovation as given in The Explanation of the Business Cycle (EBC)(2): „... primarily changes in methods of production and transportation, or in changes in industrial organization, or in the production of a new article, or in the opening up of new markets or of new sources of material.“ (EBC(2): 30) Sobel/Clemens: Schumpeter's explanation for business cycles, which again was rooted in his analysis of economic history and experience, starts with a major innovation by entrepreneurs. The initial innovation and the potential for monopoly profits spurs investment in factories, machinery, equipment, and perhaps additional research. It is critical for Schumpeter, however, that these investments and economic activity will cluster within the Single branch of the economy in which the innovation occurs. (EBC(2): 30). In other words, in the first phase of the expansion, the prosperity or economic development does not occur broadly in the economy but rather in one specific sector. >Innovation/Schumpeter, >Competition/Schumpeter, >Investments/Schumpeter. As more and more resources are reallocated to the sector experiencing expansion, the prices for resources, again including raw materials, capital, and labour begin to rise. Schumpeter described it as follows: „the swarm-like appearance of new combinations easily and necessarily explains the fundamental features of periods of boom. It explains why increasing capital investment is the very first symptom of the coming boom, why industries producing means of production are the first to show supernormal stimulation ... It explains the appearance of new purchasing power in bulk, thereby the characteristic rise in prices during booms, which obviously no reference to increased need or increased costs alone can explain.“ (TED(3): 230) As the sector with the initial innovation expands and draws resources to it, prices outside the sector also begin to rise. Sobel I 24 Specifically, firms and entrepreneurs begin to invest in the additional sectors experiencing expansion because of the in crease in demand from the sector that initially experienced the innovation breakthrough. These can include, for instance, providers of raw materials and suppliers of intermediate goods and services. As more and more firms, both within the sector initially affected by the innovation as well as those in other sectors of the economy affected by the expansion, bid on resources, including labour, and compete for investment, prices generally start to rise. During this phase, unemployment declines while wages increase, explaining the general prosperity experienced across the economy during expansions. >Creative destruction/Schumpeter. Sobel/Clemens: To summarize, the expansionary phase of the business cycle for Schumpeter starts with an initial innovation that pulls resources, particularly entrepreneurs, into the sector within which the innovation occurs. As resources are pulled into this sector and new firms develop, economic activity in related sectors also begins to expand. Ultimately, the prosperity in these directly and indirectly affected sectors drives economic expansion, Iowering unemployment, increasing wages, and driving investment. As Schumpeter described it: "the release of secondary waves - the spread of prosperity over the whole economic system". (TED(3): 230) Recession: As with the expansionary phase, Schumpeter explains the contraction or recessionary stage based on the initial innovation. Economic contractions and recessions were seen by Schumpeter as the economy's reaction and adaptation to the innovation. As noted economist Alvin Hansen put it when assessing Schumpeter's contributions to our understanding ofbusiness cycles, "depression is a process of adaptation to the change conditions ushered in by the boom" (Hansen, 1951(4): 129). Contraction: The adaptation at the heart of Schumpeter's concept of economic contraction relates to the competition between new and existing firms both within the sector initially affected by the innovation as well as the other sectors of the economy affected by it. Firms are forced to adapt to compete With new products, new processes, new markets, and other innovations. Such adaptation includes firms going out of business or perhaps being absorbed by more effcient firms, layoffs, and massive adjustments to new product and service markets. Sobel I 25 Creative destruction: It is the "creative destruction" of entrepreneurial innovation that Schumpeter saw as the fundamental characteristic of entrepreneurial capitalism. Specifically, „[t]he effect of the appearance of new enterprises en masse upon the old firms and upon the established economic situation, having regard to the fact ... that as a rule the new does not grow out of the old but appears alongside of it and eliminates it competitively, is so to change all the conditions that a special process of adaptation becomes necessary.“ (TED(3): 216) Sobel/Clemens: More specifically, Schumpeter observed a number of factors that coalesced to explain the transition from an expansionary phase to contraction.* First, as noted above, many firms fail as their products and services are replaced as a result of the emerging products and services from the innovation. Second, the successes of the boom phase cause increases in prices of raw materials and potentially of labour that dampen profitability expectations and thus investment. Third, the emergence of new firms and more competition in the sector originally affected by the innovation decreases the prices of the new products and services made available by the innovation, which again dampens additional investment. Fourth, Schumpeter observed that entrepreneurs could "overshoot" the opportunities in the sector and thus potentially overinvest. This last point is important as it is often overlooked but Schumpeter did in fact allow for entrepreneurs to make errors. * For a thorough discussion of Schumpeter's concept of the reason for recession, please see Dal-Pont Legrand and Hagemann (2007)(5). 1. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1939). Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, Volume 1 [BC1]. McGraw-Hill Book Company. 2. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1927). The Explanation of the Business Cycle [EBC]. Economica 21: 286-311. Reprinted in Joseph A. Schumpeter (1951/1989), Essays on Entrepreneurs, Innovations, Business Cycles, and the Evolution of Capitalism, Richard V. Clemence, ed. (Transaction): 21-46. 3. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1934). The Theory of Economic Development [TED]. Harvard University Press. 4. Hansen, Alvin H. (1951). Schumpeter’s Contribution to Business Cycle Theory. Review of Economics and Statistics 33, 2: 129–132. 5. Dal-Pont Legrand, Muriel, and Harald Hagemann (2007). Business Cycles in Juglar and Schumpeter. History of Economic Thought 49, 1: 1–18. |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Sobel I Russell S. Sobel Jason Clemens The Essential Joseph Schumpeter Vancouver 2020 |
| Business Failure | Schumpeter | Sobel I 11 Business Failure/Schumpeter/Sobel/Clemens: A growing, vibrant economy depends not only on entrepreneurs discovering, evaluating, and exploiting opportunities to create new goods and services, but also on the speed at which ideas are labeled as successes or failures by the profit-and-loss system. From an economic standpoint then, business failure has a positive side; it gets rid of bad combinations of resources, freeing up those resources to be used in other endeavours, and provides information and signals to other entrepreneurs about that losing combination. A vibrant economy will have both a large number of new business start-ups and a large number of business failures. In an economy where all entrepreneurs - even those with crazy ideas for new pizza combinations - can try them out in the marketplace, there will be a lot of mistakes. However, Schumpeter points out that this process is not one of entrepreneurs simply chasing a target created by a given set of consumer wants. Entrepreneurs also play an important role in anticipating and driving those wants. >Innovation/Schumpeter, >Entrepreneurship/Schumpeter. |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Sobel I Russell S. Sobel Jason Clemens The Essential Joseph Schumpeter Vancouver 2020 |
| Bystander Effect | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 206 Bystander effect/Psychological theories: VsLatané, VsDarley: the apparently robust five-step model (see below) fails to provide researchers with any clues about how to increase the likelihood of bystander interventions in violent emergencies: Haslam I 205 (Latané and Darley, 1970(1)): 1) Notice that something is happening. 2) Interpret the event as an emergency. 3) Take responsibility for providing help. 4) Decide how to act. 5) Provide help. Haslam I 206 Method/CherryVsLatané/CherryVsDarley: Frances Cherry (1995)(2) offers a fascinating analysis of the way in which the Genovese murder ((s) >Helping behavior/Darley) was translated into experimental analogues. She points out that there were a number of important features of the attack, only some of which were identified as key events worthy of experimental analysis. Cherry suggests that this gendered aspect of the event and of the violence was almost invisible to researchers at the time.We are now very familiar with the concept of domestic violence – and with concerns about male violence towards women in both public and private spaces. However, in the early 1960s, these were social concerns that had yet to be identified. In the handful of studies that do examine the role of violence and/or gender (Borofsky et al., 1971(3); Shotland and Straw, 1976(4); and more recently Fischer et al., 2006(5); Levine and Crowther, 2008)(6), a far more nuanced story emerges. For example, bystanders are more likely to intervene if they think the perpetrator and victim are strangers rather than intimates (Shotland and Straw, 1976)(4) or when they share group membership with the victim (Levine and Crowther, 2008)(6). Haslam I 207 Levine: there are several possible narratives for the murder case, e. g. , one in which the colour of the victim and the murderers would have been mentioned or not mentioned. Accordingly, it may be the case that the limited utility of bystander research can be attributed to researcher’s failure to explore these alternative narratives. In the Genovese murder case (>Helping behavior/Darley) Rachel Manning and colleagues (2007)(7) have revisited the evidence and found that there actually were much less than 38 witnesses (as reported by Latané and Darley). At the trial, only five witnesses were called and if these, only actually saw the victim and the murderer together. There is also no evidence that witnesses watched for half an hour in awe and fascination. Haslam I 209 Finally, there is evidence that, far from observing passively, bystanders made several attempts to intervene. ((s) Anyway the criticism was directed against the newspaper reporting, not against the researchers. Popular group psychology: Moreover, the development of thinking about bystander non-intervention added to this picture by seeming to indicate that the presence of others can also lead to behavioural ‚inhibition’. (…) groups could now be accused of producing the perfect storm of negative consequences – in simultaneously both unleashing anti-social behaviour and suppressing pro-social behaviour. Manning et al. (2007(7) argue that this negative image of the group continues to populate the imaginations both of researchers and of students to the present day. >Bystander effect/Social identity theory. Haslam I 213 Levine: Latané and Darley’s bystander effect appears to be one of the most robust and reliable findings in social psychology. And yet for all its robustness, it has seemed to lack any practical utility – appearing simply to point to the inevitably negative impact that groups have on individual behaviour. Indeed, in line with this perspective, Zimbardo (2004)(8) could find no place for the bystander effect in his catalogue of positive contributions that psychology has made to improving social life. >B. Latané, >J.M. Darley. 1. Latané, B. and Darley, J.M. (1970) The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn’t He Help? New York: Meredith Corporation. 2. Cherry, F. (1995) The ‘Stubborn Particulars’ of Social Psychology. London: Routledge. 3. Borofsky, G.L., Stollak, G.E. and Messe, L.A. (1971) ‘Sex differences in bystander reactions to physical assault’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 7: 313–18. 4. Shotland, R.L. and Straw, M.G. (1976) ‘Bystander response to an assault: When a man attacks a woman’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 101: 510-27. 5. Fischer, P., Greitemeyer, T., Pollozek, F. and Frey, D. (2006) ‘The unresponsive bystander: Are bystanders more responsive in dangerous emergencies?’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 36: 267–78. 6. Levine, M. and Crowther, S. (2008) ‘The responsive bystander: How social group membership and group size can encourage as well as inhibit bystander intervention’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95: 1429–39. 7. Manning, R., Levine, M. and Collins, A. (2007) ‘The Kitty Genovese murder and the social psychology of helping: The parable of the 38 witnesses’, American Psychologist, 62: 555–62. 8. Zimbardo, P.G. (2004) ‘Does psychology make a significant difference in our lives?’, American Psychologist, 59: 339–51. Mark Levine, „ Helping in Emergencies. Revisiting Latané and Darley’s bystander studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Calculus | Luhmann | AU Cass 4 Spencer-Brown, George/Luhmann: George Spencer Brown's calculus(1) is no logic! It is not about truth functional sentences, but an operational calculus. It presupposes time. - The sequence of steps is essential - combination of Boolean Algebra with Arithmetic. >Spencer-Brown. 1. Spencer-Brown, George (1969). Laws of Form. London: Allen & Unwin. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Calculus | Wessel | I 32 Calculus/Wessel: Tools to set up logical rules: 1st Semantic calculi: totalities of definitions of logical operators where semantic terms (Termini of truth values) are used: so-called "logical algebra", 2nd syntactic calculi: totalities of accepted syntactic symbol combinations and rules ("logical calculi"). 3rd Mixed calculi. >Semantics, >Proofs, >Proof theory. >Syntax, >Models, >Model theory. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Calibration | Hogan | Calibration/Kala Krishna/Kathleen Hogan/Phillip Swagel: Our work indicates that there is good reason to be suspicious of the results of (…) simple calibration exercises. Indeed, policymakers should be extremely cautious in the application of “optimal” trade policies suggested by calibrated models, as the nature of the recommended policies may simply be an artifact of the model specification and calibration procedure. Since the optimal policy resulting from one model can differ dramatically from that of another model, and since use of the “wrong” policies can actually reduce welfare, it is important to specify a flexible form which does not dictate the direction of the results. Even if the optimal policies are found and implemented, the gains from doing so are relatively limited, even without foreign retaliation. Krugman III 14 This result, that only fairly small welfare gains are to be had from optimal tariffs and subsidies, seems common to many such models. Calibration models should thus probably not be used to determine trade and industrial policy without detailed empirical work to guide the model selection. Sufficiently well specified, however, they prove to be a valuable tool in the analysis of imperfectly competitive industries, since many important results are not sensitive to model specification. Guidance from careful empirical work as to the correct demand and cost parametrizations to use in such calibration models is vital for them to serve as useful guides to determine trade policy. >International trade/Kala Krishna, >New trade theory. Kala Krishna, Kathleen Hogan, and Phillip Swagel. „The Nonoptimality of Optimal Trade Policies: The U.S. Automobile Industry Revisited, 1979-1985.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Calibration | Klepper | Calibration/Klepper: Commonly, producer cost differences are calibrated according to market shares: a producer with a large market share is presumed to have lower costs. The source of such cost differences remains unexplained. In this paper(1), it is assumed that technical know-how is available equally to all producers and that factor prices do not deviate greatly between Europe and North America. Krugman III 103 The question then is, can the existing segments market shares and those which are expected for the coming years be reasonably explained without factor price or technological differences? We show that this is possible by accounting for different times of market entry in the three market segments by two producers: a newcomer and an incumbent. Yet, if the model is calibrated to such a situation, the claim of Airbus officials that Airbus will become profitable as soon as it can supply a complete family of aircraft can not be supported by the simulations. >Models, >Model theory, >Economic models, >Simulation, >International trade, >Competition, >Trade policy, >Industrial policy, >New trade theory. 1. Gernot Klepper. „Industrial Policy in the Transport Aircraft Industry.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Gernot Klepper. „Industrial Policy in the Transport Aircraft Industry.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Calibration | Krishna | Calibration/Kala Krishna/Kathleen Hogan/Phillip Swagel: Our work indicates that there is good reason to be suspicious of the results of (…) simple calibration exercises. Indeed, policymakers should be extremely cautious in the application of “optimal” trade policies suggested by calibrated models, as the nature of the recommended policies may simply be an artifact of the model specification and calibration procedure. Since the optimal policy resulting from one model can differ dramatically from that of another model, and since use of the “wrong” policies can actually reduce welfare, it is important to specify a flexible form which does not dictate the direction of the results. Even if the optimal policies are found and implemented, the gains from doing so are relatively limited, even without foreign retaliation. Krugman III 14 This result, that only fairly small welfare gains are to be had from optimal tariffs and subsidies, seems common to many such models. Calibration models should thus probably not be used to determine trade and industrial policy without detailed empirical work to guide the model selection. Sufficiently well specified, however, they prove to be a valuable tool in the analysis of imperfectly competitive industries, since many important results are not sensitive to model specification. Guidance from careful empirical work as to the correct demand and cost parametrizations to use in such calibration models is vital for them to serve as useful guides to determine trade policy. >International trade/Kala Krishna, >New trade theory. Kala Krishna, Kathleen Hogan, and Phillip Swagel. „The Nonoptimality of Optimal Trade Policies: The U.S. Automobile Industry Revisited, 1979-1985.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Calibration | Venables | Krugman III 42 Calibration/theories/international trade/Venables: For given parameters, each theory predicts different levels of output and volumes of trade. The calibration procedure turns this around; data are available on levels of output and trade and on some parameters of the industry. Different theories then imply different values of unobserved parameters in order to support observations on the industry as an equilibrium. Observation/data: Of course, if there were sufficient observations one might reject some theories in favor of others. Calibration does not attempt this, but merely solves for unobserved parameters. Anthony J. Venables. „Trade Policy under Imperfect Competition: A Numerical Assessment.“In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Cap and Trade System | Stavins | Stavins I 157 Cap-and-Trade Systems/Aldy/Stavins: A cap-and-trade system constrains the aggregate emissions of regulated sources by creating a limited number of tradable emission allowances—in sum equal to the overall cap—and requiring those sources to surrender allowances to cover their emissions (Stavins, 2007)(1). Faced with the choice of surrendering an allowance or reducing emissions, firms place a value on an allowance that reflects the cost of the emission reductions that can be avoided by surrendering an allowance. Regardless of the initial allowance distribution, trading can lead allowances to be put to their highest valued use: covering those emissions that are the most costly to reduce and providing the incentive to undertake the least costly reductions (Hahn & Stavins, in press(2); Montgomery, 1972)(3). Cap-and-trade sets an aggregate quantity, and through trading, yields a price on emissions, and is effectively the dual of a carbon tax that prices emissions and yields a quantity of emissions as firms respond to the tax’s mitigation incentives. VsCap-and-Trade: In an emission trading program, cost uncertainty—unexpectedly high or volatile allowance prices—can undermine political support for climate policy and discourage Stavins I 158 investment in new technologies and research and development. Therefore, attention has turned to incorporating “cost-containment” measures in cap-and-trade systems, including offsets, allowance banking and borrowing, safety valves, and price collars. Increasing certainty about mitigation cost [through the above methods] reduces certainty about the quantity of emissions allowed. 1. VsVsCap-and-Trade: Smoothing allowance prices over time through banking and borrowing reduces the certainty over emissions in any given year, but maintains certainty of aggregate emissions over a longer time period. A cost-effective policy with a mechanism insuring against unexpectedly high costs—either through cap-and-trade or a carbon tax—increases the likelihood that firms will comply with their obligations and can facilitate a country’s participation and compliance in a global climate agreement. In the case of a cap-and-trade regime, the border adjustment would take the form of an import allowance requirement, so that imports would face the same regulatory costs as domestically produced goods. 2. VsCap-and-Trade: However, border measures under a carbon tax or cap-and-trade raise questions about the application of trade sanctions to encourage broader and more extensive emission mitigation actions globally as well as questions about their legality under the World Trade Organization (Brainard & Sorking, 2009(4); Frankel, 2010(5)). >Carbon Pricing/Stavins. Stavins I 172 Cap-and-Trade Linkages/Carbon Pricing Coordination/Stavins: Because linkage between tradable permit systems (that is, unilateral or bilateral recognition of allowances from one system for use in another) can reduce compliance costs and improve market liquidity, there is great interest in linking cap-and-trade systems with each other. There are not only benefits but also concerns associated with various types of linkages (Jaffe, Ranson, & Stavins, 2010)(6). A major concern is that when two Stavins I 173 cap-and-trade systems are directly linked (that is, allow bilateral recognition of allowances in the two jurisdictions), key cost-containment mechanisms, such as safety valves, are automatically propagated from one system to the other. Because some jurisdictions (such as the European Union) are opposed to the notion of a safety valve, whereas other jurisdictions (such as the United States) seem very favorably predisposed to the use of a safety valve, challenging harmonization would be required. This problem can be avoided by the use of indirect linkage, whereby two cap-and-trade systems accept offsets from a common emission-reduction-credit system, such as the Clean Development Mechanism. As a result, the allowance prices of the two cap-and-trade systems converge (as long as the ERC market is sufficiently deep), and all the benefits of direct linkage are achieved (lower aggregate cost, reduced market power, decreased price volatility), but without the propagation from one system to another of cost-containment mechanisms. (...) it is important to ask whether a diverse set of heterogeneous national, subnational, or regional climate policy instruments can be linked in productive ways. The basic answer is that such a set of instruments can be linked, but the linkage is considerably more difficult than it is with a set of more homogeneous tradable permit systems (Hahn & Stavins, 1999)(7). Another form of coordination can be unilateral instruments of economic protection, that is, border adjustments. >Carbon Pricing Coordination/Stavins. 1. Stavins, R. N. (2007). A U.S. cap-and-trade system to address global climate change (The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007-13). Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. 2. Hahn, R. W., & Stavins, R. N. (in press). The effect of allowance allocations on cap-and-trade system performance. Journal of Law and Economics. 3. Montgomery, D. W. (1972). Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs. Journal of Economic Theory, 5, 395-418. 4. Brainard, L., & Sorking, I. (Eds.). (2009). Climate change, trade, and competitiveness: Is a collision inevitable? Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 5. Frankel, J. (2010). Global environment and trade policy. In J. E. Aldy & R. N. Stavins (Eds.), Post-Kyoto international climate policy: Implementing architectures for agreement (pp. 493-529). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 6.Jaffe, J., Ranson, M., & Stavins, R. (2010). Linking tradable permit systems: A key element of emerging international climate policy architecture. Ecology Law Quarterly, 36, 789-808. 7. Hahn, R. W., & Stavins, R. N. (1999). What has the Kyoto Protocol wrought? The real architecture of international tradeable permit markets. Washington, DC: The AEI Press. Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180. |
Stavins I Robert N. Stavins Joseph E. Aldy The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 2012 |
| Capabilities | Nussbaum | Brocker I 895 Capabilities/Nussbaum: Nussbaum wants central human capabilities to be understood as specific political goals in the context of political order. As political goals, they stand beyond particular metaphysical justifications and can therefore be regarded as the basis of basic constitutional principles. In this way, capabilities can become the object of an "overarching consensus". ...the state is indeed obliged to enable each individual to exercise the basic capabilities, but the actual realization is left to each individual. Brocker I 896 Nussbaum basically focuses on the question of possibilities/skills instead of actual satisfaction.(1) Brocker I 901 Capabilities Approach/Nussbaum: its task is twofold: 1. to enable comparability of the quality of life of different people in different contexts; 2. to establish an overarching normative basis that allows core areas of human functioning to be determined and thus certain capabilities that must be guaranteed for every citizen in every nation in political contexts.(2) For problem see >Universalism/Nussbaum. VsNussbaum: Question: Doesn't Nussbaum introduce here an implicit reference to "human nature" that pushes her into the risky direction of metaphysical realism? >Human nature. NussbaumVsVs: Nussbaum does not assume a neutral observer who judges the facts of human life from an external perspective. Rather, she pleads for an internal reconstruction of knowledge about ourselves: We can only understand and comprehend ourselves from ourselves and against the background of shared experiences (cf. Pauer-Studer 1999, 10 f.).(3) Brocker I 902 It is crucial that the liberal basic principle of "each person as an end", aggravated by the "principle of each person's capability"(4), is recognised. The recognition of this principle is reflected in the fact that it is not certain lifestyles that are to be defined, but rather abilities and spheres of action that are to be guaranteed in order to allow people the free choice of how they perceive these possibilities. Functional abilities of the human being: See >Functions/Nussbaum. Brocker I 903 Nussbaum understands the capabilities approach as a theory of basic conditions, not as a full theory of justice. A complete theory would require a more clearly marked approach to determining the threshold level of capabilities.(5) >Justice theory, cf. >J. Rawls. Three categories of abilities/Nussbaum: a) basic capabilities, b) internal capabilities, c) combined capabilities. (Interaction with external conditions).(6) Cf. >Rights/Nussbaum. 1. Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development. The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge 2000, p, 12. 2. Ibid. p.71 3. H. Pauer-Studer 1999, »Einleitung«, in: Martha C. Nussbaum, Gerechtigkeit oder das gute Leben, Frankfurt/M. 1999, 7-23., p.10f 4. Nussbaum ibid. p.74 5. ibid. p. 12 6. ibid. p.84 Sandra Seubert, „Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2000)“, in:Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Capabilities | Sen | Brocker I 890 Skills/Sen: in order to revive a qualitatively oriented economic science, the distinction between "capabilities" and "functionings" must be introduced. Functions/Sen: The term 'functions' [...] reflects the various things a person likes to do or likes to be. The desirable functions may range from elementary conditions such as adequate nutrition or freedom from avoidable diseases to very complex activities or personal states such as being able to participate in community life and having self-respect. A person's 'chances of realization' refer to the possible connections of the functions he or she is able to perform. I 891 Def Realization Chances/Sen: (=abilities): are thus expressions of freedom: namely the [...] [essential] freedom to realize alternative combinations of functions (or, expressed less formally, the freedom to realize different lifestyles).(1) For Sen, the idea of "essential freedom" includes in particular the "procedural freedom" to define the concrete freedoms and opportunities that a community seeks to grant its members. (cf. (2)) >Freedom/Sen. I 892 Sen: the political dispute over the respective situation-appropriate definition of basic economic needs must not be avoided, but should be sought, because it creates the epistemic and political conditions necessary for their realization.(3) 1. Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen. Wege zu Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität in der Marktwirtschaft, München 2000, p. 95 2. B. Giovanola »Personhood and Human Richness. Good and Well-Being in the Capability Approach and Beyond«, in: Review of Social Economy 63/2, 2005, 249-267. 3. Sen 2000, p. 182 Claus Dierksmeier, „Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen (1999)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Capacity Management | Economic Theories | Mause I 462f Capacity management/Economic Theory: e.g. transport policy: At first glance, reducing delays leads to an increase in welfare. Problem: this is thought too short: e.g. allocation of slots at airports: these are divided into: a) caused by the airline (technical problems with the aircraft) Mause I 463 b) caused by the airport (infrastructure), c) deviations from the planned flight route, d) reactionary delays (caused by earlier delays); the latter is the most frequent cause. Reactionary delay: a) rotational: the return flight is delayed due to the delayed outbound flight of the same airline), b) non-rotational: a non-rotational delay occurs when a flight has to wait for passengers on a delayed flight (possibly of another airline). In this way, delays can spread worldwide. Costs: a) Passenger time costs, b) "hard", c) "soft" costs of the airline. Hard costs of the airline: operating and personnel costs, costs for rebooking and refunds. Soft costs of the airline: customer losses due to dissatisfaction. Passenger time costs: can largely be understood as opportunity costs. Opportunity costs: in this case the time evaluated in monetary terms, which could have been used better otherwise. (1) (2) Slots: are managed by the European Union. Capacity bottlenecks can be solved by voluntary coordination. In addition, there are many regional airports that are not fully utilized. Delays can be minimized by reducing the number of approvals and equalizing the flight plan. Problem: from an economic point of view, minimising delays in this way does not increase welfare per se: the maximum number of arrivals and departures is reduced, thereby a) increasing average costs per flight, but also b) reducing network effects at hubs. Network effects: Airlines are interested in hub airports because they can bundle many flights in one time window. There is then a trade-off between the network effects due to additional approvals and the increased susceptibility to delays. Mause I 465 Capacity reduction: makes sense from a theoretical point of view, depending on whether the airport is to the right or left of the optimum value resulting from the total cost curve at the current capacity utilisation. (3) This example can also be applied to rail traffic or platforms at railway stations (see Swaroop et al. 2012, p. 1240). Problem: the existing practice is criticized from an economic point of view, since permits are free of charge and trade with them is prohibited. (See also Emissions Trading). The system is referred to as "off-market". Solution: an auction of slots could generate profits. A secondary market could ensure that the airline with the highest benefit (and thus the highest willingness to pay) would receive an approval. 1. University of Westminster. 2015. The cost of passenger delay to airlines in Europe. http:// ansperformance. eu/ references/ library/ passengerdelayco st. pdf. (Access date 25.11.2016 2. Bratu, Stephane, und Cynthia Barnhart. 2006. Flight operations recovery: New approaches considering passenger recovery. Journal of Scheduling 9( 3): 279– 298. 3. Swaroop, Prem, Bo Zou, Michael O. Ball, und Mark Hansen. 2012. Do more US airports need slot controls? A welfare based approach to determine slot levels. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 46( 9): 1239– 1259. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Capital | Austrian School | Harcourt I 149 Capital/reswitching/capitalreversing/Neoclassicals/Austrian School/Harcourt: Why did the original neoclassical parables omit the double-switching and capital-reversing possibilities and why, essentially, must they be supposed to occur in comparisons of technologies such as those actually used? Here the „parables“ again: Harcourt I 122 (1) an association between lower rates of profits and higher values of capital per man employed; (2) an association between lower rates of profits and higher capital-output ratios; (3) an association between lower rates of profits and (through investment in more 'mechanized' or 'round-about' methods of production) higher sustainable steady states of consumption per head (up to a maximum); (4) that, in competitive conditions, the distribution of income between profit-receivers and wage-earners can be explained by a knowledge of marginal products and factor supplies. Harcourt I 150 Capital/Austrian school: The basic Austrian concept of capital may be expressed by supposing,… Time:… first, that labour is applied uniformly through time to produce (say) a unit of output and, … Labour: …secondly, that the greater is the time taken for the final product to emerge, the smaller is the total amount of labour that is needed overall. This is the basis of the Austrian measure of 'capital' in terms of an average period of production. Rate of profit/wage rates: It follows that at very high rates of profits (and low real-wage rates), techniques which use more total labour but less time will be cheapest; while at low rates of profits, the more time-intensive methods of production will be the most profitable. With discreteness in technology, one technique may be the most profitable for a range of values of r; but once it disappears, it never reappears again. Harcourt I 151 Though we are only making comparisons of equilibrium positions, we nevertheless always start with a high rate of profits and move to situations with low ones and it is sometimes hard to remember that we are not being told about an actual process, for example, how an economy may move, through accumulation and deepening, from a high r, scarce capital position to a low r, abundant capital one - and what we may hope to achieve by this process. Reswitching/Harcourt: Now consider the case where we compare two methods, in neither of which is labour applied uniformly over time. Then it is clear that the ratio of the costs of the methods of producing a unit of net output at different values of r can fall below and rise above unity.* A. (…) method A - has a large input of labour at the beginning of its (two-period) gestation period, B. method B - has a larger gestation period (three periods) than A, a small input of labour at the start and a large one towards the end which is, however, less than the total input in A. The total input of labour in A is less than that in B. Then at very high values of r, interest on interest on interest on the cost of labour employed at the start of method B must exceed the wage and interest costs of method A, so that A is preferred to B. Capital cost: (If we ignore wage costs and talk instead in terms of real capital, we would say that the real capital cost of B is greater than that of A. Since both methods produce the same output, clearly A will be preferred.) Input/labour/time: At very low or zero values of r, A will also be preferred because it has the lower total input of labour (and time!). But there is an intermediate range of values of r where the investment of most of B's labour for a shorter period than A's at moderate rates of interest makes B's total cost less than A's. Hence B is preferred. The analogy between this result and the possibility of multiple rates of return to investment in present value calculations has been noticed by several writers, for example, Bruno, Burmeister and Sheshinski [1966](1), pp. 528 and 533. >Reswitching. * In Samuelson's example, w does not change as r does. Sraffa [1960], pp. 34-8, however, llustrates the same phenomena, though, admittedly, in a different context, in an example in which w does change (in a manner determined by its functional relationship with r) and the same result is obtained. 1. Bruno, M., Burmeister, E. and Sheshinski, E. [1966] 'Nature and Implications of the Reswitching of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 526-53. Coyne I 15 Capital/Austrian School/Coyne/Boettke: Beginning with Carl Menger’s work in 1871, Austrian economists have emphasized the unique characteristics of capital, which refers to goods that are valued because of their contribution to producing subsequent consumer goods. In his Principles of Economics, Menger presented production as a sequential process that involved capital goods (what he called “goods of a higher order”), which are combined to produce final consumer goods (what he called “goods of the first order”). Coyne I 17 In fact, improvements in economic well-being require changes to the capital structure in response to changes in economic conditions, more accurate knowledge of those conditions, and improvements in technology and organizational forms. Cf. >Capital structure/Lachmann. The result is the need for ongoing capital substitution and re-grouping in the face of changing circumstances. The problem with traditional neoclassical methods of studying the capitalist production process lies in either treating capital as a homogeneous blob, or relying on a momentary snapshot of the capital structure at some period of time. In contrast to either the blob method or period analysis, Austrian economists emphasize that we need to focus on the process by which combinations of heterogeneous and specific capital are shuffled and reshuffled in the broader context of the capital structure. Capital stock: The concept of the capital structure stands in contrast to the idea of a "capital stock," which refers to an aggregate measure of all capital at a point in time. >Capital stock/Austrian School. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020 |
| Capital | Böhm-Bawerk | Rothbard IV 12 Capital/Böhm-Bawerk/Rothbard: (…) capital goods are not simply “frozen labor”; they are also frozen time (and land); and it is in the crucial element of time and time preference that the explanation for profit and interest can be found. >Time-preference/Böhm-Bawerk, >Interest/Böhm-Bawerk. Capial/Böhm-Bawerk: He also enormously advanced the economic analysis of capital; for in contrast not only to Ricardians but also to most economists of the present day, he saw that “capital” is not simply a homogeneous blob,(1) or a given quantity. Capital is an intricate latticework that has a time-dimension; and economic growth and increasing productivity comes from adding not simply to the quantity of capital but to its time-structure, to building “longer and longer processes of production.” The lower people’s rate of time preference, the more they are willing to sacrifice consumption now on behalf of saving and investing in these longer processes that will yield a significantly greater return of consumer goods at some date in the future. 1. See Böhm-Bawerk, Capital and Interest, vol. II, Positive Theory of Capital, pp. 1 - 118. |
Böhm-Bawerk I Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk Kapital und Kapitalzins. Vol. 2, Positive Theorie des Kapitales. 2nd ed. Innsbruck: Wagner’sche Universitätsbuchhandlung.1909 Innsbruck 1909 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Capital | Knight | Rothbard III 401 Capital/time/production/Frank H. Knight/Rothbard: The idea that the capital structure is maintained intact without savings, as it were automatically, is fostered by the use of the “net” approach. If even zero savings will suffice to maintain capital, then it seems as if the aggregate value of capital is a permanent entity that cannot be reduced. Rothbard III 402 This notion of the permanence of capital has permeated economic theory, particularly through the writings of J.B. Clark and Frank H. Knight, and through the influence of the latter has molded current “neoclassical” economic theory in America. To maintain this doctrine it is necessary to deny the stage analysis of production and, indeed, to deny the very influence of time in production.(1) >Interest rates/Rothbard, >Factors of Production/Rothbard. Production/time/Rothbard: The all-pervading influence of time is stressed in the period- of- production concept and in the determination of the interest rate and of the investment-consumption ratio by individual time preference schedules. Frank H. Knight/RothbardVsKnight: The Knight doctrine denies any role to time in production, asserting that production “now” (in a modern, complex economy) is timeless and that time preference has no influence on the interest rate. This doctrine has been aptly called a “mythology of capital.” >Time preference. RothbardVsKnight: Among other errors, it leads to the belief that there is no economic problem connected with the replacement and maintenance of capital.(2,3) 1. If permanence is attributed to the mythical entity, the aggregate value of capital, it becomes an independent factor of production, along with labor, and earns interest. 2. The fallacy of the “net” approach to capital is at least as old as Adam Smith and continues down to the present. See Hayek, Prices and Production, 2nd ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1935. Reprinted by Augustus M. Kelley, 1967. pp. 37–49. This book is an excellent contribution to the analysis of the production structure, gross savings and consumption, and in application to the business cycle, based on the production and business cycle theories of Böhm-Bawerk and Mises respectively. Also see Hayek, “The Mythology of Capital” in W. Fellner and B.F. Haley, eds., Readings in the Theory of Income Distribution (Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1946), pp. 355–83; idem, Profits, Interest, and Investment, passim. 3. For a critique of the analogous views of J.B. Clark, see Frank A. Fetter, “Recent Discussions of the Capital Concept,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 1900, pp. 1–14. Fetter succinctly criticizes Clark’s failure to explain interest on consumption goods, his assumption of a permanent capital fund, and his assumption of “synchronization” in production. |
Knight I Frank H. Knight Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit 2017 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Capital | Lachmann | Rothbard III 966 Capital/Lachmann/Rothbard: (…) "capital" is not just a homogeneous blob that can be added to or subtracted from. Capital is an intricate, delicate, interweaving structure of capital goods. All of the delicate strands of this structure have to fit, and fit precisely, or else malinvestment occurs. Free market: The free market is almost an automatic mechanism for such fitting; (…) the free market, with its price system and profit-and-loss criteria, adjusts the output and variety of the different strands of production, preventing any one from getting long out of alignment.(1) 1. Cf. L.M. Lachmann, Capital and Its Structure. Also see P.T. Bauer and B.S. Yamey, The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries (London: James Nisbet and Co., 1957), pp. 129 ff. Coyne I 16 Capital/Lachmann/Coyne/Boettke: The idea that the same good can be used by different people for different purposes refers to heterogeneity in use, which rell«orces-the idea that- whether something as a capital good depends on how people view the good as fitting into their broader plans and goals. >Capital goods/Menger. Capital stock: This suggests that there is no fixed and pre-defined stock of capital since whether something is capital depends on how individuals subjectively perceive its use. In addition to being heterogeneous, each individual capital good can itself be employed in multiple potential uses. This illustrates the multispecific nature of capital, which means that heterogeneous capital has many, albeit limited, uses. Economic actors must determine the best use of these scarce resources from an array of competing alternatives. The heterogeneity and multi-specificity of capital goods imply that capital goods are complementary to one another and must be used in capital combinations to achieve a production plan. Entrepreneurs need to discover these combinations and determine how they fit in the broader process of production in order to yield the desired consumer goods. >Production, >Production structure. Coyne I 17 These capital combinations make up what is referred to as the capital structure within an economy. This structure is characterized by a complex set of relationships with a coherent pattern of order. The capital structure is not fixed. Instead it is in a constant state of change as a result of three factors. >Capital structure/Lachmann. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020 |
| Capital | Piketty | Bofinger I 111 Capital/Piketty/Bofinger: In simple terms, capital can be defined as net assets (RV), which corresponds to equity in a company. Net assets are made up of (net) monetary assets (GV), i.e. the balance of monetary claims and liabilities, and tangible assets (SV): RV = SV + GV VsPiketti: The concept of monetary assets is overlooked in the usual introductory books on macroeconomics, which leads to a lot of confusion - not least in Piketty(1). Piketty: In his theoretical explanations, Piketty understands "capital" to mean tangible assets. This is imperative when he speaks of production functions and substitution elasticities, since in neoclassical production theory there are only tangible assets in addition to human capital. >Elasticity. Method: In his empirical analyses, however, he uses a concept of capital that includes not only tangible assets but also net financial assets, i.e. in the sense of net assets. >Method/Piketty. Bofinger I 112 Growth theory: Due to the neglect of financial assets, the current growth theory assumes as a matter of course that savings are completely transformed into investments. Saving/investment: This is why it is not necessary to distinguish between the private savings rate (S/Y) and the private investment rate (I/Y). Piketty: Accordingly, Piketty assumes that the ratio of the capital stock to the gross domestic product is determined by the ratio of the private savings rate to real economic growth. It is therefore inevitable that the high corporate profits and savings of the rich are invested in an ever larger real capital stock. Problem: (…) that would be (…) a paradoxical development. Why should an ever larger real capital stock be built up in comparison to the national income, with which ever more goods can be produced, when the vast majority of the population has an ever smaller share of the national income and is therefore less and less able to develop purchasing power? Demand/Neoclassical economics: Since Piketty - like most neoclassical economists - believes that the demand side can be neglected in a long-term perspective, he does not ask himself this question. >Demand, >Neoclassicals, >Supply, >Markets, >Investments, >Consumption. Bofinger I 125 Method: The problem is (…) that Piketty uses the term “capital” differently: a) In his statistical analyses he understands this to mean net assets, b) in his capital theory analyses, however, he must mean tangible assets. This basically leaves open whether he understands the concept of tangible assets or net assets when he predicts the increase in K/Y under K. In a world with an ever greater concentration of income and assets and an ever worsening income position of the broad masses, a sharp increase in tangible assets compared to national income seems implausible. Investments: Experience from recent years shows that in times of weak overall economic demand, companies are very cautious about investments, instead building up financial assets and reducing their debt. Consumption: The private savings rate is therefore significantly higher than the private investment rate. See >Capital structure. Some basics for Piketty: >Cambridge Capital Controversy, >Geoffrey C. Harcourt, >Capital reversing, >Capital/Joan Robinson, >Exploitation/Robinson, >Reswitching/Robinson, >Reswitching/Sraffa, >Reswitching/Economic Theories, >Neo-Keynesianism, >Neo-Neoclassical Theories. 1. Piketty, T. 2014. Das Kapital im 21. Jahrhundert. München: Beck. Peter Bofinger und Philipp Scheuermeyer. 2015.“Das „Kapital“ im 21. Jahrhundert“.In: Thomas Piketty und die Verteilungsfrage. Ed. Peter Bofinger, Gustav A. Horn, Kai D. Schmid und Till van Treeck. 2015. |
Piketty I Thomas Piketty Capital in the Twenty First Century Cambridge, MA 2014 Piketty II Thomas Piketty Capital and Ideology Cambridge, MA 2020 Piketty III Thomas Piketty The Economics of Inequality Cambridge, MA 2015 Bofinger II Peter Bofinger Monetary Policy: Goals, Institutions, Strategies, and Instruments Oxford 2001 |
| Capital | Robinson | Harcourt I 17 Capital/Joan Robinson/Harcourt: Removing the cross-section choice of technique from an analysis of investment and accumulation does not preclude her model from bringing out the simple but profound role of the real wage in the growth process. Cf. >Measurements/Robinson. Real wage/capital: Indeed it allows to be highlighted the vital significance of the real wage for the potential surplus available at any moment of time, the saving aspect whereby consumption is forgone, and the investment aspect whereby the real wage determines the command of a given amount of saving over labour power to be used in the investment-goods sector. The productivity of that labour is, of course, the place where (past) choices of technique are relevant, and past real-wage levels, and expectations formed because of them, bear vitally on this aspect of the processes of production and accumulation. Harcourt: The emphasis by Joan Robinson on the priority of forces other than the ability to choose from a number of available techniques at any moment of time does not necessarily place her in the group of economists whom Hicks [1960](1) (…) has, loosely and dangerously, labelled 'the accelerationists', but it certainly puts her apart from the aggregate production function boys, who, Hicks argues, armed with M.I.T.-type techniques [„Neo-neoclassicals“], are providing a strong backlash for a key role for the rate of interest in an explanation of long-run accumulation and distribution ((s) represented by the „Neo-Keynesians“.) >Aggregate production function, >Neo-Neoclassicals, >Neo-Keynesianism. Harcourt I 18 Capital measurement/Robinson: The first puzzle is to find a unit in which capital, social or aggregate value capital, that is, may be measured as a number, Le. a unit, which is independent of distribution and relative prices, so that it may be inserted in a production function where along with labour, also suitably measured, it may explain the level of aggregate output. Furthermore, in a perfectly competitive economy in which there is perfect foresight (either in fact or for convenience of measurement, see Champernowne [1953-4])(2) and (…) static expectations that are always realized, this unit must be such that the partial derivative of output with respect to 'capital' equals the reward to 'capital' and the corresponding one with respect to labour equals the real (product) wage of labour. >D. G. Champernowne. Marginal productivity: The unit would then provide the ingredients of a marginal productivity theory of distribution as well. >Distribution theory/Robinson. Harcourt I 19 Institutions/production/capital/Robinson: „We are accustomed to talk of the rate of profits on capital earned by a business as though profits and capital were both sums of money. Capital when it consists of as yet uninvested finance is a sum of money, and the net receipts of a business are sums of money. But the two never co-exist in time. While the capital is a sum of money, the profits are not yet being earned. When the profits (quasi-rents) are being earned, the capital has ceased to be money and become a plant. All sorts of things may happen which cause the value of the plant to diverge from its original cost. When an event has occurred, say, a fall in prices, which was not foreseen when investment in the plant was made, how do we regard the capital represented by the plant?“ (Robinson [1953-4](3), p. 84) Harcourt I 19/20 Capital/Measurment/production/J.B. Clark/Harcourt: It [the principle of differential gain] .. . identifies production with distribution, and shows that what a social class gets is, under natural law, what it contributes to the general output of industry. Com pletely stated, the principle of differential gain affords a theory of Economic Statics.(4) Stationary state: Joan Robinson had been concerned to deny that such a unit could be found even in the conditions of a stationary state. But to claim that she denied that 'capital' could be given an operative meaning in a stationary state is a bit hard, especially as she proceeds in her article to give it some (limited) meaning, a meaning which does not, however, encompass both requirements of the neoclassical and their Austrian forbears. Capital/rate of interest: The basic reason is that it is impossible to conceive of a quantity of 'capital in general', the value of which is independent of the rates of interest (or interchangeably, profits, given the present assumptions) and wages. Yet such independence is necessary if we are to construct an iso-product curve showing the different quantities of 'capital' and labour which produce a given level of national output, or, as is more usual in the theory of economic growth, if we are to construct a unique relationship between national output per man employed and 'capital' per man employed for any level of total national output. That is to say, if we are to construct the neoclassical production function (…). The slope of this curve plays a key role in the determination of relative factor prices and, therefore, of factor rewards and shares. Problem: However, the curve cannot be constructed and its slope measured unless the prices which it is intended to determine are known beforehand; moreover, the value of the same physical capital and the slope of the iso-product curve vary with the rates chosen, which makes the construction unacceptable. Kaldor: Kaldor advanced independently the same arguments for rejecting the concepts of an aggregate production function and an independent unit in which to measure capital, with their accompanying roles in the determination of factor rewards: see, for example, Kaldor [1955-6](5), 1959a](6). >N. Kaldor, >Equilibrium/Swan, >Equilibrium/Samuelson, >Equilibrium/Modigliani. Harcourt I 21 Solution/Robinson: Joan Robinson's response was to measure capital in terms of labour time. >Labour time/Robinson. 1. Hicks, J. R. [1960] 'Thoughts on the Theory of Capital-The Corfu Conference', Oxford Economic Papers, xn, pp. 123-32. 2. Champernowne, D. G. [1953-4] 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital: A Comment', Review of Economic Studies, xxi, pp. 112-35 3. Robinson, Joan (1953-4). 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital', Review of Economic Studies, xxi, pp. 81-106. 4. Clark, J.B. - [1891] 'Distribution as Determined by a Law of Rent', Quarterly Journal of Economics, v, pp. 312-13. 5. Kaldor, N. [1955-6] 'Alternative Theories of Distribution', Review of Economic Studies, xxm, pp. 83-100. 6. Kaldor, N. [1959b] 'Economic Growth and the Problem of Inflation - Part u Economica, xxvi, pp. 287-98. |
EconRobin I James A. Robinson James A. Acemoglu Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 Robinson I Jan Robinson An Essay on Marxian Economics London 1947 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Capital | Senior | Rothbard II 138 Capital/Senior/Rothbard: Even more interesting and valuable than Senior's abstinence theory was his developed theory of capital, which strongly anticipated the Austrian doctrine. >Austrian School. For Senior saw that factors of production could be divided into two classes: the original, primary ones: land (or natural resources) and labour; and all the secondary, intermediate goods which are produced by the joint efforts of the primary factors (as well as pre-existing intermediate factors). Eventually, the intermediate factors are transformed into consumer goods Rothbard II 139 that are able to satisfy the wants of the consumers. It might be thought that ultimately the intermediate factors, or capital goods, might be reduced to nature and labour, but this cannot be done, because another element is needed to combine the primary factors into more and more capital: abstinence. For again anticipating the Austrians, Senior saw that a crucial aspect of this process of production is that it must take time, and therefore an act of abstinence, ‘a term’ added Senior, ‘by which we express the conduct of a person who either abstains..., or designedly prefers the production of remote to that of immediate results’. Capital, or capital goods, then, taking time, are the result of the combination of land, labour and abstinence, and consists of the application of present resources to future production. Capital goods are produced rather than primary, factors of production. And the way in which production and living standards may increase indefinitely is by using the products of labour and nature, ‘as the means of further Production’. Capital, Senior sums up, is not a simple productive instrument: it is in most cases the result of all the three productive instruments combined. Some natural agent must have afforded the material, some delay of enjoyment must in general have reserved it from unproductive use, and some labour must in general have been employed to prepare and preserve it. >Production theory/Senior. |
Senior I Nassau William Senior Outline of the Science of Political Economy 1836 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Capital Controls | Fischer | Feldstein I 455 Capital Controls/Fischer: There are differences among types of capital control. In the first instance there is a need for prudential controls on the foreign exchange exposure of banks and possibly other institutions. We need more work to study the effectiveness of different types of prudential control and also to consider whether anything can or needs to be done to limit the exposures of nonfinancial corporations. The capital inflows problem of a country that is trying to stabilize, needing high domestic interest rates, is a familiar and difficult one. Not many countries have dealt with it successfully. Chile has. Maybe the controls have nothing whatever to do with Chile’s success, as some have argued, but that’s a hard case to make. Chile’s controls are market based, requiring a reserve deposit to be placed in the central bank. Such market-based measures are preferable to administrative controls with a large measure of discretion. >Exchange Rate Volatility/Rogoff. Feldstein I 456 IMF/Fischer: Let me also discuss the proposal to amend the Articles of Agreement of the IMF to make liberalization of capital flows a purpose of the IMF. At present we have as one of our purposes the promotion of current account convertibility, but not capital account convertibility-though we are allowed to require countries to impose capital controls in certain circumstances. The proposal to amend the articles in this direction has aroused a great deal of concern in many developing countries, though not, I believe, warranted concern. Capital account liberalization is something that in the long run is going to happen to almost every country, as current account liberalization has happened to almost every country. And in the long run, as financial structures strengthen, it will be a good thing. Quotas/capital account/Fischer: We know that quotas are by and large worse than tariffs, despite the reverse occasionally being true in very specific circumstances. We know something about liberalizing by cutting tariffs proportionally, and so forth. We don’t have similar answers on the capital account-and we should try to develop them. ((s) Written in 1999). Feldstein I 457 Equilibrium/Fischer: (…) I have great difficulty knowing how we know whether the market is doing right, whether there isn’t another equilibrium, and what exactly is driving these situations. But if that’s what you start believing, then you have to ask whether in a crisis or otherwise, countries shouldn’t at least tentatively take a view on where the exchange rate should be. Of course, they can’t in these circumstances use reserves extensively to defend a particular rate, but they may try to use the interest rate to keep the rate from moving too far. Stanley Fisher. „Crises that don’t happen.“ In: Martin Feldstein (ed). International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. |
Fischer St I Stanley Fischer Imf Essays From a Time of Crisis Boston: MIT 2005 Feldstein I Martin Feldstein (ed.) International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. Chicago 1999 |
| Capital Demand | Garegnani | Harcourt I 158 Capital demand/Garegnani/Harcourt: (…) Garegnani(2) argues, 'traditional theory - reduced to its core as the explanation of distribution in terms of demand and supply-rests in fact on a single premise', what Pasinetti [1969](1), p. 519, calls 'an unobtrusive postulate': „This premise is that any change of system brought about by a fall in r must increase the ratio of 'capital' to labour in the production of the commodity: 'capital' being the value of the physical capital in terms of some unit of consumption goods, a value which is thought to measure the consumption given up or postponed in order to bring that physical capital into existence.“ (Pasinetti [1969](1), S. 519). >Reswitching/Economic theories, >Aggregate capital/Economic theories. Harcourt: This becomes the basis for the downward-sloping demand function for capital in a more general model. Harcourt I 159 As r falls, both the change in the system of production for each consumption good, and consumer substitution in favour of the more capital-intensive goods, would raise the ratio of 'capital' to labour in the economy. If we then assume that the quantity of labour employed remains equal to its supply, and the supply shows no drastic fall as w rises with the fall of r, it would follow that the amount of capital employed in the economy increases as r falls. This relation between r and the amount of capital employed could then be viewed as a demand function for capital; and competition in the capital market could be thought of as ensuring the absorption of 'net saving' through appropriate falls of r. (p. 423.) >Rate of return/Frankmlin M.Fisher, >Rate of return/Pasinetti. 1. Pasinetti, L. L. [1969] 'Switches of Technique and the "Rate of Return" in Capital Theory', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 508-31. 2. Garegnani, P. [1970a] 'Heterogeneous Capital, the Production Function and the Theory of Distribution', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVII (3), pp. 407-36. |
Garegnani I Pierangelo Garegnani The Theory of Value and Distribution in Economics: Discussions between Pierangelo Garegnani and Paul Samuelson Milton Park 2012 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Capital Flight | Economic Theories | IMF III 31 Capital flight/Economic theories/Luckner/Koepke/Sgherri: [An] important implication of our findings is that crypto volumes alone typically reveal little about the magnitude of capital flight, especially in countries with tight external restrictions. Conversely, the relative price of crypto assets is found to contain insightful information about (a) the strength of the demand for foreign exchange, which can be regarded as a proxy for underlying macroeconomic imbalances; and (b) the marginal cost of capital flight, which is, in turn, an indicator of how tight existing controls are. Data on crypto-based shadow exchange rates provide valuable information above and beyond what is available in existing databases on capital controls (such as the IMF’s Taxonomy of Capital Flow Management Measures; or the IMF’s AREAER (Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange restrictions), and measures of financial account openness. IMF III 32 This is especially true because crypto-based FX premia are observed at the daily frequency and available in real time. Bycontrast, existing databases often require the time-intensive analysis of new laws andregulations and have difficulty capturing cases where there is a difference between what is putforward de jure and what is enforced de facto (Ilzetzki et al., 2019)(1). Alternative market-based measures, such as parallel (or black market) cash exchange rates, are often also available in real time. However, these data tend to be easy to manipulate and poorly documented since the underlying transactions are illegal. For these reasons, cryptobased FX premia can, at least for some countries, fill an important gap and provide real-time and hard-to-manipulate data on the presence and intensity of capital controls, as well as the demand for capital flight.* >Cryptocurrencies. In addition, our analysis* helps clarify when and how crypto vehicle trades affect a country’snet foreign asset position. Specifically, it illustrates that whenever residents exchange crypto assets to move their money abroad, the movement of capital across borders generally has already occurred via traditional channels before the crypto vehicle trade takes place. As such, the underlying crypto transaction per se does not affect the country’s net foreign asset position. From the narrow perspective of accounting for crypto-related transactions in external accounts, our work hence soothes concerns that a growing use of crypto assets makes standard balance-ofpayment statistics less accurate (Akbalik et al., 2021(2); Hu et al., 2021(3); IMF, 2023c,a(4,5); He et al.,2022(6); Graf von Luckner et al., 2023)(7). That said, if the use of crypto assets propels an overall increase in capital flight (via the traditional channels), this may still increase inaccuracies in external statistics, which could be reflected in increase net errors and omissions.*** *It is important to recognize that not every instance of a premia in relative prices of crypto indicate the existence of otherwise unrevealed capital controls, because other factors can contribute to the difference in prices. Indeed, other than capital controls; illiquid/shallow crypto markets can also be a factor driving premiain relative crypto prices. Moreover, exchange-specific events, can temporarily lead to idiosyncratic price changes. Hence, only when reflected in liquid markets featuring multiple exchanges should crypto shadow exchange rate premia be seen as evidence for capital controls and pressure on capital flows. ** Clemens Graf von Luckner, Robin Koepke and Silvia Sgherri (2024). Crypto as a Marketplace for Capital Flight. IMF Working Paper 24/133. *** As is discussed in Cuddington (1986)(8), the type of capital flight we focus on in this paper would typically not be expected to increase net errors and omissions because ”neither the outflow of goods nor the increase in domestic holdings of assets abroad will be recorded in the balance of payments.” 1. Ilzetzki, E., Reinhart, C. M., and Rogoff, K. S. (2019). Exchange arrangements entering the twenty-first century: Which anchor will hold? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 134(2):599–646. 2. Akbalik, M., Apergis, N., Zeren, M., and Sarigu¨l, O¨ . (2021). International capital flows and the cryptocurrency effect. Finansal Ara¸stırmalar ve C¸alı¸smalar Dergisi, 13(24):16–35. 3. He, M. D., Kokenyne, A., Lavayssière, X., Lukonga, M. I., Schwarz, N., Sugimoto, N., and Verrier, J. (2022). Capital Flow Management Measures in the Digital Age: Challenges of Crypto Assets, volume 2022. International Monetary Fund. 4. IMF (2023c). G20 Note on the Macrofinancial Implications of Crypto Assets. International Monetary Fund. 5. IMF (2023a). Elements of Effective Policies for Crypto Assets. International Monetary Fund Policy Paper. 6. He, M. D., Kokenyne, A., Lavayssière, X., Lukonga, M. I., Schwarz, N., Sugimoto, N., and Verrier, J. (2022). Capital Flow Management Measures in the Digital Age: Challenges of Crypto Assets, volume 2022. International Monetary Fund. 7. Graf von Luckner, C., Reinhart, C. M., and Rogoff, K. (2023). Decrypting new age international capital flows. Journal of Monetary Economics, 138:104–122. 8. Cuddington, J. T. (1986). Capital flight: Estimates, issues, and explanations, volume 58. International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University. |
IMF II IMF Working Paper André Reslow Gabriel Söderberg, Cross-Border Payments with Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies: Design and Policy Considerations IMF Fintech Note 2024/002 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF III IMF Working Papers Clemens Graf von Luckner Robin Koepke, Crypto as a Marketplace for Capital Flight. IMF Working Paper 24/133 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF IV IMF Working Papers Marco Pani Rodolfo Maino, “Could Digital Currencies Lead to the Disappearance of Cash from the Market? Insights from a ’Merchant-Customer’ Model.” IMF Working Paper WP/25/56 Washington, DC. 2025 |
| Capital Flight | IMF Working Papers | IMF III 5 Capital Flight/Crypto/IMF/Luckner/Koepke/Sgherri: The decentralized, borderless, and pseudonymous nature of cryptocurrencies has propelled their use to transfer funds across borders, especially amid capital controls, as documented by Graf von Luckner, Reinhart and Rogoff (2023)(1). This has raised concerns among policymakers over the implications for macroeconomic and financial stability (Auer and Claessens, 2018(2); He et al., 2022(3); IMF, 2022a(4), 2021(5); Copestake et al., 2023b(6)). Crypto as a market place for capital flight: At its core, the mechanics of crypto as a marketplace for capital flight are simple. In countries that restrict access to foreign exchange, macroeconomic imbalances and financial stability concerns can lead to excess demand for FX (foreign exchange markets). Residents cannot convert local currency using the official exchange rate and are willing to pay a premium to obtain FX. Typically, crypto exchanges allow residents to convert local currency into crypto, which they can then sell for hard currency on a foreign crypto exchange. The counterparty to this transaction is an agent seeking to make the reverse transaction (e.g. for remittances); or someone with access to FX (often illicit).* By using FX to buy crypto in the global market and selling it domestically, the counterparty can ”earn” an arbitrage premium that the resident is willing to pay. IMF III 6 The domestic crypto exchange thus matches the two counterparties to that transaction, serving as a marketplace for capital flight. A key feature of this marketplace is a crypto FX premium, which balances supply and demand for FX in the crypto market place. This premium can be defined as the price of crypto observed in local currency relative to the price of crypto on the global market (expressed in local currency using the official exchange rate). Other things equal, the greater the excess demand for FX, the higher the premium. Also, the more restricted international transactions are, the higher the premium. The premium is what drives supply of FX to the local market. Since the domestic supply of FX is scarce, additional supply is typically obtained via capital flight (i.e. the evasion of capital controls). As a result, crypto markets reinforce traditional channels for capital flight (such as trade misinvoicing) by making it possible to monetize access to capital flight on the crypto market. >Cryptocurrency, >Cross-border payments, >Money-laundry. * A typical way in which capital flight traditionally takes place is misinvoicing of trade. For example, exporters may underinvoice exports, repatriating only a portion of their export proceeds at the official exchange rate. The remaining export proceeds could then be used to purchase cryptocurrency on the global market. 1. Graf von Luckner, C., Reinhart, C. M., and Rogoff, K. (2023). Decrypting new age international capital flows. Journal of Monetary Economics, 138:104–122. 2. Auer, R. and Claessens, S. (2018). Regulating cryptocurrencies: assessing market reactions.BIS Quarterly Review September. 3. He, M. D., Kokenyne, A., Lavayssière, X., Lukonga, M. I., Schwarz, N., Sugimoto, N., and Verrier, J. (2022). Capital Flow Management Measures in the Digital Age: Challenges of Crypto Assets, volume 2022. International Monetary Fund. 4. IMF (2022a). Capital Flow Management Measures in the Digital Age (1): Challenges of Crypto Assets. Fintech Note 2022/005. International Monetary Fund. 5. IMF (2021). Global Financial Stability Report. October 2021.International Monetary Fund. 6. Copestake, A., Furceri, D., and Gonzalez-Dominguez, P. (2023a). Crypto market responses to digital asset policies. Economics Letters, 222:110949. |
IMF II IMF Working Paper André Reslow Gabriel Söderberg, Cross-Border Payments with Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies: Design and Policy Considerations IMF Fintech Note 2024/002 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF III IMF Working Papers Clemens Graf von Luckner Robin Koepke, Crypto as a Marketplace for Capital Flight. IMF Working Paper 24/133 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF IV IMF Working Papers Marco Pani Rodolfo Maino, “Could Digital Currencies Lead to the Disappearance of Cash from the Market? Insights from a ’Merchant-Customer’ Model.” IMF Working Paper WP/25/56 Washington, DC. 2025 |
| Capital Gains Tax | Fuest | Fuest I 7 Capital tax/Piketty/Fuest: Piketty (2014)(1) argues that governments should use tax policy to fight trends towards increasing inequality. He proposes that governments should levy higher taxes on capital income and wealth. The ambition is that higher taxes on capital income will reduce the after-tax return to capital and thus tend to reduce inequality of income and, ultimately, wealth. Wealth taxes would address wealth inequality directly. Problems: This proposal raises two questions: Distribution: firstly, how effective are capital taxes as an instrument for redistributing income, that is for reducing the (after-tax) return on capital? Growth: Secondly, what are the implications of this proposal for economic growth? VsCapital tax: An important objection to using capital income taxes as an instrument for income redistribution is that trying to do so will be self-defeating if capital is internationally mobile. Countries with a high income tax burden attract less investment, and the investment they do attract is less profitable (Becker et al. 2012)(2). Secondly, countries may rely on residence-based capital income taxes. Residence-based taxation at the corporate level is not very effective if corporate headquarters are internationally mobile or corporate group structures can be adjusted (Becker and Fuest 2010)(3). International mobility is slightly less problematic when it comes to capital income taxation at the personal level. Distribution: Opponents of higher capital income taxes emphasize that these taxes reduce incentives to accumulate capital. If the rate of time preference is given and determines the after-tax return on savings in the long term, and capital markets are frictionless (Judd 1985)(4), it follows that taxes cannot reduce the rate of return to capital and the optimal tax rate on capital income is zero. Fuest I 8 But other authors (e.g. Piketty and Saez 2013(5)) have argued that the existence of bequests, combined with capital market imperfections, can lead to different conclusions, with positive optimal tax rates on capital income. From this perspective, capital income taxes have the purpose of (i) indirectly taxing bequests and (ii) providing insurance against uninsurable uncertainty regarding future returns on capital. Redisribution: Should capital income taxation be increased to achieve more income redistribution? For instance, would it be desirable to abolish dual income taxation and tax capital income at progressive rates, like labour income? For a long time the enforcement of residencebased taxes on capital income was undermined by tax evasion through bank accounts held abroad. This was an important reason for reducing tax rates on capital income. But recent developments in international information exchange for tax purposes, in particular supported by the OECD and the US government, have made it significantly more difficult for taxpayers to evade these taxes. Growth: How can the tax system be changed to achieve more economic growth? In the literature on the link between tax structures and economic growth, the view is widespread that capital income taxes, and particularly corporate income taxes, are harmful for growth. For instance, a widely recognized study about the impact of tax structures on economic growth conducted by the OECD (Johansson et al. 2008)(6) concludes: The reviewed evidence and the empirical work suggests a “tax and growth ranking” with recurrent taxes on immovable property being the least distortive tax instrument in terms of reducing long-run GDP per capita, followed by consumption taxes (and other property taxes), personal income taxes and corporate income taxes. The interpretation of the results in Johansson et al. (2008)(6) and the empirical approach used in this study are the subject of an ongoing and controversial debate (see Xing 2012)(7). 1. Piketty, T. (2014), Capital in the 21st Century, Cambridge, MA: Belknap 2. Becker, J, C. Fuest and N. Riedel (2012), “Corporate Tax Effects on the Quantity and Quality of FDI”, European Economic Review 56, 1495-1511. 3. Becker, J. and C. Fuest (2010). “Taxing Foreign Profits with International Mergers and Acquisitions, International Economic Review 51, 171-186. 4. Judd, K. (1985). “Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model”, Journal of Public Economics 28, 59–83. 5. Piketty, T. and E. Saez (2013), “A Theory of Optimal Inheritance Taxation”, Econometrica 81, 1851-1886. 6. Johansson, Å., C. Heady, J. Arnold, B. Brys and L. Vartia (2008), Tax and Economic Growth, OECD Economics Department Working Paper 28. 7. Xing, J. (2012). “Tax Structure and Growth: How Robust Is the Empirical Evidence?”, Economics Letters 117, 379-382. Clemens Fuest, Andreas Peichl and Daniel Waldenström. Piketty’s r-g Model: Wealth Inequality and Tax Policy. https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/forum1-15-focus1.pdf |
Fuest I Clemens Fuest (ed.) George R. Zodrow Critical Issues in Taxation and Development (Cesifo Seminar Series) Cambridge, MA 2013 |
| Capital Gains Tax | Piketty | Fuest I 7 Capital tax/Piketty/Fuest: Piketty (2014)(1) argues that governments should use tax policy to fight trends towards increasing inequality. He proposes that governments should levy higher taxes on capital income and wealth. The ambition is that higher taxes on capital income will reduce the after-tax return to capital and thus tend to reduce inequality of income and, ultimately, wealth. Wealth taxes would address wealth inequality directly. Problems: This proposal raises two questions: Distribution: firstly, how effective are capital taxes as an instrument for redistributing income, that is for reducing the (after-tax) return on capital? Growth: Secondly, what are the implications of this proposal for economic growth? VsCapital tax: An important objection to using capital income taxes as an instrument for income redistribution is that trying to do so will be self-defeating if capital is internationally mobile. Countries with a high income tax burden attract less investment, and the investment they do attract is less profitable (Becker et al. 2012)(2). Secondly, countries may rely on residence-based capital income taxes. Residence-based taxation at the corporate level is not very effective if corporate headquarters are internationally mobile or corporate group structures can be adjusted (Becker and Fuest 2010)(3). International mobility is slightly less problematic when it comes to capital income taxation at the personal level. Distribution: Opponents of higher capital income taxes emphasize that these taxes reduce incentives to accumulate capital. If the rate of time preference is given and determines the after-tax return on savings in the long term, and capital markets are frictionless (Judd 1985)(4), it follows that taxes cannot reduce the rate of return to capital and the optimal tax rate on capital income is zero. Fuest I 8 But other authors (e.g. Piketty and Saez 2013(5)) have argued that the existence of bequests, combined with capital market imperfections, can lead to different conclusions, with positive optimal tax rates on capital income. From this perspective, capital income taxes have the purpose of (i) indirectly taxing bequests and (ii) providing insurance against uninsurable uncertainty regarding future returns on capital. Redisribution: Should capital income taxation be increased to achieve more income redistribution? For instance, would it be desirable to abolish dual income taxation and tax capital income at progressive rates, like labour income? For a long time the enforcement of residencebased taxes on capital income was undermined by tax evasion through bank accounts held abroad. This was an important reason for reducing tax rates on capital income. But recent developments in international information exchange for tax purposes, in particular supported by the OECD and the US government, have made it significantly more difficult for taxpayers to evade these taxes. Growth: How can the tax system be changed to achieve more economic growth? In the literature on the link between tax structures and economic growth, the view is widespread that capital income taxes, and particularly corporate income taxes, are harmful for growth. For instance, a widely recognized study about the impact of tax structures on economic growth conducted by the OECD (Johansson et al. 2008)(6) concludes: The reviewed evidence and the empirical work suggests a “tax and growth ranking” with recurrent taxes on immovable property being the least distortive tax instrument in terms of reducing long-run GDP per capita, followed by consumption taxes (and other property taxes), personal income taxes and corporate income taxes. The interpretation of the results in Johansson et al. (2008)(6) and the empirical approach used in this study are the subject of an ongoing and controversial debate (see Xing 2012)(7). Some basics for Piketty: >Cambridge Capital Controversy, >Geoffrey C. Harcourt, >Capital reversing, >Capital/Joan Robinson, >Exploitation/Robinson, >Reswitching/Robinson, >Reswitching/Sraffa, >Reswitching/Economic Theories, >Neo-Keynesianism, >Neo-Neoclassical Theories. 1. Piketty, T. (2014), Capital in the 21st Century, Cambridge, MA: Belknap 2. Becker, J, C. Fuest and N. Riedel (2012), “Corporate Tax Effects on the Quantity and Quality of FDI”, European Economic Review 56, 1495-1511. 3. Becker, J. and C. Fuest (2010). “Taxing Foreign Profits with International Mergers and Acquisitions, International Economic Review 51, 171-186. 4. Judd, K. (1985). “Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model”, Journal of Public Economics 28, 59–83. 5. Piketty, T. and E. Saez (2013), “A Theory of Optimal Inheritance Taxation”, Econometrica 81, 1851-1886. 6. Johansson, Å., C. Heady, J. Arnold, B. Brys and L. Vartia (2008), Tax and Economic Growth, OECD Economics Department Working Paper 28. 7. Xing, J. (2012). “Tax Structure and Growth: How Robust Is the Empirical Evidence?”, Economics Letters 117, 379-382. Clemens Fuest, Andreas Peichl and Daniel Waldenström. Piketty’s r-g Model: Wealth Inequality and Tax Policy. https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/forum1-15-focus1.pdf |
Piketty I Thomas Piketty Capital in the Twenty First Century Cambridge, MA 2014 Piketty II Thomas Piketty Capital and Ideology Cambridge, MA 2020 Piketty III Thomas Piketty The Economics of Inequality Cambridge, MA 2015 Fuest I Clemens Fuest (ed.) George R. Zodrow Critical Issues in Taxation and Development (Cesifo Seminar Series) Cambridge, MA 2013 |
| Capital Punishment | Social Psychology | Parisi I 132 Capital Punishment/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: Baldus, Pulaski, and Woodworth ( 1983)(1) found that defendants were significantly more likely to receive the death penalty when the victim was White (24%) than when the victim was Black (6%). Status: Additionally, a victim's low socioeconomic status reduced the defendant's likelihood of receiving a death sentence (Baldus et al., 1998)(2). Race: There is also evidence for the influence of defendant race, such that Black defendants were more likely to receive the death penalty than white defendants (Baldus et al., 1998)(2). Eberhardt et al. (2006)(3) displayed to experiment participants the photographs of defendants from death-eligible cases that advanced to the death penalty phase. Controlling for aggravating and mitigating factors, severity of killing, defendant and victim SES (socioeconomic status), and defendant attractiveness, the researchers found that when the victim was White, Black defendants with stereotypically Black faces were more than twice as likely to receive death sentences than those with less stereotypically Black faces. By contrast, when both the victim and the defendant were Black, stereotypicality of the defendant's appearance did not predict the likelihood of a death sentence. (See Blair, Judd, and Chapleau, 2004(4) for similar findings regarding Afrocentric features and sentence length.) 1. Baldus, D. C., C. Pulaski, and G. Woodworth (1983). "Comparative Review of Death Senences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience." Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (19739, doi:10.2307/1143133. 2. Baldus, D. C., G. Woodworth, D. Zuckerman, and N. A. Weiner (1998). "Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview with Recent Findings from Philadelphia." Cornell Law Review 83: 1638. 3. Eberhardt, J. L., P. G. Davies, V. J. Purdie-Vaughns, and S. L. Johnson (2006). "Looking Death- worthy Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes.“ Psychological Science 17(5):383-386. 4. Blair, I. V., C. M. Judd, and K. M. Chapleau (2004). "The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in Criminal Sentencing“. Psychological science 15(10): 674-679 Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Capital Structure | Lachmann | Coyne I 15 Capital structure/Lachmann/Coyne/Boettke: Heterogeneity of Capital means heterogeneity in use; Heterogeneity in use implies Multiple Specificity; Multiple Specificity implies Complementarity; Complementarity implies Capital Combinations; Capital Combinations form the elements of the Capital Structure. We are living in a world of unexpected change; hence capital combinations, and with them the capital structure, will be ever changing, will be dissolved and re-formed. In this activity we find the real function of the entrepreneur. (1) >Production, >Production structure. Coyne I 16 Menger: Raw materials do not have inherent objective value, but instead derive their value from what they contribute to the production of other, value-added capital goods in the structure of production. These Iower-order goods likewise derive their value from their contribution to the production of the final consumer good. What ultimately drives this process is the expected value of the final consumer goods (the first-order goods) as determined by consumers. Market: On the market, these subjective valuations are captured in the market prices of capital goods as discussed in the prior chapter on economic calculation. Lachmann: Taking Menger's framework as a foundation, Ludwig Lachmann further developed the Austrian understanding of capital. He emphasized that capital was characterized by heterogeneity, multiple specificity, and complementarity. Heterogeneity implies that capital goods are different. This might seem obvious, but standard economic theory treats capital as a homogeneous blob that can be used interchangeably and does not require any kind of careful planning or coordination through time. If capital goods were indeed homogeneous, they could be used interchangeably to produce whatever final products consumers desire. From this perspective, capital is analogous to a ball of Play-Dow.The same capital can be shaped into whatever output is desired by the designer. And if mistakes are made, capital resources can be reallocated quickly and with minimal cost by quickly reshaping the ball of Play-Dow. Austrian School: Scholars working in the Austrian tradition, in contrast, emphasize that capital is not homogeneous. All capital is not the same and cannot be used interchangeably. A pair of pliers is not the same thing as a pickup truck. >Capital goods. Capital goods: Each capital good can be used to achieve different purposes. Appreciating the heterogeneity of capital is also important because production plans vary from one individual to the next. >Capital/Lachmann. Coyne I 17 Capital structure/Lachmann: This structure is characterized by a complex set of relationships with a coherent pattern of order. The capital structure is not fixed. Instead it is in a constant state of change as a result of three factors. 1) The first is human error, whereby decisions made about the use of capital goods are revealed to be mistaken. 2) Second, innovations in production technologies - machinery, techniques, and organizational forms - may make portions of the prior capital structure ineffcient. Advances make old ways of producing goods and services less effcient compared to new alternatives. When this occurs, entrepreneurs will need to adjust how capital is allocated within the broader structure of production. 3) Finally, consumer desires might change so that what was previously produced is no longer valued compared to alternatives. In this case producers will need to revise their production plans, and the associated capital, to satisfy the new consumer wants. In fact, improvements in economic well-being require changes to the capital structure in response to changes in economic conditions, more accurate knowledge of those conditions, and improvements in technology and organizational forms. The result is the need for ongoing capital substitution and re-grouping in the face of changing circumstances. The problem with traditional neoclassical methods of studying the capitalist production process lies in either treating capital as a homogeneous blob, or relying on a momentary snapshot of the capital structure at some period of time. In contrast to either the blob method or period analysis, Austrian economists emphasize that we need to focus on the process by which combinations of heterogeneous and specific capital are shuffled and reshuffled in the broader context of the capital structure. Capital stock: The concept of the capital structure stands in contrast to the idea of a "capital stock," which refers to an aggregate measure of all capital at a point in time. >Capital/Austrian School. 1. Ludwig Lachmann (1956), Capital and Its Structure. London. Bell & Sons. pp. 12–13. |
Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020 |
| Capital Structure | Rothbard | Rothbard III 401 Capital Structure/Rothbard: (…) there is no great difference between durable and less durable capital. Both are consumed in the course of the production process, and both must be paid for out of the gross income and gross savings of lower-order capitalists. >Production structure/Rothbard. In evaluating the payment pattern of the production structure, then, it is inadmissible to leave the consumption of nondurable capital goods out of the investment picture. It is completely illogical to single out durable goods, which are themselves only discounted embodiments of their nondurable services and therefore no different from nondurable goods. >Durable Goods/Rothbard, >Service/Rothbard, >Production/Rothbard, >Capital/Rothbard. The idea that the capital structure is maintained intact without savings, as it were automatically, is fostered by the use of the “net” approach. If even zero savings will suffice to maintain capital, then it seems as if the aggregate value of capital is a permanent entity that cannot be reduced. Rothbard III 402 This notion of the permanence of capital has permeated economic theory, particularly through the writings of J.B. Clark and Frank H. Knight, and through the influence of the latter has molded current “neoclassical” economic theory in America. To maintain this doctrine it is necessary to deny the stage analysis of production and, indeed, to deny the very influence of time in production.(1) >Interest rates/Rothbard, >Factors of Production/Rothbard. Production/time/Rothbard: The all-pervading influence of time is stressed in the period- of- production concept and in the determination of the interest rate and of the investment-consumption ratio by individual time preference schedules. Frank H. Knight/RothbardVsKnight: The Knight doctrine denies any role to time in production, asserting that production “now” (in a modern, complex economy) is timeless and that time preference has no influence on the interest rate. This doctrine has been aptly called a “mythology of capital.” >Time preference. RothbardVsKnight: Among other errors, it leads to the belief that there is no economic problem connected with the replacement and maintenance of capital.(2,3) Rothbard III 407 Every capitalist at every stage (…) demands goods that are more distantly future than the product that he supplies, and he supplies present goods for the duration of the production stage until this product is formed. He is therefore a net supplier of present goods, and a net demander of future goods. 1. If permanence is attributed to the mythical entity, the aggregate value of capital, it becomes an independent factor of production, along with labor, and earns interest. 2. The fallacy of the “net” approach to capital is at least as old as Adam Smith and continues down to the present. See Hayek, Prices and Production, 2nd ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1935. Reprinted by Augustus M. Kelley, 1967. pp. 37–49. This book is an excellent contribution to the analysis of the production structure, gross savings and consumption, and in application to the business cycle, based on the production and business cycle theories of Böhm-Bawerk and Mises respectively. Also see Hayek, “The Mythology of Capital” in W. Fellner and B.F. Haley, eds., Readings in the Theory of Income Distribution (Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1946), pp. 355–83; idem, Profits, Interest, and Investment, passim. 3. For a critique of the analogous views of J.B. Clark, see Frank A. Fetter, “Recent Discussions of the Capital Concept,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 1900, pp. 1–14. Fetter succinctly criticizes Clark’s failure to explain interest on consumption goods, his assumption of a permanent capital fund, and his assumption of “synchronization” in production. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Capital Theory | Solow | Harcourt I 93 Capital theories/Solow/Harcourt: Solow(1) classifies capital theories as either technocratic or descriptive. Technocratic: They are technocratic when planning and allocation questions (and so socialism) are discussed, … Descriptive: ….descriptive when used in an explanation of the workings of capitalism. Joan Robinson and Solow are on common ground when he discusses a further reason for difficulty in descriptive capital theory, namely, that 'capital problems are inevitably bound up with questions of uncertainty, limited foresight and reactions to the unexpected' (p. 13)(1), all areas in which no notable progress has, as yet, been made in economic analysis. Joan Robinson's reaction has been to argue that certain concepts, the value of 'capital', 'the rate of profits', for example, can only be given meaning when uncertainty is absent and expectations are realized - hence the concentration on Golden Age situations; >Capital/Joan Robinson, >Capital/Solow. Solow's reaction is candidly to ignore it in the analysis that follows. Finally Solow also warns us that by dodging the ideological overtones, we may destroy the bridge that leads to descriptive theory, especially that relating to the workings of capitalist economies, and be left with only technocratic answers about the consequences but not the causes, of saving and investment decisions. (…) in Solow's view, the central concept of capital theory should be the rate of return on investment, i.e. capital theory should be about interest rates, not capital.* Harcourt I 94 This makes for clarity, while concentrating on 'time' or 'capital' or the 'marginal productivity of capital' (or labour) makes for confusion. >Return on investment/Solow. * Irving Fisher's theory is concerned principally with the determination of a rate of return on investment as the outcome of the interplay of the forces of productivity - the technical possibilities of transforming present goods into future goods as given by well-behaved investment-opportunity schedules - with those of thrift - the sub- jective rates, as given by their respective indifference curves, at which individuals swap present goods for future goods: see Hirshleifer [1958](2). Capital is not mentioned explicitly though investment is. Borrowing and lending possibilities are also intro- duced so that individuals and, latterly, societies, are not confined to points of tangency of their indifference curves with investment-opportunity schedules alone: see N. C. Miller [1968](3). 1. Solow, Robert M. [1963a] (Professor Dr. F. De Vries Lectures, 1963) Capital Theory and the Rate of Return (Amsterdam: North-Holland). 2. Hirshleifer, J. [1958] 'On the Theory of Optimal Investment Decision', Journal of Political Economy, LXVI, pp. 329-52. 3. Miller, N. C. [1968] 'A General Equilibrium Theory of International Capital Flows', Economic Journal, LXXVHI, pp. 312-20. |
Solow I Robert M. Solow A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth Cambridge 1956 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Capitalism | Lash | Gaus I 272 Capitalism/postmodernism/Lash/Urry/West: (...) postmodernity is characterized in terms of social and economic developments that are already familiar from theorists of modernity. Characteristic in this respect is Lash and Urry's (1987)(1) theory of 'disorganized capitalism'. Their notion of disorganized capitalism refers to a series of social and - the replacement of economic developments 'Fordism' by 'post-Fordism', the internationalization of production and finance, the relative decline of manufacturing and rise of the service sector, and the related decline of the traditional working class and the rise of 'new middle classes'. Like other theorists of NSMs [New Social Movements], Lash and Urry associate these developments with the shift from the organized class politics of industrialized societies to the new politics of NSMs (1987(1): 311). Culture: An important further consequence of these economic, social and political developments is the increasing importance of culture as a site of domination and resistance: 'domination through cultural forms takes on significance in disorganized capitalism which is comparable in importance to domination in the sphere of production itself' (1987(1): 14). Postmodernism: What differentiates Lash and Urry most clearly as theorists of postmodernity is their distinctively postmodernist view of contemporary culture. Disorganized capitalism is associated with the 'appearance and mass distribution of a culturalideological configuration of „Postmodemism" [which] affects high culture, popular culture and the symbols and discourse of everyday life' (1987(1): 7). >Culture/Lash/Urry. 1. Lash, Scott and John Urry (1987) The End of Organized Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity. West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Capitalism | Marx | Rothbard II 422 Capitalism/Marx/Rothbard: The vital corollary for the Marxian system, of the ever-thinning ranks of the centralized capitalists, is the ever-swelling ranks of the proletariat, and their increasing impoverishment and immiseration. >History/Marx. Rothbard II 423 RothbardVsMarx: Now here is a critical and crucial point in the Marxian argument. The increasing impoverishment of the working class is a key to the Marxian system, because on it rests the allegedly inevitable doom of capitalism and its replacement by the proletariat. If there is no increasing impoverishment, there is no reason for the working class to react against their intensifying exploitation and burst asunder their 'capitalist integument', those fetters on the technological mode of production. So how does Marx demonstrate the increasing poverty of the proletariat? At this point, Marx seems to grow desperate, and to come up With a number of varied and contrasting arguments, some ofwhich are mutually contradictory. For if workers' wages are already and at all times at the means of subsistence, kept there by the iron law, how can they get any worse off! >Wages/Marx, >Rate of profit/Marx. RothbardVsMarx: Setting aside for the moment this grave inner contradiction with the iron law of wages, how does Marx propose to establish his alleged law of the increasing Rothbard II 424 impoverishment of the proletariat? In one answer, the eternally falling rate of profits puts a severe pressure on capitalists to find more profit by sweating and exploiting the proletariat more intensively, making them work harder and for longer hours. But aside from the problem of the ever-present iron law, Marx is faced With the problem: Why did capitalists allow their rate of exploitation to grow slack until finally spurred on by a falling rate of profit? Don't capitalists always and at all times try to maximize their rates of profit? Solution/Marx/Rothbard: Here Marx falls back on a suggested mechanism for this increased exploitation of labour and falling wage rate: the accelerating growth of a permanent 'industrial reserve army', a growing legion of the unemployed. It is increased competition from the unemployed that forces wage rates downwards, and increasingly continues to do so as capitalism advances. RothbardVsMarx: But how can there be a continuing army of the unemployed, when wages to the unemployed are zero? Reserve army: Also, where does the industrial reserve army come from? Market economists know that unemployment quickly eliminates itselfby Iowering wage rates. Only if wage rates are bolstered above the market equilibrium level does unemployment become permanent; and if, as Marx maintains, the unemployed army Iowers wage rates through its competition, then it should rapidly disappear and pose no further problems. >Unemployment/Marx. Rothbard II 426 Impoverishment of the proletariat/Marx/Rothbard: We are left with the doctrine of the growing impoverishment of the proletariat, a doctrine so crucial in Marx that it can hardly be trivialized as a 'prediction' that somehow went astray. This 'prediction' is absolutely critical to the allegedly inevitable tendency for the workers to rise up and overthrow capitalism, a tendency that is supposed to deepen and accelerate as capitalism progresses. And yet, it has been starkly evident to everyone that one of the vitally significant facts of the century and a half since the birth of Marxism has been the continuing, spectacular growth in real wages and in the standard ofliving of the working class and of the mass of the population. Indeed what we have seen in this period is the most spectacular growth in industrialization and in living standards in the history of the world. MarxismVsVs: (…) generally, Marxists have tried to save the phenomenon, salvage the theory, by various fallback positions or forms of evasion. One popular tactic asserts that the underlying tendency toward impoverishment still exists, but has been 'temporarily' (one or two centuries?) offset by counteracting factors. A popular but bizarre Leninist variant is that workers in the West have benefited from imperialist western exploitation of, or investment in, the Third World, so that in a sense, western workers become 'capitalists' on an international scale. In the first place, in this transmutation of the oppressed proletariat of the West into exploiting 'capitalists' of the Third World, what ever happened to the inevitable dwindling of the capitalist class? Second, the grotesquerie of this doctrine may be gauged by the fact, as P.T. Bauer has demonstrated in many works, that the bulk of the Third World, however poor, has also been developing rapidly in recent decades, and the standard of living of their working masses has steadily risen. Not only that; but this development and rise in standards has taken place precisely in those areas and regions of the Third World (e.g. port cities) in closest trading and investment touch with developed western countries. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Capitalism | Pasinetti | Harcourt I 215 Capitalism/Pasinetti/Harcourt: (…) the debate is concerned with important empirical characteristics of capitalist economies, in particular, with the role of the class that accumulates capital, both by making investment decisions and by organizing the saving (their own or borrowed) to finance investment. We call this class 'pure' capitalists; they are defined as those whose only source of income is profits, which derive from their ownership of capital (see Pasinetti [1964](6), p. 489). It is in the spirit of the analysis to regard the class as profit-retaining companies organized by, say, Dr. Marris's managers (Marris [1964](1)), as Kaldor [1966](2) does in his reply to Samuelson and Modigliani (…). The managers might well have the saving behaviour of workers in their private lives (this is not all that fanciful when the consumption and other perks of expense account living are added to managerial incomes - as reported to the Inland Revenue - in order to obtain their mpss = apss), yet, simul taneously, organize the savings of companies in their role of good organization men. Harcourt I 216 The other group in the community - Pasinetti's 'workers' - may receive two classes of income, wages and profits on the financial capital which they own. It is financial capital because it results from lending their savings, as they accrue, to the 'pure' capitalists, who invest them in real, productive assets. Both classes are assumed to have simple proportional saving functions - Sw = sw(W+∏w) and Sc = sc∏c. Stiglitz: Stiglitz [1968](3) has suggested that if workers think they're capitalists when they consider the disposal of their income from profits, Uw may be subsumed along with ric in an all-embracing II. But this would drive a wedge between classes and income classes and only allow the determination of the income distribution of the latter. It does solve Nell's puzzle, and Kaldor's problem, (…). It is, of course, an empirical issue. Be that as it may, the two classes are permanent classes of incomereceivers - once there, always there - otherwise the respective property holdings of each will not grow at the rates assumed in the model. This is easier to accept for the 'pure' capitalists, where companies as going concerns immediately spring to mind, than for workers. MeadeVsPasinetti: This takes some sting out of Meade's comment [1963](4), pp. 671-2, that: 'For Mr. Pasinetti's results to have practical use we must assume a self-perpetuating class of property-owners who do no work and who, even after allowing for death duties, save a proportion of their income greater than 1/1 —T times the saving proportion of the rest of the community.' (r is the proportional marginal product of labour, i.e. labour's exponent in the neoclassical model which Meade uses partly to go over the same ground as Pasinetti.) If T = 3/5 —3/4, the ratio is 2 1/2 — 4 and the requirement is sc > 2 ½ sw - 4sw. Lf sw = 0.05 - 0.10, we get sc>0.125-0.40, which, for companies, does not seem unreasonable. Growth/investments: The debate may be seen, therefore, to relate to an integral part of the theory whereby 'the rate of growth … is determined in a modern economy by the investment decisions (of business firms) which can be actually financed and carried out within the monetary and resource constraints of society' (Davidson [1968b](5), p. 268). PasinettiVsVs: Pasinetti first got into the act by pointing out that Kaldor, in his Keynesian theory of distribution, see pp. 207-10 above, either did a Stiglitz or forgot that workers' saving would also lead to their accumulating financial capital and receiving profits - or interest - on it. 1. Marris, Robin [1964] The Economic Theory of 'Managerial Capitalism (London: Macmillan). 2. Kaldor, N. [1966] 'Marginal Productivity and the Macro-Economic Theories of Distribution', Review of Economic Studies, xxxm, pp. 309-19. 3. Stiglitz, J. E. [1968] [1968] Letter to author. 4. Meade, J. E. [1963] 'The Rate of Profit in a Growing Economy', Economic Journal, LXXIII, pp. 665-74. 5. Davidson, Paul [1968b] The Demand and Supply of Securities and Economic Growth and Ist Implications for the Kaldor-Pasinetti Versus Samuelson-Modigliani Contro- versy', American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, LVIII, pp. 252-69. 6. Pasinetti, L. [1964] 'A Comment on Professor Meade's "Rate of Profit in a Growing Economy" ', Economic Journal, LXXIV, pp. 488-9. |
Pasinetti I Luigi L. Pasinetti Structural Change and Economic Growth: A Theoretical Essay on the Dynamics of the Wealth of Nations Cambridge 1983 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Capitalism | Surowiecki | I 164 Capitalism/Surowiecki: Surowiecki shows an explanation for the emergence of an early far-reaching trading system by the Quakers, who were connected by a network of mutual trust. (1) I 165 The Quakers, for their part, had no access to the free professions because they rejected the Anglican Church. As businessmen, the Quakers became famous for their diligence and accuracy of accounting. They introduced innovations such as fixed prices for goods in order to make trading activities transparent. Thus, the Quakers became sought-after trading partners for heterodox people. The key term for this development is trust. I 168 Historian Richard Tilly shows that after 1800 merchants in England and Germany came to understand the value of honesty as a source of profit. (2) I 169 Capitalism/Surowiecki: The core element was the orientation towards long-term capital formation instead of the interest in short-term profits. According to Tilly, the economy began to see individual transactions as links in a comprehensive chain of profitable enterprises, rather than as "singular opportunities that must be exploited to the last." (2) Surowiecki: Trust became impersonal, so to speak. Buying and selling was no longer a matter of personal contact. I 171 Trust could not be maintained over distance without an institutional and legal framework. The high degree of effectiveness of laws and treaties can be measured by the fact that they are rarely invoked. >Laws, >Contracts, >Contract theory. 1. On the subject of Quakers, see Jacob M. Price, »The Great Quaker Business Families of 18th Century London«, Overseas Trade and Traders – Essays on Some Commercial, Financial, and Political Challenges Facing British Atlantic Merchants, 1600-1775 (Ashgate, Brookfield, VT, 1996); James Walvin, The Quakers – Money and Morals (Trafalgar Square, London 1998); und Peter Mathias, »Risk, Credit, and Kinship in Early Modern Enterprise«, in: John J. McCusker und Kenneth Morgan (Hrsg.), The Early Modern Atlantic Economy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000), S. 15-35. 2. Richard Tilly, »Moral Standards and Business Behavior in Nineteenth-Century Germany and Britain«, in: Jürgen Kocka und Allan Mitchell (Hrsg.), Bourgeois Society in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Berg, Oxford 1998), S. 182 ff. |
Surowi I James Surowiecki Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005 |
| Capitalism | Weber | Habermas IV 463 Capitalism/Weber/Habermas: in capitalist enterprises, the conspicuous achievement is not the institutionalization of wage labor, but the profit-oriented and rational accounting-based orderliness of economic decisions. Cf. >Labour, >K. Marx, >Marxism. "Spirit of capitalism"/Weber: the Spirit of capitalism is the mentality that characterizes the purpose-rational economic action of early capitalist entrepreneurs. >Purpose rationality, >Economics. WeberVsMarx: While Marx regards the mode of production as the phenomenon in need of explanation, and examines the accumulation of capital as the new mechanism of system integration, Weber learns the investigation into the reversal of the polarity of economy and state administration to purpose-rational orientations for action. This is about social integration. Habermas: Marx assumes problems of the system integration and Weber problems of social integration. Habermas IV 464 The learning capacities acquired by individuals or groups are incorporated into the interpretation system of society through exemplary learning processes. >Learning, >Society, >Progress, >Economic Systems. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Capitalization | Rothbard | Rothbard III 489 Capitalization/Rothbard: The principle of the determination of “capital values,” i.e., prices of “whole goods,” is known as capitalization, or the capitalizing of rents. >Capital value/Rothbard. This principle applies to all goods, not simply capital goods, and we must not be misled by similarity of terminology. Thus, capitalization applies to durable consumers’ goods, such as houses, TV sets, etc. It also applies to all factors of production, including basic land. The rental price, or rent, of a factor of production is equal (…) to its discounted marginal value product. The capital value of a “whole factor” will be equal to the sum of its future rents, or the sum of its DMVPs. (discounted marginal value products).(1) This capital value will be the price for which the “whole good” will exchange on the market. It is at this capital value that a unit of a “whole good” such as a house, a piano, a machine, an acre of land, etc., will sell on the market. >Consumer goods/Rothbard, >Durable goods/Rothbard, >Land/Rothbard, >Goods/Rothbard. There is clearly no sense to capitalization if there is no market, or price, for the “whole good.” The capital value is the appraised value set by the market on the basis of rents, durability, and the interest rate. The process of capitalization can encompass many units of a “whole good,” as well as one unit. >Price/Rothbard. Rothbard III 490 Problem: Many writers have fallen into the trap of assuming that they can, in a similar way, add up the entire capital value of the nation or world and arrive at a meaningful figure. Estimates of National Capital or World Capital, however, are completely meaningless. The world, or country, cannot sell all its capital on the market. Therefore, such statistical exercises are pointless. They are without possible reference to the very goal of capitalization: correct estimation of potential market price. Rothbard III 491 The process of capitalization, because it permeates all sectors of the economy, and because it is flexible enough to include different types of assets - such as the total capital assets of a firm—is a very important one in the economy. Prices of shares of the ownership of this capital will be set at their proportionate fraction of the total capital value of the assets. Price: In this way, given the MVPs (marginal value products), durability, and the rate of interest, all the prices on the capital market are determined, and these will be the prices in the ERE (Evenly Rotating Economy). >Evenly Rotating Economy/Rothbard, >Price/Rothbard, >Factors of production/Rothbard, >Marginal product/Rothbard. Rothbard III 492 RothbardVsFetter: If land can be capitalized, does this not mean that land and capital goods are “really the same thing” after all? The answer to the latter question is No.(2) Rothbard: It is still emphatically true that the earnings of basic land factors are ultimate and irreducible, as are labor earnings, while capital goods have to be constantly produced and reproduced, and therefore their earnings are always reducible to the earnings of ground land, labor, and time. Rothbard III 493 Basic land can be capitalized for one simple reason: it can be bought and sold “as a whole” on the market. (This cannot be done for labor, except under a system of slavery, which, of course, cannot occur on the purely free market.) Since this can be and is being done, the problem arises how the prices in these exchanges are determined. These prices are the capital values of ground land. >Rent/Rothbard. 1. On capitalization, see Fetter, Economic Principles, pp. 262–84, 308–13; and Böhm-Bawerk, Positive Theory of Capital, pp. 339–57. 2. Fetter’s main error in capital theory was his belief that capitalization meant the scrapping of any distinction between capital goods and land. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Captcha/reCAPTCHA | Mayer-Schönberger | I 99 Captcha/Luis von Ahn/Mayer-Schönberger: Ahn's original captcha represented random characters and digits that had to be typed correctly. His later re-captcha, on the other hand, brought combinations of two words from failed attempts by computers to read texts automatically.(1) Both times it is about the user demonstrating by typing that he/she is a human being and not a machine. To ensure security, the system presents the same random words to about 5 people at a time.(2) ((s) Then unanimity decides.) 1. Story of Luis von Ahn—Based on Cukier interviews with von Ahn from 2010. See also Clive Thompson, “For Certain Tasks, the Cortex Still Beats the CPU,” Wired, June 25, 2007 (http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/15-07/ff_humancomp?currentPage=all); Jessie Scanlon, “Luis von Ahn: The Pioneer of ‘Human Computation,’” Businessweek, November 3, 2008 (http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-11-03/luis-von-ahn-the-pioneer-of-human-computation-businessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice). 2. His technical description of reCaptchas is at Luis von Ahn et al., “reCAPTCHA: Human-Based Character Recognition via Web Security Measures,” Science 321 (September 12, 2008), pp. 1465–68 (http://www.sciencemag.org/content/321/5895/1465.abstract). |
MSchoen I Viktor Mayer-Schönberger Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think New York 2013 |
| Carbon Price Strategies | Stavins | Stavins I 153 Carbon Pricing Policy Instruments/Carbon price strategies/Aldy/Stavins: We consider five generic policy instruments that could conceivably be employed by regional, national, or even subnational governments for carbon pricing, including carbon taxes, cap-and-trade, emission reduction credits, clean energy standards, and fossil fuel subsidy reduction. (…) however [there are also] Stavins I 154 conventional environmental policy approaches, namely, command-and-control instruments, which have dominated environmental policy in virtually all countries over the past four decades. Command-and-Control Regulations: command-and-control regulatory standards are either technology based or performance based. Technology-based standards typically require the use of specified equipment, processes, or procedures. In the climate policy context, these could require firms to use particular types of energy-efficient motors, combustion processes, or landfill-gas collection technologies. Performance-based standards are more flexible than technology-based standards, specifying allowable levels of pollutant emissions or allowable emission rates, but leaving the specific methods of achieving those levels up to regulated entities. >Command-and-Control-Regulations/Stavins. Stavins I 155 Carbon Taxes: In principle, the simplest approach to carbon pricing would be through government imposition of a carbon tax (Metcalf, 2007)(1). The government could set a tax in terms of dollars per ton of CO2 emissions (or CO2-equivalent on greenhouse gas emissions) by sources covered by the tax, or—more likely—a tax on the carbon content of the three fossil fuels (coal, petroleum, and natural gas) as they enter the economy. The government could apply the carbon tax at a variety of points in the product cycle of fossil fuels, from fossil fuel suppliers based on the carbon content of fuel sales (“upstream” taxation/regulation) to final emitters at the point of energy generation (“downstream” taxation/regulation). >Carbon Taxation/Government policies, >Carbon Taxation/Fankhauser, >Carbon Taxation/Stavins. Stavins I 157 Cap-and-Trade Systems: A cap-and-trade system constrains the aggregate emissions of regulated sources by creating a limited number of tradable emission allowances—in sum equal to the overall cap—and requiring those sources to surrender allowances to cover their emissions (Stavins, 2007)(2). Cap-and-trade sets an aggregate quantity, and through trading, yields a price on emissions, and is effectively the dual of a carbon tax that prices emissions and yields a quantity of emissions as firms respond to the tax’s mitigation incentives. >Cap-and-Trade Systems/Stavins. Stavins I 159 Emission-Reduction-Credit Systems: An emission-reduction-credit (ERC) system delivers emission mitigation by awarding tradable credits for “certified” reductions. Generally, firms that are not covered by some set of regulations—be they command-and-control or market-based — may voluntarily participate in such systems, which serve as a source of credits that entities facing compliance obligations under the regulations may use. Individual countries can implement an ERC system without having a corresponding cap-and-trade program. While ERC systems can be self-standing, as in the case of the CDM [Clean Development Mechanism], governments can also establish them as elements of domestic cap-and-trade or other regulatory systems. These ERC systems—often referred to as offset programs—serve as a source of credits that can be used by regulated entities to meet compliance obligations under the primary system. >Emssion-Reduction-Credit System/Stavins Clean Energy Standards: The purpose of a clean energy standard is to establish a technology-oriented goal for the electricity sector that can be implemented cost-effectively (Aldy, 2011)(3). Under such standards, power plants generating electricity with technologies that satisfy the standard create tradable credits that they can sell to power plants that fail to meet the standard, thereby minimizing the costs of meeting the standard’s goal in a manner analogous to cap-and-trade. Stavins I 161 A clean energy standard represents a de facto free allocation of the right to emit greenhouse gases to the power sector. >Clean Energy Standards/Stavins. Eliminating Fossil Fuel Subsidies: Phasing out fossil fuel subsidies can represent significant progress toward “getting prices right” for fossil fuel consumption, especially in some developing countries, where subsidies are particularly large. Imposing a carbon price on top of a fuel subsidy will not lead to the socially optimal price for the fuel, but removing such subsidies can deliver incentives for efficiency and fuel switching comparable to implementing an explicit carbon price. >Eliminating Fossil Fuel Subsidies/Stavins. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Metcalf, G. E. (2007). A proposal for a U.S. carbon tax swap (The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007-12). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 2. Stavins, R. N. (2007). A U.S. cap-and-trade system to address global climate change (The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007-13). Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. 3. Aldy, J. E. (2011). Promoting clean energy in the American power sector (The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2011-04). Washington, DC: The Hamilton Project. Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180. |
Stavins I Robert N. Stavins Joseph E. Aldy The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 2012 |
| Carbon Pricing | Fankhauser | Fankhauser I 1 Carbon Pricing/Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: (…) to keep the rise in global mean temperatures well below 2°C above preindustrial levels (…) requires a variety of policy interventions, including subsidies to support the breakthrough of low-carbon technologies, regulatory standards to drive down the energy use of buildings, cars and appliances, and financing schemes to overcome capital constraints (Bowen & Fankhauser, 2017)(1). However, an effective carbon price is essential to avoid more severe interferences with the climate system (Stiglitz et al., 2018)(2). Only if the emitters of greenhouse gases face the full environmental costs of their actions will they manage their carbon emissions effectively. Carbon pricing alters relative prices, leading to an automatic adjustment in behavior by firms and consumers, and creating a continuous incentive for investments in low-carbon technological improvements. It works as a decentralized policy, in that it does not require regulators to have information on marginal abatement costs. Agents react to the carbon price based on their marginal abatement cost. By exploiting heterogeneity in marginal abatement costs, carbon pricing allows reducing the overall abatement cost (Weitzman, 1974)(3). Emissions Trading: Until now, emissions trading has been the carbon pricing instrument of choice in most jurisdictions. In the European Union, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) covers almost half of total greenhouse gas emissions. Carbon is also traded in Canada, China, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States, although most of these schemes are limited in their regional or sectoral scope (World Bank, 2016)(4). >Carbon Taxation/Fankhauser. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Bowen, A., & Fankhauser, S. (2017). Good practice in low-carbon policy. In A. Averchenkova, S. Fankhauser, & M. Nachmany (Eds.), Climate change legislation (pp. 123–140). London, England: Edward Elgar. 2. Stiglitz, J. E., Stern, N., Duan, M., Edenhofer, O., Giraud, G., Heal, G., La Rovere, E. L., Morris, A., Moyer, E., Pangestu, M., Shukla, P. R., Sokona, Y., & Winkler, H. (2018). Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices. Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition. 3. Weitzman, M. L. (1974). Prices vs. quantities. The Review of Economic Studies, 41(4), 477–491. 4. World Bank. (2016). State and trends of carbon pricing 2016. Washington, DC: Author. Stefano Carattini, Maria Carvalho & Sam Fankhauser, 2018: “Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes”. In: Stéphane Hallegatte, Mike Hulme (Eds.), WIREs Climate Change, Vol. 9/5, pages 1-26. |
Fankhauser I Samuel Fankhauser Stefano Carattini Maria Carvalho, Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes 2018 |
| Carbon Pricing Coordination | Stavins | Stavins I 169 Carbon Pricing Coordination/Stavins: (…) the location of greenhouse gas emissions has no effect on the global distribution of damages. Hence free-riding problems plague unilateral and multilateral approaches. Furthermore, nations will not benefit proportionately from greenhouse gas mitigation policies. Thus mitigation costs are likely to exceed direct benefits for virtually all countries. Stavins I 170 In principle, internationally employed market-based instruments can achieve overall cost effectiveness. Three basic routes stand out. 1. Countries could agree to apply the same tax on carbon (harmonized domestic taxes) or adopt a uniform international tax. 2. The international policy community could establish a system of international tradable permits—effectively a nation-state level cap-and-trade program. 3. A more decentralized system of internationally linked domestic cap-and-trade programs could ensure internationally cost-effective emission mitigation. >Carbon price strategies/Stavins, >Emission permits/Stavins, >Cap-and-Trade Linkages/Stavins. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180. |
Stavins I Robert N. Stavins Joseph E. Aldy The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 2012 |
| Carbon Taxation | Fankhauser | Fankhauser I 1 Carbon Taxation/EU/US/Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: Carbon taxation, in conjunction with other regulatory measures, could be an effective way of closing policy gaps in sectors that are not already covered by a functioning emissions trading system. In the EU, carbon taxes could play a role in reducing Fankhauser I 2 emissions outside the EU ETS [Emissions Trading System], where much of the future policy effort must lie, according to the European Environment Agency (2016)(1). In the United States, senior Republicans have laid out their arguments for a US $40 carbon tax in The Conservative Case for Carbon Dividends (Baker III, Feldstein, Halstead, et al., 2017)(2). >Emissions Trading. A carbon tax is a relatively simple instrument to impose on the individual emitters, including the many smaller ones that dominate the non-ETS sectors and are less likely than large emitting facilities or sources to engage in carbon trading. According to the expertise collected by the World Bank, cap-and-trade systems—like the EU ETS—are best suited for industrial actors that have the capacity and skills to engage in the market actively (World Bank, 2016)(3). With their high transaction costs, such systems are less appealing for sectors with a large number of small emission sources, such as transportation and buildings (Goulder & Parry, 2008)(4). Economists advocate the use of carbon taxes because they provide the price incentive to reduce emissions without being technologically prescriptive, are simpler to administer, and do not draw on government budgets (Aldy & Stavins, 2012(5); Baranzini et al., 2017(6); Baumol & Oates, 1971(7); Goulder & Parry, 2008(4); Mankiw, 2009(8); Metcalf, 2009(9); Weitzman, 2015(10)). Fankhauser I 4 The required tax level is determined by the environmental objective and more specifically by the marginal costs of meeting a given emissions target (Bowen & Fankhauser, 2017)(11). Fankhauser I 2 VsCarbon Taxation/VsCarbon Tax/Objections to Carbon Taxation/Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: Despite these advantages, carbon taxes are one of the least used climate policy instruments. Carbon tax proposals have been undone, sometimes at an advanced political stage, for example in Australia (in 2014), France (in 2000), Switzerland (in 2000 and 2015), and most recently in the United States in Washington State (in 2016). Objections to carbon taxation are often not about the introduction of the tax itself, but about its design (Dresner, Dunne, Clinch, & Beuermann, 2006)(12) and the way relevant information is shared. Sociopsychological factors—such as perceived coerciveness, equity, and justice—all affect the extent to which voters accept different climate policy instruments (Drews & van den Bergh, 2015)(13). Factoring them into the design from the outset could make carbon tax legislation easier to pass. Opposition by vested interests has proved to be very effective in limiting public intervention in a wide range of environmental issues (Oates & Portney, 2003)(14), and their lobbying efforts can influence voters' views, preventing the passage, or even revoking the implementation of a carbon tax. Other studies, for instance by Hammar, Löfgren, and Sterner (2004)(15), Van Asselt and Brewer (2010)(16), Dechezleprêtre and Sato (2017)(17), and Neuhoff et al. (2015)(18), provide insights into how vested interests and other political economy aspects have affected the design of carbon pricing in recent times. Fankhauser I 3 Recognizing that there are variations in attitudes and perceptions across individuals, we identify five general reasons for aversion to carbon taxes that have been recurrently emphasized in the literature. 1. VsCarbon Taxation: The personal costs are perceived to be too high. A Swedish survey by Jagers and Hammar (2009)(19) found that people associate carbon taxes with higher personal costs, more than they do with alternative policy instruments. A discrete choice experiment by Alberini, Scasny, and Bigano (2016)(20) showed that Italians had a preference, among climate policy instruments, for subsidies over carbon taxes. Participants in a lab experiment by Heres, Kallbekken, and Galarraga (2015)(21) similarly expected higher payoffs from subsidies than from taxes, especially when there was uncertainty on how tax revenues would be “rebated.” Ex ante, individuals tend to overestimate the cost of an environmental tax, and underestimate its benefits (Carattini et al., 2018(22); Odeck & Bråthen, 2002(23); Schuitema, Steg, & Forward, 2010(24)). The literature in social psychology also suggests that individuals prefer subsidies because they are perceived as less coercive than taxes. Taxes are “pushed” onto polluters, imposing a mandatory cost, while subsidies are seen as “pull” measures, which supposedly reward climate-friendly behavior (de Groot & Schuitema, 2012(25); Rosentrater et al., 2012(26); Steg et al., 2006(27)). 2. VsCarbon Taxation: Carbon taxes can be regressive. [Voters] perceive, rightly, that without counterbalancing measures carbon taxes may have a disproportionate negative impact on low-income households. These counterbalancing measures can, however, offset the adverse distributional effects of carbon taxes, and even make them progressive. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that alternative climate policy instruments such as subsidies for renewable energy can also have similar regressive effects and may not generate revenues to counter them (Baranzini et al., 2017)(28). 3. VsCarbon Taxation: Carbon taxes could damage the wider economy. This has been illustrated in Switzerland, where, in two different instances more than 10 years apart, concern about the potential competitiveness and employment effects of energy taxes contributed to their rejection in public ballots, even in the context of very limited unemployment (Carattini, Baranzini, Thalmann, Varone, & Vöhringer, 2017(29); Thalmann, 2004(30)). While these concerns are partly justified, voters may tend to overestimate competitiveness and job effects. [This] may also result from specific information campaigns led by energy-intensive companies, as in the case of Australia (cf. Spash & Lo, 2012)(31). 4. VsCarbon Taxation: Carbon taxes are believed not to discourage high-carbon behavior (…) (Klok, Larsen, Dahl, & Hansen, 2006(32); Steg et al., 2006(27)). [Individuals] consider low-carbon subsidies to be a more powerful way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, especially if the cost of switching from consuming high-carbon goods to low-carbon goods is considered high. [They] believe that the price elasticity of demand for carbon-intensive goods is close to zero. The expectation that carbon taxes do not work is one of the main reasons for their rejection by people in surveys and real ballots (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(6); Carattini et al., 2017(29); Hsu, Walters, & Purgas, 2008(33); Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010(34); Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011(35)). Fankhauser I 4 5. VsCarbon Taxation: Governments may want to tax carbon to increase their revenues. [Individuals] assume—as a direct consequence of concern 4 above—that the purpose of introducing a carbon tax is not to reduce greenhouse gases but to increase government revenues (Klok et al., 2006)(32). Trust issues sometimes concern the specific environmental tax proposal under consideration, but they may also be broader, related to people's general view of tax policy or even to trust in the government itself (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(6); Beuermann & Santarius, 2006(36); Dietz, Dan, & Shwom, 2007(37); Hammar & Jagers, 2006(38)). VsVs: Some of these perceptions are incorrect. There is evidence that carbon pricing does in fact reduce emissions (J. Andersson, 2015(39); Baranzini & Carattini, 2014(40); Martin, de Preux, & Wagner, 2014(41)) and has so far had a minimal impact on the wider economy, in terms of adversely affecting the competitiveness of domestic industry, at least in the presence of adjustments and specific measures tailored to support the most exposed firms (Dechezleprêtre & Sato, 2017)(17). On the other hand, voters are right to suspect that governments would probably welcome the extra revenues. Indeed, its benign fiscal implications are often highlighted as one of the merits of a carbon tax (Bowen & Fankhauser, 2017)(11). It is also the case that carbon taxes are often regressive; without counter measures they may affect poor households disproportionately (Gough, Abdallah, Johnson, Ryan Collins, & Smith, 2012(42); Metcalf, 2009(9); Speck, 1999(43); Sterner, 2011(44)). (…) the accuracy of public perceptions is less important than the fact that they are widely held and can hinder the adoption of otherwise desirable policies. People's attitudes to carbon taxes appear to be influenced more by the direct personal cost of the measure than by an appreciation of the environmental objective (Kallbekken, Kroll, & Cherry, 2011)(45). Consequently, the public acceptability of an environmental tax depends heavily on its policy stringency, since the proposed tax rate determines the direct costs to consumers. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. European Environment Agency (2016). Chapter 1. Overall progress towards the European Union's 20-20-20 climate and energy targets. In Trends and projections in Europe 2016—Tracking progress towards Europe's climate and energy targets (pp. 1–12). Brussels, Belgium: Author. 2. Baker, J. A. III, Feldstein, M., Halstead, T., Mankiw, N. G., Paulson, H. M. Jr., Schultz, G. P., … Walton, R. (2017). The conservative case for carbon dividends. Washington, DC: Climate Leadership Council. 3. World Bank. (2016). State and trends of carbon pricing 2016. Washington, DC: Author. 4. Goulder, L. H., & Parry, I. W. H. (2008). Instrument choice in environmental policy. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2(2), 152–174. 5. Aldy, J. E., & Stavins, R. N. (2012). The promise and problems of pricing carbon: Theory and experience. The Journal of Environment and Development, 21(2), 152–180. 6. Baranzini, A., & Carattini, S. (2017). Effectiveness, earmarking and labeling: Testing the acceptability of carbon taxes with survey data. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 19(1), 197–227. 7. Baumol, W. J., & Oates, W. E. (1971). The use of standards and prices for protection of the environment. The Swedish Journal of Economics, 73(1), 42–54. 8. Mankiw, N. G. (2009). Smart taxes: An open invitation to join the Pigou club. Eastern Economic Journal, 35(1), 14–23. 9. Metcalf, G. E. (2009). Designing a carbon tax to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 3(1), 63–83. 10. Weitzman, M. L. (2015). Voting on prices vs. voting on quantities in a World Climate Assembly (NBER Working Paper No. 20925). Boston, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 11. Bowen, A., & Fankhauser, S. (2017). Good practice in low-carbon policy. In A. Averchenkova, S. Fankhauser, & M. Nachmany (Eds.), Climate change legislation (pp. 123–140). London, England: Edward Elgar. 12. Dresner, S., Dunne, L., Clinch, P., & Beuermann, C. (2006). Social and political responses to ecological tax reform in Europe: An introduction to the special issue. Energy Policy, 34(8), 895–904. 13. Drews, S., & van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2015). What explains public support for climate policies: A review of empirical and experimental studies. Climate Policy, 16(7), 1–20. 14. Oates, W. E., & Portney, P. R. (2003). The political economy of environmental policy. In K.-G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (Eds.), Handbook of environmental economics (pp. 325–354). Elsevier Science B.V. 15. Hammar, H., Löfgren, A., & Sterner, T. (2004). Political economy obstacles to fuel taxation. The Energy Journal, 25(3), 1–17. 16. van Asselt, H., & Brewer, T. (2010). Addressing competitiveness and leakage concerns in climate policy: An analysis of border adjustment measures in the US and the EU. Energy Policy, 38(1), 42–51. 17. Dechezleprêtre, A., & Sato, M. (2017). The impacts of environmental regulations on competitiveness. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 11(2), 183–206. 18. Neuhoff, K., Ancygier, A., Ponssardet, J., Quirion, P., Sartor, O., Sato, M., & Schopp, A. (2015). Modernization and innovation in the materials sector: Lessons from steel and cement. Berlin, Germany: Climate Strategies and DIW Berlin. Retrieved from http://climatestrategies.org/publication/modernization-and-innovation-in-thematerials- sector-lessons-from-steel-and-cement/ 19. Jagers, S. C., & Hammar, H. (2009). Environmental taxation for good and for bad: The efficiency and legitimacy of Sweden's carbon tax. Environmental Politics, 18(2), 218–237. 20. Alberini, A., Scasny, M., & Bigano, A. (2016). Policy vs individual heterogeneity in the benefits of climate change mitigation: Evidence from a stated-preference survey (FEEM Working Paper No. 80.2016). Milan, Italy: FEEM 21. Heres, D. R., Kallbekken, S., & Galarraga, I. (2015). The role of budgetary information in the preference for externality-correcting subsidies over taxes: A lab experiment on public support. Environmental and Resource Economics, 66(1), 1–15. 22. Carattini, S., Baranzini, A., & Lalive, R. (2018). Is taxing waste a waste of time? Evidence from a supreme court decision. Ecological Economics, 148, 131–151. 23. Odeck, J., & Bråthen, S. (2002). Toll financing in Norway: The success, the failures and perspectives for the future. Transport Policy, 9(3), 253–260. 24. Schuitema, G., Steg, L., & Forward, S. (2010). Explaining differences in acceptability before and acceptance after the implementation of a congestion charge in Stockholm. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 44(2), 99–109. 25. de Groot, J. I. M., & Schuitema, G. (2012). How to make the unpopular popular? Policy characteristics, social norms and the acceptability of environmental policies. Environmental Science and Policy, 19–20, 100–107. 26. Rosentrater, L. D., Sælensminde, I., Ekström, F., Böhm, G., Bostrom, A., Hanss, D., & O'Connor, R. E. (2012). Efficacy trade-offs in individuals' support for climate change policies. Environment and Behavior, 45(8), 935–970. 27. Steg, L., Dreijerink, L., & Abrahamse, W. (2006). Why are energy policies acceptable and effective? Environment and Behavior, 38(1), 92–111. 28. Baranzini, A., van den Bergh, J. C. J. M., Carattini, S., Howarth, R. B., Padilla, E., & Roca, J. (2017). Carbon pricing in climate policy: Seven reasons, complementary instruments, and political economy considerations. WIREs Climate Change, 8(4), 1–17. 29. Carattini, S., Baranzini, A., Thalmann, P., Varone, P., & Vöhringer, F. (2017). Green taxes in a post-Paris world: Are millions of nays inevitable? Environmental and Resource Economics, 68(1), 97–128. 30. Thalmann, P. (2004). The public acceptance of green taxes: 2 million voters express their opinion. Public Choice, 119, 179–217. 31. Spash, C. L., & Lo, A. Y. (2012). Australia's carbon tax: A sheep in wolf's clothing? The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 23(1), 67–86. 32. Klok, J., Larsen, A., Dahl, A., & Hansen, K. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Denmark: History and social acceptability. Energy Policy, 34(8), 905–916. 33. Hsu, S. L., Walters, J., & Purgas, A. (2008). Pollution tax heuristics: An empirical study of willingness to pay higher gasoline taxes. Energy Policy, 36(9), 3612–3619. 34. Kallbekken, S., & Aasen, M. (2010). The demand for earmarking: Results from a focus group study. Ecological Economics, 69(11), 2183–2190. 35. Kallbekken, S., & Sælen, H. (2011). Public acceptance for environmental taxes: Self-interest, environmental and distributional concerns. Energy Policy, 39(5), 2966–2973. 36. Beuermann, C., & Santarius, T. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Germany: Handling two hot potatoes at the same time. Energy Policy, 34(8), 917–929. 37. Dietz, T., Dan, A., & Shwom, R. (2007). Support for climate change policy: Social psychological and social structural influences. Rural Sociology, 72(2), 185–214. Doda, B. (2016). How to price carbon in good times ... and bad! WIREs Climate Change, 7(1), 135–144. 38. Hammar, H., & Jagers, S. C. (2006). Can trust in politicians explain individuals' support for climate policy? The case of CO2 tax. Climate Policy, 5(6), 613–625. 39. Andersson, J. (2015). Cars, carbon taxes and CO2 emissions (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Paper 212/Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper 238). London, England: London School of Economics and Political Science. 40. Baranzini, A., & Carattini, S. (2014). Taxation of emissions of greenhouse gases: The environmental impacts of carbon taxes. In B. Freedman (Ed.), Global environmental change (pp. 543–560). Heidelberg, Germany and New York, NY: Springer. 41. Martin, R., de Preux, L. B., & Wagner, U. J. (2014). The impact of a carbon tax on manufacturing: Evidence from microdata. Journal of Public Economics, 117, 1–14. 42. Gough, I., Abdallah, S., Johnson, V., Ryan Collins, J., & Smith, C. (2012). The distribution of total greenhouse gas emissions by households in the UK, and some implications for social policy. London, England: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion. 43. Speck, S. (1999). Energy and carbon taxes and their distributional implications. Energy Policy, 27(11), 659–667. 44. Sterner, T. (Ed.). (2011). Fuel taxes and the poor: The distributional effects of gasoline taxation and their implications for climate policy. Abingdon, England: Routledge. 45. Kallbekken, S., Kroll, S., & Cherry, T. L. (2011). Do you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 62(1), 53–64. Stefano Carattini, Maria Carvalho & Sam Fankhauser, 2018: “Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes”. In: Stéphane Hallegatte, Mike Hulme (Eds.), WIREs Climate Change, Vol. 9/5, pages 1-26. |
Fankhauser I Samuel Fankhauser Stefano Carattini Maria Carvalho, Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes 2018 |
| Carbon Taxation | Government Policy | Geroe I 6 Carbon Taxation/ETR/Effective Tax Rate/Government Policy/Geroe: The major categories of carbon tax revenue use in ETR [effective tax rate] have been to reduce other taxes, to support environmental projects, and to provide compensation. Nonetheless, the most common definition of ETR (from the 1990s to 2006) has been the use of environmental taxes to reduce other taxes. The main focus has been on taxes on labor, although other regressive indirect taxes imposed on the cost of goods and services can also be reduced (Clinch, Dunne, & Dresner, 2006)(1). Thus, ETR has long incorporated an aspect of distributional neutrality, in terms of reducing the regressive effects of taxes impacting disproportionately on lower income households. Recycling carbon tax revenue to fund reductions in other taxes can also reduce impacts on international competitiveness, thus ameliorating carbon leakage in terms of shifting of production to jurisdictions without a carbon price (Barker & Johnstone, 1998)(2). A central element of this debate has been discussion of the ‘‘double dividend’’ of ETR, through combining emissions reductions with stimulation of employment through reductions in labor taxes or economic demand through reductions in income taxes. In the early 1990s, these issues were considered in several government sponsored Scandinavian studies and by EU in relation to its 1992 carbon tax proposal (Clinch et al., 2006)(1). In the late 1990s, O’Riordan (1997)(3) surveyed the economic modeling and theoretical argument on ETR and concluded that they ‘‘. . . do not tell us any more than that we ought to be very careful about reaching premature cost decisions on the economic efficiency of such taxes’’. Two decades later, the variety of industrial and policy contexts in which carbon taxes have been introduced continues to render evaluation of specific measures in isolation problematic. All carbon taxes have been designed and integrated into the tax mix to capture economic and social equity as well as environmental objectives. Hence, evaluation of carbon taxes necessarily relates to the diverse public policy objectives of the implementation context. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Clinch, P., Dunne, L., & Dresner, S. (2006). Environmental and wider implications of political impediments to environmental tax reform. Energy Policy, 34, 960. 2. Barker, T., & Johnstone, N. (1998). International competitiveness and carbon taxation. In T. Barker & J. Kohler (Eds.), International competitiveness and environmental policies. Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar Publishing. 3. O’Riordan, T. (1997). Editorial introduction. In T. O’Riordan (Ed.), Ecotaxation. London, England: Earthscan Publications. Steven Geroe, 2019: “Addressing Climate Change Through a Low-Cost, High-Impact Carbon Tax”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 28/1, pp. 3-27. |
Geroe I Steven Geroe Addressing Climate Change Through a Low-Cost, High-Impact Carbon Tax 2019 |
| Carbon Taxation | International Policies | Stavins I 170 Carbon taxation/Carbon Tax/International Taxes/Harmonized Domestic Taxes/Carbon Pricing Coordination/International policies/Stavins: In principle, a carbon tax could be imposed on nation states by an international agency. The supporting agreement would have to specify both tax rates and a formula for allocating the tax revenues. Cost-effectiveness would require a uniform tax rate across all countries. It is unclear, however, what international agency could impose and enforce such a tax, and so an alternative more frequently considered has been a set of harmonized domestic carbon taxes (Cooper, 2010)(1). In this case, an agreement would stipulate that all countries are to levy the same domestic carbon taxes and retain their revenues. But some developing countries may argue that the resulting distribution of costs does not conform to principles of distributional equity and call for significant resource transfers. Under a harmonized tax system, an agreement could include fixed lump-sum payments from developed to developing countries, and under an international tax system, an agreement could specify shares of the total international tax revenues that go to participating countries. As an alternative to these explicit transfers, developed countries could commit to constrain the use of their tax revenues in ways that produce global benefits. In some developing countries reluctant to implement a carbon tax, an initial cost-effective contribution to combat climate change could take the form of reducing fossil fuel subsidies. Stavins I 171 Lowering energy subsidies can free up government revenues that could be directed to other beneficial uses and improve the allocation of resources in the economy to promote faster economic growth. >Carbon Pricing Coordination/Stavins. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Cooper, R. N. (2010). The case for charges on greenhouse gas emissions. In J. E. Aldy & R. N. Stavins (Eds.), Post-Kyoto international climate policy: Implementing architectures for agreement (pp. 151-178). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180. |
Stavins I Robert N. Stavins Joseph E. Aldy The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 2012 |
| Carbon Taxation | Saez | Saez I 189 Carbon tax/Saez/Zucman: Occasionally it’s argued that a carbon tax could provide some of the funding for health or childcare, but that’s a mistake. Carbon taxation is, of course, necessary to fight climate change. But its goal should be only this: fight climate change. It should not aim at collecting revenue in the medium run, but instead aim at eradicating future carbon emissions. A successful carbon tax should eventually yield zero revenue. Cf. >Pigovian Tax. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. |
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| Carbon Taxation | Stavins | Stavins I 155 Carbon Taxation/Aldy/Stavins: In principle, the simplest approach to carbon pricing would be through government imposition of a carbon tax (Metcalf, 2007)(1). The government could set a tax in terms of dollars per ton of CO2 emissions (or CO2-equivalent on greenhouse gas emissions) by sources covered by the tax, or—more likely—a tax on the carbon content of the three fossil fuels (coal, petroleum, and natural gas) as they enter the economy. Over time, an efficient carbon tax would increase to reflect the fact that as more greenhouse gas emissions accumulate in the atmosphere, the greater is the incremental damage from one more ton of CO2. Imposing a carbon tax would provide certainty about the marginal cost of compliance, which reduces uncertainty about returns to investment decisions, but would leave uncertain economy-wide emission levels (Weitzman, 1974)(2). The government could apply the carbon tax at a variety of points in the product cycle of fossil fuels, from fossil fuel suppliers based on the carbon content of fuel sales (“upstream” taxation/regulation) to final emitters at the point of energy generation (“downstream” taxation/regulation). A carbon tax would be administratively simple and straightforward to implement in most industrialized countries, since the tax could incorporate existing methods for fuel-supply monitoring and reporting to the regulatory authority. Some developing countries with effective tax systems, including monitoring and enforcement regimes to minimize tax evasion, could also implement carbon taxes in a relatively straightforward manner. Stavins I 156 The effects of a carbon tax on emission mitigation and the economy will depend in part on the amount and use of the tax revenue. The carbon tax revenue could be put toward a variety of uses (cf. >Carbon Taxation Strategies/Fankhauser). VsCarbon Taxation: The implementation of a carbon tax (or any other meaningful climate policy instrument) will increase the cost of consuming energy and could adversely affect the competitiveness of energy-intensive industries. This competitiveness effect can result in negative economic and environmental outcomes: firms may relocate facilities to countries without meaningful climate change policies, thereby increasing emissions in these new locations and offsetting some of the environmental benefits of the policy. Additional emission leakage may occur through international energy markets—as countries with climate policies reduce their consumption of fossil fuels and drive down fuel prices, those countries without emission mitigation policies increase their fuel consumption in response to the lower prices. Since leakage undermines the environmental effectiveness of any unilateral effort to mitigate emissions, international cooperation and coordination becomes all the more important. >Carbon Taxation/Geroe, >Carbon Taxation/Fankhauser, >Carbon Pricing/Stavins. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Metcalf, G. E. (2007). A proposal for a U.S. carbon tax swap (The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007-12). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 2. Weitzman, M. L. (1974). Prices vs. quantities. The Review of Economic Studies, 41(4), 477–491. Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180. |
Stavins I Robert N. Stavins Joseph E. Aldy The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 2012 |
| Carbon Taxation | Zucman | Saez I 189 Carbon tax/Saez/Zucman: Occasionally it’s argued that a carbon tax could provide some of the funding for health or childcare, but that’s a mistake. Carbon taxation is, of course, necessary to fight climate change. But its goal should be only this: fight climate change. It should not aim at collecting revenue in the medium run, but instead aim at eradicating future carbon emissions. A successful carbon tax should eventually yield zero revenue. Cf. >Pigovian Tax. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. |
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| Carbon Taxation Strategies | Fankhauser | Fankhauser I 6 Carbon Taxation Strategies /Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: Another defining feature of a carbon tax is how its revenues are proposed to be spent. The literature has explored three revenue recycling strategies in particular: the earmarking of revenues to support emission reduction projects, the redistribution of revenues to achieve a fairer (less fiscally regressive) outcome, and the reduction of other taxes to achieve a revenue-neutral outcome. Using tax revenues for additional emissions reduction reassures voters that the tax will be effective and the environmental objective will be met (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(1); Kallbekken et al., 2011(2); Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011(3)). 1. Earmarking proceeds: The attractiveness of earmarking carbon tax revenues has been established in a range of contexts (cf. Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(1); Beuermann & Santarius, 2006(4); Bristow, Wardman, Zannia, & Chintakayalab, 2010(5); Carattini et al., 2017(6); Clinch & Dunne, 2006(7); Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006(8); Dresner, Jackson, & Gilbert, 2006(9); Gevrek & Uyduranoglu, 2015(10); Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010(11); Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011(3); Klok et al., 2006(12); Thalmann, 2004(13)). The interest in earmarking reflects two voter concerns. The first is a lack of trust in government [.] The second concern is doubt about the effectiveness of carbon taxes (…). Earmarking signals to the public that efforts are being made to make low-carbon options both technologically and commercially more viable and so will reduce the personal cost of changing behavior (Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010)(11). Earmarking is also seen as a potential solution to a perceived underinvestment in low-carbon research and development. It should, however, be noted that earmarking revenues for environmental purposes may not be a universal solution. A Swedish survey conducted by Jagers and Hammar (2009)(14) showed that respondents were unwilling to increase carbon tax rates, as they felt the carbon taxes they paid on transport fuels were high enough already. Respondents preferred alternative Fankhauser I 7 such as decreasing taxes on clean energy sources, expanding public transport, and increasing information campaigns about vehicles' contribution to climate change. Additional evidence suggests that preferences for revenue recycling may be context dependent. Carattini et al. (2017)(6) found that providing information about the environmental effectiveness of different carbon tax designs reduces the preference for environmental earmarking. 2. Compensating low-income households: Several strategies have been put forward in the literature to address potential adverse distributional effects of a carbon tax, including in the influential perspectives of Speck (1999)(15), Baranzini, Goldemberg, and Speck (2000)(16), and Metcalf (2009)(17). [There are two main options on compensation:] compensation via lump-sum transfers and social cushioning. Fankhauser I 8 (…) when there is a clear trade-off in the use of revenues between environmental earmarking and socially progressive redistribution forms, people tend to prefer to use revenues for environmental earmarking (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(1); Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011(3)). In the study by Carattini et al. (2017)(6), the most favored options for using revenue were redistribution through lump-sum transfers, and social cushioning. 3. Cutting other taxes and secur[ing …] full or partial revenue neutrality: Empirical studies show that cutting other taxes is the least popular redistribution strategy among the public (Beuermann & Santarius, 2006(4); Dresner, Jackson, & Gilbert, 2006(9); Klok et al., 2006(12); Thalmann, 2004(13)). This is in contrast to many economists, for whom using tax revenues to reduce distortionary taxes is the ideal solution. By using carbon tax revenues levied on “bads,” such as greenhouse gas emissions, to reduce distortionary taxes on labor, profits, or consumption, which discourage desirable activities, one can hope to achieve higher economic output on top of emissions abatement, and so obtain a “double dividend” (cf. Goulder, 1995)(18). One reason for public opposition is that voters do not necessarily buy into the logic behind the double dividend. They perceive these to be separate problems requiring separate solutions. Another reason for public opposition is a lack of trust in politicians and fiscal authorities (Hammar & Jagers, 2006)(19). Once the policy is implemented, governments could use information devices to increase the visibility of the tax shift. Compensation can be made visible by displaying the amount of income that is rebated on payslips, tax slips, or in contributions to social insurance (Clinch, Dunne, & Dresner, 2006(20); Dresner, Dunne, et al., 2006(21); Hsu et al. 2008(22)). Below we [Carattini, Carvalho, Fankhauser] offer some concrete design options that appear particularly promising to increase public support. Fankhauser I 9 1. Phasing in carbon taxes over time: By phasing in carbon taxes gradually, policymakers can take advantage of the fact that aversion tends to abate once people have experienced a policy. A slow ramp-up, or even a trial period, provides individuals with the opportunity to gauge the costs and benefits of the tax. Taxes can then be raised progressively until they reach the level required to meet the environmental objective. Note that this may imply renouncing to allowing the carbon tax rate to fluctuate depending on the business cycle, although this type of flexibility might be welfare improving (cf. Doda, 2016)(23). The risk with this strategy is that carbon taxes may be frozen at a level that is not sufficient to achieve their intended objectives. There are two potential, and complementary, solutions to overcome this risk. The first solution relies on societal learning. The second solution uses commitment devices. 2. Earmarking tax revenues for additional climate change mitigation: Voters have a preference for earmarking tax revenues and using the proceeds for additional greenhouse gas emissions reductions. They are particularly keen on support for low-carbon research and development, along with subsidies to promote deployment. The demand for environmental earmarking may decrease over time as people observe the impact of the tax and update their beliefs. Governments can again support this process by providing effective information about emissions trends, the distributional effects of the tax, and any ancillary benefits. Revenues may then be freed up gradually to address other sources of voter aversion, or to obtain economic gains. Tapering the degree of earmarking can also allay a government's concerns about fiscal management. 3. Redistributing taxes to improve fairness: Carbon taxes can be made more acceptable if tax revenues are used to address important societal concerns. Fankhauser I 10 While the objective of a carbon tax is to address the climate externality, and not to address the issue of raising inequalities, there may still be the expectation that carbon taxes are designed in a way that at least does not lead to a more unequal distribution. Carbon taxes can be designed to be both revenue neutral and progressive through lump-sum transfers and social cushioning measures to reduce costs for low-income households. Some voters may, however, be suspicious about a government's long-term commitment to redistribution. To allay those fears, governments can use commitment devices, such as explicit plans on how revenues are to be redistributed. 4. Information sharing and communication: A final suggestion applies to all efforts to implement a carbon tax, regardless of the use of revenues, or level of stringency. As soon as policymakers start considering the design of a carbon tax, they should provide detailed information (obtained through analysis and perhaps model simulations) to navigate the process of public consultations and to pre-emptively address voter concerns. This disclosure would ideally occur before voters are called to a ballot, or before lawmakers consider a carbon tax bill in the parliament. Fankhauser I 11 Communication efforts need to continue once the policy is implemented. Because the effects of carbon taxes are often not visible, governments are encouraged to measure their effects regularly and inform their citizens about them transparently. Communication strategies may need to be adapted to the beliefs and worldviews of the targeted population (Cherry et al., 2017)(24), and also take into account the potential implications of political polarization and bipartisan divides (Hart & Nisbet, 2012(25); Kahan et al., 2011(26)). >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Baranzini, A., & Carattini, S. (2017). Effectiveness, earmarking and labeling: Testing the acceptability of carbon taxes with survey data. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 19(1), 197–227. 2. Kallbekken, S., Kroll, S., & Cherry, T. L. (2011). Do you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 62(1), 53–64. 3. Sælen, H., & Kallbekken, S. (2011). A choice experiment on fuel taxation and earmarking in Norway. Ecological Economics, 70(11), 2181–2190. 4. Beuermann, C., & Santarius, T. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Germany: Handling two hot potatoes at the same time. Energy Policy, 34(8), 917–929. 5. Bristow, A. L., Wardman, M., Zannia, A. M., & Chintakayalab, P. K. (2010). Public acceptability of personal carbon trading and carbon tax. Ecological Economics, 69(9), 1824–1837. 6. Carattini, S., Baranzini, A., Thalmann, P., Varone, P., & Vöhringer, F. (2017). Green taxes in a post-Paris world: Are millions of nays inevitable? Environmental and Resource Economics, 68(1), 97–128. 7. Clinch, J. P., & Dunne, L. (2006). Environmental tax reform: An assessment of social responses in Ireland. Energy Policy, 34(8), 950–959. 8. Deroubaix, J.-F., & Lévèque, F. (2006). The rise and fall of French ecological tax reform: Social acceptability versus political feasibility in the energy tax implementation process. Energy Policy, 34, 940–949. 9. Dresner, S., Jackson, T., & Gilbert, N. (2006). History and social responses to environmental tax reform in the United Kingdom. Energy Policy, 34(8), 930–939. 10. Gevrek, Z. E., & Uyduranoglu, A. (2015). Public preferences for carbon tax attributes. Ecological Economics, 118, 186–197. 11. Kallbekken, S., & Aasen, M. (2010). The demand for earmarking: Results from a focus group study. Ecological Economics, 69(11), 2183–2190. 12. Klok, J., Larsen, A., Dahl, A., & Hansen, K. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Denmark: History and social acceptability. Energy Policy, 34(8), 905–916. 13. Thalmann, P. (2004). The public acceptance of green taxes: 2 million voters express their opinion. Public Choice, 119, 179–217. 14. Jagers, S. C., & Hammar, H. (2009). Environmental taxation for good and for bad: The efficiency and legitimacy of Sweden's carbon tax. Environmental Politics, 18(2), 218–237. 15. Speck, S. (1999). Energy and carbon taxes and their distributional implications. Energy Policy, 27(11), 659–667. 16. Baranzini, A., Goldemberg, J., & Speck, S. (2000). A future for carbon taxes. Ecological Economics, 32(3), 395–412. 17. Metcalf, G. E. (2009). Designing a carbon tax to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 3(1), 63–83. 18. Goulder, L. H. (1995). Environmental taxation and the double dividend: A reader's guide. International Tax and Public Finance, 2(2), 157–183. 19. Hammar, H., & Jagers, S. C. (2006). Can trust in politicians explain individuals' support for climate policy? The case of CO2 tax. Climate Policy, 5(6), 613–625. 20. Clinch, J. P., Dunne, L., & Dresner, S. (2006). Environmental and wider implications of political impediments to environmental tax reform. Energy Policy, 34(8), 960–970. 21. Dresner, S., Dunne, L., Clinch, P., & Beuermann, C. (2006). Social and political responses to ecological tax reform in Europe: An introduction to the special issue. Energy Policy, 34(8), 895–904. 22. Hsu, S. L., Walters, J., & Purgas, A. (2008). Pollution tax heuristics: An empirical study of willingness to pay higher gasoline taxes. Energy Policy, 36(9), 3612–3619. 23. Doda, B. (2016). How to price carbon in good times ... and bad! WIREs Climate Change, 7(1), 135–144. 24. Cherry, T. L., Kallbekken, S., & Kroll, S. (2017). Accepting market failure: Cultural worldviews and the opposition to corrective environmental policies. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 85, 193–204. 25. Hart, P. S., & Nisbet, E. C. (2012). Boomerang effects in science communication: How motivated reasoning and identity cues amplify opinion polarization about climate mitigation policies. Communication Research, 39(6), 701–723. 26. Kahan, D., Wittlin, M., Peters, E., Slovic, P., Ouellette, L., Braman, D., & Mandel, G. (2011). The tragedy of the risk-perception commons: Culture conflict, rationality conflict, and climate change (SSRN Scholarly Paper). Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. Stefano Carattini, Maria Carvalho & Sam Fankhauser, 2018: “Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes”. In: Stéphane Hallegatte, Mike Hulme (Eds.), WIREs Climate Change, Vol. 9/5, pages 1-26. |
Fankhauser I Samuel Fankhauser Stefano Carattini Maria Carvalho, Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes 2018 |
| Carbon Taxation Strategies | Geroe | Geroe I 18 Carbon Taxation Strategies/Business Tax/Investment Incentives/Geroe: Adjustments to business taxes to mitigate the commercial impacts of a carbon tax could be implemented so as to maximize emissions reductions. Rather than an across-the-board approach under which all liable entities received a fixed reduction in specified other taxes, a tiered approach could be adopted. For example, power generators could earn reductions in other taxes on the basis of percentage of certified reductions in emissions under a coal-fired generation baseline. So, potentially, a solar power station could obtain close to a 100% tax exemption, a hybrid solar-natural gas station say a 30% reduction, or a coalfired power station with carbon geosequestration 5% to 80% reduction based on the actual proportion of emissions verifiably sequestered. This approach could support emissions reductions at significantly lower levels of carbon taxation/prices than would otherwise be the case. It would also enable financing of currently expensive clean energy technologies at a significantly reduced rate of subsidy, FIT [federal income tax], or other state-based support. This approach is comparable with the Clean Energy Target design recommended by the Finkel report on energy security for the Australian government, under which certificates would be based on percentage reductions below an emissions intensity baseline (Finkel, Moses, Effeney, & O’Kane, 2017)(1). Various tax incentives have been used to incentivize low-carbon investments more generally, such as energy efficiency projects. In terms of both social equity and political feasibility, this tax reduction approach is superior to taxing low-carbon projects at a rate equal to high-polluting industries and passing on higher costs for clean energy (under RPS, FIT, and carbon pricing policies) to consumers. In addition, trade-exposed (and other) industries could receive enhanced tax write-offs for energy efficiency expenditures, as an alternative either to exemption from scheme coverage, receipt of free permits (‘‘grandfathering’’) under an ETS, or to mitigate compensation requirements. This approach would maintain the incentive to invest in low-emissions technology Geroe I 19 inherent in a price on carbon while also mitigating carbon leakage and loss of international competitiveness. >Carbon Taxation Strategies/Fankhauser. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Finkel, A., Moses, K., Effeney, T., & O’Kane, M. (2017). Independent review into the future security of the national electricity market (Report for the Australian Commonwealth Government). Retrieved from https://www.energy.gov.au/government-priorities/energy-markets/independent-review-future-security-national-electricity-market. Steven Geroe, 2019: “Addressing Climate Change Through a Low-Cost, High-Impact Carbon Tax”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 28/1, pp. 3-27. |
Geroe I Steven Geroe Addressing Climate Change Through a Low-Cost, High-Impact Carbon Tax 2019 |
| Cartels | Economic Theories | Mause I 381f Cartels/Economic Theory: cartels are those where at least one competitive parameter is contractually defined between at least two companies and thus withdrawn from competition.(1)(2) If the agreement is informal, it is referred to as a collusion. Horizontal Price Cartel: here the price is agreed between companies that are in direct competition with each other. From an entrepreneurial point of view, this is only profitable (and therefore rational) if either all companies in the market or at least most of them are involved, otherwise most of the customers will migrate to those competitors who compete with the cartel on price, thus eventually offering a better price-performance ratio. >Price, >Competition, >Markets. VsCartels: If the price cartel is market-wide, it can behave like a monopoly. This is generally harmful to welfare because competition comes to a standstill. Other forms of a cartel are the innovation cartel, the conditions cartel, the standardisation cartel, the procurement and distribution cartel, etc. No general statement can be made here about the damage to competition. For example innovation cartel: here the resources of several companies for research and further development of products can be bundled. For example, standardization cartels: can develop uniform standards for connectors, connections, adapters, etc. 1. Choi, Jay Pill, und Heiko Gerlach, Cartels and collusion: Economic theory and experimental economics. In The Oxford handbook of international antitrust economics, Hrsg. Roger D. Blair und D. Daniel Sokol, Vol. 2, 415– 441. Oxford 2015 2. Levenstein, Margaret C., und Valerie Y. Suslow, Cartels and collusion: Empirical evidence. In The Oxford handbook of international antitrust economics, Hrsg. Roger D. Blair und D. Daniel Sokol, Vol. 2, 442– 463. Oxford 2015. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Cartels | Rothbard | Rothbard III 636 Cartels/Rothbard: (…) is not monopolizing action a restriction of production, and is not this restriction a demonstrably antisocial act? Let us first take what would seem to be the worst possible case of such action: the actual destruction of part of a product by a cartel. This is done to take advantage of an inelastic demand curve and to raise the price to gain a greater monetary income for the whole group. >Elasticity, >Demand/Rothbard. We can visualize, for example, the case of a coffee cartel burning great quantities of coffee. In the first place, such actions will surely occur very seldom. Actual destruction of its product is clearly a highly wasteful act, even for the cartel; it is obvious that the factors of production which the growers had expended in producing the coffee have been spent in vain. Clearly, the production of the total quantity of coffee itself has proved to be an error, and the burning of coffee is only the aftermath and reflection of the error. Yet, because of the uncertainty of the future, errors are often made. Man could labor and invest for years in the production of a good which, it may turn out, consumers hardly want at all. If, for example, consumers' tastes had changed so that coffee would not be demanded by anyone, regardless of price, it would again have to be destroyed, with or without a cartel. Error is certainly unfortunate, but it cannot be considered immoral or antisocial; nobody aims deliberately at error. If coffee were a durable good, it is obvious that the cartel would not destroy it, but would store it for gradual future sale to consumers, thus earning income on the "surplus" coffee. >Durable goods/Rothbard, >Consumer goods/Rothbard. Rothbard III 637 Free market: The whole concept of "restricting production," then, is a fallacy when applied to the free market. In the real world of scarce resources in relation to possible ends, all production involves choice and the allocationof factors to serve the most highly valued ends. In Short, the production of any product is necessarily always "restricted." Such "restriction" follows simply from the universal scarcity of factors and the diminishing marginal utility of any one product. But then it is absurd to speak of "restriction" at all.(1) Rothbard: We cannot, then, say that the cartel has “restricted production.” Rothbard III 638 If there are anticartelists who disagree with this verdict and believe that the previous structure of production served the consumers better, they are always at perfect liberty to bid the land, labor, and capital factors away from the jungle-guide agencies and rubber producers, and themselves embark on the production of the allegedly “deficient” 40 million pounds of coffee. Since they are not doing so, they are hardly in a position to attack the existing coffee producers for not doing so. As Mises succinctly stated: „Certainly those engaged in the production of Steel are not responsible for the fact that other People did not likewise enter this field of production.... If somebody is to blame for the fact that the number of people who joined the voluntary civil defense organization is not larger, then it is not those who have already joined but those who have not.“ Rothbard III 640 Free market/Rothbard: Criticism of steel owners for not producing "enough" steel or of coffee growers for not producing "enough" coffee also implies the existence of a caste system, whereby a certain caste is permanently designated to produce Steel, another caste to grow coffee, etc. Only in such a caste society would such criticism make sense. Yet the free market is the reverse of the caste system; indeed, choice between alternatives implies mobility between alternatives, and this mobility obviously holds for entrepreneurs or lenders with money to invest in production. Rothbard III 642 VsCartels: A common argument holds that cartel action involves collusion. For one firm may achieve a "monopoly price" as a result of its natural abilities or consumer enthusiasm for its particular product, whereas a cartel of many firms allegedly involves "collusion" and "conspiracy." >Monopolies. RothbardVs: These expressions, however, are simply emotive terms designed to induce an unfavorable response. What is actually involved here is co-operation to increase the incomes of the producers. For what is the essence of a cartel action? Individual producers agree to pool their assets into a common lot, this single central organization to make the decisions on production and price policies for all the owners and then to allocate the monetary gain among them. But is this process not the same as any sort ofjoint partnership or theformation ofa Single corporation? What happens when a partnership or corporation is formed? >Corporations/Rothbard. Rothbard III 644 Merger/cartel/Rothbard: Yet an industry-wide merger is, in effect, a permanent cartel, a permanent combination and fusion. On the other hand, a cartel that maintains by voluntary agreement the separate identity of each firm is by nature a highly transitory and ephemeral arrangement and, (…) generally tends to break up on the market. In fact, in many cases, a cartel can be considered as simply a tentative step in the direction of permanent merger. And a merger and the original formation of a corporation do not (…) essentially differ. The former is an adaptation of the size and number of firms in an industry to new conditions or is the correction of a previous error in forecasting. The latter is a de novo attempt to adapt to present and future market conditions. >Mergers/Rothbard. Rothbard III 651 Instability: Analysis demonstrates that a cartel is an inherently unstable form of operation. Ifthe joint pooling of assets in a common cause proves in the long run to be profitable for each of the individual members of the cartel, then they will act formally to merge into one large firm. The cartel then disappears in the merger. On the other hand, if the joint action proves unprofitable for one or more members, the dissatisfied firm or firms will break away from the cartel, and (…) any such independent action almost always destroys the cartel. The cartel form, therefore, is bound to be highly evanescent and unstable. Rothbard III 652 If the cartel does not break up from within, it is even more likely to do so from without. To the extent that it has earned unusual monopoly profits, outside firms and outside producers will enter the same field of production. Outsiders, in short, rush in to take advantage of the higher profits. Rothbard III 657 The problem of „The One Big Cartel“: (…) the free market placed definite limits on the size of the firm, i.e., the limits of calculability on the market ((s) see above III 612). In order to calculate the profits and losses of each branch, a firm must be able to refer its internal operations to external markets for each of the various factors and intermediate products. When any of these external markets disappears, because all are absorbed within the province of a single firm, calculability disappears, and there is no way for the firm rationally to allocate factors to that specific area. The more these limits are encroached upon, the greater and greater will be the sphere of irrationality, and the more diffcult it will be to avoid losses. One big cartel would not be able rationally to allocate producers' goods at all and hence could not avoid severe losses. Consequently, it could never really be established, and, if tried, would quickly break asunder. Rothbard III 660 Production factors: What about the factors? Could not their owners be exploited by the cartel? In the first place, the universal cartel, to be effective, would have to include owners of primary land; otherwise whatever gains they might have might be imputed to land. To put it in its strongest terms, then, could a universal cartel of all land and capital goods "exploit" laborers by systematically paying the latter less than their discounted marginal value products? Could not the members of the cartel agree to pay a very Iow sum to these workers? Ifthat happened, however, there would be created great opportunities for entrepreneurs either to spring up outside the cartel or to break away from the cartel and profit by hiring workers for a higher wage. This competition would have the double effect of (a) breaking up the universal cartel and (b) tending again to yield to the laborers their marginal product. As long as competition is free, unhampered by governmental restrictions, no universal cartel could either exploit labor or remain universal for any length of time.(3) >Monopolies/Rothbard. 1. In the words of Professor Mises: „That the production of a commodity p is not larger than it really is, is due to the fact that the complementary factors of production required for an expansion were employed for the production of other commodities. . . . Neither did the producers of p intentionally restrict the production of p. Every entrepreneur’s capital is limited; he employs it for those projects which, he expects, will, by filling the most urgent demand of the public, yield the highest profit. An entrepreneur at whose disposal are 100 units of capital employs, for instance, 50 units for the production of p and 50 units for the production of q. If both lines are profitable, it is odd to blame him for not having employed more, e.g., 75 units, for the production of p. He could increase the production of p only by curtailing correspondingly the production of q. But with regard to q the same fault could be found by the grumblers. If one blames the entrepreneur for not having produced more p, one must blame him also for not having produced more q. This means: one blames the entrepreneur for the fact that there is a scarcity of the factors of production and that the earth is not a land of Cockaigne.“ (Mises, Planning for Freedom, pp. 115–16) 2. Ibid. p. 115. 3. Cf. Mises, Human Action New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998., p. 592. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Cash Extinction | Economic Theories | IMF IV 8 Cash extinction/Economic theories/IMF/Pani/Maino: Various authors have documented the downward trend in the use of cash and inquired about its causes. Marszałek and Szarzec (2022)(1) have retraced this decline to a change in demand for cash and banking services and to a change in the payment habits of customers. Amromin and Chakravorti (2007)(2) have shown how demand for cash (proxied by demand for small-denomination currency) decreases with increased use of debit cards and greater retail market consolidation. Arango et al. (2015)(3) have highlighted how merchants’ acceptance of payment cards - more than the rewards offered by credit card companies - affects what instrument customers use to make payments. Looking at the recent experience with mobile money in Uganda, Simione and Muehlschlegel (2023)(4) found evidence that the use of mobile money is related to perceptions of the risks of carrying cash, to send or receive remittances, and to borrow and save. >Payment systems, >Cross-border payments, >International trade, >Trade, >Money, >Monetary theory. 1. Marszałek, M., and K. Szarzec, 2022, “Digitalization and the Transition to a Cashless Society,” in Digitalization and Firm Performance, ed. by M. Ratajczak-Mrozek and P. Marszałek, pp. 251–81 (Palgrave Macmillan). 2. Amromin, G., and S. Chawrakorti, 2007, “Debit Card and Cash Usage: A Cross-Country Analysis,” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper 2007/4. 3. Arango, C., P.H. Kim, and L. Sabetti, 2015, “Consumer Payment Choice: Merchant Card Acceptance versus Pricing Incentives,” Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 55(June), pp.130–141. Armstrong, M., 2006, “Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 37(3), pp. 668–91. 4. Simione, F., and T. Muehlschlegel, 2023, “Mobile Money, Perception about Cash, and Financial Inclusion: Learning from Uganda’s Micro-Level Data,” IMF Working Paper 23/238 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). |
IMF II IMF Working Paper André Reslow Gabriel Söderberg, Cross-Border Payments with Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies: Design and Policy Considerations IMF Fintech Note 2024/002 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF III IMF Working Papers Clemens Graf von Luckner Robin Koepke, Crypto as a Marketplace for Capital Flight. IMF Working Paper 24/133 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF IV IMF Working Papers Marco Pani Rodolfo Maino, “Could Digital Currencies Lead to the Disappearance of Cash from the Market? Insights from a ’Merchant-Customer’ Model.” IMF Working Paper WP/25/56 Washington, DC. 2025 |
| Cash Extinction | IMF Working Papers | IMF IV 7 Cash Extinction/IMF/Pani/Maino: The payment system landscape is rapidly changing, driven by technological innovations. Various privately issued crypto assets, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, have already been launched in the market, with mixed success, and several jurisdictions are considering the introduction of central-bank-issued digital currencies (CBDC). >Cryptocurrencies, >Bitcoin, >Ethereum, >Blockchain, >Crypto Transactions, >Crypto and banking. Payment system: Could the introduction of digital currencies and other innovative payment instruments lead to the unintended consequence of physical cash disappearing from the payment system? This paper* addresses this question from the perspective of the dynamic evolution of the payment system. Cash: Cash has unique properties that make it an important safeguard during disruptions or failures in payment systems. Cash provides a high degree of anonymity, generally leaving no transaction records (exceptions include, in some jurisdictions, identification requirements for transactions above a certain threshold, and mandatory declarations for carrying amounts above some thresholds across borders), cannot be remotely controlled, unlike some digital currencies, and can be physically stored, enhancing its resilience to adverse events such as natural disasters. It plays a crucial role as an "outside option," ensuring the reliability and integrity of other payment methods. „Cashless society“: Concerns about a "cashless society" have been voiced by various observers. Some view it positively, such as Rogoff (2016)(1), while others, like Rochemont (2020)(2) and Beer et al. (2015)(3), warn of adverse consequences, particularly the loss of privacy. These concerns are heightened by the potential irreversibility of cash extinctionbecause reintroducing cash in a non-cash system would be challenging and costly. Pani/Maino: To safeguard the continued utilization of cash and to uphold the equilibrium of the payment system, the study* advocates for a proactive policy approach and for the implementation of measures aimed at ensuring the sustained relevance of physical currency, especially in scenarios where the introduction of new digital currencies might inadvertently lead to the extinction of traditional cash. IMF IV 8 Cash extinction/Economic theories/IMF/Pani/Maino: Various authors have documented the downward trend in the use of cash and inquired about its causes. Marszałek and Szarzec (2022)(4) have retraced this decline to a change in demand for cash and banking services and to a change in the payment habits of customers. Amromin and Chakravorti (2007)(5) have shown how demand for cash (proxied by demand for small-denomination currency) decreases with increased use of debit cards and greater retail market consolidation. Arango et al. (2015)(6) have highlighted how merchants’ acceptance of payment cards - more than the rewards offered by credit card companies - affects what instrument customers use to make payments. Looking at the recent experience with mobile money in Uganda, Simione and Muehlschlegel (2023)(7) found evidence that the use of mobile money is related to perceptions of the risks of carrying cash, to send or receive remittances, and to borrow and save. * Pani, Marco, and Rodolfo Maino. (2025). “Could Digital Currencies Lead to the Disappearance of Cash from the Market? Insights from a ’Merchant-Customer’ Model.” IMF Working Paper WP/25/56. 1. Rochemont, S., 2020, “A Cashless Society in 2019: The Cashless World in Motion Review,” January (London: Institute and Faculty of Actuaries). 2. Rogoff, K., 2016, The Curse of Cash: How Large-Denomination Bills Aid Crime and Tax Evasion and Constrain Monetary Policy, Economics Books, Princeton University Press. 3. Beer, B. U.W. Birchler, and E. Gnan, 2015, “Cash without Future? Future without Cash? A Wider View,” SUERF Policy Note 3, December. Bounie, D., A. François, and L. Van Hove, 2016, "Merchant Acceptance of Payment Cards: ’Must Take’ or ’Wanna Take’?" Review of Network Economics, Vol. 15(3), pp. 117–46. https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2017-0011. 4. Marszałek, M., and K. Szarzec, 2022, “Digitalization and the Transition to a Cashless Society,” in Digitalization and Firm Performance, ed. by M. Ratajczak-Mrozek and P. Marszałek, pp. 251–81 (Palgrave Macmillan). 5. Amromin, G., and S. Chawrakorti, 2007, “Debit Card and Cash Usage: A Cross-Country Analysis,” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper 2007/4. 6. Arango, C., P.H. Kim, and L. Sabetti, 2015, “Consumer Payment Choice: Merchant Card Acceptance versus Pricing Incentives,” Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 55(June), pp.130–141. Armstrong, M., 2006, “Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 37(3), pp. 668–91. 7. Simione, F., and T. Muehlschlegel, 2023, “Mobile Money, Perception about Cash, and Financial Inclusion: Learning from Uganda’s Micro-Level Data,” IMF Working Paper 23/238 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). |
IMF II IMF Working Paper André Reslow Gabriel Söderberg, Cross-Border Payments with Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies: Design and Policy Considerations IMF Fintech Note 2024/002 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF III IMF Working Papers Clemens Graf von Luckner Robin Koepke, Crypto as a Marketplace for Capital Flight. IMF Working Paper 24/133 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF IV IMF Working Papers Marco Pani Rodolfo Maino, “Could Digital Currencies Lead to the Disappearance of Cash from the Market? Insights from a ’Merchant-Customer’ Model.” IMF Working Paper WP/25/56 Washington, DC. 2025 |
| Cashless Society | Economic Theories | IMF IV 8 Cashless Society/Cashless economy/Economic theories/IMF/Pani/Maino: Various authors have documented the downward trend in the use of cash and inquired about its causes. Marszałek and Szarzec (2022)(1) have retraced this decline to a change in demand for cash and banking services and to a change in the payment habits of customers. Amromin and Chakravorti (2007)(2) have shown how demand for cash (proxied by demand for small-denomination currency) decreases with increased use of debit cards and greater retail market consolidation. Arango et al. (2015)(3) have highlighted how merchants’ acceptance of payment cards - more than the rewards offered by credit card companies - affects what instrument customers use to make payments. Looking at the recent experience with mobile money in Uganda, Simione and Muehlschlegel (2023)(4) found evidence that the use of mobile money is related to perceptions of the risks of carrying cash, to send or receive remittances, and to borrow and save. Cashless economy: What would the transition to a “cashless” economy imply? Some authors (e.g., Rogoff, 2016)(5) advocate in its favor on the grounds that it would facilitate the fight against crime and tax evasion. Other authors have attempted to quantify the social costs of phasing out cash. For instance, using a dynamic cash inventory model that allows agents to use either cash or credit at each moment in time, Alvarez and Lippi (2017)(6) have estimated that households’ cost of moving from their optimal cash-credit share to one where the cash share is zero would amount to a small fraction (0.005–0.025 percent) of the value of their daily consumption. Other studies have explored the economics of the market for payment instruments. This line of research has highlighted that payment instruments carry a strong fixed cost of adoption (habits) and high switching costs that entail important lock-in effects, preventing users from responding to minor differences in costs and thereby providing significant market power to the providers of payment services. This framework has been used, for instance, to explain the determinants of “interchange fees” charged to merchants by credit card networks that enjoy a strongly monopolistic position. Bounie et al. (2016)(7), for instance, found evidence that many merchants accept some credit cards out of fear of losing profitable business to competitors. IMF IV 8 This type of (in this case, negative) externalities that occur in a two-sided market is also present in our model, where both merchants’ and customers’ decisions on which instrument to use are affected by the risk of missing a transaction if the counterpart does not use that instrument. >Payment systems, >Cross-border payments, >International trade, >Trade, >Money, >Monetary theory, >Cryptocurrency. 1. Marszałek, M., and K. Szarzec, 2022, “Digitalization and the Transition to a Cashless Society,” in Digitalization and Firm Performance, ed. by M. Ratajczak-Mrozek and P. Marszałek, pp. 251–81 (Palgrave Macmillan). 2. Amromin, G., and S. Chawrakorti, 2007, “Debit Card and Cash Usage: A Cross-Country Analysis,” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper 2007/4. 3. Arango, C., P.H. Kim, and L. Sabetti, 2015, “Consumer Payment Choice: Merchant Card Acceptance versus Pricing Incentives,” Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 55(June), pp.130–141. Armstrong, M., 2006, “Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 37(3), pp. 668–91. 4. Simione, F., and T. Muehlschlegel, 2023, “Mobile Money, Perception about Cash, and Financial Inclusion: Learning from Uganda’s Micro-Level Data,” IMF Working Paper 23/238 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 5. Rogoff, K., 2016, The Curse of Cash: How Large-Denomination Bills Aid Crime and Tax Evasion and Constrain Monetary Policy, Economics Books, Princeton University Press. 6. Alvarez, F., and F. Lippi, 2017, “Cash Burns: An Inventory Model with a Cash-Credit Choice,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 90, pp. 99–112. 7. Bounie, D., A. François, and L. Van Hove, 2016, "Merchant Acceptance of Payment Cards: ’Must Take’ or ’Wanna Take’?" Review of Network Economics, Vol. 15(3), pp. 117–46. https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2017-0011. |
IMF II IMF Working Paper André Reslow Gabriel Söderberg, Cross-Border Payments with Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies: Design and Policy Considerations IMF Fintech Note 2024/002 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF III IMF Working Papers Clemens Graf von Luckner Robin Koepke, Crypto as a Marketplace for Capital Flight. IMF Working Paper 24/133 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF IV IMF Working Papers Marco Pani Rodolfo Maino, “Could Digital Currencies Lead to the Disappearance of Cash from the Market? Insights from a ’Merchant-Customer’ Model.” IMF Working Paper WP/25/56 Washington, DC. 2025 |
| Categorial Grammar | Lyons | I 230 Categorical Grammar/Lyons: Categorical grammars go back to Adjukiewicz. Have been further developed by Bar-Hillel, Lambek and other logicians. >J. Bar-Hillel, >Grammar, >Universal grammar, >Generative grammar, >Transformational grammar. Fundamental categories/Grammar: Sentence and nouns. Derived categories: are all lexical units that are not nouns. They are complex in that they simultaneously specify 1. with which other category the element can combine to form a sentence constituent, and 2. how the constituent can be categorically classified. Example: An element like run can connect to a noun to form a sentence. I 233 Categorical Grammar/constituent structure grammar/(creational grammar)/Lyons: constituent grammar: = replacement grammar the two types of grammar are more than slightly equivalent (they generate the same amount of sentences), and they break sentences like Poor John ran away into the same components. I 234 But they are not equivalent in every respect: because The system of substitution rules contains two auxiliary symbols (NP and VP) in addition to the four end symbols denoting the lexical classes (N, V intr, V tr A and Adv). Example Categorical analysis: so it specifies that poor John belongs to the same category as John and ran away to the same as ran, Replacement system: does not establish this relationship. Equivalence: but we can create equivalence between the two systems by using N for NP and V intr for VP in the replacement rules. Dependence/Grammar/Lyons: the two systems differ mainly in that the categorical grammar regards one constituent in each construction as dependent on the other. The categorical sign (see arrow above) makes clear which is the dependent constituent, namely the one with the more complex classification. Replacement rules: represent the dependency of the constituents only partially and indirectly: For example, from a rule of the form N > A + N it can be concluded that A is dependent on N. However, this is not possible in the case of example N > NP + VP. The two systems are not strongly equivalent. A system is preferable if it is more appropriate. I 238 Categorical Grammar/tradition/Lyons: here the term dependency (depndency, almost the same as subordination) is fundamental. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Categorical Imperative | Höffe | Höffe I 304 Categorical Imperative/Autonomy/Courtesy: [Autonomy] is in Kant’s terms (...) - as is often the case today – not any kind of self-determination, but rather a self-legislation, the concept of the law (...) which must not be suppressed here. For political thought, it has a mystical precedence over its "usual" concepts such as justice and rule. In the law of a basic rule that applies without exception to personal and political practice, reason and freedom find their characteristic form according to Kant. >Legislation/Kant, >Principles/Kant. I 305 In its semantic meaning the categorical imperative(1) is nothing else than the concept of morality, related to sensual beings of reason. For, in contrast to pure beings of reason, a deity or angels, morality consists with them not in a being, the (moral) law, but in a non-arbitrary, rather rational ought, an imperative. This, because of its origin in reason, has an unconditional and therefore categorical character. Mankind's purpose: The much-cited formula of mankind's purpose for demands - for rational nature exists as an "end in itself": "Act in such a way that you need mankind [in the sense of the rational nature of humans] both in your person and in the person of every other person at any time simultaneously as end, never merely as means"(2). To treat someone as a means to an end, the so-called instrumentalization, is thus not forbidden, but only its exclusivity is rejected. Instrumentalization is permitted as far as it recognizes the end character of every human being. Realm of purposes: (...) "all maxims [should] by their own legislation be tuned together to a possible realm of ends, as a realm of nature"(3). 1. I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Categorical Perception | Psychological Theories | Slater I 192 Categorical perception/CP/psychological theories: Categorical Perception (CP): This special mode of perception was characterized by two crucial properties: (a) tokens presented from a physical continuum were identified (labeled) as a member of one category or the other, with a sharp transition in identification (ID) at the category boundary, and (b) failure of within-category discrimination and a peak in between-category discrimination for tokens that straddled the category boundary. >Language development/psychological theories, cf.>Language development/Eimas, >Phonetics/psychological theories, >Phonetics/Eimas. Around 1957 [when Chomsky(1) and Liberman(2) published] CP was only present for speech, and only for the components of speech when they are heard as speech (not when these same components are heard as non-speech). This led to the proposal that humans have evolved a special neural mechanism — the speech mode — that is innate and dedicated to the interpretation of articulatory signals that are produced by the human vocal tract. (…) [T]he goal of the Eimas et al. (1971)(3) study was to determine whether very young infants, who had no experience producing speech or speech-like sounds, and only limited exposure to the sounds of their native language, perceived these sounds in a categorical manner. Slater I 197 Kuhl and Padden (1982)(4) tested rhesus monkeys and confirmed these findings with a species more similar to humans. Categorical perception: Thus, the presence of CP is not a sufficient argument for the operation of a linguistically relevant speech mode, since no one claims that chinchillas or monkeys achieve anything remotely like language, and certainly no ability to produce speech. Subsequent research by Kluender, Diehl, and Killeen (1987)(5) has shown that the fundamental properties of CP are not even unique to mammals (…). Cf. >Animal Language. Problem: CP is not nearly as definitive as the claims made by Liberman and his colleagues (1957(6), 1961(3), 1967(7). See Pisoni and Lazarus (1974)(8), Miller (1997)(9). Slater I 198 (…) infants are remarkably sensitive to the distributional properties of their linguistic input. (…) speech productions measured along a physical dimension such as VOT (voice onse time) from a given community of talkers cluster into modal categories. Maye, Werker, and Gerken (2002)(10) (…) found that 6—8 month olds exposed to a distribution of tokens with a single peak had the effect of reducing discrimination performance, as if the infants learned that the two categories were now collapsed into a single category. Similarly, Maye, Weiss, and Aslin (2008)(11) showed that eight-month-olds who did not discriminate two categories could be induced to do so by listening to a distribution that had two peaks. These results have two important implications. 1) The only way that infants could utilize the distributional properties of the input along a dimension like VOT is if they could discriminate one value of VOT from another. If they could not, as claimed by classical CP, then all tokens would be identified as equivalent (within a category). To break a category apart into two new categories, infants must have the capacity to discriminate within-category differences, as supported by the adult findings from Pisoni and colleagues (Pisoni & Lazarus, 1974(8); Pisoni & Tash, 1974)(12) and from Miller (1997)(9), as well as the infant study by McMurray and Aslin (2005)(13). As infants approach the end of the first year of life, the speed with which they are affected by lab-based distributions of phonetic tokens begins to decrease (Yoshida, Pons, Maye, & Werker, 2010)(14). 2) The Eimas et al. (1971)(3) results, which showed evidence of putatively innate VOT categories (>Chomsky/psychological theories), could have been based, at least in part, on a learning mechanism. This Hypothesis seemed extremely implausible at the time because the youngest infants tested by Eimas et al. were only one month old. But if there is a powerful distributional earning mechanism, and this mechanism is presented with highly consistent (voiced, voiceless) categories in the listening environment, then at least some of the early evidence of robust and seemingly universal VOT categories could be due to postnatal learning and not innate categories. For recent computational models see Vallabha, McClelland, Pons, Werker, & Amano, 2007(15); McMurray, Aslin, & Toscano, 2009)(16). 1. Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. Mouton: The Hague. 2. Liberman, A. M., Harris, K. S., Hoffman, H. S., & Griffith, B.C. (1957). The discrimination of speech sounds within and across phoneme boundaries. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54, 358—368. 3. Eimas, P. D., Siqueland, E. R.,Jusczyk, P., & Vigorito, J. (1971). Speech perception in infants. Science, 171, 303-306. 4. Kuhl, P. K., & Padden, D. M. (1982). Enhanced discriminability at the phonetic boundaries for the voicing feature in macaques. Perception and Psychophysics, 32, 542—550. 5. Kluender, K. R., Diehl, R. L., & Killeen, P. R. (1987). Japanese quail can learn phonetic categories. Science, 237, 1195—1197. 6. Liberman, A. M., Harris, K. S., Hoffman, H. S., & Griffith, B.C. (1957). The discrimination of speech sounds within and across phoneme boundaries. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54, 358—368. 7. Liberman, A. M., Cooper, F. S., Shankweiler, D. P., & Studdert-Kennedy, M. (1967). Perception of the speech code. Psychological Review, 74, 431—461. 8. Pisoni, D. B., & Lazarus, J. H. (1974). Categorical and non-categorical modes of speech perception along the voicing continuum. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 55, 328—333. 9. Miller, J. L. (1997). Internal structure of phonetic categories. Language and Cognitive Processes, 12, 865—869. 10. Maye, J., Werker, J. F., & Gerken, L. (2002). Infant sensitivity to distributional information can affect phonetic discrimination. Cognition, 82, B 101-Bill. 11. Maye, J., Weiss, D. J., & Aslin, R. N. (2008). Statistical phonetic learning in infants: Facilitation and feature generalization. Developmental Science, 1 1, 122—134. 12. Pisoni, D. B., & Tash, J. (1974). Reaction times to comparisons with and across phonetic categories. Perception and Psychophysics, i 5, 285—290. 13. McMurray, B. & Aslin, R. N. (2005). Infants are sensitive to within-category variation in speech perception. Cognition, 95, B15-B26. 14. Yoshida, K. A., Pons, F., Maye, J., & Werker, J. F. (2010). Distributional phonetic learning at 10 months of age. Infancy, 15,420—433. 15. Vallabha, G. K., McClelland, J. L., Pons, F., Werker, J., & Amano, S. (2007). Unsupervised learning of vowel categories from infant-directed speech. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 104, 13273—13278. 16. McMurray, B., Aslin, R. N., & Toscano, J. C. (2009). Statistical learning of phonetic categories: Insights from a computational approach. Developmental Science, 12, 369—3 78. Richard N. Aslin, “Language Development. Revisiting Eimas et al.‘s /ba/ and /pa/ Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Categoricalness | Quine | I 116f The truth of categorical sentences depends on the objects. Categoricalness is our special apparatus of designating but the stimulus meaning is the same for natives. Goodman's individual calculus is better translated than syllogistic is. V 98 Timeless Sentence/general term/singular term/Quine: relative general terms come together as absolute, with singular terms predicatively to timeless sentences like "Fido is smaller than Jumbo". Next-complex step: e.g. "A dog is an animal". This is actually a universal categorical sentence [each a is a b]. Here are both, subject and predicate general terms. >Canonicalness/Quine. Language learning: after the child has learned "animal", he/she is prepared to agree to the question "an animal?" if he/she suspects the presence of dogs or other animals. N.B.: then it comes by transmission to react positively to "an animal?" when it hears the words "A dog?" ((s) >Classification). V 114 Universal Categorical Sentence/Language Learning/Quine: Thesis: Each of us starts with a few universal categorical sentences, but different people start with different phrases. Later one appropriates the universal categorical construction as such through abstraction and can form new universal categorical sentences from one's own means. V 133 Universal categorical sentence: is not a predication but a combination of two general terms. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Categories | Aristotle | Gadamer I 435 Categories/Concepts/Aristotle/Gadamer: (...) Aristotle [attritubes to] the way in which the order of things becomes visible in speaking of things, the greatest importance everywhere. (The "categories" - and not only that which is expressly called so in Aristotle - are forms of statement). The conceptualization achieved by language is not only used by philosophical thought, but is continued in certain directions. >Language/Aristotle, >Language an thought/Aristotle. Concepts/concept formation/Aristotle/Gadamer: (...) the Aristotelian theory of concept formation, the theory of the epagogue, [could] be illustrated by the learning of speech in children (...). Language and Thought/Aristotle: In fact, even Aristotle, as much as his own training of "logic" was decisively motivated, as much as he endeavored to depict the conscious handling of the logic of definition, especially in the classificatory description of nature, the order of beings and to free it from all linguistic contingencies, remained completely bound into the unity of speaking and thinking. Gadamer I 436 Categorization: It is the logical ideal of the superordination and subordination of concepts that [in Aristotle] masters the living metaphorics of language, on which all natural concept formation is based. For only a grammar directed towards logic will distinguish the actual meaning of the word from its metaphorical meaning. What originally forms the basis of the life of language and constitutes its logical productivity - the ingenious and inventive finding of commonalities through which things are ordered - is now pushed to the margin as the metaphor and instrumentalized into a rhetorical figure. >Metaphor. 1. Top. A 18, 108b 7-31 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Categorization | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 173 Categorization/group behavior/psychological theories: after Tajfel’s minimal group studies (Tajfel et al.1971(1)) further studies have also manipulated explicit dependence on the ingroup and/or outgroup for rewards in the MGP. Cf. >Categorization/Tajfel, >Group behavior/Tajfel, >Social Identity theory/Tajfel. For example, as well as manipulating explicit categorization, Lowell Gaertner and Chet Insko (2000)(2) also manipulated whether a dependence structure was present or absent (i.e., participants were the only ones allocating rewards or others allocated them too). The prediction here was that the sole ability to allocate (i.e., where there is no dependence) should eliminate dependence on others, and thereby eliminate ingroup favouritism. This prediction held, but only for men: their responses were no more discriminatory than non-categorized men. However, women participants showed ingroup favouritism irrespective of the dependence structure –present or absent. 1. Tajfel, H., Flament, C., Billig, M.G. and Bundy, R.F. (1971) ‘Social categorization and intergroup behaviour’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 1: 149–77. 2. Gaertner, L. and Insko, C.A. (2000) ‘Intergroup discrimination in the minimal group paradigm: Categorization, reciprocation or fear?’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79: 77–94. Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Categorization | Tajfel | Haslam I 164 Categorization/Tajfel: Thesis: A network of intergroup categorizations is omnipresent in the social environment; it enters into our socialization and education all the way from ‘teams’ and ‘team spirit’ in the primary and secondary Haslam I 165 education through teenage groups of all kinds to social, national, racial, ethnic or age groups. (Tajfel et al., 1971(1): 153). >Minimal group/Tajfel. Prejudice/Tajfel: The articulation of an individual’s social world in terms of its categorization in groups becomes a guide for his [or her] conduct in situations to which some criterion of intergroup division can be meaningfully applied. (Meaningful need not be ‘rational’.) An undifferentiated environment makes very little sense and provides no guidelines for action … . Whenever … some form of intergroup categorization can be used it will give order and coherence to the social situation. >Group behavior/Tajfel. Haslam I 172 VsTajfel: An alternative interpretation of [Tajfel’s] minimal ingroup bias (>Minimal group/Tajfel, >Group behavior/Tajfel, >Social identity theory/Tajfel) was that, rather than categorization driving discrimination, this was simply caused by participants’ perception that other ingroup members were similar to themselves. This meshed with belief-congruence theory (Rokeach, 1969)(2) and similarity-attraction principles, which suggest that we are prone to dislike others (and by extension other groups) who have different views and values to our own. (RokeachVsTajfel). Could ingroup favouritism therefore be explained by the assumed similarity with those in the ingroup (and dissimilarity with those in the outgroup)? This explanation does not necessarily invalidate the effect of social categorization (as Tajfel’s own work had shown, categorization can indeed lead people to accentuate similarities within categories and differences between them). However, it does point to a different mechanism. Vs: Further experiments by Michael Billig and Tajfel (1973)(3) in which similarity and social categorization were manipulated independently seemed to rule out this idea. These showed that social categorization produces stronger ingroup bias than similarity. >Similarity/psychological theories, >Categorization/psychological theories, >Reciprocity/psycholgical theories, >Egoism/Tajfel. 1. Tajfel, H., Flament, C., Billig, M.G. and Bundy, R.F. (1971) ‘Social categorization and intergroup behaviour’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 1: 149–77. 2. Rokeach, M. (1969) Beliefs, Attitudes and Values. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 3. Billig, M.G. and Tajfel, H. (1973) ‘Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behaviour’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 3: 27–52. Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Causal Explanation | Allport | Corr I 29 (XXIX) Causal force/Causation/Psychology/Personality Traits/Allport: Allport (1937)(1) saw personality traits as possessing causal force. >Personality traits, >Personality traits/Allport. Traits correspond to ‘generalized neuropsychic structures’ that modulate the individual’s understanding of stimuli and choice of adaptive behaviours. Thus, traits represent more than some running average of behaviour. Cf. the philosophical discussion on causal forces and causality >Causal forces/Philosophy, >Causal Explanation/Philosophy. 1. Allport, G. W. 1937. Personality: a psychological interpretation. New York: Holt |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Causal Explanation | Bigelow | I 320 Explanation/Hempel/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: Hempel's explanations are generally correct but do not exhaust all cases. >C. Hempel. Individual case causation/individual event/Lewis: (1986e)(1) need not to be explained according to Hempel's style. >Single case causation. Probabilistic explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: here applies: a cause does not necessarily increase the probability of the effect. If one assumes the opposite, one must assume that the explanation itself is the cause. This is because the explanation makes the result more likely. BigelowVsProbabilistic Explanation (see above). Instead. Approach by Lewis: Causation/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: (1986e)(1) 5 stages: 1. Natural laws as input for a theory of counterfactual conditionals. I 321 2. Used counterfactual conditionals to define a relation between events, namely, counterfactual dependency. 3. Used counterfactual dependency to explain causation by two principles: (1) Thesis: Counterfactual dependency is causation (2) the cause of a cause is a cause. Causes/Lewis: is transitive. 4. Lewis constructs a causal history of an event. (Tree structure, it may be that more distant causes are not connected by counterfactual dependency, i.e. another cause could have taken the place, but in fact it is the cause.) 5. Definition Causal explanation/Lewis: is everything that provides information about the causal history. This can also be partial. E.g. maternal line, paternal line. E.g. information about a temporal section of the tree: this corresponds to the explanation by Hempel. >Counterfactual conditional, >Counterfactual dependency, >Natural laws, >Events, >Causation, >Causes, >Causality, >Transitivity. I 322 Causal explanation/BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: our theory is similar to that of D. Lewis, but also has differences: Lewis: used laws to explain counterfactual conditionals. Bigelow/Pargetter: we use degrees of accessibility for both. >Accessibility, >Degrees/Graduals. Lewis: needs counterfactual conditionals to explain causation Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not. For that, we assume forces - Lewis does not. >Forces. Transitivity: causation: Lewis pro, BigelowVs. Causal Explanation/BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: because we do not recognize any transitivity, the causal history will not be traced back to the past. Otherwise, Adam and Eve are an explanation for everything. Somewhere the causal connection has to be broken. BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: the main difference is that for Lewis information about the causal history is sufficient for a causal explanation, but for us only information about causes and thus about forces. Appropriateness/causal explanation/pragmatic/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: The adequacy of an explanation must be decided pragmatically. Bigelow/Pargetter dito. >Science, >Arbitrariness, >Acceptability, >Objectivity. I 323 Why-explanation/why/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: no explanation can do entirely without a why-explanation. This in turn needs a how-explanations. >Why-questions. 1. Lewis, D.K. (1986e). Causal Explanation. In: Philosophical Papers Vol. II. pp. 214-40. New York Oxford University Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Causal Explanation | Cartwright | I 10 Causal Explanation/Cartwright: Here, truth is critical - (but explanatory power does not guarantee truth). - But it's only the truth of deeply settled causal principles and phenomenological laws. >Explanation, >Description, >Truth, >Causality, >Causal laws, >Physics. I 82 Causal Explanation/Important Argument/Cartwright: in causal explanations we do not have to assume redundancy (possibility of alternative explanation or alternative causes) as with the mathematical (theoretical) explanation - theoretical explanation: can be justified by inference on the best explanation - causal explanations not - instead: they have an independent test for their truth: the controlled experiment. >Experiments. I 89 Declaration/Fraassen: the truth of an explanation cannot be inferred from its success. - E.g. Ptolemaic astronomy - ultimately not on the existence of theoretical entities. Duhem: truth is an external feature of explanations. >Truth/Duhem, >Explanation/Duhem. I 91 Different: in causal explanations, truth is inherent - a false cause makes the causal explanation false. >Causes. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Causal Explanation | Davidson | Glüer II 110 Explanation/causal/Action/Davidson: causal action statements are indeed not very informative but not tautological either - (as the argument of the "logical connection" assumes) - (Hume: causality is only between separate partners. - Logical Connection/Hume. Glüer II 110 Statement/Davidson: is explaining action as a singular causal statement - but delivers no definition of intentional action - e.g. shot misses the victim, this is trampled to death by a herd of frightened cattle: no case of murder. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Causal Explanation | Fraassen | Schurz I 228 Causality/van Fraassen: Thesis: the concept of causal process is theory-dependent. Schurz: ditto. Schurz: (1990a(1), 277) Proposal: to explicate the causality relation by reference to the maximal complete causal model ; M(A, E I W). (W: knowledge of circumstances initial conditions, etc.). >Theory dependence. Event/explanation/Schurz: in a deductive-nomological event explanation must. (i) the general premises must be law-like (ii) the conjunction A of antecedent premises must be a cause of E acceptable in the epistemic background system W. >Deductive-nomological explanation. 1. Schurz, G. (1990a). "Was ist wissenschaftliches Verstehen?". In: Schurz (1990, ed.) 235-267. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Causal Explanation | Lewis | V 214 Causal story/causal explanation/Lewis: not everything in a causal story is a cause - E.g. sharp curve is not a cause in itself - it causes uncontrolled turning of the steering wheel) - there are several, convergent causal chains - they can have a tree structure. - Causal chains are dense. Cause/everyday language: unclear - depending on the context. - Overall cause/Mill: Lewis Pro: is a cause. >Explanation/Lewis, >Context. V 217 Closed: everything on which an event in the (pre-)history depends is itself an event in (pre-)history - but not vice versa: a causal history needs not to be closed - explanation: Information about causal story. >Information/Lewis. V 230f Causal explanation/explanation/coincidence/why-question/Lewis: both are legitimate: a) explaining random events - b) denying that we can explain why this provides one result instead of another - this is not about relative probability - the actual causal story is not different from the unactual one which would have had the other result, if it had happened - there are no properties that distinguish the actual story from the unactual one. >Actuality/Lewis. V 327 Causal counterfactual conditionals/Lewis: can belong to patterns of causal dependence or independence - we get them when we pass from language to propositions. >Causal dependence/Lewis, >Counterfactual dependence/Lewis. --- Bigelow I 320 Explanation/Hempel/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: Hempel's explanations are generally correct but do not exhaust all cases. Individual case causation/individual event/Lewis: (1986e)(1) need not be explained according to Hempel's style. Probabilistic explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: here applies that a cause does not necessarily increase the probability of the effect. If one assumes the opposite, one must assume that the explanation itself is the cause. This is because the explanation makes the result more likely. BigelowVsProbabilistic Statement. Instead: Approach by Lewis: Causation/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: (1986e)(1) 5 stages: 1. Natural laws as input for a theory of counterfactual conditionals. --- I 321 2. Uses contrafactual conditionals to define a relation between events, namely, counterfactual dependency. 3. Uses contrafactual dependency to explain causation by two principles: (1) Thesis: Contrafactual dependency is causation (2) The cause of a cause is a cause. Causation/Lewis: is transitive. 4. Lewis constructs a causal history of an event. (Tree structure, it may be that more distant causes are not connected by counterfactual dependency, i.e. another cause could have taken the place, but in fact it is the cause. 5. Definition Causal explanation/Lewis: is everything that provides information about the causal history. This can also be partial. E.g. maternal line, paternal line. E.g. Information about a temporal section of the tree: this corresponds to the explanation by Hempel. --- I 322 Causal Explanation/BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: our theory is similar but also has differences. See Causal Explanation/Bigelow. 1. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Causal Explanation | Mill | Wright I 153 Causal explanation/Mill/Wright, G. H.: Human nature in the causal explanation/Mill: (J. St. Mill, A System of Logic, VI, iii, 2):... it can be said that the science of human nature is present to the extent that the existing truths which form the practical knowledge of human nature are represented as corollaries of the universally general laws of human nature on which they are based. >Causality, >Explanation, >Behavior, >Nature, >Human, cf. >Anomalous monism/Davidson. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Mill Ja I James Mill Commerce Defended: An Answer to the Arguments by which Mr. Spence, Mr. Cobbett, and Others, Have Attempted to Prove that Commerce is Not a Source of National Wealth 1808 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Causal Explanation | Minsky | I 128 Cause/causation/Minsky: a causal explanation must be brief. Unless an explanation is compact, we cannot use it as a prediction. >Explanation, >Prediction. Dependence/”everything depends on everything”: There can't be any causes in a world in which everything that happens depends more or less equally upon everything else that happens. To know the cause of a phenomenon is to know, at least in principle, how to change or control some aspects of some entities without affecting all the rest. >Causality, >Cause, >Effect. The most useful kinds of causes our minds can discern are predictable relationships between the actions we can take and the changes we can sense. >Reality, >World/Thinking. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Causal Explanation | Schurz | I 227 Causal explanation/Schurz: exists only if there is a natural law connection. No causal explanation: e.g. "All apples in this bag are red, therefore this apple is red". I.e. That this apple is (naturally) red is not an explanation why it is red. ((s) >Dennett: Wrong question: "Why is this car green?"). >Explanation/Dennett, >Why-questions, >Causality, >Laws of nature. Prediction/justification/Schurz: here law-likeness is not required. I 228 Ex "All apples in the bag are red": is a completely sufficient prediction or reason (just not an explanation). Causality/Explanation/Schurz: the majority of authors first tried to explicate the concept of explanation independently of causality. Vs: this does not meet the narrower concept of explanation. Schurz: supplying real reasons ((s) here: = cause) belongs to the core of the concept of event explanation. >Prediction. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Causal Explanation | Wright | I 18 Causal explanation/Wright, G. H.: consists in the subsumption of individual facts under hypothetically accepted general laws of nature, including laws of "human nature". >Generalization, >Explanation, >Classification, >Categorization. I 153 Human Nature in Causal Explanation/Mill: (J. St. Mill(1)):.... it can be said that the science of human nature is present to the extent that the existing truths which form the practical knowledge of human nature can be represented as corollaries from the universally general laws of human nature on which they are based. >Human nature, >Laws, >Laws of nature. 1. J. St. Mill, A System of Logic, Buch VI, Kap. iii, Abschn. 2. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Causal Laws | Cartwright | I 10 Asymmetry: causal laws are asymmetrical: cause and effect cannot be interchanged. - By contrast, symmetrical: Laws of Association/Hume: E.g. length of the shadow/height of the mast. - Fraassen: Thesis: asymmetries by explanation are not real. - There is no fact about what explains what. - CartwrightVsFraassen - Association/CartwrightVsHume: not sufficient E.g. malaria control: for distinguishing effective from ineffective strategies. >Association, >Symmetries. I 30 Causal Law/Causal Explanation/Cartwright: causal laws are not transitive - i.e. the causal chain does not have to be determined by a single causal law. >Transitivity. I 32 Causal Law/Cartwright: something that is always the case ((s) universal occurrence, universal fact, "permanence") cannot be consequent of a causal law. - ((s) this is a convention). - Alternatively: universal fact: Alternatively, it could be said that everything is the cause of a universal fact. - ((s) Def Universal Fact/Cartwright/(s): probability = 1.). I 36 Causal Laws/Cartwright: the reason why we need them for the characterization of effectiveness is that they pick out the right properties to which we apply our conditions. I 43 Effective Strategy/Cartwright: can only be found with assumption of causal laws. - Partition: the right one is the one that is determined by which causal laws exist - without causal laws it is impossible to pick out the right factors. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Causal Theory of Knowledge | Schiffer | I 282 Causal theory/Schiffer: a causal theory is used when you have no premises. Cf. >Causal theory of knowledge, >Causal theory of reference, >Causal theory of names, >Premises, >Theories, >Explanation. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Causal Theory of Reference | Stalnaker | I 209 Causal Theory/content/Stalnaker: N.B.: the facts about my connection to Cicero do not belong to the content. >Content. The causal theory here is not a theory that the speaker has about himself/herself but that a statement has a specific content and is a function of facts about how the world is. If the world had been different, the sentence about Cicero would have been about another person. >counterfactual conditional. This does not tie us to a causal theory. Then we can explain errors more easily. >Errors, >Explanations. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Causality | Bigelow | I 264 Explanation/causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: because of impending circularity, we cannot explain causality by laws or counterfactual conditional or probability. >Circular reasoning, >Counterfactual conditionals, >Probability, >Laws, >Explanations, >Causal explanation. Counterfactual Conditional/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Conversely, counterfactual conditionals are analyzed in terms of causality. Just as necessary. >Necessity. Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Must be an unanalyzed basic concept. It is a structural universal. Fundamental forces play a major role. >Basic concepts, >Causation, >Universals, >Forces. Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are vectors. >Vectors. I 265 Causality/causation/explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: first we refute some common theories. Causation/Tradition/Bigelow/Pargetter: is often regarded as a kind of "necessary connection". Normally, this is expressed in such a way that either the cause is necessary for the effect or the effect is a necessary consequence of the cause. Then the cause is either a necessary or a sufficient condition or both. >Cause, >Effect. Weaker: some authors: it is only unlikely to find a cause without effect (or vice versa). (Probabilistic theories of causation, Lewis 1979(1), Tooley 1987)(2). >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. "Necessity Theories"/Bigelow/Pargetter: should explain on what kind of necessity they rely on. Cause/Effect/BigelowVsTradition/BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis that a cause does not have to be a sufficient or a necessary cause for an effect, the effect could have occurred without or by another cause, or without cause at all! One cannot always assume a high probability. A cause does not always have to increase the probability of an event. I 266 Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: that's what we learned from him. (HumeVsLewis). Causality/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: his conception of it has a theological background (from Descartes and Malebranche): Thesis: it could not be that God was bound by any restrictions. >Causality/Hume. Therefore, it could not be that God would be compelled to allow the effect to follow. It would always have to come out of God's free choice and be a miracle every time. Cf. >Causes/Nietzsche. Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: Hume's theory simply eliminates God. Hume simply asks us to imagine that the effect could not follow from the cause. Bigelow/Pargetter: he's right! It is not only logically possible, but also empirically possible. >Possibility, >Logical possibility, >Metaphysical possibility. Presentation/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: is for Hume the guide to the possibility. He thus swings from a theological to a psychological argument. Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: Causes are not sufficient conditions. They are not always necessary. >Sufficiency. I 267 Solution/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: inner expectations of regularities. Cause/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to Hume "sufficient" cannot be considered modal. That is, that "sufficient" must not be considered realistic. >Modalities, >Modal logic, >Realism. BigelowVsHume: Hume went too far in his rejection of necessity in laws. But not far enough in his rejection of the necessity approach of causality. 1. Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76 2. Tooley, M. (1987). Causation. A realist's approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Causality | Bradley | Slater I 133 Causality/dyslexia/Bradley/Bryant: Bradley and Bryant (1983)(1): in order to decide whether the connection between rhyming and alliteration skills and progress in reading was causal, two research methods need[ed] to be combined. A longitudinal approach, in which a large sample of children was followed over time to see whether early rhyme and alliteration skills could determine progress in reading and spelling, had to be combined with a training study. If sound categorization was indeed important for learning to read and to spell, then children who received intensive training in sound categorization should show gains in reading and spelling in comparison to children who did not receive such training. >Reading acquisition/Bradley/Bryant. This combination hat not been used in studies of reading development before. Slater I 135 Bradley and Bryant (1983)(1) concluded that they had shown a causal link between categorizing sounds and learning to read. They speculated that experiences at home, before the children went to school, might underlie individual differences in rhyming and alliteration skills at school entry. Slater I 139/140 Causality/VsBradley/VsBryant: it is the question whether Bradley and Bryant’s (1983)(1) study really established a causal connection between categorizing sounds and learning to read. Even though the study used only pre-reading children (as measured by the Schonell standardized test), some critics have argued that most children who grow up in literate Western societies have some letter knowledge before entering school, for example being able to print their own name and being aware of popular logos and printed signs (e.g., Castles & Coltheart, 2004)(2). 1. Bradley, L., & Bryant, P. E. (1983). Categorising sounds and learning to read: A causal connection. Nature, 310, 419–421. 2. Castles, A., & Coltheart, M. (2004). Is there a causal link from phonological awareness to success in learning to read? Cognition, 91, 77–111. Usha Goswami, „Reading and Spelling.Revisiting Bradley and Bryant’s Study“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Brad I F. H. Bradley Essays on Truth and Reality (1914) Ithaca 2009 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Causality | Bryant | Slater I 133 Causality/dyslexia/Bradley/Bryant: Bradley and Bryant (1983)(1): in order to decide whether the connection between rhyming and alliteration skills and progress in reading was causal, two research methods need[ed] to be combined. A longitudinal approach, in which a large sample of children was followed over time to see whether early rhyme and alliteration skills could determine progress in reading and spelling, had to be combined with a training study. If sound categorization was indeed important for learning to read and to spell, then children who received intensive training in sound categorization should show gains in reading and spelling in comparison to children who did not receive such training. >Reading acquisition/Bradley/Bryant. This combination hat not been used in studies of reading development before. Slater I 135 Bradley and Bryant (1983)(1) concluded that they had shown a causal link between categorizing sounds and learning to read. They speculated that experiences at home, before the children went to school, might underlie individual differences in rhyming and alliteration skills at school entry. Slater I 139/140 Causality/VsBradley/VsBryant: it is the question whether Bradley and Bryant’s (1983)(1) study really established a causal connection between categorizing sounds and learning to read. Even though the study used only pre-reading children (as measured by the Schonell standardized test), some critics have argued that most children who grow up in literate Western societies have some letter knowledge before entering school, for example being able to print their own name and being aware of popular logos and printed signs (e.g., Castles & Coltheart, 2004)(2). 1. Bradley, L., & Bryant, P. E. (1983). Categorising sounds and learning to read: A causal connection. Nature, 310, 419–421. 2. Castles, A., & Coltheart, M. (2004). Is there a causal link from phonological awareness to success in learning to read? Cognition, 91, 77–111. Usha Goswami, „Reading and Spelling.Revisiting Bradley and Bryant’s Study“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Causality | Carnap | VI 10 Essence/Carnap: "Essence problems": For example, problems of identity, dualism of psychic and physical, intentionality, causality: all of them lead to metaphysics. VI 229 Causality/Carnap: only statements about "before/after" are possible. Science: only determination of conditions. A cause is no state. Causality: form: attribution of state variables (the temporal differential coefficients of a state variable). >Essence, >Knowledge, >Metaphysics, >Intentionality, >Dualism, >Attribution. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Causality | Davidson | Glüer II 104 ff Davidson: the causal relation itself is independent of description. It exists between event tokens, no matter how they are described. Causal laws, however, operate on the level of description, so they refer to event types. Causal laws are strict laws, i.e. they apply without distinction. Such laws can only exist in a sealed frame, i.e. a system of nomological sentences. McDowell I 100 Causality/Concepts/Davidson/McDowell: the objects that fulfill the sui generis concepts have causal relations with their kind and other things. But that does not endanger the thesis that causal relations only exist between residents of the realm of the laws of nature. McDowell: A reason may therefore be a cause, although it is not in causal relations by virtue of its rational relations. Rorty VI 179 ff Causality/Rorty: plays an indispensable role in determining what we say and believe. It is generally impossible to determine beliefs first and then their meaning, and then ask what its causes are. Davidson I 59 Causality/Davidson: the causal relations between world and belief are not decisive, because they provide evidence, but because they are recognizable also for others. >Communication/Davidson. Horwich I 452 Causality/Belief/Davidson/Rorty: explanation does not require causality - E.g. how we explain communication with simultaneous presence at same place - we do not know what it would be like for people if they were not there - similarly: e.g. truth has no explanatory use - we do not know what it would be like if most beliefs were wrong. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Causality | Deci | Corr I 446 Causality/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: the theory proposes that when people do activities to get tangible rewards, their behaviour tends to become dependent on the rewards, so they perceive the locus of causality (De Charms 1968(1); Heider 1958(2)) to shift from internal to external, they feel more controlled, their need for autonomy is thus thwarted, and their intrinsic motivation is undermined. The theory states that the controlling aspect of this external event is salient to the people, and that is what initiates the change in perceived locus of causality and decrease in intrinsic motivation. >Motivation/Deci/Ryan, >Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan. 1. De Charms, R. 1968. Personal causation: the internal affective determinants of behaviour. New York: Academic Press 2. Heider, F. 1958. The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Causality | Economic Theories | Harcourt I 21 Causality/equilibirum/economic theories/Harcourt: (…) to argue that, in equilibrium, the wage rate equals the marginal product of labour is not to argue that one is the cause of the other, or that one determines the other. Moreover, it is abundantly clear from the manner in which Joan Robinson's(1) version of the production function is derived and the constructions which are used, that these are not the points at issue. >Causality/philosophical theories, >Causation, >Equilibrium, >Equations, >Production function, >Joan Robinson, >Capital/Robinson. The neo-Keynesian critics really cannot be sloughed off as neo-Böhm-Bawerkians, spurning, as Stigler [1941](2), p. 18, puts it, 'mutual determination .. . for the older concept of cause and effect'. >Böhm-Bawerk, >Cause, >Effect. An argument that the destruction of the concept of an aggregate production function is not the same thing as destroying the marginal productivity theory of distribution is on safer ground (…), but even then the neoclassical are not yet safe on Jordan's shore (see Garegnani [1970a(3), 1970b(4)], Pasinetti [1969(5), 1970(6)]. 1. Robinson, Joan (1953-4). 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital', Review of Economic Studies, xxi. 2. Stigler, George J. [1941] Production and Distribution Theories: The Formative Period (New York: Macmillan). 3.Garegnani, P. - [1970a] 'Heterogeneous Capital, the Production Function and the Theory of Distribution', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVII (3), pp. 407-36. 4. Garegnani, P. 1970b] 'A Reply', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVII (3), p. 439. 5. Pasinetti, L. L. [1969] 'Switches of Technique and the "Rate of Return" in Capital Theory', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 508-31. 6. Pasinetti, L. L. [1970] 'Again on Capital Theory and Solow's "Rate of Return" ', Economic Journal, LXXX, pp. 428-31. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Causality | Evolutionary Psychology | Corr I 266 Causality/causation/evolutionary psychology: In our view, ultimate causation (‘why’) questions can be applied as well to genetically variable traits, such as personality traits, as they can to more species-typical human traits. Theories of evolutionary adaptive significance provide a framework that can inform personality theorists about (a) whether there are adaptive functions for the genetic differences that influence variation in personality characteristics and what those functions are; (b) potential new aspects of mechanisms governing personality structure; (c) what aspects of an individual’s developmental environment should be expected to affect that individual; (d) how and to what degree individuals should be affected by different environments; and (e) why personality traits are responsive to environmental modulation. ((s) For the philosophical discussion of problems in relation to >causality and >causal explanations, see there.) Aurelio José Figueredo, Paul Gladden, Geneva Vásquez, Pedro Sofio, Abril Wolf and Daniel Nelson Jones, “Evolutionary theories of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Causality | Gould | II 59 Causality/Gould: definition haplodiploid: the males develop from unfertilized eggs and have no father. Fertilized eggs, on the other hand, produce diploid females. This can be used to control the number of females. II 57 This fascinating system can help explain the origin of social systems in ants. Or that a male mite dies before its own birth, for example, after fertilising its sisters in the womb. The biologists were so fascinated by these observations that a subtle reversal of causality has crept into many descriptions: the very existence of haplodiploidism is elegantly associated with the decision "for" a better social system such as in ants. II 61 GouldVs: haplodiploid ancestors were certainly not completely social, this has only developed as a "phylogenetic additional thought" in some independent tribes. Environment of such tribes: the environment of such tribes is created by every single female! Even a not full-grown one becomes a possible founder of new colonies, as it is able to produce a generation of males, with which it can mate to create a new generation of females. Frequent error: it is a frequent error to assume that the instantaneous usefulness of a property would allow to deduce the reasons for its origin. Origin and current usefulness, however, are two very different subjects. Complex properties are full of possibilities: their conceivable uses are not limited to their original functions. For example, the fish's fins of equilibrium became the driving elements. >Properties, >Benefit, >Explanation, >Evolution. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Causality | Hempel | Wright I 27 Causality/Hempel/von Wright, G. H.: Hempel's deductive nomological model does not mention the terms 'cause' and 'effect'. The schema covers a broader area, causality is only a partial area. >Cause, >Effect. G. H. von WrightVsHempel: it is questionable whether all causal explanations actually correspond to Hempel's scheme. It is also questionable whether the scheme can really be considered an explanation if the general laws are not causal laws. >Causal explanation, >Explanation, >Laws, >Causal laws. ((s) Solution: equations do not mention cause and effect either: >Equations.) |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Causality | Kant | Danto I 298 Causality/Kant/Danto: is not derived from experience - but the condition or form of experience - the idea of causality is not causality itself. >Ideas/Kant. --- Kant I 26 Causality/Kant: things themselves are not subject to the time condition, so not causality. - (Solution of the third cosmological antinomy: namely, the antinomy of causality of freedom (that belongs to the things themselves) and causality according to nature (in the phenomenal world)). KantVsHume: causality does not apply to things themselves. VsKant: he does not stick to it himself. Mind/Kant: the mind has its own causality: the "spontaneity of terms". >Spontaneity/Kant. --- I 32 Subjectivity arises not only from causality (of freedom) but from the spontaneity of the terms - therefore metaphysics begins in empirical science. >Subjectivity/Kant, >Metaphysics/Kant. --- Vaihinger I 280 Causality/Idea/God/Kant/Vaihinger: I only underlie the idea of such a (highest) being to see the phenomena as systematically linked to each other according to the analogy of a causal determination. --- Vollmer I 25 Causality/Kant: outside of causality we cannot experience. >Experience/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Vaihinger I H. Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Causality | Kripke | Rorty II 131 Kripke/RortyVsKripke: the Kripkeans rely on a privileged vocabulary for scientific description. Causal forces are independent of description. >Description dependence/Kripke, >Description independence, >Description/Kripke, >Causal theory of knowledge, >Causal explanation, >Vocabulary/Kripke. --- Stegmüller IV 82 Causality/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripke/Stegmüller: even an omniscient being could, if it considers the individual events, only see the sequence, but not the necessity - in the universe it encounters possible worlds where less strict laws apply. >Possible world, >Possible world/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Causality | Mayr | I 62 Causality/Mayr: most scientists assume that there is a historical and causal continuity for all phenomena in the material universe. I 101 Cause/Biology: It can be difficult or even impossible to pinpoint the exact cause in an interaction of complex systems. >Cause, >Effect, >Causal explanation, >Single-case causation. I 102 Strict causality can usually be identified by retrospectively looking at the option chosen at each step of the action chain. In retrospect, even randomly chosen components can be seen as causal. I 363ff Causality/Mayr: especially for animals strictly causal sequences can be proven! >Animals, >Behavior. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Causality | McTaggart | Geach I 41 Causality/explanation/McTaggart: his formulation "in view of" instead of "because": is not causal. N.B./Geach: because of the missing causality something can also be mistakenly considered an X by someone even if it is not X! The (false) believe is then the cause of the attribution. I 41/42 N.B.: now I do not admire someone in relation to my own believe! Surely gods would have no false belief, but we can nevertheless make this distinction: The gods love something in terms of being pious, and not in relation to one's own attitude to it. But one must distinguish exactly: the attitude is already the reason (causally!) But it does not provide the property (characteristic) in relation to which it is loved. >Quine on "views". |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Causality | Minsky | Minsky I 48 Circularity/circular causality/Minsky: Two goals can support each other: A causes B John wanted to go home because he felt tired of work. B causes A John felt tired of work because he wanted to go home. There need be no first cause (…). Then a loop of circular causality ensues, in which each goal gains support from the other until their combined urge becomes irresistible. We're always enmeshed in causal loops. Suppose you had borrowed past your means and later had to borrow more in order to pay the interest on your loan. If you were asked what the difficulty was, it would not be enough to say simply, Because I have to pay the interest, or to say only, Because I have to pay the principal. Neither alone is the actual cause, and you'd have to explain that you're caught in a loop. >Circular reasoning, >Explanation, >Actions. There are countless different types of networks that contain loops. But all networks that contain no loops are basically the same: each has the form of a simple chain. >Networks, >Neural Networks, >Artificial Neural Networks. Minsky I 49 Unanswerable questions: What caused the universe, and why? How can you tell which beliefs are true? What is the purpose of life? How can you tell what is good? >Cosmology. These questions seem different on the surface, but all of them share one quality that makes them impossible to answer: all of them are circular! But when thinking keeps returning to its source, it doesn't always mean something's wrong. For circular thinking can lead to growth when it results, at each return, in deeper and more powerful ideas. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Causality | Nietzsche | Danto III 120 Causality/Nietzsche/Danto: since there are no objects for Nietzsche, the causality concept ((s) for which separate objects have to be accepted) is also a fiction. For Nietzsche, the truth is that there is a continuum ahead of us.(1) Danto III 135 Causality/Nietzsche/Danto: the causal necessity is "not a matter of fact, but an interpretation".(2) >Interpretation/Nietzsche. It turns out that it is based on a distinction between subject and object. If we give up the concept of the "thing" and thus the subject and object, our concept of causality will inevitably become invalid. If we no longer believe in the effective subject, then also the belief in effective things, in interaction, cause and effect falls away between those phenomena that we call things. Thing per se/NietzscheVsKant/Nietzsche/Danto: the contrast between "thing per se" and "appearance" is untenable (...) as well as the terms "subject" and "object" and ultimately also their various modifications e.g. "matter", "spirit" and other hypothetical beings, "eternity and unchangeability of matter" etc. We are rid of materiality.(3) >Things in themselves/Kant, >Matter, >Mind, >Spirit, >Subject/Nietzsche, >Object, >Subject/Object problem. Danto III 262 Causality/Will/Nietzsche/Danto: let us assume with Nietzsche that the will is causally effective. This hypothesis does not contradict his polemic against that idea, the concept of will can serve as an explanation. In a non-revised analysis, Nietzsche expresses the idea that human beings would catch causality in the act as soon as they perform introspection with regard to the mode of action of their own will. Then the methodical monism ((s) Danto's expression) would have to see will as the only form of causality. But Nietzsche's conception of the will is not purely psychological. Rather, it determines all acting forces as a will to power.(1) >Power/Nietzsche, Process/Nietzsche, Will/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, KGW V, 2. p. 151 2. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 540. 3. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 540f. 4. F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI. 2, p. 51. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Causality | Putnam | III 259 Causality/Putnam: the use of causal terms to explain reference is circular in that our relevant interests involve certain skills. III 84f But it is about simple explanations e.g. why the pot did not work normally. There are no physically complex facts - the physical facts themselves do not distinguish between constraints and triggers. >Causal explanation. III 206 Causality/Putnam: causality explains the reference of individual words but not the truth of sentences. >Reference, >Sentence meaning. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Causality | Strawson | IV 152 f Causality/Strawson: because of different possible descriptions in reality dependent on generality. Hume was right with that. - But it's also not a selection of individual descriptions. >Generality, >Generalization, >Description, >Description dependence, >Context dependence, >Causal dependence, >Causal explanation. IV 157 Causality/StrawsonVsHume: he overlooks the very obvious fact that objects exert physical force. (Dennett: and that is observable). >Causality/Hume, >Causality/Dennett. I 162 Pro Hume: you can observe many reactions without knowing what forces are at work. IV 163 VsHume: regularity is time neutral, it could also be reversed. (s) because (type-type, not type-token). >Regularity, >Regularity theory. IV 165 VsHume: we learn the regularity, because we already have the concept of causality. IV 172 Strawson: the utmost we can recognize are probability laws. >Probability, >Probability laws. Causality/Language: more in transitive verbs than in the word "cause". IV 175 Common Causes: easily possible: E.g. malaria - cause: denotes relation that occurs in different modes of being |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Causality | Vollmer | I 102 Causality/physics/theory/Vollmer: causality is not present in physical theories - neither cause nor causal principle nor necessity. Russell: function rather than causality. Carnap: totality of the premises a statement. I 104 Causality/Vollmer: necessary condition: energy transfer. I 105 But e.tr. is not a sufficient condition. - E.g. energetic process, which is not called causal: thunder and lightning. >Sufficiency, >Conditions, >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Necessity. I 108 The cause does not have to not provide the total energy: E.g. butterfly effect. >Causes, >Causation, >Effect. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Causality | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 101 Experience/Causality/Cause/Border/Wittgenstein: all causal laws are reached through experience, therefore we cannot ascertain the cause of experience! If you give a scientific explanation, you describe an experience. >Experiences. II 123 Causality/Wittgenstein: is actually a description of a style of investigation. For the physicist, causality stands for a way of thinking. >Physics. IV 105 Causality/Law/Law of Nature/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 6:32 the law of causality is not a law but the form of a law 6.321 law of causality is a generic name. E.g. as in mechanics. >Natural laws. IV 108 6:36 If there were a law of causality, it might be: There are laws of nature but it turns out that you cannot determine this. IV 109 6.362 What can be described, can also happen, and what is excluded by the law of causality, cannot even be described. >Description. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Causation | Bigelow | I 276 Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we should understand it as a relation between events (in a broad sense). Speech of causation/causality/Davidson/Bigelow/Pargetter. We take over from Davidson (1980)(1): Problem: singular causal statements. E.g. "The short circuit caused the fire." >Causality, >Causes, >Observation sentences. Truth conditions: the statements can be true because the relation exists, even if it is clear that short circuits are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for fire. >Truth conditions. Generalization: can be true, but only if we reword the sentence. >Generalization/Bigelow. Causal Relation/Davidson/Bigelow/Pargetter: exists, if and only iff there is a way of describing the events so that they can be brought under a general causal law. >Causal relation. BigelowVsDavidson: (see above) the causal relation is rather local than global. BigelowVsDavidson: the nature of the causal relation is not derived from the existence of an underlying law. >Laws. I 277 Bigelow/Pargetter pro Davidson: however, the truth conditions of a singular causal statement require the existence of a relation (but not under a description). Causal statements/Bigelow/Pargetter: some must be rewritten: E.g. "The stone caused the window pane to break." Must be rewritten to: "That the stone touched the window pane caused the window pane to break." E.g. "Becker's easy victory over Lendl surprised the commentators." Must be changed: "Becker's victory surprised ... and if it had not been easy, it would not have been surprising." Bigelow pro Davidson: So far his theory is convincing. Causality/causal statements/Bigelow/Pargetter: sometimes we must also make general causal statements: For this, we need types of events or properties of events. Causal statements: must then be counterfactual conditionals: E.g. "If Lendl's defeat had not been so clear, it would not have been surprising." E.g. "The antidote slowed the death of Protheros." This seems to require causal relations between characteristics of events (e.g. lightness, slowing). I 278 Universals: are sometimes used here. Sometimes it is about unique events, sometimes about characteristics of events. >Universals, >Events. Problem: why should the relations between such different entities be summarized? Why should they all be causal? Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: we must assume that they all supervene on a basic causal relation. This can not be specified in modal terms. >Modalities. Causal Relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: is largely unknown to us. It is best to recognize it when it is encountered. I 279 Our task is now to figure out what it is. This is a metaphysical, not a semantic task. >Metaphysics, >Semantics. I 288 Causation/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Let's assume that we can close the gap between everyday forces and the fundamental forces. I 289 Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: how do we justify that we have chosen forces for the explanation? >Forces, >Forces/Bigelow. Explanation/David Fair/FairVsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Fair 1979)(2): he selects instead of forces energy flow. ((s) >Energy transfer/Gerhard Vollmer). Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: we take them because they occur in Newton's 3rd law. For us, there are two instances of causation then, because there are two forces. David Fair: for him it is an instance of energy flow and thus a causation. BigelowVsFair: his theory does not provide the right relations of higher levels between universals that we need. Energy flow/energy transfer/Fair/Bigelow/Pargetter: this term requires the identification of packages of energy in time. Energy/Cause/Effect/Fair/Bigelow/Pargetter: The energy present in the effect is numerically identical to the energy lost in the cause. Problem/BigelowVsFair: but there is also cause, where no energy is transmitted, but only impulse. Therefore, it needs a shared access. Then the causation is hardly a unifying element in any explanation. Problem: besides, there are cases where both energy and impulse are transmitted, and how should one choose then? The causation cannot be identified with both. ((s) also BigelowVsVollmer). >Single-case causation, >G.Vollmer. I 290 BigelowVsFair: besides, energy transmission and pulse transmission supervene on properties and relations. Therefore, according to Fair, there can be no Humean world, which coincides with a causal possible world in all properties of the 1st level. This should, however, be possible (see Chapter 5): a theory that allows this must also recognize causation as a relation of a higher level. Fair cannot do this. >Levels/order, >Description levels. 1. Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on actions and and events. Oxford University Press. 2. Fair, D. (1979). Causation and the flow of energy. erkenntnis 14, pp. 219-50 |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Causation | Lewis | V 36 Causation/counterfactual analysis/Lewis: (elsewhere) 1) relation cause/effect depends on the causal chain. 2) causal chain is a particular type of counterfactual dependencies 3) No reverse causation. >Counterfactual dependence/Lewis, >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis, cf. >Causal dependence/Lewis, >Causality/Lewis, >Cause/Lewis, >Causal explanation/Lewis. --- V 181 Causation/Lewis: E.g. assuming two redundant systems, one produces the effect with lower probability - I switch to that one. - Then I have caused the effect nevertheless. - Wrong: to assume that there would be several ways of how the world could be. (Various counterfactual conditionals). - Lewis: That would be a metaphysical burden. - It is not about a hidden property that might be present or not. V 183 There is only one way the world is. - Both counterfactual conditionals are true or false by an arbitrary resolution of semantic indeterminacy. - But that is not a property of the world. >Possible world/Stalnaker. V 195 Redundant causation/Lewis: (multiple causes, which would also have been sufficient individually). - It is hard to decide whether the effects would have been different events. - Definition fragile: is an event that would have been different if it had been e.g. at a different time. - Events must not be too fragile. - Otherwise we have normal causation in redundant cases. - Whether redundancy is present may also depend on the standards of fragility. - Undecidable: E.g. whether a suspended performance is the same. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Causes | Cartwright | I 74 Cause/Causality/Empiricism/VsCauses - Russell: the law of gravity is given in equations - there are no "causes" and "effects" here. Equations/Cartwright: are today's generalizations. - They are the heart of science. >Equations, >Generalization. I 75 Explanations by equations are often redundant. - I.e. there are alternative equations! - Cause: cannot be redundant. - Equation: causes nothing, but includes phenomena in a frame. I 79 Alternative equations: offer different laws. - (they compete) - E.g. multiple versions of the Schrödinger equation. CartwrightVsRussell: I prefer causes rather than laws. >Laws, >Natural laws. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Causes | Dummett | III (d) 156 Cause/Dummett: The concept pf a cause is related to our concept of intention. There is a relationship between the causality of a thing and the possibility of using it to produce an effect, in the basic explanation of our acceptance of causal laws. >Causal laws, >Intentions, >Intentionality. III (d) 157 Freedom of action: the idea of freedom of action is necessary for our convictions of causality. Nevertheless, we could also have a concept of causality if we ourselves were not acting, but only observers, such as intelligent trees. In this way we would also perceive the asymmetry. >Causality. II 459 Undecidability/Dummett: A sentence like "Every event has a cause" is undecidable. >Decidability/Dummett. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Causes | Fraassen | I 25 Principle of the Common Cause/P.C.C./Fraassen: eventually leads to postulating unobservable entities. - The principle of the common cause cannot be a general principle of science. >Unobservables, >Theoretical entities. I 28 Common Cause/C.C./Fraassen: to say that C is the common cause for the correlation between A and B is to say that relative to C there is no such correlation. C explains the correlation, because we only notice a correlation for as long as we do not consider C. FraassenVsReichenbach: the principle of the common cause does not rule the science of the 20th century, because it requires deterministic theories. I 114 Cause/Explanation/Theory: Def Cause/Mackie: non-sufficient but necessary part of a non-necessary but sufficient condition. >INUS/Mackie). FraassenVsMackie: restriction: otherwise e.g. growth-plus-death-plus-decay may be the cause of death. 1) Not every sufficient condition is a cause. - E.g. the existence of the knife is a necessary part. - 2) A cause must also not be necessary. >Causation, >Causality. It may be that there are no previous sufficient conditions at all. - E.g. radium causes Geiger counter to click. But atomic physics is compatible with that it does not click. Cause/Solution/Lewis: Counterfactual Conditional: if A had not existed, B would not have exited. >Counterfactual conditional. Fraassen: but not literally. - Wrong: that a counterfactual conditional was the same as a necessary condition. Solution/Fraassen: here, the "if/then" logic does not apply, because applies the law of attenuation there. Everyday language: there is no attenuation here. >Everyday language. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Causes | Gould | II 78 Causes/Aristotle/Gould: according to Aristotle, every incident has four distinct types of causes: e.g. House: What is the cause of my house? 1. Material Cause: it makes a difference which material is used. 2. Inducing Cause: the actual work must be carried out. 3. Formal Cause: the formal cause are the pre-defined blueprints. 4. Final Causes, Purpose Cause/GouldVsAristotle: these are no longer accepted today. Today we confine ourselves to the "causative cause" of Aristotle and do not regard the composition of the table, for example, as irrelevant, but it is no longer called the cause. Aristotle believes that it "thunders, for example, because there must be a hissing and raving while the fire is being extinguished, and also to threaten the souls in Tarutarus".(1) >Causality, >Explanation, >Causal explanation. III 239 Cause/effect/evolution: cause and effect are not always unambiguously determinable with regard to evolution. For example, brain: no one can say that our brain has been enlarged by natural selection for a certain purpose! Complexity/human/evolution: complexity, as for example in the human, is a passive consequence of evolutionary principles whose main result is something completely different. It is an effect, but not an effect of causes that are used for their purpose. 1. Aristotle, Anal.Post II 94b, 1. 28 |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Causes | Hume | Armstrong II 58 Cause/effect/Hume: Cause is a necessary connection. Place: but it is conceptually and logically necessary. Place: (and all the others): causes have their effects contingent. A cause cannot be conceptually something else than a cause of effect. >Effect, --- Hoerster II 245f Cause/causality/Hume: logically anything can be any cause of something. Therefore, the necessity that we need for causality, must be empirically! Causality is necessary for Hume's psychological examinations of non-rational causes of assumptions. >Thinking/Hume, >Thoughts. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Hum II N. Hoerster Hume In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 |
| Causes | Mayr | I 101 Cause/Bbiology: it can be difficult or even impossible to find the exact the cause for an interaction of complex systems. >Causality, >Effect. I 102 Strict causality: can usually be determined by considering the selected option at each step of the action chain in retrospect. In retrospect, even randomly chosen components can be regarded as causal. >Causal explanation. I 102 Causes/Mayr: Every phenomenon is the result of two causes, an indirect one ("why, genetic program") and an direct one (functional, "how"). I 103 Cause: in the inanimate world there is only one kind of causes, that of the natural laws (often in combination with random processes). >Laws of nature, >Random, >Necessity, >Initial conditions. I 162 Cause: E.g. "Indirect cause": choice of a moderate time of year for the rearing of the offspring. Indirect: abundance of food direct cause: length of days. I 163 Cause/Paul Weiss/Mayr: all biological systems have two sides: they are both causal mechanisms and products of evolution.(1) 165 Cause/Biology: direct: affect the phenotype: morphology and behavior, mechanically, here and now, decoding a genetic code discovery by experiments Indirect: affect the genotype - probabilistic - effective and emerged over long periods of time, emergence and alteration of genetic programs discovery by conclusions from historical representations. >Terminology/Mayr. 1. P. Weiss (1947). The Place of Physiology in the Biological Sciences. In: Federation Proceedings 6, p. 523-525. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Causes | Minsky | I 128 Cause/causation/Minsky: a causal explanation must be brief. Unless an explanation is compact, we cannot use it as a prediction. >Explanation/Minsky, >Explanations, >Causal explanation, >Causality, >Complexity, >Simplicity. Dependence/”everything depends on everything”: There can't be any causes in a world in which everything that happens depends more or less equally upon everything else that happens. To know the cause of a phenomenon is to know, at least in principle, how to change or control some aspects of some entities without affecting all the rest. The most useful kinds of causes our minds can discern are predictable relationships between the actions we can take and the changes we can sense. >Prediction, >Cognition, >Knowledge, >World/Thinking, >Reality. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Central Bank | Rothbard | Rothbard II 159 Central Bank/Rothbard: The Bank of England had been the bulwark of the English (and, by serving as bankers' bank, of the Scottish) banking system since its founding in 1694. The bank was the recipient of an enormous amount of monopoly privilege from the British government. Not only was it the receiver of all public funds, but no other corporate banks were allowed to exist, and no partnerships of more than six partners were allowed to issue bank notes. As a result, by the late eighteenth century, the Bank of England was serving as an inflationary engine of bank deposits and especially of paper money, on top of which a flood of small partnership banks (‘country banks’) were able to pyramid their own notes, using Bank of England notes as their reserve. (…) when the bank got into trouble by overinflating, it was permitted to suspend specie payment, that is, refuse to meet its obligation to redeem its notes and deposits in specie. This privilege was granted to the bank several times during the century after it opened its doors. However, each time the suspension, or ‘restriction’ of specie payment lasted only a few years. >Bullionism, >Gold standard. Rothbard II 160 Before 1800, decades of inconvertible paper money in England would have been considered unthinkable, and so previous monetary theorists had scarcely contemplated or analysed such an economy. But now writers were forced to come to grips with fiat paper, and to propose policies to cope with an unwelcome new era. >Currency, >Demand for Money/Rothbard. Rothbard II 238 Central bank/Rothbard: Along with the increase in the number of banks came an expansion in bank money. Thus the circulation of country bank notes rose (…) in mid-1836. Of this growth, almost all came from the issue of the new joint-stock banks (…) Although the Bank of England and the private country banks complained at the new competition, the expansion of credit by the bank fuelled this new burgeoning ofbanks and bank notes. Rothbard II 239 (…) the bank credit expansion led, in what was becoming the usual way, to a financial crisis and panic at the end of 1836 and the beginning of 1837, replete with bank runs, especially in Ireland. There followed the typical signs of recession: contraction ofbank credit, decline ofproduction, collapse of stock prices, numerous bankruptcies ofbanks and other businesses, and a swelling of unemployment. (…) more than 40 pamphlets were published on the banking system in 1837 alone, and a large number continued the following year. The pamphlet war was touched off by a remarkable pamphlet by Colonel Robert Torrens, (…) Robert Torrens: (…) inconsistently enunciated the currency principle in Clear form: Extensive and calamitous experience had established the fact, that a currency, consisting of precious metals, and ofpaper convertible into these metals on demand, was liable to sudden and very considerable fluctuation, between the extremes of excess and of deficiency... A mixed currency... would suffer a much more considerable contraction... than a purely metallic...(1) Rothbard II 246 Laissez-faire/Richard Cobden/Rothbard: (…) Richard Cobden [was] the shining prince of the Manchester laissez-faire movement. Attacking the Bank of England, and any idea of discretionary control over the currency, Cobden fervently declared: I hold all idea of regulating the currency to be an absurdity; the very terms of regulating the currency and managing the currency I look upon to be an absurdity; the currency should regulate itself; it must be regulated by the trade and commerce of the world; I would neither allow the Bank of England nor any private banks to have what is called the management of the currency... >Gold standard/Rothbard, >Currency/Rothbard. Rothbard II 249 Central Bank/Robert Peel/Rothbard: Robert Peel's proudest achievement, (…) was his banking reform, his Act of 1844. In essence, Peel's Act established the currency principle. It divided the Bank of England into an issue department, issuing bank notes, and a banking department, lending and issuing demand deposits. True to the rigid currency school separation ofnotes and deposits, deposits would be totally free and unregulated, while notes would be limited to a ceiling of E 14 million matched by assets of government securities (roughly the extent of existing note issue). Any further notes could only be issued on the basis of 100 per cent reserve in gold. The second main provision was to grant the Bank of England its long-sought monopoly of the note issue. This was not done immediately, but to be phased in over a period of time. Specifically: no new banks were to issue any bank notes, existing banks were to issue no further notes, and the Bank of England might contract with bankers to buy out their existing notes and replace them with the bank's own. 1. Cited in Lionel Robbins, Robert Torrens and the Evolution of Classical Economics (London: Macmillan, 19 58), p. 89. Robbins, Torrens's biographer, admits his inability to explain Torrens's complete about-face on money and inflationism. Ibid., pp. 73-4. Rothbard III 1013 Central banks/Rothbard: In the late nineteenth century, the principle became accepted that the central bank must act as the "lender of last resort," which will lend money freely to banks threatened With failure. Deposit insurance: Another recent American device to abolish the confidence limitation on bank credit is "deposit insurance," whereby the government guarantees to furnish paper money to redeem the banks' demand liabilities. These and similar devices remove the market brakes on rampant credit expansion. Central bank: A second device, now so legitimized that any country lacking it is considered hopelessly "backward", is the central bank. The central bank, while often nominally owned by private individuals or banks, is run directly by the national government. Its purpose, not always stated explicitly, is to remove the competitive check on bank credit provided by a multiplicity of independent banks. Its aim is to make sure that all the banks in the country are co-ordinated and will therefore expand or contract together - at the will of the government. And we have seen that co-ordination of expansion greatly weakens the market's limits. >Credit expansion/Rothbard. Bank notes: The crucial way by which governments have established central bank control over the commercial banking system is by granting the bank a monopoly of the note issue in the country. Money-substitutes: (…) money-substitutes may be issued in the form of notes or book deposits. Economically, the two forms are identical. The state has found it convenient, however, to distinguish between the two and to outlaw all note issue by private banks. Such nationalizing of the note-issue business forces the commercial banks to go to the central bank whenever their customers desire to exchange demand deposits for paper notes. Private banks: To obtain notes to furnish their clients, commercial banks must buy them from the central bank. Such purchases can be made only by selling their gold coin or other standard money or by drawing on the banks' deposit accounts With the central bank. Since the public always wishes to hold some of its money in the form of notes and some in demand deposits, the banks must establish a continuing relationship with the central bank to be assured a supply of notes. Their most convenient procedure is to establish demand deposit accounts with the central bank, which thereby becomes the "bankers' bank." Bank reserve: These demand deposits (added to the gold in their vaults) become the reserves of the banks. The central bank can also more freely create demand liabilities not backed 100 percent by gold, and these increased liabilities add to the reserves and demand deposits held by banks or else increase central bank notes outstanding. The rise in reserves of banks throughout the country will spur them to expand credit, while any decrease in these reserves will induce a general contraction in credit. >Bank reserve/Rothbard. Rothbard III 1015 The central bank can increase the reserves of a country's banks in three ways: (a) by simply lending them reserves; (b) by purchasing their assets, thereby adding directly to the banks' deposit accounts with the central bank; or (c) by purchasing the I.0.U.'s of the public, which will then deposit the drafts on the central bank in the various banks that serve the public directly, thereby enabling them to use the credits on the central bank to add to their own reserves. Discounting: The second process is known as discounting; the latter as open market purchase. A lapse in discounts as the Ioans mature will Iower reserves, as will open market sales. In open market sales, the people will pay the central bank for its assets, purchased with checks drawn on their accounts at the banks; and the central bank exacts payment by reducing bank reserves on its books. In most cases, the assets purchased or sold on the open market are government I.0.U.'s.(1) 1. There is a fourth way by which a central bank may increase bank reserves: in countries, such as the United States, where banks must keep a legally required minimum ratio of reserves to deposits, the bank may simply Iower the required ratio. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Central Bank | Stansbury | Summers I 1 Central Bank/Inflation targeting//interest rates/secular stagnation/Summers/Stansbury: Conventional policy discussions are rooted in the (by now old) New Keynesian tradition of viewing macroeconomic problems as a reflection of frictions that slow convergence to a classical market-clearing equilibrium. The idea is that the combination of low inflation, a declining neutral real interest rate, and an effective lower bound on nominal interest rates may preclude the restoration of full employment. According to this view, anything that can be done to reduce real interest rates is constructive, and with sufficient interest-rate flexibility, secular stagnation can be overcome. With the immediate problem being excessive real rates, looking first to central banks and monetary policies for a solution is natural. The near-universal tendency among central bankers has been to interpret the coincidence of very low real interest rates and nonaccelerating inflation as evidence that the neutral real interest rate has declined and to use conventional monetary policy frameworks with an altered neutral real rate. The share of interest-sensitive durable-goods sectors in GDP has decreased. The importance of target saving effects has grown as interest rates have fallen, while the negative effect of reductions in interest rates on disposable income has increased as government debts have risen. Declining interest rates in the current environment undermine financial intermediaries’ capital position and hence their lending capacity. To take the most ominous case first, with interest-rate reductions having both positive and negative effects on demand, it may be that there is no real interest rate consistent with full resource utilization. Even if interest-rate cuts at all points proximately increase demand, there are substantial grounds for concern if this effect is weak. From a macro perspective, low interest rates promote leverage and asset bubbles by reducing borrowing costs and discount factors, and encouraging investors to reach for yield. Almost every account of the 2008 financial crisis assigns at least some role to the consequences of the very low interest rates that prevailed in the early 2000s. From a micro perspective, low rates undermine financial intermediaries’ health by reducing their profitability, impede the efficient allocation of capital by enabling even the weakest firms to meet debt-service obligations, and may also inhibit competition by favoring incumbent firms. These considerations suggest that reducing interest rates may not be merely insufficient, but actually counterproductive, as a response to secular stagnation. (…) the role of particular frictions and rigidities in underpinning economic fluctuations should be de-emphasized relative to a more fundamental lack of aggregate demand. If reducing rates will be insufficient or counterproductive, central bankers’ ingenuity in loosening monetary policy in an environment of secular stagnation is exactly what is not needed. What is needed are admissions of impotence, in order to spur efforts by governments to promote demand through fiscal policies and other means. ((s) For interest policy see also >Neo-Fisher Effect/Uribe.) Summers, Lawrence H. & Anna Stansbury: Whither Central Banking?, in: Project Syndicate (23/08/19), URL: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/central-bankers-in-jackson-hole-should-admit-impotence-by-lawrence-h-summers-and-anna-stansbury-2-2019-08 |
Summers I Lawrence H. Summers Anna Stansbury Whither Central Banking?, in: Project Syndicate (23/08/19), URL: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/central-bankers-in-jackson-hole-should-admit-impotence-by-lawrence-h-summers-and-anna-stansbury-2-2019-08 23.08. 2019 |
| Central Bank | Summers | Summers I Central Bank/Inflation targeting/interest rates/secular stagnation/Summers/Stansbury: Conventional policy discussions are rooted in the (by now old) New Keynesian tradition of viewing macroeconomic problems as a reflection of frictions that slow convergence to a classical market-clearing equilibrium. The idea is that the combination of low inflation, a declining neutral real interest rate, and an effective lower bound on nominal interest rates may preclude the restoration of full employment. According to this view, anything that can be done to reduce real interest rates is constructive, and with sufficient interest-rate flexibility, secular stagnation can be overcome. With the immediate problem being excessive real rates, looking first to central banks and monetary policies for a solution is natural. The near-universal tendency among central bankers has been to interpret the coincidence of very low real interest rates and nonaccelerating inflation as evidence that the neutral real interest rate has declined and to use conventional monetary policy frameworks with an altered neutral real rate. The share of interest-sensitive durable-goods sectors in GDP has decreased. The importance of target saving effects has grown as interest rates have fallen, while the negative effect of reductions in interest rates on disposable income has increased as government debts have risen. Declining interest rates in the current environment undermine financial intermediaries’ capital position and hence their lending capacity. To take the most ominous case first, with interest-rate reductions having both positive and negative effects on demand, it may be that there is no real interest rate consistent with full resource utilization. Even if interest-rate cuts at all points proximately increase demand, there are substantial grounds for concern if this effect is weak. From a macro perspective, low interest rates promote leverage and asset bubbles by reducing borrowing costs and discount factors, and encouraging investors to reach for yield. Almost every account of the 2008 financial crisis assigns at least some role to the consequences of the very low interest rates that prevailed in the early 2000s. From a micro perspective, low rates undermine financial intermediaries’ health by reducing their profitability, impede the efficient allocation of capital by enabling even the weakest firms to meet debt-service obligations, and may also inhibit competition by favoring incumbent firms. These considerations suggest that reducing interest rates may not be merely insufficient, but actually counterproductive, as a response to secular stagnation. (…) the role of particular frictions and rigidities in underpinning economic fluctuations should be de-emphasized relative to a more fundamental lack of aggregate demand. If reducing rates will be insufficient or counterproductive, central bankers’ ingenuity in loosening monetary policy in an environment of secular stagnation is exactly what is not needed. What is needed are admissions of impotence, in order to spur efforts by governments to promote demand through fiscal policies and other means. ((s) For interest policy see also >Neo-Fisher Effect/Uribe.) Summers, Lawrence H. & Anna Stansbury: Whither Central Banking?, in: Project Syndicate (23/08/19), URL: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/central-bankers-in-jackson-hole-should-admit-impotence-by-lawrence-h-summers-and-anna-stansbury-2-2019-08 Counter arguments against Summers and Stansbury: Taylor III Inflation targeting/interest rates/central banking/wages/economics/TaylorVsSummers/TaylorVsStansbury/Lance Taylor: Regarding inflation, both central banks and [Summers and Stansbury] ignore the facts that inflation is a cumulative process driven by conflicting claims to income and wealth and that for the past five decades profits have captured almost all the claims. Consider the real “product wage,” the nominal or money wage divided by a producer price index (PPI) to correct for cost inflation confronting business. Suppose that there is an initial inflation equilibrium (…). The [Summers and Stansbury] proposal to use fiscal policy to stimulate aggregate demand would shift the inflation locus upward (…) with more rapid inflation and a somewhat lower wage share in macro equilibrium (…) along the stable share schedule. In light of the vanishing NAIRU [Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment] over the past two decades, it is not clear how strong this upward shift could be. >Inflation targeting/Taylor. Taylor, Lance: Central Bankers, Inflation, and the Next Recession, in: Institute for New Economic Thinking (03/09/19), URL: http://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/central-bankers-inflation-and-the-next-recession |
Summers I Lawrence H. Summers Anna Stansbury Whither Central Banking?, in: Project Syndicate (23/08/19), URL: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/central-bankers-in-jackson-hole-should-admit-impotence-by-lawrence-h-summers-and-anna-stansbury-2-2019-08 23.08. 2019 |
| Certainty Effect | Kahneman | Norvig I 620 Certainty effect/decision theory/Tversky/Kahneman/Norvig/Russell: One explanation for (…) apparently irrational preferences (>Allais paradox/Norvig) is the certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)(1): people are strongly attracted to gains that are certain. There are several reasons why this may be so. 1) People may prefer to reduce their computational burden; by choosing certain outcomes, they don’t have to compute with probabilities. But the effect persists even when the computations involved are very easy ones. 2) People may distrust the legitimacy of the stated probabilities. 3) People may be accounting for their emotional state as well as their financial state. People know they would experience regret if they gave up a certain reward (B) for an 80% chance at a higher reward and then lost. >Ellsberg paradox/Norvig. Ambiguity aversion: It seems that people have ambiguity aversion: A gives you a 1/3 chance of winning, while B could be anywhere between 0 and 2/3. Similarly, D gives you a 2/3 chance, while C could be anywhere between 1/3 and 3/3. Most people elect the known probability rather than the unknown unknowns. >Preferences/Norvig, >Utility/AI research. 1. Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. econometrica, pp. 263–291. |
EconKahne I Daniel Kahneman Schnelles Denken, langsames Denken München 2012 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Certainty Effect | Tversky | Norvig I 620 Certainty effect/decision theory/Tversky/Kahneman/Norvig/Russell: One explanation for (…) apparently irrational preferences (>Allais paradox/Norvig) is the certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)(1): people are strongly attracted to gains that are certain. There are several reasons why this may be so. 1) People may prefer to reduce their computational burden; by choosing certain outcomes, they don’t have to compute with probabilities. But the effect persists even when the computations involved are very easy ones. 2) People may distrust the legitimacy of the stated probabilities. 3) People may be accounting for their emotional state as well as their financial state. People know they would experience regret if they gave up a certain reward (B) for an 80% chance at a higher reward and then lost. >Ellsberg paradox/Norvig. Ambiguity aversion: It seems that people have ambiguity aversion: A gives you a 1/3 chance of winning, while B could be anywhere between 0 and 2/3. Similarly, D gives you a 2/3 chance, while C could be anywhere between 1/3 and 3/3. Most people elect the known probability rather than the unknown unknowns. >Preferences/Norvig, >Utility/AI research. 1. Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. econometrica, pp. 263–291. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| CES Production Function | Fisher | Harcourt I 174 Cobb-Douglas production function/CES production function/F. M. Fisher/Harcourt: [In] F. M. Fisher [1970](1), (…) he reports the results of a simulation experiment. His main conclusion is that if the real world behaves in such a way as to throw up, say, a constant share of wages, or a linear relationship in the logarithms between productivity and wages, it is these findings which explain the 'apparent success' of the Cobb-Douglas and CES production functions respectively rather than the other way around. „. . . the view that the constancy of labour's share is due to the presence of an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function is mistaken. Causation runs the other way and the apparent success of aggregate Cobb-Douglas functions is due to the relative constancy of labour's share.“ (p. 4.) The present results suggest... that the explanation of that wageoutput per man relationship may not be in the existence of an aggregate CES but rather that the apparent existence of an aggregate CES may be explained by that relationship.“ (p. 32.) Econometrics/HarcourtVsFisher, F. M.: Fisher appears to have been too literal in his understanding of the nature of the econometric hypotheses involving the Cobb-Douglas and the CES functions. Their proponents have never believed that they actually existed, only that it may be useful to interpret trends in real world observations 'as if they were observations thrown up by a jelly world of either the Cobb-Douglas or CES variety. Harcourt I 175 Distribution/factor prices/Harcourt: If, then, a small (but, I like to think, significant) section of the trade is convinced that the distribution of income and factor prices cannot be explained either within the system of production alone or, relevantly, as the outcome of a general equilibrium system even when (because) we use marginal productivity notions and modern programming methods, factors and forces elsewhere in the economic system - and other than these - must be introduced. >Measurements/Sraffa. 1. Fisher, F. M. [1970] 'Aggregate Production Functions and the Explanation of Wages: A Simulation Experiment', Working Paper 61, Department of Economics, M.I.T. |
F.M. Fisher I Franklin M. Fisher Disequilibrium Foundations of Equilibrium Economics (Econometric Society Monographs) Cambridge 1989 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| CES Production Function | Harcourt | Harcourt I 51 CES Production Function/Harcourt: The CES* production function is another famous example where malleability, perfect competition, disembodied technical progress, static expectations and constant returns to scale were, initially at any rate, crucial assumptions. This particular function made its debut to a wide audience in an article published in 1961 by Arrow, Chenery, Minhas and Solow(1) (ACMS) (see also, Minhas [1963](2)).** The particular empirical findings which led to its debut were the close associations, as confirmed by the appropriate regressions, between the logarithms of labour productivity and money-wage rates in the same industries in different countries. >Production function, >Cobb-Douglas production function. Labour productivity: The observations on labour productivity were treated as if they came from a constant-returns-to-scale production function which spanned national frontiers. The function was characterized by disembodied technical progress and ex post variability of factors; so that, at any moment of time, the machines in the capital stock of each country could be treated as if they had been moulded into the form of the most up-to-date machines, namely, those which would be chosen from the various possibilities currently existing and known in each country by cost-minimizing, profit-maximizing businessmen who had static expectations. >Expectations, >Entrepreneurship. To suppose that the observations, some facts in search of a theory, should be so treated was, to ACMS, just the natural thing to do - or, at least, 'a natural first step', see ACMS [1961](1), p. 228. Harcourt I 52 With these assumptions, the regression coefficients of the relationships (…) were shown to be estimates of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, were usually less than one and greater than zero, and varied considerably as between industries. These findings were in turn brought to bear on such diverse topics as the factor-price equalization theorem, see, for example, Minhas [1963](2), and the measurement of technical progress, see, for example, Sampson [1969](5). Indeed a considerable new literature was born as a result, so that the coming out of the CES in 1961 was quite a fecund debut. Method: The essential methodology of ACMS is as follows: if the form of the production function is known, and provided that there are constant returns to scale and perfect competition in the factor and product markets, it is always possible to derive the implied form of the relationship between productivity and the wage rate. ACMS then turn this procedure around and suppose that the form of the relationship between productivity and the wage rate is known (as it was to them). * Constant elasticity of substitution, now referred to as the homohypallagic production function, see Minhas [1963](2) ** The first person to use the function was Champernowne in the mid-forties. Solow [1956b](3) used it in 1956 and Pitchford [1960](4) exhaustively examined its role in growth models in 1960. 1. Arrow, Kenneth J., Chenery, Hollis B., Minhas, Bagicha S., and Solow, Robert M.[1961] 'Capital-Labor Substitution and Economic Efficiency', Review of Economics and Statistics, XLIII, pp. 225-50. 2. Minhas, B. S. [1963] An International Comparison of Factor Costs and Factor Use (Amsterdam: North-Holland). 3. Solow, R. M. [1956b] 'A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXX, pp. 65-94. 4. Pitchford, J. D. [1960] 'Growth and the Elasticity of Factor Substitution', Economic Record, xxxvi, pp. 491-504. 5. Sampson, Gary [1969] 'Productivity Change in Australian Manufacturing Industry', Monash University: unpublished Ph.D. thesis. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Ceteris paribus | Cartwright | I 45 Ceteris Paribus Laws/CPL/Cartwright: not "The other things are assumed to be the same", but "the other things are assumed to be correct". - Different version: as "substitute": laws that are not quite right, but fulfill the same function. - Then "ceteris paribus" is a modifier. - Then they do not apply to quite as many cases. ceteris paribus laws: and these are wrong! Unknown laws cannot be a reason to say E.g. the angle is so and so because it is different in the purely isotropic medium. I 50 It would be a et on unknown laws. I 64 ceteris paribus laws only describe processes as long as a single cause exists. >Effect, >Cause, >Laws, >Causal laws, >Causality, >Description, >Explanation, >Natural laws. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Chance | Field | II 309 Objective chance/uncertainty/explanation/Field: Chances can be explained only by degrees of belief, not by objective facts of indeterminacy. >Belief degrees. Adequacy (of belief degrees) can be explained by practical-methodological description of the lottery (procedure), not by classical probability. >Adequacy. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Change | Aristotle | Bubner I, 169 Change/Aristotle: comprehending it represents the central problem to which theoretical and practical philosophy are devoted. Good/Aristotle: at first, it seems as if it could only be considered as a goal in the sense of a causa finalis. >Action/Aristotle, >Practise/Aristotle, >Good/Aristotle. But, moreover, it still claims the position in the concept of the supreme being, to which metaphysics looks. >Metaphysics/Aristotle. The argumentation which leads to the rational doctrine of God also proceeds from a general theory of motion. What is required is the connection between all real things, insofar as it is to be seen as moving. From the naturalistic point of view, God thus becomes a theoretical requirement. I 170 Chorismos ("Separation")/Plato: leaves a gap between the eternal ideas and the changing world of the senses. Kinesis/Aristotle: bridges this gap. (comes from Heraclitus). Problem: How is the determination of the changeable possible at all? Solution: Aristotle: by the four causes Shape, material, whence of the movement, whereto of the movement. This makes the fiction of a "second world" (of ideas) superfluous. Movement/Aristotle: problem: overall context. The movement cannot have emerged from itself, it must be eternal. (To escape regress). But this must now be followed by a principle that is more than a mere ability: a necessity. From something that could also be different we do not gain any theoretical certainty. Good/Aristotle: it is hidden in the special nature of a world principle, which cannot fail to provide a foundation for the overall context of the moving reality. I 172 This all-bearing principle can exist only in a continuous realization without alternative, or in actuality (energeia). Energeia/Aristotle: Reality, always completed, has no shortcomings. It occupies the highest rank. Dynamis/Aristotle: Possibility Ousia/Aristotle: the underlying something of the interrelationship between reality and possibility. For-the-Sake-of-Which/Aristotle: from the outset behind the term "good". It can only be applied about something or for something. For something: endeavored or entelechy created in nature. I 173 About something: not the goal of an endeavor, but the vanishing point of a system of reality considered as meaningful: "love". |
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| Change | Lewis | V 261 Change/changing/event/Lewis: Not all events involve change. We cannot afford to count the constancies (Nonchanges) as non-events. They are needed in the causal explanation. E.g. atomic decay: abrupt change, consists of constancies. The causal story that explains the decay is without changes. Constancy: is needed to explain the memory, perception, existence in time ((s) co-existence). Lewis: the terminology is not critical again. >Causal explanation/Lewis, >Causality/Lewis, >Event/Lewis, >Cause/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Change | Wessel | I 365f Change/WesselVsHegel: not from "being" and "nothing", we need empirical givenness for introduction. >Logic/Hegel. Empirical imagination is already provided in the logic. >Logic, >Change. Time: introduced through relatively regular processes, e.g. Earth's rotation. Change can also be introduced without time. >Introduction. "Paradox of change": the body has the property and at the same time it does not. a) two-digit predicate: "something turns into something else" b) single-digit: "something changed", "something becomes true" - E.g. "the water is moving" - >event: from change predicate sA => sB: "s(sA => sB)" sA: "the fact that A". |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Chaos Theorem | Social Choice Theory | Gaus I 243 Chaos Theorem/Social choice theory/D’Agostino: ((s) This is a special case of problems arising from the situation described by >Arrows Theorem): Arrow’s theorem/Example: e.g., Three Individuals (A, B, C) Gaus I 243 and three possible social arrangements (S1 , S2, S3), and (...) individuals' assessments of these arrangements. Given [a specific problematic] 'profile' of preferences (or deliberative judgements) [chosen for the sake of the argument], no merely 'mechanical' procedure of combination will produce a non-arbitrary (and hence legitimately collectively binding) ranking of the alternative social arrangements: Table I of preferences S1: A 1st – B 3rd – C 2nd S2: A 2nd – B 1st – C 3rd S 3: A 3rd – B 2nd - C 1st Procedures: S1/S2 then S3: Winner: S3 S1/S3 then S2: Winner: S2 S2/S3 then S 1: Winner S 1 Problem/D’Agostino: (...) it is clear that, on this profile of preferences, a collectively binding choice can be determined mechanically only on an ethico-politically arbitrary basis - e.g. by fixing the order in which alternatives are compared. Chaos theorem: (...) unless there are strong constraints on 'profiles', it is possible to establish a very general result, known in the literature of social choice as the chaos theorem, according to which, as Melvin Hinich and Michael Munger put it, 'it is possible to construct an agenda, or sequence of comparisons of pairs of alternatives, that leads to any alternative .. Choosing an agenda implies a choice of an outcome' (1997(1): 160—1). The situation is 'chaotic', in particular, because the procedure fails to provide any legitimate basis for distinguishing the alternatives among which individuals are imagined as choosing. Dynamic cycling: This situation is also, of course, chaotic dynamically, in the sense that any coalition to fix a particular procedure, and thus a particular outcome, can be destabilized. (This is called 'cycling' in the social choice literature.) Example: Consider Table I of preferences. Both B and C prefer S3 to Sl , and hence could form a coalition against A to fix the agenda (Sl/S2 then S3) that will deliver S3 as the overall result. But both A and B prefer S2 to S3 and, indeed, since B ranks S2 first, A could plausibly appeal to B to abandon her coalition with C and join him in a coalition against C; and so on ad nauseam (see Mueller, 1989(2): ch. 11.5). >Arrow’sTheorem/D’Agostino. 1. Hinich, Melvin and Michael Munger (1997) Analytical Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Mueller, Dennis (1989) Public Choice 11. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Chess | Norvig | Norvig I 192 Chess/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: Chess was one of the first tasks undertaken in AI, with early efforts by many of the pioneers of computing, including Konrad Zuse in 1945, Norbert Wiener in his book Cybernetics (1948), and Alan Turing in 1950 (see Turing et al., 1953)(2). But it was Claude Shannon’s article Programming a Computer for Playing Chess (1950)(3) that had the most complete set of ideas, describing a representation for board positions, an evaluation function, quiescence search, and some ideas for selective (nonexhaustive) game-tree search. Slater (1950)(4) and the commentators on his article also explored the possibilities for computer chess play. D. G. Prinz (1952)(5) completed a program that solved chess endgame problems but did not play a full game. Stan Ulam and a group at the Los Alamos National Lab produced a program that played chess on a 6×6 board with no bishops (Kister et al., 1957)(6). It could search 4 plies deep in about 12 minutes. Alex Bernstein wrote the first documented program to play a full game of standard chess (Bernstein and Roberts, 1958)(7). The first computer chess match featured the Kotok–McCarthy program from MIT (Kotok, 1962)(8) and the ITEP program written in the mid-1960s at Moscow’s Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics (Adelson-Velsky et al., 1970)(9). The first chess program to compete successfully with humans was MIT’s MACHACK-6 (Greenblatt et al., 1967)(10). The $10,000 prize for the first program to achieve a USCF (United States Chess Federation) rating of 2500 (near the grandmaster level) was awarded to DEEP THOUGHT (Hsu et al., 1990) (11) in 1989. The grand prize, $100,000, went to DEEP BLUE (Campbell et al., 2002(12); Hsu, 2004(13)) for its landmark victory over world champion Garry Kasparov in a 1997 exhibition match. Norvig I 193 HYDRA (Donninger and Lorenz, 2004(14)) is rated somewhere between 2850 and 3000, based mostly on its trouncing of Michael Adams. The RYBKA program is rated between 2900 and 3100, but this is based on a small number of games and is not considered reliable. Ross (2004)(15) shows how human players have learned to exploit some of the weaknesses of the computer programs. 1. Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics. Wiley. 2. Turing, A., Strachey, C., Bates,M. A., and Bowden, B. V. (1953). Digital computers applied to games. In Bowden, B. V. (Ed.), Faster than Thought, pp. 286 - 310. Pitman. 3. Shannon, C. E. (1950). Programming a computer for playing chess. Philosophical Magazine, 41(4), 256–275 4. Slater, E. (1950). Statistics for the chess computer and the factor of mobility. In Symposium on Information Theory, pp. 150-152. Ministry of Supply 5. Prinz, D. G. (1952). Robot chess. Research, 5, 261- 266. 6. Kister, J., Stein, P., Ulam, S., Walden, W., and Wells, M. (1957). Experiments in chess. JACM, 4, 174–177. 7. Bernstein, A. and Roberts, M. (1958). Computer vs. chess player. Scientific American, 198(6), 96- 105. 8. Kotok, A. (1962). A chess playing program for the IBM 7090. AI project memo 41, MIT Computation Center. 9. Adelson-Velsky, G. M., Arlazarov, V. L., Bitman, A. R., Zhivotovsky, A. A., and Uskov, A. V. (1970). Programming a computer to play chess. Russian Mathematical Surveys, 25, 221-262. 10. Greenblatt, R. D., Eastlake, D. E., and Crocker, S. D. (1967). The Greenblatt chess program. In Proc. Fall Joint Computer Conference, pp. 801-810. 11. Hsu, F.-H., Anantharaman, T. S., Campbell, M. S., and Nowatzyk, A. (1990). A grandmaster chess machine. Scientific American, 263(4), 44–50. 12. Campbell, M. S., Hoane, A. J., and Hsu, F.-H. (2002). Deep Blue. AIJ, 134(1–2), 57–83. 13. Hsu, F.-H. (2004). Behind Deep Blue: Building the Computer that Defeated the World Chess Champion. Princeton University Press. 14. Donninger, C. and Lorenz, U. (2004). The chess monster hydra. In Proc. 14th International Conference on Field-Programmable Logic and applications, pp. 927-932. 15. Ross, P. E. (2004). Psyching out computer chess players. IEEE Spectrum, 41(2), 14-15. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Chess | Russell | Norvig I 192 Chess/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: Chess was one of the first tasks undertaken in AI, with early efforts by many of the pioneers of computing, including Konrad Zuse in 1945, Norbert Wiener in his book Cybernetics (1948), and Alan Turing in 1950 (see Turing et al., 1953)(2). But it was Claude Shannon’s article Programming a Computer for Playing Chess (1950)(3) that had the most complete set of ideas, describing a representation for board positions, an evaluation function, quiescence search, and some ideas for selective (nonexhaustive) game-tree search. Slater (1950)(4) and the commentators on his article also explored the possibilities for computer chess play. D. G. Prinz (1952)(5) completed a program that solved chess endgame problems but did not play a full game. Stan Ulam and a group at the Los Alamos National Lab produced a program that played chess on a 6×6 board with no bishops (Kister et al., 1957)(6). It could search 4 plies deep in about 12 minutes. Alex Bernstein wrote the first documented program to play a full game of standard chess (Bernstein and Roberts, 1958)(7). The first computer chess match featured the Kotok–McCarthy program from MIT (Kotok, 1962)(8) and the ITEP program written in the mid-1960s at Moscow’s Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics (Adelson-Velsky et al., 1970)(9). The first chess program to compete successfully with humans was MIT’s MACHACK-6 (Greenblatt et al., 1967)(10). The $10,000 prize for the first program to achieve a USCF (United States Chess Federation) rating of 2500 (near the grandmaster level) was awarded to DEEP THOUGHT (Hsu et al., 1990) (11) in 1989. The grand prize, $100,000, went to DEEP BLUE (Campbell et al., 2002(12); Hsu, 2004(13)) for its landmark victory over world champion Garry Kasparov in a 1997 exhibition match. Norvig I 193 HYDRA (Donninger and Lorenz, 2004(14)) is rated somewhere between 2850 and 3000, based mostly on its trouncing of Michael Adams. The RYBKA program is rated between 2900 and 3100, but this is based on a small number of games and is not considered reliable. Ross (2004)(15) shows how human players have learned to exploit some of the weaknesses of the computer programs. >Artificial Intelligence, >Machine Learning. 1. Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics. Wiley. 2. Turing, A., Strachey, C., Bates,M. A., and Bowden, B. V. (1953). Digital computers applied to games. In Bowden, B. V. (Ed.), Faster than Thought, pp. 286 - 310. Pitman. 3. Shannon, C. E. (1950). Programming a computer for playing chess. Philosophical Magazine, 41(4), 256–275 4. Slater, E. (1950). Statistics for the chess computer and the factor of mobility. In Symposium on Information Theory, pp. 150-152. Ministry of Supply 5. Prinz, D. G. (1952). Robot chess. Research, 5, 261- 266. 6. Kister, J., Stein, P., Ulam, S., Walden, W., and Wells, M. (1957). Experiments in chess. JACM, 4, 174–177. 7. Bernstein, A. and Roberts, M. (1958). Computer vs. chess player. Scientific American, 198(6), 96- 105. 8. Kotok, A. (1962). A chess playing program for the IBM 7090. AI project memo 41, MIT Computation Center. 9. Adelson-Velsky, G. M., Arlazarov, V. L., Bitman, A. R., Zhivotovsky, A. A., and Uskov, A. V. (1970). Programming a computer to play chess. Russian Mathematical Surveys, 25, 221-262. 10. Greenblatt, R. D., Eastlake, D. E., and Crocker, S. D. (1967). The Greenblatt chess program. In Proc. Fall Joint Computer Conference, pp. 801-810. 11. Hsu, F.-H., Anantharaman, T. S., Campbell, M. S., and Nowatzyk, A. (1990). A grandmaster chess machine. Scientific American, 263(4), 44–50. 12. Campbell, M. S., Hoane, A. J., and Hsu, F.-H. (2002). Deep Blue. AIJ, 134(1–2), 57–83. 13. Hsu, F.-H. (2004). Behind Deep Blue: Building the Computer that Defeated the World Chess Champion. Princeton University Press. 14. Donninger, C. and Lorenz, U. (2004). The chess monster hydra. In Proc. 14th International Conference on Field-Programmable Logic and applications, pp. 927-932. 15. Ross, P. E. (2004). Psyching out computer chess players. IEEE Spectrum, 41(2), 14-15. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Chinese History | Tabellini | Mokyr I 4 Chinese History/Chinese Economics/Mokyr/Tabellini: Although the growth of clans in China was a gradual, bottom-up process and hard to time exactly, it is generally agreed that clans spread as a major social organization among the commoners during and after the Song dynasty, at the turn of the first millennium AD, and they expanded further in the following centuries. Initially, clan activities centered on strengthening group consciousness through ancestral worship, but then they evolved to provide a variety of club goods and local public goods to their members, such as religious rites worshiping common ancestors, common schools and education, risk sharing through support for widows and orphans and, when necessary, protection against bandits or pirates. During the centuries after the Song, the clans’s activities evolved. They promoted the social status and welfare of their members, they organized markets, cooperated with state officials in acts of public administration, resolved commercial disputes, and acted as political lobbies. In the words of Ebrey (1986, pp. 55-56)(1): “Lineages organized around large estates appear to be the functional successors of communal families, like communal families they exerted considerable control over individuals, regulated their access to material benefits, and acted as a social and political unit in the larger society.” Even when they did not hold common properties, lineages were important and flexible organizations, that produced for a community what individuals could not provide for themselves. Clans, however, did more than provide local public goods and cooperation; they became a pillar of local public administration, playing a central role in poor relief and tax collection and supplementing state action at the local level (without however having self-governing autonomy over a territorial jurisdiction). Mokyr I 5 More recent scholarship has affirmed the centrality of the clan as the key unit of social organization in China.* >Chinese Economy, >Clans. [Contrary to the Chinese developement]: Europe: European corporate groups also diffused after the turn of the first millennium, to address the same basic social needs of Chinese lineage organizations: they provided mutual assistance and risk sharing, coordinated protection against external threats, performed religious functions, held collective rituals to strengthen collective identity, monitored the “good behavior” of their members, provided for burials, enforced contracts, intervened to resolve conflicts, helped to supply education and training, and facilitated financing of productive and trading enterprises. Many European corporate organizations emerged in the Middle Ages. One of the earliest were monasteries and convents, already common in Merovingian times. The Church itself can be seen as a “mega corporation” in many ways. Universities emerged later, but were to become an unusually striking and viable example of corporations. >Corporations, >Christian Church, >Europe. Mokyr I 10 Political unification: (…) China achieved unification early on while Europe remained politically fragmented for much longer. Europe: As recognized by many scholars, a key feature of European economic and political development is its polycentrism and political fragmentation. According to Mokyr (2016)(3), the argument goes back to David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and has been at the center of modern thought by economists and political scientists (Jones, 1981(4); Bernholz, Streit and Vaubel, 1998(5); Karayalçin, 2008(6)). Mokyr I 11 China: By contrast, China achieved unification early on, and this allowed a large concentration of state powers before countervailing forces could emerge. Mokyr I 12 Fragmentation/geographic factors : Unity vs fragmentation are endogenous outcomes, however. What factors account for these opposite deelopments in China and Europe? Some scholars point to geography, and in particular to the “fractured land” hypothesis popularized by Diamond (1997)(7) and quantitatively investigated by Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2023)(8). Europe terrain is rugged and broken by mountains and other natural barriers. China too has high mountain ranges, but its vast and productive plain between two navigable rivers arguably facilitated unification under a large empire. Thanks to its navigable rivers, China is also more interconnected than Europe, and this is reflected in China’s lower genetic variation and smaller linguistic heterogeneity (Scheidel 2019)(9). Ko et al. (2018)(10) and Scheidel (2019)(9) also point out that, throughout much of its history, China’s external threats were mostly unidirectional: they came from the nomads in the North. This feature, too, made it possible to avoid fragmentation because troops could be held close to the Northern frontier. Europe instead was exposed to external conflicts from several directions, and this facilitated the formation of strong military blocks in different geographic areas. >Geographic factors. Mokyr I 42 Cities: Throughout most of their history, Chinese cities remained governed by the centrally controlled administrations of the counties where they were situated. As noted by Weber (1958)(11), to avoid the risk of political fragmentation the imperial administration refrained from giving Chinese cities the status of exclusive territorial units (urban wards were the major administrative unit below the county), and cities did not have their own military. By the time of the Song dynasty, most local public goods in urban areas, such as fire stations, orphanages, hospices, hospitals and other public services were controlled and financed by the central administration, and the city administration was in the hands of state officials who were responsible for administering the region (Eberhard, 1956)(12). As state capacity declined in Ming and Qing years, nongovernmental associations informally took over many of these public services, and by the late nineteenth century many or most urban services were provided informally by guilds and native-place associations and financed from dues or from the property of these associations (Skinner 1977(13), pp. 548-51). * For instance, Shiue and Keller (2023)(2), using the violence of the Ming to Ching as a plausibly exogenous treatment effect, illustrate that clan effects in the acquisition of human capital were central to the response to the shock. They use multi-generational lineage data from 500 couples of Tongcheng, a county of China’s province of Anhui,Their, and show that kinship-based group effects are larger than village-based group effects. >Human Capital. 1. Ebrey, Patricia Buckley. 1986. "The Early Stages in the Development of Descent Group Organization" in Ebrey, Patricia Buckley and James L. Watson, eds., Kinship Organization in Late Imperial China 1000-1940. Taipei, Taiwan: SMC Publishing Inc., pp. 16-61. 2. Shiue, Carol and Wolfgang Keller. 2023. “Human Capital Strategies for Big Shocks: The Case of the Fall of the Ming.” Unpublished working paper. 3. Mokyr, Joel. 2016. A Culture of Growth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 4. Jones, Eric L. 1981. The European Miracle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5. Bernholz, Peter, Manfred Streit, and Roland Vaubel, eds. 1998. Political Competition, Innovation, and Growth. Berlin: Springer. 6. Karayalçin, Cem. 2008. “Divided we Stand, United we Fall: the Hume-North- Jones Mechanism for the Rise of Europe.” International Economic Review, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 973–99. 7. Diamond, Jared. 1997. Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New York: Norton. 8. Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús, Mark Koyama, Youhong Lin and Tuan-Hwee Sng. 2020. “Fractured Land and Political Fragmentation.” Working Paper. 9. Scheidel, Walter. 2019. Escape from Rome: The Failure of Empire and the Road to Prosperity. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 10. Ko, Chiu Yu, Koyama, Mark and Sng, Tuan-Hwee. 2018. “Unified China and Divided Europe," International Economic Review, February, Vol.59, No. 1, pp. 285-327. 11. Weber, Max .1958. The City. Glencoe, IL: Free Press 12. Eberhard, Wolfram. 1956. “Data on the Structure of the Chinese City in the Pre-Industrial Period.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 4, pp. 253-68 13. Skinner, George W., and Hugh Baker D. R. 1977. The City in Late Imperial China. Stanford: Stanford University Press. |
EconTabell I Guido Tabellini Torsten Persson The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Mokyr I Joel Mokyr Guido Tabellini Social Organizations and Political Institutions: Why China and Europe Diverged CESifo Working Paper No. 10405 Munich May 2023 |
| Chinese Room | Lanz | I 296 Chinese RoomVsComputer Model/VsSimulation as an explanation of skills. Chinese RoomVs computer model / VsSimulation as an explanation of capabilities: The thought experiment of the chinese room was developed by J. R. Searle to show that the mind or its activity cannot be simulated by a computer. Another consequence is that simulation cannot be used to explain (human) abilities. See also further entries for Chinese Room. |
Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Chomsky | Deacon | I 35 Chomsky/Deacon: his theory is reminiscent of evolutionary theory by assuming "hopeful monsters": random mutations that produce new abilities. >Hopeful monsters. For example, children's ability to acquire the grammar of the grammar they learned first. Explanation/Chomsky: this can only be explained if we adopt a "universal grammar" that is built into all human brains as a blueprint. >Universal grammar. I 36 Such a "language organ" could explain why no other species has developed a language. It would also explain why there are no intermediate stages between human and non-human language. Other advantages: such a thesis explains why human and non-human communication are not similar, it explains the systematically independent nature of grammatical rules (they are all derived from the neurological interconnection of the brain), it explains the allegedly universal characteristics of language structures, it explains the reciprocal translatability of languages, it explains the ease of language acquisition with lean input and lack of error correction. I 37 DeaconVsChomsky/DeaconVsUniversal grammar: many linguists ask the wrong question: they expect something (the child's ability to learn) and ask how it comes about. The assumption of a universal grammar serves as a placeholder for everything that cannot be learned. >Learning. I 38 To say that only the human brain is able to produce a grammar, takes the problem from the linguists' hands and passes it on to the neurobiologists. >Grammar, >Neurobiology, >Neurobiology as author. Chomsky/Deacon: however, he is not concerned with the emergence of language, but with explaining the origin of language competence. >Competence, >Language acquisition, >Language emergence. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Chomsky | Psychological Theories | Slater I 191 Chomsky/psychological theories: Chomsky (1957(1) [argued] (…) for highly constrained innate biases that lead all natural languages to share a small number of universal properties. By implication, language acquisition does not require a protracted period of development during which the child is exposed to the idiosyncrasies of their native language. Rather, brief snippets of “surface” input serve to trigger one of a very few possible “hidden” structures, that then evolve into a system capable of generating an infinite variety of grammatically correct sentences in the particular native language to which the child is exposed. Psychology: while Chomsky never directly studied child language, psychological studies observed a multi-year period gradually increasing vocabulary and grammatical complexity. E.g., Eimas et al. (1971)(2). >Language development/Eimas. VsChomsky/ChomskyVsVs: When these language acquisition researchers noted the absence of evidence for innate linguistic skills, the explanation offered by those who espoused Chomsky’s nativist perspective was that children are beset by an impressive array of “production deficiencies” that mask their true underlying competence. VsProduction deficiencies see >Phonetics/psychological theories. Slater I 196 Chomsky: the argument for a special speech mode rested on two claims: (a) speech is perceived in a manner that is not shared with non-speech sounds, and (b) speech perception is fundamentally linguistic in nature, thereby arguing for an innate mechanism that is specific to humans. VsChomsky: Both of these claims were challenged by strong empirical data in the decade after Eimas et al. (1971(2)). First, Kuhl and Miller (1975(3), 1978(4)) showed that a non-human mammal (chinchilla) has CP (categorical perception) for VOT (voice onset time) including the very same synthetic speech sounds used in Eimas et al. >Phonetics/psychological theories, >Categorical perception. Moreover, Kuhl and Miller were able to develop a Slater I 197 method to obtain labeling data from the animals, and the manner in which chinchillas responded to VOT is virtually identical to human adults. Follow-up work by Kuhl and Padden (1982(5) tested rhesus monkeys and confirmed these findings with a species more similar to humans. Categorical perception: Thus, the presence of CP is not a sufficient argument for the operation of a linguistically relevant speech mode, since no one claims that chinchillas or monkeys achieve anything remotely like language, and certainly no ability to produce speech. Subsequent research by Kluender, Diehl, and Killeen (1987)(6) has shown that the fundamental properties of CP are not even unique to mammals (…). Cf. >Animal Language. Problem: CP (categorical perception) is not nearly as definitive as the claims made by Liberman and his colleagues (1957(7), 1961(8), 1967(9). See Pisoni and Lazarus (1974)(10), Miller (1997)(11). 1. Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. Mouton: The Hague. 2. Eimas, P. D., Siqueland, E. R.,Jusczyk, P., &Vigorito,J. (1971). Speech perception in infants. Science, 171, 303-306. 3. Kuhl, P. K., & Miller, J. D. (19 75). Speech perception by the chinchilla: Voiced-voiceless distinction in alveolar plosive consonants. Science, .190, 69—72. 4. Kuhl, P. K., & Miller, J. D. (19 78). Speech perception by the chinchilla: Identification functions for synthetic VOT stimuli. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 63, 905—917. 5. Kuhl, P. K., & Padden, D. M. (1982). Enhanced discriminability at the phonetic boundaries for the voicing feature in macaques. Perception and Psychophysics, 32, 542—550. 6. Kluender, K. R., Diehl, R. L., & Killeen, P. R. (1987). Japanese quail can learn phonetic categories. Science, 237, 1195—1197. 7. Liberman, A. M., Harris, K. S., Hoffman, H. S., & Griffith, B.C. (1957). The discrimination of speech sounds within and across phoneme boundaries. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54, 358—368. 8. Liberman, A. M., Harris, K. S., Kinney, J., & Lane, H. (1961). The discrimination of relative onset-time of the components of certain speech and non-speech patterns. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 61,379—388. 9. Liberman, A. M., Cooper, F. S., Shankweiler, D. P., & Studdert-Kennedy, M. (1967). Perception of the speech code. Psychological Review, 74, 431—461. 10. Pisoni, D. B., & Lazarus, J. H. (1974). Categorical and non-categorical modes of speech perception along the voicing continuum. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 55, 328—333. 11. Miller, J. L. (1997). Internal structure of phonetic categories. Language and Cognitive Processes, 12, 865—869. Richard N. Aslin, “Language Development. Revisiting Eimas et al.‘s /ba/ and /pa/ Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Christian Church | Barth | Brocker I 241 Church/Christian Church/State/Barth: Barth thesis: there is a "necessary politicization of the church"(1). Therefore, the "importance of the state for the Church" in ontological order consists in the fact that the Church becomes aware of its own original statehood ('politeuma'). The ecclesial proclamation refers to the eschatological erection of the "city of eternal right, in which there are no transgressors [...] but which does not need a temple either", because the "lamb will be their temple"(2). >Governance/Barth, >Democracy/Barth, >State, >Society. The structural definition of such "eternal right" can be read from its determination as "the right of Jesus Christ". "And this eternal right of Jesus Christ is the content of the message of justification which is the task of the Church now and here"(3). >Jesus Christ/Barth. Brocker I 243 "The state as a state knows nothing of spirit, nothing of love, nothing of forgiveness. The state carries the sword" (4). For this reason, the Church's participation in political legal discourses can always have the character of a "series of assurances, all of which have Christian existence as such as a prerequisite and an objective" (5). The Church could therefore also "expect" (6) but precisely "not demand" (7) stately security guarantees neccessary for the execution of its proclamation. 1. Karl Barth, Rechtfertigung und Recht, in: Theologische Studien 1, Zollikon 1938. Karl Barth, Rechtfertigung und Recht, in: ders., Rechtfertigung und Recht, Christengemeinde und Bürgergemeinde, Evangelium und Gesetz, Zürich 1998, S.32. 2. Ibid. p. 25 3. Ibid. p. 27 4. Ibid. p. 31 5. Ibid. p. 32 6. Ibid. p. 35 7. Ibid. p. . 29 Georg Pfleiderer, „Karl Barth, Rechtfertigung und Recht 1938)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Christianity | Hegel | Gadamer I 352 Christianity/Hegel/Gadamer: Hegel's spiritualistic interpretation of Christianity, by which he determines the nature of the spirit, is not met by the objection that there is no room in it for the experience of the other and the otherness of history. The life of the spirit consists rather in recognizing oneself in otherness. The spirit, directed towards self-knowledge, sees itself divided with what is foreign and must learn to reconcile with it, recognising it as its own and homeland. By dissolving the hardness of positivity, it is reconciled with itself. Insofar as such reconciliation is the historical work of the spirit, the historical behavior of the spirit is neither self-reflection nor the mere formal-dialectical suspension of the self-alienation that has happened to it, but an experience that experiences reality and is itself real. >Subject-object problem, >Subject/Hegel, >Intersubjectivity, >Self-knowledge, >Mind/Hegel. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Circular Reasoning | Field | II 365 Justification/"good" circle/circular/Field: (Black, 1958(1), Dummett 1978(2), Friedman 1979(3), van Cleve, 1984(4)) E.g.: A deductive explanation of deduction gives us a kind of reasonable explanation as to why we should prefer it to alternatives. Field: that is an explanation, but not a justification. An explanation can only be a justification if there is a risk that there is no explanation at all. II 386 Circular/Circularity/circular/Cognitive Theory/Induction/Field: the circle is an undeniable fundamental fact of epistemology: we need factual beliefs, which in turn can only be achieved by means of induction rules or perceptual rules. >Induction. 1. Black, Max. 1958. Self-supporting Inductive Arguments. Journal of PHilosophy 55, 718-25 2. Dummett, Michael. 1978. Truth and Other Enigmas. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press 3. Friedman, Michael. 1979. Truth and Confirmation. Journal of Philosophy 76, 361-82 4. van Cleve, James. 1984. Reliability, Justification, and the Problem of Induction. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):555-567 |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Circular Reasoning | Grice | III 91ff Circle: a circle is acceptable, as this is a special case of a general phenomenon that arises in connection with the explanation of a linguistic practice. If we are lucky, we can formulate so-called "linguistic rules" which describe the use as if we "would" accept these rules. But this is not just an interesting property of our linguistic practice, but already an explanation of this practice. In some sense we actually accept these rules implicitly. This only becomes puzzling if one has to separate the existence of these rules from practice. We will have to accept that for the time being. >Language behavior, >Communication, >Language rules, >Rules. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Circular Reasoning | McDowell | I 195 Circle/Peacock/McDowell: why does Peacocke believe that there must be bridges between the conceptual and what is external in the experience? He believes that he must avoid a circle with this. In order to explain the possession of a concept of observation, we must not, according to Peacocke, regard the content as conceptual. >Observation language/Peacocke, >Theoretical term/Peacocke, >Experience/Peacocke. For example, colors: not only the notion of "red" is presupposed, but, worse, the "concept of possession of the concept "red"" is presupposed. I 196 Circle/McDowellVsPeacocke: this only shifts the problem. Why should we actually assume that we are always in a position to explain what it means to have a concept? For example, the neurophysiological conditions would not refer to what someone thinks when he thinks that something is red. (That's exactly what Peacocke wants). Circle/McDowell: the explanation for observation concepts must always be outside the scope of the concepts. (Also Wittgenstein). But not "lateral perspective". --- I 197 Circle/Experience/Reason/Side perspective/McDowell: because of the impossibility to take the "side perspective" (to set oneself up outside of everything), the circle is not to be avoided, but it is not bad in the case of observation concepts. >Myth of the given. The problem of motivated thought tends to undermine the motivated thought. The necessary "side perspective" (external point) undermines the intelligibility of "for the reason that". |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Circular Reasoning | Minsky | Minsky I 48 Circularity/circular causality/Minsky: Two goals can support each other: A causes B John wanted to go home because he felt tired of work. B causes A John felt tired of work because he wanted to go home. There need be no first cause (…). Then a loop of circular causality ensues, in which each goal gains support from the other until their combined urge becomes irresistible. We're always enmeshed in causal loops. Suppose you had borrowed past your means and later had to borrow more in order to pay the interest on your loan. If you were asked what the difficulty was, it would not be enough to say simply, Because I have to pay the interest, or to say only, Because I have to pay the principal. Neither alone is the actual cause, and you'd have to explain that you're caught in a loop. >Explanation, >Actions. There are countless different types of networks that contain loops. But all networks that contain no loops are basically the same: each has the form of a simple chain. >Networks, >Neural Networks, >Artificial Neural Networks. Minsky I 49 Unanswerable questions: What caused the universe, and why? How can you tell which beliefs are true? What is the purpose of life? How can you tell what is good? These questions seem different on the surface, but all of them share one quality that makes them impossible to answer: all of them are circular! But when thinking keeps returning to its source, it doesn't always mean something's wrong. For circular thinking can lead to growth when it results, at each return, in deeper and more powerful ideas. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Circular Reasoning | Searle | I 57 Circle dissolved: the circle is dissolved if the entire term system corresponds to the system of causal relationships. >Conceptual scheme, >Causal relations. I 119 Circle/paradox/Searle: no problem: we can explore the eye by means of the eye, the brain with the brain, the consciousness with the consciousness, the language with the help of language. >Self-reference. III 62 Circles: the only problem is in the definition, not in use: as long as the object plays the role, we do not need the word in the definition. The linguistic explanation does not exhibit circles: language is intended to explain itself, it needs no language, because it is already language. >Definition, >Use, >Explanation. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Circumstances | Brandom | I 316 Circumstances/Brandom: what an interpreter assumes to be the circumstances, is an essential feature of the empirical content. >Empirical content. --- II 87 Circumstances: there must be sufficient conditions for the introduction of a term -> Gentzen: Introduction Rules. - Elemination rule: necessary consequences. II 90f Circumstances: parrot, thermometer (there are no consequences). - Emphasis on the circumstances: verification, assertibility - overemphasis of episodes: pragmatism. >Pragmatism, >Vericifation, >Assertibility. II 253 Circumstances/Brandom: always lie upstream. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Circumstances | Chalmers | I 21 Circumstances/Explanation/Chalmers: also the circumstances fall under two aspects: A) those of the first person (phenomenal, Qualia) B) those of the third person (psychological, behavior explaining). Cf. >Psychology/Chalmers, >First Person, >Phenomena, >Qualia, >Behavior, >Explanation, >Aspects. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Circumstances | Minsky | I 123 Circumstances/descriptions/use/Artificial Intelligence/Minsky: Until we learn to make old descriptions fit new circumstances, our old knowledge can be applied only to the circumstances in which it was learned. And that would scarcely ever work, since circumstances never repeat themselves perfectly. Cf. >Context/Philosophical theories, >Use Theory/Philosophical Theories. At first it may seem simpler to accumulate examples than to find more uniform ways to represent them. Problem: (…) later there's a price to pay for this: when we try to reason about things, accumulations can be nuisances — because then we'll be forced to find a different argument or explanation to justify each separate example. Most likely, different parts of our brains have evolved to use both kinds of strategies. Accumulations need not take longer to manipulate if all the examples can be handled at the same time, by separate agents that don't interfere with one another. >Software-Agents. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Circumstances | Tugendhat | ~ passim TugendhatVsCircumstances: Circumstances cannot be an explanation, otherwise lie, deception, error would be excluded. I 209ff Circumstances Tugendhat: If they determined the importance, all predicates would be quasi-predicates - not circumstances determine the meaning, but rules of use, namely through function. I 227 Function asks: "how", not "under which circumstances". Cf. >Use theory. I 221 TugendhatVsCircumstances as explanation of meaning (no rule possible) - VsIndicating Definition. If circumstances influenced the meaning, there would only be quasi-predicates. >Ostensive definition, >Definitions, >Predicates. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Citizen Science | Edwards | Edwards I 580 Citizen Science/Edwards: citizen science websites, and others like them, represent remarkable new possibilities for open access and citizen involvement in climate monitoring and modeling. On its face this seems salutary, and perhaps it will be. Yet such projects pull in multiple directions, not all of which lead to improvement in the quality of climate science. For example, while the National Science Foundation and numerous other agencies promote and even require data sharing, the paradigmatic case of such sharing is re-use of data by other scientists—not auditing by amateurs, no matter how knowledgeable and well educated they may be. The more open you make your science, the more effort you must expend to provide your data and to assist people in interpreting it. In the case of climate change, that effort can become onerous, even overwhelming; it can stop you from doing science at all. The “hockey stick” case (>Hockey stick controversy/Edwards) dragged Michael Mann and his co-authors into a years-long morass of hearings, letters, and public defenses of their data and methods, during which they could have been doing research. Yet if you close your science up, excluding outsiders by refusing them access to data and Edwards I 581 methods, not only will you raise suspicions and open yourself to accusations of elitism; you also may miss real scientific benefits from unusual critiques and creative ideas “outside the box” of your field’s traditions. Climate Audit’s detection of errors in the GISS temperature data and Clear Climate Code’s discovery of bugs in GISTEMP are clearly beneficial, as GISS has acknowledged. But SurfaceStations.org went beyond surveying stations. It analyzed the survey results, then posted graphics and published a report indicating a large warm bias in the US Historical Climatology Network. Perhaps the survey is accurate, but in the absence of peer review this conclusion remains highly uncertain, and the rationale for posting those results on a public website is highly questionable. Similarly, the value of citizens’ interventions in the “hockey stick” controversy is not clear. >Hockey stick controversy/Edwards. Climatology/citizen science/Edwards: Blogs and citizen science initially appear to increase the transparency of climate knowledge. On their face, they look like another mode of infrastructural inversion. They can certainly contribute to extending “ownership” of the knowledge-production process, which can broaden consensus. But on closer examination, their effects so far are decidedly mixed. Some have contributed new insight, helping to improve the scientific infrastructure by inverting it. At least as often, however, they promote confusion, suspicion, false information, and received ideas. Edwards I 582 To the extent that these new forms can be brought within some framework of credentialing and peer review, they may contribute substantially to climate knowledge. To the extent that they undermine those processes—and the danger that they will do so, at least in the near term, is great - they represent ideological and political strategies rather than knowledge projects. >IPCC/Edwards. |
Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013 |
| Citizens | Mbembe | Brocker I 920 Citizen/State/Society/Mbembe/Herb: "Today citizens are those who gain access to the networks of the parallel economy and the income that makes this economy possible" (Mbembe 2016(1), 154). In African states, according to Mbembe, the fiscal relationship between the individual and the state is initially a purely violent one; it is not mediated through a public discourse on the common good. >Government policy/Mbembe, >Tax policy/Mbembe, >Postcolonialism/Mbembe. 1. Achille Mbembe, De la postcolonie. Essai sur l’imagination politique dans l’Afrique contemporaine, Paris 2000. Dt.: Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie. Zur politischen Vorstellungskraft im Afrika der Gegenwart, Wien/Berlin 2016 Karlfriedrich Herb, „Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie (2000)“. In: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Citizenship | Gender Theory | Gaus I 281 Citizenship/Gender theory/Mottier: Much of feminist theory has focused on the absence of women from political theory. This theme was first addressed by authors such as Okin (1979)(1), Elshtain (1981)(2), Pateman (1983)(3) and Arlene Saxonhouse (1985(4); see also Mottier, Sgier and Ballmer-Cao, 2000)(5). Their pioneering work demonstrated that modern political theory neglects to address the subordinated position attributed to women in classical theories of democracy. The emergence of modern liberal democracy introduced a universalistic political discourse which claimed to be indifferent to gender or other identity differences. Citizenship/Tradition: Mainstream political theory consequently considers citizenship as a universal concept. Democratic rights of social and political participation apply to each citizen without regard for his or her race, religion or gender. FeminismVsTradition: Feminist authors have shown the central premises of universalistic conceptions of citizenship to be flawed due to gender bias. As the work of Vicky Randall (1998)(6), Ruth Lister (1997)(7) and Sylvia Walby (1994)(8) illustrates, women have been either excluded, or differentially included, in citizenship. WalbyVsTradition: Walby's historical analysis, for example, demonstrates the gendered nature of citizenship through a critical assessment of the work of T. H. Marshall (1950)(9), which is often taken to be the starting point for modern debates on the question (...). >Citizenship(Marshall. Citizenship/Marshall: According to Marshall, different types of citizenship developed successively, with civic rights in the eighteenth century, political rights in the nineteenth and social rights in the twentieth. WalbyVsMarshall: Analysing the history of citizenship in the United Kingdom and the US, Walby questions Marshall's thesis. For example, up to the 1920s, in contrast to men, British and American women had not yet acquired the majority of civic and political rights. In addition, the political rights were acquired by women before the civic rights, contradicting Marhall's sequential model. In other words, as Walby demonstrates, the three types of citizenship rights described by Marshall have followed different historical trajectories for different social groups. The conception of a unique model of citizenship therefore reveals a gender bias which is also present in the work of later authors who built on Marshall's work, such as Turner and Mann. As Walby points out, these authors similarly put the emphasis on the importance of social class in the history of citizenship and the formation of the nation-state, but neglect other factors such as gender or race. Feminism: Feminist perspectives on citizenship diverge, however, as to the ways in which they conceptualize citizenship, the theoretical foundations of these conceptualizations, and the conclusions to be drawn from the questioning of the universality of citizenship. Perhaps most importantly, they diverge in their relationship to liberalist thought. There has been an important move over the last two decades within feminist theories of citizenship 'to recuperate the liberal project' (Squires, 1994a(10): 62). Authors such as Pateman (1989)(11), Susan James (1992)(12), Phillips (1993(13) and Mouffe (1992)(14) explore the affinities between liberal and feminist conceptions of citizenship. Feminist theorizations of political citizenship and the democratization of the public sphere have consequently been dominated by debates between liberal feminist theorists and their critics. Amongst the latter, maternalist and Marxist perspectives have been particularly prominent in the 1980s, but more recently the focus of debate has shifted to poststructuralist and postmodem critiques of liberal understandings of citizenship. 1. Okin, Susan Moller (1979) Women in Western Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2. Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1981) Public Man, Private Women: Women in Social and Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 3. Pateman, Carole (1983) 'Feminist critiques of the public/private dichotomy'. In S. I. Benn and G. F. Gaus, eds, Public and Private in Social Life. London: Croom Helm, 281-303. 4. Saxonhouse, Arlene (1985) Women in the History of Political Thought. New York: Praeger. 5. Mottier, Véronique, Lea Sgier and Than-Huyen Ballmer-Cao (2000) 'Les rapports entre le genre et la politique'. In Thanh-Huyen Ballmer-Cao, Véronique Mottier and Lea Sgier, eds, Genre et politique: Débats et perspectives. Paris: Gallimard. 6. Randall, Vicky (1998) 'Gender and power: women engage the state'. In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds, Gende'; Politics and the State. London: Routledge, 185-205. 7. Lister, Ruth (1997) Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 8. Walby, Sylvia (1994) 'Is citizenship gendered?' Sociology, 28 (2): 379-95. 9. Marshall, T. H. (1950) Class, Citizenship and Social Development. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 10. Squires, Judith (1994a) 'Citizenship: androgynous or engendered participation'. Annuai,æ Suisse de Science Politique, 34: 51-62. 11. Pateman, Carole (1989) The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory. Cambridge: Polity. 12. James, Susan (1992) 'The good-enough citizen: female citizenship and independence'. In G. Bock and S. James, eds, Beyond Equality and Difference. London: Routledge. 48-65. 13. Phillips, Anne (1993) Democracy and Difference. Cambridge: Polity. 14. Mouffe, Chantal (1992) 'Feminism, citizenship and radical democratic politics'. In Judith Butler and Joan Scott, eds, Feminists Theorise the Political. New York: Routledge, 22-40. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Citizenship | Kymlicka | Gaus I 252 Citizenship/Kymlicka/Kukathas: (...) most liberal theorists accept that the world is made up of separate states. These states are normally assumed to have the right to decide who may enter their jurisdictions to visit, reside, or acquire citizenship. Kymlicka's view is that 'the orthodox liberal view about the right of states to determine who has citizenship rests on the same principles which justify group-differentiated citizenship within states, and that accepting the former leads logically to the latter' (1995a(1): 124). >Multiculturalism/Kymlicka, >Minority rights/Kymlicka. That is to say, citizenship or state membership is itself a group- differentiated notion, and liberalism is a view that recognizes the rights of individuals as members of states. It therefore makes perfect sense for liberals to be willing to recognize groups within states, for groups, like states, exist to protect people's cultural membership. What liberals defend is individual freedom. Yet this is 'not primarily the freedom to move beyond one's language and history, but rather the freedom to move around within one's societal culture, to distance oneself from particular cultural roles, to choose which features of the culture are most worth developing, and which are without value' (1995a(1): 90—1). >Culture/Kymlicka. 1. Kymlicka, Will (1995a) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Citizenship | Morris | Gauss I 205 Citizenship/state/legitimacy/justice/justification/Morris: If a state is minimally but not fully legitimate, then the obligations of citizens and other subjects are similar to those of foreigners. >Legitimacy/Morris. The latter, even when not in the territory of a legitimate state, are obligated not to undermine its institutions and possibly to support or assist it in certain circumstances. Non-citizens have no general obligation to obey the laws of legitimate states to which they do not belong or in whose territories they do not find themselves. Citizens of a merely minimally legitimate state have the same kinds of obligations: obligations not to undermine its institutions, and to support or assist it in certain circumstances, but no general obligation to obey every law (in the absence of a special relation, for instance, of taking an oath to obey). >Justification, >State, >Duties, >Nation. Morris, Christopher W. 2004. „The Modern State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
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| Citizenship | Mouffe | Gaus I 283 Citizenship/identity/Mouffe/Mottier: Mouffe (1992)(1) (...) founds her conception of citizenship on a critique as well as a critical reappropriation of liberalism. However, Mouffe's project of 'plural democracy' also draws strongly on postmodern and poststructuralist arguments (...). >Democracy/Mouffe, cf. >Identity/Postmodernism, >Gender/Poststructuralism. MouffeVsEssentialism: Indeed, Mouffe adopts an antiessentialist position towards citizenship, emphasizing the social and political construction of gender identities. Certain feminists fear that anti-essentialist positions limit the possibilities for political action and mobilization around women's identity. For Mouffe, on the contrary, the critique of essentialist identities is in fact a precondition for a truly feminist politics. Sex difference: The most urgent task in her view is to recognize the process of social construction through which sex difference has acquired such importance as a structuring factor of social relations of subordination. According to Mouffe, it is precisely within Gaus I 284 these processes that the real power relations operate in society. Therefore, a perspective that focuses only on the consequences of sex difference - whether 'equality of treatment' means that women and men should be treated differently or the same - is meaningless in her eyes. MouffeVsPateman/MouffeVsElshtain: Mouffe's anti-essentialism leads her to criticize feminists who primarily promote the revalorization of female values, such as (although coming from different perspectives) Pateman or Elshtain. For Mouffe, as for Judith Butler (1990)(2), such a position is problematic, as it assumes the existence of homogeneous identities such as 'men' and 'women'. Citizenship: Contrary to Pateman and Young, Mouffe thinks that the solution is not to make gender or other group characteristics relevant to the concept of citizenship, but on the contrary, to decrease their importance. The project of radical and democratic citizenship that she proposes implies a conception of citizenship which is neither gendered nor gender-neutral, based on a real equality and liberty of all citizens. She proposes, on the contrary, to focus on political issues and claims and not on presumably fixed and essential gender identities. Accordingly, the distinction between the private and the public spheres needs to be redefined from case to case, according to the type of political demands, and not in a fixed and permanent way. 1. Mouffe, Chantal (1992) 'Feminism, citizenship and radical democratic politics'. In Judith Butler and Joan Scott, eds, Feminists Theorise the Political. New York: Routledge, 22-40. 2. Butler, Judith (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Citizenship | Multiculturalism | Gaus I 255 Citizenship/Multiculturalism/Kukathas: the question is, how can it be possible to admit a diversity of people into a society, and allow (or even encourage) them to retain their own cultural traditions or customs, and still preserve a polity governed by, and respectful of the rights of, citizens united by a common allegiance? The dilemma is that the more robust the conception of citizenship, the less accommodating must the polity be of cultural diversity, to the extent that it cannot tolerate cultural traditions that do not value citizenship. The greater the diversity it wishes to admit, the weaker must be the demands of citizenship the polity imposes upon its members (Kukathas, 1993(1); 2003d(2): 72—5). Or citizenship may have to be rethought completely (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994(3); 2000a(4)). >Citizenship/Kymlicka, cf. >Religion/Multiculturalism, >Customs/Multiculturalism, >cf. >Multiculturalism/Charles Taylor. 1. Kukathas, Chandran (1993) 'The idea of a multicultural society'. In Chandran Kukathas, ed., Multicultural Citizens: The Philosophy and Politics of Identity. St Leonards, NSW: Centre for Independent Studies, 19—30. 2. Kukathas, Chandran (2003d) 'Ethical pluralism from a classical liberal perspective'. In Richard Madsen and Tracy B. Strong, eds, The Many and the One: Religious and Secular Perspectives on Ethical Pluralism in the Modern World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 55-77. 4. Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman (1994) 'The return of the citizen'. Ethics, 104 (2): 352—81. 5. Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman (2000a) 'Citizenship in culturally diverse societies: issues, contexts, con- cepts'. In Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, eds, Citizenship in Diverse Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1—41. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Citizenship | Pateman | Gaus I 282 Citizenship/Pateman/Mottier: Pateman's critical rethinking of citizenship operates through a critique of theories of liberal democracy on the one hand and of theories of participatory democracy on the other. 'Feminism, liberalism and democracy (that is, a political order in which citizenship is universal, the right of each adult Gaus I 283 individual member of the community) share a common origin,' Pateman argues. >Feminism, >Liberalism, >Democracy. Femimnism, a general critique of social relationships of sexual domination and subordination and a vision of a sexually egalitarian future, like liberalism and democracy, emerges only when individualism, or the idea that individuals are by nature free and equal to each other, has developed as a universal theory of social organiza-tion.‘ (1989(1): 373ff) Similarly to Walby, Pateman (1983(2); 1989(1)) emphasizes the necessity for feminist theories of citizenship to rethink the links between the private and public spheres. She develops this argument through a rereading of classical and contemporary theories of democracy, in which citizenship is assumed to be universal. >Universalism. PatemanVsTradition: The problem with classical political theories of democracy is, in her view, that only individuals of male gender are considered to have individual rights and liberties. Social contract: Social contract theories such as those of Locke and Rousseau, for example, are founded on the subordination of women to men. As Pateman notes, contemporary democratic theory sees no contradiction between universal citizenship on the one hand and the exclusion of women from equal political participation, their relegation to the private sphere, and their subordination to men on the other. >Democratic theory. Liberalism: For theories of liberal democracy, social inequalities are in any case irrelevant to democratic citizenship. Such a view predominates in analyses of citizenship, including in those that recognize that democracy does not concern only the state, but also the organization of society (for example, Barber 1984)(3). Society: However, most authors continue to consider relations between men and women in society as part of private life, and consequently do not integrate a gender dimension in their theories. 1. Pateman, Carole (1989) The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory. Cambridge: Polity. 2. Pateman, Carole (1983) 'Feminist critiques of the public/private dichotomy'. In S. I. Benn and G. F. Gaus, eds, Public and Private in Social Life. London: Croom Helm, 281-303. 3. Barber, Benjamin (1984) Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
PolPate I Carole Pateman Political Culture, Political Structure and Political Change 1971 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Citizenship | Walby | Gaus I 281 Citizenship/Walby/Mottier: Tradition: Mainstream political theory (...) considers citizenship as a universal concept. Democratic rights of social and political participation apply to each citizen without regard for his or her race, religion or gender. FeminismVsTradition: Feminist authors have shown the central premises of universalistic conceptions of citizenship to be flawed due to gender bias. As the work of Vicky Randall (1998)(1), Ruth Lister (1997)(2) and Sylvia Walby (1994)(3) illustrates, women have been either excluded, or differentially included, in citizenship. WalbyVsTradition: Walby's historical analysis, for example, demonstrates the gendered nature of citizenship through a critical assessment of the work of T. H. Marshall (1950)(4), which is often taken to be the starting point for modern debates on the question (...). >Citizenship(Marshall. Citizenship/Marshall: According to Marshall, different types of citizenship developed successively, with civic rights in the eighteenth century, political rights in the nineteenth and social rights in the twentieth. WalbyVsMarshall: Analysing the history of citizenship in the United Kingdom and the US, Walby questions Marshall's thesis. For example, up to the 1920s, in contrast to men, British and American women had not yet acquired the majority of civic and political rights. In addition, the political rights were acquired by women before the civic rights, contradicting Marhall's sequential model. In other words, as Walby demonstrates, the three types of citizenship rights described by Marshall have followed different historical trajectories for different social groups. The conception of a unique model of citizenship therefore reveals a gender bias which is also present in the work of later authors who built on Marshall's work, such as Turner and Mann. As Walby points out, these authors similarly put the emphasis on the importance of social class in the history of citizenship and the formation of the nation-state, but neglect other factors such as gender or race. In this respect Walby joins other feminist critics of the concept of citizenship, such as Lister (1990)(5) and Pateman (1989)(6), for whom the fact that women have not been treated in any democracy as full and equal citizens means that 'democracy has never existed' (1989(6): 372). Gender roles/WalbyVsPateman/WalbyVsLister: However, Walby also points out an important contradiction in their work: on the one hand, authors such as Lister and Pateman question the gendered nature of the frontiers between the public and the private while insisting on the importance of female values and roles (Pateman, 1991)(7) and on the recognition by the public sphere of the work done by women in the private sphere (Lister, 1990)(5). 1. Randall, Vicky (1998) 'Gender and power: women engage the state'. In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds, Gende'; Politics and the State. London: Routledge, 185-205. 2. Lister, Ruth (1997) Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 3. Walby, Sylvia (1994) 'Is citizenship gendered?' Sociology, 28 (2): 379-95. 4. Marshall, T. H. (1950) Class, Citizenship and Social Development. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 5. Lister, Ruth (1990) 'VVomen, economic dependency and citizenship'. Journal of Social Policy, 19 (4): 445-67. 6. Pateman, Carole (1989) The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory. Cambridge: Polity. 7. Pateman, Carole (1991) The Disorder of Women. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Civil Disobedience | Freeden | Gaus I 12 Civil disobedience/Freeden: (...) in discussions of political obligation and civil disobedience, recourse is had to rational and ethical models of promising and consent, or to utilitarian arguments. But these address the problem of obligation to a government as against obligation to a state, not obligation to a nation. Yet political obligation to a nation is a significant sentiment that helps constitute political identity. >Duty. The reason that it cannot be addressed using the current terms of political philosophy lies in the difficulty in conceptualizing its breach. Civil disobedience is located at the point of tension between obedience to a government and obedience to the constitutive principles of a state, and its practices are well recognized as acts of rational and ethical challenge. But would principled disobedience to a nation be expressed in a refusal to speak its language or to recognize its holidays? Ideological analysis can identify alternative features of discourse that treat obligation as an act of emotional sustenance by focusing on its unconditionality vis-à-vis a nation, as well as on its empowering consequences for those bearing the obligation. >Obedience, >Constitution, >Community, >Society, >Freedom, >Coercion, Freeden, M. 2004. „Ideology, Political Theory and Political Philosophy“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Civil Religion | Bellah | Habermas IV 429 Civil Religion/R. Bellah/Habermas: Bellah thesis: People of different beliefs can belong to the same, primarily secular, politically organized community. Talcott Parsons: Then religion belongs to the private sphere. Another aspect of secularization is that God's kingdom is being established on earth. The climax of this development was the founding of the American nation. Thereby, there was no radical break with religious tradition. >Privacy, >Nation. Bellah/Parsons: shows how many official announcements, especially the inauguration of the American president - Habermas IV 430 use the term "God" or various synonyms in the sense of "Supreme Being" and embarrassingly avoid a reference to Christ.(1) >State (Polity), >Autonomy. 1. Talcott Parsons, Belief, Unbelief and Disbelief, in: T. Parsons, Action Theory and the Human Condition, NY 1978, S. 309 |
Bellah I Robert N. Bellah Beyond Belief New York 1970 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Civil Religion | Parsons | Habermas IV 429 Civil Religion/R. Bellah/Parsons/Habermas: the concept of civil religion as a civic religion is borrowed from Parsons R. Bellah: People of different beliefs can belong to the same, primarily secular, politically organized community. Parsons: Then religion is part of privacy. Another aspect of secularization is that God's kingdom is being established on earth. The climax of this development was the founding of the American nation. Thereby, there was no radical break with religious tradition.(1) >R. Bellah, >Religion, >Religious Faith. 1. T. Parsons, Belief, Unbelief and Disbelief, in: T. Parsons, Action Theory and the Human Condition, NY 1978, S. 240. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Civil Society | Giddens | Brocker I 872 Civil Society/Giddens: is to emerge from the renewal and society-wide dissemination of local, self-organised initiatives of citizens who, on their own initiative, come together to fulfil tasks in important areas of life in a self-determined manner that simultaneously serve the common good and benefit them themselves. >Society, >Community, >State. The range of fields of action for this civil society commitment is extremely broad and is highlighted in detail in a separate diagram: "Promotion of the non-profit sector" (e.g. in social assistance), "Protection of the local public" (in the ecological sense and with regard to public safety), "Revitalisation of community life" (as a prophylactic fight against crime) and "The democratic family".(1) >Family. Brocker I 873 From a decided opposition to the state, civil society tried there to seize some important functions for the citizens, for example in the areas of education and the public sphere. As a result, civil society can fulfil many of the public functions itself once it is mobilized. >Third Way/Giddens. 1.Anthony Giddens, Der dritte Weg. Die Erneuerung der sozialen Demokratie, Frankfurt/M. 1999, p. 96. Thomas Meyer, „Anthony Giddens, Der dritte Weg“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Civilization | Condorcet | Habermas III 214 Civilization/Condorcet/Habermas: Both Condorcet and Kant see the progress of civilization as being in line with a republic that guarantees civil liberties, an international order that brings about lasting peace, a society that accelerates economic growth and technological progress and eliminates or at the same time compensates for social inequalities. (1) >Inequalities, >Peace, >Technology, >Republic, >Liberty, >Growth, >Society. 1. Condorcet, Entwurf einer historischen Darstellung der Fortschritte des menschlichen Geistes, (Ed.) W. Alff, Frankfurt, 1963, p. 383. |
Condo I N. de Condorcet Tableau historique des progrès de l’ esprit humain Paris 2004 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Civilization | Gandhi | Brocker I 55 Civilization/Gandhi: Gandhi sees a plague in civilization(1). But this refers above all to Western civilization, Indian civilization still rests solidly on its foundation. "Rome perished, Greece suffered the same fate; the power of the pharaohs was broken; Japan was westernized"(2); only India still exists, according to Gandhi. The Gujarati word for civilization means "good behavior"(3). The fulfilment of duties and the observance of morals are the same. It means, Brocker I 56 that you can control yourself. Gandhi presents the Indian way of life as a conscious decision of the ancestors.(4) Cf. >Colonialism, >Postcolonialism, >Nationalism, >Language Acquisition, >Education, >Educational Policy, >Culture, >Cultural Values, >Cultural Tradition, >Culture Shift, >Governance, >Civil Disobedience. 1. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule, Ahmedabad 1938 (zuerst 1909). Dt.: Mahatma Gandhi, Hind Swaraj oder Indische Selbstregierung, in: ders., Ausgewählte Werke. Grundlegende Schriften, herausgegeben von Shriman Narayan, bearbeitet von Wolfgang Sternstein, Göttingen 2011, Bd. 3, p. 97, 100 2. Ibid. p. 121 3. Ibid. p. 122 4. Ibid. Dietmar Rothermund, Mahatma Gandhi in: Brocker, Manfred, Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Civilization | Rousseau | Höffe I 272 Civilisation/Rousseau/Höffe: In civilization "a child commands the adults, a fool commands wise men and a handful of rich Höffe I 273 command the mass of the hungry" (Second Treatise, Part 2)(1). According to Rousseau, the combination of property and state protection is the cause of the many crimes and wars and the countless miseries that have marked the history of mankind up to now. Above all, innate freedom has been irrevocably destroyed. >Property, >Economic theories on crime, >State, >Freedom. Rousseau does recognise the advantage of civilisation, education and a more intensive, i.e. not just saturated, existence. Höffe: What a superficial reading still attributes to him today - a "return to nature" - he does not demand. Although he stirs up the longing for a natural life, he considers its repetition illusory, if only because the developments once introduced cannot be taken back. However, it is possible to correct wrong developments and work towards a new naturalness. Only in this way, as a mirror and critic, does nature serve as a model. 1. Rousseau, Discours sur l'inégalité parmi les hommes, 1755 |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Clans | Tabellini | Mokyr I 6 Clans/corporations(Mokyr/Tabellini: Clans and corporations relied on different methods of enforcement. Cooperation within a clan was sustained by repeated interactions over several domains. >Cooperation. Deviant behavior in one domain was punished through ostracism and exclusion from future interactions in all domains. Cooperation among kin was also sustained by bonds of kin loyalty, the worship of common ancestors, and internalized social norms. China: In China, although clans had legal authority over their members, clan rules rarely specified punishments for transgression but relied on moral and social sanctions and rewards. Clan rules in China had primarily a moral rather than a formal legal character: they mostly admonished members to behave in ethical ways, and protect the weak and the poor (Ruskola, 2000(1), p. 1660). As one clan book rule states, “a clan without rules leaves its members with no moral standard of conduct to follow” (Liu, 1959(2), p. 22). The frequent interactions among kin-related individuals, clearly facilitated the operation of reputation mechanisms, and the threat of ostracism or even expulsion from the clan was a key deterrent against rule violations. Many of the rights and duties between family members did not even have to be written down, as they simply followed Confucian philosophy of filial piety and clan solidarity. Moreover, even when formal and explicit, most internal enforcement systems were extrajudicial. Violators of clan rules and of internal agreements could in principle be reported to the authorities for punishment, but generally this happened only as a last resort, after the clan had exhausted its internal procedures for enforcement and dispute resolution. The Chinese word for civil lawsuit was xishi, meaning “minor matter”, which is informative about how imperial officials tended to see civil lawsuits (Ruskola 2000(1), p. 1659, Huang 2010(3), p. 21-22). At the highest level of abstraction this reflects the Confucian ideals that viewed formal law as redundant in a society in which wise men realized the unity of their interests. Mokyr I 8 [Difference to Europe]: Differences in enforcement methods between clans and corporations (particularly cities) are also evident from their sources of revenues. European cities depended on taxes and fees levied on the local population, whereas Chinese clans provided similar public goods often by relying on voluntary contributions and donations by members. Of particular importance were so-called lineage trusts, which owned assets (primarily land) that were earmarked for an endowment that could pay for the rites of the clan. The status of these trusts was enforced mostly by custom and self-regulation (Zelin,2007(4), pp. 9-10; see also McDermott(5), 2013, pp. 148-149). 1. Ruskola, Teemu. 2000. "Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective". Stanford Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 6, pp. 1599-1729. 2. Liu, Hiu-Chen Wang. 1959. The Traditional Chinese Clan Rules. New York: J.J. Augustin. Maddicott, John Robert. 2004. The Origins of the Early English Parliament 924-1327. Oxford: Oxford University Press 3. Huang, Philip C. 2010. Chinese Civil Justice, Past and Present. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 4. Zelin, Madeleine 2007. “Informal Law and the Firm in Early Modern China.” Unpublished ms., Columbia University, downloaded at https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=083e4b7a695da0d13775 8845fb6cb1d1ed148676 5. McDermott, Joseph P. 2013. The Making of a New Rural Order in South China: Vol. 1, Village, Land, and Lineage in Huizhou, 900-1600. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
EconTabell I Guido Tabellini Torsten Persson The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Mokyr I Joel Mokyr Guido Tabellini Social Organizations and Political Institutions: Why China and Europe Diverged CESifo Working Paper No. 10405 Munich May 2023 |
| Class Conflict | Marx | Rothbard II 376 Class conflict/Marx/Rothbard: Even assuming that the unexplained incompatibility between the productive forces and the relations of production exists, why shouldn't this incompatibility continue forever? Why doesn't the economy simply lapse into permanent stagnation of the technological forces? This 'contradiction', so to speak, was scarcely enough to generate Marx's goal of the inevitable proletarian communist revolution. >Productive forces, >Relations of production, >Historical materialism, >Technology/Marx. Class conflict: The answer that Marx supplies, the motor of the inevitable revolutions in history, is inherent class conflict, inherent struggles between economic classes. For, in addition to the property rights system, one of the consequences of the relations of production, as determined by the productive forces, is the 'class structure' of society. For Marx, the fetters are invariably applied by the privileged 'ruling classes', Who somehow serve as surrogates for, or living embodiments of, the social relations ofproduction and the legal property system. In contrast, another, inevitably 'rising' economic class somehow embodies the oppressed, or fettered, technologies and modes of production. Rothbard II 377 The 'contradiction' between the fettered material productive forces and the fettering social relations of production thus becomes embodied in a determined class struggle between the 'rising' and the 'ruling' classes, which are bound, by the inevitable (material) dialectic of history to result in a triumphant revolution by the rising class. Material dialectic: (…) the material dialectic takes one socio-economic system, say feudalism, and claims that it 'gives rise' to its opposite, or 'negation', and its inevitable replacement by 'capitalism', which thus 'negates' and transcends feudalism. And in the same way electricity (or whatever) will inevitably give rise to a proletarian revolution which will permit electricity to triumph over the fetters that capitalists place upon it. RothbardVsMarx: It is diffcult to state this position without rejecting it immediately as drivel. In addition to all the flaws in historical materialism we have seen above, there is no causal chain that links a technology to a Class, or that permits economic classes to embody either technology or its 'production relations' fetters. There is no proffered reason why such classes must, or even plausibly might, act as determined puppets for or against new technologies. Why must feudal landlords try to suppress the steam mill? Why can't feudal landlords invest in steam mills? End of dialectic/end of history: If, finally, class struggle and the material dialectic bring about an inevitable proletarian revolution, why does the dialectic, as Marx of course maintains, at that point come to an end? For crucial to Marxism, as to other millennial and apocalyptic creeds, is that the dialectic can by no means roll on forever. On the contrary, the chiliast, whether pre- or post-millennial, invariably sees the end of the dialectic, or the end of history, as imminent. Marx's atheist dialectic, too, envisioned the imminent proletarian revolution, which would, after the 'raw communist' stage, bring Rothbard II 378 about a 'hig her communism' or perhaps a 'beyond communist' stage, which would be a classless society, a society of total equality, of no division of labour, a society without rulers. But since history is a 'history of class struggles' for Marx, the ultimate communist stage would be the final one, so that, in effect, history would then come to an end. BakuninVsMarx: Critics of Marx, from Bakunin to Machajski to Milovan Djilas, have of course pointed out, both prophetically and in retrospect, that the proletarian revolution, whichever its stage, would not eliminate classes, but, on the contrary, would set up a new ruling class and a new ruled. There would be no equality, but another inequality of power and inevitably of wealth: the oligarchic elite, the vanguard, as rulers, and the rest of society as the ruled. >Marx/Rothbard, >Ideology/Marx. Höffe I 366 Class Conflict/Marx/Höffe: (...) [Marx] asserts an uninterrupted conflict, "which ended each time with a revolutionary transformation of the whole society. For its own time, it is the conflict of two classes, the main economic bourgeois called "bourgeois," the capitalists, and the wage laborers called "proletarians". This contemporary struggle is supposed to be the last one in world history, since the existing opposition is not replaced by a new opposition. The victory of the wage laborers over the capitalists is meant to overcome all (...) class barriers, thus bringing unity, harmony and peace to the world. >History/Marx. 1. K. Marx und F. Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, 1848 |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Classes | Gramsci | Brocker I 711 Classes/Gramsci: Gramsci introduces the concept "Subalterns" in the Quaderni del Carcere (1929-1935). The concept was originally used in the military field for subordinate officers. Gramsci transfers it to those who do not belong to a hegemonic class. GramsciVsMarxism: Gramsci thus deviates from the Orthodox-Marxist approach, which focuses its political attention above all on the Brocker I 712 urban working class. DhawanVsMarx: The rural population is neglected in Marx, as we know, because it is regarded as unorganized and prepolitical and cannot form a systematic antipole to the bourgeoisie. See Governance/Gramsci. Gramsci alternately calls the suppressed classes "classi subalterne", "classi subordinate" and "classi strumentali". This differentiation can only be understood in connection with the dominant social groups. The dominant social groups realize their historical unity in the state, i.e. in the combination of political and civil society. In contrast, the subaltern classes form a fragmented grouping characterized by a lack of autonomy and structural and economic exclusion (1) Subalternity/Dhawan: the term was adopted within postcolonial theory by Guha, among others, who thus defined a space that is cut off from all forms of mobility.(2)(3) Subalternity is thus not an identity designation, but a position that marks the difference. 1. Vgl. Antonio Gramsci, Gefängnishefte, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 9. Hefte 22 bis 29, hg.v. Wolfgang Fritz Haug/Klaus Bochmann, Hamburg 1999 (ital. zuerst 1934). 2. Vgl. Spivak. Selected Works of Gayatri Spivak, hg. V. Donna Landry/Gerald Maclean, New York/London 1996, S. 288. 3. Vgl. Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgery in Colonial India, Delhi 1983. Nikita Dhawan, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolGram I Antonio Gramsci Quaderni del carcere, 1948-1951 - Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Eds. Geoffrey N. Smith/Quintin Hoare, 1971 German Edition: Gefängnishefte Hamburg 1999 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Classes | Quine | I 289 Class abstraction is attributed to singular descriptions: (iy)(x)(x from y iff ..x..). Instead: x^(..x..). This does not work for intensional abstraction. Difference classes/properties: classes are identical with the same elements. Properties are not yet identical if they are assigned to the same things. >Properties/Quine. II 29 Classes: one could reinterpret all classes in their complement: "no element of .." and you would never notice anything. At the bottom layer every relative clause, every general term determines a class. II 100 Russell (Principia Mathematica(1)) classes are things: they must not be confused with the concept of classes. However: paradoxes also apply to class terms and propositional functions are not only for classes. Incomplete symbols (explanation by use) are used to explain away classes. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. VII (a) 18 Classes/Quine: simplify our access to physics but are still a myth. VII (f) 114 Classes/Quine: classes are no accumulations or collections! E.g. the class of stones in a pile cannot be identified with the pile: otherwise another class could also be identified with the same pile: e.g. the class of stone molecules in the pile. The validity theory applies to classes, but not to the individual sentences - predicates are not names of classes, classes are the extension of predicates - classes are assumed to be pre-existent. IX 21 Classes/Relations/Quine: classes are real objects if values of bound variables. IX 23 Class/Individuals/Quine: everything is class! If we understand individuals to be identical to their class of one (i.e. not elementless). IX 223 Classes/Quine: quantification through classes allows for terms that would otherwise be beyond our reach. XIII 24 Class/Quantity/Quine: we humans are stingy and so predisposed that we never use two words for the same thing, or we demand a distinction that should underlie it. XIII 25 Example ape/monkey: we distinguish them by size, while French and Germans have only one word for them. Problem: how is the dictionary supposed to explain the difference between "beer, which is rightly called so" and "ale, which is rightly called so"? Example Sets/Classes/Quine: here this behaves similarly. Class/Mathematics: some mathematicians treat classes as something of the same kind as properties (Quine pro, see above): sets as something more robust, though still abstract. >Properties/Quine. Classes: can contain sets as elements, but not other classes. (see impredicativity). Paradox/Paradoxes/Quine: lead to some element relationships not being able to define sets. Nevertheless, they can still define classes! von Neumann: established such a system in 1925. It simplifies evidence and strengthens the system, albeit at the risk of paradoxes. >Paradoxes/Quine. Problem: it requires imaginative distinctions and doublings, e.g. for every set there must be a coextensive class. Solution/Quine. (Quine 1940): simply identify the sets with the coextensive classes. XIII 26 Def Classes/Def Sets/QuineVsNeuman: new: sets are then classes of a certain type: a class is a set if it is an element of a class. A class is a Def outermost class/Quine: if it is not an element of a class. Russell's Paradox/Quine: some authors thought that by distinguishing between classes and sets, it showed that Russell's antinomy was mere confusion. Solution/some authors: classes themselves are not such substantial objects that they would come into question as candidates for elements according to a condition of containment. But sets can be. On the other hand: Sets: had never been understood as defined by conditions of abstinence. And from the beginning they had been governed by principles that Zermelo later made explicit. QuineVs: these are very perishable assumptions! In reality, sets were classes from the beginning, no matter what they were called. Vagueness of one word was also vagueness of the other word. Sets/Cantor/Quine: sure, the first sets at Cantor were point sets, but that does not change anything. QuineVsTradition/Quine: it is a myth to claim that sets were conceived independently of classes, and were later confused with them by Russell. That again is the mistake of seeing a difference in a difference between words. Solution/Quine: we only need sets and outermost classes to enjoy the advantages of von Neumann. >Sets/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Classes | Russell | I XIV Classes/Concepts/Gödel: can be construed as real objects, namely as "multiplicities of things" and concepts as properties or relations of things that exist independently of our definitions and constructions - which is just as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies - they are as necessary for mathematics as they are for physics. >Platonism, >Universals, >Mathematical entities, cf. >Hartry Field's Antiplatonism. I XVIII Set/Gödel: realistic: classes exist, circle fault no fault, not even if it is seen constructivistically. But Gödel is a non-constructivist. Russell: classes are only facon de parler, only class names, term, no real classes. I XVIII Class names/Russell: eliminate through translation rules. I XVIII Classes/Principia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Gödel: Principia do without classes, but only if one assumes the existence of a concept whenever one wants to construct a class - E.g. "red" or "colder" must be regarded as real objects. I 37 Class/Principia Mathematica/Russell: The class formed by the function jx^ is to be represented by z^ (φ z) - E.g. if φ x is an equation, z^ (φ z) will be the class of its roots - Example if φ x means: "x has two legs and no feathers", z^ (φ z) will be the class of the humans. I 120 Class/Principia Mathematica/Russell: incomplete symbol. >Incomplete symbols. Function: Complete Symbol - therefore no transitivity when classes are inserted for variables - E.g. x = y . x = z . > . y = z (transitivity) is a propositional function which always applies. But not if we insert a class for x and functions for y and z. - E.g. "z^ (φ z) = y ! z^" is not a value of "x = y" - because classes are incomplete symbols. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Flor III 117 Classes/sets/things/objects/Russell/Flor: sets must not be seen as things - otherwise, we would always have also 2n things at n things (combinations - i.e. we would have more things than we already have - Solution: Eliminate class symbols from expressions - instead designations for propositional functions. >Quine: Class Abstraction. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Classical Economics | Smith | Mause I 39 Classical Economy/Adam Smith: Adam Smith (1723-1790) founded the classical school of economics or (old) political economy with his major work "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations" (Smith 1776). >Political economy. The focus was on pricing and income distribution, longer-term economic development and the general I 40 economic policy orientation. Economy and politics are considered to be closely, inextricably linked. Smith based his economic studies on mercantilistic and physiocratic findings on the one hand, and on direct precursors such as David Hume (1711-1776) or Bernard de Mandeville (1670-1733) on the other. >Physiocracy, >Physiocrats, >D. Hume. From the former he adopted the pragmatic, utilitarian philosophy, according to which human behavior is not to be judged absolutely, but rather according to the extent to which it promotes human happiness, as well as the quantity theory of money, according to which changes in the money supply have no real, but only price effects in the longer term. The latter and its "Fable of the Bees" (Mandeville 1723) is the origin of the famous "Invisible Hand" argument in favour of free competition. |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Classification | Duhem | I 27 Classification/Duhem: What is natural classification? Context of mental operations. It treats not concrete individuals, but abstractions: the types, e.g. vertebrates. >Abstraction, >Context, >Observation. I 28 It explains, for example, that the swimming bubble of the fishes is the same as the lungs of the vertebrates. This is a purely ideal combination, which is not based on real organs but on simplified representations. More or less conspicuous similarities are seen by the zoologist as proof of a kinship. I 29 If, on the other hand, paleontology were to explain to him that the kinship did not exist in this, the zoologist would nevertheless continue to believe that the system was a real relation. He would admit to having deceived himself about the nature of these relationships, but not about their existence. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Classification | Foucault | I 279 Natural history: change between 1775 and 1795: the principle of classifications is not called into question. "Essential feature" Difference: Old view: for the systematics the representative elements were determined from the beginning. New: methodologists: for them, the representation only comes off almightily in the advancing confrontation. >Representation. 1. Hierarchy of features: some are absolutely constant and are missing in no genre or species. Others are less constant. With them a definition of families or orders is impossible. They are not essential. 2. Function of the features: functions are connected with the characteristics. Old view: the essence is fixed at the visible point. New: the feature is not created by a relationship of the visible to itself. 3. Concept of life: a relationship in the depth of the body that connects the organs to the surface. Classification: new: does no longer mean referring the visible to itself, but to a deeper cause. 4. Parallelism between classification and nomenclature is resolved by this fact. Thought image/Foucault: Relationship between the organization's space and that of the nomenclature: instead of covering one another, they will be perpendicular to each other. Similarity: presupposes the examination of the whole organization of the species. The name and genre, designation and classification, language and nature cease to intersect. The order of the words and the order of the beings are only found in an artificially defined line. Language: one begins to talk about things that stand in a space other than the words. Order/Classic: certain way of composition of elementary substances. (> Classification/Linné, Species/Linné). Gould II 70 Classification/Gould: Historical changes of classifications are the fossilized signs of mental overthrows. Gould II 71 Classification/Foucault/Gould: Why group the poor, the unemployed, and the mentally ill together? Foucault argues that the birth of modern commercial societies has led to a new definition of cardinal sin, which must be made invisible by locking it away. That sin was inaction.(1) Gould II 72 Foucault: Thesis: The things that are left out of the taxonomies are just as important as those that are included. 1. M. Foucault, |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Classification | Gould | I 215 Classification/Gould: objectivity of species: indigenous have almost everywhere the same classifications as us. I 217 Higher units (genera): higher units cannot be defined objectively in the hierarchy of Linné, because they are combinations of species and do not occur separately in nature. They do not reproduce together, nor do they influence each other in any other way. You cannot bring people and dolphins together in one order and chimpanzees in another. These orders are therefore by no means arbitrary. Although chimpanzees are genealogically related to our neighbours, do we belong to the same genus or to different genera within the same family? Species are the only objective, taxonomic units of nature (not genus, kingdom, order). >Order, >Categorization, >Categories. I 221 Other classifications: for example, the Fore in New Guinea have a single word for all butterflies, but they divide up the birds like Linné. I 230ff Classification/Gould: with the discovery of methanogens, which are not bacteria at all, the NY Times erroneously wrote that a third kingdom between plants and animals had been discovered. I 232 Biologists had abandoned this dichotomy for a long time. Today, no one tries to squeeze all single-celled organisms into the two large groups. Traditionally, they are recognized for more complex shapes. Today a system of 5 kingdoms is widespread: 1. plants, 2. animals, 3. mushrooms, 4. protists (single-cell eukaryotes, including amoebas with nucleus, mitochondria, and other organelles), as well as 5. prokaryotic monera. If methanogens are listed separately, they form a sixth kingdom. Biologists today distinguish between eukaryotes and prokaryotes rather than between plants and animals. The prokaryotes must have had a common precursor due to a common RNA sequence. I 234 The assumption of a steady evolutionary speed is probably impossible to maintain. The early methanogens may have developed much faster. II 70 Classification/Gould: historical changes in the classifications are the petrified signs of mental overthrow. II 71 Classification/Foucault/Gould: why should we group together the poor, the unemployed and the mentally ill? Foucault argues that the birth of modern trading companies has led to a new definition of a cardinal sin, which must be made invisible by locking them away. This sin was inactivity.(1) II 72 Foucault: Thesis: the things that are omitted from the taxonomies are just as important as those included. >Taxonomy. II 359 Classification/Gould: GouldVsCladism: some of our best known and most convenient groups no longer exist if the classification is to be based on Cladograms. E.g. then there is no such thing as a fish any more. There are about 20,000 species of vertebrate scales and fins living in the water, but they do not form a cohesive cladistic group. But must classifications be based exclusively on cladistic information? This is the most intense debate in evolutionary biology. II 360 The Cladist rejects the similarity altogether as an illusion. Against it: the pheneticist, who concentrates on the overall similarity, pursues a questionable ideal of objectivity. 1. M. Foucault (1965). Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason trans. by R. Howard, (London: Tavistock. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Classification | Lyons | I 150 Def Grammar Classes/Tradition/Lyons/VsTradition: Grammar classes: noun, verb, adjective, etc. Problem: tradition mixed between points of view: 1. Here you are asked about the conditions which should be decisive for the assignment of a word to a certain grammatical class. Example Does the word "men" belong to X or to Y? This is practically always determined by the distribution of the word. (Tradition ditto). 2. Has to do with the designation of the classes (if their "class content" is already determined on a formal basis): e.g. "Is X rightly designated as a class of nominal? Formal grammar: here every description is equally good, you do not have to call something "adjective"! "Universal": here word classes such as "verb", "noun" etc. are understood in terms of content. (Tradition). >Universal grammar. Formal: (modern grammar): here we assume that the classes were created based on the distribution, and could have been called differently. Cf. >Categorial grammar, >Grammar, >Generative grammar, >Transformational Grammar. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Classification | Mayr | I 133 Classification: Classification usually is done by logical division downwards: how many species are classified and what weight do the different characteristics have: "progressive" or "downwards classification". (Actually identification). >Identification, >Individuation, >Specification. Therefore later: "Upwards classification: hierarchical arrangement of ever-growing groups of related species into classes. >Species. Darwin's method confirmed the upward classification and thus triggered a scientific revolution. >Darwinism, >Evolution. I 134 Classification/20th Century (1950) two new schools: a) Numerical Phenetics b) Cladistics. Cladism: the cladist system is intended to reveal the history of the tribe only, while the evolutionary system strives to form taxa from the most similar and closely related species (useful for ecology and biology). >Ecology. Both species can continue to coexist, because they have very different objectives. I 173 Systematics: not only to describe but to contribute to understanding. I 175 Def Class/Biology/Mayr: Grouping of entities that are similar and related to each other. Classification: two important functions: a) recovery of information b) comparative research. Information storage. 1) Classes should be as homogeneous as possible 2) Attribution according to most common characteristics, 3) If the differences are too great, create a new class 4) The degree of difference between classes is ordered in a hierarchy. I 176 Taxonomy: two steps: 1) Differentiation of species (microtaxonomy). 2) Classification of species into related groups (macrotaxonomy). I 177 Microtaxonomy: The delineation of the species "Species Problem": Species usually means "organism type". Problem: Males and females are also different types of organisms, just like young and adult organisms. Def "Variety": (Linné, even Darwin): Deviations that are slightly smaller than those of a new species. ("typological" or "essential concept of species"). ("Common essence" ("Nature")). >Similarity. "Typological concept of species: four characteristics: 1) Common "nature". 2) Between the species sharp discontinuity 3) Each species is spatially and temporally constant. 4) Possible variation within the species is strictly limited. ("Natural kind"). >Species, >Natural kinds, >Essence, >Essentialism. I 178 MayrVsTypological Concept of Species: Darwin refutes the notion of the "constancy of species". Populations vary geographically, individuals vary within a population. In the animate nature there are no types or essences! Def twin species: (discovered only recently: spatially separated, but equally developed, discovered in almost all animal species), forces a new criterion for the delineatation of species: reproductive isolation of populations. I 178 Biological Concept of Species (VsTypological Concept of Species): derives from this criterion of the lack of reproduction among one another. I 183 Def Species Taxa: special populations or population groups that correspond to the species definition. They are entities ("individuals") and cannot be defined as such. Individuals cannot be defined, but are merely described and delineated. >Definitions, >Definability. I 185 Macrotaxonomy: The classification of species (in superordinate groups) Groups: Usually easily recognizable: birds, butterflies, beetles. Downward classification (actually identification). Dichotomy (Aristotelian), high time of medical botany. E.g. warm-blooded or not warm-blooded, with feathers or not. I 187 Upwards Classification/Mayr: Even Linné himself from 1770 onwards: better suited. Classes are distinguished and then grouped into superordinate groups. Unfortunately no strict methodology. There was no theoretical basis for the hierarchy. Functional Classification: Sub-form of the upwards classification. Only selected features. I 188 Two criteria: genealogy (common descent) and degree of similarity (extent of evolutionary change). Causal classification: E.g. diseases according to causes: pathogen, aging process, toxic substances, genes, malignant changes, harmful radiation, etc. >Causal explanation. Any classification that takes into account the causes is subject to severe restrictions and can never become a purely artificial system. I 189 "Taxon": Separate group of offspring. Each taxon consists of the descendants of the next common ancestor. "Monophyletic". Genealogy: Does not a classification make! Similarity cannot be neglected, because the diverging branches were subject to changes of varying extend. Result: Classification into families, genera, divisions, orders. >Systems, >Theories, >Explanation, >Causes, >Effects, >Single-case causation. Homology/Mayr: Relationship between species and higher taxa is shown by the occurrence of homologous features. I.e. a feature derived from the same feature of its next common ancestor. >Homology. I 373 You must always infer homology! There is a lot of evidence for homology, e.g. position of a structure in relation to other structures, also transitional forms with fossil ancestors. >Evidence. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Climate Change | Hooker | Singer I 231 Climate change/responsibility/individual/Singer, P.: what can I do as an individual? If I change my own behaviour, I can reduce the emission of greenhouse gases astonishingly far. However, this makes no measurable difference on a global scale. But if everyone did it, the effect would be measurable. Then it seems obvious that it is wrong for me personally not to abide by it. >Responsibility. I 232 Question: How about if I orientate my behaviour towards that of other individuals and behave badly, as long as not too many others behave badly as well? Consequentialism: on this question, there is a difference between consequentialists and non-consequentialists. >Consequentialism. Rule-Utilitarianism: would say: the best rule for the individual is not to commit any violation or to accept any damage to the community, even if it is not immediately measurable. >Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism/David Lyons(1): Thesis: In such cases, Rule Utilitarianism coincides with Action-Utilitarianism. Both welcome and reject the same solutions. R. M. Hare: claims the same with reference to Kant's appeal to the idea of a universal right.(2) >Categorical imperative) and argues that this principle leads to utilitarianism. I 233 Brad Hooker: (B. Hooker 2000(3))): Hooker argues for a version of rule utilitarianism that prevents rules from becoming too complicated. He believes that we are acting wrongly when we break a rule that is part of a set of rules that, if internalised by an overwhelming majority of the population, would have the best consequences. If the rules became too complex, people would find it hard to internalize them. The cost of educating people would be too high. See also Responsibility/Parfit, Responsibility/Ethics/Glover, J.) >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, Oxford, 1965. 2. R. M. Hare,"Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?" Utilitas 5 (1993), pp. 1-16. 3. B. Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World. Oxford, 2000. |
Hooker I Brad Hooker Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality Oxford 2003 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Climate Change | Singer | I 217 Climate Change/Ethics/P. Singer: what we do to strangers in other communities far away today is much more serious than what we could have done to them if we had the habit of sending a group of fighters to their village. I 218 We can only combat climate change with global measures. What should the ethics on the basis of which we coordinate our actions look like? Natural Resources/Locke/P. Singer: from Locke's point of view, they can be exploited as long as there is enough and of the same quality for everyone. P. Singer: But we have now discovered that the absorption capacity of the atmosphere for greenhouse gases is limited. >J. Locke. I 220 Equal distribution: what can it look like? Principles/Nozick/P. Singer: Nozick makes a sensible distinction between "historical" and "time slices" principles.(1) : Def Historical principle/Nozick: to understand whether a given distribution of goods is fair or unfair, we have to ask how the distribution came about. We need to know its story. Are the parties entitled to ownership on the basis of originally justified acquisition? >Public Goods, >Property. Def two-sided principles/Nozick: consider only the current situations and do not ask about the realization. See also Responsibility/Singer. I 224 Equal burden sharing/pollution/Singer, P: at a UN conference in 2009, Rwandan President Paul Kagame argued for equal per capita burden sharing in the elimination of environmental damage, as all people use the atmosphere to the same extent. Everything else is counterproductive. Sri Lanka made a similar proposal. Singer: this is the application of a time slice principle: Rwanda and Sri Lanka - like other developing countries - do well with it, because they consume less. It is better for them to forego the right to compensation towards industrialised countries. I 231 Climate change/responsibility/individual/Singer, P.: what can I do as an individual? If I change my own behaviour, I can reduce the emission of greenhouse gases astonishingly far. However, this makes no measurable difference on a global scale. But if everyone did it, the effect would be measurable. Then it seems obvious that it is wrong for me personally not to abide by it. >Responsibility. I 232 Question: How about if I orientate my behaviour towards that of other individuals and behave badly, as long as not too many others behave badly as well? Consequentialism: on this question, there is a difference between consequentialists and non-consequentialists. >Consequentialism. Rule-Utilitarianism: would say: the best rule for the individual is not to commit any violation or to accept any damage to the community, even if it is not immediately measurable. Utilitarianism/David Lyons: (D. Lyons 1965.(3)): Thesis: In such cases, Rule-Utilitarianism coincides with Action-Utilitarianism. Both welcome and reject the same solutions. >Utilitarianism. R. M. Hare: claims the same with reference to Kant's appeal to the idea of a universal right (>Categorical imperative) and argues that this principle leads to Utilitarianism.(3) I 233 Brad Hooker: (B. Hooker,2000(4))): Hooker argues for a version of rule utilitarianism that prevents rules from becoming too complicated. He believes that we are acting wrongly when we break a rule that is part of a set of rules that, if internalised by an overwhelming majority of the population, would have the best consequences. If the rules became too complex, people would find it hard to internalize them. The cost of educating people would be too high. See also Responsibility/Parfit, Responsibility/Ethics//Glover, J., >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York, 1974 2. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, Oxford, 1965. 3. R. M. Hare,"Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?" Utilitas 5 (1993), pp. 1-16. 4. B. Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World. Oxford, 2000. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Climate Change | Utilitarianism | Norgaard I 342 Climate Change/Utilitarianism/VsPresentism: One prominent alternative to presentism is classical utilitarianism, an ethical framework that dates to the seminal work of Jeremy Bentham (1823)(1). According to utilitarians, social institutions and public policies should be designed to maximize total utility or well‐being in society with equal weight attached to the welfare of each and every person. Mill (1863)(2) termed this criterion the ‘greatest happiness principle.’ Singer (2002: 42)(3) discusses the implications of utilitarianism for climate stabilization policy. On the one hand, utilitarians favor an approach that balances the costs and benefits of greenhouse gas emissions. On the other hand, they also attach special importance to the interests of people suffering material deprivation. >Utilitarianism/Bentham, >Utilitarianism/Singer, >Presentism/Nordhaus. Climate Costs/Utilitarianism/Singer, P.: According to Singer (…) the costs of climate change mitigation should be borne disproportionately by the wealthiest members of the international community since a dollar of net benefits provides less utility to a rich person than to a poor person. For this same reason, utilitarians are especially concerned about the potential threat that climate change poses to incomes and livelihoods in low‐income, developing countries that are resource dependent and therefore especially vulnerable to changes in environmental conditions (Anthoff et al. 2009a)(4). Utilitarianism: (…) utilitarianism provides no basis for attaching different weights to the welfare of present and future generations. On the contrary, utility is viewed as equally Norgaard I 343 valuable regardless of who experiences it in either space or time (Broome 2008)(5). (…) much of moral philosophy is concerned with understanding and managing the conflicts that exist between the pursuit of self‐interest and the performance of one's moral duties. Utilitarianism approaches this problem by asserting that people's decisions should aim to maximize total utility in society without attaching special weight to personal needs and concerns. Norgaard I 344 In this sense, utilitarianism is in tension with the moral principles that support liberal‐ democratic political, economic, and legal institutions, which attach paramount importance to the extension and preservation of individual rights and freedoms. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Bentham, J. 1823. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. London: W. Pickering. 2. Mill, J. S. 1863. Utilitarianism. London: Parker, Son & Bourn. 3. Singer, P. 2002. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press. 4. Anthoff, D., Hepburn, C., and Tol, R. S. J. 2009a. Equity weighting and the marginal damage costs of climate change. Ecological Economics 68: 836–49. 5. Broome, J. 2008. The ethics of climate change. Scientific American 298: 97–102. Howarth, Richard: “Intergenerational Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Climate Costs | Cosmopolitanism | Norgaard I 325 Climate Costs/Cosmopolitanism: The problem of climate change has emerged in the wake of several decades of growing debate among philosophers on the topic of cosmopolitanism—that is, whether the rights and duties that obtain between people within the same nation or other community also obtain between people in different countries and communities. These debates have focused primarily on questions of distributive justice, and in particular on whether rich countries and their citizens have obligations of economic justice towards poor countries and their citizens. >Climate costs/Shue. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Climate Costs | Shue | Norgaard I 326 Climate Costs/Shue/Singer: (…) there is a near consensus among the philosophers who have written on the topic that considerations of justice do in fact justify the obligation of rich and high‐emitting countries to reduce their emissions, pay for emissions reductions in poor countries, and aid poor countries in adapting to climate change. Both Henry Shue (1993(1), 1995(2)) and Peter Singer (2002)(3) (…) arguing that on all plausible moral accounts, one reaches this general interpretation of the obligations of the wealthy and the rights of the poor. The few scholarly efforts to rebut these arguments—not from philosophers—rely on a variety of counter‐strategies, arguing for example that if the rich have any obligations to the poor, preventing climate change is a very inefficient way to fulfill them (e.g. Beckerman and Pasek 2005(4); Lomborg 2006(5)) (…). Norgaard I 331 A country‐based assessment can hardly lead to a conclusion other than that the rich countries still need to ‘go first,’ as they pledged in the UNFCCC (Brown et al. 2006)(6). Norgaard I 326 Climate Costs/Nations/Individuals/Shue: (…) nation‐to‐nation obligations unjustly permit the poor in the North to have obligations to the non‐poor in the South (Posner and Sunstein 2008)(7). Norgaard I 327 Some (Shue 1993 (1); Neumayer 2000 (8)) have defended broad ‘historical accountability’, by which nations as a whole have obligations proportional to their historical emissions of greenhouse gases. Others (Caney 2009(9); Baer et al. 2010(10); Harris 2010(11)) have argued that such collective, historical accounts are problematic (especially for emissions prior to the recognition of the risks of global warming) and that obligations should also or instead be International Justice based on ability to pay. These ‘ability to pay’ arguments also focus on individuals rather than countries, which is consistent with the fundamental principles of a cosmopolitan approach. >Cosmopolitanism. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Shue, H. 1993. Subsistence emissions and luxury emissions. Law and Policy 15: 39–59. 2. Shue; H. 1995. Ethics, the environment and the changing international order. International Affairs 71: 453–61. 3. Singer, P. 2002. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press. 4. Beckermann, W., and J. Pasek. 2005. Justice, posterity, and the environment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Lomborg, B. (ed.) 2006. How to Spend $50 Billion to Make the World a Better Place. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Brown, D. et al. 2006. White Paper on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change. Available at (http://www.psu.edu/dept/rockethics/climate/whitepaper/edcc‐whitepaper.pdf) (Link not available as of 15/04/19) 7. Posner, E. A., and Sunstein, C. R. 2008. Climate change justice. Georgetown Law Journal 96: 1565–612. 8. Neumayer, E. 2000. In defence of historical accountability for greenhouse gas emissions. Ecological Economics 33: 185–92. 9. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10. Bear, P. et al. 2010. Greenhouse development rights: A framework for climate protection that is ‘more fair’ than equal per capita emissions rights. Pp. 215–30 in S. M. Gardiner, S. Caney, D. Jamieson, and H. Shue (eds.), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 11. Harris, P. G. 2010. World Ethics and Climate Change: From International to Global Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Climate Costs | Singer | Norgaard I 326 Climate Costs/Shue/Singer: (…) there is a near consensus among the philosophers who have written on the topic that considerations of justice do in fact justify the obligation of rich and high‐emitting countries to reduce their emissions, pay for emissions reductions in poor countries, and aid poor countries in adapting to climate change. Both Henry Shue (1993(1), 1995(2)) and Peter Singer (2002)(3) (…) arguing that on all plausible moral accounts, one reaches this general interpretation of the obligations of the wealthy and the rights of the poor. The few scholarly efforts to rebut these arguments—not from philosophers—rely on a variety of counter‐strategies, arguing for example that if the rich have any obligations to the poor, preventing climate change is a very inefficient way to fulfill them (e.g. Beckerman and Pasek 2005(4); Lomborg 2006(5)) (…). Norgaard I 331 A country‐based assessment can hardly lead to a conclusion other than that the rich countries still need to ‘go first,’ as they pledged in the UNFCCC (Brown et al. 2006)(6). Norgaard I 326 Climate Costs/Nations/Individuals/Shue: (…) nation‐to‐nation obligations unjustly permit the poor in the North to have obligations to the non‐poor in the South (Posner and Sunstein 2008)(7). Norgaard I 327 Some (Shue 1993(1); Neumayer 2000(8)) have defended broad ‘historical accountability’, by which nations as a whole have obligations proportional to their historical emissions of greenhouse gases. Others (Caney 2009(9); Baer et al. 2010(10); Harris 2010(11)) have argued that such collective, historical accounts are problematic (especially for emissions prior to the recognition of the risks of global warming) and that obligations should also or instead be International Justice based on ability to pay. These ‘ability to pay’ arguments also focus on individuals rather than countries, which is consistent with the fundamental principles of a cosmopolitan approach. >Cosmopolitanism. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Shue, H. 1993. Subsistence emissions and luxury emissions. Law and Policy 15: 39–59. 2. Shue; H. 1995. Ethics, the environment and the changing international order. International Affairs 71: 453–61. 3. Singer, P. 2002. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press. 4. Beckermann, W., and J. Pasek. 2005. Justice, posterity, and the environment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Lomborg, B. (ed.) 2006. How to Spend $50 Billion to Make the World a Better Place. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Brown, D. et al. 2006. White Paper on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change. Available at (http://www.psu.edu/dept/rockethics/climate/whitepaper/edcc‐whitepaper.pdf) (Link not available as of 15/04/19) 7. Posner, E. A., and Sunstein, C. R. 2008. Climate change justice. Georgetown Law Journal 96: 1565–612. 8. Neumayer, E. 2000. In defence of historical accountability for greenhouse gas emissions. Ecological Economics 33: 185–92. 9. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10. Bear, P. et al. 2010. Greenhouse development rights: A framework for climate protection that is ‘more fair’ than equal per capita emissions rights. Pp. 215–30 in S. M. Gardiner, S. Caney, D. Jamieson, and H. Shue (eds.), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 11. Harris, P. G. 2010. World Ethics and Climate Change: From International to Global Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Climate Costs | United States | Norgaard I 178 Climate Costs/Losses/United States: The original United States Environmental Protection Administration (USEPA) studies of the damages from climate change were exclusively concerned with measuring effects in the United States (Smith and Tirpak 1989)(1). The analyses examined the consequences of the equilibrium climate that would be caused by doubling carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations in the earth (550 ppm). The USEPA studies did not address the dynamics of impacts over time. For example, the coastal, forestry, and ecosystem studies involve sectors that take decades if not centuries to adjust. The studies did not capture how these costs evolved over time. The USEPA studies revealed that a limited number of economic sectors were vulnerable to climate change: agriculture, coastal, energy, forestry, infrastructure, and water. In addition, several non‐market sectors were also vulnerable including recreation, ecosystems, endangered species, and health. Subsequent economic studies attempted to value the US economic damages associated with these impacts in terms of dollars (Nordhaus 1991(2); Cline 1992(3); Titus 1992(4); Fankhauser 1995(5); Tol 1995(6)). These economic results were summarized in the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Pearce et al. 1996)(7). The aggregate damage estimates to the US for doubling greenhouse gases (550 ppm) range from 1.0 to 2.5 percent of GDP. The damage estimates varied widely across the different authors reviewed even though each author relied on the same original USEPA sectoral studies. Most of the other authors [excluding Cline and Frankhauser] assumed that ecosystem change would not necessarily be this harmful. Norgaard I 179 Climate Costs/Losses: Two studies went beyond the US and predicted impacts across the world (Fankhauser 1995(5); Tol 1995(6)). Unfortunately, there was little evidence at the time to base this extrapolation upon other than population and income. They predicted global impacts from doubling CO would range from 1.4 to 1.9 percent of Gross World Product (GWP). They predicted that the bulk of these damages would fall on the OECD (60 to 67 percent) because they assumed that damages were proportional to income. Only 20 to 37 percent of the damages were predicted to fall on low latitude countries, although this would amount to a higher fraction of their GDP (over 6 percent). Africa, southern Asia, and southeast Asia (not including China) were predicted to be the most sensitive to warming with losses over 8 percent of GDP (Tol 1995)(6). If temperatures could rise to 10 °C in future centuries, damages could rise to 6 percent of GWP (Cline 1992)(3). Vs: (…) this is based largely on just extrapolating the results of the doubling experiment rather than upon additional research concerning higher temperatures. (…) the current present value of a ton of carbon would lead to damages on the order of $5 to $12 per ton (Pearce et al. 1996)(7). This is equivalent to $1.4 to $3.3 per ton of carbon dioxide. This social cost of carbon should rise over time at approximately a 2 percent rate to account for the rising marginal damages associated with accumulating greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Such low prices will not stop greenhouse gases from accumulating over this century, they will simply slow them down (Nordhaus 1991)(2). Climate Costs/Catastrophes: The IPCC report also considered catastrophe. If temperatures were 6°C warmer by 2090, ‘experts’ predicted an 18 percent chance that damages would be greater than 25 percent of GWP (Nordhaus 1994)(8). In this case, experts included economists but also natural scientists unfamiliar with damage estimation. The three catastrophes identified in the IPCC report are a runaway greenhouse gas effect, disintegration of the West Antarctic ice sheet, and major changes in ocean currents (Pearce et al. 1996)(7). >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Smith, J., and Tirpak, D. 1989. Potential Effects of Global Climate Change on the United States. Washington, DC: US Environmental Protection Agency. 2. Nordhaus, W. 1991. To slow or not to slow: The economics of the greenhouse effect. Economic Journal 101: 920–37. 3. Cline, W. 1992. The Economics of Global Warming. Washington, DC: Institute of International Economics. 4. Titus, J. G. 1992. The cost of climate change to the United States. In S. Majumdar, L. Kalkstein, B. Yarnal, E. Miller, and L. Rosenfeld (eds.), Global Climate Change: Implications, Challenges, and Mitigation Measures. Easton, PA: Pennsylvania Academy of Sciences. 5. Fankhauser, S. 1995. Valuing Climate Change: The Economics of the Greenhouse. London: Earthscan. 6. Tol, R. 1995. The damage costs of climate change: Towards more comprehensive estimates. Environmental and Resource Economics 5: 353–74. 7. Pearce, D. et al. 1996. The social cost of climate change: Greenhouse damage and the benefits of control. Pp. 179–224 in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 8. Nordhaus, W. 1994. Managing the Global Commons. The Economics of Climate Change. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Mendelsohn, Robert: “Economic Estimates of the Damages Caused by Climate Change”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Climate Damages | Ricardian Theory | Norgaard I 184 Climate Damages/Climate Change/Ricardian Studies: A series of studies have been conducted measuring damages around the world. For example, Ricardian studies have been done to select countries: Brazil and India (Sanghi and Mendelsohn 2008)(1); Sri Lanka (Seo et al. 2005)(2), Israel (Fleischer et al. 2008)(3), Germany (Lippert et al. 2009)(4) and China (Wang et al. 2009)(5). The Ricardian studies examine farm performance (net revenue or land value) across climate zones. By comparing farms in one climate zone to another, one can see what effect climate has on farm outcomes. These studies confirmed that low‐latitude agriculture was vulnerable to warming but high‐latitude agriculture would benefit. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Sanghi, A., and Mendelsohn, R. 2008. The impacts of global warming on farmers in Brazil and India. Global Environmental Change 18: 655–65. 2. Seo, N. and Munasinghe, M. 2005. Climate change impacts on agriculture in Sri Lanka. Environment and Development Economics 10: 581–96. 3. Fleischer, A., Lichtman, I., and Mendelsohn, R. 2008. Climate change, irrigation, and Israeli agriculture: Will warming be harmful? Ecological Economics 67: 109–16. 4. Lippert, C., Krimly, T., and Aurbacher, J. 2009. A Ricardian analysis of the impact of climate change on agriculture in Germany. Climatic Change 97: 593–610. 5. Wang, J., Mendelsohn, R., Dinar, A., Huang, J., Rozelle, S., and Zhang L. 2009. The impact of climate change on China's agriculture. Agricultural Economics 40: 323–37. Mendelsohn, Robert: “Economic Estimates of the Damages Caused by Climate Change”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Climate Data | Climatology | Edwards I 406 Climate data/climatology/Edwards: The purposes, priorities, sources, and character of climate data contrast with those of weather data. The purpose of climate data is to characterize and compare patterns and trends. This requires statistics - averages, maxima, minima, etc. - rather than individual observations. And climate scientists care more about measurement quality, station stability, and the completeness and length of station records than they care about the speed of reporting. >Weather data/metereology, >Climate data/Edwars, >Models/climatology, >Weather forecasting/Edwards. Climatologists use many of the same data sources as forecasters, but they also use many others. Certain kinds of data, such as precipitation measurements or paleoclimatic proxies, are crucial to climatology yet have little relevance to forecasting. Conversely, some kinds of data useful in forecasting play little or no role in climatology. For example, Doppler radar revolutionized Edwards I 407 daily precipitation forecasting, but the data it produces are of little interest to climatologists.(1) When examining pre-twentieth century and paleoclimatic data, climatologists also use numerous “proxy” sources, including data on non-meteorological phenomena that depend strongly on climatic conditions. These data can provide indirect information about past weather conditions. Examples include ice cores, harvest records, tree rings, and species ranges.(2) Edwards I 408 Data quality: To control data quality, climatologists may compare one data set with another for the same area, perhaps taken with different instruments (e.g. radiosonde vs. satellite). Metadata - information about station or instrument history, location, etc. - are crucial to this process. Edwards I 411 Temperature changes: In an influential article published in 1953, J. Murray Mitchell dissected the many causes of “long-period” temperature changes in station records, dividing them into two principal types. “Apparent” changes, such as changes in thermometer location or shelters, were purely artifactual, stemming from causes unrelated to the actual temperature of the atmosphere. “Real” changes represented genuine differences in atmospheric conditions. These could be either “directly” or “indirectly” climatic, for example resulting from shifts in the general circulation (direct) or variations in solar output (indirect). But not all “real” temperature changes reflected actual climatic shifts, since some were caused by essentially local conditions (such as urban heat islands, industrial smoke, and local foliage cover) that had nothing to do with the climates of the region or the globe.(3) >Homogenization/climatology, >Reanalysis/climatology, >Model bias/climatology. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Doppler radar can detect falling raindrops, hail, and snow, so it is commonly used for short-term precipitation forecasts. However, the amount of precipitation actually reaching the ground can differ from what radar detects in the atmosphere. For climatological purposes, actual ground-level precipitation is usually all that matters. 2. K. R. Briffa et al., “Tree-Ring Width and Density Data Around the Northern Hemisphere: Part 1, Local and Regional Climate Signals,” The Holocene 12, no. 6 (2002): 737; H. Grudd et al., “A 7400-Year Tree-Ring Chronology in Northern Swedish Lapland: Natural Climatic Variability Expressed on Annual to Millennial Timescales,” The Holocene 12, no. 6 (2002): 657; J. Esper et al., “Low-Frequency Signals in Long Tree-Ring Chronologies for Reconstructing Past Temperature Variability,” Science 295, no. 5563 (2002): 2250–; J. R. Petit et al., “Climate and Atmospheric History of the Past 420,000 Years from the Vostok Ice Core, Antarctica,” Nature 399 (1999): 429–; T. L. Root et al., “Fingerprints of Global Warming on Wild Animals and Plants,” Nature 421, no. 6918 (2003): 57–; T. L. Root and S. H. Schneider, “Ecology and Climate: Research Strategies and Implications,” Science 269, no. 5222 (1995): 334; I. Chuine et al., “Back to the Middle Ages? Grape Harvest Dates and Temperature Variations in France Since 1370,” Nature 432 (2004): 289–. 3. 13. J. M. Mitchell, “On the Causes of Instrumentally Observed Secular Temperature Trends,” Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 10, no. 4 (1953): 244–. |
Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013 |
| Climate Data | Edwards | I 56 Climate data/Edwards: For long-term climate analyses - particularly climate change analyses - to be accurate, the climate data used must be homogeneous. A homogeneous climate time series is defined as one where variations are caused only by variations in weather and climate. Unfortunately, most long-term climatological time series have been affected by a number of non-climatic factors that make these data unrepresentative of the actual climate variation occurring over time. These factors include changes in: instruments, observing practices, station locations, formulae used to calculate means, and station environment.(1) Edwards: to decide whether you are seeing homogeneous data or “non-climatic factors,” you need to examine the history of the infrastructure station by station, year by year, and data point by data point, all in the context of changing standards, institutions, and communication techniques. >Infrastructure/Edwards. Since the 1950s, standardization and automation have helped to reduce the effect of “non-climatic factors” on data collection, and modeling techniques I 57 have allowed climatologists to generate relatively homogeneous data sets from heterogeneous sources.(2) But it is impossible to eliminate confounding factors completely. I 58 (…) only about ten percent of the data used by global weather prediction models originate in actual instrument readings. The remaining ninety percent are synthesized by another computer model: the analysis or “4-dimensional data assimilation” model, which creates values for all the points on a high-resolution, three-dimensional global grid. >Reanalysis/Climatology. I 356 Data globalization: (…) making data global is an ex post facto mode of standardization, dealing with deviation and inconsistency by containing the entire standardization process in a single place—a “center of calculation,” in Bruno Latour’s words.(3) >Weather forecasting/Edwards. I 381 Time/assimilation: Analysis produced through 4-D data assimilation thus represented an extremely complex model of data, far removed from the raw observations. With many millions of gridpoint values anchored to fewer than 100,000 observations, one could barely even call the analysis “based” on observations I 382 in any ordinary sense. As the data assimilation expert Andrew Lorenc put it, “assimilation is the process of finding the model representation which is most consistent with the observations.” >Weather forecasting/Edwards, >Homogenization/climatology, >Model bias/climatology. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. T. C. Peterson et al., “Homogeneity Adjustments of In Situ Atmospheric Climate Data: A Review,” International Journal of Climatology 18 (1998): 1493– 2. D. R. Easterling et al., “On the Development and Use of Homogenized Climate Datasets,” Journal of Climate 9, no. 6 (1996): 1429–; T. Karl et al., “Long-Term Climate Monitoring by the Global Climate Observing System (GCOS),” Climatic Change 31 (1995): 135–; Peterson et al., “Homogeneity Adjustments”; R. G. Quayle et al., “Effects of Recent Thermometer Changes in the Cooperative Station Network,” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 72, no. 11 (1991): 1718–. 3. B. Latour. 1987. Science in Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 4. Lorenc A.C. (2002) Atmospheric Data Assimilation and Quality Control. In: Pinardi N., Woods J. (eds) Ocean Forecasting. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-22648-3_5. |
Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013 |
| Climate History | Neukom | Neukom I 550 Climate History/Climate Coherence/Climate Periods/Climate Epochs/Global Warming/Neukom: Here we test the hypothesis that there were globally coherent climate epochs over the Common Era by using a collection of probabilistic, global temperature reconstructions for the period 1–2000 ad, derived from a set of six different ensemble field reconstruction methodologies (…). At the original annual resolution, the reconstruction ensemble mean shows no clear indication of a long period of years with globally consistent below-average temperatures relative to the mean for 1–2000 ad (…). Of the years before 1850, 97% had at least 10% of the globe experiencing above-average temperatures, and 10% of the globe experiencing below-average temperatures. It is only if the reconstructed time series are smoothed over multi-decadal timescales (…). I 551 To quantify the spatial coherence of cold and warm epochs, we consider the time of occurrence of a climate anomaly as the variable to be characterized within a probabilistic framework. We calculate the most probable period of peak warming or cooling during each of the five climatic epochs (…) (>Climate Periods/Neukom). (…) we identify the warmest 51-year average within the epochs commonly referred to as warm [and] we identify the coldest 51-year average for the DACP [Dark Ages Cold Period] and LIA [Little Ice Age] cold epochs. Findings: There is considerable spatial heterogeneity in the timing of temperature maxima and minima. No preindustrial epoch shows global coherence in the timing of the coldest or warmest periods. There is, however, regional coherence. I 552 In contrast to the spatial heterogeneity of the preindustrial era, the highest probability for peak warming over the entire Common Era is found in the late twentieth century almost everywhere (98% of global surface area), except for Antarctica, where contemporary warming has not yet been observed over the entire continent(1). Thus, even though the recent warming rates are not entirely homogeneous over the globe, with isolated areas showing little warming or even cooling(1,2) the climate system is now in a state of global temperature coherence that is unprecedented over the Common Era. Through a bootstrapping uncertainty analysis we find that the particular spatial patterns (…) are robust. Furthermore, the heterogeneity in the timing of maxima and minima is an inherent property of the input proxy data, which show a similar lack of global coherence in the timing of each putative climate epoch. (…) peak preindustrial warm and cool periods occurred at different times in different locations. By contrast, the CWP [current warm period] shows distinct temporal and spatial agreement, with the warmest multidecadal peak of the Common Era occurring in the late twentieth century. The area fraction agreeing on the timing of the CWP is significantly larger than that expected from stochastic climate variability (…). (…) as in the reconstructions, the spatial consistency seen in model simulations over the twentieth century suggests that anthropogenic global warming is the cause of increased spatial temperature coherence relative to prior eras. Vs: An important caveat to our results is that the spatiotemporal distribution of high-resolution proxy data is inherently unequal and often sparse. VsVs: However, [future] improvements are unlikely to lead to greater global coherence when the extant proxy data do not show indications of such. Conclusion: Peak warming and cooling events appear to be regionally constrained. Anomalous globally averaged temperatures during certain periods do not imply the existence of epochs of globally coherent and synchronous climate. This global asynchronicity suggests that multidecadal regional extremes are driven by regionally specific mechanisms, namely either unforced internal climate variability(3,4) or regionally varying responses to external forcing(5–7). >Climate Periods/Neukom. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Stenni, B. et al. Antarctic climate variability on regional and continental scales over the last 2000 years. Clim. Past 13, 1609–1634 (2017). 2. Caesar, L., Rahmstorf, S., Robinson, A., Feulner, G. & Saba, V. Observed fingerprint of a weakening Atlantic Ocean overturning circulation. Nature 556, 191–196 (2018). 3. Wang, J. et al. Internal and external forcing of multidecadal Atlantic climate variability over the past 1,200 years. Nat. Geosci. 10, 512–517 (2017). 4. Delworth, T. L. et al. The North Atlantic Oscillation as a driver of rapid climate change in the Northern Hemisphere. Nat. Geosci. 9, 509–512 (2016). 5. Hegerl, G. C., Brönnimann, S., Schurer, A. & Cowan, T. The early 20th century warming: anomalies, causes, and consequences. Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Clim. Change 9, e522 (2018). 6. Abram, N. J. et al. Early onset of industrial-era warming across the oceans and continents. Nature 536, 411–418 (2016); corrigendum 545, 252 (2017). 7. Bindoff, N. L. et al. in Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis (eds Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) 867–952 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013). Raphael Neukom, Nathan Steiger, Juan José Gómez-Navarro, Jianghao Wang & Johannes P. Werner, 2019: “No evidence for globally coherent warm and cold periods over the preindustrial Common Era”. In: Nature, Vol. 571, pp. 550–554. |
Neukom I Raphael Neukom No evidence for globally coherent warm and cold periods over the preindustrial Common Era 2019 |
| Climate Impact Assessment | Economic Theories | Norgaard I 206 Climate Impact Assessment/Economic theories/social sciences: Early global climate change impact assessments focused principally on climate‐society interactions drawing heavily from the tradition of natural hazards research (e.g. Burton et al. 1978)(1). As outlined in a now‐classic book edited by Kates et al. (1985)(2), the key challenge of climate impact assessment is to isolate climate sensitivities in biophysical and social systems. The influence of any given climate stress is therefore traceable through direct influences on biophysical attributes, to sequential (and more indirect) impacts on social activities and attributes (Kates et al. 1985)(2). This approach formed the basis of much of the research in the 1980s and 1990s by the climate change research community, and eventually evolved into a framework of ‘vulnerability’ assessment adopted by the IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] (Carter et al. 1994)(3). Climate impact assessment was designed to be compatible with climate change modeling and simulation experiments, emphasizing the mechanisms and processes by which a specific climate signal translates into a measurable impact on the biophysical environment (e.g. crop yields, streamflow, forest growth) and, through the material and economic ties of society to a resource, into (second‐ or third‐order) social and economic impacts (Carter et al. 1994)(3). Integrated modeling of climate change impacts typically focused on specific geographic regions, scaled to a spatial resolution where climate parameters could be well understood and modeled, and often focused on a specific suite of biophysical or economic measures where the mechanism of climate influence could be directly argued (e.g. Rosenberg 1982(4); Rosenzweig 1985(5); Liverman et al. 1986(6)). Norgaard I 207 Estimates of proxies for social processes such as demographic change and technological innovation were incorporated into these models to parameterize projections of greenhouse gas emissions and anticipate changes in the sensitivities of key system drivers. Serious critiques of this modeling approach emerged surrounding the realism of the underlying assumptions of human behavior (Dowlatabadi 1995(7); Berkhout and Hertin 2000(8); Kandlikar and Risbey 2000(9)). >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Burton, I., Kates, R. W., and White, G. F. (eds.) 1978. The Environment as Hazard. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. Kates, R. W., Ausubel, J. H., and Berberian, M. (eds.) 1985. Climate Impact Assessment: Studies of the Interaction of Climate and Society. SCOPE 27. Chichester: Wiley. 3. Carter, T. R., Parry, M. L., Harasawa, H., and Nishioka, S. 1994. IPCC Technical Guidelines for Assessing Climate Change Impacts and Adaptations, 59. Department of Geography, University College London and Center for Global Environmental Research, National Institute for Environmental Studies, London, UK, and Tsukuba, Japan. 4. Rosenberg, N. J. 1982. The increasing CO2 concentration in the atmosphere and its implication on agricultural productivity, Part II: Effects through CO2‐induced climatic change. Climatic Change 4: 239–54. 5. Rosenzweig, C. 1985. Potential CO2‐induced climate effects on North American wheat‐producing regions. Climatic Change 7: 367–89. 6. Liverman, D., Terjung, W. H., Hayes, J. T., and Mearns, L. O. 1986. Climatic Change and Grain Corn Yields in the North American Great Plains. Climatic Change 9: 327–47. 7. Dowlatabadi, H. 1995. Integrated assessment models of climate change. Energy Policy 23(4/5): 289–96. 8. Berkhout, F., and Hertin, J. 2000. Socio‐economic scenarios for climate impact assessment. Global Environmental Change 10: 165–8. 9. Kandlikar, M., and Risbey, J. 2000. Agricultural Impacts of Climate Change: If Adaptation is the Answer, What is the Question? An Editorial Comment. Climatic Change 45: 529–39. Polsky, Collin and Hallie Eakin: “Global Change Vulnerability Assessments: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Climate Impact Assessment | Social Sciences | Norgaard I 206 Climate Impact Assessment/Economic theories/social sciences: Early global climate change impact assessments focused principally on climate‐society interactions drawing heavily from the tradition of natural hazards research (e.g. Burton et al. 1978)(1). As outlined in a now‐classic book edited by Kates et al. (1985)(2), the key challenge of climate impact assessment is to isolate climate sensitivities in biophysical and social systems. The influence of any given climate stress is therefore traceable through direct influences on biophysical attributes, to sequential (and more indirect) impacts on social activities and attributes (Kates et al. 1985)(2). This approach formed the basis of much of the research in the 1980s and 1990s by the climate change research community, and eventually evolved into a framework of ‘vulnerability’ assessment adopted by the IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] (Carter et al. 1994)(3). Climate impact assessment was designed to be compatible with climate change modeling and simulation experiments, emphasizing the mechanisms and processes by which a specific climate signal translates into a measurable impact on the biophysical environment (e.g. crop yields, streamflow, forest growth) and, through the material and economic ties of society to a resource, into (second‐ or third‐order) social and economic impacts (Carter et al. 1994)(3). Integrated modeling of climate change impacts typically focused on specific geographic regions, scaled to a spatial resolution where climate parameters could be well understood and modeled, and often focused on a specific suite of biophysical or economic measures where the mechanism of climate influence could be directly argued (e.g. Rosenberg 1982(4); Rosenzweig 1985(5); Liverman et al. 1986(6)). Norgaard I 207 Estimates of proxies for social processes such as demographic change and technological innovation were incorporated into these models to parameterize projections of greenhouse gas emissions and anticipate changes in the sensitivities of key system drivers. Serious critiques of this modeling approach emerged surrounding the realism of the underlying assumptions of human behavior (Dowlatabadi 1995(7); Berkhout and Hertin 2000(8); Kandlikar and Risbey 2000(9)). Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Burton, I., Kates, R. W., and White, G. F. (eds.) 1978. The Environment as Hazard. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. Kates, R. W., Ausubel, J. H., and Berberian, M. (eds.) 1985. Climate Impact Assessment: Studies of the Interaction of Climate and Society. SCOPE 27. Chichester: Wiley. 3. Carter, T. R., Parry, M. L., Harasawa, H., and Nishioka, S. 1994. IPCC Technical Guidelines for Assessing Climate Change Impacts and Adaptations, 59. Department of Geography, University College London and Center for Global Environmental Research, National Institute for Environmental Studies, London, UK, and Tsukuba, Japan. 4. Rosenberg, N. J. 1982. The increasing CO2 concentration in the atmosphere and its implication on agricultural productivity, Part II: Effects through CO2‐induced climatic change. Climatic Change 4: 239–54. 5. Rosenzweig, C. 1985. Potential CO2‐induced climate effects on North American wheat‐producing regions. Climatic Change 7: 367–89. 6. Liverman, D., Terjung, W. H., Hayes, J. T., and Mearns, L. O. 1986. Climatic Change and Grain Corn Yields in the North American Great Plains. Climatic Change 9: 327–47. 7. Dowlatabadi, H. 1995. Integrated assessment models of climate change. Energy Policy 23(4/5): 289–96. 8. Berkhout, F., and Hertin, J. 2000. Socio‐economic scenarios for climate impact assessment. Global Environmental Change 10: 165–8. 9. Kandlikar, M., and Risbey, J. 2000. Agricultural Impacts of Climate Change: If Adaptation is the Answer, What is the Question? An Editorial Comment. Climatic Change 45: 529–39. Polsky, Collin and Hallie Eakin: “Global Change Vulnerability Assessments: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Climate Justice | Cosmopolitanism | Norgaard I 325 Climate Justice/Cosmopolitanism: The cosmopolitan approach argues that obligations of justice apply across borders as well as within, deriving these obligations in some cases from actual causal interrelationships (e.g. Pogge 2002)(1), sometimes from universal extension of the same egalitarian premises that ground nationally entered theories of justice (Singer 1972(2); Caney 2005b(3)), or both (Beitz 1979(4); Moellendorf 2002(5)). Rejection of such obligation typically relies on the argument that either a shared culture (e.g. Rawls 1999)(6), shared nationality (Miller 1995)(7) or a shared sovereignty (Nagel 2005)(8) is required for the existence of obligations of justice, though proponents of such views —‘communitarians’ taken loosely—do usually advocate beneficence towards persons outside the community. Norgaard I 326 Climate Justice/Climate Costs/VsRawls/Cosmopolitism: While not all the philosophers who have written on climate change are otherwise engaged in debates about cosmopolitanism (…) most conclude that claims of justice do apply to the international distribution of the costs and benefits of climate policy. However, many authors have still found it necessary to engage John Rawls's famous dismissal of cosmopolitan justice claims (Rawls 1999)(6); most conclude that the inescapable causal relationships of climate change render Rawls's position no longer supportable, if it ever was (see e.g. Vanderheiden 2008)(9). >Climate Costs/Cosmopolitanism, >Climate Costs/Shue/Singer. Cosmopolitanism/Climate Costs/VsRawls/Nagel/Miller/Rawls: Rawls argued that the social ties required to make possible a contractarian theory of justice, like that of ‘original position’ bargaining, do not exist across national borders, and that only ‘well‐ordered societies’—in practice, nations—could plausibly be bound by such a standard of justice. The theories of Nagel and Miller make similar claims on slightly different grounds. VsRawls: (…) such an argument fails when the status quo involves the imposition of significant cross‐border harms, as from greenhouse pollution; any rejection of international justice claims therefore becomes a de facto endorsement of the right to do harm to non‐citizens, which Rawls did not in fact endorse. And of course the fact that, considered as a resource, the atmosphere is not territorially bound (that is, it is a globally ‘open access’ resource) implies a need for global cooperation, providing further justification for cosmopolitan obligations (Vanderheiden 2008(9); Moellendorf 2009 (10)). >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Pogge, T. 2002. World Poverty and Human Rights. Cambridge: Polity Press. 2. Singer, P. 1972. Famine, affluence, and morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs 1: 229–43. 3. Caney, S. 2005b. Justice beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Beitz, C. R. 1979. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 5. Moellendorf, D. 2002. Cosmopolitan Justice. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 6. Rawls, J. 1999. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 7. Miller, D. 1995. On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 8. Nagel, T. 2005. The problem of global justice. Philosophy & Public Affairs 33: 113–47. 9. Vanderheiden, S. 2008. Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10. Moellendorf, D. 2009. Global Inequality Matters. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Climate Periods | Neukom | Neukom I 550 Climate Periods/Climate Epochs/Climate Change/Neukom: Since the formative period of modern Earth sciences in the 1800s, the complex history of Earth’s climate has been conceptualized through the construction of distinct climatic periods or epochs(1–7). Several terms for climatic epochs within the past 2,000 years have come into wide use. Most prominent among these is the ‘Little Ice Age’ (LIA) (…). Over the past few decades, this term has been widely used in palaeoclimatology and historical climatology to indicate a nearly global, centuries-long cold climate state that occurred between roughly 1300 ad and 1850 ad(5,8). This period is often contrasted with the Mediaeval Warm Period, also known as the Mediaeval Climate Anomaly (MCA)(8–10), which is commonly associated with warm temperatures in 800–1200 ad. The first millennium of the Common Era has also been subdivided into the ‘Dark Ages Cold Period’ (DACP)(11,12), or ‘Late Antique Little Ice Age’ (LALIA)(13), which occurred within about 400–800 ad, and lastly the ‘Roman Warm Period’ (RWP)(12,14), which covers the first few centuries of the Common Era. We note that for all of these epochs, no consensus exists about their precise temporal extent. Each of these climatic epochs has its origin in pieces of palaeoclimatic evidence from the extratropical Northern Hemisphere, particularly Europe and North America(4,9–12). Climate epoch narratives were constructed to explain the early palaeoclimatic evidence, and later-developed time series from across the globe were situated within these narrative frameworks. This process probably created the expectation that Common Era climate epochs are global-scale phenomena. >Climate history/Neukom. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Köppen, W. & Wegener, A. Die Klimate der Geologischen Vorzeit (Gebrüder Borntraeger, 1924). 2. Matthes, F. E. Report of Committee on Glaciers, April 1939. Eos 20, 518–523 (1939). 3. Grove, J. M. The Little Ice Age (Methuen, 1988). 4. Matthews, J. A. & Briffa, K. R. The ‘little ice age’: re-evaluation of an evolving concept. Geogr. Ann. A 87, 17–36 (2005). 5. Masson-Delmotte, V. et al. in Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (eds Stocker, T. F. et al.) 383–464 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013). 6. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013). 7. Brückner, E. Klimaschwankungen seit 1700 nebst Bemerkungen über die Klimaschwankungen der Diluvialzeit (E. Hölzel, 1890). 8. Mann, M. E. et al. Global signatures and dynamical origins of the Little Ice Age and Medieval Climate Anomaly. Science 326, 1256–1260 (2009). 9. Lamb, H. H. The early medieval warm epoch and its sequel. Palaeogeogr. Palaeoclimatol. Palaeoecol. 1, 13–37 (1965). 10. Bradley, R. S., Hughes, M. K. & Diaz, H. F. Climate in medieval time. Science 302, 404–405 (2003). 11. Helama, S., Jones, P. D. & Briffa, K. R. Dark Ages Cold Period: a literature review and directions for future research. Holocene 27, 1600–1606 (2017). 12. Ljungqvist, F. C. A new reconstruction of temperature variability in the extra-tropical Northern Hemisphere during the last two millennia. Geogr. Ann. A 92, 339–351 (2010). 13. Büntgen, U. et al. Cooling and societal change during the Late Antique Little Ice Age from 536 to around 660 AD. Nat. Geosci. 9, 231–236 (2016). 14. Röthlisberger, F. 10,000 Jahre Gletschergeschichte der Erde (Sauerländer, 1986). Raphael Neukom, Nathan Steiger, Juan José Gómez-Navarro, Jianghao Wang & Johannes P. Werner, 2019: “No evidence for globally coherent warm and cold periods over the preindustrial Common Era”. In: Nature, Vol. 571, pp. 550–554. |
Neukom I Raphael Neukom No evidence for globally coherent warm and cold periods over the preindustrial Common Era 2019 |
| Climate Protection | Economic Theories | Mause I 440 Climate Protection/Economic Theories: Climate protection is a global public good that is not rival in use, i.e. the consumption of the good by an actor is not impaired by the fact that an additional actor consumes the good and to which the exclusion principle cannot be applied. So everyone can consume the good of climate protection without paying a price. No one can be excluded. Reducing the greenhouse gas effect and climate change through climate policy benefits everyone. Environment/Market economy: Climate protection is therefore not or not sufficiently provided by the market (Löschel et al. 2010).(1) >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Andreas Löschel, Bodo Sturm, und Carsten Vogt. 2010. Die reale Zahlungsbereitschaft für Klimaschutz. Wirtschaftsdienst 90 (11): 749– 753. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Climate Targets | Caney | Norgaard I 327 Climate Targets/Rights/Gardiner/Caney: Stephen Gardiner (2006)(1) [is] arguing that the interests at risk from potentially catastrophic climate change vastly outweigh considerations of reduced economic growth. Others, notably Simon Caney (2005a(2), 2009(3)), have argued that the right to a stable climate should be considered a fundamental human right, because the basic interests of life, health, subsistence, and security of place, all of which are endangered by climate change, are the foundations of both moral and legal human rights. Neither Gardiner nor Caney endorse particular targets, but their arguments would seem to support the most stringent targets currently entertained in the policy debates (e.g. reduction of CO2 concentrations to 350 ppm, well below today's levels). Rights/Utilitarianism/VsGardiner/VsCaney: One counterargument is that loss of life is commonplace and should simply be treated as one more economic cost; otherwise resources will be wasted on climate mitigation that could save more lives through other means, such as the reduction of malaria (Schelling 1997(4); Lomborg 2006(5)). Yet it also seems wrong to say that we'll let millions of people die from Norgaard I 328 pollution because we can spend part of the savings preventing harms to others more cheaply. There is, it seems, a fundamental tension between the utilitarian intuition that the sum of all suffering is what matters and the intuition about rights that what matters is precisely who is exposed to harm or risk and why (Baer and Sagar 2009(6)). >Utilitarianism. Climate Targets: A consensus has gradually emerged that we should aim to keep temperature increase below 2 °C above pre‐industrial; yet many of the least developed countries and small island states now argue that the objective should be 1.5 °C. However, the emissions reduction pledges made by various nations through June of 2010 seem to fall far short of meeting even a 2°C objective, suggesting that, whatever the rhetoric, national economic interests still take precedence over global justice concerns. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Gardiner, S. M. 2006. A core precautionary principle. Journal of Political Philosophy 14: 33–60. 2. Caney, S. 2005a. Cosmopolitan justice, responsibility and climate change. Leiden Journal of International Law 18: 747–75. 3. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Schelling, T. C. 1997. The cost of combating global warming: Facing the tradeoffs. Foreign Affairs 76: 8–14. 5. Lomborg, B. (ed.) 2006. How to Spend $50 Billion to Make the World a Better Place. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Baer; P. and A. Sagar 2009. Ethics, rights and responsibilities. Pp. 262–9 in S. H. Schneider, A. Rosencranz, and M. D. Mastrandrea (eds.), Climate Change Science and Policy. Washington, DC: Island Press. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Climate Targets | Gardiner | Norgaard I 327 Climate Targets/Rights/Gardiner/Caney: Stephen Gardiner (2006)(1) [is] arguing that the interests at risk from potentially catastrophic climate change vastly outweigh considerations of reduced economic growth. Others, notably Simon Caney (2005a(2), 2009(3)), have argued that the right to a stable climate should be considered a fundamental human right, because the basic interests of life, health, subsistence, and security of place, all of which are endangered by climate change, are the foundations of both moral and legal human rights. Neither Gardiner nor Caney endorse particular targets, but their arguments would seem to support the most stringent targets currently entertained in the policy debates (e.g. reduction of CO2 concentrations to 350 ppm, well below today's levels). Rights/Utilitarianism/VsGardiner/VsCaney: One counterargument is that loss of life is commonplace and should simply be treated as one more economic cost; otherwise resources will be wasted on climate mitigation that could save more lives through other means, such as the reduction of malaria (Schelling 1997(4); Lomborg 2006(5)). Yet it also seems wrong to say that we'll let millions of people die from Norgaard I 328 pollution because we can spend part of the savings preventing harms to others more cheaply. There is, it seems, a fundamental tension between the utilitarian intuition that the sum of all suffering is what matters and the intuition about rights that what matters is precisely who is exposed to harm or risk and why (Baer and Sagar 2009(6)). >Utilitarianism. Climate Targets: A consensus has gradually emerged that we should aim to keep temperature increase below 2 °C above pre‐industrial; yet many of the least developed countries and small island states now argue that the objective should be 1.5 °C. However, the emissions reduction pledges made by various nations through June of 2010 seem to fall far short of meeting even a 2°C objective, suggesting that, whatever the rhetoric, national economic interests still take precedence over global justice concerns. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Gardiner, S. M. 2006. A core precautionary principle. Journal of Political Philosophy 14: 33–60. 2. Caney, S. 2005a. Cosmopolitan justice, responsibility and climate change. Leiden Journal of International Law 18: 747–75. 3. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Schelling, T. C. 1997. The cost of combating global warming: Facing the tradeoffs. Foreign Affairs 76: 8–14. 5. Lomborg, B. (ed.) 2006. How to Spend $50 Billion to Make the World a Better Place. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Baer; P. and A. Sagar 2009. Ethics, rights and responsibilities. Pp. 262–9 in S. H. Schneider, A. Rosencranz, and M. D. Mastrandrea (eds.), Climate Change Science and Policy. Washington, DC: Island Press. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Club (Organization) | Buchanan | Boudreaux I 43 Clubs/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: a) For a given membership size, there will be an optimal size of the club good. b) Similarly, for a given size of the club good, there will be an optimal size of the club’s membership. Buchanan solves these two issues simultaneously to show that the club has an optimal membership size and an optimal quantity, or size, of the club good. >Social goods, >Collective goods. Social goods/Buchanan: In this way, Buchanan’s theory of clubs provides a more realistic and complete depiction of the “publicness” of various goods. Viewed as an explanation of actual clubs, Buchanan’s theory sheds light on the reason they are organized as they are. His theory of clubs also sheds some light on the way that collective organizations, more generally, should be designed. Government/Federalism/Buchanan: Buchanan develops his theory explicitly around clubs, but it’s clear that the theory applies also to governments and lays a foundation for a theory of federalism. Club goods have an optimal size and an optimal sharing group, and different goods have different optimal sizes and sharing groups. Thus, his theory provides a sound rationale for having a federal system of governance with governments at different levels. A park or a library can be shared by people who live nearby, so the optimal sharing group typically will be smaller than the optimal sharing group for national defense - a good that exhibits significant economies of scale. Bigger armies with more powerful weapons have an advantage over smaller armies, so the optimal sharing group for national defense is larger than for parks and libraries. Similarly, the optimal sharing group for higher education is larger than for elementary education, so elementary education is produced at the local level while higher education is often produced at the state or national level. Some nations, and some states and provinces, have governments that are more centralized than others. Boudreaux I 44 If government is going to produce goods for collective consumption, Buchanan’s theory of clubs offers guidance on the optimal degree of centralization, and at what level various collectively consumed goods are most efficiently produced. The first question to answer is: What is the optimally sized sharing group for that particular good? >Federalism/Buchanan, >Government policy/Buchanan, >Government. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 |
| Coase Theorem | Economic Theories | Parisi I 90 Coase theorem/Economic theories/Sullivan/Holt: The first and most influential work applying experimental methods in studying the Coase Theorem is that of Hoffman and Spitzer (1982)(1). The methodology of this early study has become a jumping-off point for much of the subsequent literature. Experiment/method: After being randomly divided into pairs and assigned identities as A or B, one subject in each pair was randomly selected to be the “controller.” This subject had unilateral authority to select the “number” that would determine experimental payments;(...). Rather than select the number in isolation, however, each controller was permitted to confer face to face with their partner. In these conferences, subjects could complete binding agreements stipulating how final payments would be allocated after a number was selected. Parisi I 91 Controller Choice – Payoff Functions „number“ 0 - Payout to A ($) 0,00 - Payout to B ($) 12.00 „number“ 1 - Payout to A ($) 4.00 - Payout to B ($) 10.00 „number“ 2 - Payout to A ($) 6.00 - Payout to B ($) 6.00 „number“ 3 - Payout to A ($) 8.00 - Payout to B ($) 4.00 „number“ 4 - Payout to A ($) 9.00 - Payout to B ($) 2.00 „number“ 5. - Payout to A ($)10.00 - Payout to B ($) 1.00 „number“ 6 - Payout to A ($) 11.00 - Payout to B ($) 0.00 Source: Hoffman and Spitzer (1982)(1) p.86. Sullivan/Holt: In case it isn’t obvious, this design is an abstract and context-neutral analog of the ideal Coasean bargaining environment with no impediments to bargaining. The socially optimal outcome is number 1, yielding a total payoff of $14.00. Under the circumstances, the Coase Theorem predicts that subjects should negotiate side payments to incentivize selection of number 1 irrespective of the property right, that is, of whether A or B is selected to be the controller. Summarizing data collected in the above treatment as well as others involving three-party bargaining and alternative information structures, Hoffman and Spitzer (1982)(1) find clear support for the Coase Theorem: the efficient outcome is by far the most frequent choice. Somewhat surprisingly, subjects also frequently divide profits evenly, despite the controller’s ostensibly strong bargaining advantage in this design. Several subsequent experiments have demonstrated the causality and empirical robustness of the Coase Theorem’s predictions. Causality: For example, support for the Coase Theorem does not diminish when group size becomes as large as 20 subjects (Hoffman and Spitzer, 1986)(2), when the controller is assigned by competition rather than random chance (Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985)(3), or when asymmetric payoffs or even physical discomfort are involved in negotiation (Coursey, Hoffman, and Spitzer, 1987)(4). Importantly, Coasean bargaining appears to drive these results, as socially efficient outcomes are not usually observed when the design is altered to eliminate the negotiation of side payments (Harrison and McKee, 1985)(5). Transaction costs: (...) just as important as verification of the Coase Theorem under low transaction costs is the task of charting transaction costs sufficient to defeat the efficient reallocation of rights through private bargaining (Coase, 1992(6), p. 717). An early experiment by Schwab (1988)(7) stakes a peg well into the field of transaction-costs-through-complexity. Information asymmetry: Framing bargaining in the rich context of a collective bargaining agreement, the experiment provided subjects with multiple dimensions of value to negotiate over (wages, vacation time, noise reduction, and a “relocation clause”), introduced incomplete information (subjects could state their preferences, but could not reveal their actual payoff schedules), and admitted multiple Pareto efficient outcomes. Few subjects, in this experiment, were able to negotiate their way to socially optimal outcomes. >Coase theorem/Kahneman. Endowment effect: One consideration is the endowment effect - the tendency of property owners to value assets more than prospective buyers (Kahneman et al., 1991)(8).* Merely changing the basic experiment so that bargaining concerns the controller’s ownership of a tangible chocolate bar significantly reduces subjects’ ability to negotiate an efficient reallocation of property rights (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990)(10). Efficiency: Experiments also show reduced allocative efficiency when the process of bargaining entails explicit negotiation costs (Rhoads and Shogren, 1999)(11) and when negotiators operate under asymmetric information (McKelvey and Page, 2000)(12). Uncertainty: Interestingly, there is some evidence that uncertain property rights may actually increase efficiency by incentivizing negotiation as opposed to entrenchment (Cherry and Shogren, 2005(13); see also Croson and Johnston, 2000(14). * Experimental evidence is not fully supportive of the endowment effect. For an extensive survey and critique, see Klass and Zeiler (2013)(9). 1. Hoffman, E. and M. L. Spitzer (1982). “The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests.” Journal of Law and Economics 25(1): 73–98. 2. Hoffman, E. and M. L. Spitzer (1986). “Experimental Tests of the Coase Theorem with Large Bargaining Groups.” Journal of Legal Studies 15(1): 149–171. 3. Hoffman, E. and M. L. Spitzer (1985). “Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects’ Concepts of Distributive Justice.” Journal of Legal Studies 14(2): 259–297. 4. Coursey, D. L., E. Hoffman, and M. L. Spitzer (1987). “Fear and Loathing in the Coase Theorem: Experimental Tests Involving Physical Discomfort.” Journal of Legal Studies 16: 217–248. 5. Harrison, G. W. and M. McKee (1985). “Experimental Evaluation of the Coase Theorem.” Journal of Law and Economics 28(3): 653–670. 6. Coase, R. H. (1992). “The Institutional Structure of Production.” American Economic Review 82(4): 713–719. 7. Schwab, S. (1988). “A Coasean experiment on contract presumptions.” Journal of Legal Studies 17(2): 237–268. 8. Kahneman, D., J. L. Knetsch, and R. H. Thaler (1991). “Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(1): 193–206. 9. Klass, G. and K. Zeiler (2013). “Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics and Legal Scholarship.” UCLA Law Review 61: 2–64. 10. Kahneman, D., J. L. Knetsch, and R. H. Thaler (1990). “Experimental tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem.” Journal of Political Economy 98(6): 1325–1348. 11. Rhoads, T. A. and J. F. Shogren (1999). “On Coasean Bargaining with Transaction Costs.” Applied Economics Letters 6: 779–783. 12. McKelvey, R. D. and T. Page (2000). “An Experimental Study of the Effect of Private Information in the Coase Theorem.” Experimental Economics 3(3): 187–213. 13. Cherry, T. L. and J. F. Shogren (2005). “Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security.” Environmental & Resource Economics 31(3): 349–367. 14. Croson, R. and J. S. Johnston (2000). “Experimental Results on Bargaining Under Alternative Property Rights Regimes.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 16(1): 50–73. Sullivan, Sean P. and Charles A. Holt. „Experimental Economics and the Law“ In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Coase Theorem | Miceli | Parisi I 19 Coase theorem/Miceli: Coase’s original motivation in writing his seminal paper on externalities(1) was to offer a critique of the Pigovian view, which asserted that some form of government intervention (taxes, fines, or liability) was required to internalize external harm, such as that caused by straying cattle or railroad sparks. Causation/Pigou: Absent such intervention, the Pigovian view maintained, the “cause” of the harm (the rancher or the railroad) would over-engage in the harmful activity. CoaseVsPigou: Coase challenged this view by first noting that causation is reciprocal in the sense that both the injurer and victim must be present for an accident to occur. The designation of one party as the “injurer” is therefore arbitrary and in fact represents an implicit awarding of the right to be free from harm to the other party (the “victim”). Pigovian view: (...) the farmer has the right to be free from crop damage - whether from straying cattle or spewing sparks - and so the rancher or the railroad should be compelled to pay the farmer’s cost. Problem: (...) suppose the farmer-victim is in a better position to avoid the harm, say by moving his crops or not locating near the railroad or ranch in the first place. In that case, the designation of the rancher/railroad as the injurer may actually preclude the identification of more efficient ways of avoiding the harm. Coase’s point in raising the causation issue was to evaluate the conditions under which court-imposed liability is needed to internalize the external harm. Suppose, for example, that in the rancher–farmer dispute the court does not intervene to assign liability to the rancher. Does that necessarily mean that the rancher’s herd will expand inefficiently? Marginal benefit/marginal cost: The answer, of course, is no, provided that the parties can bargain, because if bargaining is possible, the farmer would be able to bribe the rancher to reduce the herd to the point where the marginal benefit from the last cow equals the marginal cost. In this case, property rights in straying cattle effectively belong to the rancher, and the farmer has to “purchase” them, which he will do up to the point where the two parties value the last cow equally. VsPigovian view: Note that this is the reverse of what happens under the Pigovian solution, where the farmer is (implicitly) awarded rights to the straying cattle and the rancher has to purchase them by paying the court-imposed damages. Efficiency: In both cases, however, the outcome will be efficient. Coase: This conclusion - that the initial assignment of property rights does not affect the final distribution of resources, which is efficient - is the Coase Theorem. External costs: [Key point]: When the conditions for the Coase Theorem are satisfied - that is, when bargaining is possible - the assignment of liability for external harms does not affect efficiency because the parties will rearrange any initial assignment of rights to the point where the gains from trade are exhausted. In this sense, the law does not matter for efficiency (though it does affect the distribution of wealth).* Law: When bargaining is not possible, in contrast, the law does matter because the parties will not be able to rearrange inefficient assignments of rights. As a result, the law must be designed with the explicit goal of efficiency in mind. In this way, the Coase Theorem defines the efficient scope for legal intervention (Demsetz, 1972)(2). >Liability/Calabresi/Melamed. * The conclusion that the efficient allocation of resources will be achieved regardless of the initial assignment of legal rights mirrors the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, which says that market exchange will be efficient regardless of how property rights are initially assigned. The >Coase Theorem thus shows that externalities need not preclude this outcome as long as bargaining costs are low. Cf. >Liability/Calabresi/Melamed. 1. Coase, Ronald (1960). “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1–44. 2. Demsetz, Harold (1972). “When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?” Journal of Legal Studies 1: 13 - 28. Miceli, Thomas J. „Economic Models of Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Coase Theorem | Stigler | Kiesling I 24 Coase Theorem/Stigler/Kiesling: While [Ronald] Coase(1) focused on the pervasiveness of transaction costs, his colleague George Stigler interpreted Coase’s emphasis differently (see Posner’s (2017(2)) discussion). >Social cost/Coase, >Transation costs/Coase. Stigler articulated what he called “the Coase Theorem”: when transaction costs are zero, the specific assignment of legal liability or the definition of property rights does not change the ability of parties to achieve the most efficient outcome, although it will change the distribution of realized costs and benefits. In a situation where there are no transaction costs, the precise definition of property rights does not affect the ability of the parties to find the efficient distribution of rights and efficient use of the resource. Kiesling I 25 Problem: In that setting, the only effect that the specific property rights definition has is on the distribution of costs and benefits, not on the ability to achieve the most efficient outcome. Using the paper mill and water treatment plant example, if the efficient outcome is for the paper mill to install a filter, if they face no transaction costs then discovering that efficient outcome through bargaining is easy and costless. What the court’s definition of rights and liabilities does in this case is to determine who pays for the filter that the paper mill installs. VsStigler: Although Stigler’s Coase Theorem has gathered considerable attention over the past four decades, it rather misses Coase’s point that courts and legal precedent are important precisely because transaction costs are pervasive and often high enough to prevent mutually-beneficial exchange. >Law/Coase, >Information/Coase. “The So-Called Coase Theorem” (McCloskey, 1998)(3) also misses the point to the extent that Coase’s emphasis was not on idealized models with transaction costs assumed to be zero, but was entirely on real-world situations where coordination has to create feasible institutional frameworks to manage conflict resolution in the presence of positive transaction costs. Although it the Coase Theorem provides a concrete theoretical benchmark, focusing on the unrealistic zero transaction cost case is a bit too close to the “blackboard economics” that Coase so criticized. >Law and economics. 1. Coase, Ronald H. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1-44. 2. Posner, Eric A. (2017). Coase Theorem. In Bruno Frey and David Iselin (eds.), Economic Ideas You Should Forget. Springer: 101-103. 3. McCloskey, Deirdre (1998). The So-Called Coase Theorem. Eastern Economic Journal 24, 3: 367-371. |
EconStigler I George J. Stigler Gary S. Becker De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum 1977 Kiesling I L. Lynne Kiesling The Essential Ronald Coase Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2021 |
| Cobb-Douglas Production Function | Phelps Brown | Harcourt I 87 Cobb-Douglas Production funtion/Phelps Brown/Harcourt: There is no reported instance, as there is of one man's confrontation with the binomial theorem, of anyone being reduced to tears by the sight of Cobb-Douglas 'because it is so beautiful' - but clearly many members of the trade have had lumps in their throats, even as seasoned a campaigner as Phelps Brown: see Phelps Brown [1968](1), Phelps Brown with Browne [1968](2), pp. 337-8. Technical progress: After a masterly survey of alternative theories of distribution and of the distribution of the product (of manufacturing industry) between pay and profits in five advanced industrial economies, he selects as the best explanation of the stylized facts thrown up by his researches - a constant rate of profits of 10 per cent per annum, a share of pay in product of 75 per cent, and a steady capital-output ratio of two and a half-a Cobb-Douglas constant-returns-to-scale aggregate production function allied with neutral technical progress. He couples them with a new twist - a perfectly elastic supply curve of savings at a rate of profits of 10 per cent. Marginal product of capital: The exponents of the Cobb-Douglas are such as to give a marginal product of capital (equals the rate of profits) of 10 per cent and also the values of the other observed 'great ratios'. The wage of labour (equals its marginal product) grows at the same rate as average productivity. The rate of profits is determined, along with the capitallabour ratio, by the intersection of the demand curve for investment (with a little juggling and licence, the marginal product of capital curve) with the perfectly elastic supply curve of savings. The rate of profits therefore remains constant, thus suggesting that the fruits of progress go entirely to labour. Harcourt: This, however, is an anti-wage-earner way of putting it; if the profit-receivers breed less fast than the wage-earners, because they have either more sense or less vitality, their income per head will rise faster than that of the lower classes. Harcourt I 88 Elasticity: The perfectly elastic supply curve of savings reflects Phelps Brown's vision that liberal capitalism provides the appropriate environment in which enterprise may flourish and produce this response. His model - if correct - provides the justification for Johansen's factual assumptions(3). It is, however, a little surprising that Phelps Brown should have such faith in the present hypothesis, especially when we consider the formidable arguments of his earlier paper on the CobbDouglas, see Phelps Brown [1957](4), arguments which subsequently have been reinforced by the recent work of F. M. Fisher, see F. M. Fisher [1969(5), 1970(6)] (…). 1. Phelps Brown, E. H. [1968] Pay and Profits (Manchester: Manchester University Press). 2. Phelps Brown, E. H. with Browne, Margaret H. [1968] A Century of Pay (London: Macmillan). 3. Johansen, L. [1959] 'Substitution versus Fixed Production Coefficients in the Theory of Economic Growth: A Synthesis', Econometrica, XXVII, pp. 157-76. 4. Phelps Brown, E. H. [1957] 'The Meaning of the Fitted Cobb-Douglas Production Function', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXI, pp. 546-60. 5. Fisher, F. M. [1969] 'The Existence of Aggregate Production Functions', Econometrica, xxxvn, pp. 553-77. 6. Fisher, F. M. [1970] 'Aggregate Production Functions and the Explanation of Wages: A Simulation Experiment', Working Paper 61, Department of Economics, M.I.T. |
Phelps Brown I Henry Phelps Brown Egalitarianism and the Generation of Inequality Oxford 1988 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Code | Eco | II 19 Code/Miller/Eco: according to Miller (G. Miller, 1951(1)), we define code as any system of symbols intended by prior agreement to represent the information and transmit it between source and destination. >Information. II 130 Code is: a) a system of significant units and their combinations, b) a system of semantic systems and rules of semantic combination of the different units (differentiated by their semantic components and compatible or incompatible) c) a system of their possible couplings and the rules of transformation from one to the other and d) a repertoire of rules of fact which provide for different communication circumstances corresponding to different interpretations. Footnote: one could also say that the code involves: a) the morphological systems, b) the grammatical rules, c) the semantic systems, d) the rules of coupling and transition between morphological and semantic systems and e) the rules of semantic projection. II 132 Eco: the description of codes as currently functioning can almost always only be carried out on the occasion of examining the communication circumstances of a particular message. II 142 A semiotic judgment says what the code says. A factual judgment says what the code does not provide and enriches the code. >Grammar, >Semantics, >Rules, >Systems, >Symbols, >Syntax. 1. G. Miller, Language and Communication, NY, 1951 |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Cognition | Chalmers | I 111 Cognition/explanation/consciousness/cognitive models/Chalmers: Cognitive models are very good when it comes to explaining things like learning and behavior, but not in the explanation of conscious experience. >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Learning, >Experiencing. In all that is cognitively explained, the question remains why it is accompanied by something like consciousness. I 112 Cognitive models can certainly cover the psychological side of consciousness (behavior explaining, learning, information processing), but not the phenomenal side of conscious experience. I 113 Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmers: Dennett (1978c) (1) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory,... I 114 ...control unit and module for "public relations": for implementation in everyday language. ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model. >Knowledge how. Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991) without a central "headquarter". >Awareness/Chalmers. ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience. Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows is still everything it needs to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the different functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a (2), p.210) and Chalmers I 370. Cognitive Models/Chalmers: There are also models by Churchland, (1995)(3), Johnson-Laird (1988)(4), Shallice (1972 (5), 1988a, 1988b). ChalmersVs: to all applies my criticism VsDennett from above. I 172 Cognition/Chalmers: it is wrong to assume that it is separate from consciousness, even if it belongs to another sphere (the physical). For example, one has a (physical) perception of something green which is psychologically individualized. On the other hand, we also have perceptions about our consciousness. I 218 Cognition/consciousness/psychology/Chalmers: the coherence between conscious experience and cognitive structures is remarkable. We can recognize principles: Principles: 1. Reliability principle: Our judgments of the second level about consciousness are generally correct. I 219 If I judge that I hear something, then I usually hear something. 2. The principle of deducibility (reversed reliability principle): although many experiences often escape us, we usually have the ability to notice them. I 222/223 3. Principle of structural coherence: conscious phenomenal experiences are always accompanied by (appropriately characterized) psychological consciousness. I 223 E.g. Structural features of the facial field are reflected in our experiences of larger and smaller, brighter, darker, etc. objects, and also in our reactions to them. This also applies to implicit structures such as relations between colors. Cf. >Cognitive Psychology. 1. D. Dennett, Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness. In: D. Dennett, Brainsorms, Cabridge 1978. 2. D. Dennett, Back from the drawing board. In: B. Dahlbom (Ed) Dennett and His Critics, Oxford 1993. 3. P. M. Churchland, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain. Cambridge 1995. 4. P. Johnson-Laird, A computational analysis of consciousness. Cognition and Brain Theory 6, 1983: pp. 499-508 5. T. Shallice, Dual funtions of consciousness. Psychological Review 79, 1972: pp. 383-93; Information-precessing models of consciousness: Possibilities and problems. In: A. Marcel and E. Bisach (Eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford 1988. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Cognition | Dennett | Chalmers I 113 Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmer: Dennett (1978c)(1) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory, I 114 control unit and module for "public relations": for the implementation in everyday language. ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model. Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991)(2) without a central "headquarter". ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience. Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows, is nevertheless everything it takes to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the various functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a(3), p.210) and (FN9/Chapter 3) Cognitive Models/Chalmers: there are also models by Churchland, (1995)(4), Johnson-Laird (1988)(5), Shallice (1972(6), 1988a(7), 1988b(8)). ChalmersVs: my criticism VsDennett from above applies to all. 1. Dennett, D. Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness. In: D. Dennett, Brainsorms, Cabridge 1978. 2. Dennett, D. Consciousness explained. Little, Brown and Co., Boston 1991 3. Dennett, D. Back from the drawing board. In: B. Dahlbom (Ed) Dennett and His Critics, Oxford 1993. 4. Churchland, P. M. The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain. Cambridge 1995. 5. Johnson-Laird, P. A computational analysis of consciousness. Cognition and Brain Theory 6, 1983: pp. 499-508 6. Shallice, T., Dual funtions of consciousness. Psychological Review 79, 1972: pp. 383-93; Information-precessing models of consciousness: Possibilities and problems. In: A. Marcel and E. Bisach (Eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford 1988. 7. Shallice, T. Information-precessing models of consciousness: Possibilities and problems. In: A. Marcel and E. Bisach (Eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford 1988. 8. Shallice, T. From Neuropsychology toMental structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Cognition | Maturana | I 67 Def Cognitive Area/Maturana: entire interaction area of the body - can be extended indefinitely when new forms of interaction are created, it is enlarged with instruments. >Actions, >Domains/Maturana. I 78 Described things lie exclusively in the cognitive area - i.e. it is not part of the area that is to describe - (level) >Description levels. I 81 Cognition/Maturana: generation of a closed interaction area, not comprehension of an independent outside world. >Outer world, >Exterior/interior. Conclusion: Conclusions are necessary function results from the self-referential circular organization. - They are history-independent, because time itself is only part of the cognitive area of the ((s) second) observer. >Observation/Maturana, >Circularity, >Self-reference, >Time. I 146 Cognition/Maturana: Isolation of an area and call for appropriate behavior - only criterion: this appropriate behavior - it must be explained when cognition must be explained. >Explanation/Maturana. I 200 Cognition/Maturana: condition of realization (of the structural coupling) - not unveiling a reality, representation or description of "something". >Structural coupling, >Reality, >Representation. I 202 Cognitive Area/Maturana: with humans: language - humans exist in the range of objects that produce themselves through language actions - objects: do not exist outside language >Language, >Objects, >Domains/Maturana. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Cognition | Papineau | I 273 Cognition/space/spatial orientation/content/animal/Papineau: Many birds and insects do not have egocentric maps of their environments. Nevertheless, this is not necessary purpose-means-thinking. It depends on how they use these maps! >Map example, >Animals/Papineau, >Thinking without language, >World/thinking, >Thinking. For example, they might just simply draw a straight line from their respective position to the destination, which would not be purpose-means-thinking. For example, it would be purpose-means-thinking if they were to use cognition to imagine a continuous path, which avoids all obstacles, from their initial position within the non-egocentric map, and then decide to take this path. This would be a combination of causal individual information. >Purposes/Papineau. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| Cognitive Biases | Economic Theories | Parisi I 65 Cognitive biases/non-knowledge/non-optimization/bounded rationality/economic theories/Jolls: David Friedman’s (2013)(1) analysis of the background for the New York City “soda law” develops both types of accounts [nonomniscience and nonoptimization]. >Bounded rationality/Simon. Nonomniscience: With respect to nonomniscience, Friedman describes how optimism bias leads individuals to underestimate “obesity … and other consequences” of supersized sugary drink consumption (Friedman, 2013(1), p. 94). Nonoptimization: With respect to nonoptimization, Friedman quotes former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s suggestion that the “soda law” was “really just a suggestion” that would tend to rechannel decision-making by satisficing or otherwise nonoptimizing decision-makers (...). Jolls: Note that in the case of such relatively unthinking or satisficing consumers, nonoptimization may itself contribute to nonomniscience, as individuals who consume in a reflexive manner may be unlikely to obtain and accurately process information relevant to consumption patterns. >Bounded rationality. Bounded rationality/Jolls: Although nonomniscience and nonoptimization are joined in Friedman’s analysis, there is once again no necessary implication that the two aspects of bounded rationality occasion similar normative analyses. Friedman’s own focus is on how the New York “soda law” transcended the specific, discrete parameters of the law’s nominal terms and became a subject of sweeping national debate over freedom and responsibility. >Bounded rationality/Jolls. Parisi I 66 Debiasing strategies: see Farnsworth, 2003(2); Jolls and Sunstein, 2006(3); Heller, 2009(4); Williams, 2009(5); Jolls, 2013a(6); Jolls, 2013b(7)). Parisi I 67 Optimism bias/legal limits for consumers: (...)optimism bias may lead many consumers to underestimate their personal risk (...).Accordingly, optimism bias (perhaps in conjunction with other factors) may justify legal limits on consumer transactions; the law may seek to minimize the negative effects of consumer nonomniscience while presuming that such nonomniscience itself will persist (for example, Prentice and Roszkowski, 1991–92)(8). However, such an effort may impose large costs of its own, as Schwartz (1988)(9) and others have suggested. An alternative to such an approach is to use the law to reduce the degree of consumer nonomniscience in the first instance. (...) not all forms of bounded rationality respond to debiasing strategies (for example, Weinstein and Klein, 2002)(10); but in contexts in which social science evidence suggests such strategies can succeed (for example, Babcock, Loewenstein, and Issacharoff, 1997)(11), law can employ these strategies to reduce consumer nonomniscience. >Availability heuristic/Economic theories, >Risk perception/Economic theories, >Optimism bias/Economic theories. 1. Friedman, David Adam (2013). “Micropaternalism.” Tulane Law Review 88: 75–126. 2. Farnsworth, Ward (2003). “The Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias.” U.C. Davis Law Review 37: 567–603. 3. Jolls, Christine and Cass R. Sunstein (2006). “Debiasing through Law.” Journal of Legal Studies 35: 199–241. 4. Heller, Kevin Jon (2009). “The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Rea.” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 99: 317–379. 5. Williams, Sean Hannon (2009). “Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use.” Notre Dame Law Review 84: 733–791. 6. Jolls, Christine (2013a). “Product Warnings, Debiasing, and Free Speech: The Case of Tobacco Regulation.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 169: 53–78. 7. Jolls, Christine (2013b). “Bias and the Law of the Workplace,” in Cynthia L. Estlund and Michael L. Wachter, eds., Research Handbook on the Economics of Labor and Employment Law, 275–295. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 8. Prentice, Robert A. and Mark E. Roszkowski (1991–92). “‘Tort Reform’ and the Liability ‘Revolution’: Defending Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products.” Gonzaga Law Review 27: 251–302. 9. Schwartz, Alan (1988). “Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis.” Yale Law Journal 97: 353–419. 10. Weinstein, Neil D. and William M. Klein (2002). “Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to Debiasing Interventions,” in Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, eds., Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, 313–323. New York: Cambridge University Press. 11. Babcock, Linda, George Loewenstein, and Samuel Issacharoff (1997). “Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants.” Law and Social Inquiry 22: 913–925. Jolls, Christine, „Bounded Rationality, Behavioral Economics, and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Cognitive Biases | Experimental Economics | Parisi I 93 Cognitive biases/Experimental psychology/Sullivan/Holt: [an] observation in economics experiments is the general inability of informed subjects to introspectively reproduce the judgments of relatively uninformed subjects, even when incentivized to do so - a phenomenon termed the curse of knowledge (Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber, 1989(1)). Hindsight bias/experiments: Unfortunately, substantial experimental evidence indicates that people are not very good at this type of ex post assessment of ex ante probabilities. A particularly uncomfortable problem is hindsight bias - the tendency of people who observe the outcome of a random event to overstate the ex ante probability of that outcome’s occurrence (Fischhoff, 1975(2); Slovic and Fischhoff, 1977(3)). Information asymmetry/introspection: A closely related observation in economics experiments is the general inability of informed subjects to introspectively reproduce the judgments of relatively uninformed subjects, even when incentivized to do so - a phenomenon termed the curse of knowledge (Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber, 1989(1)). >Introspection, >Knowledge, >Behavior. a) One way to interpret these results is as a fundamental strike against the validity of culpability determinations under the negligence standard: even the most well-intentioned jurors will be structurally biased toward overstating the dangerousness of the defendant’s conduct, all else equal. b) Alternatively, and more constructively, economic experiments could be seen as a tool for understanding and remedying judgment biases that undermine the standard. Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber (1989)(1), for example, find that participation in a market structure helps to partially reduce the curse of knowledge. Whether jury deliberation performs a similar function is an open empirical question. Similarly, a recent economic experiment by Wu et al. (2012)(4) suggests that providing informed Parisi I 94 subjects with specific details about the evaluative process used by an uninformed subject may help to substantially reduce hindsight bias when the informed subject attempts to assess the judgment of the uninformed subject. Hindsight bias: (...) the influence of hindsight bias on fact-finding is not limited to actions in negligence. Mandel (2006)(5) considers hindsight bias in patent applications, for example, but the problem should be expected to arise generically whenever the fact-finder is required to consider the ex ante probability of an ex post known outcome. Baysian updating: (...) hindsight bias is not the only judgment bias implicating probability determinations under the negligence standard (see e.g. Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982)(6). Experimental evidence of the difficulty of Bayesian updating (Grether 1992(7); see also Koehler and Kaye, 1991(8)) and possible workarounds (e.g. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995(9)) are particularly on-point. 1. Camerer, C., G. Loewenstein, and M. Weber (1989). “The curse of knowledge in economic settings: An experimental analysis.” Journal of Political Economy 97(5): 1232–1254. 2. Fischhoff, B. F. (1975). “Hindsight ≠ Foresight: the Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment under Uncertainty.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 1(3): 288–299. 3. Slovic, P. and B. Fischhoff (1977). “On the Psychology of Experimental Surprises.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 3(4): 544–551. 4. Wu, D. A., S. Shimojo, S. W. Wang, and C. F. Camerer (2012). “Shared visual attention reduces hindsight bias.” Psychological Science 23(12): 1524–1533. 5. Mandel, G. N. (2006). “Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration That the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational.” Ohio State Law Journal 67: 1391–1463. 6. Kahneman, D., P. Slovic, and A. Tversky (1982). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7. Grether, D. M. (1992). “Testing Bayes Rule and the Representativeness Heuristic: Some Experimental Evidence.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 17(1): 31–57. 8. Koehler, J. J. and D. H. Kaye (1991). “Can Jurors Understand Probabilistic Evidence?” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A 154(1): 75–81. 9. Gigerenzer, G. and U. Hoffrage (1995). “How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning Without Instruction: Frequency Formats.” Psychological Review 102(4): 684–704. Sullivan, Sean P. and Charles A. Holt. „Experimental Economics and the Law“ In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Cognitive Biases | Matthews | Corr I 410 Cognitive Bias/selective attention/cognitive psychology/Matthews: Unconscious bias: is bias unconscious or does it reflect a voluntary strategy of active search for potential threats? (See Matthews and Wells 2000(1)). It is plausible that both types of process may be involved. Mathews and Mackintosh (1998)(2) proposed a dual-process approach, within which bias is produced initially by an automatic threat evaluation system, but may be compensated by voluntary effort. Anxiety: Evidence for an automatic process comes from studies showing that anxiety-related bias in attention may be demonstrated even when stimuli are presented subliminally so that they cannot be consciously perceived (Fox 1996)(3). On the other hand, bias appears to be sensitive to conscious expectancies and operates over a longer time period than a simple automatic bias would predict (Matthews and Wells 2000(1); Phaf and Kan 2007)(4). Other studies have confirmed that anxious persons tend to ‘lock onto’ potential sources of threat and are slow to disengage attention (Derryberry and Reed 1997(5), 2002(6)). Anxiety effects are not restricted to slower disengagement, and various other specific attentional mechanisms are implicated (Calvo and Avero 2005(7); Matthews, Derryberry and Siegle 2000(8)). Thus, attentional bias may be a product of several interacting processes, and careful computational modelling may be needed to understand this anxiety effect (Hudlicka 2004)(9). >Anxiety, >Attention, >Selective attention, >Memory, >Performance, >Information processing, >Personality, >Personality traits, 1. Matthews, G. and Wells, A. 2000. Attention, automaticity and affective disorder, Behaviour Modification 24: 69–93 2. Mathews, A. and Mackintosh, B. 1998. A cognitive model of selective processing in anxiety, Cognitive Therapy and Research 22: 539–60 3. Fox, E. 1996. Selective processing of threatening words in anxiety: the role of awareness, Cognition and Emotion 10: 449–80 4. Phaf, R. H. and Kan, K. 2007. The automaticity of emotional Stroop: a meta-analysis, Journal of Behaviour Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry 38: 184–99 5. Derryberry, D. and Reed, M. A. 1997. Motivational and attentional components of personality, in G. Matthews (ed.), Cognitive science perspectives on personality and emotion, pp. 443–73. Amsterdam: Elsevier 6. Derryberry, D., & Reed, A. 2002. Anxiety-related attentional biases and their regulation by attentional control, Journal of Abnormal Psychology 111: 225–36 7. Calvo, M. G. and Avero, P. 2005. Time course of attentional attentional bias to emotional scenes in anxiety: gaze direction and duration, Cognition and Emotion 19: 433–51 8. Matthews, G., Derryberry, D. and Siegle, G. J. 2000. Personality and emotion: cognitive science perspectives, in S. E. Hampson (ed.), Advances in personality psychology, vol. I, pp. 199–237. London: Routledge 9. Hudlicka, E. 2004. Beyond cognition: modeling emotion in cognitive architectures, in M. Lovett, C. Schunn, C. Lebiere and P. Munro (eds.), Proceedings of the sixth international conference on cognitive modeling, ICCCM 2004, Integrating models, pp. 118–23. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Cognitive Development | Information Processing Theory | Upton I 79 Cognitive Development/Information Processing Theory/Upton: [A] criticism of Piagetian theory is provided by information-processing theory. According to this model of cognitive development, preschoolers are limited by their processing skills rather than their logical reasoning. Cf. >Egocentrism/Piaget. Between the ages of two and four, children are more likely to pay attention to salient characteristics of a task, to the detriment of more relevant ones. Such characteristics distract the child’s attention from the task. Young children are also less systematic in their approach to a task. When asked to compare two complex pictures, they do not necessarily consider all the details before making a judgement (Vurpillot, 1968)(1). (…) preschoolers are impeded by the accuracy and capacity of their short-term memories. Increased myelination in areas that support memory and planning (e.g. the hippocampus and frontal cortex), which occurs during early childhood, is thought to explain why these areas of processing improve during this phase of development (Pujol et al., 2006)(2). >Information Processing. 1. Vurpillot, E. (1968) The development of scanning strategies and their relation to visual differentiation. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 6: 632–50. 2. Pujol, J., Soriano-Mas, C., Ortiz, H., Sebastián-Gallés, N, Losilla, J.M. and Deus, J. (2006) Myelination of language-related areas in the developing brain. Neurology, 66(3): 339–43. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Cognitive Psychology | Social Psychology | Haslam I 231 Cognitive Psychology/Social psychology: Studies of social influence, attitude change and group dynamics had dominated the field of social psychology for the 20 years before 1970. Even though social psychology had always studied mental life, and had avoided the behaviourist domination of experimental psychology that had seen the near banishment of the study of mental phenomena from the psychological laboratory, in the late 1960s and early 1970s a new approach that became known as ‘cognitive psychology’ was starting to dominate psychology. Many cognitive psychologists were armed with the metaphor of the person as a faulty information-processing device and this idea was imported into social psychology in the 1970s. This metaphor implied that as people processed information about the world around them, they made a series of errors (in particular, because they had limited processing capacity) and these had a range of unintended and unfortunate consequences. >Information processing/social psychology. Craig McGarty, „Stereotype Formation. Revisiting Hamilton and Gifford’s illusory correlation studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Cognitivism/ Noncognitivism | Searle | ((s) This entry is not about cognitivism in ethics). I 60ff Cognitive Science (computer model of the mind): the relation of the mind to the brain is like that of a program to the hardware. >Computer model. SearleVsCognition: is the brain like a computer? This not the question. The question is: is the mind like a program? No, it is not. Simulation is, however, possible. The mind has an intrinsical mental content and is therefore not a program. I 226 Church Thesis: simulation on a computer is possible if it is divisible into steps. Searle: if the mind were like weather there would be no problem. >">Simulation, >Church thesis. I 242 SearleVsCognitivism: syntax (or 0 and 1) has no causal powers (unlike e.g. viruses, photosynthesis, etc.). People follow rules consciously: that would be a causal explanation. The computer has no intentional causation. I 251/52 VsCognition: cognition has a much too high level of abstraction. The brain does not process information, but carries out chemical processes. Do not confuse the model with reality. >Information processing/Psychology. See also >cognitivism/ethics. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Coherence | Millikan | I 8 Coherence/Millikan: one will have to explain why coherence is good, how it helps us, not just what it is. Ultimately, this is only possible in a total theory about the world. "New Empiricism"/Millikan: has so far only managed half of his task, it has not succeeded in overcoming the myth of the given, which is embedded in the theory of meaning. >Empiricism. Realism/Millikan: the arguments VsRealism are very simple: VsRealism: "To find the meaning of a word, one must see what would justify its application, or what an application would cause. But the application is justified by earlier applications! And it was caused by past beliefs! ((s) also VsCausal theory, VsCorrespondence theory). >Causal theory of knowledge. >Realism, >Correspondence theory. Correspondence: does not play any role in the justification or the causal explanation of an utterance. So correspondence has nothing to do with the meaning of "true". MillikanVsVs: this can be turned around just as well: Correspondence theory: pro: Correspondence is involved in the nature of truth, because for a sentence to be true means to correspond in a certain way to a part of the world. The fact that correspondence plays no role in the justification of an utterance can equally well be turned around: that the meaning has nothing to do with justification. (Millikan pro!). Sentence Meaning/Meaning/Millikan: are the special mapping functions of the sentence. But since we reject correspondence as a test for truth, the mapping function cannot exist in rules in the head. I 10 It cannot be the "user" who "assumes" that his sentences represent the world so and so. In addition, the "assumes" (the "should") that determines the meaning must be a different "assumes" ("should") than that of "assuming" from a person that it behaves in accordance with the expectation of others according to rules. ("Should behave"). Mapping function/image/meaning/Millikan: the questions become more and more difficult: What kind of things are that that map sentences? What kind of mapping functions are involved? What is the "should"? Knowledge/Self/Meaning/Millikan: if something other than the way, as I justify my utterances, defines my meanings, how can I grasp what I think myself? >Self-knowledge. Thesis: We will have to give up that we know that a priori! We also do not know a priori what we mean. Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of consistency (the essence of coherence) fits into nature. For this I need Fregean sense as the main concept. As one can be mistaken in knowledge, so also in meaning. I 324 Coherence/Millikan: coherence is essentially consistency (consistent, consistency). The lack of contradictions can be a test for the adequacy of terms. Namely, before the theories were developed at all. Perception judgement/repetition/Millikan: if a judgment can be repeated, it is a test in which no conclusion (inference) plays a role at all. Then it is only about coherence (of judgments, not of theories). >Perception, >Judgment. Coherence/Millikan: can therefore also be viewed as a test for truth, without necessitating a holism. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Coincidence | Baudrillard | Blask I 106 Coincidence/Baudrillard/early: two hypotheses: 1. Everything is destined to meet and only coincidence prevents that. 2. All things are independent of one another, and only the coincidence makes that they sometimes meet with one another. >Independence, >Dependence, >World, >World/thinking. --- Blask I 107 These two hypotheses are rejected. Both have no place in the motionless, ceremonial universe of Baudrillard: Coincidence/Baudrillard: There is no coincidence in Baudrillard's ceremonial universe. Nor does there exist a rational concatenation of things or events. Instead, a special kind of arbitrariness governs the world: catastrophic, fatal and diabolic. >Arbitrariness. |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Coincidence | Bieri | I 64 Chance/Bieri: the impression of coincidence is a symptom of the fact that we have not understood the context. >Explanation, >Understanding, >Causal explanation, >Causality, >Causal relation, >Regularity, >Observation, >Method, cf. >Consciousness/Chalmers. |
Bieri I Peter Bieri Was macht Bewusstsein zu einem Rätsel? In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Bieri III P. Bieri Analytische Philosophie des Geistes Weinheim 2007 |
| Coincidence | Cartwright | I 201 Coincidence/Explanation/Causality/Aristotle/Cartwright: (Aristotle, Physica II, Chap. 5): E.g. random meeting in the market square: causal explanation: everyone goes to market with motivations that only apply to themselves, both meet there by chance, because the scheme of motivations and abilities explains the presence of each of them, but not their meeting. Important argument: but that does not mean that the meeting was not a real physical incident, nor does it mean that it could not be predicted from the individual factors. It just means that meeting as meeting has no causal explanation in the scheme. ((s)> "qua"). >Qua-objects, >Explanation, >Causal explanation. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Coincidence | Hacking | I 335 Def Argument of Cosmic Coincidence/Hacking: it would be a coincidence if a theory were wrong, and yet the forecasted phenomena would be correct. >Predictions, >Natural laws. Then we draw the "conclusion to the best explanation", according to which the theory was true. The postulated entities must be the common cause in all cases. >Theories, >Theoretical entities, >Causation, >Causality, >Best Explanation, >Explanations. HackingVs: our argumentation is much more specific. I 336 1) Instead of blood platelets, we speak of "dense bodies". These are also dense without coloring! 2) We are not dealing with explanations here. We see the same constellation of points, regardless of whether we use an optical or an electron microscope. It is not an explanation to say that something you have not yet identified is responsible for a phenomenon. 3) We do not have a comprehensive theory for the whole domain. Coincidence/Hacking: my own coincidence argument merely states that it would be a coincidence if two completely different types of physical systems (microscopes) showed exactly the same constellations of dots. >Observation, >Observation/Duhem, >Method/Duhem, >Observability, >Theories, >Method, > Science. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Coincidence | Kircher | Gould II 75 Coincidence/Explanation/Science/Athanasius Kircher/Gould: In 1678 Athanasius Kircher published a drawing of e.g. Fossils, which show the letters of the alphabet. Later someone showed an agate showing Jesus on the cross. GouldVsKircher, Athanasius: something like this can happen by chance, one can recognize such figures just as well as one can interpret clouds as forms. |
KircherA I Athanasius Kircher China Illustrata With Sacred and Secular Monuments, Various Spectacles of Nature and Art and Other Memorabilia Bloomington, IN 1987 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Coincidence | Nozick | II 302 Random/Nozick: may be an event of a type, then it is not inexplicable. >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Events, >Type/Token, >Occurrence. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Coincidence | Vollmer | II 47 Def Random/Vollmer: post hoc event without energy transfer. >Causality, >Effect, >Cause, >Energy, >Events. II 66 Random/Vollmer: real accidents: e.g. that the disc of the moon exactly covers the disc of the sun. Independent causal chains; it would be pointless to look for an explanation. >Explanations, >Causal explanation. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Collective Action | Ostrom | Brocker I 730 Collective Action/Ostrom: Ostrom starts from the individual and the individual benefit calculations in order to make the results of self-organisation explainable. She uses the approach of Oliver Williamson and his New Institutional Economics(1) >Institutions/Williamson. Williamson: Thesis: the behavioral assumptions of limited rationality and the mutual expectation of opportunistic behavior of the individual shape the decision-making situation ((s) context: in the prisoner's dilemma, the theory assumes that rational participants decide against cooperation). Ostrom: In addition, Ostrom also takes into account the importance of context, time horizon and behavioural norms for individual decisions as a group's social capital. N.B.: in combination of these aspects, the assumption of rational behaviour can be maintained and will nevertheless lead to actors not being able to make decisions independently but in a coordinated manner. (2) See Self-organization/Ostrom. Brocker I 737 Core elements of an analysis of collective actions are for Ostrom: institutional analysis, multi-level consideration and rational election actions. >Social Goods/Ostrom, Self-organisation/Ostrom. 1. Oliver E. Williamson, Die ökonomischen Institutionen des Kapitalismus. Unternehmen, Märkte, Kooperationen, Tübingen 1990 2. Vgl. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge 1990. Dt.: Elinor Ostrom, Die Verfassung der Allmende. Jenseits von Staat und Merkt, Tübingen 1999. Markus Hanisch, „Elinor Ostrom Die Verfassung der Allmende“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOstr I Elinor Ostrom Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action Cambridge 1990 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Collective Goods | De Viti De Marco | Rothbard III 1030 Collective goods/De Viti De Marco/Rothbard: Many attempts have been made (…), to salvage the concept of the "collective" good, to provide a seemingly ironclad, scientific justification for government operations. De Viti De Marco: Antonio De Viti De Marco defined "collective wants" as consisting of two categories: a) wants arising when an individual is not in isolation and b) wants connected with a conflict of interest. RothbardVsDe Viti De Marco: Vs a) The first category, however, is so broad as to encompass most market products. There would be no point, for example, in putting on plays unless a certain number went to see them or in publishing newspapers without a certain wide market. Must all these industries therefore be nationalized and monopolized by the government? Vs b) The second category is presumably meant to apply to defense. This, however, is incorrect. Defense, itself, does not reflect a conflict of interest, but a threat of invasion, against which defense is needed. Furthermore, it is hardly sensible to call "collective" that want which is precisely the least likely to be unanimous, since robbers will hardly desire it!(1) >Collective goods/Rothbard, >Social goods. 1. Antonio De Viti De Marco, First Principles of Public Finance (London: Jonathan Cape, 1936), pp. 37-41. Similar to De Viti's first category is Baumol's attempted criterion of "jointly" financed goods, for a critique of which see Rothbard, "Toward A Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics," pp. 255-60. |
De Viti De Marco I Antonio De Viti De Marco La Politica Commerciale E Gl’interessi Dei Lavoratori Charleston, South Carolina 2010 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Collective Goods | Economic Theories | Rothbard III 1030 Collective goods/Economic theories/Rothbard: Many attempts have been made (…), to salvage the concept of the "collective" good, to provide a seemingly ironclad, scientific justification for government operations. Molinari: Molinari, for example, trying to establish defense as a collective good, asserted: "A police force serves every inhabitant of the district in which it acts, but the mere establishment of a bakery does not appease their hunger." RothbardVsMolinari: But, on the contrary, there is no absolute necessity for a police force to defend every inhabitant of an area or, still more, to give each one the same degree of protection. Furthermore, an absolute pacifist, a believer in total nonviolence, living in the area, would not consider himself protected by, or receiving defense service from, the police. On the contrary, he would consider any police in his area a detriment to him. Hence, defense cannot be considered a "collective good" or "collective want." Similarly for such projects as dams, which cannot be simply assumed to benefit everyone in the area.(1) De Viti De Marco: Antonio De Viti De Marco defined "collective wants" as consisting of two categories: a) wants arising when an individual is not in isolation and b) wants connected with a conflict of interest. RothbardVsDe Viti De Marco: Vs a) The first category, however, is so broad as to encompass most market products. There would be no point, for example, in putting on plays unless a certain number went to see them or in publishing newspapers without a certain wide market. Must all these industries therefore be nationalized and monopolized by the government? Vs b) The second category is presumably meant to apply to defense. This, however, is incorrect. Defense, itself, does not reflect a conflict of interest, but a threat of invasion, against which defense is needed. Furthermore, it is hardly sensible to call "collective" that want which is precisely the least likely to be unanimous, since robbers will hardly desire it!(2) Immaterial goods/service: Other economists write as if defense is necessarily collective because it is an immaterial service, whereas bread, autos, etc., are materially divisible and salable to individuals. RothbardVs: But "immaterial" services to individuals abound in the market. Must concert-giving be monopolized by the state because its services are immaterial? Rothbard III 1031 Samuelson: In recent years, Professor Samuelson has offered his own definition of "collective consumption goods," in a so-called "pure" theory of government expenditures. Def Collective consumption goods/Samuelson: Collective consumption goodss according to Samuelson, are those "which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good." For some reason, these are supposed to be the proper goods (or at least these) for government, rather than the free market, to provide.(3) VsSamuelson: Samuelson's category has been attacked with due severity. Professor Enke(4), for example, pointed out that most governmental services simply do not fit Samuelson's classification - including highways, libraries, judicial services, police, fire, hospitals, and military protection. In fact, we may go further and state that no goods would ever fit into Samuelson's category of "collective consumption goods." Margolis: [Julius] Margolis(4), for example, while critical of Samuelson, concedes the inclusion of national defense and lighthouses in this category. But "national defense" is surely not an absolute good with only one unit of supply. It consists of specific resources committed in certain definite and concrete ways - and these resources are necessarily scarce. A ring of defense bases around New York, for example, cuts down the amount possibly available around San Francisco. Furthermore, a lighthouse shines over a certain fixed area only. Not only does a ship within the area prevent others from entering the area at the same time, but also the construction of a lighthouse in one Place limits its construction elsewhere. In fact, if a good is really technologically "collective" in Samuelson's sense, it is not a good at all, but a natural condition of human welfare, like air - superabundant to all, and therefore unowned by anyone. Indeed, it is not the lighthouse, but the ocean itself—when the Ianes are not crowded - which is the "collective consumption good," and which therefore remains unowned. Obviously, neither government nor anyone else is normally needed to produce or allocate the ocean.(4) Rothbard III 1032 Tiebout: Charles M. Tiebout(5), conceding that there is no "pure" way to establish an optimum level for government expenditures, tries to salvage such a theory specifically for local government. Realizing that the taxing, and even voting, process precludes voluntary demonstration of consumer choice in the governmental field, he argues that decentralization and freedom of internal migration renders local government expenditures more or less optimal - as we can say that free market expenditures by firms are "optimal"—since the residents can move in and out as they please. Certainly, it is true that the consumer will be better off if he can move readily out of a high-tax, and into a Iow tax, community. But this helps the consumer only to a degree; it does not solve the problem of government expenditures, which remains otherwise the same. There are, indeed, other factors than government entering into a man's choice of residence, and enough People may be attached to a certain geographical area, for one reason or another, to permit a great deal of government depredation before they move. Furthermore, a major problem is that the world's total land area is fixed, and that governments have universally pre-empted all the land and thus universally burden consumers.(5) >Collective goods/Rothbard, >Social goods. 1. Gustave de Molinari, The Society of Tomorrow. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1904. Reprinted by Taylor & Francis, 1972. p. 63. On the fallacy of collective goods, see S.R., Ibid., p. 63. On the fallacy of collective goods, see S.R., "Spencer As His Own Critic," Liberty, June, 1904, and Merlin H. Hunter and Harry K. Allen, Principles of Public Finance (New York: Harpers, 1940), p. 22. Molinari had not always believed in the existence of "collective goods," as can be seen from his remarkable "De la production de la sécurité," Journal des Economistes, February 15, 1849 , and Molinari, "Onziéme soirée" in Les soirées de la Rue Saint Lazare (Paris, 1849). 2. Antonio De Viti De Marco, First Principles of Public Finance (London: Jonathan Cape, 1936), pp. 37-41. Similar to De Viti's first category is Baumol's attempted criterion of "jointly" financed goods, for a critique of which see Rothbard, "Toward A Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics," pp. 255-60. 3. Paul A. Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures," Review ofEconomics and statistics, November, 1954, pp. 387-89. 4. Stephen Enke, "More on the Misuse of Mathematics in Economics: A Rejoinder," Review of Economics and statistics, May, 1955, pp. 131-33 ; Julius Margolis, "A Comment On the Pure Theory of Public Expenditures," Review of Economics and statistics, November, 19 5 5, pp. 347-49. In his reply to critics, Samuelson, after hastening to deny any possible implication that he wished to confine the sphere of government to collective goods alone, asserts that his category is really a "polar" concept. Goods in the real world are supposed to be only blends of the "polar extremes" of public and private goods. But these concepts, even in Samuelson's own erms, are decidedly not polar, but exhaustive. Either A's consumption of a good diminishes B's possible consumption, or it does not: these two alternatives are mutually exclusive and exhaust the possibilities. In effect, Samuelson has abandoned his category either as a theoretical or as a practical device. Paul A. Samuelson, "Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure," Review of Economics and statistics, November, 1955, pp. 350-56. 5. Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, October, 1956, pp. 416 - 24. At one point, Tiebout seems to admit that his theory would be valid only if each person could somehow be "his own municipal government." Ibid., p. 421. In the course of an acute critique of the idea of competition in government, the Colorado Springs Gazette-Telegraph wrote as follows: „Were the taxpayer free to act as a customer, buying only those services he deemed useful to himself and which were priced within his reach, then this competition between governments would be a wonderful thing. But because the taxpayer is not a customer, but only the governed, he is not free to choose. He is only compelled to pay.... With government there is no producer-customer relationship. There is only the relation that always exists between those who rule and those who are ruled. The ruled are never free to refuse the services of the products of the ruler.... Instead of trying to see which government could best serve the governed, each government began to vie with every other government on the basis of its tax collections.... The victim of this competition is always the taxpayer.... The taxpayer is now set upon by the federal, state, school board, county and City governments. Each of these is competing for the last dollar he has.“ (Colorado Springs Gazette-Telegraph, July 16, 1958) |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Collective Goods | Margolis | Rothbard III 1031 Collective goods/Margolis/Rothbard: Many attempts have been made (…), to salvage the concept of the "collective" good, to provide a seemingly ironclad, scientific justification for government operations. Margolis: [Julius] Margolis(1), for example, while critical of Samuelson, concedes the inclusion of national defense and lighthouses in this category. But "national defense" is surely not an absolute good with only one unit of supply. It consists of specific resources committed in certain definite and concrete ways - and these resources are necessarily scarce. >Collective goods/Samuelson. A ring of defense bases around New York, for example, cuts down the amount possibly available around San Francisco. Furthermore, a lighthouse shines over a certain fixed area only. Not only does a ship within the area prevent others from entering the area at the same time, but also the construction of a lighthouse in one place limits its construction elsewhere. In fact, if a good is really technologically "collective" in Samuelson's sense, it is not a good at all, but a natural condition of human welfare, like air - superabundant to all, and therefore unowned by anyone. Indeed, it is not the lighthouse, but the ocean itself - when the Ianes are not crowded - which is the "collective consumption good," and which therefore remains unowned. Obviously, neither government nor anyone else is normally needed to produce or allocate the ocean.(1) >Collective goods/Rothbard, >Social goods. 1. Julius Margolis, "A Comment On the Pure Theory of Public Expenditures," Review of Economics and statistics, November, 1955, pp. 347-49. In his reply to critics, Samuelson, after hastening to deny any possible implication that he wished to confine the sphere of government to collective goods alone, asserts that his category is really a "polar" concept. Goods in the real world are supposed to be only blends of the "polar extremes" of public and private goods. But these concepts, even in Samuelson's own erms, are decidedly not polar, but exhaustive. Either A's consumption of a good diminishes B's possible consumption, or it does not: these two alternatives are mutually exclusive and exhaust the possibilities. In effect, Samuelson has abandoned his category either as a theoretical or as a practical device. Paul A. Samuelson, "Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure," Review of Economics and statistics, November, 1955, pp. 350-56. |
Margolis I Julius Margolis The Public Economy of Urban Communities Abingdon 2015 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Collective Intelligence | Sunstein | I 23 Collective intelligence/Sunstein: when questioning randomly selected groups, one usually learns very precisely what people think, e. g. election prognoses, popularity of TV shows, etc. It is something else if you want to know what is true, not what people believe. Here are some famous examples: Hazel Knight asked students many years ago how warm it was in the room. Estimates varied greatly, the mean hit the correct value but quite precisely.(1) When people need to estimate the number of beans in a container, it is similar. (2) I 24 The British scientist Francis Galton estimated the weight of an ox at an auction. The result was close to a pound.(3) Sunstein: Question: should a company rely on the judgement of previous employees when recruiting new employees? And should people question others when making decisions about their lives and obey the average result? What about environmental measures? I 25 Average/Sunstein: in which situations is an average made up of many opinions meaningful? See also... I 27 Randomness: the probability that groups are correct is higher if these groups are randomly composed. >Decision Theory/Condorcet. I 33 Problem/Sunstein: unfortunately, one must presuppose expertise from those involved in order for the outcome of collective decisions to turn out in the sense of actual circumstances. In two types of cases, the judgement of a statically selected group will be wrong: (a) where there is a tendency towards a particular result among the members (b) if the answers are worse than random answers. I 34 Test persons are often misguided by so-called anchors, e. g. numbers that are scattered into an explanation. Likewise, judges are influenced. The larger groups become, the greater the risk that such an anchor will have an effect ((s) as the same anchor is effective for each member).(4) >Anchoring effect. I 41 Statistics: should more account be taken of statistical knowledge? This depends on whether the interviewed experts were in a position to provide good answers that can then be evaluated statistically. I 49 Community/Aristotle: when several come together (...) everyone can contribute his share of virtue and moral wisdom (...) and some will understand something, others will understand something else and all together will understand everything.(5) I 54 Sunstein: here the whole is the sum of its parts and that is what was aimed for. This is a reading of Aristotle's suggestion that a group works better than a few of the best. But there is also the view that a group discussion delivers more than the sum of its parts. A form of information gathering in which the exchange of views provides creative solutions. However, there may be other ways in which synergy effects and learning can lead to a group's performance that exceeds that of the best members.(6) >Discourse, >Discourse theory. I 56 However, since uniformity is achieved during consultations and confidence in a result is generated, this can be favoured in the end, even if it contains errors. I 66 Group Pressure/Solomon Asch: In a famous experiment, Ash showed how group members swung back to a clearly incorrect assessment of the group after making correct estimates (in terms of line length). (7) >Conformity, >Conformity/Asch. Investment clubs sometimes make bad decisions when members are tied by tight social ties and dissenting opinions are censored. (8), (9) I 70 Representatives of minorities in groups often behave more reservedly and develop less weight (10). In concrete terms, they speak less and exert less influence.(11) >Minorities, >Majorities. 1. Lorge et al., “A Survey of Studies Contrasting the Quality of Group Performance and Individual Performance, 1920–1957,” 344. 2. See Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds, p. 5 3. Surowiecki, pp. xi–xiii. 4. Lorge et al. P. 346. 5. Aristotle, Politics, trans. E. Barker (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 123. 6. See David J. Cooper and John H. Kagel, “Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signalling Games,” American Economic Review 95 (2005): 477; Gigone and Hastie, “Proper Analysis,” 143–53 (offering some examples of group success, while showing that such success is not typical). 7. See the overview in Solomon Asch, “Opinions and Social Pressure,” in Readings about the Social Animal, ed. Elliott Aronson (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1995), 13. 8. See Brooke Harrington, Pop Finance: Investment Clubs and the New Ownership Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming). 9. See José M. Marques et al., “Social Categorization, Social Identification, and Rejection of Deviant Group Members,” in Hogg and Tindale, Group Processes, pp. 400, 403. 10. See Glenn C. Loury, Self-Censorship in Public Discourse: A Theory of “Political Correctness” and Related Phenomena, Boston University, Ruth Pollak Working Paper Series on Economics (1993), p 3. 11. See Caryn Christensen and Ann S. Abbott, “Team Medical Decision Making,” in Decision Making in Health Care, ed. Gretchen B. Chapman and Frank A. Sonnenberg (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 272–76 (discussing effects of status on exchange of information in group interactions). |
Sunstein I Cass R. Sunstein Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008 Sunstein II Cass R. Sunstein #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017 |
| Colonialism | Fanon | Brocker I 382 Colonialism/violence/Fanon: Fanon describes colonialism as a violent relationship. Brocker I 383 Fanon describes colonial societies as Manichaean, divided societies - apartheid (1) serves as his clearest example. The division is based on racism: assumptions of the constitutive difference between whites and non-whites, the categorical devaluation of the colonized, their stylization as amoral, their equation with evil and in extreme cases their dehumanization (2). The aim of colonial Manichaeism is material exploitation. Races/Class/Fanon: Thesis: in colonialism races and classes collapse. "The ruling species is first and foremost that which comes from elsewhere, which does not resemble the autochthons" (3). Brocker I 384 Decolonization: ends the division by "uniting the parts on the basis of the nation, sometimes the race" (4), but the goal of decolonization must not be the obvious one, that the colonized take the place of the colonial masters, which is understandable due to the subjectivization of the colonized by colonization. To distinguish from this desire a program of decolonization, is a "program of absolute upheaval," (5) the "creation of new people," and the "complete questioning of the colonial situation. (6) These are the characteristics of ((s) correctly understood) decolonization. The supporting class of decolonization for Fanon is the peasantry. Cf. >Postcolonialism. 1. Frantz Fanon, Les damnés de la terre, Paris 1961. Dt.: Frantz Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde, Frankfurt/M. 1981, S. 31 2. Ibid. p. 34f. 3. Ibid. p. 33. 4. Ibid. p. 38. 5. Ibid. p. 29 6. Ibid. p. 30. Ina Kerner „Frantz Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 mnés de la terre, Paris 1961. Dt.: Frantz Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde, Frankfurt/M. 1981, S. 31. |
PolFanon I Frantz Fanon Les Damnés de la Terre, Paris 1963 - Engl Transl. The Wretched of the Earth, New York 1963 German Edition: Die Verdammten dieser Erde Reinbek 1969 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Colour | Deacon | I 116 Colour Words/Language Origin/Deacon: The development of color words in different languages and societies converges. >Color words. In principle, the combination of colour tones and sounds can be arbitrary. In fact, however, the mapping relations are in some respects universal. >Image, >Picture theory, >Word meaning, >Signs. I 117 But that does not mean they are somehow built into the brain. Colour word/colours/Berlin/Kay/Deacon: In different societies, black (dark) and white (light) are the first distinctions, later on the distinction red/green is added. If there are three or four colour terms in a language, yellow or blue will be added next. If there are more terms, the pattern is not so clear to predict(1). >Distinctions. Surprisingly, the colours that are considered to be typically red or green (best red/best green) are similar all over the world(2). I 118 Explanation: this is where the brain's ability to differentiate or highlight differences comes into play, which goes beyond the specifics of the use of language in individuals or societies. I 119 Language evolution/colour words: the patterns of typical errors contribute to the fact that the language use adapts itself to the neurophysiological conditions of perception. This is a case of neurological tendency as selection pressure in social evolution. >Language emergence, >Selection, >Perception. Suppose we wanted to introduce a new word for a very special hue of colour between known colours. In the long run, this new name will disappear again in favour of old colour words. Certain prominent colours will dominate. The tendency of our brains to remember certain colours better corresponds to the natural selection of certain variants instead of other variants. Thus, the reference of colour words will develop in adaptation to the human nervous system. >Reference, >Nervous system. I 120 However, this development is due to non-genetic forces. Without these social universals, the use of colour words would be idiosyncratic, i.e. limited to single individuals. Nevertheless, it is clear that colour terms are not firmly anchored in the brain. What is universally anchored is rather certain tendencies of the group, which are not linguistic. The division of colour terms as they are is not a necessary feature of language and is not an innate linguistic category. >Classification, >Order, >Categorization. 1. Berlin, B., und Kay, P. (1969). Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press. (2) Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In: E. Rosch, & B. B. Lloyd (Hrsg.), Cognition and categorization (pp. 28-49). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Colour | Lorenz | Lorenz I 20 Colors/aggression/animal kingdom: Strongly colored fish are not to be held together in a small space. At most a single fish in a group of differently colored. I 21 The more colorful, the more resident and more aggressive. I 23 The most aggressive (strong-colored) fish in an aquarium were the ones who had no conspecifics to work off on them. I 25 The most extreme aggressiveness is in those billboard-colored, wild fishes, which display their belonging through the color at a great distance. >Psychological theories on Aggression. I 43 Colors/aggression/fish/Lorenz: the residential-bound, strongly colored aggressive fish live in a place where there is particularly abundant and diverse food available: on the coral reef. I 44 Explanation: here, like in a human colony, they can seize the "most diverse professions". I 55 Colors/signals/aggression/animal kingdom/Lorenz: where we find strong colors and bizarre forms in males, it is almost always the female who has the last word in the partner selection. The males do not fight. >Psychological theories on behavior. |
Lorenz I K. Lorenz Das sogenannte Böse Wien 1963 |
| Colour | Millikan | I 270 Standard Conditions/Contents/Millikan: 1. To give them a content, "standard observers" must mean more than "observers for whom red things look red, under standard conditions." And according to "standard conditions". Cf. >Ideal observer, >Idealization, >Observation. Solution: Standard conditions for red must be spelled out. Problem: no human being has any idea how this should work. Problem: if you had every reason to believe that you are a standard observer, there are circumstances where an object appears to have a different color than it has. But then you would not conclude that the thing was not red. Problem: if a thing is defined by its opposite properties, an observer must also be able to identify these opposing properties. And it can be the case that these never come to light! Problem: how can my experience testify the opposite of red and green? Many authors: think that you can never assert at all that red and green could be in the same place at the same time. I 271 MillikanVsTradition: this is not true, in reality, there are many possibilities, e.g. squinting. Complementary colors/perception/seeing/certainty/Millikan: our confidence in the fact that red and green are opposites, (perhaps built into nature) is an empirical certainty. And this is certainty for the objective validity of these concepts, for the fact that red and green are properties - and not just hallucinations. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Colour | Wright | I 164 Color/Supervenience/Wright: Color supervenes other physical properties: E.g. there is a chaotic variety of physical conditions which is illustrated by scarlet things. >Supervenience. This conception is therefore weaker than that according to which color words have the semantics of concepts for natural kinds. >Stronger/weaker, >Natural kinds. It's the commitment to the idea that physically identical objects share their color, even if one of the objects offers the "best" conditions and the others don't. This supervenience is therefore, as it were, a force towards the uniqueness of color concepts. >Unabiguity, >Colour words. I 169 Color/Wright: However, I do not want to go so far as to assert that color predicates are semantically concepts for natural kinds. That would also be inconsistent with the thesis that the extension is partially determined by the best opinion. >Best explanation/Wright. Color/Wright: for our everyday understanding of color words there is no such risk (that there is nothing red): if it turned out that there are no interesting physical properties that red things have in common, then we learn by that that red things are, in fact, not a natural species, but that there are still indeed infinitely many red things. >Generality. This statement is, however, entirely consistent with the belief that red things do indeed have interesting physical properties in common! >Similarity, >Properties. The explanatory intuition does not have to be more than an epiphenomenon of the presumed accuracy of the conviction that something in which redness physically consists actually exists and that it is one of the reasons for the fact that there are best judgments about that which is red. >Euthyphro contrast/Wright, >Epiphenominology. --- II 247 Color Predicates/sorites/vagueness/Wright: a color word is not like "two meters long", but "less than two meters" (length ranges). Criterion: still measuring! But we can also say without measuring what the result would be. Solution/Wright: Actual distinction between cases where we can judge by eyesight, and cases where we cannot - then still observation predicates - which other base should this distinction provide? Crispin Wright: thesis: the methodological approach must be completely behavioristic and anti-reflexive. >Behaviorism, >Perception, >Sensory impressions, >Judgments. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Commands | Gärdenfors | I 181/182 Commands/Gärdenfors: Three levels of communication: 1. Pointing - pointing is not sufficient. Solution: verbs. 2. Coordination of the inner worlds of the participants 3. Coordination of meanings. >Communication, >Triangulation, >Pointing, >Ostensive definition, >Ostension, >Meaning, >Indeterminacy. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Commodity | Marx | Rothbard II 409 Commodity/Marx/Rothbard: Marx found a crucial key to this mechanism in Ricardo's labour theory ofvalue, and in the Ricardian socialist thesis that labour is the sole determinant of value, With capital's Share, or profits, being the 'surplus value' extracted by the capitalist from labour's created product. >Capital. But, in order to arrive at the labour, or quantity-of-labour-hours, theory of value, Marx, in his systematic work Capital, had to dispose of Other, subjective, claimants to determining value. He also had to demonstrate that value was somehow objectively embodied in the product (a material good, of course, since Marx, with Smith, had dismissed immaterial services as 'unproductive'). Marx begins Capital by concentrating on 'the commodity', an Object - (…), a material substance - which has utility for satisfying human wants. In this way like Ricardo, he leaves immaterial services out of the picture, and also omits studying the value of non-reproducible products, which have no ongoing costs of production. Like Ricardo, Marx also begins With the necessity ofutility, but, like his master, he quickly dismisses this basic fact as of little or no use in explaining 'exchange-value', the proportion in which commodities exchange for one another on the market. As in Smith and Ricardo, therefore, use-value and exchange-value, or price, of commodities are sundered from each other. How, then, explain exchange-value? Problem: How, in short, explain the proportions by which commodities exchange for each other on the market? Rothbard II 410 Solution/Marx: (…) „two things must (…) be equal to a third, which in itself is neither the one nor the other. Each of them so far as it is exchange-value, must therefore be reducible to this third... of which thing they represent a greater or less quantity.(1) RothbardVsMarx: Thus, Marx inserts his crucial error at the very beginning of his system. The fact that two commodities exchange for each other in some proportion does not mean that they are therefore 'equal' in value and can be 'represented by an equation'. As we have learned ever since Buridan and the scholastics, two things exchange for each other only because they are unequal in value to the two participants in the exchange. A gives up to x to B in exchange for y, because A prefers y to x, and B, on the contrary, prefers x to y. An equals sign falsifies the essential picture. And ifthe two commodities, x andy, were really equal in value in the sight of the two exchangers, why in the world did either of them take the time and trouble to make the exchange? >Barter economy. Value/measurement/RothbardVsMarx: If there is no equality in value, then there is clearly no third isomething' to which these values must be equal. Marx compounds his original error With another, assuming that if there were an equality of value, there is therefore necessarily some third tangible thing to which they must be equal and by which they can be measured. There is no warrant for this leap from equality of value to measurement of an objective third entity; the implicit, and fallacious, assumption is that 'value' is an objective entity like weight or length which can be scientifically measured against some third, external, standard. Utility/value/use value/RothbardVsMarx: Emphasizing by mere assertion that utility can have nothing whatever to do With exchange-values, a point crucial to his case, he claims that use-values have nothing to do With exchange-values or prices. This means that all real attributes of goods, their natures, their varying qualities, etc., are abstracted from, and can have nothing to do with, their values. By tossing out all real-world properties from the discussion, Marx is perforce left With goods as the embodiment of pure, abstract, undifferentiated labour hours, the quantity of allegedly homogeneous labour hours embodied in the product. >Value theory of labour/Marx, >Value theory/Ricardo, >Utility. Solution/Marx: Marx of course sees that there are great problems with this approach. What about the scholastic thrust: is the market expected to cover the costs, the enormous number of labour hours, needed to make a product in an obsolete way? If a book is printed, or hand-scripted, is the market going to cover the payment for the enormous number oflabour hours needed in the Rothbard II 411 hand-copying process? Is the market expected to pay the labour costs of carrying goods across land, as compared to shipping them by sea? Marx's way of disposing of these awkward questions was to create the concept of 'socially necessary' labour time. The determinant of the value of a good is not any old labour time spent on, or embodied in, its production, but only labour time that is 'socially necessary'. RothbardVsMarx: But this is a cop out, and evades the issue by begging the entire question. Market value is determined only by the quantity of 'socially' necessary' labour time. But what is 'socially necessary'? Socially necessary/Marx/Rothbard: Marx defines 'labour time socially necessary' as 'that required to produce an article under the normal conditions of production, and with the average degree of Skill and intensity prevalent at the time'.(2) This brings up a corollary problem: how to meld a myriad of different qualities and skills of labour into one homogeneous, abstract 'labour hour'? Here, taking up a hint from Ricardo, Marx inserts the concepts of 'average' and 'normal'. It all averages out. But how is this average obtained? It is done by weights, with higher quality, unusually productive labour weighted more heavily in quantity labour-time units than is the labour of an unskilled worker. But who decides the weights? Once again, Marx's crucial question-begging methodology comes into play. For Marx acknowledges that it is the market, its relative prices and wages, which determines the weights, i.e. which labour is more productive or higher in quality and in what degree than some other forms of labour. So market values, prices, and productivities are being used to try to explain the determinants of those same values and prices.(3) >Rate of profit/Marx, >Surplus value/Marx. 1. Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 37. 2. Ibid. p. 39 3. 3. Compare the discussion in David Conway, A Farewell to Marx: An Outline and Appraisal of His Theories (Harmondsworth, Mddx: Penguin Books, 198 7), pp. 83-9. Habermas IV 492 Commodity/Marx/Habermas: Marx's approach owes its theory-strategic superiority over the designs developed since then at the same level of abstraction, to an ingenious coup: the analysis of the commodity form. By analyzing the dual character of the commodity ((s) with utility value and exchange value), Marx gains basic value-theoretical assumptions that make it possible to describe the process of unfolding capitalist societies simultaneously from the economic perspective of the observer as a crisis-like process of self-exploitation of capital, as well as from the historical perspective of the person concerned (...) as a conflict-prone interaction between social classes. In terms of value theory, the relationship between the exchange of labor for variable capital, which is fundamental to the mode of production and institutionalized in the employment contract, can be simultaneously explained as a control mechanism of a self-regulated reproduction process and as a reflection relationship that makes the entire accumulation process understandable as an objective, anonymous process of exploitation. Exchange value/Marx: is the medium that objectivistically covers and objectifies class dynamics at the same time, i.e. makes them more objective. The mechanism of the labour market, institutionalised under private law, assumes functions of the previously politically institutionalised relationship between social violence and economic exploitation. The class ratio becomes the basis of the Habermas IV 493 monetization of the labour force. The analysis of the class ratio must therefore start with the dual character of the commodity labour force. >Labor/Marx, >Labor Power/Marx, >Theory of Value. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Communication | Black | I 59 Communication/Black: gestures are not always already communication. >Gestures. I 70 Communication/Speaker Meaning/BlackVsGrice: propositional attitudes induced in the listener are irrelevant for these concept - Black: Once I understood, my role as a listener and performer is at an end - Black Thesis: listener understanding and speaker meaning are two sides of a single process. >Speaker meaning, >Utterance meaning. I 71 Understanding as grasping the speaker's intention is just as much in need of explanation as this - Reaction/Black: There is no standard reaction. >Understanding. I 72 BlackVsGrice: his theory is unsuitable for idiosyncratic cases |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Communication | Davidson | McDowell I 211 Communication/Language/Davidson: there is no "medium" here. Except in the sense of "smoke signals", sounds, etc. Language is at best a match of idiolects. All understanding is a special case of radical interpretation. >Radical interpretation/Davidson. "Common Language" is nothing more than the tool of cognitive activity, which could also do without it. Glüer II 58 Language/communication/meaning/Davidson/Glüer: there are two possible interpretations of the thesis of "communication without regularity": a strong one and a weak one. 1. strong demand: always use the word "capacity" in the way you want to be understood. Comprehensibility would be bound to following lexical norms. Davidson: is right: even if Mrs. X uses the word only once in the wrong way, we understand it perfectly. Comprehensibility may be difficult in practice, but theoretically it is not at risk. We cannot formulate a single lexical norm that the speaker must necessarily adhere to. 2. weak: as long as the radical interpretation should ensure the accessibility of the foreign idiolect, it must show a certain weak regularity internally. >Idiolect. DavidsonVs: the radical reading of "A nice derangement", however, denies this weak regularity. II 59 Problem: the theory of interpretation would lose its empirical character, the concept of statement intention would also remain puzzling. For it is still true that the interpreter has no other data for the determination of intentions than for meanings. They result from the same original interpretation process. "This characterization of linguistic competence is circular enough not to be wrong".(1986(1), p. 445). 1. Davidson, D. "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs" in: LePore, E. (ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, New York 1986. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Communication | Gärdenfors | I 17 Communication/Gärdenfors: human communication requires that one understands not only the meaning of the signs, but also understands that a sign can be used communicatively. (Communicative sign function). I 18 Communicative sign function/Gärdenfors: implies that the sign has the same meaning for transmitter and receiver. I 94 Communication/Levels/Gärdenfors: Level 0: Practice: Interaction without intentional communication. Level 1: Instruction: Coordination is produced by instruction. Level 2: Coordination of inner worlds: People inform each other mutually. Level 3: Coordination of meanings: people negotiate the meaning of expressions and other signals. I 97 Coordination/Gärdenfors: two main types: a) consensus about meanings, but not in the knowledge of facts of the world. For example, two people identify their localizations on a map. b) Adapting the understanding of meanings to be able to return to an earlier level of coordination. E.g. Coordination by updating the map. >Fixed point/Gärdenfors, Communication/Gärdenfors. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Communication | Sunstein | I 17 Communication/argumentation/Habermas/SunsteinVsHabermas/Sunstein: Many have expressed the hope that the "casual power of the better argument"(1) will triumph. SunsteinVsHabermas: unfortunately, this hope is often disappointed. Information pressure and social group pressure intensify errors, cascade effects and polarisation. Larger groups often act better than smaller groups in this respect. (2) >Democracy/Sunstein. I 45 In an experiment in Colorado in the summer of 2005, liberal and conservative groups were mixed together to discuss some issues such as whether the United States should sign a climate change agreement or whether affirmative action should be accorded to disadvantaged groups.(3) The result was clear: in almost every group, the positions were more polarized after the discussions, with the respective starting positions of the groups being more strongly represented. I 72 Ideal Speech Situation/Habermas/Sunstein: in Habermas' ideal speech situation all participants try to find the truth. They do not behave strategically, but accept a norm of equality. (4) >Ideal speech situation. Sunstein: According to this viewpoint, communication does not simply involve the exchange of words and opinions, but imposes requirements and preconditions on the participants. Communication (deliberation) has (then) its own internal morality, which is supposed to overcome some harmful effects of consultations in the real world. Sunstein: maybe this will work and produce better results. (...) Unfortunately, following such preconditions does not help with the problems I have in mind. I 75 Group discussions/SunsteinVsHabermas: Group discussions suffer from four problems: 1. they reinforce the errors of their members 2. they do not bring to light the information that individuals have 3. they are victims of cascade effects in which blind people are led by blind people 4. they develop polarization tendencies that lead groups to move towards extremes. >Collective Intelligence/Sunstein. I 94 Group polarization/polarization/Sunstein: arises for several reasons. (5) 1. informational influences: if there is an initial inclination in a group, most members of the group will be moved there. 2. Some people orientate themselves on what others have publicly expressed and thus occupy a dominant position. 3. There are strong links between trust, extremism and the affirmation of others. (6) When people gain confidence they will mostly be more determined in their views. Trust is in turn strengthened by the support of others, like-minded people. I 96 Does group polarization lead to correct or incorrect results? There is no general answer here. It all depends on the tendency of the group, which existed before the start of consultations. (See also Internet). 1. See Habermas, “Between Facts and Norms: An Author’s Reflections,” 940. 2. Irving L. Janis, Groupthink, 2d ed., rev. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 7–9. 3. See Reid Hastie, David Schkade, and Cass R. Sunstein, “What Really Happened on Deliberation Day?” (University of Chicago Law School, unpublished manuscript, 2006). 4. Jürgen Habermas, “What Is Universal Pragmatics?,” in Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), 2–4, 32 (discussing preconditions for communication). 5. 54. See Brown, Group Processes, 212–22, 226–45; Baron et al., “Social Corroboration and Opinion Extremity,” 540. 6. See Baron et al., “Social Corroboration and Opinion Extremity,” 557–59 (showing that corroboration increases confidence and hence extremism). |
Sunstein I Cass R. Sunstein Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008 Sunstein II Cass R. Sunstein #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017 |
| Communication Activity | Kranton | Kranton I 433 Communication Activity/Maximal Communication Equilibrium/MCE/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: We show that the MCE is Pareto-optimal for the unbiased agents and provides a refinement criterion, referred to as “activity” that distinguishes among equilibria. 1. (…) as in cheap talk games, there are babbling equilibria in which no valuable information is created. Suppose each unbiased agent who has not received the signal takes the same action independent of any message received and votes for 0 according to his prior. In this case, all unbiased agents are indifferent between all actions: creating, or not, true or false messages and transmitting, or not, messages. A simple equilibrium then consists of the following strategies: Unbiased agents never create or transmit any messages, and biased agents always create m = 1 upon receipt of the signal and transmit any m = 1 but no other message. The only messages that are generated are those from the biased agents, and hence they are not informative. These strategies form an equilibrium supported by (consistent) posterior beliefs equal to the prior, except for the agent who has received the signal. 2. Second, there are equilibria where unbiased agents create truthful messages but do not transmit credible messages. These equilibria involve a coordination failure and cannot easily be eliminated using standard selection arguments. The standard perfection argument that generates transmission in a persuasion game does not hold in our model. Because of the presence of biased agents, messages are not perfectly informative, and it may be rational not to transmit message 1. Kranton I 434 To refine the equilibrium set, consider restricting attention to the following simple strategies: A biased agent is active if and only if she creates message M(s) = 1 and only transmits message 1. An unbiased agent is active if and only if she creates a message that matches the signal and transmits message m if she thinks the probability that the true state is m is higher than 1/2. This refinement allows us to single out the MCE. Conclusion: The MCE is the only equilibrium where all agents are active. In an equilibrium where all agents are active, coordination failures are ruled out at both the message creation and transmission stages. This results in the highest expected payoff for the unbiased agents. >Network Models/Kranton, >Communication Models/Kranton, >Communication Filters/Kranton, >Misinformation/Economic Theories, >Communication Equilibria/Bayesianism. Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448. |
Kranton I Rachel E. Kranton Francis Bloch Gabrielle Demange, Rumors And Social Networks 2018 Kranton II Rachel E. Kranton George A. Akerlof Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011 |
| Communication Equilibria | Bayesianism | Kranton I 427 Communication Equilibria/Beliefs/Agents/Bayesianism: On the equilibrium path, the posteriors are formed by Bayes’ rule; m = 0 is created only by unbiased agents, the probability that the originator of message m = 1 is biased is b, and receiving no message occurs in the event no agent receives a signal and hence the prior is maintained. Off the equilibrium path, no message is received in which case we set the posterior to be equal to the prior. Turning to agents’ strategies to create messages, given these posterior beliefs, no unbiased agent who receives the signal would choose to send an untrue message (…), since this action will decrease the number of agents who vote for the outcome corresponding to the true state. No biased agent has an incentive to deviate and choose m = ∅ or m = 0, (>Terminology/Kranton) since these actions will decrease the posterior belief that 1 is the true state. Consider the possibility that in equilibrium a strict subset of unbiased agents send truthful messages. One of the unbiased agents who does not send a message or an untruthful one would have an incentive to deviate and send a truthful message, since it increases the likelihood of the correct outcome. (…) we see that communication occurs in the public broadcast model if and only if the proportion of biased agents in the population is sufficiently low. This equilibrium maximizes unbiased agents’ expected payoffs. There exists an equilibrium in which no unbiased agents broadcast messages, but there exists no equilibrium in which only a strict subset of unbiased agents broadcast truthful messages. Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448. |
Kranton I Rachel E. Kranton Francis Bloch Gabrielle Demange, Rumors And Social Networks 2018 Kranton II Rachel E. Kranton George A. Akerlof Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011 |
| Communication Equilibria | Kranton | Kranton I 421 Communication Equilibria/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: Full Communication Equilibrium/FCE: (…) a full communication equilibrium (FCE) [is a state], where all biased and unbiased agents transmit messages and, therefore, spread possibly false rumors. They do so because there is a sufficiently large probability the rumor is true. The equilibrium conditions rely on the number and distribution of biased and unbiased agents in the population. In a network, for any agent, the set of possible senders of a message must contain sufficiently few biased agents. Kranton I 428 Example: Consider five agents in a line, (…), where the links allow communication in either direction, with four unbiased agents and one biased agent in the middle. Assume that unbiased agents create true messages upon receiving a signal and transmit any message they receive. Can these strategies form an equilibrium? [Yes], strategies in which all unbiased agents transmit all messages form a [full communication] equilibrium [FCE]. Kranton I 429 Strategies: Upon receipt of the signal, every biased agent i creates a message that matches her bias, that is, Mi(s) = 1. Every biased agent only transmits a message if the message is 1; that is, ti(0) = ∅, ti(1) = 1. Every unbiased agent i creates a true message upon receiving a signal; that is, Mi(s) = s, and transmits any received message, that is, ti(m) = m. Beliefs: (1) For an agent i who has received a message m = 0 from an unbiased neighbor j, ρi(0(j )) = 0. (2) For an agent i who has received a message m = 1. These strategies and beliefs constitute an equilibrium of the network game when the posterior belief of an agent receiving message m(j) = 1 is willing to pass it on; that is, when ρi(1(j )) ≥ 1/2. Kranton I 430 Conclusion: Roughly (….), an FCE exists if biased agents are few in number and dispersed through the network. Kranton I 422 Maximal Communication Equilibrium/MCE/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: [If the condition for the] full communication [fails], there is an equilibrium, called maximal communication equilibrium (MCE), in which communication is maximized: In any equilibrium, information flows on an edge only if it flows in this MCE. A main feature of this equilibrium is that information can flow from one part of the network to another but not in the reverse direction. Unbiased agents maintain the credibility of messages by blocking those that come from a part of the network that contains too many biased agents Kranton I 432 [thus] limiting the influence of localized biased agents. Kranton I 422 This same agent, however, will transmit messages coming from another direction. These MCEs yield the highest expected payoffs of all perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game. Kranton I 432 In particular, two unbiased agents always communicate to each other in an MCE (…). Kranton I 431 Strategies: Biased agents, upon receipt of the signal, create a message that matches their bias, that is, M(s) = 1. Biased agents only transmit messages that match their bias, that is, t(0) = Ø , (Ø = message blocked) t(1) = 1. Unbiased agents, upon receipt of a signal, create true messages; that is, M(s) = s. All unbiased agents i transmit message 1 received from agent j if (j, i) ∈ G∗; (>Terminology/Kranton) otherwise agent i Kranton I 432 does not transmit the message. All unbiased agents transmit messages m = 0 received from any agent. Beliefs: The only event for which beliefs need to be specified is when an agent receives a message 0 from a biased agent. As previously, we suppose i’s posterior belief is equal to his prior in this case. Conclusion: The above strategies and beliefs form an equilibrium of the network game. We call this equilibrium the “MCE” as communication is maximal among all equilibria in the following sense: In any equilibrium, if (j, i) / ∈ G∗ (equivalently (j, i) ∈ W), then j is biased and i does not transmit m = 1 received from j. (>Terminology/Kranton). Kranton I 434 Agents/Maximal Communication Equilibrium/MCE: (…) biased agents always prefer the MCE to any equilibrium with partial communication and any equilibrium with partial communication to an equilibrium without communication. The expected utility of unbiased agents is more difficult to rank. (…) the expected utility of unbiased agents is the highest in the MCE (i.e., in the FCE when it exists) and is the lowest in an equilibrium without communication. Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448. |
Kranton I Rachel E. Kranton Francis Bloch Gabrielle Demange, Rumors And Social Networks 2018 Kranton II Rachel E. Kranton George A. Akerlof Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011 |
| Communication Filters | Kranton | Kranton I 422 Communication Filters/Networks/Filter/Communication/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: (…) networks can serve as a filter and aid communication. We contrast the network outcomes to a situation where agents can communicate to everyone simultaneously. >Public Broadcast Model: In this “public broadcast model”, there are only two equilibrium outcomes: one with full communication and one with no communication. Full communication arises if and only if there are sufficiently few biased agents in the population >Network Model: The network can replicate the full communication outcome when biased agents are evenly distributed in the network. The network, however, can also allow partial communication when no communication occurs in the public broadcast model. In a network, agents can block messages that originate in parts of the network that contain many biased agents. The messages that do circulate contain sufficient information for agents to take them into account when voting on the collective decision. Strategy/Communication: (…) biased agents wishing to influence a population could be better off limiting their numbers. As unbiased agents are strategic, they block the transmission of opinions that originate in a part of the network that contains many biased agents. Hence, it can serve biased agents to limit their numbers and to spread themselves throughout the network, so as to maximize message transmission. >Misinformation/Economic theories, >Rumors/Kranton. Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448. |
Kranton I Rachel E. Kranton Francis Bloch Gabrielle Demange, Rumors And Social Networks 2018 Kranton II Rachel E. Kranton George A. Akerlof Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011 |
| Communication Media | Parsons | Habermas IV 385 Communication media/Parsons/Habermas: Question: 1. What is the conceptual status of money as a medium that occupies the internal systemic exchange between real variables such as labour and consumer goods? 2. Do the other social subsystems also regulate the exchange in their environments via similar media?(1) Parsons later regarded his attempt to see power as a control medium anchored in the political system with structural analogies to money as a successful test for the generalizability of the media concept.(2) Habermas IV 386 In the order of money, power, influence and value retention, Parsons has analyzed four media in broad lines, each of which is assigned to one of the social subsystems: Money: the economic, Power: the political system, Influence: the system of social integration Value retention: the system for the preservation of structural patterns. Habermas: in another round of generalization, Parsons introduced four more media: Intelligence, performance, affect and interpretation.(3) >Communication media, >Money, >Power, >Values. HabermasVsParsons: the analogies to the medium of money become less clear and even metaphorical during the course of theory formation. This applies all the more to the media that Parsons recently assigned to the subsystems of the all-encompassing system of the human condition: transcendental order, symbolic meaning, health and empirical order. (4) Habermas IV 387 In the end, money is for Parsons only one of 64 socio-theoretically remarkable media. Problem: then one cannot know which of the structural characteristics read off the money medium are characteristic of media at all. Habermas IV 388 Problem: are we dealing here with an overgeneralization, i.e. with the thesis that there is something like a system of control media? Double Contingency/Parsons. Habermas IV 393 Media/Parsons/Habermas: serve not only to save information and time, and thus to reduce the effort of interpretation, but also to cope with the risk that the action sequences will break off. Media such as power and money can largely save the costs of dissent because they uncouple the coordination of action from the formation of linguistic consensus and neutralize it against the alternative of agreement and failed understanding. They are not specifications of language, they replace special language functions. Habermas IV 394 Lifeworld/Parsons/Habermas: the conversion of the coordination of actions from language to control media means a decoupling of the interaction from lifeworld contexts. >Communicative action/Parsons, >Communication theory/Habermas. 1. T.Parsons, Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory, NY 1977, S. 128 2. T. Parsons, On the Concept of Power, in: Social Theory and Modern Society, NY 1967 3. Talcott Parsons, Some Problems of General Theory, in: J.C. McKinney, E. A. Tiryakian (Eds.), Theoretical Sociology, NY 1970 S. 27ff. 4. T. Parsons, Action, Theory and the Human Condition, NY 1978, S. 393. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Communication Models | Economic Theories | Kranton I 423 Communication Models/Bloch/Demange/Kranton/Economic Theories: (…) the model [by Bloch, Demange and Kranton] combines two classic elements of information games: “cheap talk” (Crawford and Sobel, 1982)(1) in the decision of the initial receiver of the signal as to whether or not to create a truthful message, and “persuasion” (Milgrom, 1981(2); Milgrom and Roberts, 1986(3)) in the decision of agents who subsequently choose whether to transmit the message, which they cannot transform. In our model, there are multiple equilibria, along the lines of cheap talk games. However, as in persuasion games, at the transmission stage agents have an incentive to pass on credible information to other agents. In our model (Bloch/Demange/Kranton), there is a single unknown source of information and agents are Bayesian, but due to differences in their preferences and the possibility of falsification and blocking, they may end up with different beliefs and choose different actions. >Misinformation/Economic Theories, >Communication Models/Kranton. 1. CRAWFORD, V. P., AND J. SOBEL, “Strategic Information Transmission,” Econometrica 50 (6) (1982), 1431–51. 2. MILGROM, P. R., “Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications,” Bell Journal of Economics 12 (2), (1981), 380–91. 3. MILGROM, P., AND J. ROBERTS, “Relying on the Information of Interested Parties,” Rand Journal of Economics 17 (1986), 18–32. Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448. |
Kranton I Rachel E. Kranton Francis Bloch Gabrielle Demange, Rumors And Social Networks 2018 Kranton II Rachel E. Kranton George A. Akerlof Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011 |
| Communication Models | Kranton | Kranton I 424 Communication Models/Benchmark Models/Agents/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: There is a population of |N| = n agents, and two possible states of nature, θ ∈ {0, 1}. Agents: earn payoffs from a collective decision, or outcome; let x ∈ {0, 1} denote the outcome. There are two types of agents, with different preferences: a) Unbiased agents: (set U): prefer the outcome to match the state of nature. b) Biased agents: (set B) prefer outcome x= 1 to be implemented, regardless of the state of nature. The number of biased and unbiased agents in the population is common knowledge. Agents have a common prior belief that θ = 1 with probability π. We assume π < 1/2 so that agents initially believe the true state is 0 with higher probability. With this initial prior, agents are particularly interested in credible information that the outcome is 1. Interaction: between agents is divided into three phases: (i) a message creation phase, (ii) a communication phase and (iii) a collective vote phase. Kranton I 425 Communication/Benchmark Models/Communication Models/Nash Equilibrium/Kranton: We consider two benchmark models of communication (…). In the “public broadcast model”, the recipient agent broadcasts his message directly to all other agents. In the “network communication model”, agents are organized along a social network. Agent i receives a message m(j) from one of his neighbors j and chooses whether to transmit his message to all other neighbors or not. >Broadcasting, >Network Model. After all possible communication has taken place, agents vote between two alternatives, 0 and 1. Each biased agent votes for Kranton I 426 outcome 1 regardless of his posterior. Each unbiased agent votes for outcome x = 1 if π > 1/2, and votes for outcome 0 if π < 1/2 (…). (…) it is optimal for unbiased agents to vote according to their beliefs. Nash equilibrium: a nash equilibrium of the voting game consists of the following strategies [.] Each unbiased agent i votes for outcome x = 1 if π > 1/2, votes for outcome x = 0 if π < 1/2, and votes for 0 and 1 with equal probability if π = 1/2. Each unbiased agent votes for outcome x = 1.” (…) we presume that agents reach the collective decision in such a manner and therefore have an incentive to communicate information that influences others’ posteriors and hence their “votes.” Unbiased agents’ prior beliefs are that state 0 is more likely and therefore vote for outcome 0 if there is no possibility of communication. A particular benefit of communication is then learning that 1 is more likely the true state. Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448. |
Kranton I Rachel E. Kranton Francis Bloch Gabrielle Demange, Rumors And Social Networks 2018 Kranton II Rachel E. Kranton George A. Akerlof Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011 |
| Communication Theory | Bubner | I 198 Communication theory/BubnerVsHabermas: it is claimed that the observance of the formal conditions is guaranteed for the first time in history, 1. in truth, however, political events are to be transformed structurally according to the paradigm of a philosophical ideal. Idealization because the number of participants must be limited, and this is neither a historical coincidence nor a prejudice of undemocratic eliteism. I 199 2. The planned entry into the dialogue is characterized by the breaking of previously unquestioned unanimity, yet the controversy must take place in the primary intention of returning to the community. However, efforts to reach consensus are not yet agreed, and especially consensus brings the foundation of collective practice about. In a word: the dialogue is a means, but not the last content of politics. 3. It is not clear which are the contents of the event. >Dialogue, >Communication, >Discourse, >Discourse theory, >Politics. With the tendency to reformulate the flow of practice into a permanent dialogue, the contents that are derived from everyday political life are lost. The contents become playful as long as they are removed from the practical consequences. BubnerVsCommunication theory: shows that instead of a rationalization proposal for political processes in reality a new determination of the political is intended. The substantial content of the Aristotelianism which was made up of the commonality of action-orientated values was viewed as historically overtaken or consumed. >Good/Aristotle, >Community/Aristotle. The signum of modernism, subjectivity, does not longer allow the focus on good life, since this reflexive structure of the practice structure does not take into account the particularity of the individual. I 201 BubnerVsCommunication Theory/BubnerVsHabermas: seem to concentrate solely on the act of the conclusion of contract, which they reinterpret with linguistic means and declare it a permanent process. But they refrain from the stately state of tamed practice, which they suspect of the enforcement of governance. Instead of allowing politics through the contract, politics is an unceasing succession of contracts. Every trivial conflict takes the form of a fundamental problem. >Contracts, >Contract theory, cf. >Social contract. The institutional skepticism of communication theory reaches so deeply that the avoidance of the structural determination of political order is in principle pursued in the form of the favoring of the dialogue. Procedural rules, official channels, decisionistic decisions, separation of powers, temporary governance. The whole system of the differentiated form of organization of the political is suspended, and can always be revised in conversation. Other writers: the basic idealization has been lamented, the confusion of the modes of theoretical discussion with practice, the unhistorical neglect of the requirements of factual complexity of society, etc. Bubner: the main objection, however, is that the prerequisite of all political speeches, the commonality of the objectives, is thwarted in favor of an abstract agreement between partners, whose joint action remains as long as they are discussing in the dialogue method. >Subjectivity. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Communication Theory | Habermas | Bubner I 196 Habermas/Communication theory/Bubner: Thesis: Thinking of the functioning of the political system according to the model of dialogue. Clear formal conditions which should be transferred to the political system as a whole. 1. Equality of the partners, no relationship between the knowing and the ignorant. >Interaction, >Master/slave dicalectic. 2. This is not to take place, as in Hegel, by laboriously dealing with the relation of master and servant, but rather as a priori, without which there is no interaction at all. 2. Obligation to refrain from influencing, equal scope. 3. Authenticity postulate: obligation to truth. Since intentions are not to be examined, only the course of the dialogue itself can provide the proof. >Discourse, >Argumentation. BubnerVsHabermas: since one builds from the outset on truthfulness, it is obviously more a question of definition, which one wants to allow as a dialogue at all. >Truthfulness, >Truth. Bubner I 198 Communication theory/BubnerVsHabermas: it is claimed that the observance of the formal conditions is guaranteed for the first time in history, 1. in fact, political events are to be transformed structurally according to the paradigm of a philosophical ideal. Idealization because the number of participants must be limited, and this is neither a historical coincidence nor a prejudice of undemocratic eliteism. >Ideal speech community. Bubner I 199 2. the planned entry into the dialogue is characterized by the breaking of previously unquestioned unanimity, yet the controversy must take place in the primary intention of returning to the community. However, efforts to reach consensus are not yet consensus, and consensus is the foundation of collective practice. >Collectives/Habermas, >Practice. In a word: the dialogue is a means, but not the last content of politics. 3. It is not clear what is actually the content of the event. With the tendency to reformulate the flow of practice into a permanent dialogue, the contents that are derived from everyday political life are lost. The content becomes playful as long as they are removed from the practical consequences. BubnerVsCommunication theory: shows that instead of a rationalization proposal for political processes in reality a new determination of the political is intended. The substantial content of the Aristotelianism which was in the community of action-orientated values is seen as historically overtaken or consumed. >Values, >The Good/Aristotle. The signum of modernism, subjectivity, no longer allows the focus on good life, for this reflexive structure of the practice structure does not take into account the particularity of the individual. >Subjectivity, >Individuals. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Communicative Action | Habermas | III 128 Communicative action/Habermas: the concept refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who enter into an interpersonal relationship (by linguistic or non-linguistic means). The actors seek an understanding to coordinate their plans and thus their actions. Language is given a prominent status here. >Agreement, >Language/Habermas. III 143 Problem: there is a danger that social action will be reduced to the interpretive performance of the communication participants, action will be adapted to speech, interaction to conversation. In fact, however, linguistic communication is only the mechanism of action coordination, which brings together the action plans and activities of the ones involved. III 157 In communicative action, the outcome of the interaction itself is dependent on whether the participants can agree among themselves on an intersubjectively valid assessment of their world-relationships. >World/thinking, >Reality. III 158 Interpretation: Problem: for the understanding of communicative actions we have to separate questions of meaning and validity. The interpretation performance of an observer differs from the coordination efforts of the participants. The observer does not seek a consensus interpretation. But perhaps only the functions differed here, not the structures of interpretation. >Observation, >Method, >Interpretation, >Practice. III 385 Communicative Action/Habermas: here the participants are not primarily oriented towards their own success; they pursue their individual goals on the condition that they can coordinate their action plans on the basis of common situation definitions. In this respect, the negotiation of situation definitions is an essential component. >Situations. III 395 Communicative Action/Speech Acts/Perlocution/Illocution/Habermas: Strawson has shown that a speaker achieves his/her illocutionary goal that the listener understands what is being said without revealing his/her perlocutionary goal. This gives perlocutions the asymmetric character of covert strategic actions in which at least one of the participants behaves strategically, while deceiving other participants that he/she does not meet the conditions under which normally illocutionary goals can only be achieved. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act Therefore, perlocutions are not suitable for the analysis of coordination of actions, which are to be explained by illocutionary binding effects. This problem is solved if we understand communicative action as interaction in which all participants coordinate their individual action plans and pursue their illocutionary goals without reservation. III 396 Only such interactions are communicative actions in which all participants pursue illocutionary goals. Otherwise they fall under strategic action. III 397 HabermasVsAustin: he has tended to identify speech acts with acts of communication, i.e. the linguistically mediated interactions. III 400 Definition Understanding/Communication/Habermas: in the context of our theory of communicative action we limit ourselves to acts of speech under standard conditions, i.e. we assume that a speaker means nothing else than the literal meaning of what he/she says. >Meaning/Intending. Understanding a sentence is then defined as knowing what makes that sentence acceptable. >Understanding. III 457 Communicative action/Rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only if we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday actions and the formation of subsystems for procedural rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies. IV 223 Communicative Actions/HabermasVsSystem theory/Habermas: Communicative actions succeed only in the light of cultural traditions - this is what ensures the integration of society, and not systemic mechanisms that are deprived of the intuitive knowledge of their relatives. >Cultural tradition, >Culture. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Communitarianism | Barber | Brocker I 690 Communitarianism/Barber: Barber is not considered communitarian by all authors, but he does represent the typical topoi of communitarian politics: - rejection of a political philosophy based on abstract principles ((s) CommunitarianismVsKant), - the accusation of the separation of the individual from social ties ("atomism") and - dissatisfaction with a purely instrumental view of political institutions. BarberVsCommunitarianism: in contrast to the chief theorists of communitarianism, Barber participated in the communitarian reform movement around Amitai Etzioni. Variants of communitarianism: a) substantialistic: here the community is seen as a given, against it: b) procedural: this is about the common practice of counselling and decision-making. Barber is to be attributed to the latter variant. (1)(2) BarberVsMacIntyre, BarberVsWalzer, BarberVsTaylor: Considering theorists like Michael Walzer, Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor as sceptics of a national policy of democratic society and as supporters of a civil society perspective (3), Barber's programme of a strong democracy had to appear as a quite radical and reasonable position because it ultimately gave a high rank to the national political community and participation in political decisions. (BarberVsTaylor, BarberVsWalzer, BarberVsMacIntyre). >A. MacIntyre, >M. Walzer, >Ch. Taylor. 1. Hartmut Rosa, „Fremde zu Nachbarn: die Vision einer demokratischen Bürgerschaft. Rezension zu Benjamin Barber, „Starke Demokratie“, in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 43/6, 1995 S. 1066-169. 2. W. Jay Reedy, „The relevance of Rousseau to Contemporary Communitarism. The Example of Benjamin Barber”, in: Philosophy and Social Criticism 21/2, 1995 3. Michael Haus, Kommunitarismus. Einführung und Analyse, Wiesbaden 2003 Michael Haus, „Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolBarb I Benjamin Barber The Truth of Power. Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House New York 2001 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Communitarianism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 170 Communitarianism/Political Philosophy/Dagger: [Longing for community] did not find expression in the word 'communitarian' until the 1840s, when it and communautaire appeared almost simultaneously in the writings of English and French socialists. French dictionaries point to Etienne Cabet and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon as the first to use communautaire, but the Oxford English Dictionary gives the credit for 'communitarian' to one Goodwyn Barmby, who founded the Universal Communitarian Association in 1841 and edited a magazine he called The Promethean, or Communitarian Apostle. According to Ralph Waldo Emerson's essay on 'English reformers', Barmby Gaus I 171 advertised his publication as 'the cheapest of all magazines, and the paper most devoted of any to the cause of the people; consecrated to Pantheism in Religion, and Communism in Politics' (1842(1): 239). In the beginning, then, 'communitarian' seems to have been a rough synonym of 'socialist' and 'communist'. To be a communitarian was simply to believe that community is somehow vital to a worthwhile life and is therefore to be protected against various threats. Socialists and communists were leftists, but a communitarian could as easily be to the right as the left of centre politically (Miller, 2000c)(2) (...) people who moved from the settled, family-focused life of villages and small towns to the unsettled, individualistic life of commerce and cities might gain affluence and personal free- dom, but they paid the price of alienation, isolation, and rootlessness. Ferdinand Tönnies (2001)(3), with his distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (association or civil society), has been especially influential in this regard. As Tönnies defines the terms, Gemeinschaft is an intimate, organic, and traditional form of human association; Gesellschaft is impersonal, mechanical, and rational. To exchange the former for the latter then, is to trade warmth and support for coldness and calculation. Concern for community took another direction in the twentieth century as some writers began to see the centripetal force of the modern state as the principal threat to community. This turn is evident, for instance, in José Ortega y Gasset's warnings in The Revolt of the Masses against 'the gravest danger that today threatens civilisation: State intervention; the absorption of all spontaneous social effort by the State' (1932(4): 120). Nisbet: Robert Nisbet's The Quest for Community (1953)(5) provides an especially clear statement of this position, which draws more on Tocqueville's insistence on the importance of voluntary associations ofcitizens than on a longing for Gemeinschaft. >Community/Tönnies. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in short, the longing for community took the form of a reaction against both the atomizing, anomic tendencies of modern, urban society and the use of the centripetal force of the modern state to check these tendencies. Moreover, modernity was often linked with liberalism, a theory that many took to rest on and encourage atomistic and even 'possessive' individualism (Macpherson, 1962)(6). Against this background, communitarianism developed in the late twentieth century in the course of a debate with - or perhaps within - liberalism. >Liberalism/Gaus. Philosophical communitarianism: Four books published in rapid succession in the 1980s - Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981)(7), Michael Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982)(8), Michael Walzer's Spheres of.Justice (1983)(9), and Charles Taylor's Philosophical Papers (1985)(10) - marked the emergence of this philosophical form of communitarianism.FN7 Different as they are from one another, all of these books express dissatisfaction with liberalism, especially in the form of theories of justice and rights. The main target here was John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971)(11), but Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)(12), Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously (1977)(13), and Bruce Ackerman's Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980)(14) also came in for criticism. (CommunitarianismVsRawls, CommunitarianismVsNozick, CommunitarianismVsAckerman, Bruce, CommunitarianismVsDworkin). CommunitarianismVsLiberalism: a typical complaint was, and is, that these theories are too abstract and universalistic. Walzer: In opposing them, Walzer proposes a 'radically particularist' approach that attends to 'history, culture, and membership' by asking not what 'rational individuals under universalizing conditions of such-and-such a sort' would choose, but what would 'individuals like us choose, who are situated as we are, who share a culture and are determined to go on sharing it?' (1983(9): xiv, 5). >M. Walzer. Walzer thus calls attention to the importance of community, which he and others writing in the early 1980s took to be suffering from both philosophical and political neglect. For a valuable, full-length survey of this debate, see Mulhall and Swift, 1996(15) Gaus I 172 Communitarian responesVsCriticisms: responses: 1) the first is that the communitarians' criticisms are misplaced because they have misconceived liberalism (Caney, 1992)(16). In particular, the communitarians have misunderstood the abstractness of the theories they criticize. Thus Rawls maintains (1993(17): Lecture I) that his 'political' conception of the self as prior to its ends is not a metaphysical claim about the nature of the self, as Sandel believes, but simply a way of representing the parties who are choosing principles of justice from behind the 'veil of ignorance'. Nor does this conception of the individual as a self capable of choosing its ends require liberals to deny that individual identity is in many ways the product of unchosen attachments and social circumstances. 2) 'What is central to the liberal view,' according to Will Kymlicka, 'is not that we can perceive a self prior to its ends, but that we understand ourselves to be prior to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination' (1989(18) : 52). With this understood, a second response is to grant, as Kymlicka, Dworkin (1986(19); 1992(20)), Gewirth (1996)(21), and Mason (2000)(22) do, that liberals should pay more attention to belonging, identity, and community, but to insist that they can do this perfectly well within their existing theories. 3) the third response, finally, is to point to the dangers of the critics' appeal to community norms. Communities have their virtues, but they have their vices, too - smugness, intolerance, and various forms of oppression and exploitation among them. The fact that communitarians do not embrace these vices simply reveals the perversity of their criticism: they 'want us to live in Salem, but not to believe in witches' (Gutmann 1992(23): 133; Friedman, 1992(24)). 1. Emerson, R. W. (1842) 'English reformers'. The Dial, 3(2). 2. Miller, David (2000c) 'Communitarianism: left, right and centre'. In his Citizenship and National Identity. Cambridge: Polity. 3. Tönnies, Ferdinand (2001 118871) Community and Civil Society, trans. J. Harris and M. Hollis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Ortega y Gasset, José (1932) The Revolt of the Masses. New York: Norton. 5. Nisbet, Robert (1953) The Quest for Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 6. Macpherson, C. B. (1962) The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Clarendon. 7. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1981 ) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 8. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Walzer, Michael (1983) Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic. 10. Taylor, Charles (1985) Philosophical Papers, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 11. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 12. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic. 13. Dworkin, Ronald (1977) Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 14. Ackerman, Bruce (1980) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven, CT: Yale Umversity Press. 15. Mulhall, Stephen and Adam Swift (1996) Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell. 16. Caney, Simon (1992) 'Liberalism and communitarianism: a misconceived debate'. Political Studies, 40 (June): 273-89. 17. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 18. Kymlicka, Will (1989) Liberalism, Community, and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon. 19. Dworkin, Ronald (1986) Law's Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 20. Dworkin, Ronald (1992) 'Liberal community'. In S. Avinerl and A. de-Shalit, eds, ommunitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 21. Gewirth, Alan (1996) The Community of Rights. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 22. Mason, Andrew (2000) Community, Solidarity, and Belonging: Levels of Community and Their Normative Significance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 23. Gutmann, Amy (1992) 'Communitarian critics of liberalism'. In S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, eds, Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 24. Friedman, Marilyn (1992) 'Feminism and modern friendship: dislocating the community'. In S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, eds, Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Community | Easton | Brocker I 496 Community/Political System/Easton: The political community consists of the members of the political system. It is regarded as a group of people linked by a political division of labour (1). Members can have very different cultures, traditions or even nationalities. It is crucial that they have a minimal willingness to cooperate in solving political problems (2). This cooperation can take place in very different institutional structures (for example democracy or autocracy). The regime may change (see Political System/Easton), but the community may be preserved. 1. David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York 1965, p.177 2. Ibid. p. 172. Dieter Fuchs, “David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolEast I David Easton A Systems Analysis of Political Life New York 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Community | Rawls | I 521 Social Community/Social Union/Rawls: Hegel's legal philosophy, §§ 182-187, discusses preforms. >Philosophy of law/Hegel, >G.W.F. Hegel. Rawls: the members of a private community, whether individuals or associations, have their own private goals that are either competing or independent of each other. Anyway, they do not complement each other. Institutions here do not assume that they have a value, their activities are not seen as good but at best as a burden. Each person therefore only joins the community in pursuit of his or her own goals. No one takes note of someone else's possessions or goods, but prefers the most efficient arrangement that gives them the greatest advantage. Public goods consist primarily of the framework conditions provided by the state. I 522 Community members are not driven by the need to behave fairly, so the system of functioning requires sanctions. Social nature/Rawls: the social nature of the human being is best seen as a counter-image to the private community outlined above: People do indeed share common goals and they value the shared institutions and public goods as something good in itself. We need each other as partners I 523 ...in many aspects of life and the successes and experiences of others are part of our own social life. See Aristotelian Principle, >Principles/Rawls, >Community/Humboldt. Rawls: We can follow Humboldt and say that the social community makes it possible for everyone to participate in the whole of the realized possibilities of the other members. I 527 Justice/Community/Rawls: in order to understand how the principles of justice are connected with human socialization, we can imagine a well-ordered society as a social community of social communities. Collective intentions then arise as a consequence of the fact that everyone expects everyone (including themselves) to behave according to the principles of justice. I 528 The individual lives of individuals are, so to speak, plans within an overall plan of the community, but this overall plan does not set a superordinate goal, as e.g. in the case of a religious association, let alone any national prestige. Rather, it is a matter of the constitutional order implementing the principles of justice. I 529 Division of labour: will of course not be abolished in a social community. After all, it's about the opportunity for each member to bring in his or her individual skills. However, it is never possible for everyone to realize their skilss to an unlimited extent. >Division of labour. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Community | Tönnies | Gaus I 171 Community/society/Tönnies/Dagger: (...) people who moved from the settled, family-focused life of villages and small towns to the unsettled, individualistic life of commerce and cities might gain affluence and personal freedom, but they paid the price of alienation, isolation, and rootlessness. Ferdinand Tönnies (2001)(1), with his distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (association or civil society), has been especially influential in this regard. As Tönnies defines the terms, Gemeinschaft is an intimate, organic, and traditional form of human association; Gesellschaft is impersonal, mechanical, and rational. To exchange the former for the latter then, is to trade warmth and support for coldness and calculation. >Communitarianism/Political philosophy, >Communitarianism/Dagger. 1. Tönnies, Ferdinand (2001 118871) Community and Civil Society, trans. J. Harris and M. Hollis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Compactness | Logic Texts | Read III 59 Compactness: the classic logical conclusion is compact. To understand this, we must acknowledge that the set of premises can be infinite. Classically, every logical truth (of which there are infinite numbers) is a conclusion from any statement. This can be multiplied, by double negation, the conjunction of itself with its double negation, and so on. III 60 The classical compactness does not mean that a conclusion cannot have an infinite number of premises, it can. But classically it is valid exactly when the conclusion follows from a finite subset of the premises. Compactness limits the expressiveness of a logic. Proof: is performed purely syntactically. In itself, the proof has no meaning. Its correctness is defined based on its form and structure. >Proof. III 61 The counterpart of proof is completeness: there should be a derivation. >Incompleteness/logic texts. III 61 The Omega rule (>Incompleteness/logic texts) is not accepted as a rule of orthodox, classical proof theory. How can I do this? According to classical representation, a rule is valid if the premises are true and the conclusion is false by no interpretation over any range of definition. How can the premises A(0),A(1) etc. was, but be false for each n,A(n)? III 61/62 The explanation lies in the limitation of the expressiveness. In non-compact logic, there may be a categorical set of formulas for arithmetic, but the proof methods require compactness. For expressiveness: >Richness, >Meta language, >Object language. Difference compact/non compact: classical logic is a 1st order logic. A categorical set of axioms for arithmetic must be a second order logic. ((s) quantifiers also for properties). >Quantifier, cf. >Schematic letters. For example, Napoleon had all the properties of a great general: "for every quality f, if for every person x, if x was a great general, then x had f, then Napoleon had f". In reality it is a little more subtle. For syntactically one cannot distinguish whether a formula is like the 1st or 2nd level above. >2nd order logic. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Comparative Advantage | Ricardo | Rothbard II 94 Comparative Advantage/free trade/Ricardo/Rothbard: In emphasizing the great importance of the voluntary interplay of the international division of labour, free traders of the eighteenth century, including Adam Smith, based their doctrines on the law of ‘absolute advantage’. That is, countries should specialize in what they are best or most efficient at, and then Rothbard II 95 exchange these products, for in that case the people of both countries will be better off. This is a relatively easy case to argue. It takes little persuasion to realize that the United States should not bother to grow bananas (or, rather, to put it in basic micro-terms, that individuals and firms in the United States should not bother to do so), but rather produce something else (e.g. wheat, manufactured goods) and exchange them for bananas grown in Honduras. There are, after all, precious few banana growers in the US demanding a protective tariff. But what if the case is not that clear-cut, and American steel or semi-conductor firms are demanding such protection? The law of comparative advantage tackles such hard cases, and is therefore indispensable to the case for free trade. It shows that even if, for example, Country A is more efficient than Country B at producing both commodities X and Y, it will pay the citizens of Country A to specialize in producing X, which it is most best at producing, and buy all of commodity Y from Country B, which it is better at producing but does not have as great a comparative advantage as in making commodity X. In other words, each country should produce not just what it has an absolute advantage in making, but what it is most best at, or even least worst at, i.e. what it has a comparative advantage in producing. If, then, the government of Country A imposes a protective tariff on imports of commodity Y, and it forcibly maintains an industry producing that commodity, this special privilege will injure the consumers in Country A as well as obviously injuring the people in Country B. For Country A, as well as the rest of the world, loses the advantage of specializing in the production of what it is most best at, since many of its scarce resources are compulsorily compulsorily and inefficiently tied up in the production of commodity Y. The law of comparative advantage highlights the important fact that a protective tariff in Country A wreaks injury on the efficient industries in that country, and the consumers in that country, as well as on Country B and the rest of the world. Another implication of the law of comparative advantage is that no country or region of the earth is going to be left out of the international division of labour under free trade. For the law means that even if a country is in such poor shape that it has no absolute advantage in producing anything, it still pays for its trading partners, the people of other countries, to allow it to produce what it is least worst at. >Free trade. |
EconRic I David Ricardo On the principles of political economy and taxation Indianapolis 2004 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Comparisons | Barthes | Röttger-Denker I 136f Comparison/Barthes: Barthes compares almost everything with everything, text as a metaphorical event for him is like reason. The object can be displaced by a kind of imagination. >Comparability, >Comparison, >Analogies, >Metaphors, >Text, >Reason, >Similarity. |
Barthes I R. Barthes Mythologies: The Complete Edition, in a New Translation New York 2013 Röttger I Gabriele Röttger-Denker Roland Barthes zur Einführung Hamburg 1997 |
| Comparisons | Foucault | II, 224ff Comparisons/Foucault: Archeology: works with a variety of registers. Always in the plural, runs through spaces and distances. Not the same calendar. Comparison: a comparison is always limited and regional. It does not make any general forms appear. Cf. >Similarity, >Comparability, >Generality, >Form. False: it would be utterly wrong to say that in the various fields of the attribution of the classification of the designation and derivation, the whole taxi could be found shaped alike only in geometry, mechanics, physiology, or biblical criticism. Then I would not have described an area of interpositivity, but the spirit or the science of an epoch which I just did not want. Relationships/Foucault: the relationships that I have described apply to define a particular configuration. There are no signs to describe the face of a culture in its totality. It is not about description of an ideology: what the gap is there, forgetting, error, is for me conscious and methodological exclusion. Commonality: it is not about commonalities. In the determination of analogies are five different tasks: 1. to show how completely different discursive elements can be formed from analogous rules. 2. to what extent these rules are applied in the same way or do not. (To define the archaeological model of each formation). 3. to show how completely different terms (e.g. value, specific feature, price, or generic feature) occupy an analogous position in the branching of their system. 4. to show how the same term can cover archaeological different elements (the concepts of origin and evolution). 5. Subordination or complementarity relations from one positivity to another. Commonality: nothing in all these descriptions is based on the determination of influences, exchange, transmitted information and communication. Behind positivity is not an opera of neighboring disciplines. It is the law of their communications. ((s) after all: exchange of information). Archeology: also reveals the relationships between discursive information and non-discursive areas (institutions, political events, economic practices and processes). But it is not about cultural continuities. Also not about causal analysis (how political changes influenced the consciousness). Archeology: search for formal analogies and transmissions of meaning e.g. it is not how political practice has determined the meaning of medical discourse, but how and in what capacity it belongs to the conditions of its emergence, and its functioning. Political practice has not, of course, imposed new objects on medicine, but has opened up new fields of marking for the objects. >Order, >Analogies. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Comparisons | Lewis | V 5f Comparison/possible world/similarity/similarity metrics/difference/Lewis: Two possible worlds never differ in only a fact; if at all, then there is immediately an infinite number of differences. Analysis 1: only one most similar world. LewisVs: E.g. Bizet/Verdi: two equally similar worlds: both French/Italian - the next (closest) world does not exist! - Analysis 2: several similar possible worlds. Solution: van Fraassen: Supervaluation: arbitrarily chosen next world. V 21 Comparison/Counter comparison/counterfactual conditional/triple indexing/Lewis: If my yacht had been longer, I would have been happier. - 2nd World j: my yacht is longer than in i (1st World) - 3) every additional world where both is true is closer than one where the yacht is longer, but I am still not happier. - (Always in relation to the 1st World i). >Possible world/Lewis, >Similarity/Lewis, >Similarity metrics/Lewis, >Comparability. Explanation/(s): E.g., The Bizet/Verdi case: They could have been compatriots if a) Bizet had been Italian or b) Verdi had been French. Problem: Which world is closer to our world? Therefore a similarity metric for possible worlds is not achievable. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Compatibility | Brandom | I 244 Incompatibility/Brandom: normative-functionally analyzed: the determination of a claim precludes the authorization of another - advantage of this analysis: inconsistent beliefs are made understandable - definition: commitments exist only because people treat each other as fixed. >Understanding. --- I 252 Assigning foreign commitments is fundamental for entering own commitments. >Score keeping. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Competence | Chomsky | I 307 Competence/ChomskyVsHarman: I do not claim that they consist in "knowing-that", that language is described by the rules of grammar. >Propositional knowledge, >Knowledge, >Knowing how, >Capabilities. Competence/ChomskyVsHarman: not a number of habits, no reference to the ability of the cyclist - instead the mastery of generative grammar - (non-formulated knowledge). - Less than the ability to speak a language. >Speaking. --- Searle VIII 404 Competence/performance/Chomsky: Thesis: performance is just the peak of the iceberg of competence. >Performance. Searle VIII 437 SearleVsChomsky: the distinction is wrong: he assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more like a theory of performance than one of competence - he does not see that ultimately competence is a performance competence - ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: suspects behaviorism behind it. SearleVs: not true, because speech act theory involves intention. >Speech act theory. Searle VIII 409 Chomsky: new: object of study is the language skills. old: random number of sentences, classifications. ChomskyVsStructuralism: a theory must be able to explain which chains represent sentences and which do not. >Theories, >Explanation. Searle VIII 414 SearleVsChomsky: it is not clear how the grammatical theory provides the knowledge of the speaker. >Grammar, >Syntax, >Semantics. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Competence | Katz | Cresswell I 12 Competency/linguistic/linguistic competence/Chomsky/Cresswell: (Chomsky 1965, 3 - 15): the discussion continues to this day (1974). Definition linguistic competency: is an ability underlying the linguistic activity. It is about the class of sentences that the speaker finds grammatically acceptable. Semantic competency/Cresswell: (that is what I am concerned with here): I prefer a truth-conditional semantics (> truth conditions). I would like to distinguish between two things: A) CresswellVsKatz/CresswellVsFodor/Terminology/KF/Cresswell: "KF" (Katz/Fodor semantics): is incomplete, if not incorrect. B) CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsSearle/CresswellVsTactual Theory: is rather a theory of semantic performance than of semantic competence. --- Cresswell I 12 Definition Competence/linguistic competence/Katz/Nagel/Cresswell: (Katz and Nagel, 1974): explains the ability of a speaker to make judgments about the following properties: synonymy, redundancy, contradictoryness, entailment, ambiguity, semantic anomalies, antonymy and superordination. |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Competition | Keynesianism | Mause I 70 Competition/Keynesianism: The Post-Keynesians (who, like the Keynesians, do not see themselves as neoclassics) assume imperfect competition as the rule, emphasize the social context in which the economic subjects make decisions, demand realistic modelling of human decision-making behaviour and above all address production and accumulation (i.e. less exchange). The analysis focuses on production and distribution theory. (1) 1. VsNeoclassicism: the ratio between wage and interest rate, i.e. the distribution of national income among the factors of production, is not the result of market processes, but is determined by institutional factors and the respective negotiating power. 2. VsNeoclassicism: Vs assumption of rationality. This is not applicable in the case of "real" uncertainty. >Keynesianism, >Rationality. 1. J. Robinson, The accumulation of capital. London 1956. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Competition | Marx | Rothbard II 418 Competion/Marx/Rothbard: (…) one may well ask, if the accumulation of capital necessarily slashes profits, why do capitalists, who are clearly motivated by a search for higher rather than Iower profits, insist on continuing to accumulate? Why do they persist in cutting their own throats? >Rate of Profit/Marx. Solution/Marx/Rothbard: One Marxian answer to this riddle is 'competition', and Leninists in particular like to explain the allegedly later development of 'monopoly capitalism' and of imperialism as attempts by capitalists to form cartels, or find investment outlets abroad, as attempts to stave off the dread consequences of competition.(1) Rothbard: But the mere citation of 'competition' is scarcely an adequate answer. It is true, for example, that a new discovery or a new industry will cause very high profits at the beginning, and that in the pursuit of these profits new, competing firms will eventually bid down the rate of profit in the industry. But, in the short run, at least, and before equilibrium arrives, these capitalists are still making high and above normal profits. But, in contrast, the Marxian businessman who accumulates capital, loses profits at each step of the way, and not simply in the long run. It is therefore diffcult to see why any one capitalist, at any step of the way, would ever be tempted to join in the accumulative parade. Solution/Marx: Marx's ultimate answer to this riddle is deceptively simple: capitalists accumulate, despite the immediate and future fall in their profits because, well, they have an irresistible, irrational urge, or 'instinct' to do so. Rothbard: This, of course, is no explanation at all; it abandons any genuine explanation under the cloak of a high-sounding but ultimately meaningless label such as 'drive' or 'instinct'. 1. The Leninist theory depends on the claim that both state monopoly capitalism and imperialism come later than competitive, non-imperialist capitalism, the latter condition having prevailed during Marx's life- time. But imperialism - tribes or nation-states conquering or aggressing against, and robbing, other tribes or nations - is as old as recorded history, and state monopoly capitalism at least as old as the mercantilist era. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Competition | Norman | Krugman III 95 Competition/Victor D. Norman: To see whether our assumption(1) that the oligopoly equilibrium involves Bertrand price competition* is important, we also simulate the effects of entry assuming Cournot competition in the number of seats offered on each flight. >Cournot Competition, >Bertrand Competition, >Sensitivity analysis, >Models, >Economic models, >Model theory, >Equilibrium, >Oligopolies. Equilibrium: As is seen, the simulated equilibria are virtually identical, except as regards the degree of price discrimination between Euroclass and tourist-class passengers: As should be expected, Cournot competition (being less aggressive than Bertrand) involves greater price discrimination; consequently, the relative price of Euroclass tickets falls more in the case of Bertrand than in the Cournot case. >Price discrimination. Krugman III 99 Example: entry of new competitors into the European flight market: The analysis(1) indicates that there would be very significant effects of entry into the Oslo-Stockholm market. Prices could fall dramatically, and there could be some (more modest) increase in flight frequency. Consumer gains would, not surprisingly, outweigh SAS losses. Moreover, and perhaps more surprisingly, even though there would be a significant shift of profits from SAS to new entrants, the net welfare effect on Scandinavia would be positive and significant even if the entrants came from outside Scandinavia. Costs: The analysis also indicates that these conclusions are robust, both with respect to the average and marginal costs of the firms and to the nature of the market game. In particular, it does not seem to matter greatly whether a future oligopoly equilibrium involves price or quantity competition. The reason the two equilibria are virtually identical is that the capacity constraint on each flight is binding in all our simulated equilibria. *((s) In the economics of oligopoly, the Cournot and Bertrand models explore different ways firms can compete. Cournot models focus on quantity competition, where firms choose output levels, while Bertrand models focus on price competition, where firms set prices. In Bertrand competition, firms making identical products often reach an equilibrium where prices are equal to marginal costs, leading to zero economic profits. In contrast, Cournot competition typically leads to higher prices and positive profits for firms, as they limit their output to maximize profits.) 1. Victor D. Norman and Siri P. Strandenes. „Deregulation of Scandinavian Airlines: A Case Study of the Oslo-Stockholm Route.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Victor D. Norman and Siri P. Strandenes. „Deregulation of Scandinavian Airlines: A Case Study of the Oslo-Stockholm Route.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Competition | Sherif | Haslam I 156 Competition/cooperation/Sherif: The evidence from the Boys’ Camp studies (>Robbers Cave Experiment/Sherif, Sherif et al. 1969(1)) clearly shows that competition leads to increased intergroup discrimination, and that cooperation towards superordinate goals leads to a reduction in intergroup discrimination. Nevertheless, Sherif and his colleagues report much anecdotal evidence to suggest (a) that the boys showed ingroup favouring attitudes before the formal introduction of competition (see Sherif, 1966(2): 80; Sherif and Sherif, 1969(1): 239); and (b) that, although cooperation towards superordinate goals reduced ingroup favouritism, it did not eradicate it completely. VsSherif: This means that other social-psychological processes are clearly at play, ones that Sherif and his colleagues failed to address directly. 1. Sherif, M. and Sherif, C.W. (1969) Social Psychology. New York: Harper & Row. 2. Sherif, M. (1966) In Common Predicament: Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. Michael W. Platow and John A. Hunter, „ Intergroup Relations and Conflicts. Revisiting Sherif’s Boys’ Camp studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Class studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Competition | Smith | Krugman III 68 Competition/international trade/Alasdair Smith: Competition between firms is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage of the game, firms choose model numbers, taking account of the effect of their choices on the second-stage equilibrium, and the outcome is a Nash equilibrium in model numbers. >Nash equilibrium. Krugman III 69 The second stage is Cournot competition* (modified to take account of quantitative restrictions on imports) in output, given model numbers. >Cournot Competition, >Bertrand Competition. Strategies: Firms maximize profits, taking account of the impact of scale economies on marginal costs, of the effect of taxes, tariffs, and transport costs on the wedge between producer and consumer prices, and of the effect of elasticity of demand in different markets on their marginal revenues. >Profit maximization, >Tariffs, >Elasticity, >Taxation, >Transport, >Price, >Consumer price, >Production cost, >Markets. National markets are assumed to be segmented, so that firms can set different prices in different markets. Market share: A producer with a large market share in a particular national market sees its own behavior as having a strong influence on the overall price of cars in that market and thus perceives a relatively inelastic demand for its product; this leads such firms to have higher price-cost margins. >Voluntary exporst restraints (VER). * ((s) In the economics of oligopoly, the Cournot and Bertrand models explore different ways firms can compete. Cournot models focus on quantity competition, where firms choose output levels, while Bertrand models focus on price competition, where firms set prices. In Bertrand competition, firms making identical products often reach an equilibrium where prices are equal to marginal costs, leading to zero economic profits. In contrast, Cournot competition typically leads to higher prices and positive profits for firms, as they limit their output to maximize profits.) Alasdair Smith. „Strategic Trade Policy in the European Car Market.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Completeness | Gould | I 264 Completeness/Gould: completeness is an easily occurring evolutionary characteristic which can also only be analogous ((s) i. e. it is not due to a common cause in different forms of life.) >Evolution, >Explanation. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Completeness | Leibniz | Holz I 73 Complete concept/Leibniz: contains all possible conditions and determinations for the existence of a particular being, is thus identical with the concept of the world as a whole. Only perceptible to an infinite mind. Cf. >Concept/Hegel. Overarching general: for the infinite mind, the distinction between truths of reason and truths of facts is again invalid: for him, everything is a truth of reason, or just as well one can say, everything is for him a factual truth! For the finite mind, however, the truth of reason is the opposite of the truth of facts. Overarching general: the one includes its opposite. "the overarching general". |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Completeness | Poundstone | I 252 Puzzle/Poundstone: anticipate the basic problem of inference, namely the question of how to recognize a paradox - (NP-complete). >Conclusions, >Paradoxes, >Recognition. Right turn rule: is overcome by islands, therefore inefficient. Solution: Tremaux: thread, at a dead end return to the last node. Also mark dead ends. - Two breadcrumbs mark old dead ends. - At old node choose a path that was not chosen before. I 259 Results in first exploring remote areas. I 267 "Problem of the longest path": is there an easy way? Trying does not lead directly to the shortest one. - No intelligent algorithm is available. I 270 NP-Complete/Poundstone: the answers are easy to verify! E.g. puzzle: the right way may only be two nodes away, but you had to try out many combinations. >Review, >Verification, >Confirmation. I 282 Prove that NP problems cannot be solved with a computer. I 274 Combination/Permutation/Combinatorics: P: polynomial function: n² - E.g. puzzle with 5000 parts. solvable - NP: exponential function. 2n. E.g. Puzzle with 5000 paths - unsolvable. In general: difficult to solve. NP: "non-deterministically polynomial-temporally complete". I 276 So far no evidence that NP problems cannot be solved in polynomial time. - But no empirical evidence. - The process of logical inferences is itself an NP problem. - Our conclusions about the world are limited. I 281 The chain end, the very basis of our knowledge, can be recognized in polynomial time and checked for contradictions (lists; - but not walkable as a puzzle). >Knowledge, >Contradictions, >Consistency. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Complexes/Complexity | Ryle | I 190 Complexity/Ryle: e.g. The bird flies to th south. The bird moves to the south. The description is not longer, but it is a more fulfilling description. It is not about two activities. We have two different explanations and different intentions here. >Intention, >Explanation, >Description levels, >Disposition, >Description-dependence, >Context. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Complexes/Complexity | Wittgenstein | Tugendhat I 163 Complex/Wittgenstein: E.g. not: "a red circle consists of redness and circularity". Tetens VII 75 Complex/Image Theory/Tractatus: the complex characters "aRb" do not say that a stands in relation R to b, but that "a" stands in a relation to "b" (!(s) quotation marks) says that aRb. (Here no quotation marks) (3.1432) - ((s) resolution of the sign into its component parts: the relation on the level of signs says something about the relationship on the level of reality). >Relations, >Representation, >World, >Picture theory. Hintikka I 53 Mean period/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: relations and properties to the objects. Philosophical Grammar (Philosophische Grammatik): "This is the root of the bad expression: the fact is a complex of objects. >Objects, >Facts. Example "Here it is said that an ill person is compared to the combination of two things." Hintikka: such a far-reaching change of opinion is so unlikely that one should assume that the Tractatus rejects the equation of "objects" with individuals or individual things. I 68 Tractatus: renounces all complex logical forms conceived in the sense of independent entities, there is nothing left but the forms of the objects (there are no forms corresponding to complex logical propositions). I 68 Thing/complex object/Terminology/Wittgenstein: a complex object is just a thing. We know the complex objects from the point of view and know from the point of view that they are complex. I 138 ff Frege/Logic/Sentence/Hintikka: in the Tractatus there is a break with Frege's tradition: Frege's logic is regarded as the theory of complex sentences. Wittgenstein examines the simplest components of the world and their linguistic substitutes. >Atomism, >Atomic sentences. I 148 et seqq. Truth Function/Tractatus/Hintikka: Main thesis of the Tractatus: (a.o.) "The proposition is a truth function of the elementary sentences". Wittgenstein/Hintikka: must therefore prove that truth-functional operations (to form complex sets of atoms) have no influence on the image character. Wittgenstein II 39 Complexity/Wittgenstein: since an infinite number of special cases belong to a general sentence, it does not make it more complex than if only three or four special cases were belonging to it. A sentence with four special cases is probably more complex than one with three, but in an infinite number of special cases it is a generality of a different logical kind. II 314 Simple/Simplicity/Complex/Composite/Sense/meaningless/Wittgenstein: Suppose you are asked whether a drawn square is composed or simple, i.e. whether it consists of parts or not. II 315 Example "Is this uniformly white object composed or simple?" The answer is "it depends." III 139 Elementary Theorem/Wittgenstein/Flor: The term elementary theorem is important as an absolute term. Otherwise we deal with ambiguity. What occurs in one context as a simple theorem could be complex in another context. This would also mean that intentional connections between sentences could no longer be excluded. III 142 There must be an absolute distinction between the simple and the complex. IV 31 Complex/Tractatus: 3.3442 the sign of the complex does not dissolve arbitrarily even during analysis. IV 86 Complex/Tractatus: 5.5423 perceiving a complex means perceiving that its components relate to each other in such or such a way. This explains why a drawn cube can be perceived as a cube in two ways. Puzzle: here we really see two different facts. VII 75 Complex/Mapping theory/Image theory/Tractatus: not the complex sign "aRb" says that a is in relation R to b, but that "a" is in relation to "b" ((s) quotation marks!), says that aRb. (No quotes here!) (3.1432). ((s) Resolution of the sign into its components: the relation on the level of signs says something about the relation on the level of reality). >Atomism, >Atomic Sentence. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Compositionality | Gärdenfors | I 241 Compositionality/conceptual space/linguistics/Gärdenfors: how can conceptual spaces describe the mechanisms that act during the formation of composite meanings? (For compositionality Szabo 2004). (1) Compositionality/GärdenforsVsFrege: thesis: since the communicative context changes the meaning of the expressions involved, the linguistic expression is under defined in its meaning. Communication/Transformation/Gärdenfors: Thesis: the compilation of meanings often transforms these meanings. --- I 242 Direct composition/Gärdenfors: (non-Fregean): direct compositions are mappings between semantic areas (Holoyak & Thagard, 1996; Fauconnier & Turner, 1998; Gärdenfors, 2000). (2)(3)(4) Combination adjective-noun: e.g. blue rectangle: its meaning is defined as the Cartesian product of the blue region of the color space and the rectangle region of the shape space. A product of compact and convex amounts will in turn be compact and convex. The mapping functions are continuous. The function product is also continuous. N.B.: thus the fixed point properties remain in the composition. (See fixed point/Gärdenfors (I 97): certainty about the common focus on an object. Meaning/GärdenforsVsFrege: the meaning of the compound structure is no longer formed by the meaning of the components but by the areas and functions. These can be located as regions in the product space (e.g., of color and size). It is assumed that the areas involved are separable. But in practice, they are not completely separate: some pre-processing must take place before the areas can be combined. --- I 244 Head/Modification/Gärdenfors: the analysis with head and modifier will usually not work because our knowledge about the respective areas will change the representation of the modifier: e.g. white wine is not white, e.g. a large squirrel is not a big animal. ((s)> syncategorematic expressions in Analytical Philosophy). Solution/Gärdenfors: we need contrast classes. E.g. adjectives such as "large" need contrast classes, which introduce yet another property. Then we can assume compact convex regions of metric spaces for the head and modifier, as well as a radial (continuous) projection between the spaces. (C. Berge, Topological Spaces, Mineola, NY, 1997). (5) Problem: e.g. Lion > Stone Lion: here, not all areas can be equally attributed, e.g. habitat, behavior, etc. --- I 246 Metaphorical composition: even if the head and modifier have no common dimensions, one can create an image between the two by using convexity and compactness. For example, a bumpy road and a bumpy relationship share the geometrical quality of a dimension: a) the length b) the time. --- I 247 Dimension: its diversity is sometimes seen as an obstacle: cf. Lakoff & Johnson (1980).(6) > Metaphors/Gärdenfors. --- I 249 Noun verb combination/Gärdenfors: in my analysis a force pattern can be applied to different situations. E.g. the engine is running - the clock is running. --- I 250 Thesis about noun-verb combinations: the meaning of the verb is modified by the patient, but not by the agent. E.g. (From Keenan, 1984, p.20)(7): a) Oscar cut the lawn. The machine cut the lawn. b) Oscar cut the dress. The sharp stone cut the dress. Gärdenfors: the meaning of "cut" varies greatly between the pairs, but not so strong within the pairs. This shows that the meaning is not modified by the agent. 1. Szabo, Z. (2004). Compositionality. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compositionality 2. Holyoak, K. J., & Thagard, P. (1996). Mental leaps. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 3. Fauconnier, G., & Turner, R. (1998). Conceptual integration networks. Cognitive Science, 22, 133–187. 4. Gärdenfors, P. (2000). Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 5. Berge, C. (1997). Topological spaces. Mineola, NY: Dover. 6. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 7. Keenan, E. J. (1984). Semantic correlates of the ergative/absolutive distinction. Linguistics, 22, 197–223. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Compositionality | Peacocke | II 176 Compositionality/Peackocke: Idioms are not explained in terms of components along with psychological facts about English people. >Explanation, >Sentences, >Meaning, >Compositionality, >Frege Principle. Not a "theory around" (with individual axioms for individual cases). Instead: conventions. > |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Computer Games | Norvig | Norvig I 189 Computer Games/artificial intelligence/algorithms/Norvig/Russell: A game can be defined by the initial state (how the board is set up), the legal actions in each state, the result of each action, a terminal test (which says when the game is over), and a utility function that applies to terminal states. In two-player zero-sum games with perfect information, the minimax algorithm can select optimal moves by a depth-first enumeration of the game tree. The alpha–beta search algorithm computes the same optimal move as minimax, but achieves much greater efficiency by eliminating sub trees that are provably irrelevant. Usually, it is not feasible to consider the whole game tree (even with alpha–beta), so we Norvig I 190 need to cut the search off at some point and apply a heuristic evaluation function that estimates the utility of a state. Many game programs precompute tables of best moves in the opening and endgame so that they can look up a move rather than search. Games of chance can be handled by an extension to the minimax algorithm that evaluates a chance node by taking the average utility of all its children, weighted by the probability of each child. Optimal play in games of imperfect information, such as Kriegspiel and bridge, requires reasoning about the current and future belief states of each player. A simple approximation can be obtained by averaging the value of an action over each possible configuration of missing information. >Minimax algorithm. History of mechanical games: The most notorious of these was Baron Wolfgang von Kempelen’s (1734–1804) “The Turk,” a supposed chess-playing automaton that defeated Napoleon before being exposed as a magician’s trick cabinet housing a human chess expert (see Levitt, 2000)(1). Computer chess: In 1846, Charles Babbage (who had been fascinated by the Turk) appears to have contributed the first serious discussion of the feasibility of computer chess and checkers (Morrison and Morrison, 1961)(2). VsBabbage: He did not understand the exponential complexity of search trees, claiming “the combinations involved in the Analytical Engine enormously surpassed any required, even by the game of chess.” Chess: The NSS chess program (Newell et al., 1958)(3) used a simplified version of alpha-beta; it was the first chess program to do so. Alpha–beta pruning was described by Hart and Edwards (1961)(4) and Hart et al. (1972)(5). Alpha-beta was used by the “Kotok - McCarthy” chess program written by a student of John McCarthy (Kotok, 1962)(6). Knuth and Moore (1975)(7) proved the correctness of alpha-beta and analysed its time complexity. Pearl (1982b)(8) shows alpha–beta to be asymptotically optimal among all fixed-depth game-tree search algorithms. >Chess/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell. 1. Levitt, G. M. (2000). The Turk, Chess Automaton. McFarland and Company. 2. Morrison, P. and Morrison, E. (Eds.). (1961). Charles Babbage and His Calculating Engines: Selected Writings by Charles Babbage and Others. Dover. 3. Newell, A., Shaw, J. C., and Simon, H. A. (1958). Chess playing programs and the problem of complexity. IBM Journal of Research and Development, 4(2), 320–335. 4. Hart, T. P. and Edwards, D. J. (1961). The tree prune (TP) algorithm. Artificial intelligence project memo 30, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 5. Hart, P. E., Nilsson, N. J., and Raphael, B. (1972). Correction to “A formal basis for the heuristic determination of minimum cost paths”. SIGART Newsletter, 37, 28–29. 6. Kotok, A. (1962). A chess playing program for the IBM 7090. AI project memo 41, MIT Computation Center. 7. Knuth, D. E. (1975). An analysis of alpha–beta pruning. AIJ, 6(4), 293–326. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Computer Games | Russell | Norvig I 189 Computer Games/artificial intelligence/algorithms/Norvig/Russell: A game can be defined by the initial state (how the board is set up), the legal actions in each state, the result of each action, a terminal test (which says when the game is over), and a utility function that applies to terminal states. In two-player zero-sum games with perfect information, the minimax algorithm can select optimal moves by a depth-first enumeration of the game tree. The alpha–beta search algorithm computes the same optimal move as minimax, but achieves much greater efficiency by eliminating sub trees that are provably irrelevant. Usually, it is not feasible to consider the whole game tree (even with alpha–beta), so we Norvig I 190 need to cut the search off at some point and apply a heuristic evaluation function that estimates the utility of a state. Many game programs precompute tables of best moves in the opening and endgame so that they can look up a move rather than search. Games of chance can be handled by an extension to the minimax algorithm that evaluates a chance node by taking the average utility of all its children, weighted by the probability of each child. Optimal play in games of imperfect information, such as Kriegspiel and bridge, requires reasoning about the current and future belief states of each player. A simple approximation can be obtained by averaging the value of an action over each possible configuration of missing information. >Minimax algorithm. History of mechanical games: The most notorious of these was Baron Wolfgang von Kempelen’s (1734–1804) “The Turk,” a supposed chess-playing automaton that defeated Napoleon before being exposed as a magician’s trick cabinet housing a human chess expert (see Levitt, 2000)(1). Computer chess: In 1846, Charles Babbage (who had been fascinated by the Turk) appears to have contributed the first serious discussion of the feasibility of computer chess and checkers (Morrison and Morrison, 1961)(2). VsBabbage: He did not understand the exponential complexity of search trees, claiming “the combinations involved in the Analytical Engine enormously surpassed any required, even by the game of chess.” Chess: The NSS chess program (Newell et al., 1958)(3) used a simplified version of alpha-beta; it was the first chess program to do so. Alpha–beta pruning was described by Hart and Edwards (1961)(4) and Hart et al. (1972)(5). Alpha-beta was used by the “Kotok - McCarthy” chess program written by a student of John McCarthy (Kotok, 1962)(6). Knuth and Moore (1975)(7) proved the correctness of alpha-beta and analysed its time complexity. Pearl (1982b)(8) shows alpha–beta to be asymptotically optimal among all fixed-depth game-tree search algorithms. >Chess/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell. 1. Levitt, G. M. (2000). The Turk, Chess Automaton. McFarland and Company. 2. Morrison, P. and Morrison, E. (Eds.). (1961). Charles Babbage and His Calculating Engines: Selected Writings by Charles Babbage and Others. Dover. 3. Newell, A., Shaw, J. C., and Simon, H. A. (1958). Chess playing programs and the problem of complexity. IBM Journal of Research and Development, 4(2), 320–335. 4. Hart, T. P. and Edwards, D. J. (1961). The tree prune (TP) algorithm. Artificial intelligence project memo 30, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 5. Hart, P. E., Nilsson, N. J., and Raphael, B. (1972). Correction to “A formal basis for the heuristic determination of minimum cost paths”. SIGART Newsletter, 37, 28–29. 6. Kotok, A. (1962). A chess playing program for the IBM 7090. AI project memo 41, MIT Computation Center. 7. Knuth, D. E. (1975). An analysis of alpha–beta pruning. AIJ, 6(4), 293–326. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Computer Model | Dodwell | Rorty I 259 Computer modell/Dodwell: the analogy [between mind and computer] only becomes mandatory if different levels are distinguished. Hardware/Software. Conceptual level: "control process" physiological level: hardware. >Description levels, >Levels/order, >Software, >Computer programming, >Computers, >Computation. The principle of operation of the subroutines, in turn, cannot be made understandable by studying the hardware. Therefore, the understanding of how the subroutines themselves work does not help us in explaining the principle of problem solving in the terminology of a sequence of steps. >Problem solving. For this, the control process embodying the overall organization of the machine must be considered. Analogy: in reality we do not recognize visual patterns through selection of critical features, but by finding and comparing matching stencils. >Analogies, >Comparisons, >Comparability. This is neither a "conceptual" statement (about the "control process") nor a "physiological" statement (about the "hardware"), but it has nevertheless a genuine explanatory value. >Explanations, >Understanding. The notion of a "subroutine" seems to give us precisely what psychology needs, an explanation for what benefit this tertium quid between comon sense and physiology might hold. Dodwell: the subroutines, in turn, cannot be made understandable by studying the hardware, just as the purpose of multiplication tables cannot be seen by examining the brain. (Also Fodor: distinction between functions (program) and mechanics (hardware) in psychology is irreducible and not merely pragmatic.) >J. Fodor, >Psychology. |
Dod I P. C. Dodwell Brave New Mind: A Thoughtful Inquiry Into the Nature and Meaning of Mental Life Oxford 1999 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Computers | Gershenfeld | Brockman I 166 Brain/computers/Gershenfeld: (…) both brains and computer chips are hard to understand by watching their inner workings; they’re easily interpreted only by observing their external interfaces. We come to trust (or not) brains and computer chips alike based on experience that tests them rather than on explanations for how they work. >Review, >Verification, >Function, >Functional explanation. Brockman I 167 What’s interesting about amino acids is that they’re not interesting. They have attributes that are typical but not unusual, such as attracting or repelling water. But just twenty types of them are enough to make you. In the same way, twenty or so types of digital-material part types - conducting, insulating, rigid, flexible, magnetic, etc. - are enough to assemble the range of functions that go into making modern technologies like robots and computers. >Robots, >Technology. Gershenfeld, Neil „Scaling”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Conceivability | Chalmers | I 73 Conceivability/Idea/Chalmers: when two worlds resemble each other in terms of all micro-physical conditions, there is no room for the notion that they differ in terms of higher-level properties such as biological phenomena. >Possible worlds, >Distinctions, >Levels/order, >Properties, >Phenomena. This unimaginability is not caused by any cognitive limitations. It is rather logically impossible that these worlds differ. >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Experience. I 98 Imagination/Conceivability/argument/proof/VsChalermers: some may argue that conceivability is not an argument - there may always be details which have not been taken into account. ChalmersVsVs: but then one would have to specify somehow which details these are. Chalmers: the only way in which conceivability and possibility are disjointed is connected to necessity a posteriori: e.g. the hypothesis that water is not H2O seems conceptually coherent, but water is probably H2O in all possible worlds. >a posteriori necessity. Necessity a posteriori/Chalmers: however, necessity a posteriori is irrelevant to the problem of whether our conscious experience is explainable. >Explanation/Chalmers. I 99 Conceivability/Chalmers: one might think that one could imagine a situation in which Fermat's last sentence is wrong. But it would turn out that the situation was described wrongly. As it would turn out, the terms were misapplied. I 130 Idea/Conceivability/VsDescartes/Chalmers: Descartes' argument from the mere conceivability is considered as rejected. From the fact that it is conceivable that A and B are not identical does not follow that they are not. VsChalmers: Is that not true to the same extent for the zombies' example? >Zombies. I 131 ChalmersVsVs: the difference is that it is not about identity here, but about supervenience! >Supervenience, >Identity. If one can imagine the existence of all physical properties without the existence of conscious properties, then it is simply that the physical facts do not exhaust everything. This is something completely different. Supervenience is also much more fundamental here. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Concentration Risk | IMF Working Papers | IMF V 7 Concentration Risk/cryptocurrency/IMF/Hacibedel/Perez-Saiz: Despite the decentralized design of crypto assets, concentration and propagation risks in the crypto industry are relatively high. In theory, the decentralized nature of crypto assets makes them less prone to a single point of failure risk, as multiple nodes and validators potentially spread around the world (Bains et al., 2022)(1). Decentralization could improve security as well as reduce the need for trust in a single entity. In practice, concentration has also increased over the years due to high network effects, scale economies or the need to diversify risks. IMF V 7/8 There has been a remarkable trend towards concentration in the industry through the formation of large mining pools, the dominance of Bitcoin and Ethereum - currently representing more than half of the total market capitalization of crypto assets - or the emergence of large exchange platforms and wallets (see Cong et al., 2021(2); Makarov and Schoar, 2021)(3). Network effects or scale economies are also relatively important in this industry (see Halaburda et al., 2022)(4), which tends to raise concentration over time and increase the systemic importance of some key actors in the industry.* Decentralization: Decentralization of crypto assets and a high reliance on complex technologies and automatization elevates the importance of operational vulnerabilities and cyber risk in the crypto eco system. Crypto: Crypto technologies a) often rely on automated processes with little or no human intervention; b) are constantly evolving and transmuting, a source of rapid innovation; and c) they are decentralized by design which makes governance more difficult. Cyber risks: Cyber risks are estimated to be elevated in most types of crypto assets as complex technologies, actors, and weak governance are involved. Indeed, emerging financial technologies are particularly exposed to cyber-attacks given their high reliance on technology.** >Cryptocurrency risks, >Cryptocurrency, >Crypto transactions, >Fake transactions, >Cross-border payments, >Money laundry, >Crypto regulation, >Blockchain, >Bitcoin, >Crypto Firms, >Crypto and Banking, >Payment systems, >Stablecoins. * The recent collapse of FTX, a large crypto conglomerate, highlighted the inadequate governance and opaque corporate interlinkages that could arise among large crypto players (…). **In 2021, the two largest crypto-related loses were estimated at about $2 billion each, compared to an estimated operational risk losses of about $15 billion for the financial sector (Risk.net “Top 10 op risk losses for 2021 hog $15bn total”, 14 January 2022). 1. Bains, P., Ismail, A., Melo, F. and Sugimoto, N., 2022. Regulating the Crypto Ecosystem: The Case of Unbacked Crypto Assets. IMF FinTech Notes, 2022 (007). 2. Cong, L.W., He, Z. and Li, J., 2021. Decentralized mining in centralized pools. The Review of Financial Studies, 34(3), pp.1191-1235. 3. Makarov, I. and Schoar, A., 2021. Blockchain analysis of the bitcoin market (No. w29396). National Bureau of Economic Research. 4. Halaburda, H., Haeringer, G., Gans, J. and Gandal, N., 2022. The microeconomics of cryptocurrencies. Journal of Economic Literature, 60(3), pp.971-1013. |
IMF II IMF Working Paper André Reslow Gabriel Söderberg, Cross-Border Payments with Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies: Design and Policy Considerations IMF Fintech Note 2024/002 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF III IMF Working Papers Clemens Graf von Luckner Robin Koepke, Crypto as a Marketplace for Capital Flight. IMF Working Paper 24/133 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF IV IMF Working Papers Marco Pani Rodolfo Maino, “Could Digital Currencies Lead to the Disappearance of Cash from the Market? Insights from a ’Merchant-Customer’ Model.” IMF Working Paper WP/25/56 Washington, DC. 2025 |
| Concepts | Chisholm | II 73/74 Terms/Kant/Sauer: Kant assumes analytic judgments to be partial explications of concepts. > Carnap. >Explication, >Analyticity, >Judgments. Chisholm: Concepts contain also predicator rules (Lorenzen, Erlangen school: >Dialogical logic.) Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Concepts | Evans | McDowell I 73 Concept/term / Evans: a term is activated only in the judgment, not in the perception or experience. By the judgment a new type of content comes into play. >Perception, >Language use, >Content, >Judgments. Frank I 569/70 Idea/concept/Evans: the two can not be equated, otherwise there is no possibility of deception. - But they can not be separated either: otherwise the appropriateness of the idea can not be justified. >Idea, >Imagination, >Correctness. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Concepts | Flusser | I 161 Concept/Imagination/Flusser: We constantly try to imagine terms, to comprehend this idea, and then to make this concept conceivable again. >Imagination, >Conceivability, >Images, >Interpretation, >Interpretation("Deutung"). This overbidding of imagination through conception and vice versa, in which images become conceptual (concept art) and texts "imaginary" (science fiction) is an important aspect of today's "crisis of art". >Literature, >Art, >Texts, >Fiction. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
| Concepts | Gadamer | I 432 Conept/Gadamer: That the natural concept formation, which goes along with language does not always follow the order of essence, but very often carries out its word formation on the basis of accidentals and relations, is confirmed by every look into Platonic conceptual dihaireses or Aristotelian definitions. But the primacy of the logical order of essence, which is determined by the concepts of substance and accidental, makes the natural conceptualization of language appear only as an imperfection of our finite mind. Knowledge/Definition/Gadamer: Only because we know the accidentals alone, one is of the opinion that we follow them in the concept formation. Even if this is correct, however, a peculiar advantage follows from this imperfection - and Thomas Aquinas is right to have recognized this - namely the freedom to form infinite concepts and the progressive penetration of what is meant. >Knowledge. Thinking/Explaining: By thinking the process of thinking as the process of explication in the word, a logical achievement of language becomes visible, which cannot be fully understood from the perspective of the relationship of a material order as it would be before the eyes of an infinite mind. >Thinking, >Explanation. Categorization/Logic: The subordination of the natural formation of concepts by language to the essential structure of logic, which Aristotle and, following him, Thomas Aquinas taught, thus only has a relative truth. In the middle of the penetration of Christian theology by the Greek thought of logic rather something new arises: The center of language, in which the mediation of the incarnation event first brings itself to its full truth. >Incarnation/Gadamer, >Word/Gadamer. Christology becomes the forerunner of a new anthropology, which mediates the spirit of the human in his finiteness with divine infinity in a new way. Here what we have called the hermeneutical experience will find its real reason. >Hermeneutic consciousness/Gadamer. I 433 Thinking/Abstraction/Gadamer: the logical scheme of induction and abstraction [is] very misleading in that there is no explicit reflection in the linguistic consciousness on what is common between different things, and the use of words in their general meaning does not understand what is named and designated by them as a case subsumed under the general. The generality of the genre and the classificatory formation of concepts are quite far removed from the linguistic consciousness. >Categorization/Gadamer, >Induction, >Abstraction. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Concepts | Leibniz | Holz I 73 Complete concept/notio completa/Leibniz: The complete concept contains all possible conditions and determinations for the existence of a certain being, is therefore identical with the concept of the world as a whole. >World/Leibniz, >Reality/Leibniz, >Possible world/Leibniz. It is only perceptible to an infinite mind. I 75 Complete concept/notio completa/Leibniz: Each individual is only completely determined by the whole series (series rerum) from the origin onwards: The fact that this is only a fiction for the finite mind does not mean now that this reason of all things would not exist. >Fiction, >As if, cf. >Concept/Hegel. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Concepts | Quine | Rorty I 216 (According to Rorty): concept, meaning: Quine: is only a type of intention. And all intentions are to be overturned. "Means", "believes" and "wishes" have no behavioral equivalent; "opinion" and "desire" are just as dispensable as the terms "concept" and "intuition". RortyVsQuine: concepts and meaning are harmless as long as they are postulated to explain our behavior. They only become harmful when they are supposed to be the source of a certain kind of truth. Rorty VI 170 Language/World/Quine/Rorty: Vs separation between the conceptual and the empirical. Stroud I 216 Conceptual Sovereignty/Quine/Stroud: a meagre input is light/dark, temperature variations, etc. Rich output are theories about the world. Sovereignty: we discover something about the meagreness and thus discover the extent to which science is our "free creation". Quine VIII 25ff Quine/Concept: the word (!) "horse" can be seen as a designation of a certain characteristic, which is an abstract combination of characteristics. Qualities/Existence/Quine: the special existential statement "There is a thing that is horse" (not a horse) does not indicate that there are horses, but that there is the characteristic. IV 419 Concept/Quine: Quine deliberately chooses no observation concepts as starting points, since sentences have semantic priority over predicates! Sentences are first and foremost determined by sense data, not by concepts. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Concepts | Simon | Wilson I 88 Concepts/concept formation/complexity/Simon/E. O. Wilson: (H.A. Simon (1983)(1): What distinguishes creative thinking from the more common patterns of thought is 1) the willingness to accept and gradually structure problem statements that are very vaguely defined 2) to deal continuously with the same problem for a fairly long period of time; and 3) to acquire comprehensive background knowledge in relevant and potentially relevant domains. >Creativity, >Thinking, >Method, >Knowledge, >Definitions, >Definability, >Background, >Pre-knowledge, >Bounded Rationality. 1. H.A. Simon, „Discovery, invention and developemnt: human crative thinking“ in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 80 (1983), S. 4569-4571. |
psySimn II Herbert A. Simon Models of Thought New Haven 1979 Simon I Herbert A. Simon The Sciences of the Artificial Cambridge, MA 1970 WilsonEO I E. O. Wilson Consilience. The Unity of Knowledge, New York 1998 German Edition: Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge New York 1998 |
| Concepts | Sokal | I 26 Concepts/Science/Social/Bricmont: we criticize the use of scientific concepts by authors who have not understood the scientific meaning of these terms themselves. If, on the other hand, poets use terms such as "black hole" or "degree of freedom", we do not mind. The examples in our book(1), on the other hand, are only cases that have nothing to do with such poetic freedom. >Explanations, >Analogies, >Comparisons, >Comparability, >Understanding. 1. A. Sokal und J. Bricmont. (1999) Eleganter Unsinn. München. |
Sokal I Alan Sokal Jean Bricmont Fashionabel Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science, New York 1998 German Edition: Eleganter Unsinn. Wie die Denker der Postmoderne die Wissenschaften missbrauchen München 1999 Sokal II Alan Sokal Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science New York 1999 |
| Conceptual Nervous System | Gray | Corr I 349 Conceptual Nervous System/Gray: An (…) important aspect of RST (>Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory) is the distinction between those parts that belong to the conceptual nervous system (cns) and those parts that belong to the central nervous system (CNS) (a distinction advanced by Hebb 1955)(1). Def cns/Hebb: The cns component of RST provides the behavioural scaffolding, formalized within some theoretical framework (e.g., learning theory; see Gray 1975(2); or, ethoexperimental analysis; see Gray and McNaughton 2000)(3); Def CNS/Hebb: the CNS component specifies the brain systems involved, couched in terms of the latest knowledge of the neuroendocrine system (see McNaughton and Corr 2008)(4). As noted by Gray (1972a)(5), these two levels of explanation must be compatible 1. Hebb, D. O. 1955. Drives and the C. N. S. (Conceptual Nervous System), Psychological Review 62: 243–54 2. Gray, J. A. 1975. Elements of a two-process theory of learning. London: Academic Press 3. Gray, J. A. and McNaughton, N. 2000. The neuropsychology of anxiety: an enquiry into the functions of the septo-hippocampal system. Oxford University Press 4. Corr, P. J. and McNaughton, N. 2008. Reinforcement sensitivity theory and personality, in P. J. Corr (ed). The reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality, pp. 155–87. Cambridge University Press 5. Gray, J. A., 1972a. Learning theory, the conceptual nervous system and personality, in V. D. Nebylitsyn and J. A. Gray (eds.), The biological bases of individual behaviour, pp. 372–99. New York: Academic Press Philip J. Corr, „ The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press Corr II 115 Conceptual Nervous System/Central Nervous System/Brain/Drugs/Gray/McNaughton/Corr: One can, and Gray in particular did, map in [two] directions: between a ‘conceptual nervous system’ (cns) of the type inferred by Hebb (1955)(1) from the careful observation of experimentally constrained behaviour and the real ‘central nervous system’ (CNS) studied by neuroanatomy and neurophysiology. Gray’s unique step was to use drugs as a conceptual dissection tool – assuming that a drug changes synaptic activity (CNS) and so behaviour (cns) in parallel. Suppose a drug affects behaviour A but not behaviour B. We can be sure that A depends on a process not shared by B. Critically, this means we exclude from consideration all cognitive and neural processes that are not drug-sensitive. Drugs, thus, dissect both the cns and CNS in a highly replicable, theory-independent, way. Gray used drug dissection in a particularly powerful way: (…) to tie together specific behaviours, neural systems, personality systems and clinical disorders. II 125 Introversion/Gray: (…) Gray concludes ‘that it is activity in this frontal cortex-medial septal area-hippocampal system which determines the degree of introversion: the more sensitive or the more active this system is, the more introverted will the individual be’ (1970a, p. 260)(2). 1. Hebb, D. O. (1955). Drives and the C.N.S. (conceptual nervous system). Psychological Review, 62, 243–254. 2. Gray, J. A. (1970a). The psychophysiological basis of introversion–extraversion. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 8, 249–266. McNaughton, Neil and Corr, John Philip: “Sensitivity to Punishment and Reward Revisiting Gray (1970)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 115-136. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Conceptual Nervous System | Hebb | Corr I 349 Conceptual Nervous System/Hebb: An (…) important aspect of RST (>Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory) is the distinction between those parts that belong to the conceptual nervous system (cns) and those parts that belong to the central nervous system (CNS) (a distinction advanced by Hebb 1955)(1). Def cns/Hebb: The cns component of RST provides the behavioural scaffolding, formalized within some theoretical framework (e.g., learning theory; see Gray 1975(2); or, ethoexperimental analysis; see Gray and McNaughton 2000)(3); Def CNS/Hebb: the CNS component specifies the brain systems involved, couched in terms of the latest knowledge of the neuroendocrine system (see McNaughton and Corr 2008)(4). As noted by Gray (1972a)(5), these two levels of explanation must be compatible 1. Hebb, D. O. 1955. Drives and the C. N. S. (Conceptual Nervous System), Psychological Review 62: 243–54 2. Gray, J. A. 1975. Elements of a two-process theory of learning. London: Academic Press 3. Gray, J. A. and McNaughton, N. 2000. The neuropsychology of anxiety: an enquiry into the functions of the septo-hippocampal system. Oxford University Press 4. Corr, P. J. and McNaughton, N. 2008. Reinforcement sensitivity theory and personality, in P. J. Corr (ed). The reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality, pp. 155–87. Cambridge University Press 5. Gray, J. A., 1972a. Learning theory, the conceptual nervous system and personality, in V. D. Nebylitsyn and J. A. Gray (eds.), The biological bases of individual behaviour, pp. 372–99. New York: Academic Press Philip J. Corr, „ The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Hebb I Donald O. Hebb The Organization of Behavior Hoboken, NJ 1949 Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Conceptual Role | Schiffer | I 108f Conceptual Role/Schiffer: the conceptual role tells us how to get from stimuli to beliefs. >Stimuli, >Beliefs. The conceptual role of a mental representation is then the counterfactual role of the formula in the perceptual belief formation and in the reasoning. >Counterfactuals, >Mental representation. It is a counterfactual property. - A formal property of internal sentences. - It can be determined without reference to t-theoretical properties. The conceptual role of a mental representation does not determine the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. Twin earth; E.g. twin earth H2O and XYZ have the same conceptual role - i.e. the conceptual role is used in addition to the truth conditions. >Twin earth. I 109 Def Conceptual Role/Field: (Field 1977)(1): the subjectively induced conditional probability function of an actor. Two mental representations s1 and s2 have the same conceptual role for one person iff. their (the person's) subjective conditional probability function is such that for each mental representation s the subjective probability of s1 given s is the same as that of s2 given s. SchifferVs: that never happens. Field ditto - E.g. blind persons certainly have different conceptual roles of flounders - then there will be no correlation to the belief objects either. 1. Hartry Field (1977).Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role. Journal of Philosophy 74 (7):378-409 I 167 Conceptual Role/Schiffer: the conceptual role of an inner formula is then the complex counterfactual property of the formula, whose knowledge informs us about the conditions under which the formula occurs. Conceptual role instead of definition: with it, it is impossible to eliminate by paraphrase. - Then it is irreducible >controlled use! Schiffer: Thesis: simply conceptual role instead of platonist irreducible property e.g. of being a dog: cute hairy barking quadrupeds. Accordingly we need no primitive propositional attitude and no belief properties. Language development: proto-humans: have beliefs and desires, but no concepts for them - later God gives simple concepts for them (increases the survival value) - they are recognized as irreducible. I 169 Conceptual role: does not allow law-like generalization as e.g. x does A, because he wants P and believes that he achieves P if he does A - nevertheless there is reliability. >Intentionality, >Attribution, >Behavior, >Explanation, >Reliability theory. I 186 Conceptual Role/Schiffer: must be determined without reference to the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. It does not determine the truth conditions. Twin Earth: water and twin earth water have the same conceptual role. Use is synonymous to possession of a conceptual role. Internal language/Mentalese: here, the conceptual role is independent from reference. - Therefore no compositional semantics is assumed. This is not about situations, speech acts or utterances. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Conceptual Space | Croft | Gärdenfors I 21 Conceptual space/concept space/Croft/Gärdenfors: thesis: the (linguistically fixed) categories may vary from language to language, but they are projected onto a common concept space that represents a common cognitive heritage that is, in fact, the geography of the human mind, (Croft 2003, p. 139). This space can be read due to linguistic facts in a way that advanced brain scans will never be able to do so. (Croft 2001, p. 364). Gärdenfors: I am not concerned with the geography of this space, but with its geometry. I use terms like dimension, distance, region and some terms of the vector algebra. Concept spaces: are constructed from quality dimensions such as tone pitch, temperature, weight, size and force. Dimensions: its primary function is to represent the "qualities" of objects in different domains. Domain: e.g. space (dimensions height, width, depth) color (hue, saturation, brightness), taste (salty, bitter, sweet, sour, possibly a fifth dimension), feeling (excitation, value), form (less explored dimension). --- I 22 Similarity: Topology and geometry of concept space allow us to say that if x is closer to y than z, then x is more similar to y than z. Interpretation/Qualities: Qualities can now be interpreted scientifically and cognitively. We must distinguish this. Cognitive interpretation: means that we do not determine e.g. the wave lengths, but psychophysical determinations of the way how concepts are represented in our mind. |
Croft I William Croft Radical Construction Grammar: Syntactic Theory in Typological Perspective Oxford 2001 Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Conceptual Space | Gärdenfors | I 21 Conceptual Space/Croft/Gärdenfors: Thesis: the (linguistically fixed) categories may vary from language to language, but they are projected onto a common concept space that represents a common cognitive heritage that is, in fact, the geography of the human mind , (Croft 2003, p. 139)(1). This space can be read due to linguistic facts in a way that advanced brain scans will never allow us. (Croft 2001, p. 364).(2) Gärdenfors: I am not concerned here with the geography of this space, but with its geometry. Thereby, I use terms like dimension, distance, region and some terms of the vector algebra. Conceptual Space: are constructed from quality dimensions such as pitch, temperature, weight, size and force. Dimensions: its primary function is to represent the "qualities" of objects in different domains. Space/Domain: e.g. space (dimensions, height, width, depth) color (hue, saturation, brightness), taste (salty, bitter, sweet, sour, possibly a fifth dimension), feeling (excitement, value), form (less researched dimension). --- I 22 Similarity: topology and geometry of the conceptaul space allow us to say that if x is closer to y than z, then x is more similar to y than z. Interpretation/Qualities: qualities can now be interpreted scientifically and cognitively. We must distinguish this. Cognitive interpretation: means that we do not have to determine e.g. the wavelengths, but psychophysical determinations of the way concepts are represented in our mind. --- I 140 Conceptual space/domain/structure/Gärdenfors: the geometrical structure of a conceptual space influences the possibilities of the linguistic use of adjectives. (See Paradis, 2001, 2008). (3)(4) Here we distinguish scalable domains(e.g. size, temperature) of non-scalable domains: adjectives (e.g. dead, alive). Adverbs: E.g. very, terrible, considerable. --- I 141 See also Paradis (2008, p. 331).(4) Adverbs/Gärdenfors: the topological structure of the adjective-related domain determines which adverbs can be combined with the adjective. 1. Croft, W. (2003). Typology and universals (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge. 2. Croft, W. (2001). Radical construction grammar: Syntactic theory in typological perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Paradis, C. (2001). Adjectives and boundedness. Cognitive Linguistics, 12, 47–65. 4. Paradis, C. (2008). Configurations, construals, and change: Expressions of DEGREE. English Language and Linguistics, 12, 317–343. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Conceptualism | Tugendhat | I 72f Veritative being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p". - VsObject Theory (>objet theory): States of affairs are taken as objects. Conceptualism: concepts are taken as objects. Immaterial - but also VsImagination. Instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no structure). TugendhatVsMiddle Ages: verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next to unum and aliquid - had Aristotle referred to the veritative existence, he could have created a semantics of assertion. >Aristotle, >Being. I 91 VsHeidegger: existence of facts instead of "all being is being of beings". I 184f Def Conceptualism/Tugendhat: the theory that predicate = concept (conceptus). The predicate stands for something, otherwise the use of the predicate would have no objective basis. >Predicates, >Reference. I 185 Nominalism: denies that we actually always imagine something when we use a predicate sensibly. We can also understand the sentence about the red castle without having a concrete imagination. >Nominalism, >Universals. ConceptualismVsNominalism: misunderstanding: the imagination does not have to be sensual. NominalismVsConceptualism: there are no "general images" - or images of something general - characterization only exists since Wittgsteins Philosophical Inveistigations. >Generality, >Ludwig Wittgenstein. I 189 VsConceptualism: object dispensable. >Conceptualism/Quine. Nominalism: 1) linguistic sign belongs to the intersubjective understanding-each-other - then intra-subjective understanding superfluous? 2) results in positive explanation for inter-subjective meaning. I 204 Conceptualism/Tugendhat: must postulate nonsensual imagination, because no sensual imagination corresponds to "every color". >Imagination, >Colour. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Conditional | Fraassen | I 118 Conditional/truth value/Fraassen: the truth value of the conditional is partly context-dependent. >Truth values, >Context. But science does not imply that the context is either way somehow - therefore science implies counterfactual conditionals at most in the limiting case where a conditional has the same truth value in all contexts - in this case the theory plus antecedent (conditions) strictly implies the consequent. Then also the laws of attenuation and contraposition apply - but then they are useless for our task to provide an explanation. >Explanations. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Conditional | Jackson | Lewis V 153 Conditional/Grice/Lewis: if P (A > C) is high because P (A) is low (> ex falso quodlibet), what is then the meaning of "If A, then B"? Why should one not say the strongest: that it is almost as likely as not A? JacksonVsGrice/JacksonVsLewis: we often claim things that are much weaker than we could actually claim, and this for a good reason. I assume that your belief system is similar to mine, but not completely equal. E.g. Suppose you know something what seems to me very unlikely today, but I would like to say something useful anyway. So I say something weaker, so you can take me at any rate at the word. >Assertions, >Stronger/weaker. --- Lewis V 153 Definition robust/Jackson/Lewis: A is robust in relation to B, (with respect to one's subjective probability at a time) iff. the probability of A and the probability of A conditionally to B are close, and both are high,... >Probability, >Subjective probability, >Objective probability. --- V 154 ...so if one learns that B still considers A to be probable. Jackson: the weaker can then be more robust in terms of something that you think is more unlikely, but still do not want to ignore. If it is useless to say the weaker, how useless it is then to assert the weaker and the stronger together! And yet we do it! E.g. Lewis: "Bruce sleeps in the clothes box or elsewhere on the ground floor". Jackson: Explanation: it has the purpose to assert the stronger and the same purpose to assert the more robust. If both are different, we assert both. Robustness/indicative conditional/Lewis: an indicative conditional is a truth-functional conditional, which conventionally implies robustness with respect to the antecedent (conventional implicature). Therefore the probability P (A > C) and P (A > C) must both be high. This is the reason why the assertiveness of the indicative conditional is associated with the corresponding conditional probability. >Conditional probability, >Conditionals, >Truth functions. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Conditional | Quine | III 67 Implication/Conditional/Quine: Implication only exists if the conditional is true. III 68 Implication/Mention/Use/Quine: not sentences or schemata are implied, but their descriptions. For we cannot write "implies" between the sentences themselves, but only between their descriptions. So we mention the sentences by using their descriptions. We are thus talking about the sentences. ((s) implication is via the sentences. Different: Conditional/Quine: (">" or "if...then...") here we use the sentences or schemes themselves, we do not mention them. No reference is made to them. They appear only as parts of a longer sentence or schema. Example: If Cassius is not hungry, then he is not skinny and hungry. This mentions Cassius but it does not mention a sentence. It is the same with conjunction, negation and alternation. Implication/Quine/(s): only example "p implies q" but not "Cassius' skinniness implies..." III 72 "Only if....then"/Quine: is the sign for the hind leg! It also does not have the meaning of the whole "then and only then (biconditional). I 389/90 Conditional with a false antecedent/Quine: > truth value gaps. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Conditional | Tarski | Berka I 405f Conclusion/Entailment/Formal/Everyday Language/Tarski: the formal conclusion does not coincide with the everyday language one. E.g. A0: 0 has the given property P A1: 1 has the given property P, etc. An: n has the given property P - with normal rules of inference it is impossible to prove the following proposition with this: A: Every natural number has the given property P - Solution: new rule of inference: infinite induction. Problem: infiniteness. Solution: provability rather than actual evidence. >Provability, >Proofs. Berka I 407 Inference/Entailment/Gödel: Problem: statements can be constructed that follow in the usual sense from the sentences of a theory, but which cannot be proven with the rules of inference. Berka I 409 Def Logical Conclusion/Tarski: the statement X logically follows from the statements of the class K iff. each model of class K is at the same time a model of the statement X. I 410 Def of the logical conclusion has to do with the division into logical and extra-logical concepts - which is arbitrary.(1) Cf. >Extensional language, >Extensions, >Extensionality, >Formalization, >Everyday language. 1. A.Tarski, „Über den Begriff der logischen Folgerung“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, Bd. VII, ASI 394, Paris 1936, pp 1-11 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Conditional Probability | Cartwright | I 33 Conditional Probability/Cartwright: is the measure of efficiency. >Cause, >Effect, cf. >Bayesianism. I 34 Conditional Probability/Harper/Gibbard/Cartwright: can be deceiving. - E.g. it is indeed the case that the owners of the insurance policy live longer, but it would be a poor strategy, to buy one in order to get a longer life. Solution/Cartwright: counterfactual conditionals. >Causality, >Causal explanation. It's not about how many live longer, but the probability that a person lives longer if they buy one. - Problem: testing probability for counterfactual conditionals -> Kripke/((s) because we invent the possible worlds). >Counterfactual conditionals. Apparent conditional probability: is not a measure with linked causes. I 36 Conditional probability: elimination of causal laws. - Instead: association, common occurrence. >Association. I 42 Partial Conditional Probability/Cartwright: Important argument: it holds all and only the causal factors fixed. >Probability. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Conditions | Duhem | I 186 Initial conditions/Duhem: if the initial conditions are not given, questions have no sense at all. E.g. Whether the planetary movements will continue this way for evermore. >Initial conditions, >Explanation/Hempel. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Conflicts | Minsky | Minsky I 33 Conflict/compromise/Minsky: The Principle of Non-compromise [for software agents]: The longer an internal conflict persists among an agent's subordinates, the weaker becomes that agent's status among its own competitors. lf such internal problems aren't settled soon, other agents will take control and the agents formerly involved wiII be "dismissed." (…) we should not try to find a close analogy between the low-level agents of a single mind and the members of a human community. Those tiny mental agents simply cannot know enough to be able to negotiate with one another or to find effective ways to adjust to each other's interference. Only larger agencies could be resourceful enough to do such things. >Hierarchies/Minsky. Minsky I 46 Planning/goals/artificial intelligence/Minsky: We're always involved with goals of varying spans and scales. What happens when a transient inclination clashes with a long-term self-ideal? What happens, for that matter, when our ideals disagree among themselves, as when there is an inconsistency between the things we want to do and those we feel we ought to do? These disparities give rise to feelings of discomfort, guilt, and shame. To lessen such disturbances, we must either change the things we do — or change the ways we feel. Which should we try to modify - our immediate wants or our ideals? Such conflicts must be settled by the multilayered agencies that are formed in the early years of the growth of our personalities. >Hierarchies/Minsky, >Planning/AI/Minsky, >Circular causes/Minsky. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Conflicts | Tajfel | Haslam I 165 Group behavior/conflicts/Tajfel: what are the minimal conditions for conflict to emerge between groups? (Taifel et al. 1971(1): 153-4): 1) No face-to-face interaction (within or between groups). 2) Complete anonymity. 3) No link between the criteria for categorization into groups and the nature of the responses requested from participants. 4) Respondents should not derive any (utilitarian) value from their responses (to rule out self-interest). 5) A strategy designed to differentiate between groups should be in competition with rational/utilitarian principles of obtaining the maximum benefit for all. In particular, benefit to the participant’s own group (the ingroup) should be contrasted with a strategy in which the ingroup gains more than the other group (the outgroup). Responses should be made as important and real as possible (i.e., involve concrete rewards rather than some form of evaluation). >Minimal groups, >Group cohesion, >Groupthink, >Social behavior, >Behavior. 1. Tajfel, H., Flament, C., Billig, M.G. and Bundy, R.F. (1971) ‘Social categorization and intergroup behaviour’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 1: 149–77. Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Conflicts | Tetlock | Gaus I 240 Conflicts/Tetlock/D’Agostino: (...) 'people are reluctant decision makers who do their damnedest to minimize cognitive effort, emotional dissonance, and moral angst by denying that important values conflict' (Tetlock 2000(1): 240). [Tetlock] continues: ‚People will be slow to recognize that core values clash; they will rely on mental shortcuts that eliminate direct comparisons between clashing values; they will engage in the dissonance-reduction strategy of bolstering to reduce the stress of those value conflicts they are forced to acknowledge; and they will resort to decision- evasion tactics, such as buck-passing, procrastination, and obfuscation, to escape responsibility for making choices. ‚(2000(1):240) Behavior/diversity/D’Agostino: (The psychic tendencies that Tetlock refers to can make it hard to achieve political compromise, an important mechanism in the liberal repertoire.) >Diversity/D’Agostino. 1. Tetlock, Philip (2000) 'Coping with trade-offs: psychological constraints and political implications'. In Arthur Lupia, Mathew McCubbins and Samuel Popkin, eds, Elements of Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Conformity | Asch | Haslam I 77 Conformity/Asch: Solomon Asch (1951(1), 1955(2)) asked why we sometimes abandon our firmly held convictions and bring our attitudes and judgments in line with those of other people, even if we know that they are wrong and we are right. Haslam I 78 In his experiments he created a situation in which various features of the task and the social context made it extremely difficult to resist conformity pressure despite it being very clear that conforming would mean giving an incorrect response. Experiment/Asch: in his line-judgment studies the participant finds himself within a group of others [who are no real participants but assistants to the experimenter, which the participant does not know]. Cards with lines of different lengths are shown and the group is asked to judge whether the lines are equal or different in length. After a while all of the group except the real participant judge in a obviously wrong way. >Method/Asch. Haslam I 79 The results show that it is fairly difficult to withstand conforming in such contexts, even though it is clear that the majority is wrong. (…) the task was indeed incredibly easy. On this basis, Asch remarked that ‘whereas in ordinary circumstances, individuals matching the lines will make mistakes less than 1 percent of the time, under group pressure, the minority subjects swung to acceptance of the misleading majority’s wrong judgments in 36.8 percent of the selections’ (Asch, 1955(2): 32–3). Haslam I 80 In one variant of the line-judgment study, Asch inverted the typical paradigm. This time there was just one confederate who was instructed to call out the wrong answer and the confederate was surrounded by several true participants. Here the (unfortunate) confederate was openly and loudly ridiculed. For other studies see >Conformity/psychological theories. Haslam I 81 Asch also examined to what extent conformity would be affected by the extent to which the majority was unanimous. Results of these studies were even more striking. When there was one other individual who failed to conform to the incorrect majority response (either a confederate or another naïve participant), conformity dropped dramatically. Other studies examined conformity when the dissenter disagreed not only with the majority but also with the participant (i.e., still giving an obviously wrong answer, but a different one to the majority). Here conformity to the majority giving the wrong answer was relatively low (occurring on only 9% of critical trials). This led Asch to conclude that what undermined conformity was not the direction of dissent (i.e., whether the dissenter was right or wrong), but the fact that dissent had occurred at all. Haslam I 83 (…) is it really the case that conformity is a reflection of weakness and cowardice? (…) it is particularly revealing to read what participants said when asked after the study to elaborate on what it was that dictated their responses. (…) many of those who conformed spontaneously mentioned that they went along with the group because – even though they did not think the majority was right – they did not want to appear foolish or to be the odd one out. However, there were also other reasons why people conformed. Some mentioned they did not want to ‘spoil the study results’ (Asch 1955(2): p. 33). Still others believed that the first person to call out the wrong response must have a visual impairment. When Confederates 2 and 3 also called out the wrong response, they simply concluded that these participants were conforming, possibly because they did not want to make the first person look like a fool. Non-conformity/Asch: Asch himself also considered in detail the responses of those who resisted majority pressure, those responses are less often summarized in social psychological textbooks. So what exactly did those who resisted say? Asch reports two classes of individuals: a )those who were confident of their own judgment and appeared to respond without much consideration of the majority, and b) those who believed that the majority may be correct, but could not stop themselves calling out what they saw. Haslam I 84 Conformity/Hornsey/Jetten: [in the studies] it becomes clear that people were actively trying to make sense of the situation by developing different theories as to why the majority was giving these obviously wrong responses. Participants did not sit back and simply let the majority overwhelm them. Rather, they were critically engaged and tried actively to make sense of the situation in order to develop a theory that would allow them to resolve the highly dissonant experience of contradiction between what they were seeing and how the majority was responding. Cf. >Cognitive dissonance/Festinger, >Cognitive dissonance/psychological theories. See also >Conformity/psychological theories, >Conformity/cultural psychology, >Majorities/Asch, >Resistance/Hornsey. Haslam I 88 Social pressure/Asch: We should be skeptical, however, of the supposition that the power of social pressure necessarily implies uncritical submission to it: Independence and the capacity to rise above group passion are also open to human beings. (Asch 1955(2): 32) Haslam I 89 Hornsey: Nevertheless, it seems that only one-half of Asch’s message has survived and that the other part has been largely forgotten. His message and purpose has thus been transformed over the years: so that rather than trying to understand the interplay between independence and conformity, consumers of his work have focused solely on people’s inclination to conform. >Resistance/Hornsey, >Majority/Hornsey. 1. Asch, S.E. (1951) ‘Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgment’, in H. Guetzkow (ed.), Groups, Leadership and Men. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press. pp. 177–90. 2. Asch, S.E. (1955) ‘Opinions and social pressure’, Scientific American, 193: 31–5. Matthew J. Hornsey and Jolanda Jetten, “Conformity. Revisiting Asch’s line-judgment studies”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Conformity | Cultural Psychology | Haslam I 81 Conformity/cultural differences/cultural psychology: Looking at national differences in conformity in the Asch paradigm (>Conformity/Asch, Asch 1955)(1), Rod Bond and Peter Smith (1996)(2) conducted a statistical analysis in which they compared conformity levels across countries that promote individualism (e.g., the US) and countries that have a more collectivist orientation (e.g., Hong Kong). Their analysis of 133 Asch line-judgment studies showed that conformity was higher in collectivist countries than in individualist countries, presumably because conformity is more valued in the former than the latter. Their study also revealed a robust effect whereby women were more likely to conform than men. Interestingly too, the researchers found that levels of conformity had dropped significantly over the decades, with conformity levels being relatively low in more recent studies. 1. Asch, S.E. (1951) ‘Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgment’, in H. Guetzkow (ed.), Groups, Leadership and Men. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press. pp. 177–90. 2. Bond, R. and Smith, P. (1996) ‘Culture and conformity: A meta-analysis of studies using Asch’s (1952b, 1956) line judgment task’, Psychological Bulletin, 119: 111–37. Matthew J. Hornsey and Jolanda Jetten, “Conformity. Revisiting Asch’s line-judgment studies”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Conformity | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 77 Conformity/psychological theories: Solomon Asch (1951(1), 1955(2)) asked why we sometimes abandon our firmly held convictions and bring our attitudes and judgments in line with those of other people, even if we know that they are wrong and we are right. >Conformity/Asch. Haslam I 80 As a further demonstration of the power of normative influence, Morton Deutsch and Harold Gerard (1955)(3) created a situation in which participants could witness the (incorrect) responses of the majority but were allowed to record their own responses privately (thus eliminating fear of ridicule and, by extension, the power of normative influence). In this variant, the level of conformity plummeted (see also Abrams et al., 1990(4); Insko et al., 1983(5)). Interestingly, however, conformity was not reduced to zero. For some participants, the power of the situation was enough to convince them that the majority answer was the correct answer after all. In other words, the study provides evidence not only of normative influence (i.e., ‘going along’ with others) but also of informational influence (i.e., being convinced by others). Haslam I 81 Age/conformity: in a study that used a slightly different paradigm to Asch, Michael Walker and Maria Andrade (Walker and Andrade 1996)(6) found that the younger participants were, the more they conformed: conformity levels were 42% among 6- to 8-year-olds, 38% for 9- to 11-year-olds, and 9% for those 12 to 14 years old, but there was no conformity at all among those aged between 15 and 17. Conformity/cultural differences: Looking at national differences in conformity in the Asch paradigm, Rod Bond and Peter Smith (1996)(7) conducted a statistical analysis in which they compared conformity levels across countries that promote individualism (e.g., the US) and countries that have a more collectivist orientation (e.g., Hong Kong). >Cultural differences, >Cultural psychology. Their analysis of 133 Asch line-judgment studies showed that conformity was higher in collectivist countries than in individualist countries, presumably because conformity is more valued in the former than the latter. Their study also revealed a robust effect whereby women were more likely to conform than men. Interestingly too, the researchers found that levels of conformity had dropped significantly over the decades, with conformity levels being relatively low in more recent studies. Haslam I 82 (…) conformity of the form observed in Asch’s studies has been argued to underlie behaviours as diverse as going along with Nazi propaganda, succumbing to eating disorders such as bulimia (where people are not able to resist the majority pressure for thinness; Crandall, 1988)(8), and engaging in football hooliganism and other types of crowd violence (Le Bon, 1895)(9). >Conformity/Le Bon. Haslam I 83 (…) is it really the case that conformity is a reflection of weakness and cowardice? (…) it is particularly revealing to read what participants said when asked after the study to elaborate on what it was that dictated their responses. (…) many of those who conformed spontaneously mentioned that they went along with the group because – even though they did not think the majority was right – they did not want to appear foolish or to be the odd one out. However, there were also other reasons why people conformed. Some mentioned they did not want to ‘spoil the study results’ (Asch 1955(2): p. 33). Still others believed that the first person to call out the wrong response must have a visual impairment. When Confederates 2 and 3 also called out the wrong response, they simply concluded that these participants were conforming, possibly because they did not want to make the first person look like a fool. 1. Asch, S.E. (1951) ‘Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgment’, in H. Guetzkow (ed.), Groups, Leadership and Men. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press. pp. 177–90. 2. Asch, S.E. (1955) ‘Opinions and social pressure’, Scientific American, 193: 31–5. 3. Deutsch, M. and Gerard, H. (1955) ‘A study of normative and informational social influences upon individual judgment’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51: 629–36. 4. Abrams, D., Wetherell, M.S., Cochrane, S., Hogg, M.A. and Turner, J.C. (1990) ‘Knowing what to think by knowing who you are: Self-categorization and the nature of norm formation, conformity, and group polarization’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 29: 97–119. 5. Insko, C.A., Drenan, S., Solomon, M.R., Smith, R. and Wade, T.J. (1983) ‘Conformity as a function of the consistency of positive self-evaluation with being liked and being right’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19: 341–58. 6. Walker, M.B. and Andrade, M.G. (1996) ‘Conformity in the Asch task as a function of age’, Journal of Social Psychology, 136: 367–72. 7. Bond, R. and Smith, P. (1996) ‘Culture and conformity: A meta-analysis of studies using Asch’s (1952b, 1956) line judgment task’, Psychological Bulletin, 119: 111–37. 8. Crandall, C.S. (1988) ‘Social contagion of binge eating’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55: 588–98. 9. Le Bon, G. (1895) La Psychologie des foules (The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, 1982, Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing Company). Matthew J. Hornsey and Jolanda Jetten, “Conformity. Revisiting Asch’s line-judgment studies”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Conformity | Social Psychology | Haslam I 77 Conformity/psychological theories: Solomon Asch (1951(1), 1955(2)) asked why we sometimes abandon our firmly held convictions and bring our attitudes and judgments in line with those of other people, even if we know that they are wrong and we are right. >Conformity/Asch. Haslam I 80 As a further demonstration of the power of normative influence, Morton Deutsch and Harold Gerard (1955)(3) created a situation in which participants could witness the (incorrect) responses of the majority but were allowed to record their own responses privately (thus eliminating fear of ridicule and, by extension, the power of normative influence). In this variant, the level of conformity plummeted (see also Abrams et al., 1990(4); Insko et al., 1983(5)). Interestingly, however, conformity was not reduced to zero. For some participants, the power of the situation was enough to convince them that the majority answer was the correct answer after all. In other words, the study provides evidence not only of normative influence (i.e., ‘going along’ with others) but also of informational influence (i.e., being convinced by others). Haslam I 81 Age/conformity: in a study that used a slightly different paradigm to Asch, Michael Walker and Maria Andrade (Walker and Andrade 1996)(6) found that the younger participants were, the more they conformed: conformity levels were 42% among 6- to 8-year-olds, 38% for 9- to 11-year-olds, and 9% for those 12 to 14 years old, but there was no conformity at all among those aged between 15 and 17. Conformity/cultural differences: Looking at national differences in conformity in the Asch paradigm, Rod Bond and Peter Smith (1996)(7) conducted a statistical analysis in which they compared conformity levels across countries that promote individualism (e.g., the US) and countries that have a more collectivist orientation (e.g., Hong Kong). Their analysis of 133 Asch line-judgment studies showed that conformity was higher in collectivist countries than in individualist countries, presumably because conformity is more valued in the former than the latter. Their study also revealed a robust effect whereby women were more likely to conform than men. Interestingly too, the researchers found that levels of conformity had dropped significantly over the decades, with conformity levels being relatively low in more recent studies. Haslam I 82 (…) conformity of the form observed in Asch’s studies has been argued to underlie behaviours as diverse as going along with Nazi propaganda, succumbing to eating disorders such as bulimia (where people are not able to resist the majority pressure for thinness; Crandall, 1988)(8), and engaging in football hooliganism and other types of crowd violence (Le Bon, 1895)(9). >Conformity/Le Bon. Haslam I 83 (…) is it really the case that conformity is a reflection of weakness and cowardice? (…) it is particularly revealing to read what participants said when asked after the study to elaborate on what it was that dictated their responses. (…) many of those who conformed spontaneously mentioned that they went along with the group because – even though they did not think the majority was right – they did not want to appear foolish or to be the odd one out. However, there were also other reasons why people conformed. Some mentioned they did not want to ‘spoil the study results’ (Asch 1955(2): p. 33). Still others believed that the first person to call out the wrong response must have a visual impairment. When Confederates 2 and 3 also called out the wrong response, they simply concluded that these participants were conforming, possibly because they did not want to make the first person look like a fool. 1. Asch, S.E. (1951) ‘Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgment’, in H. Guetzkow (ed.), Groups, Leadership and Men. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press. pp. 177–90. 2. Asch, S.E. (1955) ‘Opinions and social pressure’, Scientific American, 193: 31–5. 3. Deutsch, M. and Gerard, H. (1955) ‘A study of normative and informational social influences upon individual judgment’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51: 629–36. 4. Abrams, D., Wetherell, M.S., Cochrane, S., Hogg, M.A. and Turner, J.C. (1990) ‘Knowing what to think by knowing who you are: Self-categorization and the nature of norm formation, conformity, and group polarization’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 29: 97–119. 5. Insko, C.A., Drenan, S., Solomon, M.R., Smith, R. and Wade, T.J. (1983) ‘Conformity as a function of the consistency of positive self-evaluation with being liked and being right’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19: 341–58. 6. Walker, M.B. and Andrade, M.G. (1996) ‘Conformity in the Asch task as a function of age’, Journal of Social Psychology, 136: 367–72. 7. Bond, R. and Smith, P. (1996) ‘Culture and conformity: A meta-analysis of studies using Asch’s (1952b, 1956) line judgment task’, Psychological Bulletin, 119: 111–37. 8. Crandall, C.S. (1988) ‘Social contagion of binge eating’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55: 588–98. 9. Le Bon, G. (1895) La Psychologie des foules (The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, 1982, Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing Company). Matthew J. Hornsey and Jolanda Jetten, “Conformity. Revisiting Asch’s line-judgment studies”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Congruence | Lyons | I 242 Def Congruence/Grammar/Lyons: (grammatical correspondence) of genus, number and case between verb and noun. (in all languages). The constituents are considered to be of equal rank, in contrast to the regimen, where the verb rules the "object" and the "subject" the verb (tradition). Congruence: between words of the same category Rection: (see below) between words of different categories. I 244 Congruence/Regimen/Modern Grammar/Lyons: new: here we describe the difference in the terms endocentric/exocentric. >Terminology/Lyons. Rection/Hockett: Rection can only be found in exocentric constructions. For example, ad urbem, differs distributionally from the constituents ad, and urbem. Congruence/Hockett: Congruence can be found in endocentric constructions, in a binding beyond hierarchical structures i.e. direct constituents, I 245 between certain predictive attributes and subjects. Congruence/Lyons: Congruence thus prevails both in endo- and in exocentric constructions e.g. un livre intéressant coincides distributionally with un livre, against this: Le livre est intéressant : (here too there is congruence between livre and intéressant) is exocentric, because its distribution differs from that of le livre on the one hand and that of intéressant on the other. >Distribution/Lyons. LyonsVsHockett: thus it is not true (as many have claimed) that a subject's number is determined by the person and the verb's number. What is also incorrect is (which is even more often claimed) that the subject and not the verb determines or vice versa, that rather subject and verb form a category that belongs to the construction of which they are members. Solution/Lyons: (see below) Numerus and person are nominal categories, which can be identified flexibly or otherwise somehow in the surface structure of the verbal complex. >Surface structure, >Deep structure. Tradition: expresses it this way: "The verb corresponds to the subject in number and person". I 245 Congruence/Subject-verb-congruence/context-independent/Lyons: Example (1a) The dog bites the man (1b) The dog bites the men I 246 (1c) The dogs bite the man (1d) The dogs bite the men (2a) The chimpanzee eats the banana usw. Context-independent Grammar/Lyons: e.g (1) ∑ > NP sing + VP sing or NP plur + VP plur. (2) VP sing > V sing + NP (3) VP plur > V plur + NP (4) NP > NP sing or NP plur (5) NP sing > T + N sing (6) NP plur > T + N plur (7) N sing > N + 0 (Zero) (8) N plur > N + s (9) V sing > V + s (10) V plur > V + 0 More than one symbol is replaced at a time. Lexical Substitutions/Lyons: here we assume that their rules are outside grammar. >Lexicon, >Grammar. I 247 Congruence/context-dependent grammar/Lyons: Suppose we want to take into account the fact that the subject's number determines the verb's number. I 248 We follow approximately Chomsky's "Syntactic Structures" (N. Chomsky, Syntactic Structures, Berlin, New York 1957): (here still without transformational rules): (1) ∑ > NP + VP (2) VP > Verb + NP (3) NP > NP sing or NP plur (4) Verb > V + s/in the context NP sing + ... or V + 0/in the context NP plur + ... (5) NP sing > T + N + 0 (6) NP plur > T + N + s New: Here we get along with only 6 instead of 10 rules. New: It completely disappears that the noun is the carrier word of the nominal complex. Context dependency: N.B.: according to rule (1) all sentences created by these rules are of the same type (NP + VP). Rule (3): The number becomes a category of the nominal complex, regardless of whether it occurs as subject or object. Rule (4): The number in the verb is determined by the preceding nominal expression. That depends on the context. N.B.: in this way the rule can only be formulated in a system of concatenation rules (see above I 212: linear). The nominal expression on the left determines the congruence, not the expression on the right. I 249 Subject/object: since the left-standing nominal complex is derived from the NP created by rule (1), it can be interpreted as a subject and not as an object. >Transformational grammar, >Transformation rules. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Conjunction | Aristotle | Geach I 16/17 Conjunction/Aristotle/Geach: In his early work, Aristotle considered conjunctions to be either true or false, but he later changed his mind. He considers what we might call a “merging of predicates”: e.g., “is white” and “is a man” to “is a white man.” This works. But: Example: “is good” and “is a cobbler” cannot be combined in this way to form “is a good cobbler.” Example: A compound noun such as “morse” (man and horse) cannot appear as the subject of a predication. This is because it does not designate anything, even or especially because it is required that “man horse” should combine all corresponding predicates. I 18 Geach: 1. That is actually questionable, but in any case it is not a conjunction if one attributes predicates to such a subject: Example: “S” is a “lawyer politician.” Then neither: “Every S is a scoundrel” nor “Some S are honest” can be considered a conjunction of predications that would be obtained by first substituting “lawyer” and then ‘politician’ for “S.” GeachVsAristotle: So his argument against the composite subject is irrelevant. 2. If the composite subject “morse” is regarded as the intended equivalent of a combination of two predications, then the result of the juxtaposition (antiphasis?) is not necessarily true and false. This shows that “morse” cannot be understood as a predication. Example: “Some morse is white” will be true if some man and some horse are white. “No morse is white” is true if no man and no horse are white. Problem: if no man is white but some horse is white, then we get true for one side and false for the other: “Some horse is white” “No horse is white”. (nsert, unity). So “Some horse is white” is not a well-formed sentence. (s) Unambiguity could be achieved if, at the same time, no man and no horse, or all men and all horses share the predicate in question. Example: In the case of four-leggedness, again, no sentence could be formed. Conjunction/GeachVsAristotle: However, this does not show that the conjunction Example: “Some men are white and some horses are white” would not be a sentence! Conjunction /Aristotle: (late, Sophistici elenchi): denies that conjunctions can be w/f. It would be the “ruin of discourse” to answer “Is it the case that p and q and r...?” with ‘yes’ or “no.” Even if it seems harmless because all terms might be true or false. GeachVsAristotle: Modern logic has no problem with this at all: the conjunction is true if all terms are true, otherwise false. Only a confused person would conclude from “no” that all terms must be false. Example Aristotle: “Are Koriscus and Kallias at home?” as if it were the same as “Is it the case that p and q?” I 19 GeachVsAristotle: but that is not exactly the same sentence as “Koriskus is at home and Kallias is at home.” (Everyone at home?). ((s) Are the subjects “summarized” or the predicates? It is impossible to separate them here.) Geach: “d and b are P's” or “d is (a) P and b is (a) P” (as Aristotle thought). But there are cases where the attribution in the plural becomes illegitimate, even though it is permissible in the singular. Example (see above). Parmenides/The Third Man Argument: Solution: if we concede that the predicate “large” can be said of itself and at the same time of many large things. However, this presupposes that we do not allow this form of “great” in the plural (ta polla megala/tanta megala) to be assumed to apply to itself at the same time. “Analogy”/Middle Ages/GeachVs: from the example “God is wise and Plato is wise,” one should not be able to conclude: “God and Plato are two wise men.” (sapiens/sapientes, plural, nominalization of the predicate). Structure: if d is P and b is P and a is a class of Ps, then we cannot conclude that “P” can be stated (predicated) in the plural by a class that has exactly a and b or only d as elements. (predication/singular/plural). Whether such a set is permissible at all depends on the accepted set theory. Aristotle: uses a devilish example to show that the plural form of the predicate cannot be attributed if it is in the singular form. Example Aristotle: Two animals “d” and “b” are blind. Is this equivalent to: “d is blind and b is blind”? Aristotle: (Sophistici elenchi): Even that is not permissible! (GeachVsAristotle). 1. “Blind” means: by nature capable of seeing, but without the ability to see. 2. If d and b are by nature capable of seeing, then they either have the ability to do so or they do not. I 20 3. If d and b are by nature sighted but do not have the ability, they are blind. 4. Therefore, if d and b are by nature sighted, either both have the ability or both do not. 5. If d has the ability and b is blind, then d and b are by nature sighted. 6. Therefore, if d has the ability and b is blind, either both have the ability or both are blind. Which is absurd. (Aristotle). Solution/Aristotle: Plural questions such as “Are they by nature sighted?” or “Are they blind?” should be banned. GeachVsAristotle: that is drastic and unnecessary. “Having the ability to see” can be constructed grammatically in two different ways: a) that no one in a class has the ability b) that not everyone in a class has the ability. Geach: To do step 3 correctly, it must say: every element of the class does not have the ability. I 25 Conjunction/Aristotle/Geach: A. Own proof of his metatheorem: Premises: should be “A is white” (of a valid syllogism) Conclusion: “B is large.” Then the premises of a presumed syllogism cannot be true: (14) If A is not white, then B is large. The syllogism itself should be represented by: (15) If A is white, then B is large. (15) leads to the contraposition (16) If B is not large, then A is not white. Then (1) and (14) lead to the conclusion in what Aristotle calls the “hypothetical syllogism”: (17) If B is not large, then B is large. Aristotle calls this “absurd.” VsAristotle: some authors: the form “If not p then p” does not have to be absurd! (Geach pro). Example: It can be used to achieve “p” itself (?). In geometry: “If AB and CD are not parallel, then they are parallel, so they are parallel.”(?). VsVs: but in this case, that overlooks the fact that “B is large” is not a proposition (statement, sentence) in the sense of a traditional syllogism: such as “Every X is Y.” GeachVsAristotle. He claims to have shown here that if we have two valid syllogistic schemata with a conjunction of the premises “p and q” and “not p and not q,” then if both yield the conclusion “Every X is Y,” we should be obliged to recognize the general validity of the formula: “If not every X is Y, then every X is Y,” and that is indeed absurd. ((s) Difference from above: If B is not large, then B is large. Does not contain “every” or “not every”: difference between contrary and contradictory). GeachVsAristotle: the error lies in his incorrect understanding of contradiction. He is right in saying that a conjunction is a proposition. Punchline: if “A is white” is supposed to represent a premise conjunction “p and q,” then its negation, “A is not white,” cannot represent “not p and not q.” Rather, the correct negation is “not both p and q.” Negation: A conjunction: ~(p u q) = (plq) not (~p u ~q). Not both, not “neither.” Example (s) “A is white”: Negation: “A is not white” not “A is not white and also not an object.” I 26 GeachVsAristotle: because he only implicitly assumed that conjunctions are sentences (Geach pro), he did not properly consider the question of what the contradiction of a conjunction actually is. (see below) In his later work, Aristotle explicitly recognized conjunctions as propositions with the ingenious invention of “A” and “B” etc. as sentence letters. (Sentence variables). >Modal logic/Geach, >Facts/Geach. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Connectionism | Theory of neural networks as an explanation for mind states. |
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| Connectionism | Churchland | Fodor IV 199 Fodor/LeporeVsConnectionism: the connectionist draws diagrams in which the labeling (designation of the nodes) say what the intentional interpretation is supposed to be. --- IV 200 But no theory explains how the node comes to its designation. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: Churchland makes the same mistake. This is only semantics by stipulation. It does not matter whether semantics is postulated for points or whole dimensions. Problem: what should decide whether brown and dark blue correspond rather to regions (places) or dimensions? It does not provide any semantics at all because the brain does not represent colors as frequencies. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Connectives | Brandom | II 87 Connectives/Gentzen/Brandom: connectives are defined according to their inferential role. (Epoch-making): Definition Introduction rules: sufficient conditions for the use of the connective - Definition elimination rules: necessary consequences of the use (of the connective). E.g. in order to define the inferential role of "&" in Boole you indicate that everyone who is defined on p and q thus has to be regarded as defined on p&q as well - the first part without the connective specifies the circumstances, i.e. the sets of the premises. >Cf. >Logical constants. --- II 88 Dummett transferred this to sentences, singular terms and predicates - it may be that we do not overlook all connections - conservative extension: by these two rules. Dummett |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Connectives | Logic Texts | Read III 268 ff Tonk/Prior/Read: Do not introduce the link first and then assign meaning. - That cannot have the consequence that another pair of statements is equivalent. >Definition, >Definability, >"Tonk", >Belnap-Prior debate. Important argument: analytic validity cannot show that. Re III 269 The meaning, even that of logic links, must be independent of and be prior to the determination of the validity of the inference structures. - BelnapVsPrior: (pro analytical validity): Must not define into existence, first show how it works. Re III 271 Classical negation is illegitimate here. >Negation- Negation-free fragment. - Peirce's law: "If P, then Q, only if P, only if P". Re III 273 ReadVsBelnap: the true disagreement lies beyond constructivism and realism. - Belnap's condition (conservative extension) cannot show that the classical negation is illegitimate. >Negation. Hoyningen-Huene II 56 Connectives/Hoyningen-Huene: You sometimes read that the truth tables would define the conncetives, i.e. clearly specify them. This is correct if one interprets the connectives in a very specific mathematical sense (namely as illustrations of two statements in the set true, false). If, on the other hand, one understands the connectives as extensional statement links, i.e. as operators that form a new statement from two statements, then the truth tables do not define the connectives. II 66 Binding strength of the connectives: increases in the following order: ,>, v, ∧. II 113 It makes sense to attribute equality and difference to the propositional logical form, because the compelling force of propositional logical inference depends on them. For the same reason, it makes sense to assign the connectives to the propositional logical form. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Connectives | Spinoza | Danto I 254 Substance/Spinoza/Danto: there is only one. - Thought and extension are modes of it. - Thus, the combination of the ideas is the same as those of the things. >Ideas, >Order, >Substance/Spinoza. |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Connectives | Strawson | I 214 Connective/Relation/Strawson: a) stating connective: (s) "is a.." b) stated connective: "is in relation to...", "is an example of...". Double-digit expressions are not designations of relations themselves! Predicable relations between things not relations themselves. >Terminology/Strawson. I 215 a) Species universals: provides classification principle, does not presuppose one - E.g. generic name. b) characterizing universals (ch. u.): e.g. verbs, adjectives: provide class · principle only for previously sorted particulars. >Universals/Strawson. But also particulars themselves provide the principle of summary: e.g. Socrates as well as wisdom. ->attributive tie: (non-relational tie between particulars of various types). I 216 Example of the characterizing tie between Socrates and the universal dying corresponds to the attributive tie between Socrates and his death. I 216 1) Species or Sample tie/Strawson: a) Fido is a dog, an animal, a terrier - b) Fido, Coco and Rover are dogs. 2) characterizing tie: e.g. Socrates is wise, is lively, argues - b) Socrates, Plato, Aristotle are all wise, all of them die. 3) attributive tie: grouping of particulars because of the characterizing tie. E.g. smiling, praying. Each is a symmetrical form: x is a characterizing tie to y. Asymmetrical: x is characterized by y. - Then y is a dependent element. I 219 Categorical criterion of the subject-predicate distinction: x is asserted to be bound non-relationallly to y i.e. universals of particulars can be predicted, but not by particulars of universals. - But even universals can be predicated by universals. I 221 New: distinction between object types instead of word types. I 227f Connective/tie/Strawson: Special case: between particulars: e.g. the catch which eliminated Compton was made by Carr. - Solution: regard is carried out, etc. as quasi-universal. - Only quasi-universal: because action and execution of the action are not different. I 229 Nevertheless: a simplification like "Compton was eliminated by Carr" has a different weighting. Point: we have transferred the role of the subject of a predication to theobjects. New criterion as a bridge between the two others. V 121f Concepts/Kant/Strawson: Objects may only change within the limits of recognition. The corresponding restrictions must somehow be reflected in the concepts. - However, it is not about a specific connective but about the existence of any such connectives. V 123 Concepts for objects are always summaries of causal law. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Connotation | Barthes | Röttger-Denker I 26 Connotation language/Barthes: very similar: first system: (little black dress that means festive occasion) becomes the signifier of the second system, whose signifier forms fashion ideology or fashion rhetoric. >Similarity, >Signs, >Designation, >Denotation, >Presentation. |
Barthes I R. Barthes Mythologies: The Complete Edition, in a New Translation New York 2013 Röttger I Gabriele Röttger-Denker Roland Barthes zur Einführung Hamburg 1997 |
| Connotation | Mill | I 51 Distinguishing connotation/denotation (co-denoting/non-co-denoting). Definition co-denotating/connotative/Mill: co-denotating/connotative are expressions that denotate a subject and include an attribute in itself. Single Subject: e.g. London, John, England. (Denotation). Single attribute: e.g. White, length, virtue. (Denotation). Co-denotating/connotation: e.g. white, long, virtuous. The word "white" denotes all white things such as snow, paper, etc., and in itself includes the attribute whiteness. >Denotation, >Naming, >Designation, >Predication, >Predicates, >Attribution, >Attributes, >Singular term, >General term, >Proper name. All concrete general names are connotative (co-denotating): e.g. human denotes Peter, Marie, John, etc. as the name of a class. It is applied to them because they possess certain attributes and to express that they possess them, e.g. physicality, a certain form, etc. The word human therefore means all these attributes and all the subjects they possess. The name means the subjects directly, the attributes indirectly.I 53 Even abstract names, although they are only the names of attributes, can be viewed as co-denotating in some cases: because attributes can also be attached to the attributes themselves. E.g. "error" of slowness in a horse: not the actual movement in place is the error, but the slow way of movement I 53 Names/Mill: names are not co-denotating, not connotative: they denote the individuals without any attribute. I 54 E.g. originally, Dartmouth may be located at the mouth of the Dart, but John is not named like this because it formed a part of the meaning that the father might have had the same name. In addition, the mouth of the river may have shifted without changing the name of the city. Proper names adhere to the things themselves (labels) and do not fall away when attributes of the object fall away. Although only God may have the appropriate attributes, it is still a general name and does not belong here anyway. I 55 Co-denotating names/Mill: are identifications: e.g. "the only son of Johann Müller". Also identifies attributes. I 56 So whenever names have any meaning, the meaning is, in what they co-denotate and not in what they denote (the bearer). Non-denotating (normal) names have no meaning. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Mill Ja I James Mill Commerce Defended: An Answer to the Arguments by which Mr. Spence, Mr. Cobbett, and Others, Have Attempted to Prove that Commerce is Not a Source of National Wealth 1808 |
| Conscientiousness | Neurobiology | Corr I 335 Conscientiousness/Neurobiology: Conscientiousness appears to reflect the tendency to maintain motivational >stability within the individual, to make plans and carry them out in an organized and industrious manner. Such top-down control of motivation should be necessary only in species capable of formulating long-term goals that might conflict with more immediate urges. In personality studies of other species, only the chimpanzee, our nearest evolutionary neighbour, has yet been found to possess a trait directly analogous to Conscientiousness (Gosling and John 1999)(1). >Personality traits, >Animal studies, >Animal models. Conscientiousness may represent the purest manifestation in personality of the ability and tendency to constrain immediate impulses in favour of longer-term goals. A factor analysis of many questionnaire measures of impulsivity (Whiteside and Lynam 2001)(2) found four factors, only two of which (labelled lack of perseverance and lack of premeditation) mapped onto Conscientiousness. The other two, labelled urgency and sensation-seeking, mapped onto Neuroticism and Extraversion, respectively, and appeared to describe strong impulses related to punishment and reward. In a similar vein, Depue and Collins (1999)(3) argued that, although theorists have often associated impulsivity with Extraversion, impulsivity might be better conceived as a compound trait emerging from the combination of high extraversion and low constraint or conscientiousness. Corr I 336 Another biological factor that may be related to Conscientiousness is glucose metabolism. Glucose represents the basic energy source for the brain, and a number of studies indicate that blood-glucose is depleted by acts of self-control and that the extent of this depletion predicts failures of self-control (Gailliot, Baumeister, DeWall et al. 2007(4); Gailliot and Baumeister 2007)(5). >Self-regulation, >Control processes. 1. Gosling, S. D. and John, O. P. 1999. Personality dimensions in nonhuman animals: a cross-species review, Current Directions in Psychological Science 8: 69–75 2. Whiteside, S. P. and Lynam, R. W. 2001. The Five Factor Model and impulsivity: using a structural model of personality to understand impulsivity, Personality and Individual Differences 30: 669–89 3. Depue, R. A. and Collins, P. F. 1999. Neurobiology of the structure of personality: dopamine, facilitation of incentive motivation, and extraversion, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 22: 491–569 4. Gailliot, M. T., Baumeister, R. F., DeWall, C. N., Maner, J. K., Plant, E. A., Tice, D. M., Brewer, L. E. and Schmeichel, B. J. 2007. Self-control relies on glucose as a limited energy source: willpower is more than a metaphor, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 92: 325–36 5. Gailliot, M. T. and Baumeister, R. F. 2007. The physiology of willpower: linking blood glucose to self-control, Personality and Social Psychology Review 11: 303–27 Colin G. DeYoung and Jeremy R. Gray, „ Personality neuroscience: explaining individual differences in affect, behaviour and cognition“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Consciousness | Bieri | I 65ff Consciousness/Leibniz/Bieri: it is the factory as a whole which is responsible for consciousness. >Thought experiments. I 66/67 Consciousness/Bieri: not laws are the problem, certainly there are some. - Problem: why they exist, what in the brain makes it necessary that a person experiences anything? - Unlike gravity: consciousness is a system property. Cf. >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Knowing how/Chalmers, >Experience/Chalmers. I 61 Consciousness/Bieri: is no uniform phenomenon. Inner drive, inner control, awareness, sensitivity ability (in any case not the same as self-awareness). >Awareness, >Sensations, >Experience, cf. >Self-Consciousness. Discriminative behavior, appropriate to a situation, coherent over a period of time, "integrated". Some mental states are verbalizable, others are not. >Mental states. Consciousness in the cognitive sense, however, does not appear to be something intellectual that is impenetrable. >Cognition, >Thinking. I 64 Experience/Riddle: the experience is the mystery, not its representation. Consciousness/du Bois Reymond: "cannot be explained from its material conditions". >Representation. BieriVsdu Bois-Reymond: why should it be? - Thesis: it is also not explained by the material conditions, if we know (which we do not now) all the material conditions. >Emergence, >Explanation. Consciousness/Leibniz: it is the "factory as a whole" that is responsible for consciousness. I 74 Explanation/Bieri: it always means revealing a certain kind of relationship. Cf. >Causal explanation, >Causal relation, >Causality. Puzzle/consciousness/Bieri: we have no idea what would be a solution, an understanding. >Understanding But it would be very strange if there was a special relationship here, which does not exist anywhere else. (VsMcGinn). >Consciousness/McGinn. If there were a being that shows us this strange relationship, we would not understand it, we could not comprehend it. |
Bieri I Peter Bieri Was macht Bewusstsein zu einem Rätsel? In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Bieri III P. Bieri Analytische Philosophie des Geistes Weinheim 2007 |
| Consciousness | Brentano | Chisholm I 130 Unity of Consciousness/Brentano(1): if a person imagines something, or at the same time imagines several objects, he also recognizes at the same time the simultaneity of both. For example, if one hears a melody, he hears the one tone as present while he perceives the other as past. ... in which of the experiences is the idea of their simultaneity? In none! >Imagination. On the contrary, it is clear that the inner cognition of the one with the other belongs to the same real unity. I 131 Consciousness/Chisholm/Unity/Brentano/Chisholm: suggests the following principle: if it is certain for x that it is F and also that it is G, then it is also certain that it is F and G. Cf. >Perception/Kant. This seems unquestionable on the basis of Kant's transcendental unity of apperception. ChisholmVs: it seems to be too strict, however. Kant: the subject, does not need to unite the ideas, it only needs to appear that it could. If it is true for x that it is F, and also that it is G, and it is considering the question whether it is both F and G, then it is certain for it. I 132 This also applies to proposed premises. 1. F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Hamburg, 1973, p. 227f --- Chisholm II 269 Consciousness/Brentano/Hedwig: Brentano has never admitted the psychological abyss of consciousness, but always insisted on the uniqueness of thinking. Chisholm II = Klaus Hedwig Brentano und Kopernikus in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Ed.), Amsterdam 1986 |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Consciousness | Chalmers | I XI Definition The Easy Problem/Consciousness/Chalmers: “easy” problems of consciousness: How does the brain process environmental stimulation? I XII How does it integrate information? How do we produce reports on internal states? I XIII If you only work on the "easy” problem, you get one sort of theory; if you believe, that there is a further “hard” problem, then you get another. Cf. >Computer model, >Computation, >Thinking, >World/thinking, >Stimuli, >Stimulus meaning, >Information, >Cognition, >Cognitive psychology. I XII Definition The Hard Problem of Consciousness/Chalmers: Why is all this processing (of stimulation, of information) accompanied by an experienced inner life? Thesis: The standard methods of neuroscience and cognitive science do not work in addressing them. I 4 Central is experience, but it is not definition. It is fruitless to define conscious experience in terms of more primitive notions. >Experience. I 5 When I am talking about it here, I mean only the subjective quality of experience. ((s) And this is not to be confused with self-experience). Cf. >Knowing how, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Self-consciousness. I 26 Consciousness/Chalmers: also this term has two aspects: A) psychological (behavior explaining, functional) - concerns reports and introspective accessibility to information. (From now on called "consciousness"). >Awareness/Chalmers, >Behavior, >Explanation, >Introspection. B) phenomenal (>Qualia/Chalmers, see also more authors on qualities). Psychological Consciousness/Chalmers: psychological consciousness is introspection, alertness, ability to reflect the content of mental states, self-awareness. >Content, >Mental states. 71 Consciousness/Chalmers: as almost the only phenomenon, conscious experience does not logically supervene on something else. Otherwise, virtually all natural phenomena are globally logically supervenient to facts about atoms, electromagnetic fields, etc. But that does not mean that all higher-level properties are based on micro-physical laws. >Supervenience. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Consciousness | Davidson | I (e) 105 States of consciousness such as doubts, desires, beliefs are partly identified by the social context of their appropriation, like other states are identified by their causes, such as snow blindness. 1. States of consciousness such as doubts, desires, beliefs are partly identified by the social context of their appropriation, similarly as other states are identified by their causes, such as snow blindness. I 106 2. This does not prove that states of consciousness are not physical states! How we identify them is not directly related to the location of these states. 3. The fact that states of consciousness are identified on the basis of their causal relations to objects of the outside world is an essential fact for the possibility of communication. 4. The separation of schema and content is an error resulting from the image that the mind is a passive observer of an inner spectacle. A naturalistic explanation of knowledge does not refer to epistemological mediation instances, type of sensory data, etc. 5. There are no "objects of thought" as ghostly entities modelled on sensory data or anything else. What remains of subjectivity? Thoughts are private. The knowledge of thoughts is something asymmetrical. Thoughts nevertheless belong to a common public world. The mere possibility of thoughts demands common standards of truth and objectivity. >Doubts, >Desire, >Beliefs, >Intentions, >Mental states, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mentalism. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Consciousness | Dennett | Rorty VI 161 Consciousness/Dennett: it is an illusion to believe that consciousness is the exception to the rule that everything can be explained by its relations to other things. It is no exception. Dennett I 534 Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way that we cannot even imagine today. Dennett II 23ff Language/Animal/Consciousness/Dennett: since there is no limit to consciousness (with or without speech), since it has gradually emerged, the question which animals have consciousness is undecidable - "a matter of style" - consciousness is not the same as thinking! Dennett: no thought works without language but consciousness does work without thinking. >Thinking without language. Rosenthal I 430 Consciousness/Dennett: not even for the first person it is always clear what conscious is and what it is not - e.g. becoming aware of the inventory of a room - E.g. wallpaper pattern: Completion by judgment, is not sensory! Metzinger I 475 Consciousness/Dennett: consciousness is like a simulation of the world. It relates to the brain as flight simulations relate to the processes in the computer. Metzinger I 555 Consciousness/Dennett: 1) cultural construction - 2) you cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness - BlockVsDennett: Incorrect fusion of p-consciousness and a-consciousness. (phenonmenal consciousness and access-consciousness). >Consciousness/Block. Chalmers I 113 Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmer: Dennett (1978c)(1) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory, I 114 control unit and module for "public relations": for the implementation in everyday language. ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model. Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991)(2) without a central "headquarter". ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience. Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows, is nevertheless everything it takes to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the various functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a(3), p.210) and (FN9/Chapter 3) Cognitive Models/Chalmers: there are also models by Churchland, (1995)(4), Johnson-Laird (1988)(5), Shallice (1972(6), 1988a(7), 1988b(8)). ChalmersVs: my criticism VsDennett from above applies to all. Chalmers I 229 Consciousness/Dennett/Chalmers: (Dennett 1993b)(9) Consciousness is what stands out in the brain processes. ("Cerebral celebrity"). Such content is conscious that fix resources themselves and monopolize them. (P. 929). Chalmers: that is close to my approach, only that I speak of potential standing out, it must only be possible that a content can play this role. 1. Dennett, D. Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness. In: D. Dennett, Brainsorms, Cabridge 1978. 2. Dennett, D. Consciousness explained. Little, Brown and Co., Boston 1991 3. Dennett, D. Back from the drawing board. In: B. Dahlbom (Ed) Dennett and His Critics, Oxford 1993. 4. Churchland, P. M. The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain. Cambridge 1995. 5. Johnson-Laird, P. A computational analysis of consciousness. Cognition and Brain Theory 6, 1983: pp. 499-508 6. Shallice, T., Dual funtions of consciousness. Psychological Review 79, 1972: pp. 383-93; Information-precessing models of consciousness: Possibilities and problems. In: A. Marcel and E. Bisach (Eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford 1988. 7. Shallice, T. Information-precessing models of consciousness: Possibilities and problems. In: A. Marcel and E. Bisach (Eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford 1988. 8. Shallice, T. From Neuropsychology toMental structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Dennett, D. The message is: there is no medium. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:919-31 |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Rosenthal I David M. Rosenthal "Multiple drafts and the facts of matter" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Consciousness | Dummett | I 116 Content of consciousness/Dummett: private contents: fragrance, melody, name "idea" (no background is necessary) - but non-private contents: concepts, thoughts, sense (public). ( VsBritish empiricists: concepts are no "Ideas"). >Concepts/Dummett, >Ideas, >Imagination. I 117 British Empiricism: identifies concepts with ideas - DummettVsSaussure: imitates this by describing sound transmissions mechanistically. - > Language as code. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Consciousness | Frege | Dummett I 60ff Frege: the content of consciousness are sensations, but not the mind or thoughts. These are the detection of the exterior. Frege IV 41 Thoughts/mind/imagination/Frege: thoughts do not belong to consciousness. They are objective. Thoughts are 'formed'. We 'have' ideas, moods and inclinations. They belong to the consciousness. IV 43 Third realm: thoughts: in the thirs realm thoughts are neither things in the outside world nor imaginations. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Imagination, >Thought, >Meaning, >Sensation, >Objectivity, >Subjectivity. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Consciousness | Frith | I 138 Consciousness/action/unconscious/action/Frith: thesis: most of the time we will not be conscious of what we are doing. Conscious/intent: we are conscious of our intention. Movement: movement only becomes conscious when something fails. Brain/knowledge/movement: the brain knows in advance how long an action will take and how it should feel. Imagination/mental training/Frith: picturing a movement in advance can actually improve the performance. I 139 It even brings almost as much increase in power as normal training. I 252 Consciousness/Frith: this book(1) is not about consciousness. Brain/Frith: instead, I emphasized how much my brain knows and does without me. Consciousness: there is very little left to be done for it. >Brain, >Brain states, >Brain/Frith, >Consciousness. 1. Chr. Frith (2013). Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft. Heidelberg. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Consciousness | Husserl | Gadamer I 248 Consciousness/Husserl/Gadamer: According to Husserl's own statement(1), it was the a priori-correlation of experience-object and given facts, which dominated his whole life-work since the logical investigations. Already in the fifth logical investigation he had worked out the peculiarity of intentional experiences and distinguished consciousness, as he made it a research topic, "as an intentional experience"(...) from the real unit of consciousness of experiences and from their inner perception. In this respect, consciousness was not an "object" for him but an essential assignment (...). What was revealed in the research of this attribution was a first overcoming of "objecivism" in so far as, for instance, the meaning of words was not connected with the real psychic content of consciousness, e.g. the Gadamer I 249 associative notions that a word evokes were allowed to be confused for a longer time. Intention of meaning and fulfillment of meaning essentially belong to the unity of meaning, and, like the meanings of the words that we use, every being that is valid for me has, correlatively and in essence, an "ideal generality of the real and possible experiencing modes of giving"(2). >Phenomenology/Husserl. 1. Husserliana VI. 169. 2. Ibid. Tugendhat I 165 Consciousness/Husserl: a sensual act is the imagination of objects. Categorical acts are acts of thought or the stating of facts. They are not sensual, they are differently composed than objects but they are real, if the objects are real. I 173f TugendhatVsHusserl: VsCategorical Act (categorical synthesis): instead of categorical acts he assumes a semantic form, rather than an "ideal composition": criterion: a relation exists when the appropriate sentence is true. --- Adorno XIII 61 Consciousness/Husserl/Adorno: according to Kant, a single consciousness is only founded by memory in its unity and thus uniform experience is made possible. Husserl later expresses that consciousness is itself a piece of the world. Adorno: they presuppose (...) what they first want to establish in the doctrine of idealism. Idealism/Adorno: idealism was thus a bit in the situation of Münchhausen, who wanted to pull himself out of the swamp by his plait, i.e. he must develop his constitutive forms from the individual consciousness. (See also Subjectivity/Adorno, Idealism/Adorno, Mind/Adorno, Hegel/Adorno). |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Consciousness | McGinn | I 49 Consciousness/mind-body problem/McGinn: there seem to be no properties of physical organisms from which consciousness could arise under certain circumstances. Now, it is also difficult to specify exactly which property of consciousness ensures that it refuses a physical explanation. I 52 Consciousness/McGinn: Problem: what is the real hallmark of a state of consciousness? Where is the problem located? "What is it like to be a K?" I 56 Consciousness/McGinn: Problem: how is it possible that states whose condition is associated with "being-like" emerge from states where there is no "being-like"? Cf. >"What is it like to be a bat?", >Knowing how, >Experience. I 68 Consciousness/McGinnVsSearle: states of consciousness do not allow emergence-theoretical explanations with mereological terms. We are unable to reduce pain to the underlying neural units. On the contrary to that it is quite possible to explain the higher-level properties of liquids in this way. (s) because all levels are easily accessible to us. States of consciousness can therefore not be explored according to Combinatorial Atomism with lawlike mappings. We can well understand higher-level brain functions from their constituents, but if we start with consciousness, this explanation fails. >Explanation. I 74 Mind/brain/meaning/reference/McGinn: so according to this view, there is no referent that would ever raise a philosophical problem of its own, because the objective world is not a problem from a philosophical point of view. Philosophical problems arise from the meanings in the light of which we understand the world. It is not the soul as a referent to which the mystery clings. >Philosophy. Consciousness/McGinn: is theoretically unfathomable, because we do not understand what kind of relationship would be capable of linking experience with the world in a way that is given by our imagination when we talk about knowledge. I 192 What does it really mean for my mind to put itself in the position of the world? Since we receive no response, there is the notion that our cognitive powers are directed entirely inwards. However, this retreat is a deception according to transcendental naturalism. >Terminology/McGinn. II 68 If the only thing on which we had relied was brain research, we would never even have got the idea that the brain houses a consciousness at all. I 86ff Knowledge/awareness/McGinn: even complete knowledge of ourselves would not let us look better in terms of consciousness. >Awareness/Chalmers. II 216 Consciousness is not a property that depends on its origin. >Artificial consciousness. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Consciousness | Nozick | II 245 Knowledge/Consciousness/Nozick: most authors: Thesis: you always know that you know. Cf. >Beliefs/Davidson, >Reference. NozickVs: it may be that you know something, but do not believe that you know it, because you do not believe that you fulfill conditions (3) and (4). (3) If p were not true, S would not believe p. (4) If p >S believes that p. Problem: if you are connected to a fact, but not with the fact that you are in connection with this fact. - It may be that the belief varies with the truth, but not with the fact that you really are in connection with it. >Truth, >Facts, >Belief, >Knowledge. 2nd order skepticism 2nd stage: that you do not know that you know something. >Skepticism. NozickVsSkepticism: only if the vat world were the next possible world, could skepticism show that a particular conditional relation does not exist, i.e. if the vat world had to exist as soon as we believed something wrong. >Brains in a vat, >Similar World, >Possible Worlds, >Similarity Metrics. Nozick: and that is not the case. II 247 Knowing that you know/Nozick: you often do not know exactly at what level you are. - E.g. if you know that you are on the 3rd level, you are already on the 4th level. >Description levels, >Levels/order. II 347 Consciousness/Explanation/Evolution Theory/Nozick: consciousness allows other types of behavior: namely, to letting yourself be guided by principles. >Principles, >Behavior, >Rules. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Consciousness | Saussure | Dummett I 117 Content of consciousness: private: fragrance, melody, name, "idea" (no background necessary) -but not: concepts, thoughts, sense (public). VsBritish empiricists: (concepts, no "ideas") British Empiricism: equates concepts with imagination. DummettVsSaussure: mimics this by mechanistically describing the transmission of sound - language as code. I 118 Meaning/Grasping/DummettVsSaussure: too simple explanation, like periodic pain. - We would then also need an explanation of what it means to use this concept. - E.g. if someone knows nothing about trees, it does not help to say that every time he heard the word concept would enter his mind. I 120 Thoughts can only be grasped as a complex. >Holism, >Complex, >Compositionality. What someone thinks about an object must be able to apply to other objects. Generality Condition/Evans: the object must also be able to have other predicates. >Generality Condition/Evans. |
F. de Saussure I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius) Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Consciousness | Sterelny | I 378 Mind/Animal/Consciousness/Representation/Sterelny: what would show that an animal has a "theory of mind"? >Theory of mind, >Animals, >Animal language. Heyes/Whiten: Maybe the ability for a role exchange? Later Vs. I 379 Premack/Woodruff: E.g. Chimpanzee Sarah sorted out photos that showed the solution of problems! HeyesVs: every single case can be clarified. Method/Heyes/Sterelny: however, it is little economical to "explain away" every single performance. One can see that there is no uniform "spoilsport theory". >Method, >Theories, >Explanations. Gorillas/Byrnes: gorillas do not learn by learning individual "chunks" of movement, but they capture a behavioral program. >Learning, >Behavior. Imitation/Sterelny: although there is a lot of anecdotal evidence about imitation in human beings, the experimental evidence for imitation is astonishingly narrow. >Imitation. I 380 But in the positive cases, it is impressive because it shows the ability of an observer to extract a program of motoric movements. >Observation, >Generality, >Generalization. HeyesVs: it doubts that the concept of a behavioral program is unclear. Delimitation to a series of movements or behavioral sequences are not clear. Sterelny: but we should be able to distinguish something empirically: 1. If social learning consists in imprecisely imitating, different individuals should not commit the same errors. The errors would have to happen at random. 2. Imitation could be distinguished from other types of social learning if a result could be achieved in more than one way. If a model is needed, it should not only contain something about the objectives but also about the means. >Models, >Goals, >Purpose-means-rationality. |
Sterelny I Kim Sterelny "Primate Worlds", in: The Evolution of Cognition, C. Heyes/L. Huber (Eds.) Cambridge/MA 2000 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Sterelny II Kim Sterelny Dawkins vs. Gould: Survival of the Fittest Cambridge/UK 2007 |
| Conservatism | Policy of Russia | Krastev I 118 Conservatism/Policy of Russia/Krastev: (...) the conservative turn in Russian politics (...) is diffcult to understand without taking Russia's aggressive isolationism into account. The most common interpretation is that Russia decided to become the champion of the conservative revolution because of the authoritarian preferences of its leaders. In these theories, Putin's version of Russian conservatism is attributed to the ideological influence of such thinkers as Ivan Ilyin or Aleksandr Dugin. But Putin, despite his occasional references to Ilyin, does not easily fit the image of a classical ideological dictator. Unlike Stalin, for instance, he is not known to be an avid reader. (...)way, Russia positions itself as the defender and saviour of an Old Europe that has been betrayed by the decadent West. But the 'Slavophile conservatism' echoed here is skin deep. Krastev I 120 Not the Slavophile classics in the Kremlin library, but Russia's unique combination of African mortality rates and European birth rates is what best explains the conservative turn in Kremlin political rhetoric.(1) It is impossible to understand the series of repressive laws being adopted in Russia recently, including legislation against 'gay propaganda'(2) if we do not realize that what is at stake is the dramatic impact that the Westernization of Russian society had on the fraught relations between generations, particularly within the Russian elite. One of the principal forces that corroded the legitimacy of communism was the limited extent to which Soviet elites could transmit their privileges to their own children. 1. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017), World Mortality 2017 — Data Booklet; http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/mortality/World- Mortality-2017-Data-Booklet.pdf 2. Masha Lipman, 'The Battle Over Russia's Anti-Gay Law', New Yorker (10 August 2013). |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Conservative Revolution | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 397 Conservative Revolution/Political Philosophy/Bellamy/Jennings/Lassman: A notable feature of German political thought in the first half of the twentieth century is the way in which it questions the relationship between democracy and liberalism. The most extreme expression of this view is found in the writings of the legal scholar Carl Schmitt. >C. Schmitt. Schmitt's rejection of liberalism and democracy, along with the idea that the relationship between them is no more than historically contingent, belongs to a general pattern of anti-democratic thought that was vociferous in its opposition to the Weimar Republic (Schmitt, 1996(1); 1985(2); 1963(3)). >Liberalism, >Democracy >Parliamentarism. The thinkers of the 'Conservative Revolution', among whom Schmitt can be numbered as a prominent representative, were as one in their cultural pessimism, nationalist resentment following defeat in the war of 1914-18, opposition to democracy, liberalism, constitutionalism, and what they considered to be the soulless character of modernity. The opposition between 'the ideas of 1914' and the alien 'ideas of 1789' is a common theme. >Constitutionalism. Schmitt: Carl Schmitt expressed in an acute form the opposition to the liberal constitution of the Weimar Republic. His open and public support for the Nazi regime after it came to power in 1933 was the outcome of an attempt to resolve what was perceived to be a crisis in the tradition of Staatslehre. This problem coexisted with a mood of cultural despair common among the proponents of the Conservative Revolution. Rule of law: The significance of the crisis that Schmitt identified in legal theory was that it threatened to destroy the underpinnings of the liberal idea of the rule of law. As early as 1912, Schmitt had argued that the application of the law to particular cases is always, under current conditions, permeated by ambiguity. The implication, for Schmitt, is that the liberal view, maintained since the Enlightenment, that political power could be restrained by the rule of law was a fiction. The answer that Schmitt arrived at was that the only way in which this crisis of legal indeterminacy could be overcome was by rejecting the universalistic premises upon which the idea of the rule of law is based. Nation: Schmitt's response was to replace liberalism and the ideals of the Enlightenment with an image of a homogeneous nation (Volk) united by a common purpose. This account of the legal crisis is at one with Schmitt's (1985)(2) understanding of the decay of parliamentary democracy and the tension that exists between it and liberalism. >Nation, >People. Politics/state/Schmitt: (...) in his The Concept of the Political first published in 1927 Schmitt's starting point is a rejection of the unsatisfactory circularity of the conventional depiction of the conceptual relationship between the state and politics (Schmitt, 1985(2); 1996(1)). For Schmitt, before we can talk about politics we require an understanding of the defining characteristic of 'the political'. This is to be found in the antithesis between friend and enemy. Any genuine politics presupposes an understanding of 'the political' in this sense. 'The political' refers to the most extreme and intense antagonism in human relations. Who counts as 'the enemy' at any particular moment is based upon a decision made by a political state. Clearly, Gaus I 398 for Schmitt and other like-minded thinkers of the Conservative Revolution, this vision of 'the political' must be intensely hostile to liberalism in all of its forms. Liberalism is taken to be a clear example of the 'neutralizing' and 'depoliticizing' tendencies of the modern age. Furthermore, Schmitt (1996)(1) argues that the political state, as 'friend', must express the political unity of a people. Conservative Revolution: Political thinkers and philosophers such as Schmitt, Ernst Jünger, Oswald Spengler, Hans Freyer and Martin Heidegger combined their opposition to the politics of the Weimar Republic with a general distaste for the culture of the 'age of technology'. Schmitt and Heidegger, in particular, were supporters of the National Socialist dictatorship, although the precise nature and manner of that support have been the subject of seemingly endless debate. >M. Heidegger, >O. Spengler. 1. Schmitt, C. (1996) The Concept of the Political. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Schmitt, C. (1985) The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1923). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 3. Schmitt, C. (1963) Der Begriff des Politischen: Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot. Bellamy, Richard, Jennings, Jeremy and Lassman, Peter 2004. „Political Thought in Continental Europe during the Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Conservativity | Brandom | I 199 Conservativity/Extension/Language/Tonk/Brandom: pro conservative extension: if the rules are not inferentially conservative, they allow new material inferences and can change the contents that were associated with the old vocabulary - expressive logic/Brandom: requires that no new inferences that contain only old vocabulary are rendered appropriate (if they have not been previously). I 200 E.g. "boche"/Dummett: non-conservative extension: statements that do not contain the expression (!) could be inferred from others that do not contain the expression either - E.g. conclusion from German nationality to cruelty. BrandomVsDummett: this is not about non-conservativity: it only shows that the expression "boche" has a content which is not contained in the other expressions - e.g. the term "temperature" has also changed with the methods of measurement - it s not about the novelty of a concept, but about unwanted conclusions. I 204 Especially the material content of concepts is lost when the conceptual content is identified with the truth-conditions. >Content, >Conceptual content, >Truth conditions. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Conservativity | Field | I 4 Conservativity/Field: Conservativity includes some features of necessary truth without actually ever involving truth. >Truth transfer. I 44 Def Conservativity/Mathematics/Field: means that every internally consistent combination of nominalist statements is also consistent with the mathematics. - If we can also show that mathematics is not indispensible, we have no reason to believe in mathematical entities anymore. >Mathematical entities. I 58 Def Conservative/Conservativity/Theory/Mathematics/Field: conservative is a mathematical theory that is consistent with every internally consistent physical theory. - This is equivalent to: a mathematical theory is conservative iff for each assertion A about the physical world and each corpus N of such assertions, A does not follow from N + M, if it does not follow from N alone. ((s) A mathematical theory adds nothing to a physical theory.) M: mathematical theory N: nominalistic physical theory. >Nominalism. Def Anti-Realism/Field: (new): an interesting mathematical theory must be conservative, but it must not be true. >Anti-Realism. Conservative theory: 1) It facilitates inferences 2) It can substantially occur in the premises of the physical theories. I 59 Conservativity: necessary truth without truth simpliciter. - (i.e. it is has the properties of a necessarily true theory without existing entities.) >Truh/Field. Unlike mathematics: science is not conservative. - It must also have non-trivial nominalist consequences. >Science. I 61 Truth does not imply conservativity, nor vice versa. I 63 The fact that mathematics never leads to an error shows that it is conservative, not that it is true. - From conservativity follows that statements with physical objects are materially equivalent to statements of standard mathematics. - N.b.: they need not have the same truth value! >Truth values. I 75 Conservativity: can explain what follows, but not what does not follow. I 59 Mathematics/Truth/Field: Thesis: good mathematics is not only true, but necessarily true. - N.B.: Conservativity: necessary truth without truth simpliciter. >Bare truth. I 159 Conservative expansion does not apply to ontology. >Expansion. III XI Def Conservative/Science/Field: every inference from nominalistic premises on a nominalistic conclusion that can be made with by means of mathematics can also be made without it - with theoretical entities, unlike mathematical entities, there is no conservativity principle - i.e. conclusions that are made with the assumption of theoretical entities cannot be made without them. >Nominalism, >Theoretical entities. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Conservativity | Quine | X 86 Definition Conservativity/substitution/variables/Harman/Quine: substitutions must be conservative. The grammatical structure and logical truth shall be preserved: i.e. the variable or lexicon word used in the object language must not already occur elsewhere in the context. >Variables/Quine, >Substitution/Quine. V 189 Theory/Ontology/Quine: how should a scientific theory look best? We want as many and good predictions as possible. Guiding principles: Simplicity and conservativity. V 190 A great simplification can justify a relatively great deviation. We need a compromise between the two. Conservativity/Quine: conservativity is among other things due to our lack of imagination. But also wise caution against hypotheses. Simplicity/Conservativity: both are already at work in language learning. Language learning/Quine: does jumps and is always oriented towards similarities and analogies. >Language Acquisition/Quine. V 191 Short steps are conservative. They are guided by relative empiricism. Def relative empiricism/Quine: do not venture further away from the sense data than necessary. Quine pro: this keeps the theoretical changes low. QuineVsRadical Empiricism: we gave it up when we gave up hope of reducing the speech of the body to the speech of sense data. N.B.: this requires sticking to the substitutional quantification of abstract objects. That appeals to the nominalistic mind. It is expressed in relative empiricism, because both are the same. Nominalism: must not, however, overestimate the ontological harmlessness of the variables of substitutional quantification. In general, one can say that the values of variables make up the whole ontology if we only have object variables, truth functions and predicates. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Consistency | Tarski | Berka I 401 Consistency Proof/Gödel: a proof of consitency cannot be performed if the metalanguage does not contain higher type variables. >Metalanguage, >Levels, >Provability, cf. >Type theory. Undecidability: is eliminated when the examined theory (object language) is enriched with higher type variables. (1) >Object language. Berka I 474f Consistency/Logical Form/Tarski: is present when - for any statement x: either x ~ε FL(X) or ~x ~ε FL(x). ((s) Either x is not an inference from the system or its negation is not an inference.) But: Completeness: accordingly: if - for any statement x either x ε FL(X) or ~x ε FL(X) ((s) if either any statement or its negation is an inference from the system). I 529 f Law of Contradiction/Tarski: "x ~ε contradiction or ~x ~ε contradiction". We cannot make any generalization from the class of these statement functions. The generalization of these statement functions would itself be a (general) statement, namely the of the law of contradiction. Problem: infinite logical product that cannot be derived with normal methods of inference. I 531 Solution: "rule of infinite induction" - (differs from all other rules of inference by infinitist character).(2) 1. A.Tarski, „Grundlegung der wissenschaftlichen Semantik“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, VOl. III, ASI 390, Paris 1936, pp. 1-8 2. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Constants | Vollmer | II 59 Constants/explanation/physics/Vollmer: even the random values e.g. the gravitational constant could be explained: by Mach's principle. "Cube world"/Wheeler: the constants are not explainable at all. Cf. >Single-case causation/Vollmer, >Natural constants, >Explanation, >Coincidence, >Necessity, >Natural laws. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Constituents | Lyons | I 212 Constituent structure grammar/constituent structure/concatenation/linearity/layers/Lyons: so far we had regarded sentences as linear chains. >Sentences. New: the constituent structural grammar sees it arranged as constituents (not e.g. "subject"/"predicate" etc.), which leads to layers (reflected in the family tree, tree structure). >Constituent structure grammar. I 213 Immediate constituents/terminology/IC analysis/Lyons: (immediate constituents, IC): Example (poor John) (ran away). Tradition: there is obviously a parallelism here to the traditional conception of "poor John" as "subject" and "ran away" as "predicate". I 214 Layers: consist of direct constituents. Each constituent of a deeper layer is part of a higher one. Family Tree/Tree Structure/Structure Tree/Tree/Linguistics/Lyons: the layers of the constituents can also be specified by trees in addition to parentheses. Nodes: y and z indicate the layers. ((s) Layer x: consists of y and z, y: consists of poor and John etc. Constituent structural grammar/Lyons: there is no mention of "adjective", "predicate", etc. at all. >Phrase structure grammar/Lyons, >Adjectives, >Predicates. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Constitution | Aristotle | Höffe I 63 Constitution/Aristotle/Höffe: The constitution of Greek communities was highly unstable, which is why Aristotle reflects on the reasons for stability and instability. The relevant Book V(1), the first systematic treatment of this topic, contains a high degree of historical analysis. Höffe: Of course, the historical material presented serves primarily to illustrate causal laws, which is why certain one-sidedness is inevitable. They do not, however, significantly limit the historical source value of the investigation, but Aristotle's inclination towards antithetical schemata is not without cause for concern. Mixed Constitution: Book VI discusses the establishment of democracies and oligarchies. Against the tendency to establish their most radical form in each case, Aristotle recommends a corrective that will become influential as a "mixed constitution": a combination of institutional elements of different oligarchic and democratic constitutions adapted to the respective circumstances. Common good: (...) the term remains peculiarly pale. It is only from the picture that Aristotle draws at the end, in Books VII to VIII, of an ideal Höffe I 64 polis, a "polis as desired", that the concept takes shape. First and foremost is national defence or military security. >Politics/Aristotle, >Community/Aristotle, >Order/Aristotle. Trade/Economy: Next, trade relations are important, followed by the division of arable land. >Economy/Aristotle. Property: Aristotle proposes a "mixed property system", rejecting both full nationalisation of land and purely private ownership. For the public duties, which are financed today by taxes, at that time for the ritual acts and the common meals, there should be a common property (state land), the "rest" should become private property. Each citizen is given two parcels of land, one towards the national border and one in the interior of the country, both for reasons of justice and to achieve unanimity against hostile neighbours. Höffe I 67 Aristotle's doctrine of three good and three degenerate forms of government (...) is already found (...) in Plato's Politikos(2) (...), [it] will become a basic pattern of political thought: A constitution that serves the common good is regarded as good and successful; bad or degenerate is that which pursues the interests of the ruling class.(3) Depending on whether one, a few or all of them rule, the positive side is the monarchy or kingship, the aristocracy and politics, the constitutional state as a civil state of free and equal citizens. A. Depending on the type of citizenship - monarchical, - aristocratic or - political constitution must be natural. B. The bad or degenerate ones, however, are "against nature"(4): the tyranny that serves the interests of the sole ruler, the oligarchy, which is concerned about the interests of the few (oligoi) and the wealthy, hence also called plutocracy, the rule of the rich, and democracy, which focuses on the interests of the demos, the mass of the poor who are not bound by any laws. Aristocracy: excludes farmers, wage-earners, craftsmen and merchants from the circle of citizens with the argument that they lead a ignoble life instead of devoting themselves to that leisure (scholê) without which one could not form virtue and act politically;(5) in the background is the distinction between a form of life subject to the necessities of life and a life deprived of necessities and thus free. >Democracy/Aristotle. Höffe I 68 God State/Aristoteles: Not least Aristotle rejects three forms of constitution, against which also today's democracy sees itself as an alternative: Lordships by the grace of God, by a superior power or by superior birth. Moreover, since he favours a mixed constitution that combines oligarchic with democratic elements, commits them to the common good and has the important decisions made by the People's Assembly, Aristotle can be considered largely democratic in the modern sense. ((s) But see >Inequality/Aristotle.) 1. Arist., Politika 2. Platon, Politikos 291c ff 3. Arist., Politika III 7 4. III 17, 1287b37 ff. 5. VII 9, 1328b38 ff. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Constitution | Levitsky | Levitsky I 115 Constitution/Democracy/Levitsky/Ziblatt: Are constitutional security measures sufficient alone to protect democracy? We think: no. Even well thought-out constitutions sometimes fail. The Weimar Republic Constitution of 1919 was written by some of the country's best legal scholars. In the opinion of many, the traditional and highly respected constitutional state enshrined in it was sufficient to prevent abuse of power. But both the constitution and the constitutional state collapsed rapidly after Hitler's seizure of power in 1933(1). Levitsky I 116 Latin America: Many of the republics that became independent followed the United States' model and adopted the presidential system, the bicameral parliament and the Supreme Court, and in some cases the electoral college and the federal structure of the country. Some adopted a constitution that was almost a copy of the U.S.(2). Nevertheless, almost all of the young republics slipped into civil wars and dictatorships. Levitsky/Ziblatt: First of all, constitutions are always incomplete. Like any set of rules, they contain numerous gaps and ambiguities. Levitsky I 118 All successful democracies are based on informal rules that are not laid down in the constitution, but are widely known and respected(3). In the case of American democracy, this is a decisive factor. 1. Kenneth F. Ledford, »German Lawyers and the State in the Weimar Republic«, in: Law and History Review 13, Nr. 2 (1995), p. 317–349. 2. George Athan Billias, American Constitutionalism Heard Round the World, 1776–1989, New York 2009, S. 124–125; Zackary Elkins/Tom Ginsburg/James Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, New York 2009, p. 26. 3. Siehe Gretchen Helmke/Steven Levitsky (Hg.), Informal Institutions and Democracy. Lessons from Latin America, Baltimore 2006. |
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| Constitution | Marsilius of Padua | Höffe I 180 Constitution/Marsilius/Höffe: People/Citizenship/eligible voters: The entirety of the citizens, however, does not exercise legislative power directly, but representatively. It delegates its legislative power to the larger and more influential part (maior et valentior pars). Höffe: As already mentioned, the more detailed explanations of this idea are not clear-cut, for they range from the majority to that representative electoral elite, where one can think of the seven electors who were authorized to elect the emperor at that time. >Democracy/Marsilius. Höffe I 182 [Marsilius] distinguishes, (...) with reference to Aristotle, the classical state powers of legislation, government and the judiciary. However, he subordinates the judiciary to the exercising power, and the latter to the legislation. In accordance with the idea of the sovereignty of the people, as far as he represents it, Marsilius places the legislature at the head of the public powers. >State/Marsilius, >Governance/Marsilius, >Legislation/Marsilius. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Constitution | Public Choice Theory | Parisi I 188 Constitution/Public choice theory/Farber: Adoption of a constitution generally requires at least majority support, if not a supermajority. But why would a majority choose to adopt a constitution and thereby tie its hands in the future? (Ginsburg, 2010(1); Mueller, 2003(2), pp. 634-639). 1) (…) the current majority may be concerned about its future control over governance. Most obviously, the current majority may fear that it will lose electoral dominance, perhaps due to demographic changes, and it therefore desires to lock in legal rules benefiting it or at least protecting it from losses at the hands of future majorities. 2) Alternatively, a majority might mobilize due to a crisis but realize that in normal times its members are unlikely to be similarly mobilized, so it wants to solidify legal rules that will protect it against adverse actions by interest groups or self-interested government officials who will remain active after the crisis fades. 3) Alternatively, constitutions may be intended to provide reassurance to minorities in order to obtain their support for a regime. The most obvious situation is where regions with minority populations have to be persuaded to join a national government. 4) Finally, constitutionalism may be at least in part oriented toward outside audiences. This was clearly the case, for instance, in postwar Japan and Germany, which were occupied by the United States when their current constitutions were adopted. >Constitutional structures/Public choice theory, >Legislature/Public choice theory. 1. Ginsburg, T. (2010). "Public Choice and Constitutional Decision," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 261-282. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 2. Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public Choice 111. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Farber, Daniel A. “Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Constitution | Wallace | Levitsky I 45 Constitution/Wallace/Levitsky: Senator George Wallace [gained] nationwide notoriety for his segregationist stance and twice applied for the presidency with astonishing success (1968 and 1972). He played the keyboard of what journalist Arthur Hadley called the "time-honored American tradition of hatred for the powerful". Wallace was a master in exploiting the "good old American anger"(1). Wallace: "There is something more powerful than the constitution ... It is the will of the people. What is a constitution then? It is a product of the people, the people are the first source of power, and the people can abolish a constitution if they so wish"(2). Levitsky/Ziblatt: Wallace's mixture of racism and populist appeals to the sense of discrimination against white workers and their anger at the economic situation succeeded in penetrating deep into this part of the Democratic Party's traditional base(3). Polls show that Wallace, as the American Independence Party candidate in 1968, had the support of about 40 percent of Americans(4). 1. Arthur T. Hadley, The Invisible Primary, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1976, p. 238; Jody Carlson, George C. Wallace and the Politics of Powerlessness. The Wallace Campaigns for the Presidency, 1964–1976, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1981, p. 6. Quoted in Lipset/Raab, The Politics of Unreason, p. 355 f. 2.Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage. George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 22000, p. 344–352; 3.Stephan Lesher, George Wallace. American Populist, Reading, Massachusetts, 1994, pp. 276–278; 4. Lipset/Raab, The Politics of Unreason, p. 345–357. |
WallaceAR I Alfred Russell Wallace The Malay Archipelago London 2016 |
| Constitutional Economics | Persson | Parisi I 205 Constitutional Economics/Tabellini/Persson/Voigt: Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) is a major contribution to Positive Constitutional Economics (PCE). They analyze the economic effects of two constitutional institutions, namely electoral system and form of government. >Electoral Rules/Persson/Tabellini. Parisi I 206 District size: Beyond electoral rules, Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) also deal with potential effects of both district size and ballot structure. Suppose (…) that single-member districts are combined with plurality rule. In this situation, a party needs only 25 % of the national vote to win the elections (50% of half of the districts: Buchanan and Tullock, 1962)(2). Contrast this with a single national district that is combined with PR. Here, a party needs 50% of the national vote to win. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that this gives parties under PR a strong incentive to offer general public goods, whereas parties under plurality rule have an incentive to focus on the swing states and promise policies that are specifically targeted at the constituents' preferences. Ballot structure: Regarding the ballot structure, MR systems frequently rely on individual candidates, whereas proportional systems often rely on party lists. Party lists can be interpreted as a common pool, which means that individual candidates can be expected to invest less in their campaigns under PR than under MR. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that corruption and political rents should be higher the lower the ratio between individually elected legislators and legislators delegated by their parties. Parisi I 207 Costs/economic variables: [Persson and Tabellini] (…) found that electoral systems are significantly correlated with a number of economic variables. (1) In majoritarian systems, central government expenditures are some 3% of GDP lower than under PR. (2) Expenditures for social services ("the welfare state") are some 2-3 % lower in majoritarian systems. (3) The budget deficit in majoritarian systems is some 1-2% below that of systems with PR. (4) A higher proportion of individually elected candidates is associated with lower levels of (perceived) corruption. (5) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have more corruption. (6) A larger proportion of individually elected candidates is correlated with higher output per worker. (7) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have lower output per worker. Blume, Müller, Voigt and Wolf (2009)(4) replicate and extend PT's analysis, finding that with regard to various dependent variables, district magnitude and the proportion of individually elected candidates is more significant - both substantially and statistically - than the electoral rule itself. Bias/VsTabellini/VsPersson: Iversen and Soskice (2006)(5) notice that three out of four governments under majoritarian systems were center-right between 1945 and 1998, whereas three out of four governments were center-left under PR. In other words, the results Parisi I 208 from Persson and Tabellini might suffer from omitted variable bias: it could be that both the electoral system as well as government expenditure are determined by the prevailing ideological preferences of the population. >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Persson/Tabellini. 1. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. 2. Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent - Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 3. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000). "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1121—1161. 4. Blume, L., J. Müller, S. Voigt, and C. Wolf (2009a). "The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating - and Extending - Persson and Tabellini." Public Choice 139: 197—225. 5. Iversen, T. and D. Soskice (2006). "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others." American Political Science Review 100: 165-181. Voigt, Stefan, “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
EconPerss I Torsten Persson Guido Tabellini The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Constitutional Economics | Tabellini | Parisi I 205 Constitutional Economics/Tabellini/Persson/Voigt: Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) is a major contribution to Positive Constitutional Economics (PCE). They analyze the economic effects of two constitutional institutions, namely electoral system and form of government. >Electoral Rules/Persson/Tabellini. Parisi I 206 District size: Beyond electoral rules, Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) also deal with potential effects of both district size and ballot structure. Suppose (…) that single-member districts are combined with plurality rule. In this situation, a party needs only 25 % of the national vote to win the elections (50% of half of the districts: Buchanan and Tullock, 1962)(2). Contrast this with a single national district that is combined with PR. Here, a party needs 50% of the national vote to win. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that this gives parties under PR a strong incentive to offer general public goods, whereas parties under plurality rule have an incentive to focus on the swing states and promise policies that are specifically targeted at the constituents' preferences. Ballot structure: Regarding the ballot structure, MR systems frequently rely on individual candidates, whereas proportional systems often rely on party lists. Party lists can be interpreted as a common pool, which means that individual candidates can be expected to invest less in their campaigns under PR than under MR. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that corruption and political rents should be higher the lower the ratio between individually elected legislators and legislators delegated by their parties. Parisi I 207 Costs/economic variables: [Persson and Tabellini] (…) found that electoral systems are significantly correlated with a number of economic variables. (1) In majoritarian systems, central government expenditures are some 3% of GDP lower than under PR. (2) Expenditures for social services ("the welfare state") are some 2-3 % lower in majoritarian systems. (3) The budget deficit in majoritarian systems is some 1-2% below that of systems with PR. (4) A higher proportion of individually elected candidates is associated with lower levels of (perceived) corruption. (5) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have more corruption. (6) A larger proportion of individually elected candidates is correlated with higher output per worker. (7) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have lower output per worker. Blume, Müller, Voigt and Wolf (2009)(4) replicate and extend PT's analysis, finding that with regard to various dependent variables, district magnitude and the proportion of individually elected candidates is more significant - both substantially and statistically - than the electoral rule itself. Bias/VsTabellini/VsPersson: Iversen and Soskice (2006)(5) notice that three out of four governments under majoritarian systems were center-right between 1945 and 1998, whereas three out of four governments were center-left under PR. In other words, the results Parisi I 208 from Persson and Tabellini might suffer from omitted variable bias: it could be that both the electoral system as well as government expenditure are determined by the prevailing ideological preferences of the population. >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Persson/Tabellini. 1. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. 2. Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent - Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 3. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000). "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1121—1161. 4. Blume, L., J. Müller, S. Voigt, and C. Wolf (2009a). "The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating - and Extending - Persson and Tabellini." Public Choice 139: 197—225. 5. Iversen, T. and D. Soskice (2006). "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others." American Political Science Review 100: 165-181. Voigt, Stefan, “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
EconTabell I Guido Tabellini Torsten Persson The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Constitutional Structures | Public Choice Theory | Parisi I 189 Constitutional structure/Public choice theory/Farber: The choice between parliamentary and presidential government is one of the major dividing lines among democratic governments. Disappointingly, public choice does not provide clear insights into the relative merits of the two systems. Parliamentarism: Empirical studies are also inconclusive, although there is some evidence that parliamentary systems are more robust on average (Ginsburg, 2010(1), pp. 271-272). Federalism: There is a much richer body of literature about federalism.* The essential benefit of decentralizing governance is that it allows laws to be tailored more closely to public preferences. If there are no spillover effects between jurisdictions, then decentralization allows each locality to adopt policies catering to its own preferences rather than imposing a "one size fits all" national uniformity. The advantages are similar to allowing consumers to buy a variety of goods rather than limiting production only to a single model preferred by a majority. This argument provides a justification for local voice by showing how it might be useful to allow existing local populations to pick their own laws. That is an argument for local voice. But besides voting on local policies, individuals can also express their preferences by moving to jurisdictions with congenial policies. This power of exit can result in better alignment between preferences and laws (Cooter, 2002(2), ch. 6). >Federalism/Public choice theory. Parisi I 192 Constitutional structure/Public choice theory/Farber: (…) majority voting by itself is not enough to produce coherent, stable outcomes except in some circumstances. In some parliamentary regimes, the solution is to delegate power to a Prime Minister or a cabinet, who can only be dislodged with difficulty before the end of her term. Governmental structures: One of the fundamental insights of public choice is that structures such as bicameralism and gatekeeper committees can limit cycling. (Cf. >Arrow’s Theorem). The reason is simply that adding veto points cuts the "win set" of proposals that can defeat any specific proposal. Essentially, giving multiple groups veto power blocks cycling except when (1) there is an identical cycle in the preferences of each of these groups, and (2) at least one proposal in the cycle is preferred to the status quo by each of these groups. In the extreme case of unanimous consent requirements, each legislator has a veto, making cycling impossible (though at the price of heavily privileging the status quo). ((s) Cf. >Veto player.) Procedural rules: Procedural rules may prevent observation of cycles in practice even in cases where the legislator's preferences do cycle. The agenda setter can potentially arrange a series of votes that will result in majority adoption of the agenda setter's preferred item in the cycle as the final outcome. Parisi I 193 Procedural rules may also limit the issue space—for instance, a committee may only have jurisdiction over a single-issue dimension, making it more likely that preferences will be single-peaked and therefore not open to cycling. The implication of these insights for statutory interpretation (Noll, McCubbins, and Weingast, 1994)(3) are an open and highly contested question (Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, 2006(4), pp. 219-257). Some scholars argue that courts can identify the key decision-makers and their goals well enough in the legislative history to take these views into account in interpreting statutes. Others view the process as too opaque for judicial investigation and instead argue that judges should abandon the idea of legislative intent when interpreting statutes (Easterbrook, 1983)(5). Preferences: (…) the existence of incoherent preferences does not necessarily translate into indeterminate meaning, quite apart from public choice theory. Given full information and zero drafting costs, we could infer that the actions of key agenda setters and veto gates must have combined to support the proposal over an alternative that was identical other than in its application to the circumstances in question. But even with those strong assumptions, there would be no need to reconstruct the preferences of those individuals in order to interpret the statute. * See Hills, R. M. (2010) "Federalism and Public Choice," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds. Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 207-233. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 1. Ginsburg, T. (2010). "Public Choice and Constitutional Decision," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 261-282. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 2. Cooter, R. D. (2002). The Strategic constitution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 3. Noll, R., M. McCubbins, and B. Weingast (writing as "McNollgast") (1994). "Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation." Law and Contemporary Problems 57(1):3-37. 4. Eskridge, W. N., P. P. Frickey, and E. Garrett (2006). Legislation and Statutory Interpretation. 2nd edition. St. Paul, MN: Foundation Press. 5. Easterbrook, F. H. (1983). "Statutes' Domains." University of Chicago Law Review 50(2): 53 3— 552. Farber, Daniel A. “Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Constraint Satisfaction Problems | Norvig | Norvig I 202 Constraint Satisfaction Problems/CSP/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: Problem: if each state is atomic, or invisible - a black box with no internal structure, problems can [only] be solved by searching in a space of states. These states can be evaluated by domain-specific heuristics and tested to see whether they are goal states. Solution: We use a factored representation for each state: a set of variables, each of which has a value. A problem is solved when each variable has a value that satisfies all the constraints on the variable. CSP search algorithms take advantage of the structure of states and use general-purpose rather than problem-specific heuristics to enable the solution of complex problems. The main idea is to eliminate large portions of the search space all at once by identifying variable/value combinations that violate the constraints. A constraint satisfaction problem consists of three components, X,D, and C: X is a set of variables, {X1, . . . ,Xn}. D is a set of domains, {D1, . . . ,Dn}, one for each variable. C is a set of constraints that specify allowable combinations of values. Norvig I 203 It can be helpful to visualize a CSP as a constraint graph, (…) The nodes of the graph correspond to variables of the problem, and a link connects any two variables that participate in a constraint. E.g., once we have chosen [a color] in the [map coloring] problem, we can conclude that none of the five neighboring variables can take on the value [of the same color]. Norvig I 205 Problem: A discrete domain can be infinite, such as the set of integers or strings. Solution: a constraint language must be used that understands constraints (…) directly, without enumerating the set of pairs of allowable values (…).Special solution algorithms (…) exist for linear constraints on integer variables—that is, constraints, (…), in which each variable appears only in linear form. Problem: It can be shown that no algorithm exists for solving general nonlinear constraints on integer variables. Norvig I 206 Continuous domains: Constraint satisfaction problems with continuous domains are common in the real world and are widely studied in the field of operations research. For example, the scheduling of experiments on the Hubble Space Telescope requires very precise timing of observations (…). The best-known category of continuous-domain CSPs is that of linear programming problems, where constraints must be linear equalities or inequalities. >Linear programming/Norvig. Norvig I 208 In regular state-space search, an algorithm can do only one thing: search. In CSPs there is a choice: an algorithm can search (choose a new variable assignment from several possibilities) or do a specific type of inference called constraint propagation: using the constraints to reduce the number of legal values for a variable, which in turn can reduce the legal values for another variable, and so on. Constraint propagation may be intertwined with search, or it may be done as a preprocessing step, before search starts. Sometimes this preprocessing can solve the whole problem, so no search is required at all. Norvig I 227 Constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs) represent a state with a set of variable/value pairs and represent the conditions for a solution by a set of constraints on the variables. Many important real-world problems can be described as CSPs. A number of inference techniques use the constraints to infer which variable/value pairs are consistent and which are not. These include node, arc, path, and k-consistency. Backtracking search, a form of depth-first search, is commonly used for solving CSPs. Inference can be interwoven with search. The minimum-remaining-values and degree heuristics are domain-independent methods for deciding which variable to choose next in a backtracking search. The least constraining- value heuristic helps in deciding which value to try first for a given variable. Backtracking occurs when no legal assignment can be found for a variable. Conflict-directed backjumping backtracks directly to the source of the problem. Local search using the min-conflicts heuristic has also been applied to constraint satisfaction problems with great success. History: The earliest work related to constraint satisfaction dealt largely with numerical constraints. Equational constraints with integer domains were studied by the Indian mathematician Brahmagupta in the seventh century; they are often called Diophantine equations (…). Systematic methods for solving linear equations by variable elimination were studied by Gauss (1829(1)); the solution of linear inequality constraints goes back to Fourier (1827)(2). Finite-domain constraint satisfaction problems also have a long history. For example, graph coloring (of which map coloring is a special case) is an old problem in mathematics. The four-color conjecture (that every planar graph can be colored with four or fewer colors) was first made by Francis Guthrie, a student of De Morgan, in 1852. It resisted solution - despite several published claims to the contrary - until a proof was devised by Appel and Haken (1977)(3) (see the book Four Colors Suffice (Wilson, 2004)(4)). Purists were disappointed that part of the proof relied on a computer, so Georges Gonthier (2008)(5), using the COQ theorem prover, derived a formal proof that Appel and Haken’s proof was correct. Norvig I 228 Constraint propagation methods were popularized by Waltz’s (1975)(6) success on polyhedral line-labeling problems for computer vision. Waltz showed that, in many problems, propagation completely eliminates the need for backtracking. Montanari (1974)(7) introduced the notion of constraint networks and propagation by path consistency. Alan Mackworth (1977)(8) proposed the AC-3 algorithm for enforcing arc consistency as well as the general idea of combining backtracking with some degree of consistency enforcement. AC-4, a more efficient arc-consistency algorithm, was developed by Mohr and Henderson (1986)(9). Soon after Mackworth’s paper appeared, researchers began experimenting with the tradeoff between the cost of consistency enforcement and the benefits in terms of search reduction. Haralick and Elliot (1980)(10) favored the minimal forward-checking algorithm described by McGregor (1979)(11), whereas Gaschnig (1979)(12) suggested full arc-consistency checking after each variable assignment—an algorithm later called MAC by Sabin and Freuder (1994)(13). Special methods for handling higher-order or global constraints were developed first within the context of constraint logic programming. Marriott and Stuckey (1998)(14) provide excellent coverage of research in this area. 1. Gauss, C. F. (1829). Beiträge zur Theorie der algebraischen Gleichungen. Collected in Werke, Vol. 3, pages 71–102. K. Gesellschaft Wissenschaft, Göttingen, Germany, 1876. 2. Fourier, J. (1827). Analyse des travaux de l’Academie Royale des Sciences, pendant l’annee 1824; partie mathematique. Histoire de l’Academie Royale des Sciences de France, 7, xlvii–lv. 3. Appel, K. and Haken, W. (1977). Every planar map is four colorable: Part I: Discharging. Illinois J. Math., 21, 429–490 4. Wilson, R. (2004). Four Colors Suffice. Princeton University Press. 5. Gonthier, G. (2008). Formal proof–The four-color theorem. Notices of the AMS, 55(11), 1382–1393. 6. Waltz, D. (1975). Understanding line drawings of scenes with shadows. In Winston, P. H. (Ed.), The Psychology of Computer Vision. McGraw-Hill. 7. Montanari, U. (1974). Networks of constraints: Fundamental properties and applications to picture processing. Information Sciences, 7(2), 95–132. 8. Mackworth, A. K. (1977). Consistency in networks of relations. AIJ, 8(1), 99–118. 9. Mohr, R. and Henderson, T. C. (1986). Arc and path consistency revisited. AIJ, 28(2), 225–233. 10. Haralick, R. M. and Elliot, G. L. (1980). Increasing tree search efficiency for constraint satisfaction problems. AIJ, 14(3), 263–313. 11. McGregor, J. J. (1979). Relational consistency algorithms and their application in finding subgraph and graph isomorphisms. Information Sciences, 19(3), 229–250. 12. Gaschnig, J. (1977). A general backtrack algorithm that eliminates most redundant tests. In IJCAI-77, p. 457. 13. Sabin, D. and Freuder, E. C. (1994). Contradicting conventional wisdom in constraint satisfaction. In ECAI-94, pp. 125–129. 14. Marriott, K. and Stuckey, P. J. (1998). Programming with Constraints: An Introduction. MIT Press. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Constraint Satisfaction Problems | Russell | Norvig I 202 Constraint Satisfaction Problems/CSP/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: Problem: if each state is atomic, or invisible - a black box with no internal structure, problems can [only] be solved by searching in a space of states. These states can be evaluated by domain-specific heuristics and tested to see whether they are goal states. Solution: We use a factored representation for each state: a set of variables, each of which has a value. A problem is solved when each variable has a value that satisfies all the constraints on the variable. CSP search algorithms take advantage of the structure of states and use general-purpose rather than problem-specific heuristics to enable the solution of complex problems. The main idea is to eliminate large portions of the search space all at once by identifying variable/value combinations that violate the constraints. A constraint satisfaction problem consists of three components, X,D, and C: X is a set of variables, {X1, . . . ,Xn}. D is a set of domains, {D1, . . . ,Dn}, one for each variable. C is a set of constraints that specify allowable combinations of values. Norvig I 203 It can be helpful to visualize a CSP as a constraint graph, (…) The nodes of the graph correspond to variables of the problem, and a link connects any two variables that participate in a constraint. E.g., once we have chosen [a color] in the [map coloring] problem, we can conclude that none of the five neighboring variables can take on the value [of the same color]. Norvig I 205 Problem: A discrete domain can be infinite, such as the set of integers or strings. Solution: a constraint language must be used that understands constraints (…) directly, without enumerating the set of pairs of allowable values (…).Special solution algorithms (…) exist for linear constraints on integer variables—that is, constraints, (…), in which each variable appears only in linear form. Problem: It can be shown that no algorithm exists for solving general nonlinear constraints on integer variables. Norvig I 206 Continuous domains: Constraint satisfaction problems with continuous domains are common in the real world and are widely studied in the field of operations research. For example, the scheduling of experiments on the Hubble Space Telescope requires very precise timing of observations (…). The best-known category of continuous-domain CSPs is that of linear programming problems, where constraints must be linear equalities or inequalities. >Linear programming/Norvig. Norvig I 208 In regular state-space search, an algorithm can do only one thing: search. In CSPs there is a choice: an algorithm can search (choose a new variable assignment from several possibilities) or do a specific type of inference called constraint propagation: using the constraints to reduce the number of legal values for a variable, which in turn can reduce the legal values for another variable, and so on. Constraint propagation may be intertwined with search, or it may be done as a preprocessing step, before search starts. Sometimes this preprocessing can solve the whole problem, so no search is required at all. Norvig I 227 Constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs) represent a state with a set of variable/value pairs and represent the conditions for a solution by a set of constraints on the variables. Many important real-world problems can be described as CSPs. A number of inference techniques use the constraints to infer which variable/value pairs are consistent and which are not. These include node, arc, path, and k-consistency. Backtracking search, a form of depth-first search, is commonly used for solving CSPs. Inference can be interwoven with search. The minimum-remaining-values and degree heuristics are domain-independent methods for deciding which variable to choose next in a backtracking search. The least constraining- value heuristic helps in deciding which value to try first for a given variable. Backtracking occurs when no legal assignment can be found for a variable. Conflict-directed backjumping backtracks directly to the source of the problem. Local search using the min-conflicts heuristic has also been applied to constraint satisfaction problems with great success. History: The earliest work related to constraint satisfaction dealt largely with numerical constraints. Equational constraints with integer domains were studied by the Indian mathematician Brahmagupta in the seventh century; they are often called Diophantine equations (…). Systematic methods for solving linear equations by variable elimination were studied by Gauss (1829(1)); the solution of linear inequality constraints goes back to Fourier (1827)(2). Finite-domain constraint satisfaction problems also have a long history. For example, graph coloring (of which map coloring is a special case) is an old problem in mathematics. The four-color conjecture (that every planar graph can be colored with four or fewer colors) was first made by Francis Guthrie, a student of De Morgan, in 1852. It resisted solution - despite several published claims to the contrary - until a proof was devised by Appel and Haken (1977)(3) (see the book Four Colors Suffice (Wilson, 2004)(4)). Purists were disappointed that part of the proof relied on a computer, so Georges Gonthier (2008)(5), using the COQ theorem prover, derived a formal proof that Appel and Haken’s proof was correct. Norvig I 228 Constraint propagation methods were popularized by Waltz’s (1975)(6) success on polyhedral line-labeling problems for computer vision. Waltz showed that, in many problems, propagation completely eliminates the need for backtracking. Montanari (1974)(7) introduced the notion of constraint networks and propagation by path consistency. Alan Mackworth (1977)(8) proposed the AC-3 algorithm for enforcing arc consistency as well as the general idea of combining backtracking with some degree of consistency enforcement. AC-4, a more efficient arc-consistency algorithm, was developed by Mohr and Henderson (1986)(9). Soon after Mackworth’s paper appeared, researchers began experimenting with the tradeoff between the cost of consistency enforcement and the benefits in terms of search reduction. Haralick and Elliot (1980)(10) favored the minimal forward-checking algorithm described by McGregor (1979)(11), whereas Gaschnig (1979)(12) suggested full arc-consistency checking after each variable assignment—an algorithm later called MAC by Sabin and Freuder (1994)(13). Special methods for handling higher-order or global constraints were developed first within the context of constraint logic programming. Marriott and Stuckey (1998)(14) provide excellent coverage of research in this area. 1. Gauss, C. F. (1829). Beiträge zur Theorie der algebraischen Gleichungen. Collected in Werke, Vol. 3, pages 71–102. K. Gesellschaft Wissenschaft, Göttingen, Germany, 1876. 2. Fourier, J. (1827). Analyse des travaux de l’Academie Royale des Sciences, pendant l’annee 1824; partie mathematique. Histoire de l’Academie Royale des Sciences de France, 7, xlvii–lv. 3. Appel, K. and Haken, W. (1977). Every planar map is four colorable: Part I: Discharging. Illinois J. Math., 21, 429–490 4. Wilson, R. (2004). Four Colors Suffice. Princeton University Press. 5. Gonthier, G. (2008). Formal proof–The four-color theorem. Notices of the AMS, 55(11), 1382–1393. 6. Waltz, D. (1975). Understanding line drawings of scenes with shadows. In Winston, P. H. (Ed.), The Psychology of Computer Vision. McGraw-Hill. 7. Montanari, U. (1974). Networks of constraints: Fundamental properties and applications to picture processing. Information Sciences, 7(2), 95–132. 8. Mackworth, A. K. (1977). Consistency in networks of relations. AIJ, 8(1), 99–118. 9. Mohr, R. and Henderson, T. C. (1986). Arc and path consistency revisited. AIJ, 28(2), 225–233. 10. Haralick, R. M. and Elliot, G. L. (1980). Increasing tree search efficiency for constraint satisfaction problems. AIJ, 14(3), 263–313. 11. McGregor, J. J. (1979). Relational consistency algorithms and their application in finding subgraph and graph isomorphisms. Information Sciences, 19(3), 229–250. 12. Gaschnig, J. (1977). A general backtrack algorithm that eliminates most redundant tests. In IJCAI-77, p. 457. 13. Sabin, D. and Freuder, E. C. (1994). Contradicting conventional wisdom in constraint satisfaction. In ECAI-94, pp. 125–129. 14. Marriott, K. and Stuckey, P. J. (1998). Programming with Constraints: An Introduction. MIT Press. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Constructivism | Searle | III 168 Constructivism/Maturana: the nervous systems (autopoietic) creates reality. >Autopoiesis. SearleVsMaturana: genetic fallacy: from the fact that our image of reality is constructed, it does not follow that reality is constructed. >Constructivism/Maturana. Maturana: rejects the idea of an "objective reality" in favour of the idea that nervous systems like autopoietic systems create their own reality. Since we have no idea and no access to reality except through social construction, there is no independent reality. >Objectivity/Maturana, >Reality/Maturana. SearleVsMaturana: from the fact that our knowledge/imagination/image of reality is constructed by human brains in social interactions, it does not follow that reality has been created by human brains. III 169 Genetic misconception: a problem beyond that: would the interactions themselves also be constructed by interaction? >Regress. Winograd: example: "there is water in the fridge". Relative to different backgrounds you can make statements that are true or false. From this he concludes that reality does not exist independently of our representations. SearleVsWinograd: the genetic fallacy as in Maturana confuses our image (background) with reality. Cf. >Background/Searle, >Terminology/Searle. --- Derrida: "Il n'y a pas de "hors texte"". SearleVsDerrida: this is simply claimed without argument. In a later polemical answer he seems to take everything back anyway. He claims that the whole thing only means banality, that everything exists in one context or another. >Derrida. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Constructivism | Waismann | Friedrich Waismann Suchen und Finden in der Mathematik 1938 in Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 76 Construction/Search/Mathematics/Waismann: e.g. false analogy: we are looking for a man with black hair and this and this appearance. In the case of the man, it would be possible to complete the description more and more without leading to a finding of such a man. I would not have the man yet. In the construction it is so: as long as the construction is not completely described, I cannot be sure if what I am looking for is logically correct, so can be described at all. The imperfect description leaves out just what would be necessary for something to be sought. It is therefore only an apparant description of the desired. E.g. Proof of the Goldbach conjecture. p. 76. e.g. the proof of induction has been rediscovered and not just a combination of simpler conclusions. >Discoveries, >Proofs, >Provability. >Goldbach's Conjecture. 77 To what extent is the search contained in the process of searching? E.g. North Pole: someone shows a point on the plan, which is the specification of the target. E.g. When searching the pentagon with a circle and a ruler, the question is: does the term allow for the search or not? In the case of mathematics the specification of the construction does not allow the search! We can even think of two different terms of construction (a layman concept of the student and a mathematical one). The space is, in reality, only the one that contains what is sought. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Constructivism | Wendt | Gaus I 297 Constructivism/international political theory/Wendt/Brown: During the course of the 1990s constructivism grew in importance, albeit aided perhaps by a certain lack of definition which enabled a great many varieties of nominally constructivist thought to flourish. The publication of Alexander Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics in 1999(1) - a text explicitly designed to play the same kind of role for constructivism as that played by Waltz's Theory of International Politics for neorealism - marked a kind of coming of age for the new approach (...). >K.N. Waltz. Wendt's achievement is to combine a high level of epistemological sophistication with insights drawn from older traditions of international thought, especially the work of the so-called 'English school' (Dunne, 1998)(2). He develops three different and competing accounts of 'anarchy'broadly, Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian - and works through the different kinds of international system that could be expected to emerge under these different accounts (...). >Anarchism, >I. Kant, >Th. Hobbes, >J. Locke. Statism/VsWendt: Wendt's statism has been criticized, and he has been accused of attempting to construct a new orthodoxy by means of a Faustian bargain, producing a critique of conventional international thought that buys acceptance from the mainstream by toning down its criticism of the latter (Kratochwil, 2000)(3). Brown: This is harsh, although, as a recent forum on Wendt's work demonstrates, it is certainly the case that mainstream writers have been more favourably disposed to its positions than late modernists (Review of International Studies, 2000). In fact, these criticisms, even if accurate, miss the real point: the value of Wendt's work is precisely the promise it offers of bringing the concerns of international political theory and mainstream international relations theory back together, to the advantage of both discourses. 1. Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Dunne, T. (1998) Inventing International Society. London: Macmillan. 3. Kratochwil, F. (2000) 'Constructing a new orthodoxy? Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics and the constructivist challenge'. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 29: 73-101. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Consumption Function | Keynesianism | Rothbard III 861 Consumption function/Keynesianism/Rothbard: The stability of the passive consumption function, as contrasted withthe volatility of active investment, is a keystone of the Keynesian system. This assumption is replete withso many grave errors that it is necessary to take them up one at a time. Consumption function/RothbardVsKeynesianism/VsConsumption function: (a) How do the Keynesians justify the assumption of a stable consumption function (…)? One route was through "budget studies" - cross-sectional studies of the relation between family income and expenditure by income groups in a given year. This is supposed to intimate that those doing the "dissaving," i.e., the dishoarding, are poor people below the subsistence level who incur deficits by borrowing. But how long is this supposed to go on? >Hoarding/Keynesianism. RothbardVsKeynesianism: How can there be a continuous deficit? Who would continue to lend these people the money? It is more reasonable to suppose that the dishoarders are decumulating their previously accumulated capital, i.e., that they are wealthy people whose businesses suffered losses during that year. (b) Aside from the fact that budget studies are misinterpreted, there are graver fallacies involved. For the curve given by the budget study has no relation whatever to the Keynesian consumption function! The former, at best, gives a cross section of the relation between classes of family expenditure and income for one year; the Keynesian consumption function attempts to establish a relation between total social income and total social consumption for any given year, holding true over a hypothetical range of social incomes. At best, one entire budget curve can be summed up to yield only one point on the Keynesian consumption function. Budget studies, therefore, can in no way confirm the Keynesian assumptions. Rothbard III 862 (c) Another very popular device to confirm the consumption function reached the peak of its popularity during World War II. This was historical-statistical correlation of national income and consumption for a definite period of time, usually the 1930's. This correlation equation was then assumed to be the "stable" consumption function. Errors in this procedure were numerous. RothbardVs: In the first place, even assuming such a stable relation, it would only be an historical conclusion, not a theoretical law. In physics, an experimentally determined law may be assumed to be constant for other identical situations; in human action, historical situations are never the same, and therefore there are no quantitative constants! Conditions and valuations could change at any time, and the "stable" relationship altered. There is here no proof of a stable consumption function. RothbardVs: Moreover, a stable relation was not even established. Income was correlated with consumption and with investment. Since consumption is a much larger magnitude than (net) investment, no wonder that its percentage deviations around the regression equation were smaller! >Consumption/Keynesianism, >Investment/Keynes, >Interest/Keynesianism. Time/ex ante/ex post/RothbardVsKeynesianism: Thirdly, the consumption function is necessarily an ex ante relation; it is supposed to tell how much consumers will decide to spend given a certain total income. Historical statistics, on the other hand, record only ex post data, which give a completely different story. For any given period of time, for example, hoarding and dishoarding cannot be recorded ex post. In fact, ex post, on double-entry accounting records, total social income is always equal to total social expenditures. Yet, in the dynamic, ex ante, sense, it is precisely the divergence between total social income and total social expenditures (hoarding or dishoarding) that Plays the crucial role in the Keynesian theory. (1) Rothbard III 863 (d) Actually, the whole idea of stable consumption functions has now been discredited, although many Keynesians do not fully realize this In fact, Keynesians themselves have admitted that, in the long run, the consumption function is not stable, since total consumption rises as income rises; and that in the short run it is not stable, since it is affected by all sorts of changing factors. RothbardVs: But if it is not stable in the short run and not stable in the long run, what kind of stability does it have? (e) it is instructive to turn now to the reasons that Keynes himself, in contrast to his followers, gave for assuming his stable consumption function. It is a confused exposition The "propensity to consume" out of given income, according to Keynes, is determined by two sets of factors, "objective" and "subjective." Rothbard: It seems clear, however, that these are purely subjective decisions, so that there can be no separate objective determinants. 1. See Lindahl, "On Keynes' Economic System - Part I," Economic Record (May 1954). p. 169 n. Lindahl shows the diffculties of mixing an ex post income line with ex ante consumption and spending, as the Keynesians do. Lindahl also shows that theexpenditure and income lines coincide ifthe divergence between expected and realized income affects income and not stocks. Yet it cannot affect stocks, for, contrary to Keynesian assertion, there is no such thing as hoarding or any other unexpected event leading to "unintended increase in inventories." An increase in inventories is never unintended, since the seller has the alternative of selling the good at the market price. The fact that his inventory increases means that he has voluntarily invested in larger inventory, hoping for a future price rise. 2. Summing up disillusionment withthe consumption function are two significant articles: Murray E. Polakoff, "Some Critical Observations on the Major Keynesian Building Blocks," Southern Economic Journal, October, 1954, pp. 141-51; and Leo Fishman, "Consumer Expectations and the Consumption Function," ibid., January, 1954, pp. 243-51. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Consumption Function | Rothbard | Rothbard III 776 Comsumtion Function/Rothbard: The Keynesian "consumption function" plays its part in establishing an alleged law that there exists a certain level of total income, say A, above which expenditures will be less than income (net hoarding), and below which expenditures will be greater than income (net dishoarding). But the basic Keynesian worry is hoarding, when total income must decline. Rothbard III 778 Keynesian law: The Keynesian law asserts social expenditures to be Iower than social income above point A, and higher than social income below point A, so that A will be the equilibrium point for social income to equal expenditure. For if social income is higher than A, social expenditures will be Iower than income, and income will therefore tend to decline from one day to the next until the equilibrium point A is reached. If social income is Iower than A, dishoarding will occur, expenditures will be higher than income, until finally A is reached again. RothbardVsKeynes/RothbardVsKeynesianism: (…) suppose that we now grant the validity of such a law; the only comment can be an impertinent: So what? What if there is a fall in the national income? Since the fall need only be in money terms, and real income, real capital, etc., may remain the same, Why any alarm? The only change is that the hoarders have accomplished their objective of increasing their real cash balances and increasing the real value of the monetary unit. It is true that the picture is rather more complex for the transition process until equilibrium is reached, (…) But the Keynesian system attempts to establish the perniciousness of the equilibrium position, and this it cannot do. >Free market/Keynesianism, >Unemployment/Keynesianism. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Content | Block | Fodor IV 172 Narrow Content/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: the idea that narrow meanings are conceptual roles throws no light on the distinction of meaning/reference. A semantic theory should not only be able to determine the identity of meaning, but also provide a canonical form that can answer questions about the meaning of expressions. If the latter succeeds, it is not entirely clear whether the first must succeed. Categories/Block: he himself says that most empirical taxonomies do not provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the application of their own categories. Narrow Content/Categories/Twin Earth/Block/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: Problem: how narrow contents can be expressed. E.g. if the mental states of the twins ipso facto share their contents, what then is the content that they share? It cannot be determined by what both share, namely the use of "water is wet": for that expresses the narrow proposition that water is wet. What then are the truth conditions? >Truth conditions. IV 173 Wide Meaning/Block: may be better suited to explain behavior. ((s) not only meaning in mind but also the circumstances). >Circumstances. Circumstances/Twin Earth/Wide Content/(s): Problem: if the circumstances consist in that once H2O and once XYZ is effective, the circumstances are something that the individual is unable to recognize. I.e. we do not know in which circumstances we are or which circumstances are given, since you cannot hold both situations up to one another.) >Twin earth. Fodor/Lepore: ... but only as far as there are nomological relations between world and belief. Psychological laws: if there are psychological laws, then there are ipso facto generalizations that work with wide, but not with narrow content. Fodor/Lepore pro. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but it misses the main point: some of these psychological laws would then be fixed with regard to intentional content: IV 174 "Ceteris paribus, if someone believes this and that and wants this and that, then he will act in this and that way". Problem: there is then an appeal to these intentional laws and not to the non-contingent connections between mind and behavior, which supposedly define the functional definitions of the content. And these intentional laws are then supposed to support the psychological explanations. >Behavior. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Content | Brandom | I 139ff Content/Brandom: any content is derived from the content of possible judgments. >Judgments. I 145 Semantic content: role in the determination of accuracies practice - basis: inferential relations - those who have content are subject to standards - Frege: Concepts from judgments. I 150f Content/Brandom: must not presume concepts and semantic content - there is a reaction without content: E.g. iron rusts in wet conditions - solution: inferential role - e.g. measurements: an instrument has no concepts. >Semantic content, >Conceptual content, >Inferential role. I 316 Circumstances/Content/Brandom: what the interpreter considers to be the circumstances is an essential feature of the empirical content. I 479 Content/Brandom: must specify the circumstances in the context under which a person is entitled to a definition - content by accuracy of inferences: three problems: 1) functional links do not only exist intra-linguistically, but also with the world - 2) Sentences often have significant portions expressing no parts which do not expres propositions - 3) Representational vocabulary is also used in analysis (> reference/Brandom). I 530 Content/Brandom: of an expression is determined by the set of SMSICs that regulate the substitution inferences (richness) - new vocabulary must be joined with the old vocabulary by SMSICs. >SMSICs. I 566 Content/Brandom (of sentences): the explicit expression of the relations between sentences, which are partly constitutive for sentences to be full of content, can be considered the content of sentences - the contents that are transmitted to the sentences through practices of community, are systematically intertwined with each other in a way that they can be considered to be products of those contents which are connected to the subsentential expressions. >Subsententials. I 658 Content/Brandom: assertions are expressed, therefore sentences are full of propositional content - subsentential expressions are indirectly full of inferential content thanks to their significance through substitution - unrepeatable Tokenings are embedded in substitutional inferences and thus indirectly inferentially contentful thanks to their connection to other Tokenings in a recurrent structure (inheritance). I 664 Content: there must be at least one context in which the addition of an assertion has nontrivial consequences. --- II 13 Content/Brandom: is explained by the act and not vice versa. >Actions. II 35 Content/Brandom: non-inferential circumstances: (perception circumstances) are a crucial element of the content of a concept such as red - further content approves the inference from the circumstances to the consequences of using it appropriately, regardless of whether those circumstances are themselves specified in narrowly defined inferential concepts. --- I 698 Content/Action/Brandom: states and actions, as premises and conclusions, obtain content by being embedded in consequences and inferences (instead of representation). I 662 Definition content/equality/Frege : "Two judgements have the same content if and only if the conclusions that can be drawn from one in connection with various others, always also follow from the other in connection with the same other judgements". BrandomVsFrege: this is a universal quantification via auxiliary hypotheses - such a requirement would erase the differences, because such a quantity could always be found: according to Frege, any two judgements have the same consequences if they are connected with a contradiction. >Implication paradox. I 731 Narrow/Content/BrandomVs: (depends only on the individual): coherent history barely possible which only considers one individual - furthermore, the stories of similar individuals should be the same - but different context always possible. >wide/narrow content. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Content | Frege | Berka I 85 Content/Frege: content is the function of an argument. A concept is formed in the following way: the subject is the argument and the predicate is the function. >Subject, >Predicate, >Function. Berka I 86 Not every content can be assessed: e.g. the idea/concept of a house. >Judgment, >Imagination, >Negation. Berka I 87 Affirmation/Frege: affirmation refers to the whole of content and judgment. Berka I 88 Against: negation/denial: negation is part of the content, not of the judgment. Berka I 87 Def Conceptual Content/Frege/(s): conceptual content is common to passive and active. ((s) From which the same set of conclusions can be drawn.) This has nothing to do with the distinction function/argument. Berka I 96 Content Identity/Frege: content identity differs from the contingency (implication) in that it refers to names, not to contents. Two names have the same content. >Proper names. Problem: characters can sometimes stand for themselves, sometimes they stand for a content. E.g. in geometry, the same point can have different meanings. Therefore, you must use two different names first to show this later. Different names are not a mere formality. Spelling: with a triple bar ≡. This refers to conceptual content. Also content identity needs its own character, because the same content can be determined differently.(1) 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 47 Content/Frege: content is intension, a way of givenness. >Intensions, >Way of givenness. II 57ff Content/sentence/Frege: content can be true or false. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 |
| Content | Perry | Newen I 110 Multiple Statement Contents/Singular Terms/Names/Descriptions/Indicators/Perry/Newen/Schrenk: Name/Content/Perry: Thesis: the content is always the designated object. >Singular terms, >Objects, >Designation. Informative Identity Sentences/Perry: it need not be possible to fully deal with the problem within the semantics. Description/Perry: has an identifying condition as referential content that can be specified by the description. >Descriptions. Designatory Content: (of the description) is then the object. Semantics/Pragmatics/Perry/Newen/Schrenk: that way, even within the semantic pragmatic aspects become relevant (interpretation, use). >Language use, >Semantics, >Pragmatics. Perry: Thesis: there are multiple statement contents for descriptions and indicators. >Indexicality, >Index words. Frank I 395f Thought is not the same as content: it may be that I now believe that it is beautiful today, but tomorrow do not believe that it was nice yesterday. - Another thought, same content. Then the thought is not the informational content. >Thoughts, >Information. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Content | Searle | I 66f Wide Content: wide content encompasses the causal relations to the world beyond the words so that meanings are not in the head (Putnam pro, but not "wide content". (> Content/Fodor), >Meanings not "in the head", >wide/narrow content. II 26f The fulfillment of conditions is fixed by propositional content. There is not a desire or belief without fulfillment conditions (i.e. no regress). >Satisfaction condition/Searle, >Regress. II 80 Deception: e.g. the moon is bigger on the horizon - that is part of the content. Solution: if we had no beliefs, we would believe the moon had changed its size. II 87 Content/Searle: the content is not the same as the object. II 196 Hallucination/deception: brains in the vat have exactly the same intentional content. II 319 Intentional Content/Pierre Example/Searle: intentional content is sufficient, and that is different in "London is ugly" and "Londres est jolie". Kripke: intentional content is not rigid, because descriptions are not rigid either. Names: names are neither equivalent to descriptions nor to intentional contents. >Pierre-Example. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Content | Wright | I 45 Content/"Deep Content"/"Deep Reference"/Wright: can be masked or simulated by syntax. (negations, conditionals). >Expression Theory. ((s) For the expression theory the question is: do the sentences have content or is it only simulated syntactically?) >Syntax, >Signs, >Meaning, >Reference. Common basis of realism and anti-realism: that this is not the case! >Realism, >Anti-realism. E.g. with Frege's numbers, there is no deep reference. The suitability of an expression to refer to one object depends on its syntax. It ensures that it can function as a singular term. >Singular terms, >Numbers/Frege. Then no more questions can be asked whether the object reference is successful. However, it is conceded that the appropriate contexts in which this is the case are true. (No "deep reference",or "deep content".) I 44 Syntactic Surface Characteristics: it must be ensured that a sentence that contains a truth predicate can be embedded in conditionals and has significant negations. >Negation, >Truth-predicate. Content/Wright: must satisfy discipline and surface syntax (e.g. conditional, negation) of a discourse. The thus secured content is enough to qualify a truth predicate (by platitudes). >Discourse, >Platitudes. I 157 Content/Wright: in conditions: is needed to prevent expressions like "whatever it takes" (> role/Wright, > circularity). - Solution: independence condition: fulfillment must be logically independent of the details of the extension of the terms (projectivistic terms such as color, morality, humor ) - then only terms within intensional operators - WrightVs provisional equations for moral discourse. I 242f Def wide cosmological role: (I 250) a content has a wide cosmological role iff the mention of facts of which it consists can occur at least in certain types of explanations of contingencies; explanations whose possibility is not only guaranteed by the minimum capacity for truth of the discourse. >Minimalism. ((s) Truth evaluability: this is about the question whether a truth value (true/false) can be attributed at all in some cases as e.g. moral judgments or assertions about the comical.) E.g. thesis: morality has no wide cosmological role. Wide cosmological role of content: we want to measure its reach for a discourse on the extent to which the provision of the various facts can potentially contribute to the explanation of all those things that have nothing or not directly something to do with our attitudes by which we conceive such facts as objects. I 248 Cosmological role: explanation of meaning/content not from our attitudes. >Meaning, >Content, >Conventions, >Language community. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Context/Context Dependence | Fraassen | I 90 Context-dependent/contextuality/Fraassen: a) meaning of theories is "explained". b) language of use of theories Definition external sentences/Quine: context-independent formulation of theories. >Theories, >Explanation, >Meaning. I 115 Context dependence/context-dependent/Fraassen: any theory of causation must explain what is discarded as unimportant. And this happens context-dependently. - This, in turn, is objective. So much context dependency must always be there. - Counterfactual Conditional: Problem: there is too much context-dependence. >Counterfactual conditionals. I 125 Cause/Fraassen: is context-dependent - dependent on description. - Many authors provide very different definitions - Lewis: cause is the factor that we control the least. Nagel: cause is the factor that we control the most. - (explanation-like). Relevance/Fraassen: is context-dependent. >Relevance. I 130 Contextuality/Fraassen: means that a factor is neither determined by the totality of accepted theories, nor by the event or the fact to be explained. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Context/Context Dependence | Hintikka | II 108 Context Dependency/context/compositionality/Frege principle/Hintikka: problem: context dependency violates the Frege principle. ((s) The meaning of a sentence can change then, although no component changes.) >Frege principle. Any/every/he/a/Hintikka: bad solution: it is not a good solution to analyze (16) (16) (Ex) George knows, that (w = x) as (20) John does not believe Mary likes him. Problem: (16) says that it is compatible with John's beliefs that Mary does not love one while (20) is compatible with the fact that John does not believe Mary likes him (John). This is then compatible with the fallacy of (17). (17) ~John believes, that (Ex)(x is a boy & Mary likes x) II 109 Any/context dependency/context/Hintikka: what we need is an explanation of how the interpretation of "any x" depends on the context. II 109 Frege principle/compositionality/Hintikka: if we proceed from the outside to the inside, we can allow that the Frege principle is violated (i.e. the semantic role of the constituents in the interior is context-dependent). II 110 HintikkaVsFrege/HintikkaVsCompositionality: thesis: meanings (meaning entities) should not be produced step by step from simpler ones in tandem with syntactic rules. They should instead be used as rules of semantic analysis. >Syntax, >Semantics. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Context/Context Dependence | Wittgenstein | Nozick II 220 Mental terms/context/Wittgenstein/philosophical examinations/Nozick: the application of mental concepts depends on what else is true, for example, in the case of understanding or reading - behavior does not imply (entails) the presence of a particular mental state. >Mental states. There could be another (wider) context which shows that the person was not in the nearby state. - Similarly the feeling of understanding produces no understanding, if it is not embedded into a wider context. >Understanding. --- Hintikka I 125 Context principle: Only the sentence has sense, only in the context of the sentence a name has a meaning. >Frege Principle. --- Wittgenstein II 400 Meaning/Wittgenstein: if one has given the term "an x in the infinite development" in a context a meaning, so one has not necessarily given it a meaning in all contexts. >Meaning. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Context/Context Dependence | Zittrain | I 229 Context/internet/free speech/Zittrain: Contextualization suggests that the aim of an informational system should be to allow those who are characterized within it to augment the picture provided by a single snippet with whatever information, explanation, or denial that they think I 230 helps frame what is portrayed. Civil libertarians have long suggested that the solution to bad speech is more speech while realizing the difficulties of linking the second round of speech to the first without infringing the rights of the first speaker.(1) […]There is also the worry that the fog of information generated by a free-for-all is no way to have people discern facts from lies. Generative networks invite us to find ways to reconcile these views. We can design protocols to privilege those who are featured or described online so that they can provide their own framing linked to their depictions. This may not accord with our pre-Web expectations: it may be useful for a private newspaper to provide a right of reply to its subjects, but such an entity would quickly invoke a First Amendment—style complaint of compelled speech if the law were to provide for routine rights of reply in any but the narrowest of circumstances.(2) And many of us might wish to discuss Holocaust deniers or racists without giving them a platform to even link to a reply. The Harvard Kennedy School’s Joseph Nye has suggested that a site like urban legend debunker snopes.com be instituted for reputation, a place that people would know to check to get the full story when they see something scandalous but decontextualized online.(3) >Misinformation, >Fake news, >Social media, >Social networks, >Internet, >Internet culture. 1. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND 207 (2004). 2. This kind of compelled speech would not be unprecedented. For much of the twentieth century, the FCC’s Fairness Doctrine forced broadcasters to air controversial public interest stories and provide opposing viewpoints on those issues. See Steve Rendall, The Fairness Doctrine: How We Lost It and Why We Need It Back, EXTRA!, Jan./Feb. 2005, http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2053. Under President Reagan, the FCC repealed this doctrine in 1987. Id. Despite this administrative change, the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the First Amendment to include the right not to speak in a line of compelled speech cases. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (holding that lawyers could not be forced to pay bar association fees to support political messages with which they disagreed); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ, 433 U.S. 915 (1977) (holding that teachers could not be forced to pay union fees to support political messages with which they disagreed). 3. Posting of Joseph Nye to The Huffington Post, Davos Day 3: Internet Privacy and Reputational Repair Sites, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-nye/davos-day-3-inter-net-pri_b_39750.html (Jan. 26, 2007, 18:14 EST). |
Zittrain I Jonathan Zittrain The Future of the Internet--And How to Stop It New Haven 2009 |
| Continuum Hypothesis | Hilbert | Berka I 295 Definition continuum hypothesis/Cantor/Berka: (Cantor 1884)(4): if an infinite set of real numbers is not countable, then it is equal to the set of real numbers R itself. The term "continuum hypothesis" emerged later. Goedel (1938)(1): Goedel proved the relative consistency in the continuity hypothesis. Independence/Cohen (1963(2), 64): Cohen proved that the negation of continuum hypothesis is also consistent with the axioms of set theory, that is, he proved the independence of the continuum hypothesis from the set theory(3). >Real numbers, >Sets, >Set theory, >Consistency, >Proofs, >Provability. 1. K. Goedel: The Consistency of the Axiom of Choice and of the Generalized Continuum-Hypothesis, in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 24. 2. P. Cohen: Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis, New York, Benjamin, 1963. 3. D. Hilbert, Mathematische Probleme, in: Ders. Gesammelte Abhandlungen (1935), Vol. III, pp. 290-329 (gekürzter Nachdruck v. pp. 299-301). 4. G. Cantor: Über unendliche lineare Punktmannigfaltigkeiten. (1872-1884) |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Contradictions | Field | II 100 Contradiction/Stalnaker: it is essential that logical falsehoods are absolutely impossible. - This is the condition that they can not be believed. >Logical truth, >Logical necessity, >Beliefs. Problem/FieldVsStalnaker: Then Cantor could not have established his (later proven to be contradictory) set theory. II 102 Cantor had not "split" belief states that had to be linked. - Rather, they all together explained his actions. >Explanation, >Behavior, >Belief states. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Control Processes | Carver | Corr I 427 Control Processes/Carver/Scheier: We address two layers of control processes, managing two different aspects of behaviour. The layers function to permit people to handle multiple tasks across time. More specifically, they help transform simultaneous motives into a stream of actions that shifts repeatedly from one goal to another. >Feedback/Carver/Scheier, >Self-regulation/Carver/Scheier, >Affect/Carver/Scheier. Corr I 430 [There is a] natural connection between affect and action; that is, if the input of the affect loop is a rate of progress in action, the output function of the affect loop must be a change in rate of that action. Thus, the affect loop has a direct influence on what occurs in the action loop. The idea of two layers of feedback systems functioning together turns out to be quite common in control engineering (e.g., Clark 1996)(1). Engineers have long recognized that having two systems–one controlling position, one controlling velocity–permits the device they control to respond in a way that is both quick and stable, without overshoots and oscillations. Psychology/Carver/Scheier: The combination of quickness and stability in responding is desirable in the kinds of devices engineers deal with, but it is also desirable in living beings. A person with very reactive emotions overreacts, and oscillates behaviourally. 1. Clark, R. N. 1996. Control system dynamics. New York: Cambridge University Press Charles S. Carver and Michael F. Scheier, “Self-regulation and controlling personality functioning” in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Control Processes | Scheier | Corr I 427 Control Processes/Carver/Scheier: We address two layers of control processes, managing two different aspects of behaviour. The layers function to permit people to handle multiple tasks across time. More specifically, they help transform simultaneous motives into a stream of actions that shifts repeatedly from one goal to another. >Feedback/Carver/Scheier, >Self-regulation/Carver/Scheier, >Affect/Carver/Scheier. Corr I 430 [There is a] natural connection between affect and action; that is, if the input of the affect loop is a rate of progress in action, the output function of the affect loop must be a change in rate of that action. Thus, the affect loop has a direct influence on what occurs in the action loop. The idea of two layers of feedback systems functioning together turns out to be quite common in control engineering (e.g., Clark 1996)(1). Engineers have long recognized that having two systems–one controlling position, one controlling velocity–permits the device they control to respond in a way that is both quick and stable, without overshoots and oscillations. Psychology/Carver/Scheier: The combination of quickness and stability in responding is desirable in the kinds of devices engineers deal with, but it is also desirable in living beings. A person with very reactive emotions overreacts, and oscillates behaviourally. 1. Clark, R. N. 1996. Control system dynamics. New York: Cambridge University Press Charles S. Carver and Michael F. Scheier, “Self-regulation and controlling personality functioning” in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Convention T | Davidson | Glüer II 37 Convention T/Davidson: says that a theory must be translating (translational). ((s) Problem: sentences like "snow is white" and "grass is green" are equivalent.) >Disquotation scheme. Glüer II 38 Convention T allows only extensional language. >Extensionality. II 22 Def " Convention T " /Tarski/Glüer: "A definition of "true" formulated in the metalanguage is factually correct if all the sentences that can be derived from the schema follow from it. S is true, just when p is obtained by inserting a name of any sentence in the object language for the symbol "S" and the translation of this sentence into the meta language for the symbol "p". The convention T tests whether a definition of truth for a language L correctly determines the extension of the predicate "true in L". Neither the convention T nor the "T-equivalences" may be confused with the definition of truth itself. >Truth definition. II 28 Def T-equivalence/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer : simply true exactly when the linked propositions have the same truth value under all circumstances. The right side does not have to be a translation of the left side. If, on the other hand, a translation would be required, then 1. the circumstances under which the W-equivalences are true are not arbitrary, and 2. the searched meaning would already be presupposed. Def Convention T*/new/Davidson/Glüer: A T-theory formulated in the meta language for an object language L is appropriate if all the sentences that can be derived from the schema (T) S is true gdw. p is obtained by using for the symbol "S" a designation of any proposition of the object language and for the symbol "p" a proposition of the meta language, which is true exactly when S is it. Glüer: here are equivalences, which are not required to translate the sentence on the right the sentence on the left, true iff. II 29 the linked sentences have the same truth value under all circumstances. DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: Whoever wants to apply Davidson's reinterpreted convention T* must therefore know when T equivalences are true. TarskiVsDavidson: with Tarski, you need to know the meaning of both object and meta-language sentences. ((s) To be able to judge whether there is a correct translation). T-predicate/Davidson/Glüer: for Davidson, on the other hand, the T predicate must be interpreted. Davidson/Glüer: thus presupposes a prior understanding of the concept of truth. Truth/Interpretation/Translation/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: a G-theory that fulfils the (new) convention G* can be read as an interpretation theory: it implies for each proposition S of the object language L a T-equivalence derived from its structure, the right side of which indicates the truth conditions under which S is true. >Truth predicate, >Object language, >Metalanguage. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Convention T | Putnam | I (b) 66 Truth/PutnamVsTarski: Tarski's convention T does not clarify the concepts of truth and reference, because it uses the concepts of the "designation" of a sentence and of "following from something". These are (too?) closely related to truth and reference. >Truth definition. PutnamVsSellars: his analysis of the designation is not helpful: "wheel" plays the role of "Rad" (German for "wheel") in English. This is not a description of the role, but the name of the role! --- II 89f Def Convention T/Tarski/Putnam: the requirement that all sentences from the language S are equivalent with the corresponding sentence of the metalanguage (MS). >Meta language, >Object language. Putnam: this only determines the extension of "true" when the connectives are interpreted classically and not intuitionistically. Intuitionistically it would be about "provable". Tarski: "electron refers" is equivalent to "there are electrons". Intuitionistically: there is a description D, so that "D is an electron" is provable in B1. That could be true with the appropriate theory, even if there are no electrons. Intuitionism: here, existence is intra-theoretical. >Intuitionism, >Tarski. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Conventions | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 192 Convention/Phenomenology/Physics/Language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the only conventionalism Wittgenstein allows refers to the choice between different phenomenological entities and this is based on the thesis that both phenomenological entities he mentions are secondary in relation to the physical objects. I 264 How do you know someone has a toothache when they hold their cheek? Here we have reached the end of our wisdom, i.e. we have reached the conventions. These "conventions" are exactly what Wittgenstein calls "criteria" in other parts of this discussion. They are the "hard rock" of the semantics of the term "toothache". "To use a word without justification does not mean to use it wrongly. Of course, I do not identify my feeling by criteria, but I use the same expression. I 303 Convention/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the name relationships are conventional, but the essence of the names is not. "In logic we do not express what we want, but the nature of natural signs expresses itself." The non-conventional element of language: "But if we transform all those signs (occurring in a sentence) into variables, there is still such a class. But this does not depend on any agreement, but only on the nature of the sentence. It corresponds to a logical form of a logical archetype." Symbol/Everyday Language/Convention/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in everyday language there are all kinds of senseless connections of symbols. In order to maintain the reflection concept, these must be excluded by conventional rules. The nature of our symbols alone does not eliminate them by itself. II 27 Learning/Wittgenstein: we learn/teach the language by using it. The language convention is communicated by combining the sentence and its verification. Def "Understanding"/Wittgenstein: means to be guided by language convention to the right expectation. II 35 Conventions/Wittgenstein: presuppose the applications of language - they say nothing about its applications. For example: that red differs from blue from red from chalk is verified formally, not experimentally. II 75 Convention/Wittgenstein: assessing belongs to (learning) history. And we are not interested in the story here if we are interested in the moves of the game. Learning, >Language Learning/Wittgenstein. II 181 Observation Concepts/Theory/Criterion/Wittgenstein: what is understood in a theory as the reason for a belief is a matter of convention. II 230 Arbitrary/Arbitrariness/Convention: Number systems are arbitrary - otherwise a different spelling would correspond to different facts. II 231 Of course you can give meaning to new sentences and symbols - that is why the conventions are arbitrary. II 238 Logic/Convention/Arbitrariness/Wittgenstein: the laws of logic, e.g. the sentences of the Excluded Third (SaD) and the Contradiction to be excluded (SvW) are arbitrary! To forbid this sentence means to adopt what may be a highly recommended system of expression. IV 26 Sentence/Tractatus: 3.317 the determination of the values is the variable. It is the specification of the sentence whose common characteristic is the variable. The fixing is a description of these sentences. The fixing will only deal with symbols, not their meaning. Convention: it is only essential that it does not say anything about what is described. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Convergence (Economics) | Feenstra | Feenstra I 10-30 Convergence/Feenstra: The convergence literature is not motivated by the endogenous growth models at all, but rather, by the exogenous growth model such as Solow (1956)(1) and extensions thereof. >Endogenous growth, >Exogenous growth, >Economic growth. In those models, all countries converge to the same steady-state growth rate, but this still allows for different levels of GDP per-capita (depending on characteristics of the countries). >Gross Domestic Product (GDP). So countries that are below their steady-state level of GDP per-capita should grow faster, and conversely, countries that are above their steady-state GDP per-capita should grow slower, so as to approach the steady state. Feenstra I 10-31 This property follows directly from the diminishing marginal product of capital. There is both convergence in growth rates, and some degree of convergence in GDP per-capita (though not necessarily to the same level across countries), and these two criterion tend to be used interchangably. The same is true for the papers dealing with trade, which examine either the impact on growth rates or on GDP per-capita across countries. >International trade. From the initial work of Barro (1991)(2) and Barro and Salai-i-Martin (1991(3), 1992(4)) the convergence hypothesis found strong empirical support. This was also demonstrated by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)(5), and led them to conclude that the original Solow model, suitably extended to allow for human capital, is “good enough” at explaining cross-country differences in growth rates: the endogenous growth models are apparently not needed! These findings have been questioned in subsequent work, however, that consider a broader range of countries. For example, Easterly and Levine (2000)(6) emphasize that there has been divergence in the absolute levels of income per-capita across countries: the rich have grown richer and some of the poorest countries have become even poorer.* A similar approach to assessing the effects of trade is taken by the authors cited above. Sachs and Warner (1995)(7) group their countries into two groups, one of which has an “open” trade regime and the other of which is judged to be “closed.” Within the open group, they find evidence of convergence, with the poorer countries growing faster, but this is not true for those countries with closed trade regimes. By this argument, openness leads to convergence of incomes across countries. Ben-David (1993(8), 1998(9)) does a grouping of countries based on their membership in regional trade agreements, or by the strength of their bilateral trade ties. Feenstra I 10-31 The finding that convergence occurs within groups, but not across groups, presents a challenge to the exogenous growth models. But this finding is in the spirit of the endogenous growth model without knowledge spillovers, discussed above, where the two countries converged to different growth rates. In a more general multi-country growth model that incorporates trade, Ventura (1997)(10) also finds this result. * Bernanke and Gürkaynak (2001)(11) also question the conclusions of Mankiw, Romer and Weil. 1. Solow, Robert M., 1956, “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70, 65-94. 2. Barro, Robert J., 1991, “Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 407-443. 3. Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Salai-i-Martin, 1991, “Convergence Across States and Regions,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 107-158. 4. Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Salai-i-Martin, 1992, “Convergence,” Journal of Political Economy, 100(2), 223-251. 5. Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer and David N. Weil, 1992, “A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2), 407-438. 6. Easterly, William and Ross Levine, 2000, “It Not Factor Accumulation: Stylized Facts and Growth Models,” World Bank and University of Minnesota, manuscript. 7. Sachs, Jeffrey and Andrew Warner, 1995, “Economic Reform and the Precess of Global Integration,” Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1-118. 8. Ben-David, Dan, 1993, “Trade Liberalization and Income Convergence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3), August, 653-679. 9. Ben-David, Dan, 1998, “Convergence Clubs and Subsistence Economies,” Journal of Development Economics, 55(1), February, 155-171. 10. Ventura, Jaume, 1997, “Growth and Interdependence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(1), February, 57-84. 11. Bernanke, Ben S. and Refet S. Gürkaynak, 2001, “Is Growth Exogenous? Taking Mankiw, Romer and Weil Seriously,” in Ben S. Bernanke and Kenneth Rogoff, eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 2001. Cambridge: MIT Press, 11-57. |
Feenstra I Robert C. Feenstra Advanced International Trade University of California, Davis and National Bureau of Economic Research 2002 |
| Cooperation | Sherif | Haslam I 156 Competition/cooperation/Sherif: The evidence from the Boys’ Camp studies (>Robbers Cave Experiment/Sherif, Sherif et al. 1969(1)) clearly shows that competition leads to increased intergroup discrimination, and that cooperation towards superordinate goals leads to a reduction in intergroup discrimination. Nevertheless, Sherif and his colleagues report much anecdotal evidence to suggest (a) that the boys showed ingroup favouring attitudes before the formal introduction of competition (see Sherif, 1966(2): 80; Sherif and Sherif, 1969(1): 239); and (b) that, although cooperation towards superordinate goals reduced ingroup favouritism, it did not eradicate it completely. VsSherif: This means that other social-psychological processes are clearly at play, ones that Sherif and his colleagues failed to address directly. 1. Sherif, M. and Sherif, C.W. (1969) Social Psychology. New York: Harper & Row. 2. Sherif, M. (1966) In Common Predicament: Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. Michael W. Platow and John A. Hunter, „ Intergroup Relations and Conflicts. Revisiting Sherif’s Boys’ Camp studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Class studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Coordination | Austrian School | Parisi I 276 Coordination/Hayek/Austrian School: The fundamental meaning of coordination is simply the mutual compatibility of plans. This requires two things. First, each individual must base his plans on the correct expectation of what other individuals intend to do. Second, all individuals base their expectations on the same set of external events (Rizzo, 1990(1), p. 17). >Planning. In this basic meaning, the existing dissemination of knowledge has led to a state of affairs where each party is able to implement her plans. All offers to buy are accepted by sellers. All offers to sell are accepted by buyers. This is to be distinguished from the process of coordination whereby, through trial and error learning and entrepreneurial discovery, agents are able to make their plans compatible or more nearly compatible with those of others. >Compatibility. Coordination is analytically different from, though not incompatible with, the concept of optimality. Pareto optimality implies that individuals exhaust all the potential gains from trade. This is a special case of coordination.9 However, there can be coordination, or the execution of mutually compatible plans, which do not exhaust all potential gains from trade, when “ … these plans are mutually compatible and that there is consequently a conceivable set of external events, which will allow all people to carry out their plans and not cause any disappointments” (Hayek, 1937(2), p. 39). A state of mutually compatible plans “represents in one sense a position of equilibrium, it is however clear that it is not an equilibrium in the special sense in which equilibrium is regarded as a sort of optimum position” (Hayek, 1937(2), p. 51). >Pareto Optimum. Everyone within a system may have mutually compatible plans and yet there may be better trading opportunities out there so that at least some parties can improve their positions by alternative trades. Thus if there is a sense in which the mutual compatibility of plans is an optimum, it is only a local optimum, that is, between the direct parties to an exchange. 1. Rizzo, M. J. (1990). “Hayek’s Four Tendencies Toward Equilibrium.” Cultural Dynamics 3(1): 12–31. 2. Hayek, F. A. (1937). “Economics and Knowledge.” Economica 4(13): 33–54. Rajagopalan, Shruti and Mario J. Rizzo “Austrian Perspectives on Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Coordination | Carbonara | Parisi I 470 Coordination/social norms/Carbonara: The essence of a coordination problem is selecting among multiple equilibriums. When a coordination problem is solved for the first time, a social norm emerges. When people change the coordination equilibrium, a social norm changes. >Equilibrium. (…) individuals will conform to a coordination equilibrium if they believe that others will conform. Thus creating or changing a coordination equilibrium requires making enough people believe that others will conform to the new social norm. Parisi I 474 The expressive power of the law plays a major role in situations characterized by coordination problems (McAdams, 2000a)(1). >Laws/Carbonara, >Law/Carbonara. For instance, by stating that drivers should keep to the right, the law creates a “focal point,” solving a coordination problem. Moreover, laws legitimized by a democratic voting process are usually positively correlated with “popular attitudes” (McAdams, 2000b)(2) and thus provide a signal of those attitudes, helping individuals to form beliefs about what others will think of their behavior. Given that people normally care about being approved or disapproved by others, the law can influence behavior even without a legal sanction. 1. McAdams, Richard H. (2000a). “A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law.” Virginia Law Review 86: 1649–1729. 2. McAdams, Richard H. (2000b). “An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law.” Virginia Law Review 79: 339–390. Emanuela Carbonara. “Law and Social Norms”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Coordination | Hayek | Parisi I 276 Coordination/Hayek/Austrian School: The fundamental meaning of coordination is simply the mutual compatibility of plans. This requires two things. First, each individual must base his plans on the correct expectation of what other individuals intend to do. Second, all individuals base their expectations on the same set of external events (Rizzo, 1990(1), p. 17). >Planning. In this basic meaning, the existing dissemination of knowledge has led to a state of affairs where each party is able to implement her plans. All offers to buy are accepted by sellers. All offers to sell are accepted by buyers. This is to be distinguished from the process of coordination whereby, through trial and error learning and entrepreneurial discovery, agents are able to make their plans compatible or more nearly compatible with those of others. >Compatibility. Coordination is analytically different from, though not incompatible with, the concept of optimality. Pareto optimality implies that individuals exhaust all the potential gains from trade. This is a special case of coordination.9 However, there can be coordination, or the execution of mutually compatible plans, which do not exhaust all potential gains from trade, when “ … these plans are mutually compatible and that there is consequently a conceivable set of external events, which will allow all people to carry out their plans and not cause any disappointments” (Hayek, 1937(2), p. 39). A state of mutually compatible plans “represents in one sense a position of equilibrium, it is however clear that it is not an equilibrium in the special sense in which equilibrium is regarded as a sort of optimum position” (Hayek, 1937(2), p. 51). >Pareto Optimum. Everyone within a system may have mutually compatible plans and yet there may be better trading opportunities out there so that at least some parties can improve their positions by alternative trades. Thus if there is a sense in which the mutual compatibility of plans is an optimum, it is only a local optimum, that is, between the direct parties to an exchange. Parisi I 281 Coordination/Hayek: Hayek argued that common law is an order where the legal rules facilitate the “order of actions” for individuals in a society. The “order of actions” is essentially the coordination of plans of economic actors (Hayek, 1973(3), p. 113). The emphasis is not on the “order of the law” but on the “order of actions” in society constrained by such laws. Therefore, the question is not whether a particular law is “socially optimal” and leads to wealth maximization. The question is not even whether the various laws form a socially optimal system. The important question is whether the system of legal rules facilitates greater coordination in society by enhancing expectational certainty. When the law succeeds in enhancing the order of actions, it is “praxeologically coherent.” On the other hand, other approaches to legal analysis emphasize the “logical coherence” of the law. Prominent among these is the idea that common law areas (property, contract, and tort) can be understood in a unified way as the expression of social wealth maximization. Posner made a bold claim in the first edition of the Economic Analysis of Law (1973)(4), that common law rules are “efficient,” that is, wealth-maximizing. >Efficiency/Posner. 1. Rizzo, M. J. (1990). “Hayek’s Four Tendencies Toward Equilibrium.” Cultural Dynamics 3(1): 12–31. 2. Hayek, F. A. (1937). “Economics and Knowledge.” Economica 4(13): 33–54. 3. Hayek, F. A. (1973). Law Legislation and Liberty, Vol. I, Rules and Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 4. Posner, Richard (1972). Economic Analysis of Law. Boston, MA: Little, Brown. Rajagopalan, Shruti and Mario J. Rizzo “Austrian Perspectives on Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Hayek I Friedrich A. Hayek The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 2) Chicago 2007 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Coordination | Rizzo | Parisi I 280 Coordination/Rizzo: The most important factor that enhances the predictability of law, even as it changes and adapts to new circumstances, is the nature of the process involved. To see this we must distinguish between two forms of coherence in the law. Rizzo (1999)(1) differentiates logical coherence of the law from the praxeological coherence, or the coordination, which arises from the law. For Rizzo, and the Austrian approach more generally, it is praxeological coherence, or coordination in society, which is at the forefront of analysis. The logical consistency of laws is neither necessary nor sufficient for such coordination. >Law, >Coordination/Hayek. 1. Rizzo, M. J. (1999). “Which Kind of Legal Order? Logical Coherence and Praxeological Coherence.” Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 9(4): 497–510. Rajagopalan, Shruti and Mario J. Rizzo “Austrian Perspectives on Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Copula | Quine | I 175 The general term is a predicate. It can take on the position of the adjective or the verb just as well as that of a noun. One could even regard the verb as a basic form, because it gets along without "is". ((s) But not "wisdom socratized", see >Things/Strawson, >Names/Strawson). The copula "is" can therefore simply be explained as a prefix. I 211 Copula/Quine: the combination "is a", which we have treated as a copula, can now be treated as particles to form an indefinite singular term: Composition of "is" and "a". E.g. "Agnes is a lamb" is then no longer seen as "Fa" but as "a=b", whereby "b" stands for an indefinite singular term of the form "an F". "Agnes bleats" and "Agnes is docile" retain the form "Fa" and the "is" retains here the status of a copula for the conversion of adjectives into verbs. But the "is" in "is a lamb" becomes "=". The equation "x = a" is now actually analyzed as a predication "x = a", whereby "=a" forms the verb. The "F" of "Fx". What used to mean "x = Socrates" is still called the same now in words but now the "=" or "is" copula as in "is mortal" or "is a human" merely serves to give the verb form to the general term and adapts it to the predicative position. Socrates becomes a general term that applies exactly to an object, but is general in that from now on it is grammatically permitted for the predicative position, but not for positions that are suitable for variables; "Socrates" then plays the role of "F" in "Fa" and no longer that of "a". II 204 Copula: Plural "excl" ("none are"). These are not singular (two-digit general terms which connect pairs of classes). XIII 36 Copula/is/Quine: Example: avoidance of "is": "You green in winter". Color word/Color words/Sentence construction/Word order/Predicate/Japanese/Quine: in Japanese color words are always placed at the beginning. N.B.: this means that Japanese color words coincide in form and grammatical behavior with the multitude of Japanese words that we call verbs when we translate Japanese. (see above: example "greenest"). XIII 37 Adjective/Quine: even in English they do not differ from intransitive verbs, but we use them attributively, e.g. green tree. ((s) instead of "The tree is green"). Semitic languages/Quine: allow forms like "you green in winter": i.e. the predicate stands as a verb without the help of a copula. Copula/Quine: is often used to structure sentence parts clearly. Example: telegram: "How old Gary Grant - Old Gary Grant very well - how you? The copula then serves to distinguish "how old is" from "how is old". Predicative/attributive/predicate/attribute/Quine: the adjective is predicative here, in the other case attributive. In other languages this may be distinguished by the word forms or the sentence order. Predication/Copula/Quine: the "is" of predication has a converse: the ing-form: one transforms adjectives into verbs, the other vice versa. Example "you are reading" to "you read". >Predication/Quine; cf. >Equal sign. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Copula | Strawson | I 214 Connective/Relation/Strawson: a) stating connective: (s) is a... b) stated connective: is in relation to..., is an example of... Double-digit expressions are not designations of relations themselves! >Relation. Predicable relations between things not relations themselves. I 215 a) Species universals: provides classification principle, does not presuppose one - E.g. generic name. b) characterizing universals (ch. u.): e.g. verbs, adjectives: provide class. principle only for previously sorted particulars. But also particulars themselves provide the principle of summary: e.g. Socrates as well as wisdom. ->attributive tie: (non-relational connection between particulars of various types). I 216 Example of the characterizing tie between Socrates and the universal dying corresponds to the attributive tie between Socrates and his death. I 216 1) Species or Sample tie/Strawson: a) Fido is a dog, an animal, a terrier - b) Fido, Coco and Rover are dogs. 2) characterizing tie: e.g. Socrates is wise, is lively, argues - b) Socrates, Plato, Aristotle are all wise, all of them die. 3) attributive tie: grouping of particulars because of the characterizing tie. E.g. smiling, praying. Each is a symmetrical form: x is a characterizing tie to y - asymmetrical: x is characterized by y. - Then y dependent member. I 219 Categorical criterion of the subject-predicate distinction: x is asserted to be bound non-relationallly to y i.e. universals of particulars can be predicted, but not by particulars of universals. But even universals can be predicated by universals. >Universals/Strawson. I 221 New/Strawson: distinction between object types instead of word types. I 227f Connective/Bond/Strawson: Special case: between particulars: e.g. the catch which eliminated Compton was made by Carr. Solution: regard is carried out, etc. as quasi-universal. Only quasi-universal: because action and execution of the action are not different. I 229 Nevertheless: a simplification like Compton was eliminated by Carr has a different weighting. Point: we have transferred the role of the subject of a predication to theobjects. >Predication. This is a new criterion as a bridge between the two others. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Copyright | Benkler | Benkler I 439 Copyright/rights/Benkler: The first domain in which we have seen a systematic preference for commercial producers that rely on property over commons-based producers is in copyright. This preference arises from a combination of expansive interpretations of what rights include, a niggardly interpretive attitude toward users’ privileges, especially fair use, and increased criminalization. 1. Jessica Litman early diagnosed an emerging new “right to read.”(1) The basic right of copyright, to control copying, was never seen to include the right to control who reads an existing copy, when, and how I 440 many times. Once a user bought a copy, he or she could read it many times, lend it to a friend, or leave it on the park bench or in the library for anyone else to read. This provided a coarse valve to limit the deadweight loss associated with appropriating a public good like information. As a happenstance of computer technology, reading on a screen involves making a temporary copy of a file onto the temporary memory of the computer. Owners should have the right to control all valuable uses of their works. Combined with the possibility and existence of technical controls on actual use and the DMCA’s prohibition on circumventing those controls, this means that copyright law has shifted. It has now become a law that gives rights holders the exclusive rights to control any computer-mediated use of their works, and captures in its regulatory scope all uses that were excluded from control in prior media. 2. Fair use in copyright was always a judicially created concept with a large degree of uncertainty in its application. (…) it is important to recognize that the theoretical availability of the fair-use doctrine does not, as a practical matter, help most productions. This is due to a combination of two factors: (1) fair-use doctrine is highly fact specific and uncertain in application, and (2) the Copyright Act provides I 441 large fixed statutory damages, even if there is no actual damage to the copyright owner. (…) in the past few years, even this uncertain scope has been constricted by expanding the definitions of what counts as interference with a market and what counts as a commercial use. 3. Copyright enforcement has also been substantially criminalized in the past few years. Beginning with the No Electronic Theft Act I 442 (NET Act) in 1997 and later incorporated into the DMCA, criminal copyright has recently become much more expansive than it was until a few years ago. As criminal copyright law is currently written, many of the tens of millions using p2p [peer-to-peer] networks are felons. It is one thing when the recording industry labels tens of millions of individuals in a society “pirates” in a rhetorical effort to conform social norms to its members’ business model. It is quite another when the state brands them felons and fines or imprisons them. Litman has offered the most plausible explanation of this phenomenon.(2) As the network makes low-cost production and exchange of information and culture easier, the large-scale commercial producers are faced with a new source of competition- volunteers, people who provide information and culture for free. As the universe of people who can threaten the industry has grown to encompass more or less the entire universe of potential customers, the plausibility of using civil actions to force individuals to buy rather than share information goods decreases. Suing all of one’s intended customers is not a sustainable business model. In the interest of maintaining the business model that relies on control over information goods and their sale as products, the copyright industry has instead enlisted criminal enforcement by the state to prevent the emergence of such a system of free exchange. 4. The change in copyright law that received the most widespread public attention was the extension of copyright term in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998. I 443 The inordinately long term of protection in the United States, initially passed under the pretext of “harmonizing” the length of protection in the United States and in Europe, is now being used as an excuse to “harmonize” the length of protection for various kinds of materials—like sound recordings—that actually have shorter terms of protection in Europe or other countries, like Australia. 5. A narrower, but revealing change is the recent elimination of digital sampling from the universe of ex ante permissible actions, even when all that is taken is a tiny snippet. The court (…) held that any digital sampling, no matter how trivial, could be the basis of a copyright suit. Such a bright-line rule that makes all direct copying of digital bits, no matter how small, an infringement, makes digital sound recordings legally unavailable for noncommercial, individually creative mixing. >Copyright/Zittrain, >Digital Millennium Copyright Act/DMCA/Benkler. 1. Jessica Litman, “The Exclusive Right to Read,” Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 13 (1994): 29. 2. Jessica Litman, “Electronic Commerce and Free Speech,” Journal of Ethics and Information Technology 1 (1999): 213. |
Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007 |
| Corporate Law | Economic Theories | Parisi I 50 Corporate Law/Economic theories/Gelbach/Klick: One area of law and economics where empirical work has been slow to adopt the modern quasi-experimental approach is corporate law and economics. In this area, the standard approach to empirical inquiry involves the use of event studies to deduce the effect of various public policies or internal corporate governance mechanisms on firm value.* Event studies/model: Event studies in this literature generally follow a fairly simple recipe. A researcher identifies the timing of the event of interest and assumes that the effect of this event will be capitalized into the value of the asset in question, Parisi I 51 appealing to the assumption of semi-strong market efficiency. The researcher then estimates a time series model of the asset’s returns based upon the historical relationship between the asset’s returns and other covariates, usually including some proxy for the market return. Based upon this model, the researcher predicts the asset’s return at the time of the event. The researcher then calculates the excess return for the event date, which is the difference between the actual return at the time of the event and the predicted counterfactual return. This excess return is then standardized to account for the volatility of the asset (i.e., the excess return is normalized by dividing by some measure of volatility of the asset’s return such as the standard deviation of non-event day excess returns), and statistical inferences are made. (see Bhaghat and Romano 2002)(3), (see Gelbach, Helland, and Klick, 2013)(4). Event studies: Expressed this way, it is easy to see that event studies are functionally equivalent to estimating a simple before-and-after time series model with no comparison group. Manne’s hypothesis/hostile takeover: It has also been used by Jonathan Klick and Robert Sitkoff to study Henry Manne’s market-for-corporate-control hypothesis (Klick and Sitkoff, 2008)(5). This hypothesis states that for publicly held firms, the possibility of a hostile takeover will discipline a firm’s managers, forcing them to maximize firm value even if the firm’s board is less than perfect in its monitoring. Klick and Sitkoff exploit the political economy dynamics that surrounded an attempt to sell the controlling interest in the Hershey Company in 2002. Parisi I 52 Results from Klick and Sitkoff’s study offer credible support for the Manne hypothesis, even though they amount to standard before-and-after analysis, because the events in question did not appear to be confounded by any other systematic changes. Literature: As Vladimir Atanasov and Bernard Black discuss in a recent literature review, it is rare for empirical research in corporate finance, including research done by law and economics scholars, to focus on the kinds of natural experiments (...). (Atanasov and Black, 2014)(6). >Economic models/Gelbach/Klick. Comparison: While comparison groups are sometimes used indirectly for so-called falsification tests, or as general control variables, it is rare that they are used to generate difference in differences estimates. One notable exception is provided by Michael Greenstone, Paul Oyer, and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen (2006)(7), who re-examine the issue of mandatory disclosure that had previously been studied at least as far back as George Stigler’s famous 1964 study (Stigler, 1964)(8). Contrary to findings in much of the previous literature that had not employed counterfactual comparison groups, these authors found that mandatory disclosure had significant effects on the returns of the affected firms. * Fama et al. (1969)(1) is often credited as the first event study. However, as noted by Newhard (2014), Armen Alchian had performed one in 1954 while he was working at Rand to deduce the fusion fuel being used in the newly developed hydrogen bomb using stock prices of firms providing the candidate fuels. This paper was never published since it was deemed a threat to national security. 1. Fama, Eugene, Lawrence Fisher, Michael C. Jensen, and Richard Roll (1969). “The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information.” International Economic Review 10(1): 1–21. 2. Newhard, Joseph Michael (2014). “The Stock Market Speaks: How Dr. Alchian Learned to Build the Bomb.” Journal of Corporate Finance 27: 116–132. 3. Bhagat, Sanjai and Robert Romano (2002). “Event Studies and the Law: Part I: Technique and Corporate Litigation.” American Law and Economics Review 4(1): 141–168. 4. Gelbach, Jonah, Eric Helland, and Jonathan Klick (2013). “Valid Inference in Single-Firm Single-Event Studies.” American Law and Economics Review 15(2): 495–541. 5. Klick, Jonathan and Robert Sitkoff (2008). “Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey’s Kiss-Off.” Columbia Law Review 108(4): 749–838. 6. Atanasov, Vladimir and Bernard Black (2014). “Shock-Based Causal Inference in Corporate Finance Research.” Northwestern Law and Economics Research Paper 11-08. 7. Greenstone, Michael, Paul Oyer, and Annette Vissing-Jorgenson (2006). “Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(2): 399–460. 8. Stigler, George J. (1964). “Public Regulation of the Securities Markets.” Journal of Business 37(2): 117–142. Gelbach, Jonah B. and Jonathan Klick „Empirical Law and Economics“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Corporations | Rothbard | Rothbard III 642 Corporations/Rothbard: What happens when a partnership or corporation is formed? Individuals agree to pool their assets into a central management, this central direction to set the policies for the owners and to allocate the monetary gains among them. In both cases, the pooling, lines of authority, and allocation of monetary gain take Place according to rules agreed upon by all from the beginning. There is therefore no essential difference between a cartel and an ordinary corporation or partnership. It might be objected that the ordinary corporation or partnership covers only one firm, while the cartel includes an entire "industry" (i.e., all firms producing a certain product). But such a distinction does not necessarily hold. Various firms may refuse to enter a cartel, while, on the other hand, a Single firm may well be a "monopolist" in the sale of its particular unique product, and therefore it may also encompass an entire "industry." The correspondence between a co-operative partnership or corporation - not generally considered reprehensible - and a cartel is further enhanced when we consider the case of a merger of various firms. Mergers have been denounced as "monopolistic," but not nearly as vehemently as have cartels. >Mergers/Rothbard, >Cartels/Rothbard, >Cartels/Mises, >Monopolies/Rothbard. Rothbard III 644 Merger/cartel/Rothbard: Yet an industry-wide merger is, in effect, a permanent cartel, a permanent combination and fusion. On the other hand, a cartel that maintains by voluntary agreement the separate identity of each firm is by nature a highly transitory and ephemeral arrangement and (…) generally tends to break up on the market. In fact, in many cases, a cartel can be considered as simply a tentative step in the direction of permanent merger. And a merger and the original formation of a corporation do not (…) essentially differ. The former is an adaptation of the size and number of firms in an industry to new conditions or is the correction of a previous error in forecasting. The latter is a de novo attempt to adapt to present and future market conditions. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Corporations | Tabellini | Mokyr I 25 Corporations/Mokyr/Tabellini: The evolution of corporations from informal voluntary associations to corporate organizations with specific legal features was important for several reasons. First, this evolution clarified that the corporation was a separate legal entity, distinct from its members. By implication, corporations acquired a permanent status, unlike the transient status of individual members. Guilds, universities and other associations were meant to last generations. This can be inferred from membership rules, that spelled out how to arrange successions within the organization and sometimes even allowed for inheritance clauses. It can also be inferred from the high observed survival rates of corporations for several centuries and well into the eighteenth century (De Moor 2008(1), p. 196). Second, thanks to the legal revolution, corporations became the holders of specific rights and responsibilities. This enabled them to enter into long term contracts, to sue and be sued, to issue debt that was an exclusive liability of the corporation and not of its administrators nor of its members, and to engage in a variety of contractual arrangements that enabled corporate organizations to fulfill new and important economic roles. Corporations were not responsible for the liabilities of its members or vice versa. >Rule of law/Mokyr/Tabellini. 1.De Moor, Tine. 2008. “The Silent Revolution: A New Perspective on The Emergence of Commons, Guilds, and Other Forms of Corporate Collective Action in Western Europe". International Review of Social History, Vol. 53, No. S16, pp. 179-212. |
EconTabell I Guido Tabellini Torsten Persson The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Mokyr I Joel Mokyr Guido Tabellini Social Organizations and Political Institutions: Why China and Europe Diverged CESifo Working Paper No. 10405 Munich May 2023 |
| Correctness | Plato | Gadamer I 350 Correctness/Truth/Formalism/Sophistry/Plato/Gadamer: [Plato has] clearly seen (...) that there is no criterion that is sufficient for argumentation, by which truly philosophical use of speech can be distinguished from sophistic use. In particular, he shows in Letter 7 that the formal refutability of a thesis does not necessarily exclude its truth.(1) Cf. >Reflection/Gadamer, >Reflection/Hegel, >Sophists/Plato. Gadamer I 412 Correctness/Word/Language/Thinking/Plato/Gadamer: If one (...) sees (...) the dispute about the "correctness of names" as it is settled by "Cratylos"(2-4), then the theories under discussion there (>Word/Plato, >Names/Plato, >Language/Plato) suddenly gain an interest that goes beyond Plato and his own intention. For both theories, which the Platonic Socrates brings to failure, are not weighed in their full truth weight. A. Conventionalist theory attributes that of words to a naming, a baptism of things in a name, as it were. ((s) Cf. today's >Causal theory of names.) For this theory, the name apparently does not claim any objective knowledge - and now Socrates convicts the advocate of this sober view by allowing him or her, from the difference between the true and the false Logos, to admit the components of the Logos, the words (onomata), as true or false, and also the naming as a part of speaking to refer to the discovery of being (ousia) happening in speaking(4). Gadamer I 413 This is such an assertion that is so incompatible with the conventionalist thesis that it is easy to infer from there, conversely, that the true name and the correct naming is decisive. Socrates himself admits that the understanding of the name thus obtained leads to an etymological intoxication and to the most absurd consequences (...). B. Similarity Theory: (...) its discussion [adheres] entirely within the preconditions of "natural theory", namely to the principle of similarity, and resolves the same only by gradual restriction. For if the "correctness" of names should really be based on the correct, i.e. appropriate, naming of things, even then, as with every such measurement, there are still degrees and gradations of correctness. Now, if only that little bit of rightness still reflects the outline (typos) of the thing in itself, it may be good enough to be useful.(6) But you have to be even more far-reaching. A word can also be understood, obviously out of habit and agreement, if it contains sounds that are not at all similar to the thing - so that the whole principle of similarity is shaken and refuted by examples such as the words for numbers. There, no similarity can be allowed at all, because numbers do not belong to the visible and moving world, so that for them the principle of agreement obviously applies alone. Solution/Plato: The convention, which is presented in practical language and which alone determines the correctness of the words, may make use of the principle of similarity wherever possible, but it is not bound by it.(7) Recognition/Language/Words/Plato: This is a very moderate point of view, but it includes the fundamental premise that words have no real cognitive meaning - a result that points beyond the whole sphere of words and the question of their correctness to the recognition of the matter. Gadamer: This is obviously what Plato alone is concerned with. Gadamer I 414 The handling of the matter at issue here is the revelation of the thing meant. The word is correct when it brings the thing to the point of representation, that is, when it is a representation (mimesis). Now, it is certainly not an imitative representation in the sense of a direct depiction, so that the phonetic or visible appearance would be depicted, but it is the being (ousia), that which is appreciated by the designation to be (einai), which is to be made manifest by the word. Gadamer: But the question is whether the terms used in the conversation, the terms of mimema or deloma understood as mimema, are correct. It is certainly in the nature of mimema that something other than what it represents itself is also represented in it. Mere imitation, "to be like", therefore always contains the possibility for reflection on the distance of being between imitation and model. Neither true nor false/Cratylos: [Cratylos] is quite right when he says that as far as a word is a word, it must be "right", a correctly "lying" (here: to lie down) one. If it is not, that is, if it has no meaning, then it is a mere sounding ore(8). There is really no point in speaking of "wrong" in such a case. ((s) Cf. >Truth value gap). 1. This is the meaning of the difficult exposition of 343 c d, for which the deniers of the authenticity of the 7th letter must accept a second, nameless Plato. (Cf. my detailed presentation "Dialectic and Sophism" in the VII Platonic Letter (vol. 6 of the Ges. Werke, pp. 90-115).21. Krat. 384 d. 3. Krat. 388 c. 4. Krat. 438 d-439 b. 5. Krat. 385 b, 387 c. 6. Krat. 432 a ff. 7. Krat. 434 e. 8. Krat. 429 loc, 430 a. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Correlation | Schurz | I 126 Correlation: is qualitative. Covariance: is the corresponding quantitative measure of correlation. Covariance between characteristics: Cov (A,K) = p(A u K) - p(K) times p(A). Covariance is numerically symmetric, i.e., Cov (A,K) = Cov(K,A). Correlation measure: on the other hand, is only qualitatively symmetric, i.e., Corr (A,K) > (<) 0, iff. Corr (K,A) > (<) 0. I 126 The correlation measure is usually not determined for individual characteristics but for the variables as a whole. Recently: Def Effect Strength/Statistics/Schurz: is a statistical correlation measure defined for individual characteristics. It assumes a binary antecedent variable A, ~A, and an arbitrarily scaled consequence characteristic, and is defined as the difference between the K mean in the A population and in the total population, divided by the K dispersion. Scale invariance: because effect size is scale-independent, it is popular in meta-analyses. Cf. >Covariance. I 146 Correlation/causality/statistics/Schurz: from high correlation one cannot conclude the existence of causality and also not the direction, if causality should be given. Correlation: is symmetrical, causality: asymmetrical. Hidden variables: that correlation exists without causality may be due to hidden variables. Ex. common cause. >Hidden variables. VsHume/(s): this one had temporal sequence assumed as condition or criterion of even substitute for causality). Ex Barometer: but its case is always temporally prior to the storm, without ever being the cause. Solution: common cause. >Causality, >Cause, >Causal relation, >Causal explanation. I 147 Common cause/correlation/Reichenbach/Schurz: solution: if the correlation of A and B is due to the common cause C, then the correlation A B must disappear with the values of the variable C held fixed. ("screening"). I 148 Shielding: direct causes shield indirect ones. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Correspondence Theory | Berkeley | I 223 Correspondence theory/Berkeley: problem: if everything is imagination, what should then match? - Solution/Berkeley: 1) coexistence of ideas - 2) agreement on the relations - 3) inclusion. >Imagination, >Reality, >World, cf. >Coherence theory. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
| Correspondence Theory | Davidson | Rorty I 328 Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: for Davidson it is a relation without ontological preferences, it can connect any words with any object. Nature prefers no mode of presentation. (VsAnthropic Principle). Rorty VI 134 Correspondence: does not add anything enlightening to the simple concept of being true. Perhaps we should rather say "mostly true" and admit that people have different views on questions of detail. Match/Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: does not add anything intelligible to the concept of "being true". Horwich I 497 DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/VsCausal Theory of Reference/DavidsonVsKripke: if, conversely, reference was fixed by a physical relation, the correspondence between the two correspondences would need an explanation - because according to causal theory it would be possible that we often refer to things that we cannot reliably report - then it would be an empirical ((s) contingent) fact that our beliefs are mostly true. >Beliefs/Davidson. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Correspondence Theory | Frege | Husted V 104 FregeVsCorrespondence Theory: the meaning of an expression which is not a sentence must be explained starting with its contribution to the determination of the meaning. V 104 FregeVsCorrespondence Theory: the expression is a contribution, not the object of the sentence. > Compositionality. V 105 FregeVsCorrespondence Theory: any attempt to define truth is a headless undertaking. If truth of a sentence were ownership of this or that property, then you would have to decide your own truth by deciding the truth of another sentence! (Regress). >Regress. Dummett I 24 Dummett/Frege: Context PrincipleVsCorrespondence Theory - Context PrincipleVsCoherence Theory: The meaning is not predefined. The representatives of the coherence theory ask incorrectly about the proposition instead of the sentence. >Coherence, >Context, >Proposition, >Sentence. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Correspondence Theory | Quine | II 56 DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: No thing makes sentences true (> truthmakers). Quine: stimuli do not make it true, but lead to beliefs. II 85 Science maintains a certain claim to a correspondence theory of truth, thanks to the connection with observation sentences; ethics, on the other hand, obviously has a theory of coherence. VI 112 Proposition/Actuality/Correspondence/Quine: a more cultivated theory postulates facts to which true sentences should then correspond as a whole. VI 113 But: QuineVsCorrespondence Theory: for an explanation of the world, objects are needed in abundance, abstract as well as concrete, but apart from such a false foundation of a correspondence theory, facts do not contribute the least. We can simply delete "it is a fact that" from our sentences. ((s) > Facts/Geach). VI 115 Correspondence Theory/Quine: as the theory of >semantic ascent already suggests, the truth predicate ("is true") is a link between words and the world. X 18 Sentence Meaning/Quine: is apparently identical to facts: e.g. that snow is white. Both have the same name: that snow is white. That sounds like the correspondence theory, but as such it is empty talk. QuineVsCorrespondence Theory: the correspondence exists only between the two intangible elements to which we have referred to as intermediaries between the English sentence and the white snow: Meaning and fact. VsQuine: one could object, that this takes the links (meaning and fact) too literally. X 19 If one speaks of meaning as a factor of truth in the sentence, one can say that the English sentence "Snow is white" would have been wrong if, for example, the word "white" had been applied to green things in English. And the reference to a fact is just a saying. Quine: this is good as long as we do not have to assume propositions. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Correspondence Theory | Rorty | I 255 Conformance/correspondence/Ryle: instead simply: he sees it. FodorVs: recognition is more complex and abstract, because surprisingly independent of differences. >Recognition, >Similarity, >Identification. I 363 Correspondence: can also mean something like relationship in general, does not have to be congruent. >Correspondence. Objective: ambiguous: a) conception that everyone would reach b) things as they really are. >Intersubjectivity, >Reality, >Objectivity, >Subjectivity. II (e) 102ff PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: the correspondence theory must be abandoned if one wants to recognize a language as privileged for representation. Otherwise, there would be no distinction between intellect and imagination, between clear and confused ideas. >Correspondence theory/Austin, >Correspondence theory/Strawson, >Correspondence theory/Ayer, >Correspondence. II (f) 126 RortyVsCorrespondence theory: misleading: it could be judged on the basis of non-words, which words are appropriate for the world. >Language use. VI 28 Conformance/correspondence/absolute/RortyVsIdealism: accordance with the absolute - with this he robbed the term of its actual core. VI 125 Correspondence Theory/Rorty: this phrase only says that the correspondence theorist needs criteria for the appropriateness of vocabularies. He needs the notion that one somehow "clings" better to reality than the other. Rorty: the assertion that some vocabularies work better than others is perfectly fine, but not that they represent the reality in a more appropriate way! >Vocabulary. Horwich I 452 Correspondence/IdealismVsCorrespondence theory//Rorty: thesis: there is no correspondence between a conviction and non-conviction (object). >Beliefs/Rorty, cf. >Coherence theory. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Correspondence Theory | Strawson | Rorty I 201 Correspondence Theory/StrawsonVsCorrespondence Theory/Strawson (similar Heidegger): does not require refinement but elimination. (Rorty per, RortyVsCorrespondence theory, HeideggerVsCorrespondence theory). >Correspondence theory/Austin, >Correspondence theory/Ayer. Strawson II 257 StrawsonVsCorrespondence theory: 1. The theory suspects non-conventional relations where there are extremely conventional (how expressions denote) 2. The theory alsely represents correspondence between statement and facts falsely a relation between events and things. >Facts, >Statements, >Events, >Objects/Strawson, >Causality, >World/thinking, >Description, >Truth. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Corruption | Constitutional Economics | Parisi I 209 Corruption/Constitutional Economics/Voigt: Gerring and Thacker (2004)(1) find that parliamentary systems suffer from significantly less corruption than do presidential ones. They argue (2004(3), p. 314) that "effective accountability arises from a highly structured relationship between voters and political parties and from the relatively clear lines of authority instituted by a centralized political apparatus." Lederman, Loayza, and Soares (2005)(2) also find that parliamentary systems suffer less from corruption than do presidential ones and also draw on the concept of accountability to explain why. Their argument is that parliamentary systems "allow for a stronger and more immediate monitoring of the executive by the legislature... " They conclude that after "political institutions are accounted for, variables usually found to be important determinants of corruption… lose virtually all their relevance." In his survey, Treisman (2007)(3) replicates these results but finds that presidentialism becomes insignificant as soon as one controls for Catholicism or when a dummy for South America is included. Parisi I 210 Geography/history: In a recent study, Cheibub, Elkins, and Ginsburg (2013)(4) find a large degree of heterogeneity across the characteristics usually attributed to the forms of government and conclude (2013(4), p. 3): "Indeed, knowing whether a constitution is parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential is less helpful in predicting a constitution's executive-legislative structure ... than is knowing the geographic region in which the constitution was produced or when it was written." Cf. >Judiciary/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics. Parisi I 211 Corruption: To the question of whether corruption is more prevalent under federal or unitary constitutions, there is one standard answer: constituent governments are closer to the people, play infinitely repeated games with local constituents, and hence are subject to local capture (see, e.g., Tanzi, 2000)(5). Therefore, corruption levels will be higher under federal than under unitary constitutions. Vs: The standard argument against the local capture hypothesis is that the behavior of constituent governments is more transparent in federations and politicians are, hence, more accountable for their actions. This would imply that corruption is lower under federal constitutions. Additionally, corruption can signal an inadequacy in the relevant rule system; under dysfunctional rules, even welfare- enhancing activities will often require corrupt behavior. This assumption leads to the argument that since the constituent units of federal states are closer to the people, it is likely that their rules will be more adequate than those in unitary states. >Direct Democracy/Constitutional economics. 1. Gerring, J. and S. Thacker (2004). "Political Institutions and Corruption: the Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism." British Journal of Political Science 34:295—330. 2. Lederman, D., N. Loayza, and R. Soares (2005). "Accountability and Corruption." Economics and Politics 17(1): 1-35. 3. Treisman, D. (2007). "What have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?" Annual Review of Political Science 10: 211-244. 4. Cheibub, J., Z. Elkins, and T. Ginsburg (2013). "Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism." British Journal of Political Science 44(3):515-544. 5. Tanzi, V. (2000). "Some politically incorrect Remarks on Decentralization and Public Finance," in J.-J. Dethier, ed., Governance, Decentralization and Reform in China, India and Russia, 47-63. Boston, MA: Kluwer. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Corruption | Public Choice Theory | Parisi I 191 Corruption/Public choice theory/Farber: (…) legislators have an incentive to support local pork barrel projects in order to woo local voters. Only a small share of the tax dollars financing the project come from the district, whereas the Parisi I 192 benefits of the projects flow there, so these projects are likely to be inefficient, with national costs exceeding their local benefits. (Note, however, that given limited funds to use for pork barrel projects, legislators will pick the most efficient local projects since they will produce the biggest local benefits given available resources.) Since their own pork projects are in the interest of every individual legislator, the legislators have an incentive to establish a norm of universalism under which each gets a share of the pork. Equilibrium: This norm is an equilibrium: no individual legislator has an incentive to opt out, since doing so would simply allow the funds to be reallocated to other districts. The legislators as a group might be better off with a norm prohibiting pork barrel projects, which would allow them collectively to bestow greater benefits to the electorate in other forms. Problem: But such a norm would be vulnerable to defection by individual legislators who would have an incentive to seek pork for their own districts. Vs: This story depends heavily on a kind of voter myopia whereby the voters credit their representatives with the economic benefits of government projects but fail to realize that these projects have the hidden cost of support for pork barrel projects elsewhere (Mueller, 2003(1) , p. 215). If the voters "wise up," legislators can benefit from adoption of a norm of self-restraint and curtailing the availability of pork barrel projects (as in the recent ban on earmarks). Presumably, as the level of pork rises, public visibility also rises, providing a check on the overall amount of pork because of the threat of voter sanctions. >Legislature/Public choice theory. 1. Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public Choice 111. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Farber, Daniel A. “Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Cosmopolitanism | Hegel | Höffe I 339 Cosmopolitanism/Hegel/Höffe: Even in the modest form represented by Kant, Hegel vehemently rejects the idea of a global rule of law. >Cosmopolitanism/Kant, >Peace/Kant. Even a League of Nations, which leaves the individual states their full right of existence and self-determination, but nevertheless continues in the form of a world civil right in a global rule of law, goes decidedly too far for Hegel. According to his argument directed against Kant, there is no public authority; between states there can at most be arbitrators and mediators. Even if, according to Kant's idea of eternal peace, a confederation of states were to come into being, it would be bound to the unanimous consent of all states, which in turn would remain subject to contingencies. >War/Hegel, >Law of nations/Hegel, >History/Hegel, >World history/Hegel. I 340 League of Nations: In Hegel's time there were neither renunciations of sovereignty nor were they foreseeable for the near future. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Cosmopolitanism | Kant | Höffe I 299 Cosmopolitanism/Kant/Höffe: Kant's thinking has, historically speaking, Greek, Roman and Christian roots, but in this respect it is clearly European. From them, however, he develops a philosophy that transcends all European borders and is truly capable of globalization. Averse to any Eurocentric arrogance, the philosopher cultivates a cosmopolitanism that pervades all of his thinking: the theory of knowledge, of morality and of the unity of nature and morality, the philosophy of education, of art, of history and, above all, of law, state and politics. This comprehensive cosmopolitanism is facilitated and at the same time saturated with reality by a curiosity that is directed at almost all objects, thus leading to an extraordinarily rich knowledge of the world. Höffe I 315 Cosmopolitanism/Kant/Höffe: Kant's philosophy of public law reaches its conclusion, at the same time the completion of the Definitive Article 3(1), with the newly introduced world civil law. Since it does not replace "national" civil law, but rather complements it, he does not advocate an exclusive but a complementary cosmopolitanism. World Citizenship: The Kantian World Citizenship consists of a well defined right of cooperation, namely a right to visit, not a right to be a guest: whether individuals, groups, companies or states, even religious communities - they are all allowed to "knock" elsewhere, but have no right to enter. In particular, they are not allowed to kill, enslave or rob the one who knocks, nor, conversely, are they allowed to subjugate, exploit or enslave the natives. Colonialism: In this context, the colonial policy of the time is strongly condemned without compromise. The "injustice" that the "trading states of our part of the world" did to foreign countries and peoples goes "to the point of horror", because "the inhabitants there reckoned them for nothing". >Freedom/Kant. 1. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 1795 |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Cost-Benefit Analysis | Zerbe | Parisi I 357 Cost-benefit analysis/Zerbe: Gains or benefits are measured against costs to determine whether or not a project is worthwhile for those given economic standing. The need to determine standing arises as no benefit–cost analysis can include all values. In practice, a BCA does not include everyone affected by a policy alternative. Most analyses are done in a particular context that determines standing. For instance, a municipality might only consider effects on municipal revenues or limit effects to those within its borders. The state government might not consider effects of its pollution policy on neighboring states and the federal government might not consider effects on foreign countries. Many projects will have only minor effects on certain groups and it may be considered too expensive to include these effects. The standing decision will be affected by the choice between a partial equilibrium analysis and a general equilibrium analysis. When the number of markets included in the BCA is highly restricted, the analysis is called a “partial equilibrium” analysis; when the number of markets included is large, it is called a “general equilibrium” analysis. A small town that conducts a BCA to determine whether to purchase a garbage truck or continue to outsource garbage collection would use a partial equilibrium analysis. On the other hand, a national oil tax will affect many markets: transportation markets, plastic goods and other petroleum product markets, labor markets, and so forth. When the effects in several markets are taken into account, the analysis is said to be a general equilibrium analysis. An analysis of a national oil tax should be done from a general equilibrium perspective in which these major markets and their interactions are considered. >Equilibrium, >Cost-benefit analysis/Hicks, >Willingness to pay/Tversky/Kahneman Richard O. Zerbe. “Cost-Benefit Analysis in Legal Decision-making.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Costs | Stigler | Rothbard III 589 Costs/production costs/Stigler/Rothbard: Rothbard: As an explanation of the pricing of factors and the allocation of output it is obvious that cost curves add nothing new to discussion in terms of marginal productivity. At best, the two are reversible. This can be clearly seen in such texts as E.T. Weiler’s The Economic System and George J. Stigler’s Theory of Price.(1) But, in addition, the shift brings with it many grave deficiencies and errors. This is revealed in the very passage in which Stigler explains the reasons for his switch from a perfunctory discussion of productivity to a lengthy treatment of cost curves: Stigler: „The law of variable proportions has now been explored sufficiently to permit a transition to the cost curves of the individual firm. The fundamentally new element in the discussion will, of course, be the introduction of prices of the productive services. The transition is made here only for the case of competition—that is, the prices of the productive services are constant because the firm does not buy enough of any service to affect its price“.(2) Rothbard: But by introducing given prices of productive services, the contemporary theorist really abandons any attempt to explain these prices. This is one of the cardinal errors of the currently fashionable theory of the firm. It is highly superficial. One of the aspects of this superficiality is the assumption that prices of productive services are given, without any attempt to explain them. To furnish an explanation, marginal productivity analysis is necessary. >Marginal productivity/Rothbard. 1. E.T. Weiler, The Economic System (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1952), pp. 141–61; Stigler, Theory of Price, New York: Macmillan, 1946. Reprinted by Prentice Hall, 1987. pp. 126 ff. |
EconStigler I George J. Stigler Gary S. Becker De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum 1977 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Costs of Production | Rothbard | Rothbard III 340 Costs of production/Rothbard: (…) the cost, or "marginal" cost, of any decision is the next highest utility that must be forgone because of the decision. When a means M must be distributed among ends E1, E2, and E3, with E2 ranked highest on the individual's value scale, the individual attempts to allocate the means so as to attain his most highly valued ends and to forgo those ranked Iower, although he will attain as many of his ends as he can with the means available. If he allocates his means to E1 and E2, and must forgo E3, E3 is the marginal cost ofhis decision. Ifhe errs in his de- cision, and arrives at E3 instead of E2, then ex post - in retrospect - he is seen to have suffered a loss compared to the course he could have taken. Production: What are the costs involved in the decisions made by the owners of the factors? (…) these costs are subjective and cannot be precisely determined by outside observers or be gauged ex post by observing accountants.(1) Secondly, it is clear that, since such factors as land and the produced capital goods have only one use, namely, the production of this product (by virtue of being purely specific), they involve no cost to their owner in being used in production. By the very terms of our problem, the only alternative for their owner would be to let the land lie unused, earning no return. The use of labor, however, does have a cost, in accordance with the value of the leisure forgone by the laborers. >Marginal costs. Sale: (…) in most cases, the sale of the good at the market price, whatever the price may be, is costless, except for rare cases of direct consumption by the producer or in cases of anticipation of a price increase in the near future. This sale is costless from the proper point of view -the point ofview of acting man at the relevant instant of action. The fact that he would not have engaged in the labor at all if he had known in advance of the present price might indicate a deplorable instance of poor judgment, but it does not affect the present situation. At present, with all the labor already exerted and the product finished, the original - subjective - cost has already been incurred and vanished with the original making of the decision. Rothbard III 341 Price/production costs/Rothbard: (…) once the product has been made, "cost" has no influence on the price of the product. Past costs, being ephemeral, are irrelevant to present determination of prices. The agitation that often takes place over sales "below cost" is now placed in its proper perspective. It is obvious that, in the relevant sense of "cost," no such sales can take Place. The sale of an already produced good is likely to be costless, and if it is not, and price is below its costs, then the seller will hold on to the good rather than make the sale. That costs do have an influence in production is not denied by anyone. However, the influence is not directly on the price, but on the amount that will be produced or, more specifically, on the degree to which factors will be used. >Factors of production/Rothbard. Rothbard III 343 Price: (…) it is clear that the determinants of price are only the subjective utilities of individuals in valuing given conditions and alternatives. There are no "objective" or "real" costs that determine, or are co-ordinate in determining, price. Time/costs: There is another (…) element: present goods are being forgone in exchange for an expectation of return in the future. Time, therefore, is a critical element in production, and its analysis must pervade any theory of production. Rothbard III 347 For the case that all factors of production are only hired, see >Interest rates/Rothbard. Rothbard III 355 Money costs are the opposite of a basic, determining factor; they are dependent on the price of the product and on consumer demands. In the real world of uncertainty it is more difficult to see this, because factors are paid in advance of the sale of the product, since the capitalist-entrepreneurs speculatively advance money to the factors in the expectation of being able to recoup their money with a surplus for interest and profit after sale to the consumers.(2) Whether they do so or not depends on their foresight regarding the state of consumer demand and the future prices of consumers’ goods. In the real world of immediate market prices, of course, the existence of entrepreneurial profit and loss will always prevent costs and receipts, cost and price, from being identical, and it is obvious to all that price is solely determined by valuations of stock - by “utilities” - and not at all by money cost. But although most economists recognize that in the real world (the so-called “short-run”) costs cannot determine price, they are seduced by the habit of the individual entrepreneur of dealing in terms of “cost” as the determining factor, and they apply this procedure to the case of the ERE (Evenly Rotating Economy) and therefore to the inherent long-run tendencies of the economy. >Evenly Rotating Economy/Rothbard. Rothbard III 360 This is not to deny, and the Austrians never did deny, that subjective costs, in the sense of opportunity costs and utilities forgone, are important in the analysis of production. >Opportunity costs/Rothbard. Rothbard III 357 Costs of production/Alfred Marshall/Rothbard: The enormous advance provided by the Austrian School, on this point as on others, was blocked and reversed by the influence of Alfred Marshall, who attempted to rehabilitate the classicists and integrate them with the Austrians, while disparaging the contributions of the latter. >Classical economics, >Austrian School. It was unfortunately the Marshallianand not the Austrian approach that exerted the most influence over later writers. This influence is partly responsible for the current myth among economists that the Austrian School is effectively dead and has no more to contribute and that everything of lasting worth that it had to offer was effectively stated and integrated in Alfred Marshall’s Principles. >Alfred Marshall. Producion costs/Marshall/Rothbard: Marshall tried to rehabilitate the cost-of-production theory of the classicists by conceding that, in the “short run,” in the immediate market place, consumers’ demand rules price. But in the long run, among the important reproducible goods, cost of production is determining. According to Marshall, both utility and money costs determine price, like blades of a scissors, but one blade is more important in the short run, and another in the long run. Marshall: (…) concludes that „as a general rule, the shorter the period we are considering, the greater must be the share of our attentionwhich is given to the influence of demand on value; and the longer the period, the more important will bethe influence of cost of production on value. . . . The actual value at any time, the market value as it is often called, is often more influenced by passing events and by causes whose action is fitful and shortlived, than by those which work persistently. Rothbard III 358 But in long periods these fitful and irregular causes in large measure efface one another’s influence; so that in the long run persistent causes dominate value completely.“(3) RothbardVsMarshall, Alfred: Marshall’s analysis suffers from a grave methodological defect - indeed, from an almost hopeless methodological confusion as regards the “short run” and the “long run.” He considers the “long run” as actually existing, as being the permanent, persistent, observable element beneath the fitful, basically unimportant flux of market value. He admits (p. 350) that “even the most persistent causes are, however, liable to change,” but he clearly indicates that they are far less likely to change than the fitful market values; herein, indeed, lies their long-run nature. He regards the long-run data, then, as underlying the transient market values in a way similar to that in which the basic sea level underlies the changing waves and tides. For Marshall, then, the long-run data are something that can be spotted and marked by an observer; indeed, since they change far more slowly than the market values, they can be observed more accurately. Marshall’s conception of the long run is completely fallacious, and this eliminates the whole groundwork of his theoretical structure. Rothbard III 359 The long run, by its very nature, never does and never can exist. This does not mean that “long-run,” or ERE (Evenly Rotating Economy), analysis is not important. >Evenly Rotating Economy/Rothbard. Prices/costs/RothbardVsMarshall: The fact that costs equal prices in the “long run” does not mean that costs will actually equal prices, but that the tendency exists, a tendency that is continually being disrupted in reality by the very fitful changes in market data that Marshall points out.(4) 1. Cf. the excellent discussion of cost by G.F. Thirlby, “The Subjective Theory of Value and Accounting ‘Cost,’” Economica, February, 1946, pp. 33 f.; and especially Thirlby, “Economists’ Cost Rules and Equilibrium Theory,” Economica, May, 1960, pp. 148 - 53. 2. Cf. Menger, Principles of Economics, pp. 149ff. 3. Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (8th ed.; London: Macmillan & Co., 1920), pp. 349 ff. 4. On this error in Marshall, see F.A. Hayek, The Pure Theory of Capital (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), pp. 21, 27 - 28. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Counter-Enlightenment | Habermas | IV 222 Counter-Enlightenment/Habermas: the counter-enlightenment that began with the French Revolution gave rise to a critique of modernity that has since branched out widely. (1) Their common denominator is the belief that the loss of meaning, anomie and alienation, that the pathologies of bourgeois, post-traditional society in general, can be traced back to the rationalisation of the lifeworld itself. This backward-looking critique is at first a critique of bourgeois culture. MarxismVsEnlightenment: the Marxist criticism of bourgeois society, on the other hand, starts with the circumstances of production because it accepts the rationalization of the lifeworld, but wants to explain the deformations of the rationalized lifeworld from conditions of material reproduction. This approach requires a theory that operates on a broader basic conceptual basis than that of the "lifeworld". >Enlightenment, >Lifeworld, >Bourgeoisie, >Society, >Culture. 1. While this tradition was represented by authors such as A. Gehlen, M. Heidegger, K. Lorenz, C. Schmitt between the wars, today it continues at a comparable level only in French poststructuralism. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Field | Counterfactual conditionals/FieldVsCounterfactual conditional: the counterfactual conditional is too vague for physical theories or geometric terms. DummettVsCounterfactual conditionals: they cannot be "just right" (barely true). - They need ascertainable facts as truth-makers (without counterfactual conditionals). >Counterfactual conditionals, cf. >Implication, >Conditionals, >Counterfactuals, >Theories, >Method, >Measurements, >Truth, >Truth conditions. Substantivalism/Field: can guarantee that situations where distances differ also differ in non-counterfactual aspects. . >Substantivalism. FieldVsRelationism: Relationism cannot. >Relationism. FieldVsCounterfactual Conditionals: no theory about counterfactually defined relations works if these relations cannot be defined non-counterfactually as well. - (This is why they cannot be "barely true"). >Bare truth. Counterfactual conditionals cannot be derived from counterfactual statements about points in the plane. - Therefore, we must take them as the naked truth. - That would be no problem if you only needed a few of them. I 233 Counterfactual Conditional/explanation/Lewis: nothing can counterfactually depend on the non-contigent. - E.g. counterfactually depend on which mathematical entities there are. - Nothing sensible can be said about which of our opinions would be different if the number 17 did not exist. - Since mathematics consists of necessary truths, there can be no explanation problem here. FieldVsLewis: not all facts in mathematics are necessary - e.g. number of planets. >Mathematics, >Physics, >Necessity, >Facts, >Contingency. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Nozick | II 172 Counterfactual Conditionals/Co.Co./Overdeterminism/Knowledge/Nozick. Counterfactual conditionals help exclude cases of overdeterminism - i.e. cases where multiple independent causes are sufficient in themselves. >Overdetermination, >Cause, >Effect, >Knowledge, >Sufficiency. II 174 Example Barn Facades/Alvin Goldman/Nozick: if there are many fakes, we should not speak of knowledge. >Barn Façades, >Causal Theory of Knowledge. II 175 Counterfactual Conditional/Nozick: shows covariance. >Covariance. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Wessel | I 308 Counterfactual Conditionals/Wessel: can always be replaced by conjunctions of real conditionals - Counter-position: leads out of unreal conditional clauses Bizet/Verdi/Wessel: is due to the ambiguous predicate "compatriots": might both be Japanese. Solution: E.g. "if someone is a compatriot of Bizet's, he is a Frenchman". ((s) Explanation/(s): E.g. Bizet/Verdi: in what world would they have been compatriots? - In a world in which Verdi would have been French or Bizet Italian. - Problem: which of the two worlds is closer to our world? - This shows that you can't give a similarity metric for worlds). >Similarity metrics, >Possible worlds. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Counterfactuals | Kripke | I 60 Kripke: In general, things about a counterfactual situation are not "found out", they are determined. Cf. >Telescope theory of possible worlds. I 63 It is often said that when we describe a counterfactual situation and it cannot result in a purely qualitative one, then mysterious "mere individual things" would be assumed, featureless substrates, on which the properties are based. This is, however, not the case. I 89 Let us assume we use the reference of the name "Hitler" due to the fact that it is the man who killed more Jews than anyone has ever done in history. But in a counterfactual situation in which someone else possessed this bad reputation we would not say that in this other situation the other man would have been Hitler. >Possible world/Kripke. I 93 Counterfactual: even if you say "suppose Hitler had never been born", then the name "Hitler" refers here, and still in a rigid manner, to something that would not exist in the described counterfactual situation. >Names/Kripke, >Reference/Kripke, >Causal theory of reference, >Nonexistence. I 126/27 Remember, though, that we describe the situation in our language, not in the language that people would have used in that situation. Hesperus = Phosphorus is necessarily true (but a situation is possible in which Venus does not exist). >Morning star/evening star, >Identity/Kripke, >Necessary/Kripke. I 130 ... But this would still not be a situation in which this woman which we call "Elizabeth II" was the child of Mr. and Mrs. Truman. It would be a situation in which there was another woman who had many of the features which actually apply to Elizabeth. The question is: was Elizabeth herself ever born in this possible world? Let us say no. Then Truman and his wife would have a child possessing many of the properties of Elizabeth, but in which Elizabeth herself never existed. >Properties/Kripke, >Designation/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Cournot Competition | Norman | Krugman III 95 Cournot Competition/Victor D. Norman: To see whether our assumption(1) that the oligopoly equilibrium involves Bertrand price competition* is important, we also simulate the effects of entry assuming Cournot competition in the number of seats offered on each flight. >Cournot Competition, >Bertrand Competition, >Sensitivity analysis, >Models, >Economic models, >Model theory, >Equilibrium, >Oligopolies. Equilibrium: As is seen, the simulated equilibria are virtually identical, except as regards the degree of price discrimination between Euroclass and tourist-class passengers: As should be expected, Cournot competition (being less aggressive than Bertrand) involves greater price discrimination; consequently, the relative price of Euroclass tickets falls more in the case of Bertrand than in the Cournot case. 1.Victor D. Norman and Siri P. Strandenes. „Deregulation of Scandinavian Airlines: A Case Study of the Oslo-Stockholm Route.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Victor D. Norman and Siri P. Strandenes. „Deregulation of Scandinavian Airlines: A Case Study of the Oslo-Stockholm Route.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Court Proceedings | Social Psychology | Parisi I 125 Court proceedings/juror decision-making/Social psychology/Nadler/Mueller: (...) each individual juror hears the evidence and arguments presented by lawyers, as well as the judge's instructions. Story model: According to the Story Model of Juror Decision-Making (Bennett, 1978(1); Pennington and Hastie, 1981(2)) jurors make sense of the evidence at trial by organizing it in a narrative fashion. Instead of passively absorbing verbatim the enormous amount of complex, Parisi I 126 ambiguous information given in a trial, jurors actively process the information using the framework of their existing knowledge to fill in gaps and construct stories from the evidence. Jurors create a story narrative that explains the different pieces of reliable evidence, and then reach a decision by matching the best-fitting story to the verdict categories. Criteria/eveluation: In order to evaluate competing stories, jurors use several criteria. The most preferred story will account for the greatest amount of evidence, will be internally consistent and leave no gaps in the causal chain of events, and will be plausible in light of what the juror believes about the world (Pennington and Hastie, 1981)(2). „Thinking aloud“: This model has been supported by "think aloud" observations of mock jurors (Pennington and Hastie, 1986)(3), as well as experiments examining judgments in mock criminal and civil trials (Huntley and Costanzo, 2003(4); Pennington and Hastie, 1992(5)). Decision-making: More recent experimental research on coherence-based reasoning has stablished that the process of reaching a decision is often bi-directional (Holyoak and Simon, 1999)(6). The decision task faced by jurors is cognitively complex because it requires consideration of information that is voluminous, contradictory, and ambiguous (D. Simon, 2004)(7). Information processing: To process the large amount of complex information presented in a trial, jurors reconstruct the information into simpler mental representations, upon which their cognitive system imposes coherence (D. Simon, 2004)(7). Schemas/beliefs: (...) jurors bring with them into the courtroom commonsense notions of legal categories like insanity, self-defense, and intent, and those existing schemas influence how jurors evaluate evidence and make legal judgments (Finkel, 2005(8); Finkel and Groscup, 1997(9); Robinson and Darley, 1995(10)). Even after receiving instructions about the definitions of crimes like burglary or robbery, jurors import their commonsense notions of these offenses into their decisions. Parisi I 127 Prediction: (...) (Kalven and Zeisel, 1966)(11) (...) found that a majority jury vote on the first ballot predicted the final verdict in over 90% of the cases, and they hypothesized that deliberation often focused on convincing the members of the minority to change their vote. Subsequent research set out to investigate more precisely the relationship between pre-deliberation preference and final verdict. In fact, immediate votes prior to deliberation seem to occur in only a small minority of cases (Devine et al., 2004(12); Diamond and Casper, 1992(13); Diamond et al., 2003(14); Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington, 1983(15); Sandys and Dillehay, 1995)(16). When the first ballot does occur, if each juror expresses their preference verbally, the early preferences can influence those voting subsequently (J. H. Davis et al., 1988)(17). Jurors' certainty and confidence in their views can be weak before deliberations begin, such that some do not begin leaning strongly toward one side until after substantial deliberations have taken place (Hannaford-Agor et al., 2002)(18). To understand the influence of the jury deliberation process, it is therefore important to measure pre-deliberation preferences of individual jurors prior to deliberation. >Negotiation/Social psychology. 1. Bennett, W. L. (1978). "Storytelling in Criminal Trials: A Model of Social Judgment." Quarterly Journa1 ofSpeech 64(1): 1-22. doi:10.1080/0033563 7809383408. 2. Pennington, N. and R. Hastie (1981). "Juror Decision-making Models: The Generalization Gap." Psychological Bulletin doi: 10.103 7 3-2909.89.2.246. 3. Pennington, N. and R. Hastie (1986). "Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51 (2):242-258. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.2.242. 4. Huntley, J. E. and M. Costanzo (2003). "Sexual Harassment Stories: Testing a Story-me- diated Model of Juror Decision-making in Civil Litigation." Law and Human Behavior 27(1): 29-51. 5. Pennington, N. and R. Hastie (1992). "Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 62(2): 189—206. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.62.2.189. 6. Holyoak, K. J. and D. Simon (1999). "Bidirectional Reasoning in Decision Making by Constraint Satisfaction." Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 128(1): 3-31. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.128.1.3. 7. Simon, D. (2004). "A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making." University of Chicago Law Review 71(2): 511-586. 8. Finkel, N. J. (2005). Commonsense Justice: Jurors' Notions of the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 9. Finkel, N. J. and J. L. Groscup (1997). "Crime Prototypes, Objective versus Subjective Culpability, and a Commonsense Balance." Law and Human Behavior 21 (2):209-230. 10. Robinson, P. H. and J. M. Darley (199 5).Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 11.Kalven, Harry, jr. And Hans Zeisel (1967). „The American Jury“. In: 24 Wash. & LeeL. Rev. 158 (1967),https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol24/iss1/18 12. Devine, D. J., K. M. Olafson, L. L. Jarvis, J. P. Bott, L. D. Clayton, and J. M. T. Wolfe (2004). "Explaining Jury Verdicts: Is Leniency Bias for Real?" Journal of Applied social Psychology 34(10): 2069-2098. 13. Diamond, S. S. andJ. D. Casper (1992). "Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury." Law and society Review 26(3): 513 - 563. doi:10.2307/3053737. 14. Diamond, S. S., N. Vidmar, M. Rose, and L. Ellis (2003). "Juror Discussions during Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation." Arizona Law Review 45: 1. 15. Hastie, R., S. Penrod, and N. Pennington (1983). Inside the Jury. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 16. Sandys, M. and C. Dillehay (1995). "First-ballot Votes, Predeliberation Dispositions, and Final Verdicts in Jury Trials." Law and Human Behavior 19(2): 175-195. doi:10.1007/ BF01499324. 17. Davis, J. H., M. F. Stasson, K. Ono, and S. Zimmerman (1988). "Effects of Straw Polls on Group Decision Making: Sequential Voting Pattern, Timing, and Local Majorities." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 5 5(6): 918—926. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.55.6.918. 18. Hannaford-Agor, P., V. Hans, N. Mott, and T. Munsterman (2002). "Are HungJuries a Problem National Center for State Courts, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdfilesl/ nij /grants/1993 72.pdf Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press Parisi I 131 Court Proceedings/racial bias/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: (...) many attorneys try to (...) select jurors based on their assumptions that Black jurors are less likely to find defendants, especially Black defendants, guilty (Bonazzoli, 1998(1); Kerr et al., 1995(2)). In fact, behavioral and neuroimaging research provide some support for these intuitions, suggesting that we may be more able to empathize or take the perspective of individuals who are similar to ourselves (Cialdini et al., 1997(3); M. H. Davis et al., 1996(4); N. Eisenberg and Mussen, 1989(5); J. P. Mitchell, Macrae, and Banaji, 2006(6); but see Batson et al., 2005(7) for an alternate behavioral mechanism). Black sheep effect: However, there is evidence that in some situations, people may want to distance themselves from ingroup members who have committed bad acts, that is, the "black sheep" effect (J. Marques et al., 1998(8); J. M. Marques, Yzerbyt, and Leyens, 1988)(9). >Capital Punishment/Social Psychology. 1. Bonazzoli, M. J. (1998). "Jury selection and Bias: Debunking Invidious Stereotypes through Science." Quinnapiac Law Review 18:247. 2. Kerr, N. L., R. W. Hymes, A. B. Anderson, and J. E. Weathers (1995). "Defendant-Juror Similarity and Mock Juror Judgments" Law and Human Behavior 19(6):545-567. doi:10.1007/BF01499374. 3. Cialdini, R. B., S. L. Brown, B. P. Lewis, C. Luce, and S. L. Neuberg (1997). "Reinterpreting the Empathy-Altruism Relationship: When One into One Equals Oneness." Journal of Personality and social Psychology 73(3): 481-494. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.73.3.481. 4. Davis, J. H. (1996). "Group Decision Making and Quantitative Judgments: A Consensus Model," in E. H. Witte andJ. H. Davis, eds., Understanding Group Behavior, Vol. 1: Consensual Action By Small Groups, 35—59. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 5. Eisenberg, N. and P. H. Mussen (1989). The Roots of Prosocial Behavior in Children. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Mitchell, J. P., C. N. Macrae, and M. R. Banaji (2006). "Dissociable Medial Prefrontal Contributions to Judgments of Similar and Dissimilar Others." Neuron 50(4): 655-663. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2006.03.040. 7. Batson, C. D., D. A. Lishner, J. Cook, and S. Sawyer (2005). "Similarity and Nurturance: Two Possible Sources of Empathy for Strangers." Basic and Applied social Psychology 2 15-25. 8. Marques, J., D. Abrams, D. Paez, and C. Martinez-Taboada (1998). " The Role of Categorization and In-group Norms in Judgments of Groups and their Members." Journal of Personality and social Psychology doi:10.1037/0022-3514.75.4.976. 9. Marques, J. M., V. Y. Yzerbyt, andJ.-P. Leyens (1988). "The 'Black Sheep Effect': Extremity of Judgments Towards Ingroup Members as a Function of Group Identification." European Journal of Social Psychology 18(1): 1—16. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420180102. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Covering Laws | Covering laws: general statements of law which, together with empirical conditions within the so-called deductive-nomological model (according to Hempel and Oppenheim) form the premises from which causal explanations can be obtained. See also explanation, causal explanation. |
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| Covering Laws | Cartwright | I 17 covering law: thesis: there is a single correct explanation for each phenomenon. CartwrightVscovering law. >Explanation, >Phenomena, All authors Vscovering Law: does not correctly describe the causes. >Description, >Causes, >Experiment. I 44 Def covering law model/Hempel/Cartwright: Hempel assumes that we need to know all the natural laws, and a little logic and possibly probability theory. Then we know what factors explain what other factors. >Natural laws. I 45 many authors Vs: athis llows for too much - e.g. Henry is not pregnant because he takes birth control pills - E.x. Barometer explains storm. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Covering Laws | Dray | Schurz I 224 Covering law/Dray/Schurz: (Dray 1957)(1): simplest case of a deductive nomological explanation: here antecedent and explanandum are implicatively connected by a single law. logical form: (x)(Ax > Ex), Aa/Ea. HempelVsDray/HempelVscovering law: its own model includes more complex explanations e.g. planet positions explained from initial conditions plus laws of nature. >Models, >Theories, >Explanations. 1. Dray, W. (1957). Laws and Explanation in History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Dray I W. Dray Laws and Explanation in History Westport 1979 Dray I W. H. Dray Perspectives on History Sydney 1980 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Covering Laws | Hempel | Wright I 23 Covering Laws/Hempel/von Wright, G. H.: the name for this approach by Hempel comes from a critic of this theory: William Dray(1). I 24 Subsumption theory/terminology/von Wright, G. H.: I choose this expression instead of the term of Hempel's Covering Law theory. There are two options: a) deductive-nomological: in this variant, all subsequent events logically follow from the existence of a situation and from laws. I 25 b) inductive-probabilistic: here there is a general law, the "bridge" or the "ribbon", which links the basis of the explanation to the subject matter. This is a probability hypothesis according to which, if events E1... Em (the base) are given, it is very likely that event E will take place(2). G. H. von WrightVsHempel: in what sense - if at all in one - can one speak of explanation? I 155 Hempel's terminology fluctuated. He called non-eductive explanations alternately inductive, statistical, probabilistic and inductive-statistical explanations. >Terminology/Hempel. I 156 von Wright, G. H.: The arguments of Scriven and Dray are related to my criticism of the scheme, Sriven uses the successful wording that Hempel's approach "gives the individual case away". Scriven: an event can move freely within a network of statistical laws, but is located within the "normic network" and explained by this localization(3)(4). I 26 Wright: the two schemes differ more than expected. WrightVsHempel: one should not speak of an explanation for the inductive-probabilistic model, but rather of the fact that certain expectations are justified. I 28 Wright: a test on the Covering Law approach would be to ask whether the law scheme of the explanation also covers teleological explanations. Teleology/von Wright, G. H.: there are two sections: a) the field of the term function, goal (purposefulness) and "organic wholeness" ("systems"). b) purposefulness and intentionality. See also >Feedback/von Wright, G. H., >Teleology. 1. W. Dray: Laws and Explanation in History, 1957, p. 1. 2. C. G. Hempel: Aspects of Scientific Explanation, in: "Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science", New York 1965. 3. M. Scriven: Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation, in: P. Gardiner (Ed.), 1959, p. 467. 4. W. Dray: The Historical Explanation of Actions Reconsidered, 1963. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Covering Laws | Lewis | V 239 Statement/covering law/deductive-nomological/Railton/Lewis: Conclusion: the difference to my model is small - not only DnN-models (deductive-nomological model) are correct explanations - but they are a way an explanatory speaker must argue for what he believes. - Laws: are important in the causation and thus for the explanation. LewisVsRailton: covering laws are not part of the explanatory information. >Explanation/Railton. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Creation Myth | Gadamer | I 423 Creation/Language/Christianity/Gadamer: Once (...) creation happens through the Word of God. Thus the early fathers already made use of the miracle of language to make the un-Greek thought of creation conceivable. But above all, the actual act of salvation, the sending of the Son, the mystery I 424 of the Incarnation, is described in the prologue of John himself by word. Exegesis interprets the sounding of the word as a miracle, just as it interprets the incarnation of God. >Incarnation/Gadamer. The becoming that is at issue in both is not a becoming in which something becomes something else. It is neither a separation of the one from the other (kat' apocope), nor a diminution of the inner word by its emergence into the outer world, nor any other becoming at all, so that the inner word would be consumed(1). Even in the earliest references to Greek thought, the new direction towards the mysterious unity of Father and Son, of Spirit and Word, can be recognized. And if the direct reference to the utterance, the utterance of the word, is in the end also rejected in Christian dogmatics - in the rejection of subordinationism - it is precisely because of this decision that it becomes necessary to philosophically re-examine the mystery of language and its connection with thought. Language/Christianity/Gadamer: The greater miracle of language is not that the word becomes flesh and emerges in the outward being, but that what emerges in this way and is expressed in utterance is always already word. That the word is with God, and that is from eternity, that is the Church's teaching, which is victorious in the defense against subordinationism, and which also lets the problem of language enter completely into the inner being of thought. >Language/Christianity, >Word/Augustine. I 428 Creation Myth/Gadamer: The mystery of the Trinity, which is to be illuminated by the analogy with the inner word, must in the end remain incomprehensible from human thinking. If in the divine word the whole of the divine spirit is pronounced, then the processual moment in this word means something for which basically every analogy lets us down. If the divine spirit, by recognizing itself, at the same time recognizes all that exists, then the Word of God is the Word of the Spirit that sees and creates everything in an intuition. The process disappears in the actuality of the divine All-Wisdom. Creation, too, is not a real process, but only interprets the order of the world as a whole in a temporal scheme(2). >Trinity. 1. Assumendo non consumendo, Aug. de Trin. 15, 11. 2. It is clear that the patristic and scholastic interpretation of Genesis to some extent repeats the discussion about the right interpretation of "Timaios" that was held between Plato's disciples. (Cf. my study of "idea and reality in Plato's "Timaios". (Meeting reports of the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences, Philos.-histor. Class, 2nd Abh. Heidelberg 1974; now in vol. 6 of the Ges. Werke, pp. 242-270). |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Creativity | Deci | Corr I 447 Creativity/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: studies have shown that autonomous motivation, which comprises intrinsic motivation and the more fully internalized forms of extrinsic motivation (i.e., identified and integrated), has consistently been associated with more positive relational, performance and wellbeing outcomes. For example, an experiment by McGraw and McCullers (1979(1)) examined the relation of motivation to cognitive flexibility. In it, they gave participants a problem-solving task in which the participants tended to develop a mental set for solving the problems. Half of the participants were rewarded for solving the puzzles and half were not. >Intrinsic, >Extrinsic, >Motivation, >Behavior, >Competition. Then, participants were given a problem that required breaking their mental set and thinking in a fresher way, and the results showed that those who had been rewarded for solving the earlier problems had a harder time breaking set and thus did less well on the new problem. In motivational terms, this suggests that rewarded participants had become more controlled in their motivation and this was associated with a more rigid, less flexible mode of thinking and information-processing. >Information processing, >Problem solving. Experiments by Amabile (1979(2), 1982(3)) showed that participants who were told their artistic work would be evaluated and those who competed to win a reward for their artistic endeavours made products that were judged to be less creative than did participants who were not being evaluated or competing for a reward. 1. McGraw, K. O. and McCullers, J. C. 1979. Evidence of a detrimental effect of extrinsic incentives on breaking a mental set, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 15: 285–94 2. Amabile, T. M. 1979. Effects of external evaluations on artistic creativity, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37: 221–33 3. Amabile, T. M. 1982. Children’s artistic creativity: detrimental effects of competition in a field setting, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 8: 573–8 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Creativity | Ryan | Corr I 447 Creativity/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: studies have shown that autonomous motivation, which comprises intrinsic motivation and the more fully internalized forms of extrinsic motivation (i.e., identified and integrated), has consistently been associated with more positive relational, performance and wellbeing outcomes. For example, an experiment by McGraw and McCullers (1979(1)) examined the relation of motivation to cognitive flexibility. In it, they gave participants a problem-solving task in which the participants tended to develop a mental set for solving the problems. Half of the participants were rewarded for solving the puzzles and half were not. >Intrinsic, >Extrinsic, >Motivation, >Behavior, >Competition. Then, participants were given a problem that required breaking their mental set and thinking in a fresher way, and the results showed that those who had been rewarded for solving the earlier problems had a harder time breaking set and thus did less well on the new problem. In motivational terms, this suggests that rewarded participants had become more controlled in their motivation and this was associated with a more rigid, less flexible mode of thinking and information-processing. >Information processing, >Problem solving. >Reinforcement sensitivity. Experiments by Amabile (1979(2), 1982(3)) showed that participants who were told their artistic work would be evaluated and those who competed to win a reward for their artistic endeavours made products that were judged to be less creative than did participants who were not being evaluated or competing for a reward. 1. McGraw, K. O. and McCullers, J. C. 1979. Evidence of a detrimental effect of extrinsic incentives on breaking a mental set, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 15: 285–94 2. Amabile, T. M. 1979. Effects of external evaluations on artistic creativity, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37: 221–33 3. Amabile, T. M. 1982. Children’s artistic creativity: detrimental effects of competition in a field setting, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 8: 573–8 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Creativity | Self-Determination Theory | Corr I 447 Creativity/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: studies have shown that autonomous motivation, which comprises intrinsic motivation and the more fully internalized forms of extrinsic motivation (i.e., identified and integrated), has consistently been associated with more positive relational, performance and wellbeing outcomes. >Intrinsic, >Extrinsic, >Motivation, >Behavior, >Competition. For example, an experiment by McGraw and McCullers (1979(1)) examined the relation of motivation to cognitive flexibility. In it, they gave participants a problem-solving task in which the participants tended to develop a mental set for solving the problems. Half of the participants were rewarded for solving the puzzles and half were not. Then, participants were given a problem that required breaking their mental set and thinking in a fresher way, and the results showed that those who had been rewarded for solving the earlier problems had a harder time breaking set and thus did less well on the new problem. In motivational terms, this suggests that rewarded participants had become more controlled in their motivation and this was associated with a more rigid, less flexible mode of thinking and information-processing. >Information processing, >Problem solving. >Reinforcement sensitivity. Experiments by Amabile (1979(2), 1982(3)) showed that participants who were told their artistic work would be evaluated and those who competed to win a reward for their artistic endeavours made products that were judged to be less creative than did participants who were not being evaluated or competing for a reward. 1. McGraw, K. O. and McCullers, J. C. 1979. Evidence of a detrimental effect of extrinsic incentives on breaking a mental set, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 15: 285–94 2. Amabile, T. M. 1979. Effects of external evaluations on artistic creativity, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37: 221–33 3. Amabile, T. M. 1982. Children’s artistic creativity: detrimental effects of competition in a field setting, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 8: 573–8 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Credit | Mises | Rothbard IV 16 Credit/inflation/Mises/Rothbard: (…) the attraction of inflation is that the government and other groups in the economy can silently but effectively benefit at the expense of groups of the population lacking political power. Inflation - an expansion of the money supply - Mises showed, is a process of taxation and redistribution of wealth. In a developing free-market economy unhampered by government-induced increases in the money supply, prices will generally fall as the supply of goods and services expands. And falling prices and costs were indeed the welcome hallmark of industrial expansion during most of the nineteenth century. >Money/Mises, >Money supply/Mises, >Marginal utility/Mises. Rothbard IV 55 (…) Mises became convinced that, contrary to prevailing opinion, monetary inflation was the cause of balance of payments deficits instead of the other way round, and that bank credit should not be “elastic” to fulfill the alleged needs of trade. Rothbard IV 61 Central Banks/inflation/Mises/Rothbard: In addition to his feat in integrating the theory of money with general economics and placing it on the micro-foundations of individual action, Mises, in Money and credit(1), transformed the existing analysis of banking. Returning to the Ricardian-Currency School tradition, he demonstrated that they were correct in wishing to abolish inflationary fractional-reserve credit. Mises distinguished two separate kinds of functions undertaken by banks: channeling savings into productive credit ("commodity credit"), and acting as a money-warehouse in holding cash for safekeeping. Both are legitimate and non-inflationary functions; the trouble comes when the money-warehouses issue and lend out phony warehouse receipts (notes or demand deposits) to cash that does not exist in the bank's vaults ("fiduciary credit"). These "uncovered" demand liabilities issued by the banks expand the money supply and generate the problems of inflation. Mises therefore favored the Currency School approach of 100 percent specie reserves to demand liabilities. He pointed out that Peel's Act of 1844, established in England on Currency School principles, failed and discredited its authors by applying 100 percent reserves only to bank notes, and not realizing that demand deposits were also surrogates for cash and therefore functioned as part of the money supply. Mises wrote his book at a time when much of the economics profession was still not sure that demand deposits constituted part of the money supply. >Money/Mises, >Regression theorem/Mises. Rothbard IV 62 Central banks/Mises/Rothbard: Not wishing to trust government to enforce 100 percent reserves, however, Mises advocated totally free banking as a means of approaching that ideal. Money and credit demonstrated that the major force coordinating and promoting bank credit inflation was each nation's central bank, which centralized reserves, bailed out banks in trouble, and made sure that all banks inflated together. Eight years before C.A. Phillips's famous demonstration, Money and credit showed that an individual bank enjoyed very little room to expand credit. 1. Ludwig von Mises. 1912. The Theory of Money and Credit (Theorie des Geldes und der Umlaufsmittel, Translated by H.E. Batson in 1934; reprinted with “Monetary Reconstruction» (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953). Reprinted by the Foundation for Economic Education, 1971; reprinted with an Introduction by Murray N. Rothbard, Liberty Press Liberty Classics, 1989. |
EconMises I Ludwig von Mises Die Gemeinwirtschaft Jena 1922 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Criminal Law | Economic Theories | Parisi I 17 Criminal Law/economc theories/Miceli: [there is a] normative analysis [an economic approach to crime control] based on the economic theory of law enforcement as first formalized by Becker (1968)(1) and elaborated on by Polinsky and Shavell (2000(2), 2007(3)), among others. [Becker-Polinsky-Shavell, BPS model]. The economic approach to crime control is based on the assumption that rational offenders decide whether or not to commit an illegal act by comparing the dollar value of the gains from the act to the expected cost, which is equal to the magnitude of the sanction multiplied by the probability of apprehension and conviction. Cf. Hand test: >Tort law/Learned Hand. BPS model: Given the goal of deterrence, the optimal law enforcement policy prescribed by the BPS model involves choosing the probability of apprehension, the Parisi I 18 type of criminal sanction (a fine and/or prison), and its magnitude, to minimize the overall cost of crime. The standard BPS model asserts that efficiency is the (primary) norm for deriving the optimal enforcement policy. 1) (...) the BPS model says that the optimal sanction, whether a fine or imprisonment, should be maximal. The reason this is true for a fine is clear: offenders only care about the expected sanction, pf, and since it is costly to raise the probability of apprehension, p, but not the fine, f, it is cost-minimizing to raise the fine as much as possible (up to the offender’s wealth) before raising the probability. Less obviously, when the sanction is prison only, the optimal prison term should also be maximal. Intuitively, expected costs can be lowered by increasing the prison term and lowering the probability of apprehension proportionally (thereby holding deterrence fixed) because the punishment, although costly, is imposed less often. In terms of actual punishment policy, however, it is clear that fines and prison terms are not set at their maximal levels for most crimes. In this sense, the model is not descriptive of actual legal practice. 2) (...) the BPS model predicts that imprisonment should only be used after fines have been used up to the maximum extent possible (for example, up to the offender’s wealth), and only then if additional deterrence is cost-justified. Again, the logic is clear: fines are costless to increase while prison is costly, so it is optimal to exhaust the costless form of punishment first. Norms/efficiency: The reason for both of these divergences of practice from theory is almost certainly due to the importance of norms besides efficiency, such as fairness or equal treatment, that society deems relevant for the determination of optimal criminal punishment.* Equality/practise/society: (...) the idea of sentencing poor defendants to lengthier prison terms than wealthy defendants for the same crime would strike many as unacceptable (if not unconstitutional) because it would appear that the wealthy were being allowed to buy their way out of prison (Lott, 1987)(5). Society therefore apparently tolerates a costlier punishment policy for the sake of more equal treatment of offenders. >Crime/Economic theories. * See, for example, Miceli (1991)(4) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000)(2). 1. Becker, Gary (1968). “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 76: 169–217. 2. Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Steven Shavell (2000). “The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law.” Journal of Economic Literature 38: 45–76. 3. Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Steven Shavell (2007). “The Theory of Public Law Enforcement,” in A. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, eds., Handbook of Law and Economics, 403–454. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 4.Miceli 1991 5. Lott, John (1987). “Should the Wealthy Be Able to ‘Buy Justice’”? Journal of Political Economy 95: 1307–1316. Miceli, Thomas J. „Economic Models of Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Crises | Habermas | IV 434 Crises/Society/HabermasVsPasons/Habermas: Talcott Parsons Thesis: Social pathological phenomena are due to systemic imbalances. >Systems/T. Parsons, >Systems Theory. HabermasVsParsons: with this reduction, the specific of social crises is lost. For self-regulated systems, which must permanently secure their risky existence by adapting to conditions of a contingent and over-complex environment, IV 434 internal imbalances are the normal state. Whether these imbalances assume a "critical dimension" can only be assessed by the systems analyst from an external perspective if, as with organisms, he/she can refer to clearly identifiable limits of superiority. A comparably clear-cut problem of death does not arise for social systems.(1) Crises/Habermas: only when relevant social groups experience structural changes that are systemically reduced as critical to their existence and feel their identity threatened, may the social scientist speak of crises.(2) Solution/Weber/Habermas: By understanding modernization as social rationalization, Weber establishes a connection with identity-vouching worldviews and with structures of the lifeworld that determine the conditions of consistency of social experiences. >Worldviews, >Modernization, >M. Weber. IV 565 Crises/Habermas: system imbalances only have an effect as crises if the achievements of economy and state remain manifestly below an established aspirational level and impair the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld by causing conflicts and reactions of resistance there. IV 566 Before such conflicts endanger core areas of social integration, they are moved to the periphery: before anomic states occur, phenomena of withdrawal of legitimacy or motivation occur. However, if we succeed in intercepting control crises, i.e. perceived disturbances of material reproduction through recourse to resources of the lifeworld, pathologies of the lifeworld will arise. This can be imagined as an overexploitation of the remaining resources: culture and personality are being attacked in favour of a crisis-managing stabilisation of society. Phenomena of alienation and uncertainty of collective identities arise. See Colonization of the Lifeworld (Terminology/Habermas) and Reification/Lukács. 1. R. Döbert, Systemtheorie und die Entwicklung religiöser Deutungssysteme, Frankfurt, 1973 2. J. Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus, Frankfurt 1973, S. 9ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Crises | Rothbard | Rothbard III 535 Crises/Rothbard: The case of the retrogressing economy is [an] example of what we may call a crisis situation. A crisis situation is one in which firms, in the aggregate, are suffering losses. The crisis aspect of the case is aggravated by a decline in production through the abandonment of the highest production stages. The troubles arose from “undersaving” and “underinvestment,” i.e., a shift in people’s values so that they do not now choose to save and invest enough to enable continuation of production processes begun in the past. We cannot simply be critical of this shift, however, since the people, given existing conditions, have decided voluntarily that their time preferences are higher, and that they wish to consume more proportionately at present, even at the cost of lowering future productivity. Once an increase to a greater level of gross investment occurs, therefore, it is not maintained automatically. >Economy/Rothbard, >Productivity/Rothbard, >Capital consumption/Rothbard, >Production structure/Rothbard, >Economic cycles/Rothbard. Rothbard III 852 Crises/Business cycles/Rothbard: Historical events can be explained by laws of praxeology, which isolate causal connections. >Praxeology/Rothbard. Some of these events can be explained (…): a general price rise could result from an increase in the supply of money or from a fall in demand, unemployment from insistence on maintaining wage rates that have suddenly increased in real value, a reduction in unemployment from a fall in real wage rates, etc. >Money supply, >Demand for money, >Wages, >Unemployment. Free market: But one thing cannot be explained by any economics of the free market. And this is the crucial phenomenon of the crisis: Why is there a sudden revelation of business error? >Free market/Rothbard. Crisis: Suddenly, all or nearly all businessmen find that their investments and estimates have been in error, that they cannot sell their products for the prices which they had anticipated. This is the central problem of the business cycle, and this is the problem which any adequate theory of the cycle must explain. Interventions/pattern: (…) since the eighteenth century there has been an almost regular pattern of consistent clusters of error which always follow a boom and expansion of money and prices. In the Middle Ages and down to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, business crises rarely followed upon booms in this manner. They took place suddenly, in the midst of normal activity, and as the result of some obvious and identifiable external event. Thus, Scott lists crises in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England as irregular and caused by some obvious event: famine, plague, seizures of goods in war, bad harvest, crises in the cloth trade as a result of royal manipulations, seizure of bullion by the King, etc.(1) >Interventions, >Interventionism. But in the late seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there developed the aforementioned pattern of the business cycle, and it became obvious that the crisis and ensuing depression could no longer be attributed to some single external event or single act of government. >Depression. „Overoptimism“/“overpessimism“: We must search for the objective reasons that cause businessmen to become "overoptimistic." And they cannot be found on the free market.(2) >Business cycle/Schumpeter. 1. Cited in Wesley C. Mitchell, Business cycles, the Problem and lts Setting (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1927), pp. 76-77. 2. See V. Lewis Bassie: The whole psychological theory of the business cycle appears to be hardly more than an inversion of the real causal sequence. Expectations more nearly derive from objective conditions than produce them.... It is not the wave of optimism that makes times good. Good times are almost bound to bring a wave of optimism with them. On the other hand, when the decline comes, it comes not because anyone loses confidence, but because the basic economic forces are changing. (V. Lewis Bassie, "Recent Development in Short-Term Forecasting," Studies in Income and Wealth, XVII [Princeton, N.J.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1955), 10-12) |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Criteria | Popper | Flor II 479 Criterion: is no criterion of sense. The principle of falsification does not say that all other kinds of statements are cognitively pointless or empty. Even basic propositions can be criticized. Their assumption is not justified by our experiences. >Protocol sentences, >Sense/Science. --- Flor II 479 Differentiation Criterion/Popper: it is going to be a proposal for a determination. Only a matter of decision. Can only be justified by analyzing its logical consequences: >fertility, >explanatory power, etc. Principle of falsification = principle of differentiation. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Critical Junctures | Acemoglu | Acemoglu I 106 Critical Junctures/Acemoglu/Robinson: During critical junctures, a major event or confluence of factors disrupts the existing balance of political or economic power in a nation. These can affect only a single country, such as the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976, which at first created a critical juncture only for Communist China. Often, however, critical junctures affect a whole set of societies, in the way that, for example, colonization and then decolonization affected most of the globe. Such critical junctures are important because there are formidable barriers against gradual improvements, resulting from the synergy between extractive political and economic institutions and the support they give each other. Such critical junctures are important because there are formidable barriers against gradual improvements, resulting from the synergy between extractive political and economic institutions and the support they give each other. Once a critical juncture happens, the small differences that matter are the initial institutional differences that put in motion very different responses. >Institutional drift/Acemoglu, cf. >Path dependence. Acemoglu I 114 E.g., Western Europe, experiencing many of the same historical processes, had institutions similar to England at the time of the Industrial Revolution. There were small but consequential differences between England and the rest, which is why the Industrial Revolution happened in England and not France. This revolution then created an entirely new situation and considerably different sets of challenges to European regimes, which in turn spawned a new set of conflicts culminating in the French Revolution. The French Revolution was another critical juncture that led the institutions of Western Europe to converge with those of England, while Eastern Europe diverged further. Acemolgu I 242 Industrial Revolution: The Industrial Revolution created a transformative critical juncture for the whole world during the nineteenth century and beyond: those societies that Acemoglu I 243 allowed and incentivized their citizens to invest in new technologies could grow rapidly. But many around the world failed to do so—or explicitly chose not to do so. Nations under the grip of extractive political and economic institutions did not generate such incentives. Spain and Ethiopia provide examples where the absolutist control of political institutions and the implied extractive economic institutions choked economic incentives long before the dawn of the nineteenth century.(1) 1. The notion of a critical juncture was first developed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan, eds. (1967). Party System and Voter Alignments. New York: Free Press. |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Critical Junctures | Robinson | Acemoglu I 106 Critical Junctures/Acemoglu/Robinson: During critical junctures, a major event or confluence of factors disrupts the existing balance of political or economic power in a nation. These can affect only a single country, such as the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976, which at first created a critical juncture only for Communist China. Often, however, critical junctures affect a whole set of societies, in the way that, for example, colonization and then decolonization affected most of the globe. Such critical junctures are important because there are formidable barriers against gradual improvements, resulting from the synergy between extractive political and economic institutions and the support they give each other. Such critical junctures are important because there are formidable barriers against gradual improvements, resulting from the synergy between extractive political and economic institutions and the support they give each other. Once a critical juncture happens, the small differences that matter are the initial institutional differences that put in motion very different responses. >Institutional drift/Acemoglu, cf. >Path dependence. Acemoglu I 114 E.g., Western Europe, experiencing many of the same historical processes, had institutions similar to England at the time of the Industrial Revolution. There were small but consequential differences between England and the rest, which is why the Industrial Revolution happened in England and not France. This revolution then created an entirely new situation and considerably different sets of challenges to European regimes, which in turn spawned a new set of conflicts culminating in the French Revolution. The French Revolution was another critical juncture that led the institutions of Western Europe to converge with those of England, while Eastern Europe diverged further. Acemolgu I 242 Industrial Revolution: The Industrial Revolution created a transformative critical juncture for the whole world during the nineteenth century and beyond: those societies that Acemoglu I 243 allowed and incentivized their citizens to invest in new technologies could grow rapidly. But many around the world failed to do so—or explicitly chose not to do so. Nations under the grip of extractive political and economic institutions did not generate such incentives. Spain and Ethiopia provide examples where the absolutist control of political institutions and the implied extractive economic institutions choked economic incentives long before the dawn of the nineteenth century. |
EconRobin I James A. Robinson James A. Acemoglu Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 Robinson I Jan Robinson An Essay on Marxian Economics London 1947 Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Critical Theory | Habermas | IV 560 Critical Theory/Habermas: the ideology-critical examination with tradition can only aim at the truth content of philosophical concepts and problems, at the appropriation of their systematic content because criticism is guided by theoretical assumptions. >Truth content. At the time of Adorno, Benjamin, Marcuse, Löwenthal and Fromm, Critical Theory was still based on Marxist philosophy of history, namely the belief that the productive forces developed an objectively bursting force. Only under this condition could critique limit itself to "raising awareness of the possibilities to which the historical situation itself has matured"(1). >Th. W. Adorno, >W. Benjamin. Habermas: without a theory of history there could not be an immanent criticism of the figures of the objective mind. Otherwise, it would have to surrender historically to the respective standards of an epoch. The research program of the 1930s stood and fell with the historical-philosophical confidence in a rational potential of bourgeois culture that would be released in social movements under the pressure of the developed productive forces. >Philosophy of history, >Historiography, >History. Ironically, however, Horkheimer, Marcuse IV 561 and Adorno strengthen the assumption, particularly through their ideology-critical works, that culture loses its autonomy in post-liberal societies and is incorporated into the drive of the economic-administrative system in the de-sublimated forms of mass culture. >M. Horkheimer. Only instrumental reason, spread out into totality, is embodied in the totally administered society. This transforms everything that is into real abstraction (see Terminology/Marx). But then what is seized and distorted by these abstractions must escape empirical access. >Abstraction. HabermasVsCritical Theory: Critical Theory could not yet ascertain its normative foundations in historical philosophy. This soil was not viable for an empirical research programme. This was also shown by the fact that a clearly defined object area such as the communicative everyday practice of the lifeworld, in which structures of rationality are embodied and where processes of reification can be identified, was missing. >Lifeworld, >Rationality. Critical Theory suddenly contrasted the consciousness of individuals with the inwardly, intrapsychically only prolonged social integration mechanisms. Solution/Habermas: on the other hand, the theory of communicative action of the reasonable content of anthropologically deep-seated structures can be asserted in an analysis that is initially reconstructive, i.e. unhistorical. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. IV 562 It writes structures of action and understanding, which can be read from the intuitive knowledge of competent members of modern societies. There is no way back to a history theory that does not separate a fortiori between problems of developmental logic and development dynamics. >Progress. 1. H.Marcuse, Philosophie und Kritische Theorie, in. Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, Hg.6, 1937, S. 647. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Critical Theory | Honneth | Brocker I 789 Critical Theory/Honneth/Sigwart: Honneth combines the basic concerns of Critical Theories, such as their approaches to a reinterpretation of Hegel and Marx and the combination of social theoretical reflection with empirical research, including suggestions of American pragmatism. The works of George Herbert Mead (1) and John Dewey serve as reference points. (2) >Pragmatism, >G.H. Mead, >J. Dewey, >Th.W. Adorno, >M. Horkheimer, >H. Marcuse, >J. Habermas. 1. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p. 114-147 2. Ebenda p. 96-101. Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Honn I A. Honneth Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010 Honn II Axel Honneth Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Cross-Border Payments | Economic Theories | IMF III 8 Cross-Border Payments/Crypto/Economic theories/Luckner/Koepke/Sgherri: Graf von Luckner et al. (2023)(1) examine offchain peer-to-peer transactions involving bitcoin to identify trades in which the crypto currency is used to make cross-border and cross-currency transfers (rather than to ”invest” in Bitcoin itself). Importantly, the authors find such trades to be most common in economies with capital controls and exchange restrictions in place. Focusing on the case of China, Hu et al. (2021)(2) identify traders that buy bitcoin at Chinese exchanges and sell it at foreign exchanges with the aim of circumventing China’s outflow capital controls. The authors find that the aggregate volume of trades that evade capital controls is sizable and positively associated with Chinese economic policy uncertainty and the bitcoin premium in Renminbi. Using survey data and cross-country correlations, Alnasaa et al.(2022)(3) confirm that cryptoasset use has a significant positive association with increased perceived corruption and the intensity of capital controls. Chen and Sarkar (2022)(4) confirm the importance of capital controls as drivers of price differences across countries: in particular, price differences are found to correlate with the time-variant intensity of capital controls. The present paper* builds on this finding and proposes to make use of the price differential of crypto in the local vs. the external market as an indicator of excess demand for foreign currency (with the dataset made available online as a public good). In addition to serving as a vehicle for cross-border transactions, crypto assets have also been found to serve as hedging instruments against exchange rate and inflation risks - particularly in countries with weaker economic fundamentals (IMF, 2021)(5). Cerutti et al. (forthcoming) find that cross-border flows via bitcoin behave differently from portfolio capital flows as they are less sensitive to traditional drivers like the VIX and the U.S. dollar. IMF III 8/9 Our work also relates to prior research documenting the cross-county (and cross-exchange) differences in relative prices (Makarov and Schoar, 2020(6); Borri and Shakhnov, 2022(7); Hu and Zhang, 2023(8); Pieters, 2016(9); Pieters andVivanco, 2017(10); Tang and You, 2021(11); Borri and Shakhnov, 2022)(7) and studies that analyze the drivers of crypto prices (Liu and Tsyvinski, 2021(12); Glaser et al., 2014(13); Garcia et al., 2014)(14). Our model* and empirical evidence align with the view that longstanding premia in relative prices of crypto currencies reflect macro imbalances in the presence of of financial account restrictions; rendering them similar to parallel, or black market exchange rates.** Other works have instead described such price differences to be driven by risk premia (Borri and Shakhnov, 2022)(7); differences in regulation (Pieters and Vivanco, 2017)(10) or cultural levels of distrust prevalent in a given country (Tang and You, 2021)(11). >Payment systems, >Capital flight. * Clemens Graf von Luckner, Robin Koepke and Silvia Sgherri (2024). Crypto as a Marketplace for Capital Flight. IMF Working Paper 24/133. ** A view also supported by Makarov and Schoar (2020)(6); Graf von Luckner et al. (2023)(1) and Pieters (2016)(9), inter alia. 1. Graf von Luckner, C., Reinhart, C. M., and Rogoff, K. (2023). Decrypting new age international capital flows. Journal of Monetary Economics, 138:104–122. 2. Hu, J. and Zhang, A. L.(2023). Competition in the cryptocurrency exchange market. Available at SSRN 4472475. 3. Alnasaa, M., Gueorguiev, N., Honda, J., Imamoglu, E., Mauro, P., Primus, K., and Rozhkov,D. L.(2022). Crypto, corruption, and capital controls: Cross-country correlations. International Monetary Fund. 4. Chen, J. and Sarkar, A. (2022). Slowed-down capital: Using bitcoin to avoid capital controls. 5. IMF (2021). Global Financial Stability Report. October 2021.International Monetary Fund. 6. Makarov, I. and Schoar, A. (2020). Trading and arbitrage in cryptocurrency markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 135(2):293–319. 7. Borri, N. and Shakhnov, K. (2022). The cross-section of cryptocurrency returns. The Review of Asset Pricing Studies, 12(3):667–705. 8. Hu, J. and Zhang, A. L.(2023). Competition in the cryptocurrency exchange market. Available at SSRN 4472475. 9. Pieters, G. C. (2016). Does bitcoin reveal new information about exchange rates and financial integration? Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Working Paper, 292. 10. Pieters, G. and Vivanco, S. (2017). Financial regulations and price inconsistencies across bitcoin markets. Information Economics and Policy, 39:1–14. 11. Tang, B. and You, Y. (2021). Distrust and cryptocurrency. Available at SSRN 3981990. 12 Liu, Y. and Tsyvinski,A.(2021). Risks and returns of cryptocurrency. The Review of Financial Studies, 34(6):2689–2727. 13. Glaser, F., Zimmermann, K., Haferkorn, M., Weber, M. C., and Siering, M. (2014). Bitcoinasset or currency? revealing users’ hidden intentions. Revealing Users’ Hidden Intentions (April 15, 2014). ECIS. 14. Garcia, D., Tessone, C. J., Mavrodiev, P., and Perony, N. (2014). The digital traces of bubbles: feedback cycles between socio-economic signals in the bitcoin economy. Journal of the Royal Society Interface, 11(99):20140623. |
IMF II IMF Working Paper André Reslow Gabriel Söderberg, Cross-Border Payments with Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies: Design and Policy Considerations IMF Fintech Note 2024/002 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF III IMF Working Papers Clemens Graf von Luckner Robin Koepke, Crypto as a Marketplace for Capital Flight. IMF Working Paper 24/133 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF IV IMF Working Papers Marco Pani Rodolfo Maino, “Could Digital Currencies Lead to the Disappearance of Cash from the Market? Insights from a ’Merchant-Customer’ Model.” IMF Working Paper WP/25/56 Washington, DC. 2025 |
| Cross-Border Payments | IMF Working Papers | IMF II 8 Cross-Border Payments/Crypto/IMF/Reslow/Söderberg/Tsuda: There are three prevailing models for processing cross-border payments: correspondent banking, closed loops, and aggregators. Hybrid forms are also possible, for example a closed-loop system utilizing correspondent banking relationships to maintain its liquidity and manage risks. - Correspondent banking is one of the most common methods to facilitate cross-border payments. It involves two or more banks, typically located in different countries, establishing relationships to facilitate cross-border transactions. In this relationship, one bank acts as a correspondent bank and provides services to another bank, the respondent bank, sometimes with the use of intermediary banks. The respondent bank uses the correspondent bank’s services to facilitate cross-border payments for its customers. - A closed-loop system operates within a specific network, usually owned by a single company, such that the payer and the payee interact with the same entity—exemplified by Western Union, PayPal, Wise, and Revolut. The payment is processed within the network, allowing quick and secure transfer of funds between accounts. The closed-loop system can facilitate cross-border payments because it has a local presence in multiple countries or has agreements with banks or financial institutions in the countries where the payment is being sent or received. - Cross-border payments via aggregators refer to the process of PSPs using a third party, the aggregator, to process cross-border payments—exemplified by VISA, MasterCard, and Wise Platform. These payment aggregators establish a global network and do not communicate directly with end users but with PSPs, who interact with the end users. The aggregatorstypically use a correspondent banking network to gain access, but can also participate directly in local financial market infrastructures (FMIs). IMF II 14 Nexus Project: Many central banks are investigating the use of proxies, sometimes called aliases, such as phone numbers, nicknames, and email addresses, for addressing CBDC payments domestically. Cross-border addressing would be significantly more straightforward if the same proxies used domestically could be used also for cross-border payments, since they are more familiar to the users. IMF II 15 Indeed, this is addressed in the Nexus project when connecting fast payment systems, such that Nexus allows the payer to use the proxy format used in the system of the payee.(1) In the Nexus blueprint, each system shares the servicelevel description - describing, among other things, the account number format and proxy format - so the payer PSP can retrieve this information. The address book with proxies would likely need to be made available to foreign PSPs to validate the address and perform compliance checks. Initiating a cross-border CBDC payment with only a phone number would probably not meet most countries' regulatory requirements. Hence, central banks should consider using proxies for simplified addressing for the end user and options for making the full address book available to foreign PSPs for compliance checks (such as those required for AML/CFT purposes). Furthermore, the authentication of users via digital ID systems is envisioned for many CBDC systems. Having standardized digital ID frameworks across jurisdictions would certainly be beneficial in facilitating more efficient communication and messaging across borders and systems.(2) >Payment systems, >Capital flight. 1. The Nexus project is led by BISIH Singapore Centre, and in 2022, they built a working prototype to connect the test systems of three established instant payment systems (IPSs): The Eurozone's TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) system, operated by Bank of Italy on behalf of the Eurosystem, Malaysia's Real-time Retail Payments Platform (RPP), operated by Payments Network Malaysia (PayNet), and Singapore's Fast and Secure Transfers (FAST) payment system, operated by Banking Computer Services (BCS). The BISIH Singapore Centre is now collaborating with the central banks of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand as they work towards connecting their domestic payment systems. For more details about Nexus, see: https://www.bis.org/about/bisih/topics/fmis/nexus.htm 2. Related to information and identity sharing is the exploration of privacy-enhancing technologies by several central banks (see, for example, Project Aurora and Project Aurum 2.0, from the BIS Innovation Hub) demonstrating that the combination of identifiers and privacy-enhancing technologies can enable both efficient identification of all parties and ensure high levels of privacy. |
IMF II IMF Working Paper André Reslow Gabriel Söderberg, Cross-Border Payments with Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies: Design and Policy Considerations IMF Fintech Note 2024/002 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF III IMF Working Papers Clemens Graf von Luckner Robin Koepke, Crypto as a Marketplace for Capital Flight. IMF Working Paper 24/133 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF IV IMF Working Papers Marco Pani Rodolfo Maino, “Could Digital Currencies Lead to the Disappearance of Cash from the Market? Insights from a ’Merchant-Customer’ Model.” IMF Working Paper WP/25/56 Washington, DC. 2025 |
| Crypto and Banking | Congressional Research Service (CRS) | CRS II 13 Banking Services for Crypto/CRS/Tierno/Labonte/Scott: A blanket ban on providing traditional banking services to crypto firms would have been particularly problematic because of controversies over whether banks can deny services to specific industries. Under then-Acting Comptroller of the Currency Brian Brooks, the OCC promulgated a “fair access” rule to codify guidance that a bank should make risk-based assessments on individual customers (rather than broader decisions about groups of customers) when providing financial services, but after Brooks stepped down the rule was paused before it went into effect. However, the OCC stated at the time that guidance “stating that banks should avoid termination of broad categories of customers without assessing individual customer risk remains in effect.”(1) Nevertheless, some crypto market participants have expressed concern that they are having trouble accessing traditional banking services because of de-risking concerns, which they have referred to as “Operation Chokepoint 2.0.”(2) To “de-risk,” banks may close accounts to avoid reputational, legal, or regulatory risk, such AML (Anti-Money laundry) violations.(3) >Cryptocurrency risks, >Cryptocurrency, >Crypto transactions, >Fake transactions, >Cross-border payments, >Money laundry, >Crypto regulation, >Blockchain, >Bitcoin, >Crypto Firms, >Crypto and Banking, >Payment systems, >Stablecoins, >Ethereum, >Wash trade, >Crypto and Energy. 1. The OCC proposed the rule in November 2020 and finalized the rule on January 14, 2021. See OCC, “OCC Finalizes Rule Requiring Large Banks to Provide Fair Access to Bank Services, Capital, and Credit,” January 14, 2021, https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2021/nr-occ-2021-8.html; OCC, “OCC Puts Hold on Fair Access Rule,” January 28, 2021, https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2021/nr-occ-2021-14.html; CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10571, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s Fair Access to Financial Services Rule, by M. Maureen Murphy 2. ee, for example, Alternative Investment Management Association, The Debanking Dilemma, https://www.aima.org/compass/insights/digital-assets/the-debanking-dilemma.html. a 2012-2017 Operation Choke Point was a Department of Justice (DOJ) initiative that targeted consumer fraud facilitated by banks and third-party payment processors (TPPPs) that resulted in unauthorized transfers from consumers’ bank accounts. Critics alleged that Operation Chokepoint abused legal authorities to pressure banks to terminate relationships with lawful—but politically disfavored— businesses. See Victoria Guida, “Justice Department to End Obama-era ‘Operation Choke Point,’” August 17, 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/17/trump-reverses-obama-operation-chokepoint-241767. 3. Operation Choke Point was a controversial 2012-2017 Department of Justice (DOJ) initiative that targeted consumer fraud facilitated by banks and third-party payment processors (TPPPs) that resulted in unauthorized transfers from consumers’ bank accounts. See CRS In Focus IF12886, De-Banking/De-Risking: Issues for the 119th Congress, by Andrew P. Scott. |
CRS I Congressional Research Service (CRS) Marc Labonte Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? Washington: Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress 2007 CRS II Congressional Research Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Marc Labonte, Banking and Cryptocurrency: Policy Issues. CRS Congressional research Service Report R48430. Washington, DC. 2025 CRS III Congressional Research Service (CRS) Corrie E. Clark Heather L. Greenley, Bitcoin, Blockchain, and the Energy Sector. Washington, DC. 2019 CRS IV Congressional Reserch Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Cryptocurrency: Selected Policy Issues Congressional Reserch Service CRS Report R47425 Washington, DC. 2023 |
| Crypto and Macroeconomics | IMF Working Papers | IMF V 3 Crypto and Macroeconomics/IMF/Hacibedel/Perez-Saiz: Linkages of crypto assets with the rest of the economy are still limited but are being established rapidly as crypto assets become more widely used. While crypto asset technologies could create de facto a new and alternative financial system, linkages with the traditional financial sector can be substantial. Considering how crypto assets interact with the real, fiscal, or external and financial sectors, they may pose significant risks to macroeconomic and financial stability. >Cryptocurrency risks, >Cryptocurrency, >Crypto transactions, >Fake transactions, >Cross-border payments, >Money laundry, >Crypto regulation, >Blockchain, >Bitcoin, >Crypto Firms, >Crypto and Banking, >Payment systems, >Stablecoins. Literature: A recent G20 note prepared by the IMF summarizes implications of crypto assets for domestic and external stability and the structure of financial systems (IMF 2023b)(1). Crypto assets have also been widely covered in recent IMF Global Financial Stability Reports (IMF, 2021a(2); IMF, 2022a(3)), Article IV staff reports (e.g., El Salvador 2021(4), Marshall Islands 2022, or Central African Republic 2023(5)), and Financial System Stability Assessments (e.g. Sweden 2023, Ireland 2022, or Hong Kong 2021), among others. 1. International Monetary Fund, 2023b. G20 Note on the Macrofinancial Implications of Crypto Assets, IMF G20 Note, February 2023. 2. International Monetary Fund, 2021a. The Crypto Ecosystem and Financial Stability Challenges. Global Financial Stability Report, Chapter 2, October 2021. 3. International Monetary Fund, 2022a. The Rapid Growth of Fintech: Vulnerabilities and Challenges for Financial Stability. Global Financial Stability Report, Chapter 3, April 2022. 4. International Monetary Fund, 2022c. El Salvador: 2021 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for El Salvador, January 2022. 5. International Monetary Fund, 2023c. Central African Republic: 2023 Article IV Consultation and request for a 38-month arrangement under the Extended Credit Facility-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for the Central African Republic, May 2023. |
IMF II IMF Working Paper André Reslow Gabriel Söderberg, Cross-Border Payments with Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies: Design and Policy Considerations IMF Fintech Note 2024/002 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF III IMF Working Papers Clemens Graf von Luckner Robin Koepke, Crypto as a Marketplace for Capital Flight. IMF Working Paper 24/133 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF IV IMF Working Papers Marco Pani Rodolfo Maino, “Could Digital Currencies Lead to the Disappearance of Cash from the Market? Insights from a ’Merchant-Customer’ Model.” IMF Working Paper WP/25/56 Washington, DC. 2025 |
| Crypto Debate | Congressional Research Service (CRS) | CRS IV 2 Crypto Debate/CRS/Tierno: Using crypto for routine payments was not attractive when holding it could yield significant return.(1) Its novelty and opaqueness and the mystery behind its origins sustain a lore that boosted cryptocurrency’s popularity. At the same time, the industry is rife with ideological tensions that have become more visible since the market lost more than 70% of its peak market capitalization and some of its most visibleCompanies- including FTX, which at its peak had been the third-largest crypto exchange - collapsed.(2) VsCrypto/VsBitcoin/VsBlockchain: Some say the industry is a technological solution in search of a problem. Some who espouse this view note that the technology and industry as a whole do not have an economic or productive capacity beyond speculation or the expectation of appreciation.(3) Moreover, if there is no productive use for crypto, then its large carbon emissions and energy use appear more problematic, according to this view. The Bitcoin network alone, for example, uses as much energy and produces emissions comparable to nation states.(4) Proponents of crypto disagree, believing that it is a new and innovative technology with potentially valuable and paradigmshifting applications, many of which may not yet be realized. Internally, the recent and relentless failure of centralized crypto institutions highlights the tension between (1) factions that adhere to the idealistic origins of decentralization and (2) the institutions that have fueled its trajectory from obscure technology to financial mainstay. The rise of cryptocurrencies has produced a host of policy issues that may be of interest to Congress. In light of crypto’s various potential use cases and factions (e.g., payments vs. speculative investment, decentralized vs. centralized), crypto has become a Rorschach test of sorts in which users and policymakers see in it what they value most and interpret policy considerations through that same lens. The host of policy issues raised includes, among others: managing the tension between public interest in privacy and government desire to monitor and eliminate illicit financial activity, the ongoing debate on the adequacy of the existing regulatory structure, determining whether cryptocurrencies should be considered currencies or property for tax purposes, and the industry’s potential contribution to climate change. >Cryptocurrency risks, >Cryptocurrency, >Crypto transactions, >Fake transactions, >Cross-border payments, >Money laundry, >Crypto regulation, >Blockchain, >Bitcoin, >Crypto Firms, >Crypto and Banking, >Payment systems, >Stablecoins, >Ethereum, >Wash trade, >Crypto and Energy. 1. For a discussion of the conceptual foundation of cryptocurrency, see CRS Report R45427, Cryptocurrency: The Economics of Money and Selected Policy Issues, by David W. Perkins. 2. Associated Press, “The Downfall of FTX’s Sam Bankman-Fried Sends Shockwaves Through the Crypto World,” November 14, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/11/14/1136482889/ftx-sam-bankman-fried-shockwaves-crypto. 3. See, for example, Joe Weisenthal and Tracy Alloway, “Aaron Lammer on Yield Farming and Trading in the World of DeFi,” Bloomberg Odd Lots (Podcast), May 22, 2021, at 43:00, https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/aaron-lammeron-yield-farming-and-trading-in-the/id1056200096?i=1000522481080; and Hilary Allen, “The Superficial Allure of Crypto,” IMF Finance and Development, September 2022, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2022/09/ Point-of-View-the-superficial-allure-of-crypto-Hilary-Allen. 4. For comparison and other Bitcoin-related energy statistics, see the Cambridge Bitcoin Electricity Index at https://ccaf.io/cbeci/ghg/comparisons. |
CRS I Congressional Research Service (CRS) Marc Labonte Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? Washington: Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress 2007 CRS II Congressional Research Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Marc Labonte, Banking and Cryptocurrency: Policy Issues. CRS Congressional research Service Report R48430. Washington, DC. 2025 CRS III Congressional Research Service (CRS) Corrie E. Clark Heather L. Greenley, Bitcoin, Blockchain, and the Energy Sector. Washington, DC. 2019 CRS IV Congressional Reserch Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Cryptocurrency: Selected Policy Issues Congressional Reserch Service CRS Report R47425 Washington, DC. 2023 |
| Crypto Firms | Congressional Research Service (CRS) | CRS II 19 Crypto Firms/CRS/Tierno/Labonte/Scott: In addition to traditional banks providing banking services to crypto, some new entrant firms have sought federal or state charters to provide crypto specific services. Instead of banks engaging in crypto, in a sense, crypto firms are seeking to engage in banking. Federal and state regulators grant charters to financial businesses that seek to offer banking services. It is common for companies with different lines of business to seek to acquire banking charters or existing banks, and regulators follow statutory guidelines when reviewing applications for charters. There are a variety of bank charters offered at the state and federal levels, but conceptually, the main charters are full-service bank charters and limited purpose bank charters. Another option is for a crypto firm to provide banking services by purchasing a controlling stake in an existing bank, subject to Federal Reserve approval.(1) CRS II 20 (Noncontrolling stakes by investors are not subject to regulatory approval and are not necessarily publicly disclosed.) In the process of doing so, it would become a BHC and become subject to Federal Reserve oversight and the regulatory requirements of the Bank Holding Company Act. Generally, firms engaged in permissible financial activities (…) may own banks if they qualify as FHCs and their applications are approved by the Fed under the statutory guidelines.(2) For example, the holding company and its nonbank subsidiaries must be able to serve as a source of strength to the bank and not pose a safety and soundness risk to the bank.(3) >Cryptocurrency risks, >Cryptocurrency, >Crypto transactions, >Fake transactions, >Cross-border payments, >Money laundry, >Crypto regulation, >Blockchain, >Bitcoin, >Crypto Firms, >Crypto and Banking, >Payment systems, >Stablecoins, >Ethereum, >Wash trade, >Crypto and Energy. 1. There is an example of a crypto firm taking an ownership stake in a bank, but it is unclear if it was a controlling stake that would have required regulatory approval. In 2022, FBH, a BHC that owns Farmington (later Moonstone) Bank, announced that Alameda Research Ventures, a “crypto hedge fund” that was part of the FTX Group, was investing $11.5 million in private equity funding in FBH. According to court filings by the firm hired to recover assets in FTX’s bankruptcy, FTX group received “an approximately 10% interest in FBH” in exchange for this investment, “meaning Plaintiff paid an amount equal to double the bank’s entire reported net worth for just a 10% interest.” Soon after, the one-branch bank in rural Washington changed its name to Moonstone and changed its business model to focus on cryptocurrencies, cannabis, and banking-as-a service. FTX also held deposits at Moonstone Bank. In 2023, the Fed issued a cease-and-desist order to FBH to wind down Moonstone because it had violated a condition of the original regulatory approval of FBH’s purchase of Moonstone—that it would not change its business model (digital assets were explicitly included as an example). Legally, Alameda could take a controlling stake in FBH only if approved by the Fed under the Change in Bank Control Act approval process. CRS was unable to locate any notification of approval by the Fed. Determination of control is complex and case specific, but the first litmus test is whether the investor has at least 25% of any class of voting securities or is the only investor with at least 10% of any class of voting securities that are registered with the SEC. The bankruptcy filing claims that “Plaintiff did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the foregoing payment as the investment was virtually worthless, including because, among other reasons, Plaintiff’s investment for a 10% interest was double the reported value of the bank, and Defendants’ business plan for Farmington centered on (business model) transformations that violated the conditions that the Federal Reserve had placed on FBH’s acquisition of Farmington.” When FBH purchased Farmington in 2021, it was 100% owned by Jean Chalopin, who was a defendant described in the legal filing as FBH’s principal shareholder and the company’s President and Chairman. See FTX TRADING LTD., et al., CLIFTON BAY INVESTMENTS LLC f/k/a ALAMEDA RESEARCH VENTURES LLC, Plaintiff, v. FARMINGTON STATE CORPORATION (f/k/a FARMINGTON STATE BANK, d/b/a GENIOME BANK, d/b/a MOONSTONE BANK), FBH CORPORATION, and JEAN CHALOPIN, Defendants. Chapter 11, Case No. 22-11068 (JTD) IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE, filed November 8, 2024, https://restructuring.ra.kroll.com/FTX/ExternalCallDownloadPDF?id1=MzIyNDY5Mg==&id2=0&cid=0; In the Matter of FARMINGTON STATE BANK, Farmington, Washington and FBH CORPORATION, Baltimore, Maryland, Docket No. 23-005-B-HC, 23-005-B-SM, Order to Cease and Desist Issued Upon Consent Pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as Amended and Section 30A.04.450 of the Revised Code of Washington, July 18, 2023, tps://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/enf20230817a1.pdf; UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, - v. -SAMUEL BANKMAN-FRIED a/k/a “SBF,” Defendant. GOVERNMENT’S FORFEITURE BILL OF PARTICULARS, 22 Cr. 673 (LAK), January 20, 2023, https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.590940/gov.uscourts.nysd.590940.49.0.pdf; Moonstone Bank, “FBH Corp. raises $11.5M in private equity funding from Alameda Research Ventures,” press release, July 22, 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20221123140831/https://www.moonstonebank.com/post/fbh-corp-raises-11-5m-inprivate-equity-funding-from-alameda-research-ventures. 2. In other words, a firm’s crypto activities would need to be approved as financial in nature before the firm could purchase a bank. 3. For more information see CRS Report R48291, Bank Holding Companies: Background and Issues for Congress, by Marc Labonte. |
CRS I Congressional Research Service (CRS) Marc Labonte Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? Washington: Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress 2007 CRS II Congressional Research Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Marc Labonte, Banking and Cryptocurrency: Policy Issues. CRS Congressional research Service Report R48430. Washington, DC. 2025 CRS III Congressional Research Service (CRS) Corrie E. Clark Heather L. Greenley, Bitcoin, Blockchain, and the Energy Sector. Washington, DC. 2019 CRS IV Congressional Reserch Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Cryptocurrency: Selected Policy Issues Congressional Reserch Service CRS Report R47425 Washington, DC. 2023 |
| Crypto History | Congressional Research Service (CRS) | CRS IV 0 Crypto history/CRS/Tierno: Cryptocurrencies are digital financial instruments exchanged across public blockchains, and recorded on ledgers, that do not require central intermediaries (e.g., commercial banks, central banks) for clearing and settlement. Satoshi Nakamoto, an anonymous individual or collective, introduced the first cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, in a whitepaper in 2008* and a subsequent blockchain in 2009. While Bitcoin was a novel form of financial transaction, it built on technology that had been decades in the making, including blockchains, cryptography, and consensus protocols, among others. >Central Banks, >Cryptocurrency risks, >Cryptocurrency, >Crypto transactions, >Fake transactions, >Cross-border payments, >Money laundry, >Crypto regulation, >Blockchain, >Bitcoin, >Crypto Firms, >Crypto and Banking, >Payment systems, >Stablecoins, >Ethereum, >Wash trade, >Crypto and Energy. Cryptocurrency was initially developed as a payments system. Cryptocurrency transactions have proven to take longer and be costlier to settle than existing payments options, creating challenges for wider adoption. Adoption challenges, combined with crypto’s periodic bouts of sharp price fluctuations, have fueled crypto’s use as a speculative investment. Once used by a small subset of computer scientists, cryptocurrency has gone global. The crypto market capitalization reached a high of nearly $3 trillion in November 2021, with an estimate of more than 10,000 cryptocurrencies in circulation. Currently ((s) written in 2023), there is no overarching regulatory regime for crypto. Federal regulators have adapted existing regulations where cryptocurrency resembles traditional products and services in the financial sector. Regulation has generally flowed from enforcement actions rather than rulemaking, limiting the reach of regulators and creating regulatory ambiguity for the cryptoindustry. Federal financial regulators claim varying degrees of authority over different corners of the industry. CRS IV 1 In January 2009, Satoshi Nakamoto - the pseudonym of an unidentified computer scientist (or collective of scientists) - mined the first block (or group of transactions) on the Bitcoin network a few months after publishing the “Bitcoin Whitepaper.”(1) This Genesis Block - as the first transaction on the Bitcoin network was called - included an encoded message that referred to a newspaper headline published around that time: “Chancellor on brink of second bailout for banks.”(2) The article the block referenced described a bailout for English banks in the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis. While the message was relevant historical context for when the transaction occurred, transactions processed on the Bitcoin network include dates and timestamps, so the reference to the English bank bailout was unnecessary. Instead, Satoshi Nakamoto and commentators have since clarified that this allusion to banking conditions was intended to draw a contrast between the new financial paradigm Bitcoin represented and the traditional financial system.(3) These early developers did not want to rely on a financial system dependent on third parties - especially governments and central and commercial banks - but instead created a system to bypass them. Cryptocurrency’s initial use case was as a combined payment system and unit of account that eschewed intermediaries. Traditional payments systems are composed of various banks, payments processors, credit card networks, central clearinghouses, central banks, and a vast technological infrastructure that supports it. Traditional system/transactions: In this system, banks ultimately validate customer transactions and log the details of the transactions digitally in their private ledgers. Banks then submit these details via messaging networks, which authorize transactions to occur, and ultimately facilitate the exchange of funds at banks’ master accounts at a national central bank, which in the United States is the Federal Reserve. As such, transactions between two individuals with accounts at two or more different financial institutions involve at least two commercial bank ledgers and the ledger of at least one central party, which acts as an intermediating agent for the transacting parties. Cryptocurrency: Cryptocurrency, on the other hand, is a payment and value storage system that functions as “electronic cash protected through cryptographic mechanisms instead of a central repository or authority.”(4) CRS IV 1/2 In lieu of independent financial institutions with individual ledgers relying on third- party mediation and securing consumer trust, the crypto system consists of a single ledger distributed to all members of the network that is constantly updated. Users believe the system works because they can see it and track it. The system uses cryptography and incentives for diverse participants to secure the network. Since 2009, the crypto industry - which now consists of thousands of cryptocurrencies and various applications - has experienced both relatively low adoption as a payment tool and various periods of rapid price increases and decreases. These two facets combined have helped fuel crypto as a speculative asset at the expense of its use as a payment tool. In this context, crypto became a victim of its own success. Using crypto for routine payments was not attractive when holding it could yield significant return.(5) *See the full paper under http://www.bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf 1. For information on the Genesis Block, see Brenden Rearick, “What Is the Genesis Block? 8 Things to Know as Investors Celebrate ‘Bitcoin’s Birthday,’” Yahoo, January 3, 2022, https://www.yahoo.com/now/genesis-block-8-things-know-215101010.html. Satoshi Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System,” October 10, 2008, https://Bitcoin.org/Bitcoin.pdf. 2. The headline is from a story published in The Times on January 3, 2009. See this article at Bryce Elder, “Happy Birthday to a Giant Ponzi Scheme,’ from Bitcoin’s Accidental Co-Creator,” Financial Times, January 3, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/465fb224-3fc9-4b37-81d4-39eece1041df. 3. Pymnts, “A Bitcoin Declaration of Financial Independence,” July 4, 2022, https://www.pymnts.com/blockchain/Bitcoin/2022/a-Bitcoin-declaration-of-financial-independence/. See http://p2pfoundation.ning.com/forum/topics/ Bitcoin-open-source?id=2003008%3ATopic%3A9402&page=1 for a blog post attributed to Satoshi Nakamoto on the role of central banks in the past. 4. Dylan Yaga et al., Blockchain Technology Overview, National Institute of Standards and Technology, October 2018, p. iv, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2018/NIST.IR.8202.pdf. 5. For a discussion of the conceptual foundation of cryptocurrency, see CRS Report R45427, Cryptocurrency: The Economics of Money and Selected Policy Issues, by David W. Perkins. |
CRS I Congressional Research Service (CRS) Marc Labonte Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? Washington: Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress 2007 CRS II Congressional Research Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Marc Labonte, Banking and Cryptocurrency: Policy Issues. CRS Congressional research Service Report R48430. Washington, DC. 2025 CRS III Congressional Research Service (CRS) Corrie E. Clark Heather L. Greenley, Bitcoin, Blockchain, and the Energy Sector. Washington, DC. 2019 CRS IV Congressional Reserch Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Cryptocurrency: Selected Policy Issues Congressional Reserch Service CRS Report R47425 Washington, DC. 2023 |
| Crypto Mining | Congressional Research Service (CRS) | CRS IV 5 Crypto mining/CRS/Tierno: Different cryptocurrencies may have different criteria. But in the proof of work consensus mechanisms, the hash must meet certain parameters for the block to be added to the chain. Namely, a certain number of leading zeros must precede it. Because miners use a standard program - which creates a random hash from the block data, previous hash, and nonce - miners cannot control the output they generate when hashing and must continue the process each time using different nonces until one miner achieves a random hash that meets the difficulty requirement. (Each time a hash is attempted, computers create a random 64-digit alphanumeric string of characters. The level of difficulty of finding a correct random output increases with the requisite number of preceding zeros.)(1) The miner that generates a suitable hash is awarded a block reward. Then the system sets about it all over again, mining the next block. Generating hashes quickly requires significant computational power, energy consumption, and increasingly specialized and expensive equipment. While being the first to generate the hash is difficult, validating that the solution is correct is easy. Moreover, because data from the preceding block is used as an input for hashing the subsequent block, tampering with any previous block - in effect attempting to change the ledger of who owns what - would show in subsequent blocks.(2) All participants would be aware if a miner retroactively tries to change a previous block (or mines a block with a transaction that tries to do so). Typically, miners want only to mine on top of blocks that have been appropriately mined. Herein lies the mechanism that allows disparate nodes that do not know each other to form a consensus.(3) Miners would not want to add subsequent blocks to a bad block out of fear that that path of the chain will be abandoned, a new strand of the chain created, and the cryptocurrency held on the old strand of blocks - called a fork - deemed worthless.(4) The second cryptographic function that secures blockchain-based transactions is asymmetric-key cryptography, sometimes referred to as public key cryptography. Asymmetric-key cryptography uses two keys - private and public - to secure verification of a transaction. System participants use the public key to encrypt the data and, as the name suggests, can publish it and make it widely available. Encrypted messages can then be sent on to their recipients and may be decrypted only by the private key, which is (or should be) kept secret.(5) CRS IV 6 Participants use private keys to digitally sign transactions. The authenticity of private keys is verified with the public key.(6) Importantly, it is infeasible to ascertain the private key from the available public key, therefore allowing users to share public keys. When executing transactions, individuals use private keys to digitally sign transactions such that a recipient can use the associated public key to confirm the authenticity of the sender.(7) >Cryptocurrency risks, >Cryptocurrency, >Crypto transactions, >Fake transactions, >Cross-border payments, >Money laundry, >Crypto regulation, >Blockchain, >Bitcoin, >Crypto Firms, >Crypto and Banking, >Payment systems, >Stablecoins, >Ethereum, >Wash trade, >Crypto and Energy. 1. Anders Brownworth, “How Blockchain Works, Blockchain 101 - A Visual Demo,” http://blockchain.mit.edu/howblockchain-works. For difficulty of generating preceding zeroes, see Vitalik Buterin, “What Proof of Stake Is and Why It Matters,” Bitcoin Magazine, August 26, 2013, https://Bitcoinmagazine.com/culture/what-proof-of-stake-is-and-whyit-matters-1377531463. 2. Brownworth, “How Blockchain Works.” To illustrate, this paragraph may be hashed to produce a hash output. Moreover, data created from the hash is used as an input for transaction data in the next block, and any tampering to a previous block would show in subsequent ones. If even one character were changed and the paragraph rehashed, the function would produce an entirely different hash, making the edits immediately obvious, akin to a word processing version of track changes. 3. Yaga et al., Blockchain Technology Overview, p. 18. 4. This is commonly referred to as the Byzantine Generals problem. For more on the Byzantine Generals Problem, see Leslie Lamport, Robert Shostak, and Marshall Pease, “The Byzantine Generals Problem,” ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems, vol. 4, no. 3 (July 1982), pp. 382-340, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/ research/uploads/prod/2016/12/The-Byzantine-Generals-Problem.pdf. 5. See CRS Report R44642, Encryption: Frequently Asked Questions, by Chris Jaikaran, and Yaga et al., Blockchain Technology Overview, p. 11. According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, “One can encrypt with a private key and then decrypt with the public key. Alternately, one can encrypt with a public key and then decrypt with a private key” (Yaga, et al., Blockchain Technology Overview, p. 11). 6. Yaga, et al., Blockchain Technology Overview, p. 11. 7. See CRS Report R45116, Blockchain: Background and Policy Issues, by Chris Jaikaran; Gary Gensler, “Blockchain and Money,” Massachusetts Institute of Technoloby, 2018, at 55:20, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 0UvVOMZqpEA; and Yaga et al., Blockchain Technology Overview, p. 11. |
CRS I Congressional Research Service (CRS) Marc Labonte Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? Washington: Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress 2007 CRS II Congressional Research Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Marc Labonte, Banking and Cryptocurrency: Policy Issues. CRS Congressional research Service Report R48430. Washington, DC. 2025 CRS III Congressional Research Service (CRS) Corrie E. Clark Heather L. Greenley, Bitcoin, Blockchain, and the Energy Sector. Washington, DC. 2019 CRS IV Congressional Reserch Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Cryptocurrency: Selected Policy Issues Congressional Reserch Service CRS Report R47425 Washington, DC. 2023 |
| Crypto Pseudonymity | IMF Working Papers | IMF VI 3 Pseudonymity of cryptocurrency/IMF/Reuter: (…] [there is a] common misconception - contrary to popular belief, the vast majority of crypto assets do not provide anonymity. Every transaction is publicly recorded on a freely accessible ledger known as a blockchain. The perception of anonymity arises because blockchain data is pseudonymized; rather than recording personal information such as names or residences, blockchains log only the wallet addresses of senders and receivers. A wallet address, typically a long hexadecimal string such as '0xdFDEe1155E1dd7c01774560C6E98C41B7da945dB', does not directly reveal personal information about the user. The key challenge in mapping the geography of crypto asset flows is supplementing blockchain data with useful information about senders and receivers. Our methodology* addresses this challenge by enabling the estimation of the geographic region of any arbitrary self-custodial wallet** in the Ethereum ecosystem. >Cryptocurrency risks, >Cryptocurrency, >Crypto transactions, >Fake transactions, >Cross-border payments, >Money laundry, >Crypto regulation, >Blockchain, >Bitcoin, >Crypto Firms, >Crypto and Banking, >Payment systems, >Stablecoins, >Ethereum. * Marco Reuter. (2025) Decrypting Crypto: How to Estimate International Stablecoin Flows. IMF Working Paper 25/141. ** A self-custodial wallet is a type of crypto wallet where the user has full control and responsibility over their funds, without relying on third-party intermediaries for custody. Name systems allow users to replace the long hexadecimal strings with human-readable names. A similar system, the Domain Name System (DNS) is at the core of the internet, replacing numerical IP-addresses with domain names in the common “www.xyz.com” format. |
IMF II IMF Working Paper André Reslow Gabriel Söderberg, Cross-Border Payments with Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies: Design and Policy Considerations IMF Fintech Note 2024/002 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF III IMF Working Papers Clemens Graf von Luckner Robin Koepke, Crypto as a Marketplace for Capital Flight. IMF Working Paper 24/133 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF IV IMF Working Papers Marco Pani Rodolfo Maino, “Could Digital Currencies Lead to the Disappearance of Cash from the Market? Insights from a ’Merchant-Customer’ Model.” IMF Working Paper WP/25/56 Washington, DC. 2025 |
| Crypto Taxation | Congressional Research Service (CRS) | CRS IV 28 Crypto Taxes/CRS/Tierno: The Internal Revenue Service treats cryptocurrency as property for tax purposes. This means that receipt of crypto as a form of payment, and the sale or exchange of crypto, may have tax consequences.(1) Whether the resulting income (or loss) from a transaction involving crypto is characterized as capital or ordinary income would depend on how such assets were being used.(2) For example, crypto received in exchange for a service would be categorized as ordinary income,and the taxpayer would include the fair market value of the crypto received when computing gross income.(3) Alternatively, when crypto is exchanged for another asset or converted into fiat currency (e.g., dollars), the transaction would result in a capital gain or loss.(4) The amount of the gain or loss would depend on fair market value of the asset received and the taxpayer’s “basis” in the crypto (which is generally the fair market value of the crypto at the time of the transaction).(5) Because cryptocurrencies are not widely accepted for day-to-day payments, cryptocurrency owners must often convert their cryptocurrency into fiat currency before it can be used. That conversion would typically constitute a taxable event.(6) The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58) imposes additional data reporting requirements for brokers. Brokers must provide returns (1099-B) for taxpayers’ trades performed on their platforms.(7) The law also requires that individuals and companies who receive more than $10,000 in crypto proceeds from a single transaction in the course of their trade or business file returns with respect to the transaction.(8) Such information must include the identity of the sender.(9) >Cryptocurrency risks, >Cryptocurrency, >Crypto transactions, >Fake transactions, >Cross-border payments, >Money laundry, >Crypto regulation, >Blockchain, >Bitcoin, >Crypto Firms, >Crypto and Banking, >Payment systems, >Stablecoins, >Ethereum, >Wash trade, >Crypto and Energy. 1. Internal Revenue Service (IRS), “Frequently Asked Questions on Virtual Currency Transactions,” https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/frequently-asked-questions-on-virtual-currency-transactions. 2. IRS, “Digital Assets,” https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/digital-assets. 3. IRS, LB&I International Practice Service Concept Unit, p. 3, https://www.irs.gov/pub/int_practice_units/ fcu_cu_c_18_2_1_04.pdf; IRS, Notice 2014-21: IRS Virtual Currency Guidance, April 14, 2014, https://www.irs.gov/irb/2014-16_IRB#NOT-2014-21; and IRS, Publication 544: Sales and Other Dispositions of Asset, February 16, 2022, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p544.pdf. 4. IRS, “Frequently Asked Questions on Virtual Currency Transactions.” 5. IRS, “Frequently Asked Questions on Virtual Currency Transactions.” There are many caveats to this. First, presumably, the person is not a dealer, and second, the person must hold the asset for the holding period, etc. 6. IRS, “Frequently Asked Questions on Virtual Currency Transactions.” 7. IRS, “Frequently Asked Questions on Virtual Currency Transactions.” 8. See CRS In Focus IF11910, Cryptocurrency Transfers and Data Collection, by Mark P. Keightley and Andrew P. Scott; and Laura Davison, “How Taxing Crypto Got Changed by Biden’s Infrastructure Law,” Bloomberg, November 17, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-17/how-taxing-crypto-got-changed-by-infrastructurelaw-quicktake. Soon after the law was signed, various Members of Congress expressed interest in altering the definition of broker to omit software developers, miners, and various other parties. 26 U.S.C. §6050I. 9. Davison, “How Taxing Crypto Got Changed by Biden’s Infrastructure Law.” This would be reported on Form 8300. Tim Shaw, “The Long Read: Catching Up with Crypto,” Thompson Reuters, April 29, 2022, https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/news/the-long-read-catching-up-with-crypto/. |
CRS I Congressional Research Service (CRS) Marc Labonte Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? Washington: Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress 2007 CRS II Congressional Research Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Marc Labonte, Banking and Cryptocurrency: Policy Issues. CRS Congressional research Service Report R48430. Washington, DC. 2025 CRS III Congressional Research Service (CRS) Corrie E. Clark Heather L. Greenley, Bitcoin, Blockchain, and the Energy Sector. Washington, DC. 2019 CRS IV Congressional Reserch Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Cryptocurrency: Selected Policy Issues Congressional Reserch Service CRS Report R47425 Washington, DC. 2023 |
| Cryptocurrency | Congressional Research Service (CRS) | CRS IV 3 Cryptocurrencies/CRS/Tierno: Cryptocurrencies consist of both the units of stored value and the networks on which they are exchanged. The cryptocurrencies discussed in this report are decentralized and permission-less, which means that neither a transacting participant nor a node, which is a component that supports the system in some capacity, requires any permission or special authorization to participate in the network or modify the ledger of transactions.(1) (Some of the system-supporting participant nodes are called validators or miners.) Cryptocurrency networks are comprised of unaffiliated participants operating specific software that they have downloaded on individual computers - not a central server. CRS IV 3/4 These key features distinguish the technology from traditional bank ledger management, which requires specific permissions to access accounts as well as to implement and approve transactions. >Cryptocurrency risks, >Cryptocurrency, >Crypto transactions, >Fake transactions, >Cross-border payments, >Money laundry, >Crypto regulation, >Blockchain, >Bitcoin, >Crypto Firms, >Crypto and Banking, >Payment systems, >Stablecoins, >Ethereum, >Wash trade, >Crypto and Energy. 1. Cryptocurrencies may also be permissioned. See CRS Report R47064, Blockchain: Novel Provenance Applications, by Kristen E. Busch, for an explanation of the difference between permissioned and permission-less blockchains |
CRS I Congressional Research Service (CRS) Marc Labonte Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? Washington: Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress 2007 CRS II Congressional Research Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Marc Labonte, Banking and Cryptocurrency: Policy Issues. CRS Congressional research Service Report R48430. Washington, DC. 2025 CRS III Congressional Research Service (CRS) Corrie E. Clark Heather L. Greenley, Bitcoin, Blockchain, and the Energy Sector. Washington, DC. 2019 CRS IV Congressional Reserch Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Cryptocurrency: Selected Policy Issues Congressional Reserch Service CRS Report R47425 Washington, DC. 2023 |
| Cryptocurrency Regulation | Economic Theories | IMF III 9 Crypto currency regulation/Economic theories/Luckner/Koepke/Sgherri: (…) our work* relates to the broader literature on crypto currency regulation, as in Auer and Claessens (2018)(1); Copestake et al. (2023a)(2); IMF (2022a)(3). For example, IMF (2022a)(3) argues for capital control laws and regulations to be effective in the digital age, it is imperative that capital control laws and regulations cover crypto assets. >Cryptocurrency risks, >Cryptocurrency, >Crypto transactions, >Fake transactions, >Cross-border payments, >Money laundry, >Crypto regulation, >Blockchain, >Bitcoin, >Crypto Firms, >Crypto and Banking, >Payment systems, >Stablecoins. * Clemens Graf von Luckner, Robin Koepke and Silvia Sgherri (2024). Crypto as a Marketplace for Capital Flight. IMF Working Paper 24/133. 1. Auer, R. and Claessens, S. (2018). Regulating cryptocurrencies: assessing market reactions.BIS Quarterly Review September. 2. Copestake, A., Furceri, D., and Gonzalez-Dominguez, P. (2023a). Crypto market responses to digital asset policies. Economics Letters, 222:110949. 3. IMF (2022a). Capital Flow Management Measures in the Digital Age (1): Challenges of Crypto Assets. Fintech Note 2022/005. International Monetary Fund. IMF VI 1 Crypto regulation/Economic theories/IMF/Reuter: Policymakers are increasingly wary of the popularity of crypto assets and have called forbetter monitoring of crypto transactions and international crypto asset flows (BIS (2023)(1), EU (2023)(2), G7 (2023)(3), FATF (2023)(4), FSB (2023)(5), IMF (2023)(6), US Treasury (2023)(7)). At the same time, recent research shows that crypto assets are increasingly used for international transactions, particularly when capital flow measures make it difficult to use traditionalchannels (von Luckner et al. (2023)(8), von Luckner et al. (2024)(9)), and that they could potentially be sizable (Cardozo et al. (2024)(10), Cerutti et al. (2024)(11), Auer et al. (2025)(12)). However,estimating international crypto asset flows remains challenging due to the opaque nature of crypto assets. 1. Bank for International Settlements (2023): “BIS Annual Economic Report 2023,” . 2. European Union (2023): “Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 on Information Accompanying Transfersof Funds and Certain Crypto-assets,” . 3. G7 (2023): “G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ Statement on Crypto Assets,” . 4. Financial Action Task Force (2023): “Virtual Assets: Targeted Update on Implementation of the FATF Standards on VAs and VASPs,” . 5. Financial Stability Board (2023): “High-level Recommendations for the Regulation, Supervision and Oversight of Crypto-Asset Activities and Markets,” . 6. International Monetary Fund (2023): “Elements of Effective Policies for Crypto Assets,” . 7. United States Department of the Treasury (2023): “Treasury Illicit Finance Risk Assessment of Decentralized Finance,” . 8. von Luckner, C. G., R. Koepke, and S. Sgherri (2024): Crypto as a Marketplace for CapitalFlight, International Monetary Fund. 9. Von Luckner, C. G., C. M. Reinhart, and K. Rogoff (2023): “Decrypting New Age International Capital Flows,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 138, 104–122. 10. Cardozo, P., A. Fernández, J. Jiang, and F. Rojas (2024): “On Cross-Border Crypto Flows: Measurement Drivers and Policy Implications,” IMF Working Papers. 11. Cerutti, E., J. Chen, and M. Hengge (2024): A Primer on Bitcoin Cross-Border Flows: Measurement and Drivers, International Monetary Fund. 12. Auer, R., U. Lewrick, and J. Paulick (2025): “DeFiying gravity? An empirical analysis ofcross-border Bitcoin, Ether and stablecoin flows,” Bank for International Settlements. |
IMF II IMF Working Paper André Reslow Gabriel Söderberg, Cross-Border Payments with Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies: Design and Policy Considerations IMF Fintech Note 2024/002 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF III IMF Working Papers Clemens Graf von Luckner Robin Koepke, Crypto as a Marketplace for Capital Flight. IMF Working Paper 24/133 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF IV IMF Working Papers Marco Pani Rodolfo Maino, “Could Digital Currencies Lead to the Disappearance of Cash from the Market? Insights from a ’Merchant-Customer’ Model.” IMF Working Paper WP/25/56 Washington, DC. 2025 |
| Cryptocurrency Regulation | IMF Working Papers | IMF III 29 Cryptocurrency Regulation/IMF/Luckner/Koepke/Sgherri: From a policy perspective, recognizing that crypto exchanges have the potential to serve as a marketplace for capital flight has important implications. When there are targeted exceptions to capital controls (such as the exclusion of certain sectors/economic agents), crypto exchanges can amplify the leakages that may occur through these channels, undermining the effectiveness of external restrictions. In this situation, the first best policy option is generally to address the underlying macroeconomic imbalances, reducing the need for external restrictions, as set out in the IMF’s Institutional View (IV) on the Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows (IMF, 2022c)(1). This is especially important in the context of restrictions that may be inconsistent with a country’s international commitments, as in the case of trade restrictions, exchangerestrictions and multiple currency practices. Moreover, the IV sets out a roadmap for the removal of financial account restrictions in a context of safe liberalization, though full liberalization is not presumed to be an appropriate goal for all countries at all times. If the first best policy option is not available, a second best option may be for policymakers to consider tighter regulation of crypto markets, at least for agents with access to targeted exceptions to controls. This is where crypto assets have significantly altered the world we live in. [There is a] crypto policy trilemma in economies with macro imbalances: Policymakers can achieve any two of three policy goals. However, achieving all three is not possible. IMF III 29/30 For instance, the relatively wide-spread practice of restricting capital flows coupled with targeted exemptions from such controls (for example for foreign entities in order to attract FDI) is inconsistent with legalized crypto markets, as we show in the model*. Yet, legalized crypto markets are not inconsistent with a restricted financial account, as long ascapital controls are comprehensive and effective. (…) in the absence of crypto exchanges, loopholes to capital controls that allow individual agents/firms to make large transfers are likely less consequential, since sharing such a loophole with others can be difficult. This is mainly because the illegal nature of the underlying activity would make it hard to enforce contractual obligations between the parties involved. But when there is a liquid crypto exchange, it is easy to share a capital flight channel with others. Consistent with this, many regulators have reacted with a ban of crypto exchanges (…). However, a ban is not necessarily the best regulatory approach. After all, even without liquid crypto exchanges, crypto assets can still fulfill the same function. Granted, the matching with a counterparty is rendered more difficult when no centralized exchanges exist, meaning the marketplace for capital flight loses some of its efficiency. Yet, it is worth noting that when banning crypto exchanges, governments also lose potential avenues of regulatory oversight (as well as potential societal benefits related to innovation). IMF III 31 When instead regulating centralized crypto exchanges, imposing Anti-Money-Laundering (AML) and KnowYour-Customer (KYC) regulation, governments have more control over crypto-related flows and can also leverage the data from crypto exchanges to identify leaks and loopholes in the existing capital flow measures, by identifying the individuals that act as liquidity providers in these markets (see also IMF (2022a)(2)). >Cryptocurrency risks, >Cryptocurrency, >Crypto transactions, >Fake transactions, >Cross-border payments, >Money laundry, >Crypto regulation, >Blockchain, >Bitcoin, >Crypto Firms, >Crypto and Banking, >Payment systems, >Stablecoins. * Clemens Graf von Luckner, Robin Koepke and Silvia Sgherri (2024). Crypto as a Marketplace for Capital Flight. IMF Working Paper 24/133. 1. IMF (2022c). Review of The Institutional View on The Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows. Technical report, International Monetary Fund. 2. IMF (2022a). Capital Flow Management Measures in the Digital Age (1): Challenges of Crypto Assets. Fintech Note 2022/005. International Monetary Fund. |
IMF II IMF Working Paper André Reslow Gabriel Söderberg, Cross-Border Payments with Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies: Design and Policy Considerations IMF Fintech Note 2024/002 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF III IMF Working Papers Clemens Graf von Luckner Robin Koepke, Crypto as a Marketplace for Capital Flight. IMF Working Paper 24/133 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF IV IMF Working Papers Marco Pani Rodolfo Maino, “Could Digital Currencies Lead to the Disappearance of Cash from the Market? Insights from a ’Merchant-Customer’ Model.” IMF Working Paper WP/25/56 Washington, DC. 2025 |
| Cryptocurrency Regulation | NBER Working Papers | NBER I 31 Crypto regulation/wash trading/NBER/Cong/Li/Tang/Yang: Evidently, the supposedly decentralized crypto ecosystems do have centralized players such as the exchanges, which are prone not only to being hacked but also to manipulative behavior. This casts shadows over the industry’s development, adding to what the critics have voiced about the limitation of the technology and the fraudulent nature of the industry (Roubini, 2018)(1). Our findings* add new insights concerning the role of regulation. NBER I 32 We demonstrate that regulated and unregulated exchanges exhibit vastly divergent trading patterns.** Without claiming causality, we offer three potential interpretations of the results. First, regulated exchanges are directly required to follow the regulation, and violations are severely punished. For example, the regulator can issue heavy fines for unregulated behavior,which hurts the balance sheet of the company as well as its reputation/goodwill. Furthermore, because regulated exchanges spent enormous resources obtaining the license, it will be an unbearable loss for them to have the license revoked and the business expelled from the jurisdiction, as outlined in sections 23 CRR-NY 200.3 and 200.6 of the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations (BitLicense, 2015)(2). The centralized nature of these exchanges, while ironic when we consider the origins of blockchains and decentralized finance, does make direct inspections and the enforcement of regulation on crypto exchanges much more feasible than on other (often anonymous) agents. For wash trading specifically, the two major categories of wash trading techniques, exchange forged data and incentivized wash trading programs, can all be heavily prevented by regulation. Incentivized wash trading campaigns are prohibited by law obviously. Exchange faked trading records are nearly impossible when they are required to regularly submit data ‘for each transaction, the amount, date, and precise time of the transaction, any payment instructions, the total amount of fees and charges received and paid to, by, or on behalf of the licensee’ (23 CRR-NY 200.12, New York Codes, Rules and Regulations).*** Second, it is possible that compliance with regulation is costly but does not affect wash trading incentives directly. Some firms simply get a license to signal their quality (e.g., Spence, 1978)(3). This is inconsistent with the observation that after acquiring the license, regulated exchanges still do not wash trade. Third, some unobserved exchange characteristics may cause the exchange to refrain fromwash trading and acquire licenses at the same time. Such a screening function is plausible and would imply that by observing which exchanges are regulated, traders can tell whether wash trading takes place on a particular exchange. >Cryptocurrency risks, >Cryptocurrency, >Crypto transactions, >Fake transactions, >Cross-border payments, >Money laundry, >Crypto regulation, >Blockchain, >Bitcoin, >Crypto Firms, >Crypto and Banking, >Payment systems, >Stablecoins, >Ethereum, >Wash trade. * Lin William Cong, Xi Li, Ke Tang, and Yang Yang. (2022). Crypto Wash Trading. NBER Working Paper No. 30783. Cambridge, MA. ** Why do investors trade on unregulated exchanges? Most exchanges started as unregulated and regulation was only introduced gradually. Many investors were unaware of wash trading until 2019, and do not treat regulatory status as their primary decision variable, especially if they have already been trading on an exchange. Customer acquisitions by unregulated and regulated exchanges are also thus far centered around various promotions, fee cut, reputation within the industry, perceived liquidity, etc. ***Regulators, with basic forensic tools, can easily find wash trading evidence with this level of trading records. For example, the exchange account carrying wash trading activities are likely to exhibit abnormally large volume as well as unusual behavior patterns (like Willy and Markus in Mt Gox). Besides, wash trading volume do not bring trading fee revenues, so exchanges need to work hard to cover the tells in the balance sheet. Regulators can also find suspicious wash trading from the trading volume and user scale and custodian assets size. 1. Roubini, N. (2018). Testimony for the Hearing of the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Community Affairs On “Exploring the Cryptocurrency and Blockchain Ecosystem. Retrieved from https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Roubini%20Testimony%2010-11-18.pdf 2. BitLicense. (2015). Regulations of the Superintendent of Financial Services, Part 200: Virtual Currencies. New York State Department of Financial Services. Retrieved from https://govt.westlaw.com/nycrr/Browse/Home/NewYork/NewYorkCodesRulesandRegulations?guid=I7 444ce80169611e594630000845b8d3e&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default) 3. Spence, M. (1978). Job Market Signaling. Uncertainty in economics, pp. 281-306. Academic Press |
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| Cryptocurrency Risks | IMF Working Papers | IMF V 10 Cryptocurrency Risks/IMF/Hacibedel/Perez-Saiz: Currently the main sources of risk to the external sector come from remittances and the volatility of cross-border capital flows. Leading to potentially lower transaction costs,* cryptos are likely to become increasingly important as a transmission channel. >Transaction costs. Lower transaction costs could also trigger highly volatile capital flows relying increasingly on crypto currencies. Moreover, transmission through trade could also be amplified and have implications for overall macroeconomic stability if the crypto market destabilizes. Reserve adequacy, external buffers and capital flow management (CFM) measuresmight need to be revisited for countries with high usage of crypto assets (IMF 2020(1); He et al., 2022(2)). Considering the decentralized nature of crypto markets and assets, their increased use could have implications for the monetary transmission mechanism. Cryptos could accelerate bank disintermediation, reduce the effectiveness of capital controls, and undermine traditional credit transmission channels, thus limiting the effectiveness of monetary policy. There is also the risk of creating a parallel market for exchange rates and domestic currencies. Additionally, the lack of data on the issuance size, holdings and transactions of crypto assets could lead to the mismeasurement of the money supply. >Cryptocurrency risks, >Cryptocurrency, >Crypto transactions, >Fake transactions, >Cross-border payments, >Money laundry, >Crypto regulation, >Blockchain, >Bitcoin, >Crypto Firms, >Crypto and Banking, >Payment systems, >Stablecoins, >Ethereum. * While crypto technologies have the potential to substantially reduce transaction costs, the median value of some crypto transactions, such as Bitcoin, can be higher than most conventional financial technologies used for domestic transactions. Internationally, the comparative advantage of cryptos depends crucially on the corridor considered (IMF, 2023a)(3). 1. International Monetary Fund, 2020. Digital Money Across Borders: Macro-Financial Implications. IMF Staff Report. 2. He, D., Kokenyne, A., Lavayssière, X., Lukonga, I., Schwarz, N., Sugimoto, N. and Verrier, J., 2022. Capital Flow Management Measures in the Digital Age: Challenges of Crypto Assets. FinTech Notes, 2022(005). 3. International Monetary Fund, 2023a. Elements of Effective Policies for Crypto Assets, IMF Board Paper, February 2023. |
IMF II IMF Working Paper André Reslow Gabriel Söderberg, Cross-Border Payments with Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies: Design and Policy Considerations IMF Fintech Note 2024/002 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF III IMF Working Papers Clemens Graf von Luckner Robin Koepke, Crypto as a Marketplace for Capital Flight. IMF Working Paper 24/133 Washington, DC. 2024 IMF IV IMF Working Papers Marco Pani Rodolfo Maino, “Could Digital Currencies Lead to the Disappearance of Cash from the Market? Insights from a ’Merchant-Customer’ Model.” IMF Working Paper WP/25/56 Washington, DC. 2025 |
| Culpable States of Mind | Neuroscience | Parisi I 143 Culpable States of Mind/neuroscience/Nadler/Mueller: Some researchers have suggested that neuroscientific techniques will be the future of assessing mental states (Meixner, 2012(1); Meixner and Rosenfeld 2014(2). Eggen and Laury, 2012(3); Farah, 2005(4)). However, there is general agreement that the state of the art does not yet meet evidentiary standards for this purpose (Meixner, 2012(1); Brown and Murphy, 2010(5)). >Mental states, >Neurobiology, >Neuroimaging. Credibility assessment: The neuroscience underlying credibility assessment and other mental state tools has not yet reached the standards that Daubert requires for admissibility. Realistic field tests have not yet been undertaken. And while there have been advances in fMRI techniques that allow for general assessment of current mental states while in the scanner (e.g. decoding what stimulus a person was viewing or imagining) (see Haynes and Rees, 2006(6) for review), methods are far from being able to accurately pinpoint past mental states (Brown and Murphy, 2010(5); Jones et al., 2009(7)). Evidence: It is also important to keep in mind that bad reasoning is more likely to be overlooked when neuroscience data - even irrelevant information - is also presented (Weisberg et al., 2008)(8), and that many reports about the capabilities of neuroscience often gloss over critical nuances (Satel and Lilienfeld, 2013)(9). Fortunately, the viewing of brain images by jurors deciding criminal liability does not in itself appear to have biasing effects - the influence of brain images, if any, tracks the influence of conventional neuroscience expert testimony (Roskies, Schweitzer, and Saks, 2013)(10). 1. Meixner, John B. (2012). "Liar, Liar, Jury's the Trier - The Future of Neuroscience-Based Credibility Assessment in the Court." NW. UL Rev. 106: 1451. 2. Meixner, John B. and J. Peter Rosenfeld (2014). "Detecting Knowledge of Incidentally Acquired, Real-world Memories Using a P 300-based Concealed-Information Test." Psychological Science 25(11): 1994-2005. 3. Eggen, Jean Macchiaroli and Eric J. Laury (2011). " Toward a Neuroscience Model of Tort Law: How Functional Neuroimaging will Transform Tort Doctrine." Colum. sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 13:235. 4. Farah, Martha J. "Neuroethics: the Practical and the Philosophical." Trends in Cognitive sciences 9(1):34-40. 5. Brown, Teneille and Emily Murphy (2010). "Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Past Mental States." Stanford Law Review 62(4): 1119-1208. 6. Haynes, John-Dylan and Geraint Rees (2006). "Decoding Mental States from Brain Activity in Humans." Nature Reviews Neuroscience 7(7):523-534. 7. Jones, Owen D., Joshua Buckholtz, Jeffrey D. Schall, and Rene Marois (2009). "Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed." Stanford Technology Law Review 5, Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 10-09. 8. Weisberg, Deena Skolnick, Frank C. Keil, Joshua Goodstein, Elizabeth Rawson, and Jeremy R. Gray (2008). "The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations." Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 20(3):470-477. 9. Satel, Sally and Scott O. Lilienfeld (2013). Brainwashed: The Seductive Appeal of Mindless Neuroscience. New York: Basic Books. 10. Roskies, Adina L., Nicholas J. Schweitzer, and MichaelJ. Saks (2013). "Neuroimages in Court: Less Biasing than Feared." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17(3):99—101. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Cultural Differences | Acemoglu | Acemoglu I 56 Cultural differences/prosperity/economy/Acemoglu/Robinson: widely accepted theory, the culture hypothesis, relates prosperity to culture. The culture hypothesis, just like the geography hypothesis, has a distinguished lineage, going back at least to the great German sociologist Max Weber, who argued that the Protestant Reformation and the Protestant ethic it spurred played a key role in facilitating the rise of modern industrial society in Western Europe. The culture hypothesis no longer relies solely on religion, but stresses other types of beliefs, values, and ethics as well. >Protestant ethics. Acemoglu I 57 Is the culture hypothesis useful for understanding world inequality? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that social norms, which are related to culture, matter and can be hard to change, and they also sometimes support institutional differences, this book’s explanation for world inequality. But mostly no, because those aspects of culture often emphasized - religion, national ethics, African or Latin values—are just not important for understanding how we got here and why the inequalities in the world persist. Other aspects, such as the extent to which people trust each other or are able to cooperate, are important but they are mostly an outcome of institutions, not an independent cause. (...) it is not a surprise that Mexicans lack trust when their government cannot eliminate drug cartels or provide a functioning unbiased legal system. Post-colonialism: Maybe the cultural factors that matter are not tied to religion but rather to particular “national cultures.” Perhaps it is the influence of English culture that is important and explains why countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia are so prosperous? Though this idea sounds initially appealing, it doesn’t work, either. Yes, Canada and the United States were English colonies, but so were Sierra Leone and Nigeria. The variation in prosperity within former English colonies is as great as that in the entire world. The English legacy is not the reason for the success of North America. >Colonialism, >Postcolonialism. Acemoglu I 61 European heritage: perhaps it is not English versus non-English that matters but, rather, European versus non-European. Could it be that Europeans are superior somehow because of their work ethic, outlook on life, Judeo-Christian values, or Roman heritage? Acemoglu I 62 Vs: (...) this version of the culture hypothesis has as little explanatory potential as the others. A greater proportion of the population of Argentina and Uruguay, compared with the population of Canada and the United States, is of European descent, but Argentina’s and Uruguay’s economic performance leaves much to be desired. Japan and Singapore never had more than a sprinkling of inhabitants of European descent, yet they are as prosperous as many parts of Western Europe. Acemoglu I 463 Literature: Views about culture are widely spread throughout the academic literature but have never been brought together in one work. Weber (2002)(1) argued that it was the Protestant Reformation that explained why it was Europe that had the Industrial Revolution. Landes (1999)(2) proposed that Northern Europeans developed a unique set of cultural attitudes that led them to work hard, save, and be innovative. Harrison and Huntington, eds. (2000)(3), is a forceful statement of the importance of culture for comparative economic development. The notion that there is some sort of superior British culture or superior set of British institutions is widespread and used to explain U.S. exceptionalism (Fisher, 1989)(4) and also patterns of comparative development more generally (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008)(5). The works of Banfield (1958)(6) and Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1994)(7) are very influential cultural interpretations of how one aspect of culture, or “social capital,” as they call it, makes the south of Italy poor. For a survey of how economists use notions of culture, see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006)(8). 1. Weber, Max (2002). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: Penguin. 2. Landes, David S. (1999). The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor. New York: W. W. Norton and Co. 3.Harrison, Lawrence E., and Samuel P. Huntington, eds. (2000). Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress. New York: Basic Books. 4.Fischer, David H. (1989). Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America. New York: Oxford University Press. 5.La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (2008). “The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins.” Journal of Economic Literature 46: 285–332. 6..Banfield, Edward C. (1958). The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Glencoe, N.Y.: Free Press. 7.Putnam, Robert H., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti (1994). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 8.Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales (2006). “Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20: 23–48. |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Cultural Differences | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 30 Cultural Differences/Kagan/Developmental psychology/Upton: In the paper ‘Reactivity in infants: a cross-national comparison’ Kagan et al. (1994)(1) argue that behavioural traits, such as the amount of motor activity seen in infants, are innate. In this study, Kagan provides evidence for very different patterns of motor arousal in four-month-old infants in three different cultures – China, Ireland and the USA. The data suggest that Chinese infants are much calmer, quieter and less fretful than the American and Irish infants, which Kagan cites as evidence for biological differences in temperament between Caucasian and Asian infants. Upton I 31 Questions: Can we be certain that these differences [including motor activity, fretting, crying and vocalization] are biological? At what point in development is experience relevant? For example, how might prenatal experiences have influenced the behaviours shown by these infants? >Heritability, >Innateness, >Personality traits, >Molecular genetics, >Culture, >Nature versus nurture. 1. Kagan,J., Articus, D. and Snidman, N. et al. (1994) Reactivity in infants: a cross-national comparison. Developmental Psychology, 30: 3 42—5. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Cultural Differences | Experimental Psychology | Parisi I 117 Cultural differences/ideologies/Experimental Psychology/Wilkinson-Ryan: One of the areas where experimental psychology and law have had the greatest impact has been in the field referred to as "cultural cognition." This is essentially a body of research that takes up the question of individual differences - how responses and effects differ across individuals or groups within a population. In the seminal article in this field, Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman (2009)(1) took up the Supreme Court's "unusual invitation" to the public to view a video recording of a police offcer chasing a motorist and ultimately ramming his car into the citizen's vehicle when he refused to pull over. Although a clear majority of subjects agreed with the court's determination, there was a clear consensus among a cognizable minority that the offcer's actions were unjustified. In a group that tended to be less affluent, less white, less conservative, Parisi I 118 and less male, the view of the accident was clearly more pro-plaintiff, calling into question the court's assertion that no reasonable juror could disagree with their findings. In a similar set of findings, Conservatism: Kahan (2010)(2) found that the hierarchical worldview (one that might be shorthanded as "conservative") predicts the perception of complainant consent in acquaintance-rape cases, even when the complainant repeated verbal objections. Cultural background: Kahan and Braman (2008)(3) also found individual differences in perceptions of self-defense cases, with individuals' cultural or political commitments predicting their view of whether a battered woman or a "beleaguered commuter" was justified in using force against an assailant. Group behavior: Testing further that perceptions of legal acts is heavily influenced by group membership, Kahan et al. (2012)(4) showed subjects in an experimental study a video of a political demonstration. >Group behavior. Manipulation: Cultural cognition research has also begun to document differential effects of experimental manipulations by group. In a study of the role of cultural differences in perceptions of climate change science, Kahan et al. (2015)(5) randomly assigned participants in a survey study to read either an irrelevant technology-related article or an article about the potential for geoengineering to reduce the effects of carbon dioxide emissions and thereby stem global warming. The dependent variable was subjects' attitudes toward a second article on the science of climate change. Manipulation. Liberals: Simplifying slightly, the liberals who read the geoengineering article were essentially unmoved - they were no less likely to believe or disbelieve that climate change is happening and is caused at least in part by humans. Conservatives: Conservatives, on the other hand, were skeptical of climate change science if they did not read about geoengineering, but when they were primed with the possibility of a market-based technological solution to global warming, they were more willing to believe the science of global warming is reliable. Results: Thus, the research showed that open-mindedness toward scientific evidence depended in part on whether individuals believed that the consequences of believing the evidence Parisi I 119 would require action that conflicted with the individuals' own worldviews (e.g., for conservatives, government regulation of pollution). >Political orientation/Experimental psychology, >Decision-making/Experimental Psychology. 1. Kahan, Dan M., David A. Hoffman, and Donald Braman (2009). "Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism." Harvard Law Review 122: 8-18. 2. Kahan, Dan M. (2010). "Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 158: 729-813. 3. Kahan, Dan M. and Donald Braman (2008). "The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense." American Criminal Law Review 45: 1-65. 4. Kahan, Dan M., David A. Hoffman, Donald Braman, and Danieli Evans (2012). "They Saw a Protest: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech—Conduct Distinction." Stanford Law Review 64:851-906. 5. Kahan, Dan M., Hank Jenkins-Smith, Tor Tarantola, Carol L. Silva, and Donald Braman (2015). "Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization Testing a Two-Channel Model of Science Communication." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and social Science 658: 192-222. Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess. „Experimental Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Cultural Differences | Kagan | Upton I 30 Cultural Differences/Kagan/Developmental psychology/Upton: In the paper ‘Reactivity in infants: a cross-national comparison’ Kagan et al. (1994)(1) argue that behavioural traits, such as the amount of motor activity seen in infants, are innate. In this study, Kagan provides evidence for very different patterns of motor arousal in four-month-old infants in three different cultures – China, Ireland and the USA. The data suggest that Chinese infants are much calmer, quieter and less fretful than the American and Irish infants, which Kagan cites as evidence for biological differences in temperament between Caucasian and Asian infants. >Stages of development, >Temperament, >Personality traits, >Developmental psychology, >Innateness, >Heredity. Upton I 31 Questions: Can we be certain that these differences [including motor activity, fretting, crying and vocalization] are biological? At what point in development is experience relevant? For example, how might prenatal experiences have influenced the behaviours shown by these infants? >Pre-natal learning, >Behavior, >Method. 1. Kagan,J, Articus, D. and Snidman, N. et al. (1994) Reactivity in infants: a cross-national comparison. Developmental Psychology, 30: 3 42—5. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Cultural Differences | McCrae | Corr I 151 Cultural differences/cultural psychology/psychology/psychological theories/McCrae: Over the past twenty years, researchers around the world have begun to translate instruments like the NEO-PI-R (McCrae and Allik 2002)(1) and the Big Five Inventory (BFI) (Schmitt, Allik, McCrae et al. 2007)(2), and have administered them to respondents in dozens of countries. Results are easily summarized: personality is much the same everywhere. The FFM structure ((s) >Five-Factor Model) itself is universal. McCrae and colleagues (McCrae, Terracciano and 78 others 2005)(3) reported an almost perfect replication of the American adult self-report NEO-PI-R structure using 11,985 observer ratings of college-age and adult targets from 50 cultures. The same study replicated the American pattern of age differences (although the age effects for N ((s) >neuroticism) and A ((s) >agreeableness) were much smaller in the international sample). >Cultural psychology, >Neuroticism, >Agreeableness, >Openness to experience, >Conscientiousness, >Intraversion, >Five-Factor Model. There is a plausible explanation for this universality: the FFM is strongly rooted in biology. Each of the five factors is heritable (Riemann, Angleitner and Strelau 1997)(4), and studies of twins (Yamagata, Suzuki, Ando et al. 2006)(5) and of family relatives (Pilia, Chen, Scuteri et al. 2006)(6) show that the five-factor structure of the observed traits mirrors the structure of their underlying genes. Apparently, Warmth and Assertiveness are both definers of E because they are influenced by some of the same genes. 1. McCrae, R. R. and Allik, J. (eds.) 2002. The Five-Factor Model of personality across cultures. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers 2. Schmitt, D. P., Allik, J., McCrae, R. R., Benet-Martínez, V., Alcalay, L., Ault, L. et al. 2007. The geographic distribution of Big Five personality traits: patterns and profiles of human self-description across 56 nations, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 38: 173–212 3. McCrae, R. R., Terracciano, A. and 78 Members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project 2005. Universal features of personality traits from the observer’s perspective: data from 50 cultures, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 88: 547–61 4. Riemann, R., Angleitner, A. and Strelau, J. 1997. Genetic and environmental influences on personality: a study of twins reared together using the self- and peer report NEO-FFI scales, Journal of Personality 65: 449-75 5. Yamagata, S., Suzuki, A., Ando, J., Ono, Y., Kijima, N., Yoshimura, K., Ostendorf, F., Angleitner, A., Riemann, R., Spinath, F., Livesley, W. J. and Jang, K. L. 2006. Is the genetic structure of human personality universal? A cross-cultural twin study from North America, Europe, and Asia, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90: 987–98 6. Pilia, G., Chen, W.-M., Scuteri, A., Orrú, M., Albai, G., Deo, M. et al. 2006. Heritability of cardiovascular and personality traits in 6,148 Sardinians, PLoS Genetics 2: 1207–23 Robert R. McCrae, “The Five-Factor Model of personality traits: consensus and controversy”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Cultural Industry | Habermas | IV 572 Cultural industry/Horkheimer/Adorno/Habermas: according to Horkheimer and Adorno's ideas, communication flows controlled by the mass media take the place of those communication structures that once made public discussion and self-understanding of an audience of citizens and private individuals possible. The mass media represent an apparatus that completely penetrates and masters everyday communicative language. On the one hand, it transforms the authentic contents of modern culture into the stereotyped and ideologically effective stereotypes of a mass culture that merely doubles the existing; on the other hand, it consumes the culture purified from all subversive and transcendental moments for a comprehensive system of social control imposed on individuals that partly reinforces, partly replaces the weakened internal controls of behavior. >Mass culture, cf. >Dialectics of Enlightenment. The functioning of the cultural industry should be mirrored in the functioning of the psychic apparatus, which, as long as the internalization of paternal authority was still functioning, had subjected the driving nature to the control of the superego as technology had subjected the external nature of its domination. >Technology, >Governance, >Society, >Instrumental Reason, >Procedural Rationality. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Cultural Relativism | Deci | Corr I 450 Cultural Relativism/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: cultural relativists (e.g., Markus, Kitayama and Heiman 1996)(1) have claimed that the need for autonomy is not relevant for Eastern, collectivist cultures. Self-Determination TheoryVsCultural Relativism/DeciVsRelativism/RyanVsRelativism: SDT argues that satisfaction of the basic needs is essential for all people, several cross-cultural studies have been done to confirm that need satisfaction is essential in cultures that are vastly different. >Self-Determination Theory, >Self-Determination. Chirkov, Ryan, Kim and Kaplan (2003)(2) investigated the internalization of the values of individualism (a strongly endorsed Western value) and collectivism (a strongly endorsed Eastern value) within four disparate cultures (Turkey, Korea, Russia and the United States). [They] found that the higher people’s relative autonomy for both individualist and collectivist practices, the higher their level of psychological wellbeing in each of the four cultures. That is, to the degree that people in any culture can enact a value autonomously, even if it does not match the dominant value of their culture, those individuals will display higher levels of wellbeing. >Autonomy, >Culture, >Cultural psychology, >Cultural differences. 1. Markus, H. R., Kitayama, S. and Heiman, R. J. 1996. Culture and basic psychological principles, in E. T. Higgins and A. W. Kruglanski (eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles, pp. 857–913. New York: Guilford Press 2. Chirkov, V. Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y. and Kaplan, U. 2003. Differentiating autonomy from individualism and independence: a self-determination theory perspective on internalization of cultural orientations and well-being, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84: 97–110 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Cultural Relativism | Gould | IV 257 Cultural Relativism/Gould: despite my inclination to cultural relativism, I feel that I am entitled to take the right to criticise when other cultures adopt the mistakes of my own culture. For example Singapore: Singapore introduced intelligence tests and population control in 1983: See Intelligence/Gould. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Cultural Relativism | Ryan | Corr I 450 Cultural Relativism/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: cultural relativists (e.g., Markus, Kitayama and Heiman 1996)(1) have claimed that the need for autonomy is not relevant for Eastern, collectivist cultures. Self-Determination TheoryVsCultural Relativism/DeciVsRelativism/ RyanVsRelativism: SDT argues that satisfaction of the basic needs is essential for all people, several cross-cultural studies have been done to confirm that need satisfaction is essential in cultures that are vastly different. >Self-Determination Theory, >Self-Determination. Chirkov, Ryan, Kim and Kaplan (2003)(2) investigated the internalization of the values of individualism (a strongly endorsed Western value) and collectivism (a strongly endorsed Eastern value) within four disparate cultures (Turkey, Korea, Russia and the United States). [They] found that the higher people’s relative autonomy for both individualist and collectivist practices, the higher their level of psychological wellbeing in each of the four cultures. That is, to the degree that people in any culture can enact a value autonomously, even if it does not match the dominant value of their culture, those individuals will display higher levels of wellbeing. >Autonomy, >Culture, >Cultural psychology, >Cultural differences. 1. Markus, H. R., Kitayama, S. and Heiman, R. J. 1996. Culture and basic psychological principles, in E. T. Higgins and A. W. Kruglanski (eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles, pp. 857–913. New York: Guilford Press 2. Chirkov, V. Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y. and Kaplan, U. 2003. Differentiating autonomy from individualism and independence: a self-determination theory perspective on internalization of cultural orientations and well-being, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84: 97–110 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Cultural Relativism | Self-Determination Theory | Corr I 450 Cultural Relativism/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: cultural relativists (e.g., Markus, Kitayama and Heiman 1996)(1) have claimed that the need for autonomy is not relevant for Eastern, collectivist cultures. Self-Determination TheoryVsCultural Relativism/DeciVsRelativism/ RyanVsRelativism: SDT argues that satisfaction of the basic needs is essential for all people, several cross-cultural studies have been done to confirm that need satisfaction is essential in cultures that are vastly different. >Self-Determination Theory, >Self-Determination. Chirkov, Ryan, Kim and Kaplan (2003)(2) investigated the internalization of the values of individualism (a strongly endorsed Western value) and collectivism (a strongly endorsed Eastern value) within four disparate cultures (Turkey, Korea, Russia and the United States). [They] found that the higher people’s relative autonomy for both individualist and collectivist practices, the higher their level of psychological wellbeing in each of the four cultures. That is, to the degree that people in any culture can enact a value autonomously, even if it does not match the dominant value of their culture, those individuals will display higher levels of wellbeing. >Autonomy, >Culture, >Cultural psychology, >Cultural differences. 1. Markus, H. R., Kitayama, S. and Heiman, R. J. 1996. Culture and basic psychological principles, in E. T. Higgins and A. W. Kruglanski (eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles, pp. 857–913. New York: Guilford Press 2. Chirkov, V. Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y. and Kaplan, U. 2003. Differentiating autonomy from individualism and independence: a self-determination theory perspective on internalization of cultural orientations and well-being, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84: 97–110 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Cultural Rights | Levy | Gaus I 253 Cultural Rights/Levy/Kukathas: [Will] Kymlicka's(1) defence of group-differentiated rights immediately raised a range of questions and problems, and the literature on multiculturalism over the past decade has tackled many of them. >Minority rights/Political Philosophy. The most helpful elucidation of the different kinds of rights claims made on behalf of cultural groups was offered by Jacob Levy (1997(2): 24—5), who distinguished eight categories of rights. categories of rights. These include exemption rights (exempting groups from laws that burden their cultural practices), assistance rights (to do those things the majority can do unassisted), self-government rights, rights to impose external rules (say, restricting non-members' rights to buy property or restricting their right to use their own language), rights to enforce intemal rules (even if they violate other rights), rights of recognition of the group's legal code, rights of representation in government, and rights to symbolic claims to acknowledge the worth, status, or existence of the group (1997(2): 25). >Culture/Kymlicka, >Minority rights/Kymlicka, >Minorities/Kymlicka. 1. Kymlicka, Will (1995a) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Levy, Jacob (1997) 'Classifying cultural rights'. In Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro, eds, Ethnicity and Group Rights: NOMOS xxwx New York: New York University Press, 22—66. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Levy I I. Levy Gambling With Truth an Essay of Induction and the Aims of Science Cambridge 1974 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Cultural Tools | Vygotsky | Upton I 14 Cultural tools/human history/Vygotsky/Upton: Vygotsky thesis: human history is created through the construction and use of cultural tools (Vygotsky 1930/1978)(1). It is this inventive use of tools that makes humans unique. A hammer is a physical example of a cultural tool. It is a means of knocking sharp objects such as nails into surfaces, in order to create a new structure. The form and function of the hammer are Upton I 15 the result of generations of cultural evolution and adaptation. The meaning and use of a hammer are not immediately obvious to someone who has never come across one before, or who has never needed to knock nails in. The information about how to use tools is also culturally transmitted. >Use, >Understanding, >Actions, >Explanations. Each generation may adapt the hammer for its own needs or use it in new ways. Vygotsky calls this ‘appropriation’. >Culture. Upton I 16 Language/Vygotsky: One of the most important cultural tools people use is language. Like the hammer, the language we use today is the result of long-term cultural development, adaptation, transmission and appropriation. >Language, >Language use, >Language community. 1. Vygotsky, LS (1930/1978) Mind in Society: The development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. |
Vygotsky I L. S. Vygotsky Thought and Language Cambridge, MA 1986 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Cultural Tradition | Parsons | Habermas IV 322 Cultural Tradition/Parsons/Habermas: after Parsons got to know Malinowski's Freudian personality theory and cultural anthropology, his theoretical perspective shifted: systems of action are no longer built up elementarily from their units, they are the starting point. For Parsons, the starting point is now the concept of culture; the systems of action society and personality are declared as institutional embodiments and motivational anchoring of cultural patterns. Elementary units are no longer units of action, but cultural patterns and symbolic meanings. These form configurations, systems of cultural values and interpretations that can be handed down. Habermas IV 323 The part of cultural tradition that is relevant for the constitution of systems of action is the pattern of value. These are processed through internalisation into personal motives or character-forming dispositions for action. Then action systems are complementary channels through which cultural values are translated into motivated actions.(1) >Values, >Action Systems. Problem: 1. How should the cultural determination of systems of action be thought of? 2. How can the three concepts of order in the cultural, social and personality system be combined with the concept of action from which it could not be built? Habermas IV 326 Ad 1: Solution/Parsons: Value standards are no longer attributed to individual actors as subjective properties; cultural value patterns are introduced from the outset as intersubjective property. However, they are initially only regarded as components of cultural tradition and do not have normative binding force by their very nature. Habermas IV 327 Ad 2: From the conceptual perspective of communication-oriented action, the interpretative appropriation of traditional cultural contents presents itself as the act through which the cultural determination of action takes place. >Action theory, >Communicative action. Habermas IV 328 HabermasVsParsons: this way of analysis is blocked by Parsons, because he sees the orientation to values as an orientation to objects. >Objects/Parsons. 1.Talcott Parsons, Toward a General Theory of Action, NY 1951, S. 54. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Culture | Fanon | Brocker I 390 Culture/Fanon: In his speech to the Second Congress of Black Writers and Artists in Rome in 1959, entitled "On National Culture", Fanon makes it clear that and to what extent he understands nationalism, for which he pleads, as a political phenomenon that transcends the particular (for example ethnic or religious) cultural structure without negating it. In this way, he uses the term in a different sense than that which is common in Europe when a homogeneous nation or even a national dominant culture is invoked. FanonVsNégritude/FanonVsCésaire/FanonVsCulturalism: The movement of Négritude (or culturalism) was primarily concerned with an affirmative reference to aspects of black culture - and thus to something whose existence colonialism had either flatly denied or massively devalued. He considers these projects a political impasse. (1) For the alleged link is that of a cultural community. However, Fanon does not think that this is the case. Def National Culture/Fanon: is for Fanon "the totality of the efforts that people make in the spiritual sphere to describe, justify and sing about the action in which it has founded and asserted itself" (2). A nation emerges "in the struggle[...] that the people wage against the occupying forces" (3). 1. Frantz Fanon, Les damnés de la terre, Paris 1961. Dt.: Frantz Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde, Frankfurt/M. 1981, S. 182. 2. Ibid. p. 198 3. Ibid. p. 189. Ina Kerner „Frantz Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolFanon I Frantz Fanon Les Damnés de la Terre, Paris 1963 - Engl Transl. The Wretched of the Earth, New York 1963 German Edition: Die Verdammten dieser Erde Reinbek 1969 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Culture | Flusser | Rötzer I 70 Cultural Revolution/Flusser: is the reluctance to not want to recognise all these images and sounds as art, since they do not correspond to the modern art concept. Rock music, for example, has a great influence on our behaviour, such as car gears. Rötzer I 71 Culture/Flusser: if the selection of sounds is determined by chance, one speaks of nature, it is determined by humans, one speaks of culture. This selection and design can now be left to machines. According to Husserl, qualities can no longer be abstracted from quantities. >E. Husserl. --- Flusser I 66 Mass culture/Flusser: not perceived as a blurring of articulation, but as a more beautiful and colourful world. (Coca-Cola) 'better designed'. >Mass culture. For example, Brazilian coffee pickers eat pizza without protest, which is actually intended for Neapolitan fishermen and e.g. Parisian bank officials wear Texan cowboy hats. cf. >Civilization. I 67 - I 70 Existentially, no one benefits from the massification because all people are massified, i.e. no one stands above it. (>Warhol: the Queen doesn't get a better Coke.). Public opinion can only demand a new soap or a war if the product is already ready. I 153 Culture/Flusser: The relationship between masses and elite culture is often misrepresented: it is not about whether a philosopher should publish in "Playboy", but about whether the sketch above can be influenced from the left, i.e. from history! I 154 Flusser: it is the question of whether Buddhist monks burning themselves in front of the camera have not recognized themselves better than "committed philosophers", what this is currently about. Turning the texts around at a critical moment means that they become opaque for the world and transparent for the person who codifies them. >Code/Flusser, >Pictures/Flusser, >Photography/Flusser. Behind the texts you do not see the world, but the person who wrote them. At this moment, the danger of falling into the abyss of the madness of the senseless, inaccessible world is arising (Wittgenstein, Kafka) >Texts, >Literature. 1. One can fall silent. I 155 2. One can try to regain the magical consciousness (Nazism). 3. One can try to give the texts a new meaning. 1. and 2. are useless, because it is impossible to undo alienation. Third possibility: no longer try to understand one-dimensional processual, linear, but structural, multi-dimensional, figurative. Not historically, but to think phenomenally about processes, cybernetically. >Understanding. I 156 The world hides the texts from us in such a way that it does not allow us to see their insignificance. It makes us second-degree illiterate. >World, >Reality, >World/Thinking. I 205 Supermarket: The supermarket is a rat trap, you have to stand in line and pay a sacrifice for the release from captivity at the cash desk. The supermarket is the opposite of the real market: it does not allow the exchange of information, it is not a public space but a prison (private in the strictest sense of the word). I 249 Culture/Flusser: The improbability of the Concorde ((s) A supersonic passenger plane operated between 1976 and 2003) is different from that of the hen, and this is a fact that we disguise. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 Rötz I F. Rötzer Kunst machen? München 1991 |
| Culture | Huntington | Brocker I 835 Culture/Huntington: Thesis: Western culture is in decline, while the economically strengthened Chinese and the rapidly growing demographically Islamic culture are becoming new challengers. Brocker I 836 Thesis: "Culture and the identity of cultures, i.e. the identity of cultural areas at the highest level", are decisive for current and future global patterns of order. (1) Brocker I 836 Huntington: Cultural areas are not closed, demarcable entities; however, we are still able to comprehend the rise and decline of certain cultural orders. Huntington differentiates seven or eight cultural areas: He distinguishes between Sinian, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Slavic-orthodox Brocker I 837 and Latin American, while the existence of a genuinely African culture is not conclusively established. (2) Relations between these cultural areas have so far taken place in two phases: 1) As "encounters": in the second until about 1500 AD, but limited by spatial and temporal distance. 2) The offensive extension of European rule to other continents led to significant intercultural relations under Western dominance, founded on the technological strength of the West. 3) We are currently witnessing real interactions between cultural centres. At this point Huntington uses Hedly Bull's system definition (1977 (3)), according to which states see themselves as part of the international system. See State/Huntington. Brocker I 838 Universal Culture/cultural universalism: the development of a "universal culture" appears to Huntington as naive wishful thinking. In fact, there is neither a universal language that goes beyond mere understanding nor a universal religion that is capable of breaking down cultural boundaries. This idea is a "typical product of Western culture". (4) The idea of such a culture is based on fallacy which the West believes in after the victory over Soviet Communism. Liberal democracy is by no means the only alternative to socialist ideas of order; nor can global trade and communication turn Western universalism into reality. Western culture is not the only modern culture. (5) A shift in the balance of power in favour of other cultural areas is "gradual, unstoppable and fundamental". (6) Brocker I 840 Culture/EspositoVsHuntington: the heart of Huntington's argument for a new world order is based on a monolithic understanding of culture. (7) Brocker I 847 Robert JervisVsHuntington: he regards cultural areas as given, unchanging units Brocker I 848 and thereby breaks with the constructivist perspective of the finiteness of identity. (8) Edward SaidVsHuntington: Said Thesis: Cultures are not ahistorical and uniform, but full of internal oppositions, adaptations, counter-concepts and variations that play no role in Huntington's crude abstractions. (9) Amartya SenVsHuntington: People are not just members of a single culture. Possible alternative attributes must not be hidden. (10) Dieter SenghaasVsHuntington: It remains unclear why certain cultures are belligerent - which is certainly due to the lack of theoretical support for the culture-behavior nexus. (11) Bruce LawrenceVsHuntington: Internal cultural heterogeneities are deliberately overlooked, giving the impression that large cultural circles can be given a united voice. The accusation of cultural racism is obvious here. (12) 1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York 1996. Dt.: Samuel P. Huntington, Kampf der Kulturen. Die Neugestaltung der Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, München/Wien 1998 (zuerst 1996).S. 19 2. Ebenda S. 57-62 3. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, New York 1977. 4. Huntington ebenda, S. 92 5. Ebenda S. 98 6. Ebenda S. 119. 7. John L. Esposito The Islamic Threat. Myth or Reality?, New York/Oxford 1999, S. 229 8. Robert Jervis »Review: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by Samuel P. Huntington«, in: Political Science Quarterly 112/2, 1997, 307-308. 9. Edward Said, »The Clash of Definitions. On Samuel Huntington«, in: ders., Reflections on Exile and Other Literary and Cultural Essays, London. 2001, p. 569-590, S. 578f. 10. Amartya Sen Die Identitätsfalle. Warum es keinen Krieg der Kulturen gibt, München 2007, S. 54f. 11. Dieter Senghaas, Zivilisierung wider Willen. Der Konflikt der Kulturen mit sich selbst, Frankfurt/M. 1998, S. 140 12. Bruce Lawrence, 2002, »Conjuring with Islam, II«, in: The Journal of American History 89/2, 2002, 485-497, S. 489 Philipp Klüfers/Carlo Masala, „Samuel P. Huntington, Kampf der Kulturen“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolHunt I Samuel P. Huntington The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order New York 1996 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Culture | Kymlicka | Gaus I 252 Culture/multiculturalism/Kymlicka/Kukathas: National cultures are 'societal cultures', and the modern world is divided into such groupings. They provide their members with meaningful ways of life across the range of human activities - from the economic to the educational and religious. 'These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language' (1995a(1): 76). These are 'societal' cultures because they comprise not just shared memories or values but also common institutions and practices. A 'societal culture' is embodied in schools, in the media, in the economy, and in government. >Multiculturalism/Kymlicka, >Minority rights/Kymlicka, Cf. >Nationalism/Kymlicka. Minorities/groups: For Kymlicka, national minorities are, typically, groups with societal cultures — albeit cultures that have struggled against conquest, colonization, and forced assimilation. Immigrants, however, have no societal culture (though tthey may have left their own societal cultures). Societal cultures tend to be national cultures, and nations are almost invariably societal cultures (1995a(1): 80). Traditional culture/Kymlicka: In the modern world, cultures which are not societal cultures are not likely to prosper, given the pressures towards the creation of a single common culture in each country. His theory of group-differentiated rights accordingly focuses on enabling national minorities to sustain their societal cultures, while protecting immigrants with polyethnic rights that would 'help ethnic groups and religious minorities express their cultural particularity and pride without it hampering their success in the economic and political institu-tions of the dominant society' (1995a(1): 31). 1. Kymlicka, Will (1995a) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Culture | Lash | Gaus I 272 Culture/postmodernism/Lash/Urry/West: an important (...) consequence of [the] economic, social and political developments (>Capitalism/Lash/Urry) is the increasing importance of culture as a site of domination and resistance: 'domination through cultural forms takes on significance in disorganized capitalism which is comparable in importance to domination in the sphere of production itself' (1987(1): 14). Postmodernism: what differentiates Lash and Urry most clearly as theorists of postmodernity is their distinctively postmodernist view of contemporary culture. Disorganized capitalism is associated with the 'appearance and mass distribution of a culturalideological configuration of „Postmodemism" [which] affects high culture, popular culture and the symbols and discourse of everyday life' (1987(1): 7). Accordingly, philosophical postmodernism can be regarded as a symptom of broader cultural developments, which can, in their turn, be characterized in terms of postmodern philosophy. Postmodern culture is 'transgressive' both of intellectual boundaries between 'rational' and 'non-rational' and of aesthetic boundaries between 'high' and 'low' culture. It is suspicious of the distinction (so important for Habermas) between ethical, scientific and aesthetic discourse. Art/aura: Drawing on the work of Walter Benjamin, Lash and Urry describe postmodern culture as 'post-auratic' (1987(1): 286): the work of art is no longer an eternal object of contemplative, almost religious reverence, just another constituent of an 'economy of pleasure', a means of distraction like any other. By implication, postmodern culture is particularly resistant to the discursive forms characteristic of modernity. Communication now occurs more through images, sounds and impulses than through the spoken or written word. Politics: Culture, finally, is an increasingly important medium of political struggle. It is the potential site for the imposition of an 'authoritarian populism' closely identified with the politics of the new right and Thatcherism. On the other hand, developments like the counterculture, popular music and film testify to the alternative possibility of an 'anti-authoritarian radical democracy'. Less clear from Lash and Urry's analysis are the details of this progressive alternative: they offer little guidance beyond the need for a 'genuine dialogue' between 'new social movements' and the old left (1987(1): 312). >Democracy/Laclau/Mouffe. 1. Lash, Scott and John Urry (1987) The End of Organized Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity. West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Culture | Policy of Russia | Krastev I 117 Culture/Policy of Russia/Krastev: Putin (...): 'We must not lose our cultural roots and all that was formed over the centuries by the various peoples and religions here and was saved and preserved for future generations at the most diffcult turning points in our country's history' was Putin's offcial line after 2012.(1) Krastev: Russia's new strategy had two elements: a conservative turn away from fake Westernization at home and new initiatives of aggressive imitation abroad. The Kremlin's putative return to traditional conservative values, signalling and sealing its repudiation of Western liberalism, was not totally unexpected. Huntington: Russia's nationalistminded intellectuals enthusiastically endorsed the late Harvard professor's claim that 'the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural“.(2) Krastev: Along similar lines, a hard-shelled state that can be integrated safely into the global economy only if its national traditions, domestic politics and civil society are sealed offto some extent from external influences has been a principal goal of Putin's state-building project ever since he acceded to power. >Policy of Russia/Krastev. Krastev: From Putin's perspective, an important source of his regime's vulnerability is the Russian elite's cultural and financial dependence on the West. Putin controls everything in Russia except the things that really matter: the price of hydrocarbons, public sentiments (his popularity dropped significantly in 2018-2019)(3), and to some extent the loyalty of the rich. 1. Meeting of the Council for Culture and Art (October 2, 2013), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19353 2. Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?' Foreign Affairs 72:3 (Summer, 1993), p. 156. 3. Henry Foy, 'Russia's Trust in Vladimir Putin Falls to At Least 13-year Low', Financial Times (21 January 2019). |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Culture | Saucier | Corr I 392 Culture/Saucier: when culture is divined as a set of shared patterns, one is prompted to look for the (one) pattern shared by a whole distinct group, relying on the common but unexamined assumption that cultures are homogeneous. But in reality, culture does not regularly correspond to nations, ethnicities or so-called ‘races’. Some individuals are ‘bicultural’, able to operate in two different cultures. One can learn a new culture without necessarily giving up an old one. Nor is culture homogeneous: within any nation one typically finds numerous sub-cultures, which might be organized along what are seen as ethnic or racial lines, or alternatively by language, lifestyle or ideology. For a solution see >psychological anthropology. Cf. >Culture/Schwartz, >Culture/Goodenough. Gerard Saucier, „Semantic and linguistic aspects of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Culture | Urry | Gaus I 272 Culture/postmodernism/Lash/Urry/West: an important (...) consequence of [the] economic, social and political developments (>Capitalism/Lash/Urry) is the increasing importance of culture as a site of domination and resistance: 'domination through cultural forms takes on significance in disorganized capitalism which is comparable in importance to domination in the sphere of production itself' (1987(1): 14). Postmodernism: what differentiates Lash and Urry most clearly as theorists of postmodernity is their distinctively postmodernist view of contemporary culture. Disorganized capitalism is associated with the 'appearance and mass distribution of a culturalideological configuration of „Postmodemism" [which] affects high culture, popular culture and the symbols and discourse of everyday life' (1987(1): 7). Accordingly, philosophical postmodernism can be regarded as a symptom of broader cultural developments, which can, in their turn, be characterized in terms of postmodern philosophy. Postmodern culture is 'transgressive' both of intellectual boundaries between 'rational' and 'non-rational' and of aesthetic boundaries between 'high' and 'low' culture. It is suspicious of the distinction (so important for Habermas) between ethical, scientific and aesthetic discourse. Art/aura: Drawing on the work of Walter Benjamin, Lash and Urry describe postmodern culture as 'post-auratic' (1987(1): 286): the work of art is no longer an eternal object of contemplative, almost religious reverence, just another constituent of an 'economy of pleasure', a means of distraction like any other. By implication, postmodern culture is particularly resistant to the discursive forms characteristic of modernity. Communication now occurs more through images, sounds and impulses than through the spoken or written word. Politics: Culture, finally, is an increasingly important medium of political struggle. It is the potential site for the imposition of an 'authoritarian populism' closely identified with the politics of the new right and Thatcherism. On the other hand, developments like the counterculture, popular music and film testify to the alternative possibility of an 'anti-authoritarian radical democracy'. Less clear from Lash and Urry's analysis are the details of this progressive alternative: they offer little guidance beyond the need for a 'genuine dialogue' between 'new social movements' and the old left (1987(1): 312). >Democracy/Laclau/Mouffe. 1. Lash, Scott and John Urry (1987) The End of Organized Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity. West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Currency | Boyd | Rothbard II 166 Currency/convertibility/Walter Boyd/Rothbard: (…) according to Boyd(1), the depreciation of fiat paper in terms of other currencies would be reflected in a rise in the price of gold or silver bullion, and an appreciation of foreign currencies on the foreign exchange market. >Gold standard/Walter Boyd. This view (…) provides the germ of the purchasing-power-parity theory of exchange rates under inconvertible fiat currencies: „Specifically, Boyd contends that an increase in the supply of inconvertible paper money effects a general rise in domestic prices or, what is the same thing, a depreciation in the exchange value of the currency in terms of commodities which necessarily drives down the value of domestic currency in terms of foreign currencies whose exchange values have remained unchanged. This fall in the value of the inflated and depreciated domestic currency relative to foreign currencies is manifested in the depreciation of the exchange rate. Contained in Boyd's argument... is the seminal formulation of the purchasing-power-parity of exchange-rate determination which, of course, is the logical outcome of the application of the monetary approach to conditions of inconvertible paper currency.“(2) >Money/Walter Boyd. 1. Walter Boyd. 1800. A Letter to the Rt. Hon. William Pitt published in 1801. 2. Joseph Salerno. 1980. ‘The Doctrinal Antecedents of the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments’ (doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University, 1980), p 294. |
Boyd I Richard Boyd The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991 Boyd W I Walter Boyd Letter to the Right Honourable William Pitt on the Influence of the Stoppage of Issues in Specie at the Bank of England on the Prices of Provisions and other Commodities London 1801 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Currency Boards | Congressional Research Service (CRS) | CRS I 1 Currency Boards/Marc Labonte/CRS: A political advantage of a currency board or currency union in a country with a profligate past is that it “ties the hands” of the monetary and fiscal authorities, making it harder to finance budget deficits by printing money. Recent experience with economic crisis in Mexico, East Asia, Russia, Brazil, and Turkey suggests that fixed exchange rates can be prone to currency crises that can spill over into wider economic crises. This is a factor not considered in the earlier exchange rate literature, in part because international capital mobility plays a greater role today than it did in the past. These experiences suggest that unless a country has substantial economic interdependence with a neighbor to which it can fix its exchange rate, floating exchange rates may be a better way to promote macroeconomic stability, provided the country is willing to use its monetary and fiscal policy in a disciplined fashion. The collapse of Argentina’s currency board in 2002 suggests that such arrangements do not get around the problems with fixed exchange rates, as their proponents claimed. This report does not track legislation and will be updated as events warrant. >Currency policy, >Fixed exchange rates, >Floating exchange rates. CRS I 5 Currency boards/Marc Labonte/CRS: A currency board is a monetary arrangement where a country keeps its own currency, but the central bank cedes all of its power to alter interest rates, and monetary policy is tied to the policy of a foreign country. For example, Hong Kong has a currency board linked to the U.S. dollar. Argentina had a similar arrangement which it abandoned in 2002, during its economic crisis. In Argentina, for every peso of currency in circulation the Argentine currency board held one dollar-denominated asset, and was forbidden from buying and selling domestic assets. Thus, the amount of pesos in circulation could only increase if there was a balance of payment surplus. In effect, the exchange rate at which Argentina competed with foreign goods was set by the United States. Because exchange rate adjustment was not possible, adjustment had to come through prices (i.e., inflation or deflation) instead. Domestically, because the central bank could no longer alter the money supply to change interest rates, the economy could only recover from peaks and valleys of the business cycle through gradual price adjustment. >Hard pegs, >Soft pegs, >Fixed exchange rates, >Floating exchange rates, >Currency Unions. Congressional Research Service of the Library of congress (CRS) Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? RL31204 (2007) https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL31204 |
CRS I Congressional Research Service (CRS) Marc Labonte Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? Washington: Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress 2007 CRS II Congressional Research Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Marc Labonte, Banking and Cryptocurrency: Policy Issues. CRS Congressional research Service Report R48430. Washington, DC. 2025 CRS III Congressional Research Service (CRS) Corrie E. Clark Heather L. Greenley, Bitcoin, Blockchain, and the Energy Sector. Washington, DC. 2019 CRS IV Congressional Reserch Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Cryptocurrency: Selected Policy Issues Congressional Reserch Service CRS Report R47425 Washington, DC. 2023 |
| Currency Crises | Economic Theories | Feldstein I 426 Currency crises/Economic theories/Krugman: (…) the standard reaction both of most economists and of international officials to currency crises is, at least informally, based on something like the scenario just described. >Currency crises/Obstfeld. That is, they recognize that the speculative attack, driven by expectations of devaluation, was itself the main proximate reason for devaluation; yet they regard the whole process as ultimately caused by the policies of the attacked country, and in particular by a conflict between domestic objectives and the currency peg that made an eventual collapse of that peg inevitable. In effect, the financial markets simply bring home the news, albeit sooner than the country might have wanted to hear it. A significant number of economists studying this issue do, however, believe that the complaints of countries that they are being unfairly or arbitrarily attacked have at least some potential merit. So let me turn to the possible ways that - especially in the context of second-generation models ((s) like the Obstfeld model) - such complaints might in fact be justified. Feldstein I 427 KrugmanVsObstfeld: (…) it is possible to conceive of a number of circumstances under which the financial markets are not as blameless as all that. Self-Fulfilling Crises/Krugman: An individual investor will not pull his money out of the country if he believes that the currency regime is in no imminent danger; but he will do so if a currency collapse seems likely. A crisis, however, will materialize precisely if many individual investors do pull their money out. The result is that either optimism or pessimism will be self-confirming; (…). Feldstein I 428 Herding/Krugman: Both the canonical currency crisis model and the second-generation models presume that foreign exchange markets are efficient-that is, that they make the best use of the available information. >Currency crises/Krugman. There is, however, very little evidence that such markets are in fact efficient; (…). In general, herding can be exemplified by the result found in Shiller’s (1989)(1) remarkable Feldstein I 429 survey of investors during the 1987 stock market crash: the only reason consistently given by those selling stocks for their actions was the fact that prices were going down. In the context of a currency crisis, of course, such behavior could mean that a wave of selling, whatever its initial cause, (…). Feldstein I 430 Contagion/Krugman: One simple explanation of contagion involves real linkages between the countries: a currency crisis in country A worsens the fundamentals of country B. However, even in the European and Asian cases the trade links appear fairly weak; (…). At this point two interesting “rational” explanations for crisis contagion between seemingly unlinked economies have been advanced (Drazen 1997)(2). One is that countries are perceived as a group with some common but imperfectly observed characteristics. To caricature this position, Latin American countries share a common culture and therefore, perhaps, a “Latin temperament”; (…). Feldstein I 431 Market manipulation/Krugman: Scenarios in which crises are generated either by self-fulfilling rational expectations or by irrational herding behavior imply at least the possibility of profitable market manipulation by large speculators. (Krugman 1996)(3) proposed that such hypothetical agents be referred to as “Soroi.” ((s) this is the Greek plural of Soros.)) Suppose that a country is vulnerable to a run on its currency: either investors believe that it will abandon its currency peg if challenged by a speculative attack, or they simply emulate each other and can therefore be stampeded. Then a large investor could engineer profits for himself by first quietly taking a short position in that country’s currency, then deliberately triggering a crisis-which he could do through some combination of public statements and ostentatious selling. Feldstein I 432 In Krugman (1996)(3) I also argued that the existence of Soroi itself tends to advance the date of speculative attack: since everyone knows that a currency that is vulnerable to a self-fulfilling attack presents a profit opportunity for large players, investors will sell the currency in anticipation that one or another of these players will in fact undermine the exchange regime-and in so doing investors will force the collapse of the regime even without the aid of a Soros. >Currency crises/Krugman. 1. Shiller, R. 1989. Market volatility. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 2. Drazen, A. 1997. Contagious currency crises. Mimeograph. 3. Krugman, P. 1996. Are currency crises self-fulfilling? In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1996, ed. B. S. Bernanke and J. J. Rotemberg. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Paul R. Krugman. „Currency Crises“. In: Martin Feldstein (ed). International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. |
Feldstein I Martin Feldstein (ed.) International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. Chicago 1999 |
| Currency Crises | Fischer | Feldstein I 453 Currency crises/Stanley Fischer: The natural tendency to focus on crises that have happened may lead to certain biases. Almost by definition, these are outliers, outcomes that are worse Feldstein I 454 than anticipated. We should also think for a minute about crises that don’t happen. First, crises don’t happen in most countries, most of the time. Second, in some cases, they don’t happen because countries have taken action to avoid crises that were coming. Third, there are crises that are expected but don’t happen. In thinking about crises, we will need to figure out how and why the markets keep financing these countries, possibly long enough for them to avoid a crisis. >Exchange rates/Fischer, >Exchange rates, >Fixed exchange rates, >Floating exchange rates. Feldstein I 456 IMF/Fischer: Let me also discuss the proposal to amend the Articles of Agreement of the IMF to make liberalization of capital flows a purpose of the IMF. At present we have as one of our purposes the promotion of current account convertibility, but not capital account convertibility-though we are allowed to require countries to impose capital controls in certain circumstances. The proposal to amend the articles in this direction has aroused a great deal of concern in many developing countries, though not, I believe, warranted concern. Capital account liberalization is something that in the long run is going to happen to almost every country, as current account liberalization has happened to almost every country. And in the long run, as financial structures strengthen, it will be a good thing. Quotas/capital account/Fischer: We know that quotas are by and large worse than tariffs, despite the reverse occasionally being true in very specific circumstances. We know something about liberalizing by cutting tariffs proportionally, and so forth. We don’t have similar answers on the capital account-and we should try to develop them. ((s) Written in 1999). Feldstein I 457 Equilibrium/Fischer: (…) I have great difficulty knowing how we know whether the market is doing right, whether there isn’t another equilibrium, and what exactly is driving these situations. But if that’s what you start believing, then you have to ask whether in a crisis or otherwise, countries shouldn’t at least tentatively take a view on where the exchange rate should be. Of course, they can’t in these circumstances use reserves extensively to defend a particular rate, but they may try to use the interest rate to keep the rate from moving too far. Contagion: Contagion exists if, given the objective circumstances, a country is more likely to have a crisis if some other country is also having a crisis. The data show, for instance in a paper by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996)(1), that contagion exists, a result that is easy to believe given the European crisis, the Latin American crisis, and the Southeast Asian crisis. Question: (…) should the IMF be lending in these circumstances and does that create too much moral hazard? Moral hazard/Fischer: Article I of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, which sets out the purposes of the Fund, includes the following: “To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily available to them under appropriate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjust Feldstein I 458 ments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.” We were set up in part to lend to countries in crisis and are thus not going to tell a member that we cannot lend to it because of the moral hazard. There is moral hazard in every single insurance arrangement. We all know the analysis that seatbelts increase the speed at which people drive, and increase the intensity of accidents, and could even increase the number of accidents. That is also the case with the moral hazard of lending by the official sector in circumstances in which a country is in severe trouble, and there seems to be nothing else that will help it avoid taking measures destructive of national prosperity, which means having a very, very deep recession. 1. Eichengreen, Bany, Andrew Rose, and Charles Wyplosz. 1996. Contagious currency crises. NBER Working Paper no. 5681. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research. Stanley Fisher. „Crises that don’t happen.“ In: Martin Feldstein (ed). International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. |
Fischer St I Stanley Fischer Imf Essays From a Time of Crisis Boston: MIT 2005 Feldstein I Martin Feldstein (ed.) International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. Chicago 1999 |
| Currency Crises | Krugman | Feldstein I 421 Currency crises/Krugman: [a] sort of circular logic - in which investors flee a currency because they expect it to be devalued, and much (though usually not all) of the pressure on the currency comes precisely because of this investor lack of confidence - is the defining feature of a currency crisis. Feldstein I 422 Canonical crises model/Salant/Krugman: The canonical crisis model derives from work done in the mid-1970s by Stephen Salant(1), at that time at the Federal Reserve’s International Finance Section. His starting point was the proposition that speculators will hold an exhaustible resource if and only if they expect its price to rise rapidly enough to offer them a rate of return equivalent (after adjusting for risk) to that on other assets. This proposition is the basis of the famous Hotelling model of exhaustible resource pricing: the price of such a resource should rise over time at the rate of interest, with the level of the price path determined by the requirement that the resource just be exhausted by the time the price has risen to the “choke point” at which there is no more demand. >Hotelling Rule, >Exhaustible resources, >Currency crises/Salant. Feldstein I 423 Salant/Krugman: The canonical currency crisis model, as laid out initially by Krugman (1979)(2) and refined by Flood and Garber (1984),(3) was designed to mimic the commodity board story. Canonical crises model/Salant/Krugman: The canonical currency crisis model, then, explains such crises as the result of a fundamental inconsistency between domestic policies - typically the per- Feldstein I 424 sistence of money-financed budget deficits - and the attempt to maintain a fixed exchange rate. This model has some important virtues. First of all, many currency crises clearly do reflect a basic inconsistency between domestic and exchange rate policy; (…). Second, the model demonstrates clearly that the abrupt, billions-lost-in-days character of runs on a currency need not reflect either investor irrationality or the schemes of market manipulators. It can be simply the result of the logic of the situation, in which holding a currency will become unattractive once its price is no longer stabilized, and the end of the price stabilization is itself triggered by the speculative flight of capital. These insights are important, especially as a corrective to the tendency of observers unfamiliar with the logic of currency crises to view them as somehow outside the normal universe of economic events-whether as a revelation that markets have been taken over by chaos theory, that “virtual money” has now overpowered the real economy (Drucker 1997)(4), or as prima facie evidence of malevolent market manipulation. VsCanonical model/Krugman: Perhaps the best way to describe what is wrong with the canonical crisis model is to say that it represents government policy (though not the market response) in a very mechanical way. The government is assumed to blindly keep on printing money to cover a budget deficit, regardless of the external situation; the central bank is assumed to doggedly sell foreign exchange to peg the exchange rate until the last dollar of reserves is gone. In reality the range of possible policies is much wider. For more sophisticated models see >Currency crises/Obstfeld, >Currency crises/economic theories. Feldstein I 439 Preventions: [One] answer is simply not to offer speculators an easy target, by refusing to defend any particular exchange rate in the first place. Once a country Feldstein I 440 has a floating exchange rate, any speculative concerns about its future policies will already be reflected in the exchange rate. Thus anyone betting against the currency will face a real risk, rather than the one-way option in speculating against a fixed rate. Reasoning along these lines has convinced a number of economists working on currency crises that the ultimate lesson of the crisis-ridden 1990s is that countries should avoid halfway houses. They should either float their currencies or join currency unions. 1. Salant, Stephen. "Exhaustible Resources and Industrial Structure: A Nash-Cournot Approach to the World Oil Market," Journal of Political Economy, October 1976. 2. Krugman, P. 1979. A model of balance of payments crises. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 11:311-25. 3. Flood, R., and P. Garber. 1984. Collapsing exchange rate regimes: Some linear examples. Journal of International Economics 17: 1-13. 4. Drucker, P. 1997. The global economy and the nation-state. Foreign Affairs 76 (5): 159-71. Paul R. Krugman. „Currency Crises“. In: Martin Feldstein (ed). International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 Feldstein I Martin Feldstein (ed.) International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. Chicago 1999 |
| Currency Crises | Obstfeld | Feldstein I 424 Currency crises/Obstfeld/Krugman: So-called second-generation models, perhaps best represented by Obstfeld (1994)(1), require three ingredients. First, there must be a reason why the government would like to abandon its fixed exchange rate. Second, there must be a Feldstein I 425 reason why the government would like to defend the exchange rate-so that there is a tension between these motives. Finally, in order to create the circular logic that drives a crisis, the cost of defending a fixed rate must itself increase when people expect (or at least suspect) that the rate might be abandoned. In order for a government to have a real incentive to change the exchange rate, something must be awkwardly fixed in domestic currency. One obvious possibility is a large debt burden denominated in domestic currency-a burden that a government might be tempted to inflate away but cannot as long as it is committed to a fixed exchange rate. Given a motive to depreciate, why would a government choose instead to defend a fixed rate? One answer might be that it believes that a fixed rate is important in facilitating international trade and investment. Finally, why would public lack of confidence in the maintenance of a fixed rate itself have the effect of making that rate more difficult to defend? Here there is a somewhat subtle distinction between two variants of the story. Some modelers - notably Obstfeld (1994)(1) - emphasize that a fixed rate will be costly to defend if people expected in the past that it would be depreciated now. Krugman: The alternative (which to my mind seems much closer to what happens in real crises) is to suppose that a fixed rate is costly to defend if people now expect that it will be depreciated in the future. >Currency crises/Economic theories, >Currency crises/Krugman. 1. Obstfeld, M. 1994. The logic of currency crises. Cahiers Economiques et Monetaires 43: 189-213 Paul R. Krugman. „Currency Crises“. In: Martin Feldstein (ed). International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. |
Obstfeld I Maurice M. Obstfeld The logic of currency crises 1994 Feldstein I Martin Feldstein (ed.) International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. Chicago 1999 |
| Currency Crises | Salant | Feldstein I 422 Currency crises/Canonical Crises Model/Salant/Krugman: The canonical crisis model derives from work done in the mid-1970s by Stephen Salant, at that time at the Federal Reserve’s International Finance Section. His starting point was the proposition that speculators will hold an exhaustible resource if and only if they expect its price to rise rapidly enough to offer them a rate of return equivalent (after adjusting for risk) to that on other assets. This proposition is the basis of the famous Hotelling model of exhaustible resource pricing: the price of such a resource should rise over time at the rate of interest, with the level of the price path determined by the requirement that the resource just be exhausted by the time the price has risen to the “choke point” at which there is no more demand. >Hotelling Rule, >Exhaustible resources. Feldstein I 423 But what will happen, asked Salant, if an official price stabilization board announces its willingness to buy or sell the resource at some fixed price? As long as the price is’ above the level that would prevail in the absence of the board-that is, above the Hotelling path-speculators will sell off their holdings, reasoning that they can no longer expect to realize capital gains. Thus the board will initially find itself acquiring a large stockpile. Eventually, however, the price that would have prevailed without the stabilization scheme-the “shadow price”- will rise above the board’s target. At that point speculators will regard the commodity as a desirable asset and will begin buying it up; if the board continues to try to stabilize the price, it will quickly-instantaneously, in the model-find its stocks exhausted. KrugmanVsSalant: The canonical currency crisis model, as laid out initially by Krugman (1979)(2) and refined by Flood and Garber (1984)(3), was designed to mimic the commodity board story. >Currency crises/Krugman. 1. Salant, Stephen. "Exhaustible Resources and Industrial Structure: A Nash-Cournot Approach to the World Oil Market," Journal of Political Economy, October 1976. 2. Krugman, P. 1979. A model of balance of payments crises. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 11:311-25. 3. Flood, R., and P. Garber. 1984. Collapsing exchange rate regimes: Some linear examples. Journal of International Economics 17: 1-13. Paul R. Krugman. „Currency Crises“. In: Martin Feldstein (ed). International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. |
Salant I Stephen W. Salant Exhaustible Resources and Industrial Structure: A Nash-Cournot Approach to the World Oil Market Chicago 1976 Feldstein I Martin Feldstein (ed.) International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. Chicago 1999 |
| Currency Depreciation | Benguria | Benguria I 1 Currency Appreciation/depreciation/tariffs/Benguria/Saffie: We find* that a one percentage point higher tariff is associated with a statistically significant 0.23%decline in stock prices. Further, we find no evidence of a dollar appreciation; if anything, higher tariffs are associated with a dollar depreciation, driven by countries with a floating regime. We show this is consistent with a model that allows for trade reallocation and in which exports to the US are invoiced in dollars while exports to the rest of the world are partly invoiced in producer currency. Benguria I 2 Across several specifications with various controls, we find a bilateral depreciation of the dollar. This is driven by countries with a floating exchange rate regime, and is statistically significant only in some of our regressions. This goes against what we would expect from existing theory, which indicates that US tariffs would reduce demand for foreign currencies, leading to a dollar appreciation. If US imports are invoiced in US dollars, we would expect no or small response in the exchange rate. We find that these results are robust to including in our regressions a component capturing the product exclusions in the tariff announcement. >Currency, >Share prices, >Stock prices, >Elasticity. Benguria I 13 Tariffs/currency depreciation/Benguria/Saffie: In the standard model of trade and exchange rates, a US tariff would reduce demand for foreign currencies, leading to a dollar appreciation. We develop a simple model* which departs from the standard model by changing its assumptions about invoicing currencies and about trade reallocation in response to tariffs. In both regards, our assumptions are guided by well-established empirical facts. This simple variation delivers the opposite result: a US tariff leads to a dollar depreciation. The assumption about invoicing patterns is the following. Exports to the US are invoiced in US dollars. Exports to the rest of the world are invoiced partly in dollars and partly in the currency of the exporting country (producer currency, using the terminology in the literature). This assumption is consistent with the evidence in the literature on invoice currencies in trade [Boz et al., 2022(1), Gopinath and Rigobon, 2008(2)]. Benguria I 14 The assumption about export reallocation is that US tariffs lead to a decline in exports to the US but an increase in exports to the rest of the world. This reallocation can be microfounded by assuming an increasing marginal cost. This mechanism is featured in Benguria and Saffie [2024](3) and Almunia et al. [2021](4). Further, Benguria and Saffie [2024](3) show that in there is a substantial amount of trade reallocation in response to trade war tariffs. Combining both assumptions, a tariff imposed by the US on a given country leads to a decrease in exports to the US and an increase in exports to the rest of the world. Because only exports to the rest of the world are invoiced in producer currency, this leads to a higher relative demand for producer currency. This implies an appreciation of the producer currency (i.e., a depreciation of the US dollar). We now provide a mathematical overview. In Appendix Section A.4, we provide the microfoundations for this model by assuming an increasing marginal cost. For this purpose, we extend the model in Benguria and Saffie [2024](3) by including assumptions about invoice currencies. Benguria I 15 Stock prices: This model also predicts a decline in stock prices in response to a US tariff. *Felipe Benguria Felipe Saffie . (2025) Rounding up the Effect of Tariffs on Financial Markets: Evidence from April 2, 2025. NBER Working Paper 34036 http://www.nber.org/papers/ 1050. 1. E. Boz, C. Casas, G. Georgiadis, G. Gopinath, H. Le Mezo, A. Mehl, and T. Nguyen. Patterns of invoicing currency in global trade: New evidence. Journal of International Economics, 136:103604, 2022. 2. G. Gopinath and R. Rigobon. Sticky borders. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2):531–575, 2008. 3. F. Benguria and F. Saffie. Escaping the trade war: Finance and relational supply chains in the adjustment to trade policy shocks. Journal of International Economics, 152:103987, 2024. 4. M. Almunia, P. Antras, D. Lopez-Rodriguez, and E. Morales. Venting out: Exports during a domestic slump. American Economic Review, 111(11):3611–62, 2021. |
Benguria I Felipe Benguria Felipe Saffie Rounding up the Effect of Tariffs on Financial Markets: Evidence from April 2, 2025. NBER Working Paper 34036 http://www.nber.org/papers/ 1050. Cambridge, MA 2025 |
| Currency Policy | Friedman | Brocker I 398 Currency Policy/Friedman: according to Friedman, no monetary policy is needed to regulate international monetary relations: if exchange rates are allowed to fluctuate freely, central banks no longer have to intervene in the currency markets in order to keep the relative prices of national currencies constant. Flexible exchange rates are then adjusted in the free play of market forces in such a way that free world trade is promoted, any differences in inflation between the nation states are compensated for and no country suffers major disruptions to its international competitiveness. >Competition, >Monetarism. In the 1960s, money supply management and flexible exchange rates were widely accepted economic policy concepts. Peter Spahn, „Milton Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Econ Fried I Milton Friedman The role of monetary policy 1968 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Currency Unions | Congressional Research Service (CRS) | CRS I 5 Currency Unions/Marc Labonte/CRS: From an economic perspective, a currency union is very similar to a currency board. An example of a currency union is the euro, which has been adopted by 13 members of the European Union. >Currency boards, >Fixed exchange rates, >Floating exchange rates. The individual nations in the euro zone have no control over the money supply in their countries. Instead, it is determined by two factors. First, the European Central Bank (ECB) determines the money supply for the entire euro area by targeting short-term interest rates for the euro area as a whole. Second, how much of the euro area’s money supply flows to, say, Ireland depends upon Ireland’s net monetary transactions with the rest of the euro area. >Central Banks. For this second reason, different countries in the euro area have different inflation rates despite the fact that they share a common monetary policy. In a currency union such as the euro arrangement, each member of the euro has a vote in determining monetary policy for the overall euro area.(1) This is the primary difference from a currency board - the country that has adopted a currency board has no say in the setting of monetary policy by the country to which its currency board is tied. The countries of the euro also share in the earnings of the ECB, known as seigniorage, just as they would if they had their own currency. Not all currency unions give all members a say in the determination of monetary policy, however. For instance, when Ecuador, El Salvador, and Panama unilaterally adopted the U.S. dollar as their currency, they gained no influence over the actions and decisions of the Federal Reserve. CRS I 6 From a macroeconomic perspective, a unilateral currency adoption and a currency board are indistinguishable. Between these two arrangements, there are only two minor differences of note. First, currency boards earn income on the dollar-denominated assets that they hold (another example of seigniorage) while currency adopters do not.(2) Second, investors may view a currency union as a more permanent commitment than a currency board, particularly after the failure of Argentina’s currency board. If this were the case, they would view the risks associated with investment in the former to be lower. >Hard pegs, >Soft pegs. 1. Specifically, each country is represented on the ECB’s Governing Council, which determines monetary policy. The ECB has operational independence from the European Commission, EU Council of Ministers, and the national governments of the euro area, just as the Federal Reserve has operational independence from the U.S. Congress and executive branch. 2. There have been congressional proposals to transfer seigniorage earnings to countries that dollarize in order to encourage dollarization. For example, see H.R. 2617 in the 107th Congress. Congressional Research Service of the Library of congress (CRS) Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? RL31204 (2007) https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL31204 |
CRS I Congressional Research Service (CRS) Marc Labonte Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? Washington: Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress 2007 CRS II Congressional Research Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Marc Labonte, Banking and Cryptocurrency: Policy Issues. CRS Congressional research Service Report R48430. Washington, DC. 2025 CRS III Congressional Research Service (CRS) Corrie E. Clark Heather L. Greenley, Bitcoin, Blockchain, and the Energy Sector. Washington, DC. 2019 CRS IV Congressional Reserch Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Cryptocurrency: Selected Policy Issues Congressional Reserch Service CRS Report R47425 Washington, DC. 2023 |
| Customs/Morality | Hegel | Brocker I 791 Sittlichkeit/HegelVsHobbes/Hegel/Honneth: (Honneth refers here to Hegel's early Jena writings.(1) Hegel develops a concept of morality that has a principally progressive thrust and therefore also points "beyond the institutional horizon" of Hegel's own present.(2) The social struggle of individuals for recognition is characterized by a distinctive dynamic; for Hegel, it proves to be an event that is open to the future and can never be finally concluded. With the motif of recognition, Hegel inscribes a principal tension in his understanding of social life, which integrates the social conflicts between individuals and groups into the historical horizon of a moral process of progress that is open to the future. >Recognition/Honneth, >Identity/Honneth. 1. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Jenaer Schriften 1808-1807 Frankfurt, 1986. 2. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) S.11 Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I 334 Morality/Hegel/Höffe: The basic lines(1) reach their climax, the synthesis as reconciliation of abstract law and subjective morality, morality, in a will that is free both externally, qua law, and internally, qua morality. This includes social forms and institutions in which a free >self-consciousness can recognize and acknowledge itself. Because they realize a far higher degree of rationality, they have an "infinitely more solid authority and power than the being of nature" (§ 146). Polis: To his thought of morality Hegel sees correspondences in the ancient Polis, namely in its theorist Aristotle. According to him, the guiding goal of human practice, eudaimonia, happiness, is the same for the individual citizen and for the polis. Similarly, Hegel, the great Neoaristotelian of modern times, conceives the highest level of freedom, morality, as the unity of the moral concepts of individuals with the moral concepts of the "moral powers," with law, custom and religion and their concrete communities and states. HegelVsAristotle/Höffe: Over this common ground one may not overlook however the fundamental difference: With Hegel, the Aristotelian doctrine of the personal household community (oikos) is replaced by the theory of the anonymous bourgeois Höffe I 335 society, with which the newer national economy or economics is integrated into the theory of law and state. >Second Nature/Hegel. Normative elements are clearly included in the description of the process. a) Hegel begins with the "immediate by-oneself", the family shaped by love. According to a further triune section this is divided into marriage, in which an initially only external unity is transformed, by free consent, into a spiritual unity of a self-conscious love. b) According to the antithesis, marriage requires a "lasting and secure possession, a property" (§ 170), for the acquisition of which, according to Hegel, the man is primarily responsible. c) According to the synthesis, the children who guarantee the progress of humanity have the right to be nourished and educated from the common family property. Alienation: With the coming of age of the children, the possibility of new families of their own arises, in which the transition to the next step, the antithesis within morality, becomes apparent. Their essence is alienation from the family, including history and religion. It is the economic and working society, known as the "civil society", which on the one hand is necessary for the development of freedom, but on the other hand does not get rid of its problem of poverty and wealth. Welfare state: The welfare state as a corrective does not come into view here. In order for bourgeois society to "function", it needs a legal system that Hegel calls the state of necessity and understanding. 1. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Customs/Morality | Multiculturalism | Gaus I 254 Customs/morality/multiculturalism/Kukathas: Headscarves affair: [France 1989]: in this instance, a problem arose because three North African immigrant women in a French public secondary school chose to wear their headscarves in class, in a gesture that was interpreted as a challenge to the national policy of secularism in schools. As Bhikhu Parekh notes, this issue 'went to the heart of the French conceptions of citizenship and national identity and divided the country' (2000(1): 250). But it also divided political theorists (Galeotti, 1993(2); 1994; Moruzzi, 1994a(3); 1994b(4)). Cf.>Religion/Multiculturalism. Privacy/liberalism/problem: on this, as on many other occasions, the liberal contention that individuals should be left free to live by their own lights in matters that are of private and not public concern does not help to resolve things. Even the matter of what one eats has a public dimension since there are laws governing the treatment of animals, and in particular the slaughtering of animals for human consumption. Conflicts: Religious demands for kosher or halal meat go against laws providing for the humane slaughter of animals in Europe. And to the extent that religious and cultural groups can gain exemptions to allow ritual slaughter or killing for sport, multiculturalism turns out not only to be bad for animals but problematic for political theory (Casal, 2003)(5). What is to be Gaus I 255 regarded as a public issue and what as private itself becomes a matter of political and philosophical disagreement. This is even more evidently the case when disputes centre on state symbols, the official status of languages, and the timing of holidays. Solutions: while Kymlicka' s philosophical response(6) to this has been a theory of group-differentiated citizenship, with specific rights for immigrant and indigenous minorities, others have responded with calls for a slowing or halting of immigration from culturally different people (Brimelow, 1995)(7) or restricting the granting of citizenship to those who have more completely assimilated into the ways of their new society (Pickus, 1998)(8). For some, the nation-state is indeed the expression of a specific ethno-cultural group, and to try to create a multicultural state is therefore a mistake (Auster, 1992)(9). >Cultural rights/Levy, >Culture/Kymlicka, >Group rights/Political Philosophy, >Minority rights/Kymlicka. 1. Parekh, Bhikhu (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. London: Macmillan. 2. Galeotti, Anna Elisabetta (1993) 'Citizenship and equality: the place for toleration'. Political Theory, 21 (4): 585-605. 3. Moruzzi, Norma Claire (1994a) 'A problem with headscarves: contemporary complexities of political and social identity'. Political Theory, 22 (4): 653—72. 4. Moruzzi, Norma Claire (1994b) 'A response to Galeotti'. Political Theory, 22 (4): 678_9. 5. Casal, Paula (2003) 'Is multiculturalism bad for animals?' Journal of Political Philosophy, 11 1-22. 6. Kymlicka, Will, ed. (1995b) The Rights of Minority Cultuæs. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 7. Brimelow, Peter (1995) Alien Nation: Common Sense about America's Immigration Disaster. New York: Random House. 8. Pickus, Noah M. J. (1998) 'To make natural: creating citizens for the twenty-first century'. In Noah M. J. Pickus, ed., Immigration and Citizenship in the Twenty- First Century. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 107-40. 9. Auster, Lawrence (1992) 'The forbidden topic: the link between multiculturalism and immigration'. National Review, 27 (April). Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Cybernetics | Wright | I 33 Cybernetics/Teleology/Wright, G. H.: How deep do cybernetic explanations penetrate the field of teleology? Do they go beyond the boundaries of biology to the field of human sciences (humanities?). Question: does the cybernetics provide an explanation according to the Covering-Law-model? >Cybernetics, >Covering laws. Wright: in my opinion, it does not. "Cybernetics" in the social sciences differs from that in biology by far more than this equation suggests. It is the question of how far actions are explained with the Covering-Law-model. >Actions, >Explanation, cf. >Anomalous Monism, >Actions/Davidson. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Cyberspace | Lessig | I 83 Cyberspace/Lessig: Cyberspace, is not just about making life easier. It is about making life different, or perhaps better. It is about making a different (or second) life. I 85 Cyberspace has changed in part because the people—who they are,what their nterests are—have changed, and in part because the capabilities provided by the space have changed. But part of the change has to do with the space itself. Communities, exchange, and conversation all flourish in a certain type of space; they are extinguished in a different type of space. (1) Spaces have values.6 They manifest these values through the practices or lives that they enable or disable. I 86 Choices mean that differently constituted spaces enable and disable differently. The blind could easily implement speech programs that read the (by definition machine-readable) text and could respond by typing.Other people on the Net would have no way of knowing that the person typing the message was blind, unless he claimed to be. The blind were equal to the seeing. I 169 Trespass law/Harold Reeves/Lessig: should there be a trespass law for the cyberspace? (2) – Reeves initial idea was simple: There should be no trespass law in cyberspace.2 The law should grant “owners” of space in cyberspace no legal protection against invasion; they should be forced to fend for themselves. What means would bring about themost efficient set of protections for property interests in cyberspace? One is the traditional protection of law […]The other protection is a fence, a technological device (a bit of code) that (among other things) blocks the unwanted from entering. I 170 The implication of this idea in real space is that it sometimesmakes sense to shift the burden of protection to citizens rather than to the state. […]Reeves argues that the costs of law in this context are extremely high—in part because of the costs of enforcement, but also because it is hard for the law to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate uses of cyberspaces. I 197 Cyberspace will open up three important choices in the context of intellectual property: whether to allow intellectual property in effect to become completely propertized (for that is what a perfect code regime for protecting intellectual property would do); and whether to allow this regime to erase the anonymity latent in less efficient architectures of control; and whether to allow the expansion of intellectual property to drive out amateur culture. These choices were not made by our framers. They are for us to make now. I 283 Spaces like Second Life richly control the life of people playing there. Indeed, the whole objective of playing there is create the impression that one is there. These, again, are the sorts of places I call cyberspace. Cyberspace is very different from life on a bill-paying website, or on a site holding your e-mail. Code controls these, too. But the control, or sovereignty, of those sites is distinct from the control of Second Life. In Second Life, or in what I’ve defined to be cyberspace generally, the control is ubiquitous; on a I 284 bill-paying website, or on what I’ve called the Internet, the control is passing, transitory. Interestingly, there is an important dynamic shift that we’ve already identified, more in thinly controlling spaces than thick. This is the preference for code controls where code controls are possible. Think again about the bill-paying website. It is of course against the law to access someone’s bank account and transfer funds fromthat account without the authorization of the account owner. But no bank would ever simply rely upon the law to enforce that rule. Every bank adds a complex set of code to authenticate who you are when you enter a bill-paying website. Where a policy objective can be coded, then the only limit on that coding is the marginal cost of code versus the marginal benefit of the added control. But in a thickly controlling environment such as Second Life, there’s a limit to the use of code to guide social behavior. I 285 Democracy/cyberspace/Castronova/Lessig: the single most interesting nondevelopment in cyberspace is that,again, as Castronova puts it, “one does not find much democracy at all in synthetic worlds.” (3) I 288 David Post: Communities in cyberspace, Post argues, are governed by “rule-sets.”We can understand these rule-sets to be the requirements, whether embedded in the architecture or promulgated in a set of rules, that constrain behavior in a particular place. I 307 Cyberlaw/internet law/international law/Lessig: if you’re offering Nazi material, and a French citizen enters your site, you should block her, but if she is a U.S. citizen, you can serve her. Each state would thus be restricting the citizens of other states as those states wanted. But citizens fromits nation would enjoy the freedoms that nation guarantees. This world would thus graft local rules onto life in cyberspace. I 308 Each state […] has its own stake in controlling certain behaviors, and these behaviors differ. But the key is this: The same architecture that enables Minnesota to achieve its regulatory end can also help other states achieve their regulatory. I 309 An ID-rich Internet would facilitate international zoning and enable this structure of international control. Such a regime would return geographical zoning to the Net. It would reimpose borders on a network built without those borders.[…] To those who love the liberty of the original Net, this regime is a nightmare. […] Of course, my view is that citizens of any democracy should have the freedom to choose what speech they consume. But I would prefer they earn that freedom by demanding it through democratic means than that a technological trick give it to them for free.[…] This regime gives each government the power to regulate its citizens; no government should have the right to do anything more. >Internet, >Internet culture, >Internet law. 1. See Katie Hafner and Matthew Lyon,Where Wizards Stay Up Late: The Origins of the Internet (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 62–63. 2. Harold Smith Reeves, “Property in Cyberspace,” University of Chicago Law Review 63 (1996): 761. 3. Castronova, Synthetic Worlds, 207. |
Lessig I Lawrence Lessig Code: Version 2.0 New York 2006ff |
| Darwinism | Kropotkin | Brocker I I26 Darwinism/Kropotkin: Kropotkin saw himself as a Darwinist, but rejected the evolution theorist from his students. According to Kropotkin, Darwin was "quite right when he saw in the social characteristics of man the main factor for his further development, and Darwin's vulgarizing successors are completely wrong when they claim the opposite".(1) >Evolution. VsKropotkin/VsSocial Darwinism: 1. Both are guilty of naturalistic failure: to derive a "shall" from being. Darwin himself, on the other hand, only tried to provide a description and explanation for the emergence and development of life in nature, and not to derive instructions for action from it. >Social Darwinism. CantzenVsKropotkin: 2. Both Kropotkin and the social Darwinism he criticized appear with the claim of a natural science and try to present mutual help as a law of nature. Kropotkin does not reflect on the relationship between the natural environment and the social environment. However, this is a historical relationship and not a law of nature.(2) Cf. >Altruism, >Laws. 1. Pjotr Alexejewitsch Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, London 1902. Dt.: Peter Kropotkin, Gegenseitige Hilfe in der Tier- und Menschenwelt. Mit einem Nachwort neu herausgegeben von Henning Ritter, Frankfurt/M./Berlin/Wien 1975, S. 113.f. 2. Rolf Cantzen, Weniger Staat – mehr Gesellschaft. Freiheit – Ökologie – Anarchismus, Frankfurt/M. 1987 , S. 23. |
Kropot I Peter Kropotkin Gegenseitige Hilfe in der Tier- und Menschenwelt Frankfurt/Berlin/Wien 1975 |
| Darwinism | Mayr | I 135 Darwin/Science Theory/Mayr: we speak of Darwin's first and second revolution. 1) Acknowledgement of evolution through common descent. a) Replace supernatural by natural explanation, b) Replace the linear model with a complex one. 2) Natural selection: refutation of the theory of acquired traits, refutation of mixed inheritance, discovery of the source of genetic diversity (mutation, genetic recombination, diploidy). >Explanation, >Evolution, >Causal explanation, >Selection, >Genes. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| de dicto | Brandom | I 714 De Dicto/Brandom: E.g. "he believes this from this tree bark ..." - de re: "he believes of quinine..."- quinine has more inferential connections to other contents - E.g. de re: the student believes of the number 17,163 that it... - (but he does not even know the number). I 965 Belief/Brandom: any belief, be it strong or weak, can be attributed de re or de dicto. I 845 De Re/Brandom: with this, determinations are made - de dicto: attributions are made. >Attribution, cf. >de re. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| de re | Perry | Frank I 412 f de re/trivial theory: de re is usually explained by de dicto. >de dicto, >Explanations. Frank I 414 Localization/localizing opinions/re/erry: it's not surprising that de re doesn't help with localization: De re-propositions do not remain indexical. >Localization, >Propositions, >Indexicality, >Index words. Propositions that are partly individuated by objects remain just as insensitive to the essence of localizing opinions as those that are entirely individuated by concepts. >Individuation, >Terms, >Objects. The decisive change in my situation is concealed: I notice that the untidy customer was not only for the customer with the torn package, but for me. ((s) Two different descriptions without "I" are not sufficient). >Sugar trail example, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. John Perry (1979): The Problem of the Essential Indexicals, in : Nous 13 (1979), 3-21 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Death | Barthes | Röttger-Denker I 121 Death/Barthes: where does he have its place, if not anymore in society, or in religion, then perhaps in the picture? The age of photography is also that of revolutions, assassinations, explosions. >Photograhy, >Picture, >Mapping, >Image, >Symbols, >Icons. Röttger-Denker I 129 Death/Antiquity/Greek culture/Barthes: The Greeks entered the realm of the dead backwards, so that what they had before them was their past. >Ancient philosophy, >More authors on death. |
Barthes I R. Barthes Mythologies: The Complete Edition, in a New Translation New York 2013 Röttger I Gabriele Röttger-Denker Roland Barthes zur Einführung Hamburg 1997 |
| Death | Baudrillard | Blask I 49 Death/Baudrillard: death must never be understood as a real event in which the purpose of the subject and the value gets lost. It is a bearer and a metaphor of reversibility. It is not to be understood religiously. The exchange behaves like in the primitive initiation rituals and the myth of rebirth. Death/society: death is forbidden, suicide is frightening: this leads to social control. Fascination of natural catastrophes or terrorism: longing for subversion. Blask I 51 Death/Bataille: Anti-Economy. >Economy/Baudrillard. Cf >Death/Barthes, >Death/Condorcet, >Death/Development psychology. |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Death | Mbembe | Brocker I 922 Death/Mbembe/Herb: Mbembe's analysis of the tyranny of representation (...) penetrates behind the "noise of the tam-tam" (Mbembe 2016(1), 266) into the sphere of extinction and forgetting. There he searches for the reasons why Africa is so twinned with violence and death that the violence of death has become the "normal state of things" (248). In the entourage of Frantz Fanon, Mbembe once again inspected the "terrifying places" (261) of the colony. >Language/Mbembe. Brocker I 923 Postcolony: The postcolony appears as an "epoch of raw life" (282), as a place of indistinguishability of life and death. The colonial relationship between death, body and flesh, which Mbembe describes in such detail, remains intact in the postcolony. The new rulers also show their "carnivorous face"(287). >Colonialism, >Postcolonialism. 1. Achille Mbembe, De la postcolonie. Essai sur l’imagination politique dans l’Afrique contemporaine, Paris 2000. Dt.: Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie. Zur politischen Vorstellungskraft im Afrika der Gegenwart, Wien/Berlin 2016 Karlfriedrich Herb, „Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie (2000)“. In: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Deceptions | Grice | Hungerland I 281ff Lying/deception/Hungerland: one must assert something in order to lie. I 300 f Strawson: deception/lie: the deception is the exception to the rule. HungerlandVsStrawson: deception is only possible in front of the right background. Avramides I 52 Deception/Grice: there are additional conditions: 2) there must be no inference element E such that S utters x by intendeding both: a) that A's determination of the reaction r is based on E and b) that A thinks S intends that a) is false. This is to prevent fraudulent intent. I 53 SchifferVs: this fails with the original counter-example. Solution/Schiffer: the solution here is mutual knowledge ad infinitum. Knowing that knowledge of a certain property is sufficient for the knowledge of a proposition. >Sufficiency, >Knowledge, >Communication. Then we also know that knowledge is sufficient. Avramides: e.g. being F, being G: speaker/listener are having intact sensory organs. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Hungerland I Isabel C. Hungerland Contextual Implication, Inquiry, 3/4, 1960, pp. 211-258 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Decision Networks | Norvig | Norvig I 626 Decision Networks/influence diagrams/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Decision networks combine Bayesian networks with additional node types for actions and utilities. (Cf. Howard and Matheson, 1984(2)). In its most general form, a decision network represents information about the agent’s current state, its ossible actions, the state that will result from the agent’s action, and the utility of that state. It therefore provides a substrate for implementing utility-based agents (…). E.g. the problem of the siting of an airport (>Multi-attribute utility/AI Research). Chance nodes: (…) represent random variables, just as they do in Bayesian networks. The agent could be uncertain about the construction cost, the level of air traffic and the potential for litigation, (…). Each chance node has associated with it a conditional distribution that is indexed by the state of the parent nodes. In decision networks, the parent nodes can include decision nodes as well as chance nodes. Decision nodes: (…) represent points where the decision maker has a choice of Norvig I 627 actions. The choice influences the cost, safety, and noise that will result. Utility nodes/value nodes: (…) represent the agent’s utility function. The utility node has as parents all variables describing the outcome that directly affect utility. Associated with the utility node is a description of the agent’s utility as a function of the parent attributes. >Information value/Norvig. Norvig I 638 Decision theory has been a standard tool in economics, finance, and management science since the 1950s. Until the 1980s, decision trees were the main tool used for representing simple decision problems. Smith (1988)(1) gives an overview of the methodology of decision analysis. Influence diagrams were introduced by Howard and Matheson (1984)(2), based on earlier work at SRI (Miller et al., 1976)(3). Howard and Matheson’s method involved the Norvig I 639 derivation of a decision tree from a decision network, but in general the tree is of exponential size. Shachter (1986)(4) developed a method for making decisions based directly on a decision network, without the creation of an intermediate decision tree. This algorithm was also one of the first to provide complete inference for multiply connected Bayesian networks. Zhang et al. (1994)(5) showed how to take advantage of conditional independence of information to reduce the size of trees in practice; they use the term decision network for networks that use this approach (although others use it as a synonym for influence diagram). Nilsson and Lauritzen (2000)(6) link algorithms for decision networks to ongoing developments in clustering algorithms for Bayesian networks. Koller and Milch (2003)(7) show how influence diagrams can be used to solve games that involve gathering information by opposing players, and Detwarasiti and Shachter (2005)(8) show how influence diagrams can be used as an aid to decision making for a team that shares goals but is unable to share all information perfectly. The collection by Oliver and Smith (1990)(9) has a number of useful articles on decision networks, as does the 1990 special issue of the journal Networks. 1. Smith, J. Q. (1988). Decision Analysis. Chapman and Hall. 2. Howard, R. A. and Matheson, J. E. (1984). Influence diagrams. In Howard, R. A. and Matheson, J. E. (Eds.), Readings on the Principles and Applications of Decision Analysis, pp. 721–762. Strategic Decisions Group. 3. Miller, A. C., Merkhofer, M. M., Howard, R. A., Matheson, J. E., and Rice, T. R. (1976). Development of automated aids for decision analysis. Technical report, SRI International. 4. Shachter, R. D. (1986). Evaluating influence diagrams. Operations Research, 34, 871–882. 5. Zhang, N. L., Qi, R., and Poole, D. (1994). A computational theory of decision networks. IJAR, 11, 83–158. 6. Nilsson, D. and Lauritzen, S. (2000). Evaluating influence diagrams using LIMIDs. In UAI-00, pp. 436–445. 7. Koller, D. and Milch, B. (2003). Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games. Games and Economic Behavior, 45, 181–221. 8. Detwarasiti, A. and Shachter, R. D. (2005). Influence diagrams for team decision analysis. Decision Analysis, 2(4), 207–228. 9. Oliver, R. M. and Smith, J. Q. (Eds.). (1990). Influence Diagrams, Belief Nets and Decision Analysis. Wiley. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Decision Theory | AI Research | Norvig I 638 Decision theory/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Decision theory has been a standard tool in economics, finance, and management science since the 1950s. Until the 1980s, decision trees were the main tool used for representing simple decision problems. Smith (1988)(1) gives an overview of the methodology of decision analysis. Influence diagrams were introduced by Howard and Matheson (1984)(2), based on earlier work at SRI (Miller et al., 1976)(3). Howard and Matheson’s method involved the Norvig I 639 derivation of a decision tree from a decision network, but in general the tree is of exponential size. Shachter (1986)(4) developed a method for making decisions based directly on a decision network, without the creation of an intermediate decision tree. This algorithm was also one of the first to provide complete inference for multiply connected Bayesian networks. Zhang et al. (1994)(5) showed how to take advantage of conditional independence of information to reduce the size of trees in practice; they use the term decision network for networks that use this approach (although others use it as a synonym for influence diagram). Nilsson and Lauritzen (2000)(6) link algorithms for decision networks to ongoing developments in clustering algorithms for Bayesian networks. Koller and Milch (2003)(7) show how influence diagrams can be used to solve games that involve gathering information by opposing players, and Detwarasiti and Shachter (2005)(8) show how influence diagrams can be used as an aid to decision making for a team that shares goals but is unable to share all information perfectly. The collection by Oliver and Smith (1990)(9) has a number of useful articles on decision networks, as does the 1990 special issue of the journal Networks. >Decision networks/Norvig. Norvig I 639 Surprisingly few early AI researchers adopted decision-theoretic tools after the early applications in medical decision (…). One of the few exceptions was Jerry Feldman, who applied decision theory to problems in vision (Feldman and Yakimovsky, 1974)(10) and planning (Feldman and Sproull, 1977)(11). After the resurgence of interest in probabilistic methods in AI in the 1980s, decision-theoretic expert systems gained widespread acceptance (Horvitz et al., 1988(12); Cowell et al., 2002)(13). >Expert systems/Norvig. 1. Smith, J. Q. (1988). Decision Analysis. Chapman and Hall. 2. Howard, R. A. and Matheson, J. E. (1984). Influence diagrams. In Howard, R. A. and Matheson, J. E. (Eds.), Readings on the Principles and Applications of Decision Analysis, pp. 721–762. Strategic Decisions Group. 3. Miller, A. C., Merkhofer, M. M., Howard, R. A., Matheson, J. E., and Rice, T. R. (1976). Development of automated aids for decision analysis. Technical report, SRI International. 4. Shachter, R. D. (1986). Evaluating influence diagrams. Operations Research, 34, 871–882. 5. Zhang, N. L., Qi, R., and Poole, D. (1994). A computational theory of decision networks. IJAR, 11, 83–158. 6. Nilsson, D. and Lauritzen, S. (2000). Evaluating influence diagrams using LIMIDs. In UAI-00, pp. 436–445. 7. Koller, D. and Milch, B. (2003). Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games. Games and Economic Behavior, 45, 181–221. 8. Detwarasiti, A. and Shachter, R. D. (2005). Influence diagrams for team decision analysis. Decision Analysis, 2(4), 207–228. 9. Oliver, R. M. and Smith, J. Q. (Eds.). (1990). Influence Diagrams, Belief Nets and Decision Analysis. Wiley. 10. Feldman, J. and Yakimovsky, Y. (1974). Decision theory and artificial intelligence I: Semantics-based region analyzer. AIJ, 5(4), 349–371. 11. Feldman, J. and Sproull, R. F. (1977). Decision theory and artificial intelligence II: The hungry monkey. Technical report, Computer Science Department, University of Rochester. 12. Horvitz, E. J., Breese, J. S., and Henrion, M. (1988). Decision theory in expert systems and artificial intelligence. IJAR, 2, 247–302. 13. Cowell, R., Dawid, A. P., Lauritzen, S., and Spiegelhalter, D. J. (2002). Probabilistic Networks and Expert Systems. Springer. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Decision Tree | Norvig | Norvig I 698 Def Decision tree/Norvig/Russell: A decision tree represents a function DECISION TREE that takes as input a vector of attribute values and returns a “decision”—a single output value. The input and output values can be discrete or continuous. A decision tree reaches its decision by performing a sequence of tests. Each internal node in the tree corresponds to a test of the value of one of the input attributes, Ai, and the branches from the node are labeled with the possible values of the attribute, Ai =vik. Each leaf node in the tree specifies a value to be returned by the function. A Boolean decision tree is logically equivalent to the assertion that the goal attribute is true if and only if the input attributes satisfy one of the paths leading to a leaf with value true. Writing this out in propositional logic, we have Goal ⇔ (Path1 ∨ Path2 ∨ · · ·) , where each Path is a conjunction of attribute-value tests required to follow that path. Thus, the whole expression is equivalent to disjunctive normal form. ((s) >Normal form/logic.) Unfortunately, no matter how we measure size, it is an intractable problem to find the smallest consistent tree; there is no way to efficiently search through the 22n trees. With some simple heuristics, however, we can find a good approximate solution: a small (but not smallest) consistent tree. The decision tree learning algorithm adopts a greedy divide-and-conquer strategy: always test the most important attribute first. This test divides the problem up into smaller subproblems that can then be solved recursively. “Most important attribute”: the one that makes the most difference to the classification of an example. Decision tree learning algorithm: see Norvig I 702. Norvig I 705 Problems: the decision tree learning algorithm will generate a large tree when there is actually no pattern to be found. Overfitting: algorithm will seize on any pattern it can find in the input. If it turns out that there are 2 rolls of a 7-gram blue die with fingers crossed and they both come out 6, then the algorithm may construct a path that predicts 6 in that case. Solution: decision tree pruning combats overfitting. Pruning works by eliminating nodes that are not clearly relevant. Norvig I 706 Missing data: In many domains, not all the attribute values will be known for every example. Norvig I 707 Multivalued attributes: When an attribute has many possible values, the information gain measure gives an inappropriate indication of the attribute’s usefulness. In the extreme case, an attribute such as exact time has a different value for every example, which means each subset of examples is a singleton with a unique classification, and the information gain measure would have its highest value for this attribute. Continuous and integer-valued input attributes: Continuous or integer-valued attributes such as height and weight, have an infinite set of possible values. Rather than generate infinitely many branches, decision-tree learning algorithms typically find the split point that gives the highest information gain. Continuous-valued output attributes: If we are trying to predict a numerical output value, such as the price of an apartment, then we need a regression tree rather than a classification tree. A regression tree has at each leaf a linear function of some subset of numerical attributes, rather than a single value. >Learning/AI Research. Norvig I 758 History: The first notable use of decision trees was in EPAM, the “Elementary Perceiver And Memorizer” (Feigenbaum, 1961)(1), which was a simulation of human concept learning. ID3 (Quinlan, 1979)(2) added the crucial idea of choosing the attribute with maximum entropy; it is the basis for the decision tree algorithm in this chapter. Information theory was developed by Claude Shannon to aid in the study of communication (Shannon and Weaver, 1949)(3). (Shannon also contributed one of the earliest examples of machine learning, a mechanical mouse named Theseus that learned to navigate through a maze by trial and error.) The χ2 method of tree pruning was described by Quinlan (1986)(4). C4.5, an industrial-strength decision tree package, can be found in Quinlan (1993)(5). An independent tradition of decision tree learning exists in the statistical literature. Classification and Regression Trees (Breiman et al., 1984)(6), known as the “CART book,” is the principal reference. 1. Feigenbaum, E. A. (1961). The simulation of verbal learning behavior. Proc. Western Joint Computer Conference, 19, 121-131. 2. Quinlan, J. R. (1979). Discovering rules from large collections of examples: A case study. In Michie, D. (Ed.), Expert Systems in the Microelectronic Age. Edinburgh University Press. 3. Shannon, C. E. and Weaver, W. (1949). The Mathematical Theory of Communication. University of Illinois Press. 4. Quinlan, J. R. (1986). Induction of decision trees. Machine Learning, 1, 81-106. 5. Quinlan, J. R. (1993). C4.5: Programs for machine learning. Morgan Kaufmann. 6. Breiman, L., Friedman, J., Olshen, R. A., and Stone, C. J. (1984). Classification and Regression Trees. Wadsworth International Group. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Decision-making Processes | Economic Theories | Parisi I 502 Decision-making processes/Economic theories/Nitzan/Paroush: Suppose (…) that asymmetry exists between the two alternatives. Asymmetry may stem from three different sources. First, the priors of the two states of nature (the defendant being innocent and the defendant being guilty) may be different. For example, assume that most people are not criminals, so in order to convict a defendant the state “innocent” is considered as a status quo that has to be refuted and the state “guilty” is deemed as the alternative that has to be proved. Thus, a collective decision to convict is expected to be “beyond any doubt,” whereas collective acquittal may remain doubtful. Second, the net benefits of a correct decision under the two states of nature can be different. The two types of errors, acquittal of a guilty defendant and conviction of an innocent defendant, may have different costs. Third, an individual’s decisional competency may depend on the state of nature. In particular, the probability to decide correctly if the state is “innocent” can be different from the probability to decide correctly if the state is “guilty.” >Decision Rules. In any case, the decisional competency of an individual is not parameterized by a single probability of making a correct choice, but by two probabilities of deciding correctly in the two states of nature. Under asymmetry it is required that one of the two alternatives, say conviction, will be the collective choice only when it receives the support of a special majority with a quota larger than one-half. Thus, under asymmetry the decision rule should be a qualified majority rule (QMR). QMRs are discussed in several works in the political context of constitutions and fundamental laws as well as in relation to juries (see, e.g., Parisi I 503 Buchanan and Tullock, 1962(1); Rae, 1969)(2). Nitzan and Paroush (1984d)(3) were the first to derive the exact quota necessary for the optimal QMR. However, their quota is derived under the restrictive conditions of identical competencies that are invariant to the state of nature. The special case of identical competencies that depend on the state of nature was extensively analyzed by Sah and Stiglitz (1988)(4) and Sah (1990(5), 1991(6)). Allowing heterogeneous and state-dependent competencies, Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997)(7) specify the expression for both the weight that has to be assigned to each member of the team under the optimal rule as well as the desirable quota of votes necessary for the rejection of the status quo. The optimal rule in this more general case therefore becomes a weighted qualified majority rule, WQMR. The optimal weight is now proportional to the average of the logs of the odds of the two probabilities of making a correct choice and the optimal quota is a function of four parameters: the log of the two probabilities of making a correct decision, the log of the odd of the prior probability, and the log of the ratio of the two net benefits. >Condorcet Jury Theorem, >Jury Theorem, >Arrow’s Theorem. 1. Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 2. Rae, D. W. (1969). “Decision-rules and individual values in constitutional choice.” American Political Science Review 63(1): 40–56. 3. Nitzan, S. and J. Paroush (1984d). “Are qualified majority rules special?” Public Choice 42(3): 257-272. 4. Sah, R. K. and J. Stiglitz (1988). “Committees, hierarchies and polyarchies.” Economic Journal 98(391): 451-470. 5. Sah, R. K. (1990). “An explicit closed-form formula for profit-maximizing k-out-of-n systems subject to two kinds of failures.” Microelectronics and Reliability 30(6): 1123-1130. 6. Sah, R. K. (1991). “Fallibility in human organizations and political systems.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(2): 67-88. Sah, R. K. and J. Stiglitz (1985). 7. Ben-Yashar, R. and S. Nitzan (1997). “The optimal decision rule for fixed size committees in dichotomous choice situations - The general result.” International Economic Review 38(1): 175-187. Shmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush. “Collective Decision-making and the Jury Theorems”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Deduction Theorem | Berka | I 112 Def "Deduction Theorem"/Hilbert: if from a formula A a formula B is derivable in such a way that every free variable occurring in A is held fixed. i.e. that it is neither used for an insertion to be made for it nor as a distinguished variable of one of the schemes (α), (β), then the formula A > B is derivable without using the formula A. ((s) elimination of the premise). >Premises, >Deduction, cf. >Induction, >Logical formula, >Derivation, >Derivability, >Elimination, >Eliminability, >Variables. |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Deduction Theorem | Hilbert | Berka I 112 Definition "Deduction Theorem"/Hilbert: if a formula B can be derived from a formula A in such a way that every free variable occurring in A is fixed, i.e. that it is neither used for an insertion, done for it, nor as a designated variable of a shemata (α), (β), then the formula A > B can be derived without using the formula A ((s) elimination of the premise). >Deduction, >Premises. I 116 Note: Rule of the back generalization/scheme (α)/Hilbert: A > B(a) A > (x) B(x) Rule of the front particularisation/scheme (β)/Hilbert: B(a) > A (Ex)B(x) > A >Particularization, >Existential Generalization, >Universal Generalization. 1. D. Hilbert & P. Bernays: Grundlagen der Mathematik, I, II, Berlin 1934-1939 (2. Aufl. 1968-1970). |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Deductive-nomological Explanation | Schurz | I 223 Deductive-nomological explanation/Hempel/Schurz: (Hempel 1942(1), Hempel/Oppenheim 1948(2), Vs: Stegmüller 1969(3), Salmon 1989(4)). Deductive-nomological: Explanans: set of premises: from strictly general propositions G and antecedent A (singular propositions). Explanandum: conclusion E. (sing proposition). Consequence condition: E is a deductive consequence of G and A. Ex G: All metals conduct electricity A: This vase is metallic E: Therefore it conducts electricity. Law: law premises are never definitely verifiable. Model: therefore the epistemic model version is more important. I.e. it is about acceptance and not about truth against a background knowledge. >Background, >Knowledge, >Models, >Model theory. I 224 Potential Explanation/Hempel: Here merely logical consistency of the premises is required. This is important when evaluating hypotheses in terms of their explanatory power. >Best explanation. I 224 Covering law/Dray/Schurz: (Dray 1957)(5): simplest case of a deductive nomological explanation: here antecedent and explanandum are implicatively connected by a single law. Logical form: (x)(Ax > Ex), Aa/Ea. >Covering laws. HempelVsDray/HempelVsCovering law: Hempel's own model includes more complex explanations. Ex. planetary positions explained from initial conditions plus laws of nature. I 228 Law/Explanation/Schurz: Deductive-nomological explanation of law by higher-level theories cannot be directly applied to the causality requirement. ((s) Schurz/(s): laws are explained by higher-level theories). Law of nature/problem/Schurz: A law is not a spatiotemporally localized fact and can therefore not be the subject of a causal relation. Law/causality/explanation/Schurz: Many laws are not causal: E.g. the laws of evolution are not causal. Also in physics: Explanation due to symmetry principles, Ex many explanations in quantum mechanics. >Explanation/Hempel, >Explanation/Hegel, >Explanation/Scriven, >Causality, >Causal explanations, >Laws, >Law-likeness, >Laws of nature. 1. Hempel, C. (1942). "The Function of General Laws in History". In: The Journal of Philosophy 39, (abgedruckt in ders. 1965, 221-243.) 2. Hempel, C. & Oppenheim, P. (1948). "Studies in the Logic of Explanation", >Philosophy of Science 39, 135-175. 3. Stegmüller, W. (1969). Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie. Band I:Wissenschaftliche Erklärung und Begründung. Berlin: Springer. 4. Salmon, W. (1989). Four Decades of Scientific Explanation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 5. Dray, W. (1957). Laws and Explanation in History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Deep Learning | Gropnik | Brockman I 224 Deep Learning/Gropnik: A. Bottom-up deep learning: In the 1980s, computer scientists devised an ingenious way to get computers to detect patterns in data: connectionist, or neural-network, architecture (the “neural” part was, and still is, metaphorical). The approach fell into the doldrums in the 1990s but has recently been revived with powerful “deep-learning” methods like Google’s DeepMind. E.g., give the program a bunch of Internet images labeled “cat” etc. The program can use that information to label new images correctly. Unsupervised learning: can detect data with no labels at all; these programs simply look for clusters of features (factor analysis.) Reinforcement learning: In the 1950s, B. F. Skinner, building on the work of John Watson, famously programmed pigeons to perform elaborate actions (…) by giving them a particular schedule of rewards and punishments. The essential idea was that actions that were rewarded would be repeated and those that were punished would not, until the desired behavior was achieved. Even in Skinner’s day, this simple process, repeated over and over, could lead to complex behavior. >Conditioning. E.g., researchers at Google’s DeepMind used a combination of deep learning and reinforcement learning to teach a computer to play Atari video games. The computer knew nothing about how the games worked. Brockman I 225 These bottom-up systems can generalize to new examples; they can label a Brockman I 226 new image as a cat fairly accurately over all. But they do so in ways quite different from how humans generalize. Some images almost identical to a cat image won’t be identified by us as cats at all. Others that look like a random blur will be. B. Top-down Bayesian Models: The early attempts to use this approach faced two kinds of problems. 1st Most patterns of evidence might in principle be explained by many different hypotheses: It’s possible that my journal email message is genuine, it just doesn’t seem likely. 2nd Where do the concepts that the generative models use come from in the first place? Plato and Chomsky said you were born with them. But how can we explain how we learn the latest concepts of science? Solution: Bayesian models combine generative models and hypothesis testing. >Bayesianism. A Bayesian model lets you calculate how likely it is that a particular hypothesis is true, given the data. And by making small but systematic tweaks to the models we already have, and testing them against the data, we can sometimes make new concepts and models from old ones. Brockman I 227 VsBaysianism: The Bayesian techniques can help you choose which of two hypotheses is more likely, but there are almost always an enormous number of possible hypotheses, and no system can efficiently consider them all. How do you decide which hypotheses are worth testing in the first place? Top-Down method: E.g., Brenden Lake a New York University and colleagues used top-down methods to solve a problem that is easy for people but extremely difficult for computers: recognizing unfamiliar handwritten characters. Bottom-up method: this method gives the computer thousands of examples (…) and lets it pull out the salient features. Top-down method: Lake et al. gave the program a general model of how you draw a character: A stroke goes ether right or left; after you finish one, you start another; and so on. When the program saw a particular character, it could infer the sequence of strokes that were most likely to have led to it (…). Then it could judge whether a new character was likely to result from that sequence or from a different one, and it could produce a similar set of strokes itself. The program worked much better than a deep-learning program applied to exactly the same data, and it closely mirrored the performance of human beings. Brockman I 228 Bottom-up: here, the program doesn’t need much knowledge to begin with, but it needs a great deal of data, and it can generalize only in a limited way. Top-down: here, the program can learn from just a few examples and make much broader and more varied generalizations, but you need to build much more into it to begin with. Brockman Learning in Children/Gropnik: (…) the truly remarkable thing about human children is that they somehow combine the best features of each approach and then go way beyond them. Over the past fifteen years, developmentalists have been exploring the way children learn structure from data. Four-year-olds can learn by taking just one or two examples of data, as a top-down system does, and generalizing to very different concepts. But they can also learn new concepts and models from the data itself, as a bottom-up system does. Young children rapidly learn abstract intuitive theories of biology, physics, and psychology in much the way adult scientists do, even with relatively little data. Gropnik, Alison “AIs versus Four-Year-Olds”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Deep Structure | Chomsky | I 269f Surface Structure/Chomsky: Determination of a hierarchy of parts of sentences that belong to specific categories: noun phrase, verb phrase, adjective phrase, etc. E.g. John is certain that Bill will leave. John is certain to leave: - similar surface structure, different deep structure. >Surface structure. I 273 Surface Structure/Chomsky: Assumption: it contributes nothing to the meaning. The contribution an expression makes to the sentence is defined by the deep structure. >Compositionality. ChomskyVsAnalytic Philosophy: if different intensions were to change their meaning after substitution, there would have to be a corresponding difference in the deep structure, which is unlikely. >Substitution, >Meaning, >Intensions. I 276f Deep Structure/Chomsky: plays a role in the mental representation of sentences. >Representation. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Definiteness | Meixner | I 56 Def Overdetermination: something is overdetermined, if there is at least one property of which it may be claimed that x has f and has non-f. >Overdetermination, >Properties, >Exemplification. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Definiteness | Prior | I 88f Thinking/determinateness/particularization/Prior: e.g. I forgot what I had for breakfast, although I had something specific for breakfast. So I can think something φ’s (something is "specific"), without knowing what φ’s. >Thinking, cf. >Thinking/Davidson, >Thinking/Hume. Vsnamely riders: no individual determination must be true for itself. >Namely riders, >Necessity, >Contingency, >Truth. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Definitions | Definition: determination of the use of linguistic signs (words, symbols, connectives) for non-linguistic or linguistic objects. New definitions are not supposed to be creative, that is, they are to be derived from the use of the signs already employed. See also definability, conservativity, systems, theories, models, reference systems, context definition, explicit defnition, implicit definition. |
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| Definitions | Dummett | III (a) 15 And/conjunction/definition/logical constants/Dummett: We get a definition of "and" from the assertion of P and the assertion of Q. - This is not circular: because for that one does not need the concept of conjunction. E.g., like the dog that is trained to respond to a bell only together with light signal. Or/disjunction/Problem: for "or" no such explanation in bivalent logic. It may be that we can assert "P or Q" without being able to assert one individually without the other. Right explanation: through the fact that makes one of two true. Knowledge or recollection does not matter. >Logical constants. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Definitions | Feynman | I 174 Laws Definition//Meaning/Laws of Nature/Feynman: it is generally believed that laws of nature represent some kind of genuine knowledge. What does that mean? What does F = ma mean? What is the meaning of force, mass, acceleration? We can feel mass intuitively and we can define acceleration. Definition e.g. "when a body accelerates, a force acts upon it". Definitions/Feynman: such definitions cannot be the content of physics, because they are circular. Nevertheless, the Newtonian statement above appears to be the most precise definition of force. But it is completely pointless, because no predictions can be made from it. (From no definition!). >Laws of nature, >Forces/Bigelow, >Forces/Cartwright, >Forces/Leibniz, >Forces/Russell, >Knowledge, >Circularity. The way in which objects behave is completely independent of the choice of definitions. For example, we define something new: Def "Gorce"/Fictitious Force/Terminology/Feynman: temporal change of position with a new law: everything stands still, except when a gorce is effective. This would be analogous to the old force and would not contain any new information. (But: see below...) >Cause/Cartwright, >Cause/Fraassen, >Cause/Vollmer, >Cause/Lewis, >Cause/Bigelow, >Cause/Armstrong. I 175 Forces/Laws of Nature/Newtonian Laws/Theory/Feynman: their true content is that the force, in addition to the law F = ma, should have some independent properties. But these specific properties have not not been described by Newton, nor by anyone else, and therefore F = ma is an incomplete law. It implies that we will find some simple properties when studying the forces. It is an indication that forces are simple. This is a good program for analyzing nature. Laws/Laws of Nature/Theory/Feynman: if nothing but gravitation existed, then the combination of the law of gravitation and the law of force would be a complete theory. We need further properties of the force: e.g. if no physical object is present, the force equals zero, if it is different from zero, and something is found in the neighborhood, then that must be the cause. That is the difference to "gorce" (see above). That power has a material origin is one of its most important properties, and that is not only a definition. I 175 Definition/Law/Feynman: e.g. second Newtonian Law. Action equals response: that is not quite precise. If it were a definition, we would have to say that it is always precise, but it is not! >Natural laws/Cartwright. Feynman: every simple thought is approximated. E.g. chair: superposition of atoms, constant decrease and increase, depending on the accuracy of the measurement. I 176 Mathematical definitions can never work in the real world. I 233 Empiricism/Definition/Mach/Feynman: you can only define what you can measure. FeynmanVsMach: whether a thing is measurable or not cannot be decided a priori solely by reasoning! It can only be decided in experiments. >Experiments, >Measurements, >Ernst Mach. Feynman: it is clear that absolute speed has no meaning. Whether or not it can be defined is the same as the problem, whether you can prove if you are moving or not! I 642 Definition/Temperature/Physics/Chemistry/Feynman: two different definitions: 1) Assuming the kinetic energy of the molecules is proportional to the temperature, this assumption defines a temperature scale: "Scale of the ideal gas". We call the correspondingly measured temperatures kinetic temperature. 2) Other temperature definition: independent of any substance: "Great thermodynamic absolute temperature". |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Definitions | Kripke | III 342 Definition/Kripke: a definition is a "great fundamental principle". Definitions must be formulated in a language already understood - then there is little room for alternative interpretations of a metalanguage (even if the syntactic and semantic structure can be interpreted differently). >Loewenheim, >Meta language, >Object language. III 390 Implicit Definition/Kripke: an implicit definition is given by rule - otherwise no generalizations in finite systems can be derived from (infinite) instances. III 392 Definition/Kripke: no inductive definition is possible if it does not start with a general characterization of the atomic (basic) case. III 393 Direct definition: a direct definition is not recursive. Recursive definition: is indirect. In Tarski the definition of truth is given via a recursive definition of fulfillment. Question: could he also have defined truth directly? If so, would fulfillment be definable in terms of truth? >Satisfaction, >Satifiability. III 399 Implicit Definition: depends on axioms. These imply (for example) truth implicit in the sense that truth is the only interpretation of the predicate T(x) which makes all the axioms true. Explicit definition: does not depend on axioms, but on expressive power of the language (not theory). Sat1(x,y) is explicitly definable in terms of T(x) - it is an explicit definition by introducing a new variable (II 402). --- Kripke I 66ff Definition/reference/standard meter/Kripke: Kripke does not use this definition to specify the meaning, but to define the reference. There is a certain length which he would like to denote. He denotes it through an accidental property. Someone else may refer to the same reference by another accidental property. He can still definitely say: if heat had been in the game, the length would have changed. Rigid: the meter is rigid. Not rigid: the length of S at time t is not rigid. >Standard meter, >Rigidity/Kripke, >Reference/Kripke. I 136f The "definition" does not say that the two terms are synonymous, but that we have determined the reference of the term "one meter" by establishing that it should be a rigid designation expression that actually has the length S. So not a necessary truth! We must distinguish between definitions that specify a reference, and definitions that specify a synonym. >Synonymy/Kripke. Definition: is not necessary: e.g. tiger: large, carnivorous, four legged cat, etc. Suppose someone says: "This is the meaning of tiger in German". ZiffVs: this is wrong. E.g. a tiger with three legs is not a contradiction in itself. I 153 In the case of proper names the reference can be defined in various ways. Determination of reference: is a priori (contingent) and not synonymous. Meaning: is analytical (required). Definition: specifies reference and expresses a priori truth. >Meaning/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Definitions | Logic Texts | Hoyningen-Huene II 56 Def/truth value table/junctor/Hoyningen-Huene: the tables define the junctors only if they are understood mathematically - not if they are understood extensionally. >Extensionality, >Truth table, >Connective, >Logical constant. Hoyningen-Huene II 93 Definition/Hoyningen-Huene: Synthetic: here a concept is created (abbreviation) - it cannot be true/false. Analytical: descriptive or lexical definition: here, an existing concept is analyzed - e.g. bachelor/ unmarried man. Explication: is between analytical and synthetic definition - This can be more fruitful. >Explanation, >Analytic/synthetic. --- Read III 40 The definition of truth is different from the adequacy conditions. III 265 Prior: "tonk": does not define connections first and then meaning. >tonk- Then it cannot cause another pair of statements to be equivalent. - N.B.: "analytical validity" cannot show this - BelnapVsPrior: (pro analytical validity): should not get mixed with the definition of existence, it first has to show how it works -> classical negation is illegitimate here. - Negation-free fragment - > Peirce's law: "If P, then Q, only if P, only if P": --- Salmon I 252 Some words must be defined in non-linguistic ways. I 254 Context definition: many logical words are explained by context definition. E.g. "All F are G" is equal to "Only F are G" This is a definition of the word "only". |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal I Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 German Edition: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sal II W. Salmon The Foundations Of Scientific Inference 1967 SalN I N. Salmon Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II 2007 |
| Definitions | Mates | I 248 Definitions/Mates: we need them to represent formalized theories. - They introduce designations that do not belong to the vocabulary of the language, but make them more readable. >Theories, >Formulas, >Logical formulas, >Theoretical language, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Definitions, >Definability. I 250 Def Creative Definition/Mates: leads to new theorems in which the defined symbol does not occur. >Symbols. Requirement: a satisfactory definition should be non-creative. >Vocabulary/Mates. I 248 Metalinguistic definitions/Mates: Metalinguistic definitions bring a name of the defined symbol in object language: the symbol itself - e.g. a) metalinguistically: if a and b are terms so is a = b for I21ab b) object-language: (x) (y) (x = y I21xy). >Metalanguage, >Object language, >Identity, >Definition/Frege, >Symbolic use. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Definitions | Quine | Rorty I 302 Definition: Quine’s attack on the first dogma had made it doubtful. Operational definition: along with Sellar’s doctrine that a "sensory fact" is a function of socialization it became twice as questionable with Quine’s holistic attacks. >Two dogmas, >Definability. Quine I 327 Definition: is an instructions for transformation. It reinstates the singular term. Definitions are flexible, without truth value gaps. II 109 Carnap quasi-analysis: encompasses a full reduction through definition. QuineVs: an assignment of sense qualities to spacetime points must be kept revisable. Therefore it is not attributable to definitions. VII (b) 24 Definition/Quine: can serve opposite purposes: e.g abbreviation or more economic vocabulary (then longer chains). Part and whole are bound by translation rules. The definition key is neither for synonymy nor analyticity. Ad X 70 Definition/object language/meta language/Quine/(s): the term which is defined, cannot stand in the object language, even if the rest of the definition is (not always) in the object language. X 84 Definition/VsQuine: from appropriate method of proof is of no interest, because the property of being provable by a particular method is uninteresting. It is only interesting in connection with the completeness theorem. QuineVsVs: logical truth is not mentioned there. X 101 Context Definition: introduces merely a facon de parler. That creates eliminability at all times without ontological commitment. XIII 43 Definition/Quine: Lexicon entries are a distant echo of what philosophers and mathematicians call definition. Lexicon/Dictionary/Quine: is intended to facilitate our conversations. Def Definition/Quine: to define an expression means to explain how to do without it. XIII 44 Defining is eliminating. Definition/Quine: a) an expression. b) an object. >Expressions, >Objects. One way is reduced to the other, because we define people by defining "people" and numbers by defining numbers or the word "number". Expression/Definition: Definition of expressions is the broader term, because expressions like "or" are also included. Object Definition/Object: this is what we talk about when we think more about the nature of an object. Elimination/Quine: the concept of definition as elimination is especially helpful when definitions are not compatible as in the case of natural numbers. This also applies to the many possible definitions of the ordered pair. All that is required is that x and y can be uniquely obtained from Definition/Quine: has several purposes: sometimes to elucidate the use of the established language, XIII 45 sometimes an idiolect, sometimes philosophical considerations. Definition: if it requires translation from one structure to another, this can enable us to enjoy the advantages of each by switching back and forth. (See singular terms). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Definitions | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 228 Sense Data/Ostension/Definition/Learning/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: pointing out, the legacy of the Tractatus "Showing", can certainly serve as the only method for defining sense data. But as soon as inaccessible objects (atoms) are added, it is no longer sufficient. Showing/WittgensteinVsShowing/Ostension/Hintikka: Problem: e.g. how to show the state of California? (>Definition, >indicative definition.) Even if Wittgenstein claims on the first page of the Blue Book that all non-verbal definitions are indicative definitions, he immediately limits this: I 229 "Does the indicative definition itself need to be understood?" >Understanding. The listener must probably already know the logical status of the defined entity. For example, it is not possible to point out a non-existent object, even if you are telephoning someone who sees it. The same applies to other people's immediate experiences. And if one thinks that even the words "there" and "this" for their part are to be introduced by an indicative explanation, then this indicative indication must be quite different from the usual indicative explanation. (PI §§ 9,38). >Explanation. I 329 Color/Definition/Reference/Wittgenstein:...Now we can understand what Wittgenstein means when he says: ""red" means the color that comes to my mind when I hear the word "red"" would be a definition. No explanation of the nature of the denotation by a word. This point loses its essence if "denotation" is understood here in the sense of "name". Even a completely successful definition does not indicate what it means that the definition refers directly - i.e. without language play - to its subject. II 44/45 Ostensive Definition/Wittgenstein: it just adds something to the symbolism - it does not lead beyond the symbolism - a set of symbols is replaced by another. The explanation of the meaning of symbols is given in turn, via symbols. >Symbols. II 73 Definition/Wittgenstein: a definition is nothing more than an indication of a relevant rule - (s) context: e.g. negation.) >Negation. II 116 Calculating/Wittgenstein: the tables of multiplication are definitions. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Deflationism | Brandom | I 466 Deflationism: Brandom pro: propositional elimination of unnecessary assumptions - Problem: the deflationism undermines itself - not a fact is claimed when "it is true that snow is white" - Definition Deflationism: denies that content can be explained in concepts of truth conditions and compliance with the facts - Problem: the deflationism cannot deny that properties are expressed by predicates. >Truth conditions. I 468 BrandomVsVs: "is true" is a pro-sentence forming operator, not a predicate. >Pro-sentence, >Predicates. I 469 Deflationism/Non-Factualism (BoghossianVs): Brandom: a fact does not make a fact true, only in the derived sense - not semantic fact together with physical fact - facts do not depend on the assertion - BrandomVsBoghossian: there is no situation in which there are no facts. >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Deflationism | Wright | I 26ff Deflationism: is directed against the "inflation" by creating more truth predicates: legitimate assertibility next to truth (> redundancy theory). Thesis: truth is no property, only a means of disquotation. I 46 Deflation/Ramsey: was here first. (Recently: Horwich: "minimalism"): Truth assertorical - claiming, but not supported by adoption of metaphysical objects or situations. Tarski: disquotation is sufficient. Truth is no substantial property of sentences. True sentences like "snow is white" and "Grass is green" have nothing in common. Important: you can use the disquotation scheme without understanding the content. One can "truly" "approximate" the predicate. >Goldbach's conjecture. Deflationism thesis: the content of the truth predicate is the same as the claim, which makes its assertoric use. Deflationism: E.g. Goldbach's conjecture: the deflationism recognizes that there must be said more beyond Tarski. Also, cf. e.g. "Everything he said is true". VsDeflationism: not a theory but a "potpourri". There is no clear thesis. I 47 ff Inflationism: a) "true" is merely a means of affirming, only expresses attitudes towards sentences. It does not formulate a standard. b) The disquotation scheme contains a (nearly) complete explanation of the meaning of the word. ("True"). I 293 Deflationism: every meaningful sentence (i.e. a sentence with truth-condition) is suitable for deflationary truth or falsity. But if truth is not deflationary, "true" must to refer to a substantial property of statements. (Deflationism: truth is no property). --- I 27 Deflationism/Wright: truth is no substantial property. - Disquotation is enough. - "Snow is white" and "Grass is green" have nothing in common. The content of the truth-predicate is the same as the claim which raises its claiming use. Thesis: the truth predicate is prescriptive and descriptive normative. I 33ff Deflationism: the only standards of truth are the ones of legitimate assertibility. >Assertibility. I 51 WrightVsDeflation: "minimalist", > I 97 Vs (classical) Deflationism: no norm of truth-predicate may determine by itself that it is different from assertibility because the normative power of "true" and "assertible" coincides, but may diverge extensionally. - Then the disquotation scheme can play no central role. - >Tarski-scheme, >Disquotation. Therefore statements may be true in a certain discourse, without being super-asserting - then truthmakers must be independent of our standards of recognisability (>realism/Wright). --- Rorty I 38ff Disquotation/Wright: the deflationist thinks through the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely determined. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Degrees, graduals | Hintikka | II 187 Gradual/degree/yes-no/explanation/method/definition/Hintikka: thesis: seemingly dichotomous concepts can often be explained better if one considers them as gradual. Definability/Rantala/Hintikka: Rantala thesis: we do not start with asking when a theory clearly defines a concept, but how much freedom the theory leaves to the concept. II 188 Determinateness/Hintikka: determinateness is a gradual issue, and definability sets in when the uncertainty disappears. This is an elegant correspondence of model theory. Qualitative/comparative/Hintikka: by the assumption that a property is gradual, one can transform a qualitative concept into a comparative one. Then we do not only have to deal with yes-no questions. >Bivalence, >Definitions, >Methods, >Explanations. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Delegative Democracy | O’Donnell | Gaus I 150 Delegative democracy/minimalist liberalism/O’Donnell/Dryzek: (...) minimalism can allow forms of democracy that are very thin indeed, to the extent they barely merit the description 'democratic'. O’Donnell/Dryzek: For example, what Guillermo O'Donnell (1994)(1) calls delegative democracy passes the minimalist test. Under delegative democracy, found especially in Latin America but also in the post-communist world, leaders submit themselves to regular elections, but otherwise govern without accountability, without any sense that election promises need to be remembered and without constitutional constraint (except of course the one specifying regular free elections). PettitVsO’Donnell: Delegative democracy completely misses what Philip Pettit (1999)(2) calls the contestatory as opposed to electoral aspect of democracy. In light of this aspect, the guarantee of freedom (defined as non-domination) is the ability of citizens to contest the content of collective decisions under fair terms, be it via access to courts, legislatures, or administrative review. >Minimalist liberalism/Dryzek, >Democratic practise/Dryzek. 1. O'Donnell, Guillermo (1994) 'Delegative democracy'. Journal of Democracy, 5: 55—69. 2. Pettit, Philip (1999) 'Republican freedom and contestatory democratization'. In Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordön, eds, Democracy i Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 163—90. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Deliberative Democracy | Egalitarianism | Gaus I 147 Deliberative Democracy/Egalitarianism/Dryzek: (...) sceptical egalitarians, defend more traditional accounts of democracy against the deliberative turn. Cf. >Deliberative Democracy/Social Choice Theory, >Deliberative Democracy/Diversity Theories. ShapiroVsDeliberation: In Shapiro's pithy (1999)(1) terms, 'enough about deliberation, politics is about interest and power'. In this light, those interested in improving the quality of democracy should seek the equalization Gaus I 148 of power; here, issues of democracy become linked to distributive justice. Such sceptics can point to the rather embarrassing fact that deliberation cannot be a complete theory of democracy because its advocates do not specify how collective decisions get made (Saward, 2000)(2). Przeworski : if so, then deliberative democrats might have to retreat to more familiar aggregative mechanisms, and the deliberative/aggregative dichotomy is proven false, for then democracy is necessarily aggregative, and votes have to be taken (Przeworski, 1998(3): 140—2). GoodinVsDeliberative democracy: Goodin (2000)(4) points out that deliberation is an activity that can never realistically involve more than a handful of people. Saward: Saward (2000) believes that such considerations mean that egalitarians should therefore oppose deliberation's aristocratic leanings that would exclude those with non-deliberative preferences; far better, in this light, to extend democracy in more direct fashion (for example, by greater use of referenda). FishkinVsVs: Deliberative democrats can reply to the sceptics who charge that deliberation can only be an elite activity in several ways here. In Fishkin's (1995)(5) deliberative opinion polls, articipants for a deliberative forum are selected at random from the population, and complete a uestionnaire at the end of the process. Citizens' juries too are recruited by random selection, but conclude with a policy recommendation crafted and agreed upon by the jurors rather than a questionnaire (Smith and Wales, 2000)(6). Fishkin argues that a deliberative poll represents what public opinion would be if everyone could deliberate; the same might be said for citizens' juries. >Democracy/Fishkin. Dryzek: Alternatively, deliberative democrats could allow that deliberation can coexist with a variety of mechanisms for reaching binding decisions, be they voting in referenda, elections, or the legislature, the decisions of courts, consensus among stakeholders in an issue, or even administrative fiat. More radically, they might think about ways in which the deliberative contestation of discourses in the public sphere can generate collective outcomes not only in its indirect influence on public policy, but also via cultural change and paragovernmental action (Dryzek, 2000)(7). 1. Shapiro, Ian (1999) 'Enough of deliberation: politics is about interest and power'. In Stephen Macedo, ed., Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagæement. New York: Oxford University Press, 28-38. 2. Saward, Michael (2000) 'Less than meets the eye: democratic legitimacy and deliberative theory'. In Michael Saward, ed., Democratic Innovation: Deliberation, Association and Repesentation. London: Routledge, 66_77. 3. Przeworski, Adam (1998) 'Deliberation and ideological domination'. In Jon Elster, ed., Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 140—60. 4. Goodin, Robert E. (2000) 'Democratic deliberation within'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29: 81—109. 5. Fishkin, James (1995) The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 6. Smith, Graham and Corinne Wales (2000) 'Citizens' juries and deliberative democracy'. Political Studies, 48: 51-65. 7. Dryzek, John S. (2000) Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Deliberative Democracy | Habermas | Gaus I 145 Deliberative Democracy/Habermas/Dryzek: The mam shortcoming of liberal constitutionalist deliberative democracy is that it says little about Gaus I 146 extra-constitutional agents of distortion, such as the dominant position of business in liberal states, oppressive discourses (in Foucault's sense), and imperatives dictated to states by either security concerns or the transnational political economy and its institutions. Hbermas/Dryzek: In this light, it is perhaps surprising that Habermas, who once highlighted such forces, has now turned his back upon them and taken his critical theory of deliberation quite close to liberalism. In Between Facts and Norms (1996)(1) he advances a 'two-track' model of deliberative democracy. One track is rooted in the public sphere, the other in the legislature. Influence formulated through deliberation in the informal public sphere is converted to communicative power - especially via elections - and thence to administrative power through legislation, whose precepts are followed to the letter by government bureaucracies. Dryzek: Constitutions are necessary to detail these elements and, in particular, to specify the rights necessary to enable the public sphere to flourish. Habermas: The public sphere itself is seen in less insurgent terms than was the case for an earlier Habermas (for example, 1989)(2), and there is no recognition of any need to democratize the econ- omy, the administrative state, or the legal system, all of which receive easy legitimacy. >Public sphere, >Electoral systems. 1. Habermas, Jürgen (1996) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2. Habermas, Jürgen (1989) Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bowgeois Society. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Demand | Marginalism | Kurz I 259 Demand/Supply/Neoclassical Economics/Marginalism/Kurz: The method which marginalist economists, (…) generally adopted up till the 1930s was the long-period method inherited from the classical authors. However, with their fundamentally different kind of analysis - demand and supply theory - they encountered formidable problems. These originated with their concept of capital. The sought determination of income distribution in terms of the demand for and the supply of the different factors of production - labour, land and capital - necessitated that they specify the capital endowment of the economy at a given point in time in terms of a 'quantity of capital' that could be ascertained independently of, and prior to, the determination of relative prices and the rate of profits. >Growth/Neoclassical Economics, >Exogenous Growth/Neoclassical Economics, cf. >Growth/Classical Economics. Yet, as Erik Lindahl and others understood very well, this was possible only in the exceptionally special case of a corn model in which there was but a single capital good. In order to apply the demand and supply approach to all economic phenomena, neoclassical authors were thus compelled to abandon Kurz I 260 long-period analysis and develop (…) intertemporal (and temporary) equilibrium analysis. >Equilibrium, >Equilibirum theory/Neoclassical Economics, >New growth theory. Kurz, Heinz D. and Salvadori, Neri. „Endogenous growth in a stylised 'classical' model“.In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Demand | Neoclassical Economics | Kurz I 259 Demand/Supply/Neoclassical Economics/Marginalism/Kurz: The method which marginalist economists, (…) generally adopted up till the 1930s was the long-period method inherited from the classical authors. However, with their fundamentally different kind of analysis - demand and supply theory - they encountered formidable problems. These originated with their concept of capital. The sought determination of income distribution in terms of the demand for and the supply of the different factors of production - labour, land and capital - necessitated that they specify the capital endowment of the economy at a given point in time in terms of a 'quantity of capital' that could be ascertained independently of, and prior to, the determination of relative prices and the rate of profits. >Growth/Neoclassical Economics, >Exogenous Growth/Neoclassical Economics, cf. >Growth/Classical Economics. Yet, as Erik Lindahl and others understood very well, this was possible only in the exceptionally special case of a corn model in which there was but a single capital good. In order to apply the demand and supply approach to all economic phenomena, neoclassical authors were thus compelled to abandon Kurz I 260 long-period analysis and develop (…) intertemporal (and temporary) equilibrium analysis. >Equilibrium, >Equilibirum theory/Neoclassical Economics, >New growth theory. Kurz, Heinz D. and Salvadori, Neri. „Endogenous growth in a stylised 'classical' model“.In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Demand for Money | Rothbard | Rothbard II 166 Demand for money/prices/Rothbard: (…) partial ‘real’ factors - such as government expenditures abroad, a sudden scarcity of food, or ‘a sudden diminution of the confidence of foreigners, in consequence of any great national disaster’ - could influence overall prices or the status of the pound in the foreign exchange market. But (…) such influences can only be trivial and temporary. The overriding causes of such price or exchange movements - not just in some remote ‘long run’ but a all times except temporary deviations - are monetary changes in the supply of and demand for money. Changes in ‘real’ factors can only have an important impact on exchange rates and general prices by altering the composition and the height of the demand for money on the market. But since market demands for money are neither homogeneous nor uniform nor do they ever change Rothbard II 167 equiproportionately, real changes will almost always have an impact on the demand for money. Salerno: ... since real disturbances are invariably attended by ‘distribution effects’, i.e. gains and losses of income and wealth by the affected market participants, it is most improbable that initially nonmonetary disturbances would not ultimately entail relative changes in the various national demands for money...[U]nder inconvertible conditions, the relative changes in the demands for the various national currencies, their quantities remaining unchanged, would be reflected in their long-run appreciation or depreciation on the foreign exchange market.(1) >Price theory/Rothbard. Rothbard III 756 Demand for money/Rothbard: The total demand for money on the market consists of two parts: Exchange demand: the exchange demand for money (by sellers of all other goods that wish to purchase money) and Reservation demand: the reservation demand for money (the demand for money to hold by those who already hold it). Because money is a commodity that permeates the market and is continually being supplied and demanded by everyone, and because the proportion which the existing stock of money bears to new production is high, it will be convenient to analyze the supply of and the demand for money in terms of the total demand-stock analysis (…). In contrast to other commodities, everyone on the market has both an exchange demand and a reservation demand for money. A. Exchange Demand Exchange demand: The exchange demand is his pre-income demand. As a seller of labor, land, capital goods, or consumers' goods, he must supply these goods and demand money in exchange to obtain a money income. >Production factors, >Income, >Goods, >Production. Demand: Aside from speculative considerations, the seller of ready-made goods will tend, (…) to have a perfectly inelastic (vertical) supply curve, since he has no reservation uses for the good. Rothbard III 757 Supply: But the supply curve of a good for money is equivalent to a (partial) demand curve for money in terms of the good to be supplied. Exchange demand: Therefore, the (exchange) demand curves for money in terms of land, capital goods, and consumers' goods will tend to be perfectly inelastic. >Elasticity/Rothbard. Labour: Some people might work a greater number of hours because they have a greater monetary inducement to sacrifice leisure for labor. Others may decide that the increased income permits them to sacrifice some money and take some of the increased earnings in greater leisure. In both cases, the man earns more money at the higher wage rate.(…) Therefore, a man’s backward-sloping supply curve will never be “backward” enough to make him earn less money at higher wage rates. Rothbard III 758 „Buying money“/market: Thus, a man will always earn more money at a higher wage rate, less money at a Iower. But what is earning money but another name for buying money? And that is precisely what is done. People buy money by selling goods and services that they possess or can create. Demand schedule for money: We are now attempting to arrive at the demand schedule for money in relation to various alternative purchasing powers or "exchange-values" of money. Exchange value of money: A Iower exchange-value of money is equivalent to higher goods-prices in terms of money. Conversely, a higher exchange-value of money is equivalent to Iower prices of goods. Labour/wages: In the labor market, a higher exchange-value of money is translated into Iower wage rates, and a Iower exchange-value of money into higher wage rates. Labour market: Hence, on the labor market, our law may be translated into the following terms: The higher the exchange-value of money, the Iower the quantity of money demanded; the Iower the exchange-value of money, the higher the quantity of money demanded (i.e., the Iower the wage rate, the less money earned; the higher the wage rate, the more money earned). Therefore, on the labor market, the demand-for-money schedule is not vertical, but falling, when the exchange-value of money increases, as in the case of any demand curve. Exchange demand for money: Adding the vertical demand curves for money in the other exchange markets to the falling demand curve in the labor market, we arrive at a falling exchange-demand curve for money. B. Reservation Demand Reservation demand: More important, because more volatile, in the total demand for money on the market is the reservation demand to hold money. This is everyone's post-income demand. After everyone has acquired his income, he must decide, between the allocation of his money assets in three directions: a) consumption spending, b) investment spending, and c) addition to his cash balance ("net hoarding"). Furthermore, he has the additional choice of subtraction from his cash balance ("net dishoarding"). How much he decides to retain in his cash balance is uniquely determined by the marginal utility of money in his cash balance on his value scale. >Cash balance/Rothbard. Reservation demand curve for money: (…) the higher the PPM (purchasing power of money; the exchange-value of money), the lower the quantity of money demanded in the cash balance. >Purchasing power/Rothbard. As a result, the reservation demand curve for money in the cash balance falls as the exchange-value of money increases. This falling demand curve, added to the falling exchange-demand curve for money, yields the market's total demand curvefor money - also falling in the familiar fashion for every commodity. Rothbard III 762 Equilibirum/purchasing power: Suppose (…) that the PPM (purchasing power of money) is slightly higher (…). The demand for money at that point will be less than the stock. People will become unwilling to hold money at that exchange-value and will be anxious to sell it for other goods. These sales will raise the prices of goods and Iower the PPM, until the equilibrium point is reached. On the other hand, suppose that the PPM is Iower (…). In that case, more people will demand money, in exchange or in reservation, than there is money stock available. The consequent excess of demand over supply will raise the PPM again (…). >Purchasing power parity/Rothbard. Rothbard III 766 Economic law: Every supply of money is always utilized to its maximum extent, and hence no social utility can be conferred by increasing the supply of money. >Money supply/Rothbard, >Money supply/David Hume. Economists have attempted mechanically to reduce the demand for money to various sources(2) RothbardVsKeynes: There is no such mechanical determination, however. Each individual decides for himself by his own standards his whole demand for cash balances, and we can only trace various influences which different catallactic events may have had on demand. >Speculative Demand, >Clearing/Rothbard. Rothbard III 772 Demand for money/Rothbard: Is the demand for money unlimited? A popular fallacy rejects the concept of "demand for money" because it is allegedly always unlimited. This idea misconceives the very nature of demand and confuses money with wealth or income. the form of holding back the good from being sold. (…) effective demand for money is not and cannot be unlimited; it is limited by the appraised value of the goods a person can sell in exchange and by the amount of that money which the individual wants to spend on goods rather than keep in his cash balance. Purchasing power: Furthermore, it is, of course, not "money" per se that he wants and demands, but money for its purchasing power, or "real" money, money in some way expressed in terms of what it will purchase. (This purchasing power of money (…) cannot be measured.) >Time preference/Rothbard, >Price/Rothbard. Rothbard III 775 Value of cash balances: The only necessary result (…) of a change in the demand-for-money schedule is precisely a change in the same direction of the proportion of total cash balances to total money income and in the real value of cash balances. Given the stock of money, an increased scramble for cash will simply Iower money incomes until the desired increase in real cash balances has been attained. If the demand for money falls, the reverse movement occurs. The desire to reduce cash balances causes an increase in money income. Total cash remains the same, but its proportion to incomes, as well as its real value, declines.(3) 1. Joseph Salerno. 1980. ‘The Doctrinal Antecedents of the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments’ (doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University, 1980), pp. 299-300. 2. J.M. Keynes’ Treatise on Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1930) is a classic example of this type of analysis. 3. Strictly, the ceteris paribus condition will tend to be violated. An increased demand for money tends to Iower money prices and will therefore Iower money costs of gold mining. This will stimulate gold mining production until the interest return on mining is again the same as in other industries. Thus, the increased demand for money will also call forth new money to meet the demand. A decreased demand for money will raise money costs of gold mining and at least Iower the rate of new production. It will not actually decrease the total money stock unless the new production rate falls below the wear-and-tear rate. Cf. Jacques Rueff, "The Fallacies of Lord Keynes' General Theory" in Henry Hazlitt, ed., The Critics ofKeynesian Economics (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1960), pp. 238-63. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Democracy | Böckenförde | Brocker I 782 Democracy/Böckenförde: representative democracy is not only the form required in the territorial state for technical reasons, but also the form superior to direct democracy for reasons of legitimation theory (BöckenfördeVsRousseau). See Legitimation/Böckenförde. BöckenfördeVsDirect Democracy: For him, the idea of an undistorted determination of the will of the people, which is not influenced by procedures, is misleading because it ignores the reality of political contexts for action. Even in the case of direct-democratic decisions on the merits, it depends on the respective procedures. In any case, it requires the organization of domination. (1) Decision/Böckenförde: all political decision making depends on procedures. Brocker I 783 Democracy/People/Schmitt/Böckenförde: Böckenförde uses Carl Schmitt's idea that democracy refers to the people as a political community. (2) Unity/People/Hermann Heller/Böckenförde: with Heller, Böckenförde comes to the thesis: a unit of effect and action that unites a group of people comes about through organizational processes that only align, coordinate and bring the multiple human actions and behaviors into a certain pattern of action in a certain way. (3) The state authorities (Heller speaks of "governing bodies" ((s) source not given)), which in a sense precede the many. (4) This means that in democracy the people can only rule by means of a ruling organization. Power/Hermann Heller/Böckenförde: Heller: "Every organization needs (...) an authority and all exercise of power is subject to the law of small numbers; always those who update the organizationally united power performances must have Brocker I 784 some degree of freedom of choice and thus democratically unattached power." (H. Heller, quoted (5)) Problem: those in power must be accountable to the people and bound to democratic control. (6) Democracy/Böckenförde: is a demanding form of order in so far as it is based on conditions that precede the constitution and are not self-evident. People/Böckenförde: must be supported by "homogeneity" i.e. there must be a "similarity" that "can be given by common religion, common language and culture, common political confession". (7) Homogeneity/BöckenfördeVsSchmitt: Böckenförde does not see homogeneity as a counter term to plurality as Carl Schmitt represented it in National Socialism. (See Democracy/Schmitt). VsBöckenförde: after criticism of his choice of words, Böckenförde changed the concept of "similarity" to that of "commonness". He writes an explanatory note on this. (8) Relative homogeneity/solution/Böckenförde: the socio-economic differences must not be so extreme that irreconcilable conflicts of interest arise. Therefore, the state has a moderating function in market relations. See Citizens/Böckenförde. 1. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat – Verfassung – Demokratie. Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht, Frankfurt/M. 1992 (zuerst 1991), p. 382-386 2. Ibid. p. 332 3. Ibid. p. 386 4. Ibid. p. 387 5. Ibid. p. 387 6. Ibid. p. 388 7. Ibid. p. 333 8. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde „Demokratie als Verfassungsprinzip“, in: Josef Isensee/Paul Kirchhof (Hg.) Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bd 2. Heidelberg 2004 p. 461, FN 106 Tine Stein, „Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat – Verfassung- Demokratie“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Böckenf I Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde State, Society and Liberty: Studies in Political Theory and Constitutional Law, London 1991 German Edition: Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit. Studien zur Staatstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht Frankfurt 1976 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Democracy | Brown | Mause I 74f Democracy/Brown: The high regard for the steering power of the market and the widespread rejection of political control and redistribution in neoliberalism is contrary to basic democratic values, above all to the equality of all citizens. Moreover, it is the signum of the political that no clear "right" or "wrong" exists, and for this very reason democracy as a medium of self-reflection and self-direction of citizens with the aim of mediating and balancing between various equal interests, perspectives and values becomes normatively a priority. (1) Problem: the institutions and procedures of liberal democracy have not been implemented with a view to economic efficiency criteria. (2) Democracy: has an intrinsic value and democratic institutions and processes allow citizens to live under their own laws. The value of democratic self-determination cannot be paid out in the coin of efficiency. >Institutions. 1. Cf. W.Brown, Neoliberalism and the end of liberal democracy. Edgework. Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics, Princeton 2005. 2. Ibid. p. 46. |
BrownMurray I Murray Brown On the theory and measurement of technological change Cambridge 1968 PolBrown I Wendy Brown American Nightmare:Neoliberalism, neoconservativism, and de-democratization 2006 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Democracy | Dryzek | Gaus I 143 Democracy/Dryzek: Adversarial, aggregative, associative, capitalist, Christian, classical, communicative, communitarian, consensual, consociational, constitutional, contestatory, corporatist, cosmopolitan, delegative, deliberative, developmental, difference, direct, discursive, ecological, economic, electoral, elitist, epistemic, feminist, global, grassroots, green, juridical, industrial, legal, liberal, local, majoritarian, minimalist, parliamentary, participatory, peoples' , pluralist, populist, presidential, procedural, property-owning, protective, push-button, radical, reflective, representative, social, strong, thin, transnational and unitary are all adjectives that can be, and have been, attached to democracy. Dryzek: The categories represented by the adjectives are not mutually exclusive. While there are some obvious binary oppositions (...), many combinations are plausible and have their advocates and critics. The categories represented by these adjectives are not collectively exhaustive. The conversation about democratic development shows no signs of closure. Boundaries: While covering a lot of territory, democratic theory is not completely unbounded. Contributors to the enterprise all address questions pertaining to the collective construction, distribution, application, and limitation of political authority. >Democratic theory/Dryzek. Gaus I 144 (...) part of what makes democracy interesting in both theory and practice is contestation over its essence. (...) any search for the essential meaning of democracy is undermined by conceptual historians who point to the inevitable historical contingency of key political concepts like democracy (Hanson, 1989)(1), and how democracy's meaning is itself constitutive of politics at particular times and laces. >Deliberative democracy/Dryzek. Gaus I 148 Problems with deliberation and democracy: If democracy involves aggregation (however much it is downplayed by deliberative democrats), that can be across judgements and not just across preferences as emphasized in social choice theory. Such judgements can involve disagreement over (say) what is in the common good. This epistemic way of thinking about democracy is associated with Rousseau, according to whom the general will can be ascertained by voting. Bernard Grofman and Scott Feld (1988)(2) argue that if indeed there is such a thing as the common good, though people differ in their judgements about which option will best serve it, then Condorcet's jury theorem applies. Jury theorem/Condorcet/Dryzek: This theorem demonstrates that if each citizen has a better than even chance of being correct in his/her judgement, then the larger the number of voters, the greater the chance of the majority choosing the correct option. The jury theorem therefore justifies the rationality of majoritarian democracy, at least in a republican context of a search for the common good, though only if each citizen reaches and exercises independent judgement. So there should be no factions (which reduce the effective number of voters) and, it might seem, no communication. These, at least, were Rousseau's own views: deliberation should only be a matter of internal reflection, not communication. However, as Robert Goodin (2002(3): 125) and others point out, discussion is fine so long as people then subsequently exercise their own independent judgements when voting. 1. Hanson, Russell L. (1989) 'Democracy'. In Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson, eds, Political Innovation and Conceptual Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Grofman, Bernard and Scott Feld (1988) 'Rousseau's general will: a Condorcetian perspective'. American Political Science Review, 82: 567-76. 3. Goodin, Robert E. (2002) Reflective Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Democracy | Fishkin | Surowiecki I 330 Democracy/Politics/Deliberation/Communication/Fishkin/Surowiecki: In 2003, Fishkin organized a meeting of 343 people in Philadelphia who had been carefully selected to represent a cross-section of the American population. (1) Fishkin invented the deliberative opinion poll based on the idea that political discussion should not be confined to specialists or members of the political class and that there is no need to do so. Since then, such initiatives have been carried out in hundreds of major cities around the world. Surowiecki I 331 Given sufficient information and the opportunity to discuss matters with their peers, ordinary citizens are perfectly capable of understanding complicated situations and choosing between different points of view in a meaningful way. Richard PosnerVsFishkin/PosnerVsAckerman: it is a false expectation that such discussion events could turn Americans into role models of reason and civic virtue. The people of the United States form a "deeply philistine society". "Citizens have little taste in abstraction, little time and even less inclination to spend a considerable part of their free time educating themselves to be informed and responsible voters". And further: "It is much more difficult to get a solid idea of what is necessary for the whole society than to be aware of one's own interests". (2) Democracy/Surowiecki: the dispute between Posner and Fishkin is about the question of what we mean by democracy at all: do we have a democracy, because it... a) gives people a feeling of being involved in everything and being able to determine their own lives,... Surowiecki I 332 ...and that is why it contributes to political stability? Or b) because citizens have the right to govern themselves, even if they use this right in a ridiculous way? Or c) because democracy is an excellent instrument for making intelligent decisions and discovering the truth? 1. A similar idea is presented in: James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation (Yale University Press, New Haven 1952), as well as in: Fishkin, The Voice of the People – Public Opinion and Democracy (Yale University Press, New Haven 1996). The "National Issues Convention" attracted considerable national attention and a five-hour segment was broadcast live on PBS and C-SPAN. Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin outlined their idea of a day of political opinion-forming in "Deliberation Day", a treatise they presented at the conference "Deliberating About Deliberative Democracy" at the University of Texas (February 2000). See also Ackerman and Fishkin, Deliberation Day (Yale University Press, New Haven 2004). 2. Richard Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2003), S. 131 f., 164. |
PolFishk I James S. Fishkin Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform New Haven 1993 Surowi I James Surowiecki Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005 |
| Democracy | Fukuyama | Brocker I 806 Democracy/Fukuyama: is the model of order that relatively satisfies the human need for social recognition better than other systems. With the victory of this model, the battle for recognition ends and, according to Fukuyama, the driving force of history is stopped. However, this is a Pyrrhic victory, because the individual needs the fight. FukuyamaVsDemocracy: one of the shortcomings of the democratic model is social inequality. Fukuyama also does not predict a quick victory for democracy. The struggle for them continues between a so-called post-historical world (in the industrialized countries of the Global North) and a historical world (in the industrializing countries of the Global South). In relative terms, however, the democratic system produces the least inequality. The democratic system itself is a good to be aspired to. FukuyamaVsDoyle, Michael/FukuyamaVsRussett, Bruce: Fukuyama shares the thesis of Doyle (1986)(1) and Russett (1993) (2) that democracies are peaceful among themselves, but wars between democracies and non-democracies are likely. But he goes beyond that and sees a potential cause of war in the constant striving for recognition. Brocker I 808 Democratization/History/Fukuyama: For Fukuyama, the spread of democracy began in the mid-1970s with the - according to Huntington - so-called "Third Wave of Democratization". This began with the Clove Revolution in Portugal in 1974, then spread to Latin America, Eastern Europe and East Asia, and finally came to a temporary end in Africa. See History/Fukuyama, Universal History/Fukuyama. Brocker I 815 Democracies/MillerVsFukuyama/MaceyVsFukuyama: 1. Fukuyama overestimates the actual spread of democracies and their alleged consequences. He sees many states as liberal-democratic which do not deserve this name, e.g. Iran, Peru, Singapore. (4) (written 1992). 2. VsFukuyama: The interaction between capitalism and democracy does not even function smoothly in the USA. (1) 3.VsFukuyama: Fukuyama blurs the differences between democratic systems, especially between inclusive and exclusive democracies. (1) But it is precisely this blindness that leads to the misconception that an expansion of democracies leads to the end of history. Solution/Miller/Macey: Thesis: The story is just beginning! And in the sense of a struggle for the system that can best be connected to a capitalist economic system. Liberalism/MillerVsFukuyama/MaceyVsFukuyama: When Fukuyama speaks of liberal democracies, he makes no distinction between liberalism and democracy. In reality, however, there is a difference depending on whether rights take precedence or majority decisions. The wider the sphere of the Brocker I 816 individual rights, the more difficult it will be to organise majorities. Fukuyama's mistake is to describe democracies as liberal as soon as they recognize certain rights (property, free market economy). In reality, however, many of the states Fukuyama classifies as democracies are not liberal. 1. Michael W. Doyle, „Liberalism and World Politics“, in: American Political Science Review 80/4, 1986, p. 1151-1169. 2. Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World, Princeton 1993. 3. Jonathan R. Macey/Geoffrey P. Miller, “The End of History and the New World Order. The Triumph of Capitalism and the Competition between Liberalism and Democracy”, in: Cornell International Law Journal 25/2, 1992, p. 277-303. 4. Ebenda p. 281f. Anja Jetschke, „Francis Fukuyama, Das Ende der Geschichte“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolFuku I Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man New York 1992 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Democracy | Held | Gaus I 149 Democracy/international insstitutions/globalization/Held/Dryzek: The more critical stances that democratic theorists are inclined to take would highlight the limitations on democracy that this global dominance of minimalist liberal democracy plus capitalism entails. >Minimalist liberalism/Dryzek. But any such critical response is easily countered if it remains devoid of ideas about how such dominance might realistically be challenged (without retreating to ungrounded idealism). Part of the response might involve the strengthening and democratization of international institutions in response to the migration of political power from the state to the transnational political economy. Held: This is, Gaus I 150 for example, the approach taken by Held and his fellow advocates of a cosmopolitan democracy that would involve a more inclusive United Nations Security Council, a strengthened UN General Assembly, cross-national referenda, and international economic, military and judicial authorities accountable to regional and global parliamentary bodies (Held, 1995(1); Archibugi, Held and Köhler, 1998(2)). Dryzek: Alternatively, if state democracy can only be minimalist, theorists might explore non-state locations for the pursuit of democracy. Such locations might involve public spheres in both domestic and transnational civil society that remain distant from state power though still oriented to public affairs (Cohen and Arato, 1992(3); Fraser, 1992(4); Dryzek, 1996(5): 46—53), and home to social movements. 1. Held, David (1995) Democracy and the Global Order: From the Nation State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Cambridge: Polity. 2. Archibugi, Daniele, David Held and Martin Köhler, eds (1998) Re-Imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy. Cambridge: Polity. 3. Cohen, Jean and Andrew Arato (1992) Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 4. Fraser, Nancy (1992) 'Rethinking the public sphere: a contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy'. In Craig Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 5. Dryzek, John S. (1996) Democracy in Capitalist Times: Ideals, Limits, and Struggles. New York: Oxford University Press. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Democracy | Holmes | Krastev I 6 Democracy/ex-communist countries/Krastev/Holmes: After the communist collapse, according to Central Europe’s populists, liberal democracy became a new, inescapable orthodoxy. Their constant lament is that imitating the values, attitudes, institutions and practices of the West became imperative and obligatory. Krastev I 58 Democracy/Krastev: Unlike liberalism, in any case, democracy is an exclusively national project. This is why, in the end, de Gaulle’s ‘Europe of fatherlands’ has resisted all pressures to dissolve separate member-country identities into a common post-national identity.64 Because of its inherent affinity with the universalism of human rights, liberalism is more hospitable to trans-national globalization than is democracy. But liberalism, too, works best within the context of politically bounded communities. After all, the most effective human rights organization in the world is the liberal nation-state. |
LawHolm I Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The Common Law Mineola, NY 1991 Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Democracy | Kelsen | Brocker I 132 Democracy/Kelsen: For Kelsen, modern democracy can only be realized as parliamentary democracy.(1) But Kelsen's position for parliamentarism is not a dogmatic position either; it is the observation of a civilizing process of increasing division of labor and social differentiation.(2) This functional theory of the parlamentary system explicitly opposes Kelsen's "fiction of representation".(3) >Parlamentary System/Kelsen. Brocker I 132/133 Kelsen sees the competition between democracy and autocracy as central. Democracy itself strives for "leadershiplessness".(4) Kelsen explains the existence of democratic ideology predominantly in social psychology. He describes popular sovereignty as a "totem"(5), a mask that the norm-subjected people put on in order to at least in rituals stand out from the actors actually exercising power and to exalt themselves. Kelsen, on the other hand, like Weber, regards domination as necessary, which is why one only has to ask oneself the question how it is to be structured. In Kelsen's eyes, democracy necessarily goes hand in hand with a certain world view, which assumes an unrecognizable absolute truth and absolute values and therefore also considers the "foreign, contrary opinion at least possible"(6). Only this allows democracy to be open to changing majorities and makes the minority position bearable. Brocker I 135 KelsenVsSchmitt/KelsenVsSmend/Llanque: Kelsen is mainly seen as the author who can clearly be counted among the supporters of parliamentary democracy among the majority of democracy-critical state teachers of the Weimar Republic (Groh 2010)(7). He has published sharp criticisms of opponents in this debate, including Rudolf Smend and Carl Schmitt. Some also consider Kelsen to be the clearest opponent of Schmitt (Diner/Stolleis 1999(8); Dreier 1999(9)). Brocker I 139 SchmittVsKelsen/HellerVsKelsen: Kelsen was accused of emptying democracy of content and degrading it to a procedural concept (Boldt 1986(10); Saage 2005(11)). 1. Hans Kelsen, »Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie«, in: Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 47, 1920/1921, 50-85 (Separatdruck: Tübingen 1920). Erweiterte Fassung: Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, Tübingen 1929 (seitenidentischer Nachdruck:Aalen 1981), S. 25 2. Ibid. p. 29 3. Ibid. p. 30 4. Ibid. p. 79 5. Ibid. p. 86 6. Ibid. p. 101 7. Kathrin Groh, Demokratische Staatsrechtslehrer in der Weimarer Republik. Von der konstitutionellen Staatslehre zur Theorie des modernen demokratischen Verfassungsstaates, Tübingen 2010 8. Dan Diner & Michael (Hg.) Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt. A Juxtaposition, Gerlingen 1999 9. Horst Dreier »The Essence of Democracy: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt Juxtaposed«, in: Dan Diner/Michael Stolleis (Hg.), Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt. A Juxtaposition, Gerlingen 1999, 71-79 10. Hans Boldt, »Demokratietheorie zwischen Rousseau und Schumpeter. Bemerkungen zu Hans Kelsens ›Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie‹«, in: Max Kaase (Hg.), Politische Wissenschaft und politische Ordnung. Analysen zur Theorie und Empirie demokratischer Regierungsweise, Festschrift für Rudolf Wildenmann, Opladen 1986, 217-232. 11. Richard Saage, Demokratietheorien: Historischer Prozess, Theoretische Entwicklung, Soziotechnische Bedingungen. Eine Einführung, Wiesbaden 2005. Marcus Llanque, „Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Democracy | Krastev | Krastev I 6 Democracy/ex-communist countries/Krastev: After the communist collapse, according to Central Europe’s populists, liberal democracy became a new, inescapable orthodoxy. Their constant lament is that imitating the values, attitudes, institutions and practices of the West became imperative and obligatory. Krastev I 58 Democracy/Krastev: Unlike liberalism, in any case, democracy is an exclusively national project. This is why, in the end, de Gaulle’s ‘Europe of fatherlands’ has resisted all pressures to dissolve separate member-country identities into a common post-national identity.64 Because of its inherent affinity with the universalism of human rights, liberalism is more hospitable to trans-national globalization than is democracy. But liberalism, too, works best within the context of politically bounded communities. After all, the most effective human rights organization in the world is the liberal nation-state. |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Democracy | Mill | Höffe I 356 Democracy/Mill/Höffe: Mill fears that mere democracy, which he does not qualify in more detail, could lead to a terror of opinion, which he emphatically rejects(1). In contrast to a simple understanding of popular rule, which is reduced to factual majorities, this concept suggests the idea of a constitutional democracy based on the rule of law and the constitution. In every mere democracy, there is the threat of forced domination by society over the individual. In this case, what alone is desirable is not ruled by itself, but by all others, so that, which frightens the highly educated Mill, everyone is ruled by an uneducated mass. Individualism/Mill: Mill's rejection of any form of coercive domination over the individual merely allows the state to establish a framework within which everyone is free to make their own well-informed decisions. >Governance. HöffeVsMill: However, the uncompromising nature of this partisanship for freedom and impartiality contradicts Mill's theory of science and epistemology. Because it accepts contre cæur not only in utilitarianism(2), but also in the writing "On Liberty"(1), and that does not exist at all according to the system of logic: an a priori element. Cf. >a priori/Mill, >Freedom. In the writing "The Subjection of Women"(3) Mill himself will admit this contradiction. >State/Mill. 1. J.St. Mill. On Liberty, 1859 2. J.St. Mill, Utilitarianism 1861 3. J.St. Mill The Subjection of Women, 1869 (dt. Die Hörigkeit der Frau) Brocker I 508 Democracy/learning/skills/personality/Mill: The process of improving human abilities (in cognitive, moral and emotional perspectives) requires individual courage and - as Mill very critically states in On Liberty - is undermined by democracy and majority decisions. Democracy has an inherent tendency towards mediocrity, which restricts freedom. SchaalVsPateman: Carole Pateman(1) shortens Mill inadmissibly by referring significantly to Mill's On Representative Government and largely ignores the connection between freedom and the holistic training of human abilities that Mill carries out in On Liberty (in reference to Wilhelm von Humboldt). >Abilities, cf. >W. v. Humboldt. 1. Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge 1970, S. 34f Gary S. Schaal, “Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Mill Ja I James Mill Commerce Defended: An Answer to the Arguments by which Mr. Spence, Mr. Cobbett, and Others, Have Attempted to Prove that Commerce is Not a Source of National Wealth 1808 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Democracy | Posner | Surowiecki I 331 Democracy/Richard Posner/Surowiecki: Posner turns against the civil assemblies called to life by James S. Fishkin, among others, at which a representative cross-section of all social classes come together to discuss political issues: PosnerVsFishkin: "Citizens have little taste in abstraction, little time and even less inclination to spend a considerable part of their free time training themselves to be informed and responsible voters". And further: "It is much more difficult to get a solid idea of what is necessary for the whole society than to be aware of one's own interests".(1) >S. Fishkin, >Deliberative Democracy, >Democracy. Democracy/Surowiecki: the dispute between Posner and Fishkin is about the question of what we mean by democracy at all: do we have a democracy, because it... a) gives people a feeling of being involved in everything and being able to determine their own lives, I 332 ...and that is why it contributes to political stability? Or b) because citizens have the right to govern themselves, even if they use this right in a ridiculous way? Or c) Because democracy is an excellent instrument for making intelligent decisions and discovering the truth? >Decisions, >Political decisions. 1. Richard Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2003), S. 131 f., 164. |
LawPosn I Richard A. Posner Economic Analysis of Law, Ninth Edition New York 2014 Surowi I James Surowiecki Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005 |
| Democracy | Sartori | Gaus I 148 Democracy/minimalist liberalism/Sartori/Dryzek: The model of democracy most popular among comparative politics scholars, especially those in the burgeoning field of democratic transition and consolidation, expects far less from democracy than do the deliberative democrats. This model is essentially that proposed long ago by Schumpeter (1942)(1): democracy is no more than competition among elites for popular approval that confers the right to rule. In the 1950s this idea became the foundation for 'empirical' theories of democracy happy with the generally apathetic role of the ignorant and potentially authoritarian masses (Berelson, 1952(2); Sartori, 1962(3)). >Minimalist liberalism/Dryzek, cf. >Fukuyama/Dryzek. Gaus I 149 Lindblom: as Lindblom (1982)(4) among others notes, the capitalist market context automatically punishes governments that pursue policies that undermine the confidence of actual or potential investors by causing disinvestment and capital flight. Thus when it comes to public policy, democracy can only operate in what Lindblom calls an 'unimprisoned' zone. Sartori/Dryzek: dominant view among transitologists. Life with this model, and without the kinds of critical questions that democratic theorists are apt to raise, is certainly less complicated for the transitologist. Obviously happy about this state of affairs Sartori wants to be done with the critics: 'the winner is an entirely liberal democracy, not only popularly elected government, but also, and indivisibly, constitutional government; that is, the hitherto much belittled "formal democracy" that controls the exercise of power' (1991(5): 437). >Minimalist liberalism/Dryzek. 1. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1942) Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper. 2. Berelson, Bernard (1952) 'Democratic theory and public opinion'. Public Opinion Quarterly, 16: 313—30. 3. Sartori, Giovanni (1962) Democratic Theory. Detroit: Wayne State Umversity Press. 4. Lindblom, Charles E. (1982) 'The market as prison' Journal of Politics, 44: 324-36. 5. Sartori, Giovanni (1991) 'Rethinking democracy: bad polity and bad politics'. International Social Science Journal, 129: 437-50. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Democracy | Schmitt | Brocker I 165 Democracy/Schmitt: Schmitt speaks of a triumphant advance of democracy. (1) Democratic legitimacy has found its "evidence" (2) as a "polemical concept" against the ruling monarchies and has been realized in various forms. Legitimacy is now almost "generally recognized" (3); its "core" - clearly formulated by Rousseau - is the "assertion of an identity of law and popular will" (4). Schmitt gives this finding an analytical twist: If almost all modern political movements claim the democratic slogan for themselves and claim a "series of identities" (5) for themselves, democratic rhetoric should be questioned about their propagandistic techniques of "identification". >Identification/Schmitt. No popular will is real consensual; every "general will" (5) is fictitious and propagandistically purchased. "So it seems to be the fate of democracy to cancel itself out in the problem of decision-making" (6). Democracy tends to "popular education" and educational dictatorship, to "suspension of democracy in the name of true democracy still to be created" (6). Brocker I 169 Schmitt (...), anticipating his concept of the political (1927), emphasizes that every democratic identity also has the "correlate of inequality" (7) and Rousseau had already thought of the "unanimity" (8) of an indisponsible national homogeneity and substance. Unlike the liberal "democracy of humanity", Bolshevism and Fascism realized the possibility of an anti-liberal and "direct democracy" (9): a "modern mass democracy" (10) in which the people existed vital and politically in the "sphere of publicity" (11). 1. Carl Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, in: Bonner Festgabe für Ernst Zitelmann zum fünfzigjährigen Doktorjubiläum, München/Leipzig 1923, 413-473. Separatveröffentlichung in der Reihe: Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen und Reden zur Philosophie, Politik und Geistesgeschichte, Bd. 1, München/Leipzig 1923. Zweite, erweiterte Auflage 1926. p. 30 2. Ibid. p. 32 3. Ibid. p. 39 4. Ibid. p. 35 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. p. 37 7. Ibid. p. 18 8. Ibid. p. 20 9. Ibid. p. 22 10. Ibid. p. 21 11. Ibid. p. 22. Reinhard Mehring, Carl Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus (1923), in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Schmitt I Carl Schmitt Der Hüter der Verfassung Tübingen 1931 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Democracy | Schumpeter | Brocker I 260 Democracy/Schumpeter: For Schumpeter, the defining feature of democracy consists in placing a "competition for political leadership" (1) at the centre of attention. The core idea is: similar to the way companies compete for the favour of consumers, Brocker I 261 politicians and parties are in competition for the favour of voters (2) - with the important difference that people are usually well informed in economic matters, but usually rationally ignorant in political matters (3). What both systems have in common is the striving for one's own individual advantage. Thesis: Modern democracy is a product of the capitalist process (4); however, two important prerequisites for the functioning of democracy in contemporary capitalism are no longer fulfilled: a) the ideal of the economical state (5) b) the basic social consensus.(6) Because of the expectation of large parts of the electorate to live at the expense of the state.(7) >Free riders, >State, >Economy, >Society. 1. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York 1942. Dt.: Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie, Tübingen/Basel 2005 (zuerst: Bern 1946), p. 427. 2. Ibid p. 427-433 3. Ibid p. 407 – 420. 4. Ibid p. 471. 5. Ibid p.. 471f. 6. Ibid p. 473. 7. Ibid p. 472. Ingo Pies, „Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie (1942)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. Gaus I 148 Democracy/Schumpeter/Dryzek: The model of democracy most popular among comparative politics scholars, especially those in the burgeoning field of democratic transition and consolidation, expects far less from democracy than do the deliberative democrats. >Deliberative democracy This model is essentially that proposed long ago by Schumpeter (1942)(1): democracy is no more than competition among elites for popular approval that confers the right to rule. In the 1950s this idea became the foundation for 'empirical' theories of democracy happy with the generally apathetic role of the ignorant and potentially authoritarian masses (Berelson, 1952(2); Sartori, 1962(3)). Competition models of democracy: Such competitive elitist models have Gaus I 149 long been discredited among democratic theorists - not least those such as Dahl (1989)(4) who had earlier believed in them as both accurate descriptions of United States politics and desirable states of affairs. Yet they live on among transitologists and consolidologists, who see the hallmark of a consolidated democracy as a set of well-behaved parties representing material interests engaged in electoral competition regulated by constitutional rules (see, for example, Di Palma, 1990(5); Huntington, 1991(6); Mueller, 1996(7); Schedler, 1998(8)). The deliberative democrat's concern with authenticity is nowhere to be seen. Active citizens play no role in such models. 1. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1942) Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper. 2. Berelson, Bernard (1952) 'Democratic theory and public opinion'. Public Opinion Quarterly, 16: 313—30. 3. Sartori, Giovanni (1962) Democratic Theory. Detroit: Wayne State Umversity Press. 4. Dahl, Robert A. (1989) Democracy and its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 5. Di Palma, Giuseppe (1990) To Craft Democracies. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 6. Huntington, Samuel (1991) The Third Wave. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. 7. Mueller, John (1996) 'Democracy, capitalism and the end of transition'. In Michael Mandelbaum, ed. Postcommunism: Four Perspectives. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 8. Schedler, A. (1998) 'What is democratic consolidation?' Journal of Democracy, 9: 91-107. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications Sobel I 28 Democracy/Schumpeter/Sobel/Clemens: „Nothing is easier than to compile an impressive list offailures of the democratic method, especially if we include not only cases in which there was actual breakdown or national discomfiture but also those in which, though the nation led a healthy and prosperous life, the performance in the political sector was clearly substandard relative to the performance in others.“ Joseph A. Schumpeter (1942), Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy(1): 289. Sobel/Clemens: Joseph Schumpeter is largely known for his seminal contributions to our understanding of the role of entrepreneurs, innovation, and creative destruction in economic growth and development. >Business cycle/Schumpeter, >Innovation/Schumpeter, >Competition/Schumpeter, >Creative destruction/Schumpeter, >Entrepreneurship/Schumpeter. However, Schumpeter's economic insights extend far beyond just his most well-known work on innovation. Another area where Schumpeter was well ahead of the economics profession and provided real insights is the nature of politics and the democratic process of collective decision making. The economic analysis of the process of politics and collective decision making is the focus of a modern field of economics known as public choice. While Schumpeter wrote prior to the formal origins of this field in economics, early scholars such as Anthony Downs did cite and attribute some of his ideas to Schumpeter's writings in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (CSD)(1).* >Government policy/Schumpeter. Democracy: Schumpeter understood that democracy was merely an alternative process for producing social and economic outcomes, and "it would not necessarily follow that the political decisions produced by that process from the raw material of those individual volitions would represent anything that could in any convincing sense be called the will of the people" (CSD(1): 254). Regarding the idea that government pursues some common good, Schumpeter argues: „There is, first, no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all People could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument. This is due not primarily to the fact that some people may want things other than the common good but to the much more fundamental fact that to different individuals and groups the common good is bound to mean different things ... as a consequence ... the particular concept of the will of the people ... vanishes into thin air.“ (CSD(1): 251-252) Sobel/Clemens: Schumpeter recognized that to understand democratic outcomes one must look to understand the motivations and different desires of the individuals involved in the process, be they the voters, elected politicians, or administrators and bureaucrats running government agencies. That is, to understand democratic outcomes one must understand the role of what he termed "Human Nature in Politics". Thus, Schumpeter shared a common insight with the founders of the field of public choice, such as Nobel Laureate James Buchanan, who recognized that just because individuals step into the public sphere, they do not suddenly start acting for the common good - instead they continue to be self-interested actors concerned with their own goals and desires. >James M. Buchanan. Democracy/Schumpeter: According to Schumpeter, democracy is best understood as follows: "it may be put into the nutshell of a definition ... the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people's vote." (CSD(1): 269). According to Schumpeter, as far as there are genuine group-wise volitions ... we are now able to insert them in exactly the role they actually play…called to life by some political leader who turns them into political factors …by working them up and by including eventually appropriate items in his competitive offering ... The incessant competitive struggle to get into offce or to Stay in it imparts to every consideration of policies and measures the bias so admirably expressed by the phrase about "dealing in votes". (CSD(1): 270, 287). * In The Economic Theory of Democracy, Downs writes: "Schumpeter's profound analysis of democracy forms the inspiration and foundation for our whole thesis, and our debt and gratitude to him are great indeed" (1957(2):29). 1. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy [CSD]. Harper & Brothers. 2. Downs, Anthony (1957). The Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper & Row. |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Sobel I Russell S. Sobel Jason Clemens The Essential Joseph Schumpeter Vancouver 2020 |
| Democracy | Soviet Union | Krastev I 91 Democracy/Soviet Union/Krastev: (...)Marx's final gift to the Soviet elites was persuading them not only that capitalism was designed for the predatory self-enrichment of a few but also that Western democracy was a shrewdly constructed system for maintaining class domination. Democracy, viewed in this cynical light, had nothing to do with the accountability of politicians to citizens. On the contrary, the democratic illusion of accountability helped mask and preserve the autonomy of a political ruling class that was never, as a whole, chosen in a fairly contested multi-candidate election. >Democracy/Policy of Russia. |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Democracy | Surowiecki | I 331 Democracy/Surowiecki: we have a democracy, a) because it gives people a feeling of being involved in everything and being able to determine their own lives,... I 332 ...and that is why it contributes to political stability? Or b) Because citizens have the right to govern themselves, even if they use this right in a ridiculous way? Or c) Because democracy is an excellent instrument for making intelligent decisions and discovering the truth? What do voters think democracy is for? Can we understand this in the same way as a market? I 333 This contradicts the fact that politicians want to extend their power and be re-elected, which is not always to the benefit of the general public. Public Choice Theory/Politics/Economic Sciences/Buchanan/Surowiecki: thesis(1): the tendency is to suppress long-term problems in favour of short-term political interests. In reality, many regulations tend to serve regulated companies. >Public Choice-Theory, >J. Buchanan. I 334 SurowieckiVsBuchananan: the assumption that principles and public interest have no place in politics overlooks the fact that voters themselves did not think of broader goals and that interest groups exercise an almost complete control (...). James M. Buchanan/Gordon Tullock: Thesis: The average individual acts on the basis of the same overall value framework when he/she participates in the (...) market and is politically active. (2) SurowieckiVsBuchanan: this was simply an assumption that was not proven. The counterposition that different activities cause different values and behaviours in people was at least as plausible. We do not treat our family members like our customers. >Political Elections/Surowiecki, Political Elections/Buchanan, Political Elections/Riker. I 337 Politics/Information/Democracy/Surowiecki: although the Americans have been proven to have false information on many individual issues, it is likely that they will elect the candidate who makes the right decisions. Missing information is not a sign of lack of intelligence, but a sign of lack of interest in details. Surowiecki's thesis: An essential point of representative democracy is that it allows, politically in the cognitive sphere, the same Democracy/Surowiecki: is not an instrument for solving cognition problems, not a mechanism for recognising what is in the public interest. However, it is a system to deal with the most fundamental problems of coordination and cooperation. >Cooperation. 1. The Nobel Prize Lecture by James Buchanan (1986) offers an interesting view of the philosophical and conceptual foundations of the "public choice" theory, which Buchanan has elsewhere described as "politics without romanticism": http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1986/buchanan-lecture.html. 2. Mark Kelman, »On Democracy-Bashing – A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and ›Empirical‹ Practice of the Public Choice Movement«, Virginia Law Review 74/1988, S. 235, 252. |
Surowi I James Surowiecki Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005 |
| Democratic Theory | Barber | Brocker I 681 Democratic Theory/Democracy/Barber: Barber understands democracy not only as a decision-making process, but as an overarching way of life that a self-governing political community is able to support. Thus, his work Strong Democracy (1) is an attempt to re-found a participatory theory of democracy. 1. BarberVsLiberalism: Barber criticizes liberal concepts of democracy 2. Barber pro Pluralism, Barber pro Individualism 3. Thesis: a "strong democracy" ((s) participatory democracy) can be achieved in a targeted manner in contemporary society. See Democracy/Barber. Brocker I 682/683 Def Anarchist Disposition of traditional Democratic Theory: this reflects the power-critical side of liberalism, e.g. Locke and Robert Nozick. Def Realistic Disposition: can be found in Machiavelli and Hobbes in particular: it is domination affine because it assumes that politics cannot bind people by inner beliefs, but rather requires external sanctions and incentives. BarberVsLiberalism: the conflict between power-critical-anarchistic and power-affinity-realistic disposition leads to schizophrenic features (2) Def Minimalist disposition: (e.g. Rawls and Mill): aims to resolve this disunity by advocating a "policy of tolerance". (3) Solution/Rawls/Mill: Protection against intolerant majorities and goods distribution on the basis of reciprocity. Barber pro Minimalism: in this way beyond liberalism, but without revealing the view to "more creative forms of politics" (4). >Terminology/Barber. 1. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democary, Participatory Politics for a New Age, Berkeley CA, 1984, Dt. Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie. Über die Teilhabe am Politischen, Hamburg 1994. 2. Ibid. p. 47 3. Ibid. p. 49 4. Ibid. p. 55. Michael Haus, „Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolBarb I Benjamin Barber The Truth of Power. Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House New York 2001 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Democratic Theory | Barry | Mause I 64 Democratic Theory/Barry: International democracy theory has been shaped for almost three decades by two books written by economists: Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy by Joseph A. Schumpeter (1942) (1) and An Economic Theory of Democracy by Anthony Downs (1957 (2). In the history of theory there are only a few works on economic democracy theory (cf. however the works of Brian Barry 1970) (3). The idea that both parties and voters are benefit maximizing and democracy has no intrinsic value is one of the central assumptions of (almost) all rational-choice-inspired democracy theories and election analyses. 1. J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. New York 1942. [dt. Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie. Tübingen/Basel 2005. 2. A. Downs, An economic theory of democracy. New York 1957; [dt. Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie. Tübingen 1968. 3. B. Barry, Sociologists, economists, and democracy. Chicago 1970. |
EconBarry I Brian Barry Sociologists,economists, and democracy Chicago 1970 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Democratic Theory | Downs | Mause I 64 Democracy Theory/Downs: International democracy theory has been shaped for almost three decades by two books written by economists: Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy by Joseph A. Schumpeter (1942) (1) and An Economic Theory of Democracy by Anthony Downs (1957 (2). In the history of theory there are only a few works on economic democracy theory (cf. the works of Brian Barry 1970) (3). 1. J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. New York 1942. [dt. Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie. Tübingen/ Basel 2005. 2. A. Downs, An economic theory of democracy. New York 1957; [dt. Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie. Tübingen 1968. 3. B. Barry, Sociologists, economists, and democracy. Chicago 1970. |
EconDowns I Anthony Downs An economic theory of democracy New York 1957 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Democratic Theory | Olson | Mause I 66 Democracy Theory/Olson: Olson has done the trick of making a theory based on individual action at the micro level fruitful for analyses and explanations of (political) phenomena at the meso and macro levels without conceptual breaks. Furthermore, he uses identical mechanisms of explanation for the meso and macro levels. See (1),(2). 1. Mancur Olson, The logic of collective action. Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge 1965. [dt.: Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns. Tübingen 1968]. 2. Mancur Olson, The rise and decline of nations: Economic growth, stagflation and social rigidities. Yale 1982. |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Democratic Theory | Schumpeter | Mause I 64f Democratic Theory/Schumpeter: For almost three decades, international democracy theory has been shaped by two books written by economists: Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy by Joseph A. Schumpeter (1942)(1) and An Economic Theory of Democracy by Anthony Downs (1957(2). In the history of theory there are only a few works on economic democracy theory (cf. the works of Brian Barry 1970) (3). Method/Schumpeter: Method transfer: Schumpeter conceives democracy in analogy to the market, but not yet with neoclassical methodology. The central elements of his economic theory - the creative entrepreneur and competition - are transposed into the political sphere. Schumpeter's elite theory of democracy is thus shaped by his economic theory. For him, democracy is only one method by means of which political elites competing for power can be elected and voted out of office. It no longer has intrinsic value, but is only a means to an end - for the selection of political elites. In summary, the central task of a realistic theory of democracy is "to adequately recognize the vital fact of leadership" (4). N.B.: the personnel of the elite is determined by rivalry and competition. Problem: Schumpeter himself sees weaknesses in this analogy: the quality of personnel cannot be determined as precisely by choice as in the case of goods. I 65 Democratic Theory/Schumpeter: Thesis: Democracy should be reduced to a method of electing or replacing competing elites without bloodshed. >Democratic Theory/Sartori, >Democratic Theory/Pateman. PatemanVsSchumpeter: this is a fatal logic of argumentation: citizens do not meet the normative expectations of classical theory, and therefore democratic participation must be reduced to a minimum in order to not endanger democracy. 1. J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. New York 1942. [dt. Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie. Tübingen/ Basel 2005. 2. A. Downs, An economic theory of democracy. New York 1957; [dt. Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie. Tübingen 1968. 3.B. Barry, Sociologists, economists, and democracy. Chicago 1970. 4. Schumpeter, ebenda, deutsch, S. 429. Gary S. Schaal, “Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory” in: Manfred Brocker (ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Demonstratives | Castaneda | Frank I, 185f This/demonstrative/Castaneda: demonstratives are indicative, but not naming. - They are denotative. >Designation, >Naming, >Denotation, Cf. >Logical proper names. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 |
| Denotation | Denotation, naming: specify a word or phrase for an object. Related terms: description designation. |
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| Denotation | Black | II 224 Designate/Black: this is no designation: E.g. "the sought object", "average person". Cf. >Descriptions. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Denotation | Burge | Wolf I 266 Speaker’s reference/designating/proper names/Burge: the designation of a proper name should not be identified with the speaker’s reference: unlike the object to which a speaker refers, the object, the proper name referred to might be an object that only bears this name. >Speaker meaning, >Reference, >Intentions. Wolf Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 p. 266 |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Denotation | Carnap | VI 97 Def designate(denote/Carnap: a thing is given a character, e.g. numbered, but not named with a quality name. Housed in a relation. >Signs, >Order. Def naming/Carnap: (unlike designation) provided with a quality name, (not merely placed in a sequence). >Proper names, >Quality, >Properties. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Denotation | Evans | I 322 Designation/Evans: with names as with other expressions, what they designate (signify) depends on what we designate with their use. Nevertheless, in individual cases, saying may coincide with intending. ((s) How we designate things depends on our use of words.) >Use, >Meaning (>intending), >Reference. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Denotation | Fodor | II 117 Theory of Denotation/formal languages/Fodor: the theory of denotation of the formal semantics does not reflect denotation in the specific language properly. Therefore, the real problems do not appear in the formal languages. >Formal language. Designation theory: in two parts: 1) A set of rules specifies the designates for the individual constants and predicates in the vocabulary. 2) A second set determines the concept true in L for the sentences by a recursive. In this second set there is usually a rule that defines a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of every elementary sentence (Snow is white...). Denotation/Fodor: denotation cannot grasp the problems of denotation in natural languages, e.g. "I want to be Pope" does not refer to the Pope, e.g. "I would like to meet the Pope": refers to the Pope, e.g. the checkered dress: can refer to the darker dress. >Vocabulary, >Constants, >Predicates, >Rules, >Conditions, >Reference. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Denotation | Frege | Berka I 387 Designate/denote/meaning/Frege: ("sense and meaning"): denotation has a two-dimensional semantics. It identifies designation and meaning function (because of a lack of content in logic.) denote sense < ----(express)---- name ----(mean)---- > meaning >Sense, >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Meaning; cf. >Twodimensional semantics. Frege/Berka: Frege thus equates designating with meaning. Frege I 87 Variable/designating/designation/denotationFrege: "x" designates nothing. X only indicates numbers. Hence, e.g. "x² + 3x" designates nothing. The entire function only indicates. By contrast, "sin" (sine) is a sign which designates but it is still no law! A lawis : e.g., "y = sin x". >Laws. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Denotation | Geach | I 28 Denotating expression/Russell/Geach: the denotating expression is a general term after the prefix the, one, every, all, some, etc. >Articles, >Quantifiers, >Quantification, >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Predication, >Attribution, >Sentence/Geach. I 93f Denotating expression/Geach: E.g. Robinson made a lot of money by selling it This is no sentence - "it" without antecedent is no denotating expression. But if a word chain does not have a logical role in a particular context, it does not mean that it never has one. - E.g. Jones has a car and Jones daughter drives it. "has a car" is not denotating: "p and Jones' daughter drives it". > Anaphora. Also not: "there is a car ..." for "p" then: p and that is driven by Jones' daughter. Wrong solution: to look for criteria for "real incidents": these can also be of the wrong kind. E.g. "the only one who ever stole a book from Snead ..." I 190f Denotation of sentences/Carnap/Geach: E.g. DES(English) "red" is red, DES(French) "l'eau" is water etc. - for all x, x is true in L ⇔ DES(L) x. Geach: this offers a definition of "true in L" in terms of "denotation in L"- if it is grammatically not a complete sentence, it is nevertheless in the logical sense. It means roughly: "mon crayon est noir" is true in French". Because "DES(English)"Chicago is a large city" is a complete sentence, "DES(English)" is not a relation sign. We cannot ask "what is it what it denotates," as we cannot ask, "what is it that it rains?" >Translation, >Designation. I 204 Denotation/naming/names of expressions/mention/use/Geach: E.g. A. or is a junctor. If this sentence is to be true, then only when the first word is used to denotate that of which the sentence says something. "Or" is only a junctor (E.g. "but" is a junctor or a verb") in special contexts. >Junctor. Therefore "or" is not used autonym in A (it does not denotate itself). The first word in A is no example here. It is a logical subject, so in the sentence it is no junctor, so the sentence A is wrong. ((s) With and without quotation marks that were saved here) - (s) Or can only be used as a connection, when it is mentioned, it is no longer a connection.) >Mention, >Use, >Mention/use, >Description level, >Level/Order. Mention/use/Geach: Is it wrong to say or is a connection? - No. - Is it wrong to say "or" is a connection? - Yes. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Denotation | Perry | Frank I 400f Denotation/designation: reference is designated, meaning is expressed. Quasi-indicator/Castaneda: the quasi-indicator expresses no extra sense, but rather designates it. >Denotation, >Expressions, >Sense, >Reference. John Perry (1979): The Problem of the Essential Indexicals, in : Nous 13 (1979), 3-21 - - - Frank I 449 Variables: Variables have no sense, merely designation ((s) designating is actually naming). >Designation, >Naming. Problem: embedded sentences must transport their sense to the outside. >Clauses. Variables have no intension. >Variables, >Intensions. John Perry (1983a): Castaneda on He and I, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed.) Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World: Essays Presented to Hector-Neri Castaneda. Hackett (1983), 15-39 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Denotation | Prior | I 16f Designate/expression/Prior: sentences designate nothing. >Designation, >Denotation, >Sentences. Belief/fear: refers to what is expressed, not to the designated. >Expressions, >Beliefs, >Levels, >Description levels. I 51 Sentence/Prior: a sentence designates (denotates) nothing. - only names designate. >Names. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Denotation | Russell | Hintikka I 165 On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: with phrases that stand for real constituents of propositions. Problem/Frege: failure of the substitutability of the identity (SI) in intensional contexts. >Substitution, >Identity/Frege, >Opacity, >Intensionality, >Intension. Informative identity/Frege: that identity can sometimes be informative at all is related to this. ((s) Explanation: uninfromative identity. a0a - informative identity: a=b; the same object under a different description.) EG/existential generalization/Russell: it, too, can fail in intensional contexts, (problem of empty terms). >Existential generalization, >Nonexistence. HintikkaVsRussell: he does not recognize the depth of the problem and rather avoids the problems with denotating terms. The present King/Russell: Problem: we cannot prove by existential generalization that there is a present king of France. HintikkaVsRussell: but there are other problems. (See below: because of the ambiguity of the cross-world identification). >Cross world identification. Hintikka I 173 Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: N.B.: a brilliant feature of Russell's theory of the denotation from 1905 is that it is the quantifiers who denote! >Quantifiers. Theory of Description/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") Thesis: contains the reduction of descriptions on objects of acquaintance. >Theory of descriptions/Russell. I 174 Hintikka: this connection is astonishing. It also appears to be circular, only to admit objects of acquaintance. Solution: we must see what successfully denotating phrases actually denote: they denote objects of acquaintance. >Acquaintance. Ambiguity/uniqueness/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization. E.g. Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: that only objects of acquaintance are allowed, shows its own example: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is actually a primary event, i.e. his example (2). "Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "whether" instead of "did not know". Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed in the way that George wanted to know from the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott. I 175 That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (at a distance) and asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell choose an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not normally deal with individuals of flesh and blood, whose identity is known to us, rather than merely with perceptual objects? Knowledge who/knowledge what/perception object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely in the case of perception objects, it seems as if the kind of uniqueness that we need for a knowledge-who does not exist. >Ambiguity. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Denotation | Tarski | Berka I 397 Designation/denotation/description/Tarski: Example: "the victor of Jena" refers to Napoleon. Satisfaction: Example: snow satisfies the condition "x is white" Definition: Example: x³ = 2 defined (uniquely determined), the cube root of the number 2.(1) >Descriptions, >Definitions, >Satisfaction. 1. A.Tarski, „Grundlegung der wissenschaftlichen Semantik“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, VOl. III, ASI 390, Paris 1936, pp. 1-8 Berka I 481 Def designating/Tarski: to say that the name x refers to an object a, is the same as to determine that the object a (or any sequence whose corresponding element is a) satisfies a propositional function of a particular type. >Propositional functions, >Proper names. In ordinary language: "x is a".(2) 2. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935 Skirbekk I 186 Def denotnation / Tarski: a given term denotes a given object, if this object satifies the propositional function "x is identical with T", where "T" stands for the given term.(3) >Identity, cf. >Predication. 3. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
| Denotation | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 328 Denotation/Reference/Wittgenstein: language game: reference occurs only within a language game. - On the other hand: Denotation: runs without a language game. >Reference, >Language game. Hintikka: It is precisely the absence of a language game that Wittgenstein emphasizes with the expression "denotate". I 327 ff Denotation/Description/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: a simple relationship of the type "denotation" only has content if the corresponding object exists and is open to the public. "Naming is something like attaching a name tag to an object." (WittgensteinVs, QuineVs) I 328 Remarks on the philosophy of Psychology/Wittgenstein: e.g. names that have meaning only in company of their bearers. They serve only for the avoidance of the constant pointing/showing, example: lines, points, angles in geometric figures, with A, B, C, ..a, b. etc." Denotation/Wittgenstein/Beetle Example/Hintikka: as Wittgenstein puts it, it is quite possible that everyone has something different in the box. If that were the case, we would not use the word "beetle" to describe a thing. For the word beetle to make sense, a public language game is needed to support it semantically. But it is precisely the lack of a language game that Wittgenstein emphasizes with the expression "denotating". Color/Definition/Reference/Wittgenstein: Now we can understand what Wittgenstein means when he says: ""red" means the color that comes to my mind when I hear the word "red"" would be a definition. No explanation of the nature of the denotation by a word. >Colour. The point loses its essence if "denotation" is understood here in the sense of "name". Even a completely successful definition does not indicate what it means that the definition refers directly - i.e. without language play - to its subject. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Dependence | Bigelow | I 312 Functional dependence/Counterfactual conditional/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: For example, an icon on the screen obeys the movements of a joystick. We formulate this with counterfactual conditionals. Counterfactual dependence: is expressed by a series of counterfactual conditionals: p1 would> be q1 p2 would be> q2 ... pi would be > would be qi E.g. Joystick: the four directions p1 - p4. There can also be an infinite series of alternatives. E.g. Acceleration. Logical form: Px would be > would be q f(x) Natural laws/Bigelow/Pargetter. Many are in reality equations, which together with initial conditions contain series of counterfactual conditionals expressing counterfactual dependence. >Counterfactual conditional, >Counterfactual dependency, >Natural Laws, >Equations. I 313 Counterfactual conditionals/natural laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: the counterfactual conditionals are thus in a connection with the laws of nature. It may be that e.g. the joystick does not work properly. Nobody would come to the idea to say that the movement of the icon is legally related to the stick. This only happens when the device is in good condition. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: With the establishment of the series of counterfactual conditionals, we set up only conditions for laws. Counterfactual dependence/Bigelow/Pargetter: (series of counterfactual conditionals) provides indirect information about laws. And thus provide information about causes. And ultimately, why explanations. --- I 314 E.g. p1 would be > would be q1 p2 would be > would be q2 p3 would be > would be q3 p4 would be > would be q4 Let p3 be true and q3 true. Then we can say that q3 is true because p3 is true. The icon moves in this direction because the stick has been moved in this direction. >Causality, >Causal explanation. In the context of the alternatives we can also say q3 is true instead of q1, q2, or q4. Why Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: E.g. a priest asked a bank robber why he was robbing banks - "Because there is the money". Explanations: often serve to exclude alternatives. Objectivity/explanation/objective/Bigelow/Pargetter: what is objective is whether counterfactual conditionals are true or false in a given row (expressing the counterfactual dependence). >Why-Questions. Why-Questions/Context/Counterfactual dependence/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: thus, the counterfactual dependence also takes into account the context dependency in the case of why explanations. >Context dependency. I 315 Why explanation: but is limited to prominent possibilities. Counterfactual Conditional/Bigelow/Pargetter: restrict the laws Laws: restrict the causes. >Cause, >Effect. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Dependence | Leibniz | Holz I 75 World/Leibniz: Through the universal connection which is necessary for the determination of each individual (>complete concept) it follows that, if one changes, the whole changes. >World/Leibniz, >Reality/Leibniz, >Deduction/Leibniz, >Contingency/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Dependence | Peacocke | I 144 Experience-dependency/Peacocke: if properties can be causally explained and the object of experience is in a contingent relationship then there is an experience-dependence. >Experience, >Perception, >Sensory impressions, >Statements, >Causal explanation, >Causality, >Causation. Even places and times (even if they are not experienced literally). Independent of experience: recognition, demonstratives, [self], [now]. >Recognition, >Demonstratives, >Self-knowledge, cf. >Awareness. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Depression | Galbraith | Rothbard III 984 Depression/inflation/Galbraith/Rothbard: (…) Galbraith pours much of his scorn on the supply-and-demand explanation of inflation, and especially on the proper monetary explanation, which he terms "mystical." His view of depression is purely Keynesian and assumes that a depression is caused by a deficiency of aggregate demand. Inflation/Galbraith: "Inflation" is an increase in prices, which he would combat either by reducing aggregate demand through high taxes or by selective price controls and the fixing, by compulsory arbitration, of important wages and prices. If the former route is chosen, Galbraith, as a Keynesian, believes that unemployment would ensue. But Galbraith is not really worried, for he would take the revolutionary step of separating income from production; production, it seems, is important only because it provides income. Rothbard: We have seen that government activity has already effected a considerable separation. Galbraith: Galbraith proposes a sliding scale of unemployment insurance provided by the government, to be greater in depression than in boom, the payment in depression rising almost to the general prevailing wage (for some reason, Galbraith would not go precisely as high, because of a lingering fear of some disincentive effect on the unemployed's finding jobs). He does not seem to realize that this is merely a way of aggravating and prolonging unemployment during a depression and indirectly subsidizing union wage scales above the market. RothbardVsGalbraith: There is no need to stress the author's other vagaries, such as his adoption of the conventional conservationist concern about using up precious resources—a position, of course, consistent With Galbraith's general attack on the private consumer.(1) 1. Amidst the tangle of Galbraith's remaining fallacies and errors, we might mention one: his curious implication that Professor von Mises is a businessman. For first Galbraith talks of the age-old hostility between businessmen and intellectuals, backs this statement by quoting Mises as critical of many intellectuals, and then concedes that "most businessmen" would regard Mises as "rather extreme." But since Mises is certainly not a businessman, it is Odd to see his statements used as evidence for businessman-intellectual enmity. John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958)., pp. 184-85. This peculiar error is shared by Galbraith's Harvard colleagues, whose work he cites favorably, and Who persist in quoting such nonbusinessmen as Henry Hazlitt and Dr. F.A. Harper as spokesmen for the "classical business creed." See Francis X. Sutton, Seymour E. Harris, Carl Kaysen, and James Tobin, The American Business Creed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956). Rothbard: The Affluent Society is a work that particularly lends itselfto satire, and this has been cleverly supplied in "The Sumptuary Manifesto," The Journal of Law and Economics, October, 1959, pp. 120-23. |
Galbraith I John Kenneth Galbraith The Affluent Society London 1999 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Derivation | Hilbert | Berka I 113 Derivation/insertion/"evidence threads"/Hilbert: any derivation can be dissolved into evidence threads, that is, we start with the final formula by applying the schemes (α), (β), (...). I 114 N.B.: then by the dissolution of a derivative into evidence threads, one can put back the insertions into the initial formulas. >Proofs, >Provability, >Derivability. Inserting/insertion rules/variables/evidence threads/Hilbert: we can do without rules of insertion by putting back the insertions (by means of evidence threads). From the derivation of formulas which contain no formula variable, we can eliminate the formula variables altogether, so that the formally deductive treatment of axiomatic theories can take place without any formula variables. >Inserting. Hilbert: the rule that identical formulas of the propositional calculus are permitted as initial formulas is modified in such a way that each formula which results from an identical formula of the propositional calculus by insertion is permitted as the initial formula. Evidence(s): the rule of insertion is also superfluous by the fact that one can study the practical application in the course of time. That is, each case is documented, so you do not need a rule for non-current cases. Hilbert: Instead of the basic formula (x)A(x) > A(a) is now: (x)A(x) > A(t) And in place of (Ex) A (x) is now: A(t) > (Ex)A(x) t: term. Formulas are replaced by formula schemes. Axioms are replaced with axiom schemata. In the axiom schemata, the previously free individual variables are replaced by designations of arbitrary terms, and in the formula schemes, the preceding formula variables are replaced by arbitrary formulas(1). >Schemes, >Axioms, >Axiom systems. 1. D. Hilbert & P. Bernays: Grundlagen der Mathematik, I, II, Berlin 1934-1939 (2. Aufl. 1968-1970). |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Derivation | Lyons | I 198 Derivation/Tradition/Linguistics/Lyons: Word derivation. Methods to extract words from existing words (or "roots") e.g. triumphal (adjective) from triumph (nouns) etc. I 199 The reason why a section on derivation was added to classical grammars in the 19th century is due to the influence of the newly accessible treatises on Sanskrit, which recently led to an interest in historical language development (diachronic). It was recognized that flexion and derivation have much in common. Classical grammar: distinguished very precisely between flexion and derivation: E.g., singing: is only a syntactically conditioned form of the word sing. Against this: E.g., singer: is an own word with its own set of forms and its own paradigm. ((s) Because it itself is changeable, e.g. plural and declination can be formed). >Words, >Grammar, >Syntax, >Language. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Description Levels | Bigelow | I 43 Levels/Universals/Hierarchy/Bigelow/Pargetter: N.B.: we do not consider universals of a "higher-level" as objects of a quantification of a higher level or second-level logic, but as entities that can be named, that is, first level logic (1st level language). >Universals, >Logic, >2nd Order Logic, >Naming, >Designation, >Names, >Denotation, >Objects, >Order/Levels. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Description Levels | Flusser | I 86 Steps/Image/Flusser: 1. pictograms 2. ideograms 3. hieroglyphics 4. letters. (1 3 precursor of the alphabet: all linear codes) I 86 Pictogram: an agreed image of an object it means (convention). >Conventions, >Meaning, >Meaning/Intending, >Images, >Code, >Sign, >Symbol. I 87 Ideogram: can be the same image as a pictogram, but it no longer means the object but a general situation, an "idea" in which the object participates. For example, a watery eye can mean "grief". >Icons. I 88 Linear codes: e. g. picture box with stick figures, the sun is at the top, in the middle a dog. Next to it the same again without frame, linear order: sun, male, dog, male. (> Scene) Meaning: The "text" to the right (without frame) means the image, which means the scene. >Levels. I 89 Scene: framed picture with stick figures about 2 people walking a dog around noon. If the frame is omitted, it becomes a > linear code. I 89ff Alphabet/Flusser: the usual historical explanation of the alphabet is wrong, which was formed through the initial letters of the objects. Semitic alphabets do not know any consonants. "Genetic" explanation has little to do with the function of the letters in the alphabet. Meaning/Alphabet: The question: "What is the meaning of the 'C'" in the Latin alphabet? is not related to the camel, which originally depicted it. The alphabet is a unique invention that was made only once, about 1500 B.C. in the eastern Mediterranean: clay tablets on Crete and Syria: proto-Hebrew: "linear A" proto-Greek: "linear B". Ulysses and Abraham, for example, were originally the same figure. The alphabet is a code invented by merchants for merchants By alphabet: Technical pictures I 103 Scheme: "World" < Image < Text < technical images. >Terminology/Flusser, >Techno-image. The photographer stands behind the writer, who stands behind the draftsman who stands behind the world. To draw, one has to distance oneself from the world. >World, >Image, >Text. Techno-Image/Flusser: are to be regarded genetically as a step back from the texts (especially optics and chemistry) and they are consequences of scientific progress. >Science, >Measurements, >Observation language, >Progress. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
| Description Levels | Genz | II 47 Description/level/Genz: systems in which everything really depends on everything do not allow for a delimitation of levels. The laws apply on all levels, the system is "self-similar". >Levels (order). Self-similarity/laws/system/Genz: if you know a little bit about self-similar systems, you know the whole thing. The big is created by enlarging the small. >Self-similarity. II 304 Level/natural law/legislative level/description/Genz: different levels of description can be delimited, on which laws apply that use terms that do not require the deeper levels to be used for their definition. For example, the physician can draw conclusions about a disease of the liver from the blood count without knowledge of chemistry. >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Inferences, >Conclusions, >Symptoms. II 304 Level/natural laws/legislative level/description/Genz: levels are possible because not everything depends on everything. Levels/Genz: why they can be delimited at all can only be answered anthropically: if there are no laws, we could not have formed ourselves. Cf. >Anthropic Principle, >Explanations. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Description Levels | Habermas | IV 25 Description levels/interaction/communication/Habermas: that interaction participants interpret the same stimulus in a consistent way is a fact that exists per se, but not for them ((s) the interaction participants). ((s) See Exterior/interior/Maturana, Descriptions/Maturana). Application example: IV 30 It is not enough to attribute consistent interpretations, IV 31 instead, identical meanings must be demanded. The constancy of meaning of the symbols must not only be given by themselves, but must be recognizable for the symbol users themselves. ((s) Only then can reactions not only be expected, but also misinterpretations be made recognizable.) >Meaning, >Signs, >Symbols. IV 229 Description levels/lifeworld/system/Habermas: from the participant's perspective of the members of the lifeworld, it must appear as if systems-theoretical sociology only refers to one of the three lifeworld components, namely the institutional system, to which culture and personality only form environments. From the systems-theoretical observer perspective, it is as if the analysis of the lifeworld is limited to that of the social subsystems that specializes in the conservation of structural patterns (pattern-maintenance). The components of the lifeworld are then only internal differentiations of this subsystem of the inventory definition. IV 232 The decoupling of system and world cannot be understood as a process of second-order differentiation, as long as we concentrate on only one of the two perspectives instead of transforming them into one another. Instead, we want to investigate the interrelationships between the two. Every new level of system differentiation requires a different institutional basis, and for this transformation the evolution of law and morality takes on pacemaker functions. >Law, >Morality. IV 246 Segmental differentiation through exchange relationships and the stratification of tribal societies through power relationships characterize two different levels of system differentiation. For the preservation of the system inventory, social integration (coordination of action orientations) is only necessary to the extent that it ensures the framework conditions for the functionally necessary allocation of action effects. But the various mechanisms are not a priori harmonised. IV 259 Description levels/Habermas: Moral and legal norms are second-order norms of action at which the forms of social integration can be studied. According to Durkheim, they become more abstract and more general, while simultaneously differentiating from each other. >Norms. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Description Theory | Dummett | III (b) 68 Def " Theory of descriptions"/Kripke: According to Kripke the wrong theory that every name has the same meaning as a particular description. Dummett: In fact, Frege's view that it is essential that a name can have the same meaning as a particular description. >Recognition. III (c) 135 Attribution/Frege: Attribution of pure object knowledge without further identification of the meaning is incomprehensible. An object must somehow be given. There can be no "mere knowledge of reference". Description theory/Kripke/RussellVsFrege/Dummett: This theory is tendentiously attributed to Frege. ((s) Ultimately the view that names are "hidden descriptions", but this is not explicitely claimed by Frege). Frege is concerned with the fact that reference without meaning (meaning) is not possible. III (c) 151 Description Theory/Names/Dummett: The theory derives its considerable plausibility from the fact that someone who does not know a proper name can be made familiar with it by a verbal explanation. Modified version of the theory of descriptions: two characteristics: 1st: There is usually more than one legitimate introduction of a proper noun. The ways of givenness together offer more than is necessary for introduction. 2nd: Several solutions are available in advance for each conflict. This can be expressed in such a way that a weighted majority of sentences containing the name must prove to be true. >Way of givenness. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Description Theory | Evans | I 313f Description theory/Names: ~ "x is the only phi-ist, and everything elsethat phi-es is identical with x" - EvansVs: the situation for propositional attitudes is falsely portrayed as equal to the situation in which the object does not exist. >Proper names, >Descriptions, >Non-existence. I 313 Reference/Meaning/Generic Term/EvansVsDescription Theory: we are constantly using generic terms of whose fulfillment of conditions we have only the darkest ideas. E.g. chlorine, microbiology, etc. However, it is wrong to say that we do not say anything when we utter sentences that this generic term I 315 Name/Causal Theory/Kripke/Evans: Kripke’s causal theory looks something like this: the chain of causality only retains the reference if the speaker intends to use the name for the same thing for which it was used by the person from whom he has learned the name. Evans: Question: Is it sufficient that such use is a so described causal consequence? E.g. (Evans) a group of people talk in the bar about a certain Louis, of whom S has never heard. He asks "What has Louis done?" It’s clear that he refers to a certain man with that!. I 316 He might even continue to refer to him on a later occasion. VsDescription Theory: This is difficult to reconcile with it, because the chunk of information that S overheard could include any attitude and could match someone else much better. She has no explanation for why it is impossible that other descriptions outweigh this one. VsCausal Theory: It can probably ensure the right answer in this case. But it cannot rule out that S denotes a certain Frenchman - maybe Louis XIII - at any time in the future, as alien to the subject matter and as confused the speaker may seem, as long as there is a causal link to that conversation in the bar. I 321 EvansVsDescription Theory: If we thought at the same time that the name refers to the person who was killed by Elhannan, then it shows that the conditions of the description theory are not necessary and not sufficient. >Conditions, >Sufficiency. I 321/322 EvansVsKripke: this is the view for which Kripke should have argued, but did not argue. EvansVsDescription Theory: does not distinguish between the notions: a) that the described thing is determined by the intention of the speaker, and b) that the object fulfils the descriptions. EvansVsDescription Theory: point b) is the weakness: the "fitting in with" is absurd if, in the case of a speaker who is isolated from his community, it only fits this thing better than anything else because of a bunch of descriptions which the speaker associates. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Descriptions | Cartwright | I 3 Explanation/Description/Physics/Cartwright: in modern physics the phenomenological laws are considered as being descriptive, the fundamental laws as being explanatory. Problem: the explanatory power comes at the cost of the adequacy of description Explanatory power (of laws) The semblance of truth comes from a false explanation model: wrong connection of laws with reality. I 4 Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum" View/Cartwright: of explanation: Thesis: the way from theory to reality is this: theory > model > phenomenological law Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be). Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are only true of the objects in the model. >Fundamental laws/Cartwright. Explanation/Cartwright: is not a guide to the truth. I 57 Description/Laws of Nature/LoN/Physical Laws/Cartwright: E.g. the gravitation law does not describe the behavior of the objects, because electrical forces also play a role - (Coulomb's law) - no charged body behaves according to the gravitation law. And every massive body is a counter-E.g. to Coulomb's law. Solution: "... if no other forces..." - without ceteris paribus. >ceteris paribus. I 131 Description/Physics/Cartwright: false: that we have to depart from existence assumptions to come to a description according to which we can set up the equations. Correct: the theory has only few principles to move from descriptions to equations - these principles certainly require structured information. - And the "descriptions" on the right side have to satisfy many mathematical requirements. >Equations, >Principles. The best descriptions are those that best match the equations. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Descriptions | Chaitin | Rucker I 350 Name / designation: "impossible object": "Name of the impossible object": >Chaitins sentence: e.g. "the first number, which I can not name with eleven words" - inconsistency. >Contradictions, >Consistency, >Names, >Possibility, >Metaphysical possibility, >Logical possibility. |
|
| Descriptions | Dummett | III (c) 151 Dummett pro description theory: verbal explanations help to understand unfamiliar names. >Recognition/Dummett. I 43 There is a persistent tendency today to deny that a singular term has a meaning different from its reference to this or that object. DummettVs: This seems intuitively appealing in the case of proper names, but absurd in the case of complex terms such as some descriptions. If you like this direction, you can't help but say that this or that description is not really a singular term. Recently, it has been argued that labels behave differently than proper names in temporal or modal contexts. Nevertheless, as Gareth Evans has shown, there are proper names whose reference is descriptive - through descriptions. >Theory of descriptions/Dummett. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Descriptions | Kripke | I 78 ff You could say "The Jonah of the book never existed", as one might say "the Hitler of Nazi propaganda never existed." Existence is independent of representation. >Existence/Kripke, >Description dependence/Kripke, >Presentation. I 94 Reference by description: E.g. "Jack the Ripper" E.g. "Neptune" was named as such before anyone had seen him. The reference was determined because of the description of its place. At this point they were not able to see the planet. Counter-example: "Volcano". I 94f It might also turn out that the description does not apply to the object although the reference of the name was specified with the description. E.g. the reference of "Venus" as the "morning star", which later turns out not to be a fixed star at all. In such cases, you know in no sense a priori that the description that has defined the reference applies to the object. I 93ff Description does not shorten the name. E.g. even if the murdered Schmidt discovered the famous sentence, Goedel would still refer to Goedel. I 112f Description determines a reference, it does not provide synonymy. "Standard meter" is not synonymous with the length - description provides contingent identity: inventor = post master. Cf. >Standard meter. I 115 Identity: through the use of descriptions contingent identity statements can be made. >Identity/Kripke. I 117 QuineVsMarcus ("mere tag") is not a necessary identity of proper names, but an empirical discovery - (Cicero = Tully) identity does not necessarily follow from description - the identity of Gaurisankar is also an empirical discovery. I 25/26 Description/names/Kripke: the description serves only to determine the reference, not to identify the object (for counterfactual situations), nor to determine the meaning. I 36 Description is fulfilled: only one sole object fulfils the description, e.g. "The man drinking champagne is angry" (but he drinks water). Apparent description: e.g. the Holy Roman Empire (was neither holy nor Roman) - it is a hidden proper name. --- III 353 Description/substitutional quantification: L must not occur in the substitution class: necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure that each sentence of the referential language retains its truth value is that whenever (Exi)f is true (when only xi is free), a substitution class f" of f will be be true (> condition (6)) - this does not work with certain L, even if (6) is fulfilled. III 369 Theory of Descriptions/Russell: y(ixf(x)) where f(x) is atomic, analyzed as follows: (Ey)(x)(y = x ↔ f(x)) ∧ y(y)) (Wessel: exactly one": (Ex)(P(x) ∧ (y)(P(y) > x = y)) "There is not more than one thing": (x)(y)(x = y) - is ambiguous, if there is more than one description: order of elimination. >Reference/Kripke, >Meaning/Kripke, cf. >necessary a posteriori. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Descriptions | Millikan | I 175 Description/Millikan: we are here to find out what the stabilization function of definite and indefinite descriptions is. >Terminology/Millikan. We have to go on our own. We cannot rely on the tradition of Russell-Trawson-Donnellan. Reference/MillikanVsStrawson: we must assume that it is not just speakers who are referring, but we must assume that the linguistic expressions themselves also refer. I 176 Indefinite description/real value/Millikan: The real value is determined by the rest of the sentence, not by the indefinite description itself. I 177 Reference: is something different than an image! Indefinite description: maps, but without referring! Inner name: it is not the task of an indefinite desription to be translated into an inner name. Their normal eigenfunction is to be translated into an inner description, which still contains a general expression. I 178 Indefinite description: an indefinite description as a whole, is not a referential term. Tradition: has assumed however e.g. "an Indian friend of mine gave me this". Here I think of Rakesh. MillikanVsTradition: this leads to confusion. I leave the referent open on purpose. Reference: it is certainly true that I intended Rakesh, so I will also refer to him. N.B.: if Rakesh asks me later: "Did you tell them about me?" The correct answer is "No!". Eigenfunction/Descripion/Millikan: the eigenunction is not here to be translated into an inner name for Rakesh. On the other hand: Natural sign: is causally dependent. And the identification was finally caused by Rakesh, who gave me the book. >Identification, >Reference. I 179 Causality/description/real value/Millikan: The causal connection of an intentional icon with its real value makes it possible for the listener to use it as a natural sign. >Causality, >Causal theory of knowledge. N.B.: thus a new inner name can be coined. ((s) Not an already existing inner name). Definition "natural referent"/indefinite description/Terminology/Millikan: any indefinite description has a real value in accordance with a normal explanation, the "natural referents". This also applies to stories (fiction). But this is not a public reference. Here, causality and mapping rules do not matter. >Fiction. Public referent/Millikan: a definite description or name can have (by chance) a public referent, without having a natural referent. Therefore an indefinite description can have a natural one without having a public one. I 181 Real value/definite descripion/Millikan: the real value of a definite description is determined by the rest of the sentence. E.g.: Which of my friends was it? The one who gave me the book. I 185 Description/Millikan. E.g. "my brother" is neither definite nor indefinite. I can use the description if I have one or more brothers. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Descriptions | Quine | I 320 Elimination of singular descriptions/Quine: there are no more truth value gaps. All are wrong now: "..y .. and only y" instead of "y = (ix) (x .. ..)" when applicable to nothing. I 328f Descriptions can be revived. This is possible in all positions. Socrates is then again definable as a singular term. Quotes are names of linguistic structures. They eliminate the characteristic occurrences of the corresponding terms. II 75 ff Russell/Theory of Descriptions: a term is not defined by equivalence but through paraphrases. Reference is only simulated, not fixed. VII (i) 167 Descriptions/Quine: descriptions are singular terms. >Singular Terms/Quine. III 279 Description/Synonymy/Quine: whether a description assumption is available at all depends on an appropriate translation, and this in turn depends on the vague concept of synonymy. What is synonymous for us depends on what you first got to know in your individual learning history. Solution/Quine: we separate logic from empiricism by emphasizing the priority of the predicates: we insist that what we learn through perception is never terms, but only predicates. ((s) We then use these in the descriptions as building blocks.) III 280 Predicate/Quine: a predicate (instead of description) should then only apply to this (shown) object. Then we explain "(ix)Fx" as the actual name, where "F" stands for this basic predicate. That does not even apply to epistemology. Description/singular term/Quine: then nothing prevents us anymore to regard all singular terms as descriptions! If, for example, "The author of Waverley" is given, we do not need to stop looking for the correct "F" for translation into the "(ix)Fx" description. We allow the following: "(ix)(x is cerberus)" (>unicorn as description). Any less incompetent translation would only differ in its clarity, not in its meaning. Singular terms/Quine: treating all as descriptios has the advantage, III 281 to spare a difference to non-descriptive singular terms. The dispute over descriptions becomes one about predicates. >Predicates/Quine. III 293 Description/Equal Sign/Quine: if we have the equal sign, we can afford the luxury of introducing descriptions without having to calculate them as primitive basic concepts. Because with the equal sign we can eliminate a description from every sentence. >Equal sign/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Descriptions | Rorty | II (f) 130ff Description/Rorty: the described nature will always have some sort of order!. Criterion: according to which criterion are new descriptions helpful? - Rorty: Those who ask such a question imagine that the language of the future should be a tool in the hands of the present-day language. These are ultimately power struggles. In the sense of Gadamer one would simply see that everyone’s order system requires storage compartments with enough space for the order systems of all others. >Order. VI 128f World/insight/reality/existence/Rorty: E.g. once you’ve described a something as a dinosaur, it is causally independent of this description. But before you have described it as a dinosaur or anything else, it is pointless to claim that it is "out there" and has properties! What’s out there? The thing itself? The World? Tell us more! Describe it! Once you did that, we are able to specify which properties of the object are causally independent of the description and which are not. >Description-dependence. Independent of description/Rorty: E.g. oviparous. Dependent on description/Rorty: E.g. "an animal whose existence was only suspected in recent centuries." This is not about the distinction >intrinsic/>extrinsic. VI 128 Independent of description: causal relationships are not given under a description. Independent of description/Davidson: in contrast to the explanation, causality is not bound to the any description. Independent of description/RortyVsDavidson: Davidson is not quite right: he should have said that the same causal relationship-with-a-description can be explained in many different ways. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Descriptions | Sellars | I 27 Report/statement/Sellars: phrases like "This is green" both have a facts-declaratory and a reporting use. E.g. Tie seller John must learn to suppress his report. I.e. the report on his own sensory impression which contradicts the fact that he has learned: under different illumination the colors can change. John says now: "this tie is blue". But he makes no reporting use of this sentence. He used it in the sense of a conclusion. Report: experiences, feelings, sensations. On the other hand: Determination: conclusion, facts. >Experience, >Sensations, >Facts, >Conclusion; cf. >Ideal observer, >Standard conditions. --- II 318 Thesis: that one can translate every statement that contains at least one reference expression and a descriptive expression, into a (fictional) understandable language, that contains the equivalent of reference expressions, but not of description expression, but therefore a special notation for reference terms, in which the description expressions can be translated into. Once again the essence of "mapping" has been proved as a translation. (Mapping/translation). >Mapping, >Translation, >Observation language, >Perception, >Seeing-as, >Concepts/Sellars. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Descriptions | Stegmüller | Stegmüller I 449f Statement: within the scientific difference between description and explanation. E.g. the rapid immersion of a thermometer in hot water first sinks the mercury column, and then increases rapidly. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Descriptions | Tugendhat | I 348 Descriptions/Frege (also Husserl): descriptions more fundamental than names - for finding the reference of names. MillVsFrege: Names more fundamental. >Names/Mill. VsMill: mysterious: "enclosed to the object itself". Solution/Mill: not to the object but to the idea of object. >Imagination. I 378 Frege: names are abbreviations for descriptions. >Abbreviated descriptions. I 396 Description/properties/Identification/Tugendhat: doubtful whether descriptions can really pick out an object. "Original" property: E.g. "the highest mountain", "the second highest mountain," and so on. Problem: there can also be two mountains of the same height, at one point there can be multiple or none so-and-so. Tugendhat: there must be added something else, ostension, name or location. E.g. someone who is lead in front of the highest mountain, does not need to know that it is the highest. - ((s) "This mountain" is not a property.) >Knowledge, >Identification, >haecceitism, cf. >Two lost wanderers. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Designation | Designation: ascription of a character to an object that allows the localization within an order, as opposed to naming. See also denotation, individuation, identification, specification. |
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| Designation | Chisholm | I 166 ff Planet/Denoting/Designating/Kaplan: Planets example: if you take as a necessary name a for the number nine, then you believe of a that it is an even number, then: in "x is even", you can replace x with a. ChisholmVs: Denoting (linguistically) is not helpful, cannot be a basic concept if intentionality is a basic concept: we explain the linguistic with the intentional. >Planets example, >Intentionality, >Basic conepts. I 167 Instead: Designating: numeral necessary because of successor relation! - It brings us the object closer - Numerals: its meaning happens to involve a property that constitutes an individual being of the number, a property for which applies that the number necessarily has it (E.g. successor - unlike names) (!). >Propoer names, >Singular terms, >Numerals. I 168 Designate/Chisholm: must necessarily bring features: "the property blue" instead of "the color of the sky", E.g. "All men are mortal" instead of "Aristotle's favorite proposition". >Features. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Designation | Cresswell | II 119 Naming/Denotation/Cresswell: E.g. the predicate "was so called" is a property of pairs so that it consists, when a is the name of a. - (> inserting). ((s) Name not as a property, but "naming"as a feature of a word-object-pair). See also >denoting position/Quine, >Names of expressions, >Name of a sentence, >Names, >Naming, >Denotation, cf. >Predication. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Designation | Geach | I 52 Naming/Denotation/Two-Names Theory/GeachVsAristoteles: Incorrect approximation of predication and naming: as if predicates were (complex) names : "on the mat". >Naming, >Predication, >Attribution, >Names, >Predicates, >Aristotle. ((s) "The man stabbing Caesar to death stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus.") Geach: Additionally, Geach would use a link. Two-names theory/Aristotle/Geach: "Socrates is a philosopher" should be true because the thing is named. GeachVs: "Philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or every) philosopher". >General terms. --- I 153f Intentionality/naming/Parmenides/Geach: one cannot name anything that does not exist. (Geach pro) - ((s) Existence introduction is not arbitrary, not without premise). >Existence, >Existence statement, >Existence/Parmenides, >Introduction, >Nonexistence, >Fiction. E.g. Geach dreamed of a girl and wants to call it "Pauline". - On the other hand, acquaintance is sufficient - presence is not necessary. Problem: is the girl even more imaginary, if he has not dreamed of her? Geach: that is a sure sign that this is all nonsense. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief. Geach with Parmenides: "There is only that what exists." GeachVsParmenides: However, one can talk about non-existent objects. - E.g. talking about absent friends without knowing that he is dead, changes the truth value, but not the fact that these are sentences. >Truth value, >Reference. Imaginary girls are not competing for identification in the dream. - If it is true of no identifiable girl that I dreamed of her, then I have not dreamed of any girl. >de re, >de dicto, >Identification. Solution: "I dreamed of a girl, but it is not true of a certain girl that I dreamed of her". - This is similar to: it is not true of a certain stamp that I want it. --- I 252 Predication/Geach: predication can be done without naming: in an if-that-sentence or in an or-sentence, a term P can be predicated of a thing without naming the thing "P". E.g. "If that what the policeman said is true, then he drove faster than 60". This does not call the policeman's sentence true. - (> Conditional). Predication/naming: centuries-old error: that the predicate is uttered by the thing. Frege: Difference >naming / >predication, >designation: to name a thing "P", a sentence must be asserted! But a property is also predicted in a non-assertive sub-clause (subset). Therefore, naming must be explained by predication, not vice versa. >Naming. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Designation | Hacking | I 142 Naming/Hacking: there can be no complete theory of naming. >Naming, >Proper names, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Theory language, >Unobservables, >Descriptions, >Theory of Descriptions, >Causal theory of names, >Denotation, >Reference, >Completeness, >Incompleteness. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Designation | Kripke | III 380 Naming/designation/Kripke: designation has nothing to do with existence: wrong question: "Does ___ live on Mars?" and then insert name. ((s) The substitutional quantification: would be satisfied by a name because it refuses an ontology that goes beyond its expressions.) >Existence/Kripke, >Substitutional quantification/Kripke. --- Kripke I 121 Naming/designation/Kripke: designation does not create identity: Phosphorus/Hesperus has the same epistemic situation named as different celestial bodies - it is quite possible, therefore contingent, but does not affect the actual identity. We use them as names in all possible worlds. >Identity/Kripke, >Morning star/evening star, >Possible world/Kripke. I 134 Geach: designation reflects something important: Nixon = human (a priori). KripkeVs: e.g. Lot’s guests are Angles despite designation. Difference: there is a difference in the use of the name/designation. This is no case of indeterminacy of reference. >Indeterminacy, >Inscrutability of reference, >Reference/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Designation | Locke | Arndt II 202 Naming/Locke: naming creates no objectivity or unity - this is established by the mind.- ((s) corresponding to an idea, not directly referred substance.) >Mind/Locke, >Object, >Substance/Locke, >Unity, |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Loc II H.W. Arndt "Locke" In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 |
| Designation | Meixner | I 70 f Naming/Meixner: Naming different from expressions. To name: a name is saturated (it stands for an object). >Saturated/unsaturated, >Expressions/Meixner. Difference: functions can also be expressed by unsaturated expressions. >Functions. I 102 Expression/naming/Meixner: facts are expressed by sentences and named by a phrase (subordinate clauses). >That-sentences, >States of affairs. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Designation | Prior | I 155 Naming/applying/Prior: adjectives do not name, but can be applied to something. >Predication, >True-of. The application is not part of the meaning. >Meaning. Descriptions can be understood without knowing to whom they are applied. >Descriptions, >Understanding. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Designation | Quine | II 61 Naming: is a name or singular term. Designate: a predicate designates. Naming and designating are referring. They do not express meaning. VIII 27 Syncategorematic expressions such as "on" do not designate anything. Likewise, we can assume that words such as "unicorn" do not designate anything; neither something abstract nor something concrete. The same applies to "-ness" or punctuation marks. The mere ability to appear in a sentence does not make a string a name. Nominalism: interprets all words as syncategorematic! Ad XI 173 Note 18: Sentences/QuineVsFrege/Lauener: sentences do not designate! Therefore no names can be formed by them (by quotation marks). XI 173 Substitutional Quantification/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: Substitutional Quantification does not enter into an ontological obligation in so far as the names used do not have to name anything. That is, we are not forced to accept values of the variables. >Substitutional Quantification/Quine. XI 49 QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: this is precisely what we use to disguise ontology by not getting out of the language. XI 132 Sense/designate/singular term/Quine/Lauener: it does not need a name to make sense. Example: unicorn. There is a difference between sense,meaning and reference. XII 73 Distinguishability/real numbers/Quine: N.B.: any two real numbers are always distinguishable, even if not every real number can be named! ((s) Not enough names). Because it is always x < y or y < x but never x < x. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Designation | Russell | VI 69 Designate/Russell: only familiar objects can be designated (> acquaintance) - problem: it is hard to find a name that is not a description. Only a "real name" can do this - "logical proper names" e.g. "this"). |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Designation | Tugendhat | I 342 Naming/Tugendhat theories that name the objects are no philosophical theories but linguistic. >Philosophy, >Semantics, >Linguistics, >Theories, >Names, >Definitions, >Definition/Frege. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Designation | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 338 Naming/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in order that mere naming can make sense, a lot has to be prepared already in the language. --- VI 154 Naming/Wittgenstein/Schulte: is still no move in the language game. >Language game, >Proper names. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Desire | Freud | Pagel I 58 Desire/Freud: boils down to hallucinating. --- Rorty V 64 "Capability"/Freud/Rorty: (according to Davidson): Freud has abolished the idea of "capability" and replaces it with a variety of belief and desire quantities. >Beliefs, >Imgination, >Ability. |
Freud I S. Freud Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011 Lacan I Gerda Pagel Jacques Lacan zur Einführung Hamburg 1989 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Desire | Lacan | Pagel I 63 Desire/Lacan: the desire wants more than real saturation: recognition and love. I 64 Desire/Lacan: the desire flows into the language. Mother is giving more than food. When the subject entrusts the need to the mother, the kind of neediness changes in a retroactive manner. The primary need turns into the claim to the other. Insatiability. The child, nourished with the highest measure of love, refuses food. It's about the symbol. >Symbol, >Language, >Psychological needs. I 65 Desire: Dialectic: Desire wants to be acknowledged! Neither appetite for satisfaction nor claim to love, but rather the difference arising from the subtraction of the satisfaction of the claim. I 68 Desire: neither the subject nor the other can be content to be subjects of need or objects of love, but solely to be a governor for the cause of desire. Passion: its scope is that the desire of the human is the desire of the other. I 75 Desire: behind each desire lurks a new, it is a never finished series. Irreducible alienation. Lacan: This is the real reason for the "discomfort in culture" (Freud). Lacan: not "lack of having", but "withdrawal from being". >Psychological theories on Desire, >Freud, >Alienation. |
Lacan I Gerda Pagel Jacques Lacan zur Einführung Hamburg 1989 |
| Determinates/ Determinables | Bigelow | I 51 Definition Determinable/Bigelow/Pargetter: what the objects have in common, but what is differently strong in them. For example, mass. Definition Determinate/Bigelow/Pargetter: is the special property that distinguishes the objects (simultaneously). For example a mass of 2.0 kg. Both together show what is common and what is different. >Problem of quantities, >Methexis/Plato, >Distinctions. Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: the approach is still incomplete: I 52 Either the relation between determinates and determinables is objective or it is not objective. A) objective: if it is objective, we need an explanation in which it exists. B) non-objective: then it is arbitrary to assert that objects that have different Determinates fall under that same Determinable. W.E. Johnson: our approach is based on one of Johnson's: in it, both are Determinables and also Determinate properties of individuals. Bigelow/Pargetter: Variant: we can start with a special property for each individual (Determinate, e.g. color shading). Then we define the common: color, this commonality is a property of 2nd level Definition 2nd degree property/Bigelow/Pargetter: E.g. the commonality of all shades of a color. I 53 Hierarchy: can then be continued upwards. E.g. to have a color at all is one level higher. Level/degree: E.g. pain: is having a 2nd level property. >Pain. Functional role/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a commonality, so there is a property 2nd level to have a certain functional role. >Functional role. Hierarchy: then consists of three sets of properties. 1. Property 1st level of individuals. All other properties supervene on them. 2. Properties of properties 1st level: = properties of 2nd degree (commonality of properties) 3. Properties 2nd level of individuals: = the property to have that or that property of the 1st level which has that or that property of the 2nd degree. >Properties. Problem of Quantities/Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: 1. Objects with different Determinates are different because each has a property of 1st level that another thing does not have. 2. they are the same because they have the same property of 2nd level. Determinables/Determinates/Johnson: are in close logical relations: to have a Determinate entails to have the corresponding Determinable. I 54 But not vice versa! Having a Determinable does not require possession of a particular Determinate! But it requires some Determinate from the range. BigelowVsJohnson: he could not explain the asymmetry. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: properties of 2nd level. Problem: our theory is still incomplete! Problem: to explain why quantities are gradual. This does not mean that objects are the same and different at the same time. New: the problem that we can also say exactly how much they differ. Or, for example, two masses are more similar than two others. Plato: Plato solves this with the participation. >Methexis. Bigelow/Pargetter: we try a different solution see >Relational theories. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Determinism | Cartwright | I 201 Determinism/Cartwright: deterministic motions are continuous - indeterministic: discontinuous. Cartwright: the existing energies choose whether deterministic or indeterministic. - Hence determinism is a true, but random physical characteristics. >Reality, >Explanation, >Energy/Feynman. I 202 Cartwright/Leibowitz: according to Cartwrights indeterministic developments are also natural and therefore need no explanation. They are no disturbances and therefore do not need reasons. >Probability, >Causes, >Effect. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Determinism | Inwagen | Pauen I 273 Determinism/Peter van Inwagen/Pauen: determinism is not an implication of physicalism. The principle of causal closure refers to the fact that only physical explanations may be used. This does not mean that the cause/effect ratio must always be deterministic. The principle of physical determination does not make a statement about the necessity of certain causal chains but only requires that there is a physically describable change for every change that can be described in a higher level. van Inwagen: determinism thus stands for the thesis that the state of the world can be derived anytime later from a complete description and knowledge of the state of affair. >Initial conditions. Pauen: it is more than controversial that the determinism applies to our physical reality. --- Lewis V 296 Determinism/VsSoft determinism/VsCompatibilism/van InwagenVsLewis: (against the soft determinism which I pretend to represent): E.g. supposed to reductio that I could have lifted my hand, though determinism would be true. Then follows from four premises which I cannot deny that I could have produced a false conjunction HL from a proposition H over a time before my birth and a certain proposition about a law L. Premise 5: if so, then I could have falsified L. Premise 6: but I could not have falsified L (contradiction). LewisVsInwagen: 5 and 6 are not both true. Which one is true depends on what Inwagen means by "could have falsified". But not in the ordinary language but in Inwagen's artificial language. Even there it does not matter what Inwagen himself means! What is important is whether we can give a sense to this at all, which makes all premisses valid without circularity. Inwagen: (verbally) third meaning for "could have falsified": namely, and only if the acting person could have arranged things the way that his/her acting plus the whole truth about the prehistory together imply the nontruth of the proposition. Then, premise 6 says that I could not have arranged things the way that I was predestined not to arrange them like that. Lewis: but it is not at all instructive to see that soft determinism has to reject premise 6 that was interpreted in that way. V 297 Falsification/action/free will/Lewis: provisional definition: an event falsifies a proposition only if it is necessary that in the case that the event happens, then the proposition is false. But my act of throwing a rock would not itself falsify the proposition that the window in the course remains intact. Everything that is true, is that my act invokes another event that would falsify the proposition. The act itself does not falsify any law. It would falsify only a conjunction of prehistory and law. Everything that is true, is that my act precedes another act - the miracle - and this falsifies the law. Weak: let us state that I would be able to falsify a proposition in the weak sense if and only if I do something, the proposition would be falsified (but not necessarily by my act and not necessarily by any event evoked by my act). (Lewis pro "weak thesis" (soft determinism)). Strong: if the proposition is falsified either by my act itself or by an event which has been evoked by my act. Inwagen/Lewis: the first part of his thesis stands, no matter whether we represent the strong or weak thesis: If I could lift my hand although determinism is true and I have not lifted it then it is true in the weak and strong sense that I could have falsified the conjunction HL (propositions on the prehistory and the natural laws). But I could have falsified the proposition L in the weak sense although I could not have falsified it in the strong sense. Lewis: if we represent the weak sense, I deny premise 6. If we represent the strong sense, I deny premise 5. Inwagen: represents both premises by considering analogous cases. LewisVsInwagen: I believe that the cases are not analogous: they are cases in which the strong case and the weak case do not diverge at all: Premise 6/Inwagen: he asks us to reject the idea that a physicist could accelerate a particle faster than the light. LewisVsInwagen: but that does not help to support premise 6 in the weak sense,... V 298 ...because the rejected presumption is that the physicist could falsify a natural law in the strong sense. Premise 5/Inwagen: here we are to reject the assumption that a traveler might falsify a conjunction of propositions about the prehistory and one about his/her future journey differently than by falsifying the nonhistorical part. LewisVsInwagen: you can reject the assumption completely which does nothing to support premise 5 in the strong sense. What would follow if one could falsify the conjunction in the strong sense? That one could falsify the non-historical part in the strong sense? This is what premise 5 would support in the strong sense. Or would only follow (what I think) that the non-historical part could be rejected in the weak sense? The example of the traveler does not help here because a proposition about future journeys could be falsified in the weak as well as the strong sense! Cf. >Strength of theories. |
Inwagen I Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Fourth Edition Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Determinism | Nagel | McGinn I 135 McGinn: Untraceability : wants to recognize the special status of the free will to which the the failure of domestication seems to point. >Terminology/McGinn. McGinn: We should accept things as indefinable and reasonable by themselves. Free players are then an independent ontological category. (Thomas Nagel, Galen Strawson). Nagel II 49 Determinism/ethics/Nagel: there is also responsibility in deterministic actions when the determination is intrinsic - actions that are determined by nothing are incomprehensible. >Principles//Nagel, >Responsibility, >Understanding/Nagel. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Determinism | Pauen | Pauen I 274 Determinism/Van Inwagen/Pauen: the principle of the causal closure says that only physical explanation may be used. - It is not about a need for certain causal chains. Only requirement: that for any higher order describable change there is a physically describable change. Thesis: from full description later states can be derived. >Initial conditions, >Levels/order, >Levels of description, >Description, >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Causal dependence, >P. van Inwagen. Pauen: determinism is more than controversial. I 275 Determinism/freedom/Moore: determinism does not entitle us to the conclusion that nothing else could have happened. >Freedom, >Freedom of will, >Actions, cf. >Anomalous monism. Ambiguity of "can": a) possible actions b) physical impossibility. G.E. Moore: For the purposes of a) it is possible to say "I could have decided otherwise" - ("conditional analysis"). VsMoore: Example he would falsely call psychological coercion "free". >Coercion. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Determinism | Popper | McGinn I 135 Freedom/domestication theory/indeterministical/McGinn: Thesis: only an acausal model could meet the freedom modality. If you say the actor was able to act otherwise, one must believe that a repeat would not lead to a decision that would be determined. (Accordingly some are of the opinion, freedom must be rooted in quantum indeterminacy.) E.g. Eccles/Popper: Thesis: Random events at the subatomic level in the brain are responsible. See >Eccles/Popper. McGinnVsEccles/McGinnVsPopper: desperate responses to problems of the first type: randomness on the deepest level is required. Then the actor is quasi a passive victim of quantum leaps. Both types of explanation are not satisfactory, the assumed similarities are distortions. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Devaluation | Congressional Research Service (CRS) | CRS I 13 Devaluation/Marc Labonte/CRS: When investors recognize a situation where devaluation becomes likely, even though they may have had no intention of leaving a country otherwise, they have every incentive to remove their money before the devaluation occurs because devaluation makes the local investment worth less in foreign currency. Because the central bank’s reserves will always be smaller than liquid capital flows when capital is mobile, devaluation becomes inevitable when investors lose faith in the government’s willingness to correct the exchange rate’s misalignment. To an extent, the phenomenon then takes on the aspect of a self-fulfilling prophecy. The reason the depreciation of a currency in crisis is typically so dramatic is because at that point investors are no longer leaving because of economic fundamentals, but simply to avoid being the one “standing when the music stops.” Notice that in the textbook explanation, a currency depreciation is expected to boost growth through an improved trade balance. In a currency crisis, this does not happen at first, although it does happen eventually, because resources cannot be reallocated towards increased exports quickly enough to compensate for the blow to the economy that comes through the sudden withdrawal of capital. In the Asian crisis, businessmen told of export orders they were unable to fill following devaluation because their credit line had been withdrawn. The shock of the capital outflow is exacerbated by the tendency for banking systems to become unbalanced in fixed exchange rate regimes. When foreigners lending to the banking system start to doubt the sustainability of an exchange rate regime, they tend to shift exchange rate risk from themselves to the banking system in two ways. First, foreign investors denominate their lending in their own currency, so that the financial loss caused by devaluation is borne by the banking system. CRS I 14 Before devaluation, a bank’s assets might exceed its liabilities. With devaluation, the foreign currency liabilities suddenly multiply in value with the stroke of a pen without any physical change in the economy, and the banks become insolvent.(1) Second, foreign lending to the banking system is done on a short-term basis so that investments can be repatriated before devaluation takes place. This is problematic because most of a bank’s investments are longer term. The banks then enter a cycle where the short-term debt is rolled over until crisis strikes, at which point credit lines are cut. Both of these factors lead to a situation where a currency crisis causes a banking crisis, which is a much more significant barrier to economic recovery than the devaluation itself. These two characteristics both tend to be present when lending to developing countries even in good times; the tendencies are accelerated when booms look unsustainable. An exception may have been Brazil, which some economists have suggested recovered so quickly from its devaluation because its banking system had few short-term, foreign currency denominated assets.(2) It is not necessarily illogical for the banking system to accept financing on a short term basis or denominated in foreign currency when credit conditions tighten. If it did not accept all forms of financing available to it, it could face insolvency at worst and a significant contraction in business at best. If the banks believe that the downturn is temporary and the episode will pass without a currency devaluation, then the banks will be able to repay the loans once conditions improve. If devaluation causes them to fail, they may expect the government to bail them out, perhaps explaining their willingness to accept these currency risks. >Currency crises, >Capital controls, >Fixed exchange rates, >Floating exchange rates, >International trade, >Currency. 1. The insolvency problem occurs because, in practice, the bank does not denominate its assets in terms of the foreign currency. This is presumably because its assets are domestic loans. 2. Paul Krugman, “Crises: The Price of Globalization?” paper presented at Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City symposium, August 2000. Congressional Research Service of the Library of congress (CRS) Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? RL31204 (2007) https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL31204 |
CRS I Congressional Research Service (CRS) Marc Labonte Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? Washington: Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress 2007 CRS II Congressional Research Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Marc Labonte, Banking and Cryptocurrency: Policy Issues. CRS Congressional research Service Report R48430. Washington, DC. 2025 CRS III Congressional Research Service (CRS) Corrie E. Clark Heather L. Greenley, Bitcoin, Blockchain, and the Energy Sector. Washington, DC. 2019 CRS IV Congressional Reserch Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Cryptocurrency: Selected Policy Issues Congressional Reserch Service CRS Report R47425 Washington, DC. 2023 |
| Developing Countries | Ostry | Ostry I 19 Developing countries/tariffs/Furceri/Hannan/Ostry/Rose: (…) for advanced economies, the decline in output after tariff increases is larger than in the baseline. >Tariff increase. Similarly, the effect on productivity is higher than in the baseline for advanced economies, but lower for other economies. One of the reasons for the different effects in advanced and emerging/developing economies could be due to the differential impact of trade liberalization. Leibovici and Crews (2018)(1) provide suggestive evidence that the potential gains from trade liberalization differ based on a country’s income level. Factors like financial development, limited infrastructure, and limited human capital prevent EMDEs ((s) Emerging Market and Developing Economies) from increasing production to sell internationally following trade liberalization. Consequently, EMDEs are disproportionally less affected during trade protectionism episodes, since they reap less benefits from trade liberalization to begin with. >Developing countries, >Tariffs, >Tariff impacts. 1. Leibovici, Fernando, and Jones Crews, 2018, “Trade Liberalization and Economic Development,” Economic Synopses, No. 13, Economic Research, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/economic-synopses/2018/04/20/tradeliberalization-and-economic-development. |
Ostry I Jonathan D. Ostry Davide Furceri Andrew K. Rose, Macroeconomic Consequences of Tariffs. IMF Working Paper. WP/19/9.International Monetary Fund. Washington, D.C. 2019 |
| Developing Countries | Rothbard | Rothbard III 969 Growth/Developing countries/Rothbard: Concomitantly with the hubbub about growth there has developed an enormous literature about the "economics of underdeveloped countries." We can here note only a few considerations. 1) First, contrary to a widespread impression, "neoclassical" economics applies just as fully to underdeveloped as to any other countries. In fact, as P. T. Bauer has often stressed, the economic discipline is in some ways sharper in less developed countries because of the extra option that many People have of reverting from a monetary to a barter economy. An underdeveloped country can grow only in the same ways as a more advanced country: largely via capital investment. The economic laws which we have adumbrated throughout this volume are independent of the specific content of any community's or nation's economy, and therefore independent of its level of development. >Neoclassical Economics. 2) Secondly, underdeveloped countries are especially prone to the wasteful, dramatic, prestigious government "investment" in such projects as Steel mills or dams, as contrasted with economic, but undramatic, private investment in improved agricultural tools.(1),(2) 3) Thirdly, the term "underdeveloped" is definitely value-loaded to imply that certain countries are "too little" developed below some sort of imposed standard. As Wiggins and Schoeck point out, "undeveloped" would be a more objective term.(3) 1. The prolific writings of Professor Bauer are a particularly fruitful source of analysis of the problems of the underdeveloped countries. In addition to the references above, see especially Bauer's excellent United States Aid and Indian Economic Development (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Association, November, 1959); his West African Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954); "Lewis' Theory of Economic Growth," American Economic Review, September, 1956, pp. 632-41; "A Reply," Journal of Political Economy, October, 1956, pp. 435-41; and P.T. Bauer and B.S. Yamey, "The Economics of Marketing Reform," Journal of Political Economy, June, 19 54, pp. 210-34. The following quotation from Bauer's Study on India is instructive for its analysis of central planning as well as development: „As a corollary of reserving a large (and increasing) sector of the economy for the government, private enterprise and investment, both Indian and foreign, are banned from a wide range of industrial and commercial activity. These restrictions and barriers affect not only private Indian investment, but also the entry of foreign capital, enterprise and skill, which inevitably retards economic development. Such measures are thus paradoxical in View of the alleged emphasis on economic advance.“ (Bauer, United States Aid, p. 43) Bauer's chief defect is a tendency to underweigh the role of capital in economic development. 2.It is fascinating to discover, in 1925-26, before Soviet Russia became committed to full socialism and coerced industrialization, Soviet leaders and economists attacking central planning and forced industry and calling for economic reliance on private peasantry. After 1926, however, the Soviet planned economy deliberately planned uneconomically for forced heavy industry in order to establish an autarkic socialism. See Edward H. Carr, socialism In One Country, 1921-1926 (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1958), 1, 259 f., 316, 35 1, 503-13. On the Hungarian experience, see Ray, "Industrial Planning in Hungary," pp. 134 ff. 3. Wiggins and Schoeck, Scientism and Values, p. v. This symposium has many illuminating articles on the whole problem of underdevelopment. In addition to the Bauer article cited above, see especially the contributions of Rippy, Groseclose, Stokes, Schoeck, Haberler and Wiggins. Also see the critique of the concept of underdevelopment in Jacob Viner, International Trade and Economic Development (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1952), pp. 120 ff. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Dialectic | Ancient Philosophy | Gadamer I 464 Dialectics/Ancient Philosophy/Gadamer: The Greeks have something ahead of us, who are entangled in the aporias of subjectivism, when it comes to understanding the supersubjective powers that dominate history. They did not seek to establish the objectivity of knowledge from and for subjectivity. Rather, their thinking saw itself a priori as a moment in being itself. Parmenides saw in him the most important signpost on the way to the truth of being. The dialectic, this experience of the Logos, was, as we emphasized, for the Greeks not a movement carried out by thinking, but the movement of the thing itself, which can be experienced by him. >Parmenides. Gadamer: The fact that such a phrase sounds like Hegel does not imply a false modernization, but testifies to a historical connection. In the situation of newer thinking that we have marked, Hegel has consciously taken up the model of Greek dialectic(1). Whoever wants to go into the school of the Greeks has therefore always gone through the school of Hegel. His dialectic of thought determinations as well as his dialectic of the forms of knowledge repeat in explicit execution the total mediation of thinking and being, which used to be the natural element of Gadamer I 465 of Greek thought. In that our hermeneutic theory seeks to acknowledge the interweaving of events and understanding, it is not only referred back to Hegel, but to Parmenides. >Dialectic/Hegel, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer, >Dialectic/Plato, >Dialectic/Aristotle. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Dialectic | Bubner | I 40 Dialectic/Bubner: neither gadgetry nor ontology: method. It proves itself in its application, for itself it has no sense. Problem: does one know the application area before, or is it first opened by the method? So there could be the illusion of a perfect application of the method. The problem is precisely when one understands the dialectic as a method. I am referring exclusively to Plato and Hegel here. They both agree in terms of the method role. Hegel: the correct application is proof of the mastery of the method. --- I 54 Dialogue/Bubner: does not come about where the intention of the whole venture is to eliminate the difference by the predetermined identification of the one with the other. However, this fundamental equality of truth interests is nowhere present in Hegel's phenomenology. It does without the clear separation from the thing itself and external reflection as it prevails in logic. --- I 57 Dialectics/today/Bubner: today is hardly regarded as the highest form of science, rather in the form of questions of belief; one searches for its value where scientific precision is not sufficient. But this does not detract from the epochal importance of Hegel. --- I 59 Logic/dialectics/Hegel: "The course of the thing itself". He is the Absolute not against the finite, and under the oppression of its concretion, but so as to produce the concretion from itself. Without the help of others, he conveys the abstract generality of the conceptual nature with all the wealth of the content of interest to the theory. The essential point is that the method finds and recognizes the determination of the universal within itself. The absolute method is not an external reflection, but takes the particular from its object itself, since it is itself its principle and soul. (Adopted by Plato: soul as the principle of movement). |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Dialectic | Levine | Gaus I 79 Dialectic/method/analytical marxism/Levine: the analytical Marxists came to realize that dialectical explanations either restate what can be expressed in unexceptionable ways, or else are unintelligible and therefore not explanatory at all. ((s) for „Analytical Marxism“ see >Marxism/Levine.) (...) plain: if there were a dialectical method that bears constructively on the explanatory aims Marx espoused, it ought by now to have become apparent. That it has not is good reason to conclude that, at most, the dialectic is a way of organizing and directing thinking at a pre-theoretic level. A heuristic device of this sort is not to be despised. But it is not a royal road to knowledge inaccessible to modern science. Tradition: That Marx was a ‘dialectical materialist’ is an orthodox claim. To be sure, Marx never used the expression. Levine, Andrew 2004. A future for Marxism?“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Dialogue | Gadamer | I 308 Dialogue/Understanding/Gadamer: Just as in conversation the other person, after having determined his or her position and horizon, becomes understandable in his or her opinions without the need to get along with that person, so for the one who thinks historically, the tradition becomes understandable in its sense without one nevertheless understanding with it and in it. In both cases the person who understands has, as it were, withdrawn from the situation of understanding. He or she is not to be found. By including the other's point of view in what he or she claims to tell you from the outset, you put your own point of view in a safe inaccessibility. Cf. >I-You-Relationship/Gadamer. I 372 Dialectic: Dialectic as the art of questioning only proves its worth in the fact that the one who knows how to ask is able to capture his or her questioning, and that means: the direction into the open. The art of questioning is the art of asking further questions, i.e. it is the art of thinking. It is called dialectic, because it is the art of having a real conversation. >Openness. I 373 The maieutic productivity of the Socratic dialogue, its midwifery of the word, may well address the human persons who are the partners in the conversation, but it only adheres to the opinions they express and whose immanent factual consistency is developed in the conversation. Logos: What emerges in its truth is the logos, which is neither mine nor yours, and which therefore surpasses the subjective meaning of the interlocutors in a way I 374 that the person leading the conversation always remains the unknowing person. >Logos. I 375 Hegel: But the originality of the conversation as the reference of question and answer is even more evident in such an extreme case as Hegelian dialectic as a philosophical method. To unfold the totality of thought determinations, as it was the concern of Hegel's logic, is, as it were, the attempt in the great monologue of the modern "method" to embrace the continuum of meaning, the particular realization of which is provided by the conversation of the speakers. >Logic/Hegel. When Hegel sets himself the task of liquefying and putting a spirit in (sic) the abstract determinations of thought, this means melting logic back into the consummative form of language, the concept back into the meaning of the word that asks and answers - a reminder, still in failure, of what dialectic actually was and is. Hegel's Dialectic is a monologue of thought that seeks to achieve in advance what gradually matures in each real conversation. I 387 [In a conversation] the partners (...) are far less the leaders than the led. Nobody knows in advance what will "come out" of a conversation. The understanding or its failure is like an event that has happened to us. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Digital Millennium Copyright Act | Benkler | Benkler I 413 Digital Millennium Copyright Act/DMCA/Institutional Ecology/Benkler: No piece of legislation more clearly represents the battle over the institutional ecology of the digital environment than the pompously named Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA). The DMCA was the culmination of more than three years of lobbying and varied efforts, both domestically in the United States and internationally, over the passage of two WIPO treaties in 1996. The basic worldview behind it, expressed in a 1995 white paper issued by the Clinton administration, was that in order for the National Information Infrastructure (NII) to take off, it had to have “content”, and that its great promise was that it could deliver the equivalent of thousands of channels of entertainment. This would only happen, however, if the NII was made safe for delivery of digital content without making it easily copied and distributed without authorization and without payment. I 414 (…) significant lobbying for “implementing legislation” to bring U.S. law in line with the requirements of the new WIPO treaties (…) placed the emphasis of congressional debates on national industrial policy and the importance of strong protection to the export activities of the U.S. content industries. It was enough to tip the balance in favor of passage of the DMCA. The central feature of the DMCA, a long and convoluted piece of legislation, I 415 is its anti-circumvention and anti-device provisions. These provisions made it illegal to use, develop, or sell technologies that had certain properties. Copyright owners believed that it would be possible to build strong encryption into media products distributed on the Internet. If they did so successfully, the copyright owners could charge for digital distribution and users would not be able to make unauthorized copies of the works. The DMCA was intended to make this possible by outlawing technologies that would allow users to get around, or circumvent, the protection measures that the owners of copyrighted materials put in place. There are two distinct problems with this way of presenting what the DMCA does. There are many uses of existing works that are permissible to all. They are treated in copyright law like walking on the sidewalk or in a public park is treated in property law, not like walking across the land of a neighbor. The second problem with the DMCA is that its definitions are broad and malleable. Simple acts like writing an academic paper on how the encryption works, or publishing a report on the Web that tells users where they can find information about how to circumvent a copy-protection mechanism could be included in the definition of providing a circumvention device. I 417 The DMCA is intended as a strong legal barrier to certain technological paths of innovation at the logical layer of the digital environment. It is intended specifically to preserve the “thing-” or “goods”-like nature of entertainment products—music and movies, in particular. As such, it is intended to, and does to some extent, shape the technological development toward treating information and culture as finished goods, rather than as the outputs of social and communications processes that blur the production-consumption distinction. It makes it more difficult for individuals and nonmarket actors to gain access to digital materials that the technology, the market, and the social practices, left unregulated, would have made readily available. I 418 It burdens individual autonomy, the emergence of the networked public sphere and critical culture, and some of the paths available for global human development that the networked information economy makes possible. Passing a DMCA-type law will not by itself squelch the development of nonmarket and peer production. Indeed, many of these technological and social-economic developments emerged and have flourished after the DMCA was already in place. It does, however, represent a choice to tilt the institutional ecology in favor of industrial production and distribution of cultural packaged goods, at the expense of commons-based relations of sharing in formation, knowledge, and culture. >Copyright/Benkler. |
Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007 |
| Digital Networks | Benkler | Benkler I 54 Digital Networks/Benkler: The difference that the digitally networked environment makes is its capacity to increase the efficacy, and therefore the importance, of many more, and more diverse, nonmarket producers (…). It makes nonmarket strategies—from individual hobbyists to formal, well-funded nonprofits—vastly more effective than they could be in the mass-media environment. The economics of this phenomenon are neither mysterious nor complex. >Networks, >Internet, >Internet culture, >Social networks, >Social media, >Misinformation. I 55 A billion people in advanced economies may have between two billion and six billion spare hours among them, every day. Beyond the sheer potential quantitative capacity, however one wishes to discount it to account for different levels of talent, knowledge, and motivation, a billion volunteers have qualities that make them more likely to produce what others want to read, see, listen to, or experience. They have diverse interests—as diverse as human culture itself. It’s an emergent property of connected human minds that they create things for one another’s pleasure and to conquer their uneasy sense of being too alone”(1). It is this combination of a will to create and to communicate with others, and a shared cultural experience that makes it likely that each of us wants to talk about something that we believe others will also want to talk about, that makes the billion potential participants in today’s online conversation, and the six billion in tomorrow’s conversation, affirmatively better than the commercial industrial model. I 56 The economics of production in a digital environment should lead us to expect an increase in the relative salience of nonmarket production models in the overall mix of our information production system, and it is efficient for this to happen—more information will be produced, and much of it will be available for its users at its marginal cost. 1. Eben Moglen, “Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright”, First Monday (1999), http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4_8/moglen/. [Website not available as of 15/07/19] |
Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007 |
| Diplomacy | Morgenthau | Brocker I 290 Diplomacy/Morgenthau: Morgenthau finds the safest conceivable method of permanently preventing war in the gradual development of statehood on a global scale. For the time being, it will remain a system of sovereign nation states. Against this background, says Morgenthau, realistic decision is called for, in other words: the return to a foreign policy that promotes one's own interests but absolutely prevents war. Their most important instrument is diplomacy. On the last pages of Politics Among Nations there is not only a regress from the necessary to the possible, but also a bridge from the analytical to the practical. (1) Brocker I 291 Even the best diplomacy will never be able to bring about the structural changes of its own accord that the destructive potential of modern technology so urgently demands. (2) >International relations. 1. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 1948. Dt.: Hans J. Morgenthau, Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der internationalen Politik, Gütersloh 1963, S. 402f. 2. Vgl. ebenda S. 445. Christoph Frei, „Hans J. Morgenthau, Macht und Frieden (1948)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pol Morg I Hans Morgenthau Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 1948 German Edition: Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der internationalen Politik Gütersloh 1963 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Discourse | Bohman | Gaus I 155 Discourse/Bohman: Discourse in political practices and in the public sphere seems to be directed to an implied audience or 'unseen gallery' and thus goes beyond 'sociable' interaction among friends (Gamson, 1992(1): 20). 1) Thus, discourse is communication directed to an indefinite audience, and an extension of face-to-face interaction that is made possible by technologies of writing, mass media or computer assisted communication and by formal political institutions (Thompson, 1995)(2). Second order coummuncation/reflexion: (...) discourse that has the property of being public is also reflexive or second-order communication; it must at least Gaus I 156 include the possibility of communication about the mode and assumptions of communication itself, for example, whether it is really public or not (Habermas, 1984)(3). This reflexivity is apparent especially when communication fails, when the assumptions that we make for practical purposes 'until further notice' in Garfinkel's (1969(4): 33) phrase are no longer successful in producing mutual understanding or co-ordination of action. In this case, speakers must make explicit the basis of communication itself by providing reasons and arguments that others might be able to accept. Just how far the demand for justification can be pursued by speakers and institutionalized in practices is subject to dispute among the proponents of various theories of discourse. Linguistics: For some, the linguistic medium makes reflexivity possible, while for others it imposes insuperable limits on reflection (Hoy and McCarthy, 1994)(5). >Discourse/Political Theory, >Discourse/Social sciences. 1. Gamson, William (1992) Talking Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Thompson, John (1995) The Media and Modernity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 3. Habermas, Jürgen (1984) The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I. Boston: Beacon. 4. Garfinkel, Harold (1969) Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 5. Hoy, David and Thomas, McCarthy (1994) Critical Theory. London: Blackwell. Bohman, James 2004. „Discourse Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Discourse | Flusser | I 23 ff Discourse/Flusser: a) Theatre discourse: theatre, concert hall, classroom. The so-called bourgeois family with the sending mother and the meteoricly approaching father. I 23 b) Pyramid discourses: armies, churches, political parties more suitable than theatre discourses for preserving the original information c) Tree discourses: science, technology tendency to progressive specialization. d) Amphitheatre discourses: (all around) I 27 Mass media, press, television I 29 e) circular dialogues "round tables" committees, laboratories, congresses, parliaments "free markets". I 32 f) Net dialogues diffuse, chatter, talk, chitchat, spreading of rumours. "public opinion." ((s) This refers to a literal (spatial) form of the network. Flusser wrote before the advent of the World Wide Web). I 48 Flusser: Synchronization of amphitheatre and web is a well-known fact. I 51 ff Situation/texts/pictures/documents/Flusser: a) Situation "Printed Books" - Universal level - National level - People's level b) Situation "Manuscripts" - Universal Level (Catholic) - people's level (pagan) c) Situation "Technical Images" - Universal Level - mass level >Discourse theory. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
| Discourse | Foucault | II 33ff Discourse/Foucault: First, negative work: we have to separate ourselves from a whole complex of concepts: 1.Tradition, 2. unreflected continuities. Def tradition/Foucault: thanks to it one can isolate the news on a background of permanence, similarities and repetitions get a causal painting. The term connects to distance and through time. It groups scattered events. FoucaultVs: there are never sharp boundaries. In another system, there are quite different connections. The term should not be used. Discourse/Foucault: 1. False assumption that there is always a secret origin. 2. false assumption, every discourse was secretly based on what had already been said. Instead new: treating the discourse in the mechanism of its insistence. Thus, the project of a pure description of the discursive events appears as a horizon for the investigation of the units formed therein. No analysis of the language. Instead: Question: how is it that a certain statement has appeared and no other in its place? Thinking/discourse: this description of discourse is not the history of thought. The history of thought would attempt to examine the intentions of subjects. >History of consciousness, >Subject, >Intention. Discourse: discourse is about the re-finding of the silent, muttering, inexhaustible speech that invigorates the voice that you hear from the inside. Thinking: analysis of thought is always allegorical in relation to the discourse that it uses. Question: What was really said? Discourse: is analyzed differently: one must show why it was so and not otherwise. It is about events that can neither exhaust the language nor the meaning completely. Not psychologically! No groupings. II 48ff Discourse: could one speak of an identity of the topics? For example, whether evolution had been the theme from Buffon to Darwin? Foucault: this subject always implied more than one knew about it, but forced a fundamental choice. Answer: instead of creating chains of logical conclusions or tables of differences, one should describe systems of control. Formation rules. II 61ff Analysis of the discourse: discovers no form, but a set of rules that are immanent in a practice. Not the objects remain constant, nor the area they form, not even the point of emergence or their characterization, but the comparing of the surfaces where they appear. E.g. We do not want to know whether the same person was mad at any time. (Such a story of the speaker is undoubtedly possible). But the point here is not to neutralize discourse historically, but, on the contrary, to preserve it in its consistency, in its own complexity. It is not a matter of investigating the meaning-change of words and concepts. The words are as far removed from our analysis as the things themselves. It is rather about why an object has become the subject of an investigation. For example, why the crime has become an object of the medical examination or, for example, the sexual deviation object of psychiatric discourse. Discourse: not a pure and simple limitation of things and words, no thin contact surface between reality and language. Rather, the analysis makes the rules visible. The rules and practices form the objects. II 154f Def discourse/Foucault: set of statements belonging to the same formation system (discursive formation). For example, clinical, economic discourse. Def formulation: An event that can always be found spatial-temporally. Def sentence/proposition: the units that can recognize grammar or logic in a character set. Def statement: the existential modality of this character set. Discursive formation: is now to be formulated into one law of the series. Concept: the description of the statements turns to a certain vertical dimension to the existence conditions of the different set of meanings. Description of the statement: Paradox: the description does not attempt to circumvent the linguistic performances, but the statement is not directly visible. It is at the same time not visible and not hidden. Analysis of the statement: historically, but outside of any interpretation: it does not question what is said according to what they conceal, but rather the way in which they exist, what it means to be manifested. Meaning: different meanings exist on an identical statement basis. But missing regularity is not a hidden meaning. Statement: no unit next to, above or below the sentences or propositions. Meaning: always points to something else. Language/Foucault: always seems to be populated by the other, the otherworldly, the distant. It is hollowed out by the absence. II 165ff How can the description of the statements be adapted to the analysis of the discursive formations? Concept: I do not proceed by means of a linear deduction, but in concentric circles. Theory/Foucault: I have not set up a strict theoretical model but released a coherent description area. Def Discursive Formation: the general presentation system, in a group of linguistic performances obeys. It is not the only system by which it is controlled; it is also directed by a logical, linguistic, psychological system. A statement belongs to a discursive formation, like a sentence to a text and a proposition to a deductive totality. Def discourse/Foucault: a set of statements as far as they belong to the same discursive formation (formation system). Def "Discursive practice": not expressive action, also not rational activity, not competency, but the totality of anonymous, historical rules, rules always determined in time and space, which in a given epoche, have defined the operating conditions of the statement function for a social, economic, geographical or linguistic environment. >Discourse theory. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Discrimination | Alchian | Henderson I 31 Discrimination/Alchian/Henderson/Globerman: „Discrimination in choosing employees by reason of race, creed, sex, beauty, or age will be more pronounced in not-for-profit firms than in business firms.“(1) Costs of discrimination: [context: Private companies do not discriminate as strongly as public institutions]: The government-run City colleges of Chicago could discriminate against a high-quality applicant because no one owned the university and, therefore, no one bore a cost for this discrimination. But the ad agency was a for-profit company. If the company passed up the opportunity to hire someone Who would do a good job, it wouldn't do as well financially. >Private sector, >Public sector. By taking longer to find someone as good or by settling for someone less skilled, the company would suffer financially for its decision to discriminate, which is why the company that hired him didn't ask him about his political background - it didn't care enough to risk its profits. >Cost, >Rate of Profit, >Profit, >Racism, >Prejudice, >Discrimination/Becker. Henderson I 32 Alchian/Kessel: In their famous 1962 article, "Competition, Monopoly and Pecuniary Gain"(2), they asked, "But why do monopolistic enterprises discriminate against negroes more than do competitive enterprises?" AlchianVsBecker: They went on to point out that there was no good reason, or at least no reason that Becker gave, to expect monopolistic enterprises to discriminate more against black people than competitive enterprises did. Alchian and Kessel provided the missing logic. Monopolies: Monopolies, they noted, tend to get their monopoly power from the government. Governments often prevent other firms from competing. Public sector: Public utilities are an example. But often the government, in return for granting monopoly power, regulates the profits of the monopolies. Wrote Alchian and Kessel: "Their cardinal sin is to be too profitable."(2) In their article, Alchian and Kessel noted an important implication: "If regulated monopolists are able to earn more than the permissible pecuniary rate of return, then 'ineffciency' is a free good because the alternative to ineffciency is the same pecuniary rate of return and no 'ineffciency."'(2) Henderson I 33 In other words, once regulated monopolies bump up against the profit constraint imposed on them by government, they can't legally earn more and so they "spend" what would otherwise be the additional profits on things that can be considered consumption items. Alchian and Kessel, writing in a less politically correct era, gave a long list of these other items, a list that includes "pretty secretaries," "lavish offces," and "large expense accounts." Racism: Where does racial discrimination come in? As noted above, the cost of racial discrimination limits the amount of racial discrimination that will occur. But if the government constrains firms to earn Iower profits than they could otherwise earn, racial discrimination, like ineffciency, becomes a "free good." Therefore, we would expect to see more racial discrimination in monopolistic firms whose profits are regulated by governments. Test of the hypothesis: Alchian and Kessel tested their hypothesis by analyzing a sample of 224 non-Jewish and 128 Jewish MBA students Who had graduated from the Harvard Business School. The graduates were employed in 10 major industry categories. Of the 10, they wrote, the two industries with the greatest regulatory restrictions discouraging effcient production were "transportation, communication and other public utilities" and "finance, insurance and real estate." Although 36 percent of the MBAs were Jewish, their representation in the two most heavily regulated industries was only 18 percent. The probability of this outcome happening by chance, they noted, was less than 0.0005.* Attenuating the rights of the owners of the regulated companies to use their property to increase profits had the effect of encouraging anti-social behaviour and outcomes. *For an overview of this Study and several other seminal studies on property rights by Alchian, see Henderson (2019)(3). 1. Armen A. Alchian (2006), "Some Economics of Property," p. 48. 2. Alchian, Armen A., and Reuben A. Kessel (1962). Competition, Monopoly and Pecuniary Gain. In H.G. Lewis (ed.), Aspects of Labor Economics (National Bureau of Economic Research): 157-183. 3. Henderson, David (2019, May 6). Economics Works. Liberty Classics. Econlib. |
Alchian I Armen A. Alchian William R. Allen Exchange and Production: Competition, Coordination and Control Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 1977 Henderson I David R. Henderson Steven Globerman The Essential UCLA School of Economics Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2019 |
| Discrimination | Becker | Henderson I 31 Discrimination/cost/Gary Becker/Henderson/Globerman: In 1957, Gary Becker, then an economics professor at Columbia University, published a path-breaking book titled The Economics of Discrimination(1). Cost of discrimination: The book's most important message is that an employer who discriminates in hiring on the basis of race rather than on the basis of productivity gives up profits. In other words, there is a cost to discriminating. Henderson I 32 Racism: Becker was careful to note that that does not imply that there will be no discrimination. Some employers are willing to give up profits in order to exercise what Becker called their "taste for discrimination." But his point was that discrimination is costly for those who do it and that that cost limits the amount of discrimination. Demand: The law of demand, which says that when the price of something rises people buy less ofit, applies to discrimination as well. Alchian/Kessel: Alchian and co-author Reuben Kessel of the University of Chicago took Becker's insight and ran with it. Monopolies and discrimination: In his book(1), Becker had noted that black people were discriminated against more frequently by monopolistic enterprises. While Becker didn't see that fact as a puzzle, Alchian and Kessel did. Alchian/Kessel: In their famous 1962 article, "Competition, Monopoly and Pecuniary Gain"(2), they asked, "But why do monopolistic enterprises discriminate against negroes more than do competitive enterprises?" AlchianVsBecker: They went on to point out that there was no good reason, or at least no reason that Becker gave, to expect monopolistic enterprises to discriminate more against black people than competitive enterprises did. >Discrimination/Alchian. 1. Becker, Gary (1957). The Economics of Discrimination. University of Chicago Press. 2. Alchian, Armen A., and Reuben A. Kessel (1962). Competition, Monopoly and Pecuniary Gain. In H.G. Lewis (ed.), Aspects of Labor Economics (National Bureau of Economic Research): 157-183. |
Henderson I David R. Henderson Steven Globerman The Essential UCLA School of Economics Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2019 |
| Discrimination | Economic Theories | Henderson I 35 Discrimination/profit/Economic theories/Henderson/Globerman: In our transactions for goods, people gain by ignoring characteristics of those they deal with in order to make money. Many intellectuals and many members of the public dismiss or even attack the profit motive. But the profit motive is a strong incentive for people to treat others well, whatever their skin color, ideology, or preferences about baseball teams. >Discrimination/Alchian, >Discrimination/Becker, >Racism/Alchian, >Rent control/Alchian/Demsetz, >Racism, >Apartheid. Henderson I 37 Capitalism and discrimination: Contrary to some contemporary claims that "capitalism" fosters discrimination against women and minority groups, work done by the UCLA School shows just the opposite. Namely, laws and regulations constraining the legal ability of owners of property to use their property to maximize profits, along With government-imposed barriers to competition, promote discrimination by reducing or sometimes eliminating the powerful role that competitive free markets can play in penalizing discrimination. >Free market. |
Henderson I David R. Henderson Steven Globerman The Essential UCLA School of Economics Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2019 |
| Discrimination | Fanon | Brocker I 389 Discrimination/Postcolonial Structures/Postcolonies/Fanon: thesis: in young postcolonies federalism partially wins(1). Postcolonies are multilingual and ethnically plural. It is not possible to construct a transethnic citizenship. Instead, in many cases majority ethnic groups dominate the state, ethnic minorities are discriminated against: "While the national bourgeoisie competes with the Europeans, the craftsmen and the small professions begin a struggle against the non-national Africans"(2). This extends to demands for emigration and assault: "We have moved from nationalism to ultra-nationalism, to chauvinism, to racism"(3). >Racism/Fanon. 1. Frantz Fanon, Les damnés de la terre, Paris 1961. Dt.: Frantz Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde, Frankfurt/M. 1981, S. 135 2. Ebenda S. 133 3. Ebenda. Ina Kerner „Frantz Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolFanon I Frantz Fanon Les Damnés de la Terre, Paris 1963 - Engl Transl. The Wretched of the Earth, New York 1963 German Edition: Die Verdammten dieser Erde Reinbek 1969 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Discrimination | Group Psychology | Haslam I 178 Discrimination/Group psychology: Spears/Otten: it seems there are plausible evolutionary reasons for people to put more trust in ingroups than outgroups and hence to act in terms of bounded reciprocity. At the same time, it appears that minimal ingroup bias can arise from the tendency to use the self as an anchor and to project self-interests onto the ingroup. (Spears et al., 2002(1), 2009(2)). >Distinctiveness/Group psychology, >Reciprocity/Psychological theories. Tajfel: substantial evidence has also accumulated for more group-level explanations of Tajfel and colleagues’ findings. These suggest that discrimination serves not only to enhance a positive sense of (collective) self but also to create positive group distinctiveness. 1. Spears, R., Jetten, J. and Scheepers, D. (2002) ‘Distinctiveness and the definition of collective self: A tripartite model’, in A. Tesser, J.V. Wood and D.A. Stapel (eds), Self and Motivation: Emerging Psychological Perspectives. Lexington, KY: APA. pp. 147–71. 2. Spears, R., Jetten, J., Scheepers, D. and Cihangir, S. (2009) ‘Creative distinctiveness: Explaining in-group bias in minimal groups’, in S. Otten, T. Kessler and K. Sassenberg (eds), Intergroup Relations: The Role of Motivation and Emotion; A Festschrift in Honor of Amélie Mummendey. New York: Psychology Press. pp. 23–40. Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Discrimination | Jurisprudence | Parisi I 129 Discrimination/bias/Jurisprudence/Nadler/Mueller: Race can influence legally relevant decisions in many situations, from policing decisions to final sentencing judgments. Race/jurisprudence: At the same time, law often refuses to define the concept of race, leading to confusion and inconsistency (Peery, 2011)(1). It is worth noting that many findings of racially motivated legal decision-making are generally uncorrelated with measures of explicit racial bias - "the kinds of bias that people knowingly - sometimes openly - embrace" (Rachlinski et al., 2009)(2). Implicit bias: Implicit bias (Greenwald and Krieger, 2006(3); Kang et al., 2012(4)) is a more insidious issue than explicit bias. Attitudes and stereotypes are implicit when they are not consciously accessible through introspection (Kang et al., 2012)(4). Both laypersons and judges hold implicit racial biases, and sometimes these biases can influence their judgment (Rachlinski et al., 2009)(2). Implicit Association Test (IAT): Implicit bias has been measured in a variety of ways (Jost, Federico, and Napier, 2009)(5), and one commonly used measure is the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which assesses the strength of a person's association between two concepts using response times; in a classic version, Black and White faces are paired with positively valenced and negatively valenced words. Parisi I 130 Results suggest a pervasive implicit favoritism for one's own groups and socially dominant groups (Lane, Kang, and Banaji, 2007)(6). Numerous studies suggest that IAT performance is a better predictor of behavior in socially sensitive situations than explicit racism measures (see Greenwald et al., 2009(7) for a meta-analysis; but see Oswald et al., 2013(8) for a dissenting view). Race: In other studies, people with higher implicit bias judged ambiguous actions by a Black person more negatively (Rudman and Lee, 2002)(9), and were quicker to detect hostility on Black faces, but not White faces (Hugenberg and Bodenhausen, 2003). More recently, a Guilty/Not Guilty IAT has been developed, and implicit associations between Black and guilty have been shown to predict evaluation of evidence, though not judgments of guilt (Levinson, Cai, and Young, 2010)(11). >Criminal Justice/Social Psychology. 1. Peery, D. (2011). "Colorblind Ideal in a Race-Conscious Reality: The Case for a New Legal Ideal for Race Relations." Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy 6:473. 2. Rachlinski, J. J., S. L. Johnson, A. J. Wistrich, and C. Guthrie (2009). "Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges." Notre Dame Law Review 84: 1 195. 3. Greenwald, A. G. and L. H. Krieger (2006). "Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations." California Law Review doi:10.2307/20439056. 4. Kang, J., M. Bennett, D. Carbado, and P. Casey (2012). "Implicit Bias in the Courtroom." UCLA Law Review 59: 1 124. 5. Jost, J. T., C. M. Federico, andJ. L. Napier (2009). "Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affnities." Annual Review of Psychology 60: 307—337. doi:10.1146/ annurev.psych.60.110707.163600. 6. Lane, K. A., J. Kang, and M. R. Banaji (2007). "Implicit Social Cognition and Law." Annual Review of Law and Social Science 3(1): 427—451. doi:10.1146/annurev.lawsoc- sci.3.081806.112748. 7. Greenwald, A. G., T. Andrew, E. L. Uhlmann, and M. R. Banaji (2009). "Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: Ill. Meta-analysis of Predictive Validity." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 97(1): 17—41. doi:10.1037/a0015575. 8. Oswald, F. L., G. Mitchell, H. Blanton, J. Jaccard, and P. E. Tetlock (2013). "Predicting Ethnic and Racial Discrimination: A Meta-analysis of IAT Criterion Studies." Journal of Personality and social Psychlogy 105(2): 171-192. doi:10.1037/a0032734. 9. Rudman, L. A. and M. R. Lee (2002). "Implicit and Explicit Consequences of Exposure to Violent and Misogynous Rap Music." Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 5(2): 133-150. doi:10.1177/1368430202005002541. 10. Hugenberg, K. and G. V. Bodenhausen (2003). "Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice and the Perception of Facial Threat." Psychological Science 14(6):640-643. 11. Levinson, J. D., H. Cai, and D. Young (2010). "Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test." Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 8: 187. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Discrimination | Pariser | I 137 Discrimination/Software/Pariser: Problem: a software that, for example, examines a company's hiring practices and randomly picks out nine white persons could specify that this company is not interested in hiring persons of color and filter them out from the outset. (1) This problem is called "over-adjustment" among programmers. I 139 Over-adjustment/Pariser: becomes a central and irreducible problem of the filter bubble, because over-adjustment and stereotyping are synonymous here. I 140 Such stereotypes can cause your creditworthiness to be downgraded because your friends do not pay their debts on time. 1. Dalton Conley, Elsewhere, U. S. A.: How We Got from the Company Man, Family Dinners, and the Affluent Society to the Home Office, BlackBerry Moms, and Economic Anxiety, New York: Pantheon, 2008, S. 164. |
Pariser I Eli Pariser The Filter Bubble: How the New Personalized Web Is Changing What We Read and How We Think London 2012 |
| Discrimination | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 36 Attitudes/psychological theories: Contemporary social psychologists tend to conceptualize attitudes as evaluative dispositions (e.g., Eagly and Chaiken, 1993)(1), and this conceptualization has driven, and continues to drive, the way in which attitudes are measured. >Attitudes and Behavior/psychological theories. Problem: verbally expressed attitudes may not be an accurate representation of people’s genuine feelings. The recommended solution is to try to measure implicit attitudes. Unlike explicit attitudes, such as those that individuals are aware of consciously and that are assessed by asking individuals to express their attitudes overtly in a questionnaire, implicit attitudes are assumed to be activated automatically in response to an attitude object and to guide behaviour unless overridden by controlled processes. In other words, implicit attitudes exist outside of conscious awareness or outside of conscious control. >Self-description, >Behavior, >Attitudes. Solution: Indirect measures such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998)(2) and evaluative priming (Fazio et al., 1995)(3) rely on response times to measure evaluative biases in relation to different attitude objects. These measures rest on the idea that exposure to a concept or stimulus (e.g., a picture of members of your own racial group) activates concepts in memory (e.g., a feeling that members of my group are generally positive), and then facilitates a positive response to related concepts (e.g., a positive word such as ‘good’) while simultaneously inhibiting responses to unrelated concepts (e.g., a negative word such as ‘bad’). >Method, >Experiments. Haslam I 37 (…) the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes raises interesting questions about the relationship between these constructs. Are implicit and explicit attitudes tapping distinct concepts such that people can hold opposing implicit and explicit attitudes towards the same attitude object (e.g., as suggested by Devine, 1989)(4)? Or do implicit and explicit attitudes reflect a single underlying evaluation, such that the only difference between them is the extent to which they are affected by conscious processes (e.g., Fazio, 2001)(5)? (…) reviews of the relations between implicit and explicit attitudes have typically found only modest correlations (e.g., r = .24; Hoffman et al., 2005)(6). However, there is considerable variability in the strength of this relationship (with some rs > .40 and others < .10) suggesting that additional factors, such as the desire to present the self positively and the strength of one’s attitudes, are important (Nosek, 2005)(7). Expression of attitudes: “Verbal expressions of liking are subject to social desirability biases … , physiological reactions may reflect arousal or other reactions instead of evaluation … , and response latencies may be indicative not of personal attitudes but of cultural stereotypes.” (Ajzen and Gilbert Cote 2008(8): p. 289) >Culture, >Cultural differences, >Stereotypes. Haslam I 38 (…) other research points to the importance of attitude accessibility (i.e., the extent to which an attitude is frequently invoked or expressed; Fazio, 1990)(9) and social identity (i.e., the extent to which an attitude is associated with a salient group membership; Terry and Hogg, 1996)(10). Measuring attitudes: (…) there is now widespread use of tasks, such as the IAT (see above) , to measure implicit attitudes. However, just as Wicker (1969) did in his review of the literature on explicit attitudes, it is important to ask whether implicit attitudes actually predict behaviour and, if they do, do they predict it any better than explicit attitudes? See the review by Greenwald et al. (2009)(11). 1. Eagly, A.H. and Chaiken, S. (1993) The Psychology of Attitudes. Belmont, CA: Thomson. 2. Greenwald, A.G., McGhee, D.E. and Schwartz, J.L.K. (1998) ‘Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74: 1464–80. 3. Fazio, R.H., Jackson, J.R., Dunton, B.C. and Williams, C.J. (1995) ‘Variability in automatic activation as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: A bona fide pipeline’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69: 1013–27. 4. Devine, P.G. (1989) ‘Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63: 754–65. 5. Fazio, R.H. (2001) ‘On the automatic activation of associated evaluations: An overview’, Cognition and Emotion, 15: 115–41. 6. Hofmann, W., Gawronski, B., Gschwendner, T., Le, H. and Schmitt, M. (2005) ‘A meta-analysis on the correlation between the Implicit Association Test and explicit self-report measures’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31: 1369–85. 7. Nosek, B.A. (2005) ‘Moderators of the relationship between implicit and explicit evaluation’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134: 565–84. 8. Ajzen, I. and Gilbert Cote, N. (2008) ‘Attitudes and the prediction of behaviour’, in W.D. Crano and R. Prislin (eds), Attitudes and Attitude Change. London: Psychology Press. pp. 289–311. 9. Fazio, R.H. (1990) ‘Multiple processes by which attitudes guide behaviour: The MODE model as an integrative framework’, in M.P. Zanna (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 23. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. pp. 75–109. 10. Terry, D.J. and Hogg, M.A. (1996) ‘Group norms and the attitude–behaviour relationship: A role for group identification’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22: 776–93. 11. Greenwald, A.G., Poehlman, A.T., Uhlmann, E.L. and Banaji, M.R. (2009) ‘Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-analysis of predictive validity’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97: 17–41. Joanne R. Smith and Deborah J. Terry, “Attitudes and Behavior. Revisiting LaPiere’s hospitality study”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications Haslam I 154 Prejudice/discrimination/Tradition/psychological theories: Prior to the publication of the Boys’ Camp studies (>Robbers Cave Experiment/Sherif, >Robbers Cave Experiment/psychological theories, >Social Groups/Sherif, >Group Behavior/Sherif), Sherif and Sherif 1969(1)), psychologists had typically explained stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination in terms either of some form of biological factor, individual psychological (decontextualized) characteristic, or intragroup property (see Sherif and Sherif, 1969(1), for a review). Moreover, this pursuit continued even after the publication of these studies (e.g., Hamilton and Gifford, 1976(2); Sibley and Duckitt, 2008(3)). Haslam I SherifVsTradition: the Boys’ Camp studies (>Group behavior/Sherif) demonstrated unequivocally the presence and importance of social-psychological variables that exist only at the conceptual level of the group. Haslam I 153 Sherif and Sherif(1969)(1): Groups: have a material reality including roles and status relationships Relationships: will vary dynamically with the nature of intragroup members identifying with the group. Groups: have a psychological validity, with members identifying with the group Intergroup attitudes: are psychological meaningful outcomes of the nature of intergroup relations. >Competition/Sherif. 1. Sherif, M. and Sherif, C.W. (1969) Social Psychology. New York: Harper & Row. 2. Hamilton, D.L. and Gifford, R.K. (1976) ‘Illusory correlation in interpersonal perception: A cognitive basis of stereotypic judgments’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 12: 392–407. 3. Sibley, C.G. and Duckitt, J. (2008) ‘Personality and prejudice: A meta-analysis and theoretical review’, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12: 248–79. Michael W. Platow and John A. Hunter, „ Intergroup Relations and Conflicts. Revisiting Sherif’s Boys’ Camp studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Discrimination | Rawls | I 331 Discrimination/Sexual Practices/Rawls: when we say that certain sexual relations are degrading and embarrassing and should be banned on this basis, even if only for the benefit of individuals, regardless of their actual desires, it is often because the principles of justice do not apply here. Instead, we fall back here on terms that are used in connection with excellence. >Perfectionism/Rawls. We are probably influenced by subliminal aesthetic preferences and personal feelings of ownership. Individuals, class and group differences are often sharp and irreconcilable. Solution/Rawls: Instead of relying on uncertain perfectionist criteria, we should rely on the principles of justice, which have a better defined structure(1)(2)(3). RawlsVsPerfectionism: here again it is shown that perfectionism is not a suitable basis for social justice. >Perfectionism. 1. See Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London, 1965). 2. See also L. A. Hart Law, Liberty and Morality (Stanford, 1963). 3. See also Brian Barry, Political Argument (London, 1965). |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Discrimination | Social Psychology | Haslam I 36 Attitudes/psychological theories: Contemporary social psychologists tend to conceptualize attitudes as evaluative dispositions (e.g., Eagly and Chaiken, 1993)(1), and this conceptualization has driven, and continues to drive, the way in which attitudes are measured. >Attitudes and Behavior/psychological theories. Problem: verbally expressed attitudes may not be an accurate representation of people’s genuine feelings. The recommended solution is to try to measure implicit attitudes. Unlike explicit attitudes, such as those that individuals are aware of consciously and that are assessed by asking individuals to express their attitudes overtly in a questionnaire, implicit attitudes are assumed to be activated automatically in response to an attitude object and to guide behaviour unless overridden by controlled processes. In other words, implicit attitudes exist outside of conscious awareness or outside of conscious control. Solution: Indirect measures such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998)(2) and evaluative priming (Fazio et al., 1995)(3) rely on response times to measure evaluative biases in relation to different attitude objects. These measures rest on the idea that exposure to a concept or stimulus (e.g., a picture of members of your own racial group) activates concepts in memory (e.g., a feeling that members of my group are generally positive), and then facilitates a positive response to related concepts (e.g., a positive word such as ‘good’) while simultaneously inhibiting responses to unrelated concepts (e.g., a negative word such as ‘bad’). Haslam I 37 (…) the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes raises interesting questions about the relationship between these constructs. Are implicit and explicit attitudes tapping distinct concepts such that people can hold opposing implicit and explicit attitudes towards the same attitude object (e.g., as suggested by Devine, 1989)(4)? Or do implicit and explicit attitudes reflect a single underlying evaluation, such that the only difference between them is the extent to which they are affected by conscious processes (e.g., Fazio, 2001)(5)? (…) reviews of the relations between implicit and explicit attitudes have typically found only modest correlations (e.g., r = .24; Hoffman et al., 2005)(6). However, there is considerable variability in the strength of this relationship (with some rs > .40 and others < .10) suggesting that additional factors, such as the desire to present the self positively and the strength of one’s attitudes, are important (Nosek, 2005)(7). Expression of attitudes: “Verbal expressions of liking are subject to social desirability biases … , physiological reactions may reflect arousal or other reactions instead of evaluation … , and response latencies may be indicative not of personal attitudes but of cultural stereotypes.” (Ajzen and Gilbert Cote 2008(8): p. 289) Haslam I 38 (…) other research points to the importance of attitude accessibility (i.e., the extent to which an attitude is frequently invoked or expressed; Fazio, 1990)(9) and social identity (i.e., the extent to which an attitude is associated with a salient group membership; Terry and Hogg, 1996)(10). Measuring attitudes: (…) there is now widespread use of tasks, such as the IAT (see above) , to measure implicit attitudes. However, just as Wicker (1969) did in his review of the literature on explicit attitudes, it is important to ask whether implicit attitudes actually predict behaviour and, if they do, do they predict it any better than explicit attitudes? See the review by Greenwald et al. (2009)(11). 1. Eagly, A.H. and Chaiken, S. (1993) The Psychology of Attitudes. Belmont, CA: Thomson. 2. Greenwald, A.G., McGhee, D.E. and Schwartz, J.L.K. (1998) ‘Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74: 1464–80. 3. Fazio, R.H., Jackson, J.R., Dunton, B.C. and Williams, C.J. (1995) ‘Variability in automatic activation as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: A bona fide pipeline’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69: 1013–27. 4. Devine, P.G. (1989) ‘Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63: 754–65. 5. Fazio, R.H. (2001) ‘On the automatic activation of associated evaluations: An overview’, Cognition and Emotion, 15: 115–41. 6. Hofmann, W., Gawronski, B., Gschwendner, T., Le, H. and Schmitt, M. (2005) ‘A meta-analysis on the correlation between the Implicit Association Test and explicit self-report measures’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31: 1369–85. 7. Nosek, B.A. (2005) ‘Moderators of the relationship between implicit and explicit evaluation’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134: 565–84. 8. Ajzen, I. and Gilbert Cote, N. (2008) ‘Attitudes and the prediction of behaviour’, in W.D. Crano and R. Prislin (eds), Attitudes and Attitude Change. London: Psychology Press. pp. 289–311. 9. Fazio, R.H. (1990) ‘Multiple processes by which attitudes guide behaviour: The MODE model as an integrative framework’, in M.P. Zanna (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 23. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. pp. 75–109. 10. Terry, D.J. and Hogg, M.A. (1996) ‘Group norms and the attitude–behaviour relationship: A role for group identification’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22: 776–93. 11. Greenwald, A.G., Poehlman, A.T., Uhlmann, E.L. and Banaji, M.R. (2009) ‘Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-analysis of predictive validity’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97: 17–41. Joanne R. Smith and Deborah J. Terry, “Attitudes and Behavior. Revisiting LaPiere’s hospitality study”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications Parisi I 132 Employment discrimination/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: (...) disparate treatment jurisprudence treats stereotypes as consciously held beliefs, suggesting that an honest employer explaining a discriminatory decision would include the biased motive among its reasons for the decision. However, discriminatory employment decisions are often driven by implicit biases (Rooth, 2010(1); Rudman and Glick, 2001(2)). The unconscious nature of these biases renders them invisible to the biased employer, allowing it to honestly maintain that a discriminatory hiring Parisi I 133 decision was based entirely on legitimate factors, thereby shielding the employer from liability. Evidence from the field and the laboratory supports the notion that implicit biases influence organizational decisions. For example, in one study job applicants with African-American names were less likely than those with white names to receive job interviews (Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir, 2004)(3). Equal treatment: Successful women working in traditionally male domains (e.g. aircraft company executive) were penalized relative to men in the same position (Heilman et al., 2004)(4). 1. Rooth, D.-O. (2010). "Automatic Associations and Discrimination in Hiring: Real World Evidence." Labour Economics 17(3): 523-534. doi:10.1016/j.1abeco.2009.04.005. 2. Rudman, L. A. and P. Glick (2001). "Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and Backlash Toward Agentic Women.“ Journal of Social Issues 57(4): 743-762. 3. Bertrand, M., S. Mullainathan, and E. Shafir (2004). "A Behavioral-Economics View of Poverty." American Economic Review 94(2): 419-423. 4. Heilman, M. E., A. S. Wallen, D. Fuchs, and M. M. Tamkins (2004). "Penalties for Success: Reactions to Women Who Succeed at Male Gender-Typed Tasks." Journal of Applied Psychology 89(3): 416-427. doi:10.103 7/0021-9010.89.3.416. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Discrimination | Utilitarianism | Gaus I 224 Discrimination/Utilitarianism/Lamont: While many utilitarians claim that economic or legal discrimination against ethnic minorities will not maximize overall utility, they do not provide the evidence required to support their claims against the populist politicians advocating such policies. Partly, this is due to the complexity of the required evidence, but a further counterintuitive element of the theory is that the consequences, for overall welfare, of discriminatory practices include such contingencies as the size of the ethnic minority and whether the majority has racist beliefs and preferences. Few reasonable people, outside academia, are willing to embrace a theory according to which racist policies and institutions are morally right so long as the ethnic minority is small enough. So substantial stumbling blocks have been encountered in the utilitarian justification for expanding the government's role from improving the welfare of the poor to maximizing overall welfare. >Racism, >About utilitarianism. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Disjunction | Disjunction: linking two or more statements by an inclusive "or". The disjunction is only false when all disjuncts are false. Notation v. See also adjunction, alternation, conjunction, compound sentences. |
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| Disjunction | Fraassen | I 127 Contrast-class/Bromberger/Explanation/Fraassen: E.g. why (it is the case that) P in contrast to (other elements of) X? X: Contrast-Class:set of alternatives. P may belong to X or not - e.g. why this temperature instead of another? - ((s)> disjunctive predicates). E.g. Why is this person suffering from paresis - because previously Syphilis. Why from this syphilis patient: here there is no answer. Individual/Fraassen: is never explained - only qua event of a certain type. >Individual causation. VsContrast class: dos not exclude irrelevance. Still a problem: asymmetry: e.g. length of the shadow. >Asymmetry. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Disjunction | Putnam | III 125 Disjunction/definition/science/Putnam: e.g. different color combinations can produce the same perceived color. Any non-disjunctive predicate can be converted into a disjunctive predicate through conversion (by switching the current basic concepts terms in each case, and vice versa). Therefore disjunctivity is not a refutation that no >universal exists. --- V 122 Disjunction/property/Putnam: the disjunction of properties is itself a third property: neither A nor B is a sensation state, but only their disjunction. >Properties/Putnam. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Disjunction | Quine | V 113 Alternation is implied by each of its components - (s) e.g. Monday = Monday or Tuesday. XI 62 Disjunction/Intuitionism/Brouwer/Lauener: a disjunction cannot be claimed if you do not know which of the disjuncts is true. XI 145 Elimination of reference: we could transform all quantifications into conjunctions and disjunctions, so that no recognizable referential apparatus remains. >Reference. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Dispositions | Goodman | II 58f Disposition/Goodman: I suspect that dispositions are less problematic than subjunctive conditionals, which sounds weird, given that both can be completely transformed into one another. Vs: there can easily be given circumstances (for example, lack of oxygen) under which the disposition statement is true and the subjunctive conditional (counterfactual conditional) is wrong. One would have to translate more carefully: If the condition had been favorable ... The key point is that the disposition statement is weaker.> Circumstances. II 61 Hidden Variable/Goodman: it is misleading to regard the problem of disposition as the one of explanation of hidden properties. I do not want to say that there is some object like the property burnable or the property of "burning". There are just predicates that produce relations. II 65 Essential features/nature/Goodman: it does not matter to which degree a property is essential, but how it relates to the manifest property. The problem of disposition is in the definition of this type of connection. II 69 When you come to the conclusion that the occurrence of a specific spectrum is a good indication for the flexibility, then you can define the predicate "flexible - under force or under spectroscopic examination" and its opposite (not flexible). |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Dispositions | Lewis | V 223 Disposition: something that plays a causal role - not a cause in itself - e.g. possession of antibodies does not cause - but the immunity - immunity = Disposition. V 224 E.g. another patient has anti-bodies to the formation of anti-bodies - then two properties - disjunction: "one or the other" - Lewis pro - but these existential properties as the basis of the disposition are not causal - real event: the possession of anti-bodies - immunity: no event, therefore not a causal explanation. >Causal role. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Dispositions | Quine | I 72 Disposition: stimulus is not a single event here, but a universal one. They are not two similar ones, but the repetition of the same. I 386f Disposition expressions: is an assumptions from detailed structure. Colors: "red" is actually also a disposition expression. These are rreducible general terms. I 387 Praphraseable only through unreal conditional clauses. V 20f Disposition/Quine: Problem: you can define the conditions so narrowly that every event is unprecedented. Stich: then every action is a congenital disposition - absurd - Quine: then there is no difference between the disposition, behaving this way and the fact of behavior. V 23 Definition Disposition: is the property of the object, by virtue of which the circumstances cause c to do a. Problem: the "virtue" is inexplicable. V 24 You need a strong link between the dispositions (e.g. water solubility) and its update (e.g. the dissolving when in water). V 25 Ryle: wants to assume disposition as a basic concept. Other authorsVs: Counterfactual conditional is used for explanation. >Counterfactual Conditional/Quine. V 26 Dispositions/Quine: are a physical state (micro structure) or a mechanism, e.g. intelligence. V 28 Problem: dependence on ceteris paribus sentences: means an elimination of disturbances. V 30 Quine takes the nerve path itself to be a disposition. V 40 Solution for ceteris-paribus/disturbance: ask what pairs of stimuli the person finds most similar. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Dispositions | Sellars | I XXXIII Disposition/explanation/appearance/Sellars: Sellars goes one step further than Ryle by asking how one can explain the behavioral dispositions themselves. Therefore he invents the example of "Rylean ancestors" with an elementary language use for perceptions. Cf. >Rylean ancestors, >Perception, >Language use, >World/Thinking. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Disruption | Schumpeter | Sobel I 13 Disruption/Creative destruction/Schumpeter/Sobel/Clemens: ((s) Schumpeter does not use the term disruption) „The fundamental new impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates … that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.“(1) Creative destruction*/Schumpeter/Sobel/Clemens: In Schumpeter’s words it is the creation of a new combination of resources. We also think of it as progress—something that makes the future better than the past: like the invention of the time-saving clothes dryer, microwave oven, or the rapid transportation afforded by the airplane. What we do not always remember is that it is destructive in that the old way of doing things often dies off as a result. Perhaps the most well-known contribution of Joseph Schumpeter is his discussion of this evolutionary process and the term “creative destruction” that he used to describe it in his 1942 book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (CSD)(1)*. (…) examples of Schumpeter’s process of creative destruction: Perhaps the most frequently used is the case of the automobile replacing the horse and buggy. Sobel I 14 Creative destruction/Schumpeter: „The essential point to grasp is that in dealing With capitalism we are dealing With an evolutionary process ... Capitalism, then, is by nature a form or method of economic change and not only never is but never can be stationary ... The fundamental new impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers' goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates ... the same process of industrial mutation ... that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the Old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in ... Every Piece of business strategy acquires its true significance only against the background of that process and within the situation created by it.“ (CSD: 82—84)(1) Sobel I 15 Sobel/Clemens: Schumpeter himself was much more concerned with the market system as a process than any specific outcome it may generate at a point in time -and to him, this process is "never stationary" but is continuously ongoing - perennial. Creative destruction is indeed central to Schumpeter's theory of economic development -how market-based societies progress though time. In his 1934 book, The Theory of Economic Development (TED)(2), he discussed the different types of changes he considered part of this process of creative destruction: This concept covers the following five cases: (1) The introduction of a new good - that is one with which consumers are not yet familiar - or of a new quality of a good. (2) The introduction of a new method of production, that is one not yet tested by experience in the branch of manufacture concerned, which need by no means be founded upon a discovery cientifically new, and can also exist in a new way of handling a commodity commercially. (3) The opening of a new market, that is a market into which the particular branch of manufacture of the country in question has not previously entered, whether or not this market has existed before. (4) The conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials or half-manufactured goods, again irrespective of whether this source already exists or whether it has first to be created. (5) The carrying out of the new organization of any industry, like the creation of a monopoly position (for example through trustification) or the breaking up of a monopoly position. (TED: 66)(2) Obviously, Schumpeter's view of this process included not just one new good (the automobile) replacing an old one (horse and buggy), but also included changes to production processes (like the assembly line or franchising), as well as the opening of new sources of supply or new markets. >Creative destruction/Kirzner. * The term "creative destruction", while sometimes attributed to Schumpeter, was actually first used by a German economist and sociologist named Werner Sombart, in his 1913 book, War and Capitalism. Nonetheless, Schumpeter is the one who popularized the term and brought it to the forefront of economic theory in his writings about capitalism as an evolutionary process. 1. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy [CSD]. Harper & Brothers. pp.82-84. 2. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1934). The Theory of Economic Development [TED]. Harvard University Press. |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Sobel I Russell S. Sobel Jason Clemens The Essential Joseph Schumpeter Vancouver 2020 |
| Distinctions | Minsky | I 105 Distinctions/word meaning/adverbs/adjectives/learning/development/Artificial Intelligence/Minsky: E.g. More colorful. More loud. More swift. More valuable. More complicated. Instead of assuming that our children come to crystallize a single concept of quantity, we must try to discover how our children accumulate and classify their many methods for comparing things. Problem: (…) what prevents the child from inventing senseless concepts such as being Green and Tall and having recently been touched? No child has the time to generate and test all possible combinations to find which ones are sensible. Life is too short to do that many bad experiments! Solution: (…) always try to combine related agents first. [Software agents may be named like this]: Tall, Thin, Short, and Wide - [they] are all closely related, because they are all concerned with making comparisons between spatial qualities. In fact, they probably involve agencies that are close to one another in the brain and share so many agents in common that they'll naturally seem similar. ((s) For contemporary research cf. >Brain/Deacon, (T. Deacon: The symbolic Species, 1997). >Information/Minsky. I 121 Essential Information/distinctions/differences/environment/Artificial Intelligence/Minsky: Should we learn to exploit all the information we can get? No! There are good reasons not to notice too much, for every seemingly essential fact can generate a universe of useless, accidental, and even misleading facts. Most differences are redundant. Most of the rest are accidents. But how can we judge which facts are useful? On what basis can we decide which features are essential and which are merely accidents? Such questions can't be answered as they stand. They make no sense apart from how we want to use their answers. There is no single secret, magic trick to learning; we simply have to learn a large society of different ways to learn! |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Distinctiveness | Group Psychology | Haslam I 176 Distinctiveness/group psychology/VsTajfel: tests of the social identity explanation of minimal ingroup bias (>Minimal groups/psychological theories; >Minimal groups/Tajfel, >Social Identity Theory/Tajfel) became somewhat side-tracked by the self-esteem hypothesis. One consequence of this was that researchers neglected the role of group distinctiveness that was central to Tajfel’s original explanation. In short, gaining positivity was emphasized at the expense of gaining distinctiveness. Moreover, the very question of what is distinctive about the ingroup (in contrast to the outgroup) has not been discussed. Spears/Otten: To address this, in some of our own research we have therefore distinguished ‘reactive distinctiveness’ motivated by an established outgroup that is explicitly similar to the ingroup, from a ‘creative distinctiveness’ process relevant to unknown or minimal groups (Spears et al., 2002(1), 2009(2)). Haslam I 177 There is now evidence that one factor that contributes to responses in the minimal group paradigm is the opportunity this provides for creating coherence and meaning through the creation of positive group distinctiveness (Spears et al., 2009)(2). Participants showed more ingroup bias (on matrices and evaluative ratings) when groups were minimal rather than meaningful. This supports the idea that discrimination in the minimal group paradigm is a way of achieving group distinctiveness that gives meaning to the participants’ assigned group identity. Moreover, the studies also provided evidence that social identification increased in the minimal conditions. 1. Spears, R., Jetten, J. and Scheepers, D. (2002) ‘Distinctiveness and the definition of collective self: A tripartite model’, in A. Tesser, J.V. Wood and D.A. Stapel (eds), Self and Motivation: Emerging Psychological Perspectives. Lexington, KY: APA. pp. 147–71. 2. Spears, R., Jetten, J., Scheepers, D. and Cihangir, S. (2009) ‘Creative distinctiveness: Explaining in-group bias in minimal groups’, in S. Otten, T. Kessler and K. Sassenberg (eds), Intergroup Relations: The Role of Motivation and Emotion; A Festschrift in Honor of Amélie Mummendey. New York: Psychology Press. pp. 23–40. Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Distribution | Leontief | Kurz I 12 Value/distribution/Leontief/Kurz: The difficulty with this approach (Supply/Leontief) is that the magnitudes of value added per unit of output in the different industries cannot generally be determined prior to, and independently of, the system of prices. In this conceptualization the constraint binding changes in the distributive variables shaped by the system of production in use, and the dependence of relative prices on income distribution - facts stressed by Leontief in his 1928 paper(1) - are removed from the scene. >Supply/Leontief. Value and distribution were already set aside as part and parcel of the analytical problem at hand in Leontief’s seminal 1936 paper(2) on ‘Quantitative input–output relations in the economic system of the United States’ (Leontief, 1936*). Leontief introduced his study in the following terms: ‘The statistical study presented in the following pages may be best defined as an attempt to construct, on the basis of the available statistical materials, a Tableau Economique of the United States for the year 1919’ (Leontief, 1936*, p. 105)(2). Giving his study the name of Tableau Economique is indeed appropriate. As is well known, François Quesnay’s original Tableau contains a summary account of national production, distribution and consumption during a given year, in the mid eighteenth century, for France. Most importantly for our purpose, it takes the distribution of the surplus product, or produit net, and the corresponding prices to be given and known. >F. Quesnay. Quesnay/Leontief: In his 1936 paper(2), Leontief follows Quesnay closely in that he also takes distribution and prices to be given and reflected in the available national accounting system. He is actually forced to do so, because there is no statistical description of the production process of the economy during a year in purely material terms. 1. Leontief, W. (1928) Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 60, pp. 577–623. 2. Leontief, W. (1936) Quantitative input and output relations in the economic systems of the United States, Review of Economics and Statistics, 18, pp. 105–125. Heinz D. Kurz and Neri Salvadori 2015. „Input–output analysis from a wider perspective. A comparison of the early works of Leontief and Sraffa“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Leontief I Wassily Wassilyevich Leontief Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 60, pp. 577–623. 1928 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Distribution | Lyons | I 72 Def Distribution/Linguistics/Lyons: each linguistic unit has a characteristic distribution, namely the set of contexts in which it can stand. >Context. Distribution equivalent: two expressions can be in the same context. Correspondingly distribution-complementary or distribution-overlapping. If two units are at least partially distribution equivalent, they cannot contrast with each other. I 145 Distribution/Grammar/Lyons: We can take distribution as a starting point for a grammatical description: expressions have meaning when they are used in an appropriate context. >Expressions/Lyons, >Grammar, >Meaning. I 147 Distribution analysis/grammar/Lyons: a list would not be the most direct description of a text: in a sufficiently large language sample there will be a considerable overlap in the distribution of different words. >Lists. Distribution classes: Classes of words that can be used for each other in a sentence. Example "I drink beer": liquor, milk, water... and so forth. >Word classes, cf. >P. Gärdenfors. General/formal: e.g. we assume a material corpus of 17 "sentences": ab,ar,,pr,qab,dpb,aca,pca,pcp,qar,daca,dacp,dacqa,dacdp,acqp,acdp. Letters: stand here for words. I 148 Problem: we still have no distinction between "grammatically correct" and "meaningful" (useful). >Meaningful/meaningless, >Acceptability/Lyons. In our example, a and p have certain contexts in common (namely -r,pc-, dac-), b and r (a-,qa) and d and q (dac-a,-aca, ac-p) c: is unique in its distribution (a-a,p-c,p-p,qa-a,da-a,da-p), because no other word can be found in the same context as c. X: we now merge a and p in the class CX and insert this class name everywhere where either a or p occur. Sentences that differ only in that o is where the other sentence has a are thus grouped into a class. ((s) "disjunctive"): Xb,Xr,(ar,pr), qXb,dXb,XcX, (aca, pca, pcp), qXr, qXcX,dXcX (daca,dacp), dXcqX,dXcdX,qXcdX,XcdX,XcqX,XcdX,XcdX. Y: we set Y for b and r, Z: for d and q. Then we get 1. XY, (Xb,Xr) 2. ZXY (qXb, qXr, dXb) 3. XcX, 4. ZXcX (qXcX, dXcX) 5. ZXcZX (dXcqX, dXcdX, qXcdX) 6. XcZX (XcqX, XcdX). N.B.: with this we can capture the 17 sentences of our corpus through six structural formulas. (c is a one-membered class). They specify which consequences of word classes are acceptable. The consequences are linear. (see below). Grammatically correct: are sentences in our example, that result from these structure rules. This is only achieved by the fact that the sentences that occur are regarded as links in a superset of 48 sentences. (The number 48 is obtained by applying the syntagmatic length formulas to each of the six sentence types and adding the results). I 149 Generative/generative grammar/Lyons: the "grammar" in our example is generative in that it assigns a certain structural description to each sentence that appears in the "sample", for example pr is a sentence with the structure XY, pcda is a sentence with the structure XcZY, etc. >Generative Grammar. Grammar/Lyons: as it is understood here, it is nothing else than the description of the sentences of a language as combinations of words and word groups due to their affiliation to distribution classes. It is a kind of "algebra" in which the variables are the word classes and the constants or the values assumed by the variables in certain sentences are the individual words. >Grammar, cf. >Syntax. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Distribution | Robinson | Harcourt I 169 Value theory/distribution theory/Robinson/Harcourt: Some writers, for example, Bhaduri [1969](1), Joan Robinson [1965a](2), also [1965b](3), pp. 173-81, and Nell [1967b](4); look to Marx's theory of exploitation brought up to date in the guise of relative bargaining strengths, to explain the distribution of income, treated as a surplus, between profit-receivers and wage-earners. >Value theory/Marx. Competition: Competition's role, then, is to ensure the equality of profit rates in all activities and this, together with the technical coefficients of production, determine relative prices, i.e. the classical dichotomy between the theory of distribution and the theory of value is restored. In this way capital goods in their role of aids to labour - a role common to all industrial societies, capitalist or socialist – Harcourt I 170 can be separated from capital in its role of investible funds, belonging to those who own - have property in - the means of production and who obtain a share in the distribution of the net product or surplus because of their property rights. The trouble with jelly (>Terminology/Harcourt) is that it was meant to serve both purposes (it is after all the ideal medium by which the two concepts may be merged into one) and the theory of production relations and value was meant to be independent of the institutions of society; that is, relations between men were treated as irrelevant for an explanation of distribution. As J. B. Clark [1889](5), pp. 312-13, says: „It [the principle of differential gain] identifies production with distribution and shows that what a social class gets is, under the natural law, what it contributes to the general output of industry. Completely stated the principle of differential gain affords a theory of Economic Statics.“ Robinson: And as Joan Robinson [1970b](6) puts it, Walras' short-run stocks of physical inputs have been boiled down into a homogeneous, malleable commodity (leets) which can both produce output and purchase extra capital goods (through saving being investment) at an unchanged price of one to one. Rate of return: The owners of the capital goods receive a rate of return - leets over leets - equal to the marginal product of the existing (fullyemployed and correctly formed) stocks at any moment of time. Marx: It wasMarx's insight that the separation of value from institutions was invalid even in a world of pure logic, and the significance of the distinction for the case of more than one capital good has been emphasized by the modern critics of the neoclassical parables. Here the again parables: Harcourt I 122 (1) an association between lower rates of profits and higher values of capital per man employed; (2) an association between lower rates of profits and higher capital-output ratios; (3) an association between lower rates of profits and (through investment in more 'mechanized' or 'round-about' methods of production) higher sustainable steady states of consumption per head (up to a maximum); (4) that, in competitive conditions, the distribution of income between profit-receivers and wage-earners can be explained by a knowledge of marginal products and factor supplies. Neo-NeoclassicalsVs: >Distribution theory/Neo-neoclassicals, >Value theory/Neo-neoclassicals. 1. Bhaduri, A. [1969] 'On the Significance of Recent Controversies on Capital Theory: A Marxian View', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 532-9. 2. Robinson, Joan [1965a] 'Piero Sraffa and the Rate of Exploitation', New Left Review, pp. 28-34. 3. Robinson, Joan [1965b] Collected Economic Papers, Vol. Ill (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 4. Nell, E. J. [1967b] 'Theories of Growth and Theories of Value', Economic Development and Cultural Change, xvi, pp. 15-26. 5. Clark, J. B. [1889] 'The Possibility of a Scientific Law of Wages', Publication of the American Economic Association, iv, pp. 39-63. 6. Robinson, Joan [1970b] 'Review of C. E. Ferguson, The Neoclassical Theory of Production and Distribution, 1969', Economic Journal, LXXX, pp. 336-9. |
EconRobin I James A. Robinson James A. Acemoglu Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 Robinson I Jan Robinson An Essay on Marxian Economics London 1947 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Distribution Theory | Neo-Neoclassical Economics | Harcourt I 170 Distribution theory/Value theory/Neo-neoclassicalsVsMarx/Harcourt: The neo-neoclassicals have produced a string of rebuttals ((s)to Joan Robinson’s remarks on Value theory). >Distribution/Value theory/Robinson. Rate of profit/demand: First, they argue that no one, these days, tries, or ever did try, to determine the rate of profits or other prices within the production system alone. After all, the neoclassical marginalist 'revolution' was concerned with first the prior, and then the equal, importance of the blade of scissors known as 'demand'. Measurement of capital: Secondly, they could refer to Bliss's arguments (…), and to the statements by Hahn and Matthews [1964](1) at the end of their survey of the theory of economic growth. Thus: „As far as pure theory is concerned the 'measurement of capital' is no problem at all because we never have to face it if we do not choose to. With our armchair omniscience we can take account of each machine separately. Moreover the measurement business has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of whether imputation theory is or is not valid. In an equilibrium of the whole system provided there is perfect competition, no learning by doing and no uncertainty, the neoclassical imputation results hold. Harcourt I 171 This should now be beyond dispute. It is also of little comfort to the empirically inclined.“ (p. 888.) „Returning once more to the question of the validity or otherwise of imputation theory there is a further, purely theoretical, point of some importance to be made. When an economy with many goods is considered, then we must also find the relative equilibrium prices of these goods. Whether these are determined a la Leontief-Samuelson-Sraffa or a la Walras, imputation is at once involved. If we abandon imputation entirely then the whole question of relative prices must be reconsidered afresh. Perhaps it ought to be, but recognition that this problem exists seems desirable“.(p. 889.) >Relative prices. Harcourt: (…) [the neo-neoclassicals] could refer to Samuelson's opening remarks in Samuelson [1962](2), (…) and Solow's closing ones, Solow [1970](3). That is to say, they would dismiss an aggregative approach to a rigorous theory of distribution - and capital - (though not, necessarily, one to econometrics). They could next invoke Swan's appendix, Swan [1956](4), and Champernowne's original paper [1953-4](5). In the latter, when doubleswitching is allowed to occur, the production function is multi-valued, i.e. the same q is associated with two or more values of k. Factors of production/factor price: Nevertheless, factors are paid their marginal products. Labour/capital/ Champernowne: However, 'the question of which (r, w) and hence what income-distribution between labour and capital is paid is left in this model for political forces to decide' (p. 130) - surely one of the most perceptive comments of the whole debate? (At the (double) switch points, one technique is coming in at one point, leaving at the other, as it were; which, then, is the relevant one to determine distribution?) Champernowne adds: 'It is interesting to speculate whether more complex situations retaining this feature are ever found in the real world.' Harcourt I 172 To the neo-neoclassical answer that the existence or not of an aggregate production function or of a well-behaved demand curve for capital at economy (or industry level) has nothing to do with marginal productivity relations, some critics (Kaldor [1966](6), Nell [1967b](7)) might reply: Your logic may be impeccable but your results are, nevertheless, irrelevant for the world as we know it, and especially for an explanation of distribution, i.e. they would reject maximizing behaviour as a fundamental postulate of economic analysis (see Solow [1968](8) also). This raises a puzzle in the analysis of choice of technique where most writers, including Sraffa, explicitly assume maximizing behaviour. Kaldor: Kaldor, of course, does not; his analysis is based upon the implications of businessmen following rules of thumb such as the pay-off period criterion. Brown: Brown [1966](9), on the other hand, just because he wishes to retain maximizing behaviour, has suggested neoclassical exploitation as a compromise. Moreover, in his later papers [1968(10),1969(11)], while he accepts the logic of the neo-Keynesian critics, as an econometrician, he, possibly rightly and certainly understandably, tries to find common ground between linear models and neoclassical ones. He works out the conditions which ensure capital-intensity uniqueness (CIU) at an aggregate level in two two-sector models, one linear, the other neoclassical, i.e. one in which each sector has a well-behaved production function. >Capital/Brown. 1. Hahn, F. H. and Matthews, R. C. O. [1964] 'The Theory of Economic Growth: A Survey', Economic Journal, LXXIV, pp. 779-902. 2. Samuelson, P.A. [1962] 'Parable and Realism in Capital Theory: The Surrogate Production Function', Review of Economic Studies, xxix, pp. 193-206. 3. Solow, R M. [1970] 'On the Rate of Return: Reply to Pasinetti. Economic Journal, LXXX, pp.423-8. 4. Swan, T. W. [1956] 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation', Economic Record, xxxn, pp. 334-61. 5.Champernowne, D. G. [1953-4] 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital: A Comment', Review of Economic Studies, xxi, pp. 112-35 6. Kaldor, N. [1966] 'Marginal Productivity and the Macro-Economic Theories of Distribution', Review of Economic Studies, xxxm, pp. 309-19. 7. Nell, E. J. [1967b] 'Theories of Growth and Theories of Value', Economic Development and Cultural Change, xvi, pp. 15-26. 8. Solow, R. M. [1968] 'Distribution in the Long and Short Run', The Distribution of National Income, ed. by Jean Marchal and Bernard Ducros (London: Macmillan), pp. 449-75. 9. Brown, Murray [1966] 'A Measure of the Change in Relative Exploitation of Capital and Labor', Review of Economics and Statistics, XLvm, pp. 182-92. 10. Brown, Murray [1968] 'A Respecification of the Neoclassical Production Model in the Heterogeneous Capital Case', Discussion Paper No. 29, State University of New York at Buffalo. 11. Brown, Murray [1969] 'Substitution-Composition Effects, Capital Intensity Uniqueness and Growth', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 334-47. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Distribution Theory | Piketty | Bofinger I 39 Distribution theory/distribution/Piketty/Krämer: With the exception of the explanation of top managers' incomes, Piketty considers the neoclassical marginal productivity theory of distribution to be “useful” and “natural” when explaining wages and profits (Piketty 2014: 283 ff.)(1). VsNeoclassics/VsPiketty: However, this theory of distribution has some serious logical deficiencies and shortcomings that make it unsuitable as a theoretical explanation for the distribution of income and wealth (...) Marginal productivity/neoclassical: The neoclassical marginal productivity theory of distribution is used to explain both the micro and macro level. The microeconomic version of marginal productivity theory does not focus on income distribution, which is explained en passant, so to speak. Bofinger I 40 Factors of production/microeconomics: This is primarily about determining the demand for the individual factors of production on the respective factor markets. At the same time as the factor demand is determined, the individual factor prices (wages, interest on capital, basic rent) are also determined. The basic principle of factor price determination is identical for all factors of production. Using various assumptions - including in particular perfect competition and constant returns to scale - each factor of production in market equilibrium is remunerated according to the marginal product of the last unit still employed. In this model framework, the theory of price formation on a factor market is simultaneously a theory of income distribution. >Factors of production, >Factor market, >Production structure. Macroeconomics: The macroeconomic version of the marginal productivity theory of distribution transfers the laws obtained at the microeconomic level to the economy as a whole. The incomes of the factors of production also correspond to their respective factor prices at the macroeconomic level. If, as is generally the case, a Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed, the income produced is distributed completely among the factors of production involved. The macroeconomic wage rate (profit rate) is equated with the production elasticity of labor (capital). Variations in the wage rate or profit rate have no influence on the proportional distribution of income, as these trigger a corresponding compensating factor substitution. Elasticity: The income ratios change at most if the production elasticities are changed by non-neutral technical progress. >Elasticity. Bofinger I 41 Capital theory/VsPiketty: As has become clear in the context of the so-called capital theory controversy, however, the assumption of the existence of a macroeconomic production function and the specification of a defined “quantity of capital” independent of the prices of the various capital goods and thus of the profit rate prove to be untenable for certain logical reasons (cf. Harcourt 1972)(2)(3). >Capital/Piketty, >Cambridge Capital Controversy/Harcourt. Method: The problem here is that the prices of the individual, heterogeneous capital goods must be known in advance in order to be able to add them up to an overall economic capital stock. However, the prices of the individual capital goods cannot be determined without knowledge of the interest rate on capital (the profit rate) (cf. Kurz/Salvadori 1995)(4). >Heinz D. Kurz, >Neri Salvadori. As Piero Sraffa demonstrated as early as 1960(5), the prices of capital goods and the rate of profit must be determined simultaneously (Sraffa 2014)(5). >Piero Sraffa. Outside of a one-sector model, it is therefore not possible to aggregate the various capital goods into a single variable “capital”. Samuelson: Paul Samuelson and other neoclassicists also conceded this at the end of the long-standing dispute between the critics of neoclassical production and capital theory from Cambridge (England) and its defenders from Cambridge (USA), which Piketty, however, completely misunderstands. >Paul Samuelson. Bofinger I 42 Capital theory: Although the Cambridge-Cambridge controversy has clearly shown that the macroeconomic version of marginal productivity theory is based on a circular argument that calls its theoretical foundation into question, it is still the central building block for neoclassical distribution analysis, on which Piketty also builds. Market power: Another point of criticism of the distribution theory used by Piketty is that the standard approach of the marginal productivity theory of distribution leaves no room for market power, social factors of influence or the consideration of other distributional conflicts that constantly occur in reality. Some basics for Piketty: >Cambridge Capital Controversy, >Geoffrey C. Harcourt, >Capital reversing, >Capital/Joan Robinson, >Exploitation/Robinson, >Reswitching/Robinson, >Reswitching/Sraffa, >Reswitching/Economic Theories, >Neo-Keynesianism, >Neo-Neoclassical Theories. 1. Piketty, T. 2014. Das Kapital im 21. Jahrhundert. München: Beck. 2. Harcourt, G. (1972): Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital. Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press. 3. Piketty (2014: 305 ff.) is mistaken when he argues that the Cambridge controversy was essentially about the question of the constancy of the capital coefficient. Unfortunately, he is clearly not familiar with this important topic. 4. Kurz, H. D./Salvadori, N. (1995): Theory of Production: a Long-Period Analysis. Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press. 5. Sraffa, P. (2014 [1960]): Warenproduktion mittels Waren. Einleitung zu einer Kritik der ökonomischen Theorie. Marburg: Metropolis. Hagen Krämer. 2015. „Make no mistake, Thomas! Verteilungstheorie und Ungleichheitsdynamik bei Piketty“. In: Thomas Piketty und die Verteilungsfrage. Ed. Peter Bofinger, Gustav A. Horn, Kai D. Schmid und Till van Treeck. 2015. |
Piketty I Thomas Piketty Capital in the Twenty First Century Cambridge, MA 2014 Piketty II Thomas Piketty Capital and Ideology Cambridge, MA 2020 Piketty III Thomas Piketty The Economics of Inequality Cambridge, MA 2015 Bofinger II Peter Bofinger Monetary Policy: Goals, Institutions, Strategies, and Instruments Oxford 2001 |
| Distribution Theory | Robinson | Harcourt 18 Distribution theory/Robinson/Harcourt: The first puzzle is to find a unit in which capital, social or aggregate value capital, that is, may be measured as a number, Le. a unit, which is independent of distribution and relative prices, so that it may be inserted in a production function where along with labour, also suitably measured, it may explain the level of aggregate output. Furthermore, in a perfectly competitive economy in which there is perfect foresight (either in fact or for convenience of measurement, see Champernowne [1953-4])(1) and, (…) static expectations that are always realized, this unit must be such that the partial derivative of output with respect to 'capital' equals the reward to 'capital' and the corresponding one with respect to labour equals the real (product) wage of labour. >D. G. Champernowne. Marginal productivity: The unit would then provide the ingredients of a marginal productivity theory of distribution as well. If such a unit can be found, two birds may be killed with the one stone; for we may then analyse a system of production in which capital goods - produced means of production - are an aid to labour, a feature of any advanced industrial society Harcourt I 19 and, simultaneously, we may analyse distribution in a capitalist economy in which the institutions are such that property in value capital means that its owners share in the distribution of the national income by receiving profits on their invested capital, where both the amount of these profits and the rate of profits itself are related to the technical characteristics of the system of production. Factor price: Moreover, by making the pricing of the factors of production but one aspect of the general pricing-process of commodities, itself regarded as a reflection of the principles of rational choice under conditions of scarcity and so thought to be independent of sociological and institutional features, both the original neoclassicals and now their successors hoped to escape from uncomfortable questions thrown up by the Ricardian-Marxian scheme, for example, whether relative bargaining strengths or differing market structures could affect the distribution of income, see Dobb [1970](2). >Capital/Robinson. 1. Champernowne, D. G. [1953-4] 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital: A Comment', Review of Economic Studies, xxi, pp. 112-35 2. Dobb, Maurice [1970] 'The Sraffa System and Critique of the Neo-Classical Theory of Distribution', De Economist, 4, pp. 347-62. |
EconRobin I James A. Robinson James A. Acemoglu Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 Robinson I Jan Robinson An Essay on Marxian Economics London 1947 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Distributive Justice | Aristotle | Gaus I 313 Distributive Justice/Aristotle/Keyt/Miller: [Aristotle’s] theory of distributive justice consists in the combination of his justice-of-nature principle with the Platonic principle of proportional equality. By this theory a just constitution is one under which political power is distributed in proportion to worth, where worth is assessed according to the standard of nature - the standard of a polis with a completely natural social and political structure. Aristotle describes such a polis in Politics VII-VIII, and virtue, rather than wealth or freedom, turns out to be nature's standard (for details see Keyt, 1991a(1)). >Justice/Aristotle, >Nature/Aristotle, >Stasis/Aristotle, >Nomos/Aristotle. 1. Keyt, David (1991a) 'Aristotle's theory of distributive justice'. In David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, eds, A Companion to Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Distributive Justice | Climate Policy | Norgaard I 328 Distributive Justice/Emissions/Climate Policy: (…) a number of non‐philosophers made early contributions explicitly analyzing traditional theories of justice such as utilitarianism, Rawlsianism, and Kantianism and their applicability to mitigation policy (Solomon(1) and Ahuja 1991(2); Ghosh 1993(3); Paterson 1996(4)). >Justice, >I. Kant, >J. Rawls, >Utilitarianism. (…) the idea of equal per capita emissions rights has consistently been a focal point for advocates of just climate policy, who have often argued that it is a necessary response to engender cooperation from developing countries (Meyer 2000(5); Athanasiou and Baer 2002(6)) as well as a fair solution in its own right. Norgaard I 330 (…) most analysts who have studied the problem from an ethical perspective have concluded that equal per capita is a minimum standard of distributive justice, inasmuch as it ignores disproportionate historical emissions, even if one limits the period of ‘responsibility’ to (say) 1990, by which time knowledge of the risks of GHG emissions were widespread (Jamieson 2001(7); Singer 2002(8)). Yet it is also commonplace to simply state that ‘the financial transfers that would be associated with equal per capita allocations would be unacceptable to the wealthy countries’ (e.g. Ashton and Wang 2003(9); Posner and Sunstein 2008(10)), which is not an argument about justice, but rather about power. >Power, >Environmental policy. 1. Solomon, B. 1995. Global CO2 emissions trading: Early lessons from the U.S. Acid Rain Program. Climatic Change 30: 75–96. 2. Ahuja, D. R. 1991. International reductions in greenhouse‐gas emissions: An equitable and efficient approach. Global Environmental Change 1: 343–50. 3. Ghosh, P. 1993. Structuring the equity issue in climate change. Pp. 267–74 in A. N. Achanta (ed.), The Climate Change Agenda: An Indian Perspective. Tata Energy Research Institute, New Delhi. 4. Paterson, M. 1996. International justice and global warming. Pp. 181–201 in B. Holden (ed.), The Ethical Dimensions of Global Change. New York: St Martin's Press. 5. Meyer, A. 2000. Contraction and Convergence: The Global Solution to Climate Change. Totnes: Green Books. 6. Athanasiou, T., and Baer, P. 2002. Dead Heat: Global Justice and Global Warming. New York: Seven Stories Press. 7. Jamieson, D. 2001. Climate change and global environmental justice. Pp. 287–308 in C. A. Miller and P. N. Edwards (eds.), Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance. Cambridge, 8. Singer, P. 2002. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press. 9. Ashton, J., and Wang, X. 2003. Equity and climate: In principle and practice. Pp. 61–84 in J. E. Aldy, J. Ashton, R. Baron, et al. (eds.), Beyond Kyoto: Advancing the International Effort Against Climate Change. Washington, DC: Pew Center on Global Climate Change. 10. Posner, E. A., and Sunstein, C. R. 2008. Climate change justice. Georgetown Law Journal 96: 1565–612. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Diversity (Politics) | Hart | Gaus I 241 Diversity/Hart/D’Agostino: [judgment and interpretation may differ - Example]: A considers X superior to Y whereas B does not because he, A, does judge that some choice-relevant concept (e.g. 'is just') applies to X whereas, because of indeterminacy or vague ness, she, B, does not. (D’Agostino: A and B agree about 'core cases' for the application of the term but disagree about 'peripheral cases', which may, of course, still be important, ethico-politically.) Strong/weak reading/D’Agostino: weak: he must mean, on [a] weak reading, merely that there is some 'practical impossibility' associated with the reduction of those conceptual indeterminacies associated with evaluation and choice. >Diversity/Rawls. Hart: Still, there are also strong readings of this claim, of which H. L. A. Hart provided a well- known and influential example, in terms, specifically, of the 'open texture' of (specifically normative and evaluative) language. In particular, the sort of abstract and general terminology that unavoidably figures in the assessment of options always represents a compromise between two factors. a) On the one hand, such terminology must provide for the unsupervised co-ordination ofpeople' s attitudes and actions - both A and B forgo (b-ing because each understands, independently of the Gaus I 242 other, that (D-ing is unjust. b) On the other hand, such terminology must, as Hart put it, 'leave open, for later settlement by an informed [deliberative] choice, issues which can only be properly appreciated and settled when they arise in a concrete case' (1962(1): 127). Any choice-relevant general idea that is sensitive to these two demands will be sufficiently vague in its applications to specific cases to admit, at least 'at the margins' , of multiple interpretations consistent with previous usage. (D’Agostino: The moral particularism of such theorists as Jonathan Dancy, 1993(2), provides the basis for an analogous argument, as does the finitism which Barry Barnes, 1982(3), detects in the work of Mary Hesse and Thomas Kuhn.) >Diversity/D‘‘Agostino, >Pluralism/D’Agostino, >Pluralism/Political Philosophy. 1. Hart, H. L. A. (1962) The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon. 2. Dancy, Jonathan (1993) Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell. 3. Barnes, Barry (1982) T. S. Kuhn and Social Science. London: Macmillan. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Diversity (Politics) | Multiculturalism | Gaus I 251 Diversity/Multiculturalism/Kukathas: a) For some, multiculturalism requires moderate changes to social and political institutions to enable cultural minorities to preserve their languages and their distinctive customs or practices. b) For others, however, multiculturalism requires much greater social transformation to turn modern society into one in which racism has been eliminated and 'difference' is nurtured rather than repudiated, or simply tolerated. Unity/problems: But if multiculturalism is a way of embracing diversity, this still leaves open the question of how diversity is to be embraced. If a multicultural society is one in which different religions, cultures, languages, and peoples can coexist without some being subordinated to others, or to a single, dominant group, how can this be achieved, and what principles would describe such a society? This issue arises because even if there is diversity, there must surely be some kind of unity for a society to exist. The real question (...) is what does multiculturalism mean in practice? This question, however, was not addressed systematically until the 1990s when political theorists began to consider what might be the principled basis of a multicultural society. >Multiculturalism/Kymlicka, >Minority rights/Kymlicka, >Minority/Kymlicka, >Culture/Kymlicka. Gaus I 255 Diversity/Charles Taylor: Out of such desires, according to Taylor, grew a philosophical alternative to liberalism: the politics of difference. This view is sceptical about the pretensions of liberalism to offer neutral or difference-blind principles that are more than simply reflections of the standards of the dominant culture. >Multiculturalism/Taylor. Gaus I 256 A number of other theorists have developed arguments about how cultural diversity might be accommodated by giving greater recognition to 'difference' rather than extending the scope or range of liberal rights (Baumeister, 2000)(1). James Tully's Strange Multiplicity (1995)(2), for example, offers a reconstruction of modern constitutionalism that is able to accommodate a greater variety of cultural traditions, and adapt elements from some of them to enhance the quality of liberal constitutional arrangements. In many of these cases, defenders of the politics of difference present an approach to cultural diversity which not only criticizes liberal individualism but also advocates a greater emphasis on the extension of democratic processes to give greater scope to the participation of cultural minori- ties in the shaping and governing of the polity (see Young, 1990(3); 2000(4); Phillips, 1995(5); Devaux, 2000(6); Williams, 1998(7); Tully, 2003(8)). 1. Baumeister, Andrea T. (2000) Liberalism and the 'Politics of Difference Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 2. Tully, James (1995) Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Young, Iris Marion (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 4.Young, Iris Marion (2000) Democracy and Inclusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Phillips, Anne (1995) The Politics of Presence. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. Devaux, Monique (2000) Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 7. Williams, Melissa (1998) Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 8. Tully, James (2003) 'Ethical pluralism and classical liberalism'. In Richard Madsen and Tracy B. Strong, eds, The Many and the One: Religious and Secular Perspectives on Ethical Pluralism in the Modern World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 78—85. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Diversity (Politics) | Rawls | Gaus I 240 Pluralism/diversity/Rawls/D’Agostino: [in relation to diversity] there are, (...) a variety of pluralisms, of stances towards and arguments about the purported political relevance of diversity. We might believe, for instance, that, 'in the limit' , diversity of evaluations would be eliminated by the progressive correction of epistemic and/or motivational deficiencies, much as monism presupposes. We might nevertheless also believe that, given human finitude (Chemiak, 1986)(1), such a 'limit' is unapproachable (to any very great degree) without forms of corrective action that would themselves be manifestly indefensible, ethico-politically, and, hence, that it cannot be demanded, as monism does demand, that we actually aim at the elimination of such diversity. Rawls: This seems to have been John Rawls's view in the book Political Liberalism and he grounds such weak pluralism, as I will call it, in his analysis of the so-called 'burdens of judgment' (1993(2): ch. II, s. 2). These are, specifically, those 'hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) Gaus I 241 exercise of our powers of reason and judgement in the ordinary course of political life' , which make it improbable that 'conscientious persons with full powers of reason, even after free discussion, will all arrive at the same conclusion' (1993(2): 56, 58). Rawls himself characterizes this doctrine in terms of 'the practical impossibility of reaching reason- able and workable political agreement' (1993(2): 63), and says that it expresses 'a political conception [that] tries to avoid, so far as possible, disputed philosophical theses and to give an account that rests on plain facts open to all' (1993(2): 57, n. 10). >Pluralism/Political Philosophy. ((s) This is a weak version of pluralism; for the distinction of strong and weak pluralism. >Pluralism/D’Agostino.) 1) Rawls points out that '[e]ven where we fully agree about the kinds of considerations that are relevant [to assessment and choice], we may disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different Lover- allJ judgments' (1993(2): 56). Rawls himself of course treats this phenomenon in purely 'practical' terms: reduction of such diversity would require the deployment of morally impermissible tactics. D’AgostinoVsRawls: Some observations of Thomas Kuhn (1977(3): 330ff) provide the basis, however, for an argument in favour of precisely this kind of diversity. 2) Rawls points out that 'all our [choice-relevant] concepts are vague and subject to hard cases Land that this indeterminacy means that we must rely on judgement and interpretation... where reasonable persons may differ' (1993(2): 56). Example: This might mean, schematically, that A considers X superior to Y whereas B does not because he, A, does judge that some choice-relevant concept (e.g. 'is just') applies to X whereas, because of indeterminacy or vagueness, she, B, does not. (A and B agree about 'core cases' for the application of the term but disagree about 'peripheral cases', which may, of course, still be important, ethico-politically.) Cf. >Diversity/Hart. Gaus I 242 3) Rawls notes, finally, that 'any system of social institutions is limited in the values it can admit so that some selection must be made from the full range of moral and political values that might be realized' (1993(2): 57). Individuals/diversity/Ralws/D’Agostino: In Rawls's terminology, diversity in individuals' evaluations 'rests on plain facts open to all'. And, indeed, there may even, as Rawls himself believes, be versions of the diversity-endorsing doctrine of pluralism which manage to avoid 'disputed philosophical theses'. But there are also versions of pluralism which are more robust philosophically (than Rawls's weak pluralism), and which are argued for on quite different bases. >Pluralism/Berlin, >Diversity/Hart. 1. Cherniak, Christopher (1986): Minimal Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2. Rawls, John (1993): Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 3. Kuhn, Thomas (1977): The Essential Tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Division of Labour | Ricardo | Mause I 41 Division of Labour/Ricardo: Using the principle of comparative cost advantage, he justified the international division of labour and the advantages of free trade for all countries involved.(1) >Costs. 1. Ricardo, David, On the principles of political economy and taxation. London 1817. |
EconRic I David Ricardo On the principles of political economy and taxation Indianapolis 2004 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Division of Labour | Rothbard | Rothbard III 95 Division of labour/Rothbard: In describing the conditions that must obtain for interpersonal exchange to take place (such as reverse valuations), we implicitly assume[d] that it must be two different goods that are being exchanged. >Exchange/Rothbard. Trade/market/Rothbard: If exchangers must exchange two different goods, this implies that each party must have a different proportion of assets of goods in relation to his wants. He must have relatively specialized in the acquisition of different goods from those the other party produced. This specialization by each individual may have occurred for any one of three different reasons or any combination of the three: (a) differences in suitability and yield of the nature-given factors; (b) differences in given capital and durable consumers’ goods; and (c) differences in skill and in the desirability of different types of labor.(1) Production: These factors, in addition to the potential exchange-value and use-value of the goods, will determine the line of production that the actor will pursue. Rothbard III 96 Exchange/division of labour: Exchange, a productive process for both participants, implies specialization of production, or division of labor. production, or division of labor. The extent to which division of labor is carried on in a society depends on the extent of the market for the products. The latter determines the exchange-value that the producer will be able to obtain for his goods. Productivity/Praxeology/Rothbard: It is clear that, praxeologically, the very fact of exchange and the division of labor implies that it must be more productive for all concerned than isolated, autistic labor. Economic analysis alone, however, does not convey to us knowledge of the enormous increase in productivity that the division of labor brings to society. This is based on a further empirical insight, (…). >Praxeology/Rothbard, >Specialization/Rothbard. Rothbard III 98 With all-pervasive variation offering possibilities for specialization, and favorable conditions of exchange occurring even when one party is superior in both pursuits, great opportunities abound for widespread division of labor and extension of the market. As more and more people are linked together in the exchange network, the more “extended” is the market for each of the products, and the more will exchange-value predominate, as compared to direct use-value, in the decisions of the producer. >Society/Rothbard. Rothbard III 100 Productivity: suppose (…) that the division of labor were not productive, or that men had failed to recognize its productivity. In that case, there would be little or no opportunity for exchange, and each man would try to obtain his goods in autistic independence. The result would undoubtedly be a fierce struggle to gain possession of the scarce goods, since, in such a world, each man’s gain of useful goods would be some other man’s loss. It would be almost inevitable for such an autistic world to be strongly marked by violence and perpetual war. 1. Basically, class (b) is resolvable into differences in classes (a) and (c), which account for their production. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Division of Labour | Smith | Otteson I 29 Division of labour/Adam Smith/Otteson: After surveying the evidence that he could gather, Smith came to the conclusion that the primary factor in explaining Why some Places were increasing in wealth was the division of labor. What about natural resources? What about infrastructure? What about education? What about technology? Smith had considered these possibilities, but he discovered that they did not account for the differentials in wealth he was observing. >Geographical factors/Adam Smith, >Wealth/Adam Smith. Otteson I 30 Smith claims that dividing the labor required to complete a task enables a far greater production. Consider Smith's now-famous example of making Pins. Smith says that a pin-maker could, if he is a master at it, make no more than twenty complete pins in a day. A shop of ten such pin-makers could thus make 200 pins per day, if they each made one pin at a time from start to finish. If the various tasks involved in making pins are divided, however, with different people specializing on individual tasks "One man draws out the wire, another straightens it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head" (WN(1): 15), and so on - the overall production of pins increases dramatically. Smith argues that division oflabor will lead to specialization. Specialization, in turn, leads to increasing quantity of production because of three factors: first, "the increase of dexterity in every particular workman"; second, "the saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another"; and, third, "the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of many" (WN(1): 17). These three factors, and in particular the last one - innovation - lead, Smith claims, to a "great increase of the quantity" in production. In fact, Smith claims that that same ten-person pin-making shop could, if it divides the labor and allows specialization, make upwards of 48,000 pins per day, or the equivalent of 4,800 pins per person. That is an increase in production of 23,900%! Otteson I 31 Otteson: Here are the steps in Smith's Story of wealth: Step One: The labor is divided. Step Two: Production increases. Step Three: Increasing production leads to decreasing prices. Step Four: Decreasing prices leads to increasing standards of living. Adam Smith: „It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in consequence of the division oflabour, which occasions, in a well-governed society, that universal opulence which extends itself to the Iowest ranks of the people. Every workman has a great quantity of his own work to dispose of beyond what he himself has occasion for; and every other workman being exactly in the same situation, he is enabled to exchange a great quantity of his own goods for a great quantity, or, what comes to the same thing, for the price of a great quantity of theirs. He supplies them abundantly with what they have occasion for, and they accommodate him as amply with what he has occasion for, and a general plenty diffuses itself through all the different ranks of society.“ (WN(1): 22) >Specialization. Otteson: (1) First, it highlights the extensive cooperation and interdependence that arises in markets: we all become dependent on one another to supply what we have "occasion for." For Smith, this is a cause of celebration. Far better to view others - including people from other countries, who speak different languages, who practice different religions, who are of different races, and so on -as opportunities for mutual benefit rather than as enemies to be feared. >Cultural differences. (2) Second, Smith speaks of "universal opulence," "general plenty," and of the common "workman." All of these emphasize Smith's primary concern, namely, the least among us. He is interested to understand how the poor can raise their estate. (3) Third and finally, note Smith's qualifier "in a well-governed society." What constitutes a "well-governed society"? >Society, >Government/Adam Smith, >Government Policy. 1. Smith, Adam. (1776) The Wealth of Nations. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell. |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Otteson I James R. Otteson The Essential Adam Smith Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2018 |
| Dixit, Avinash | Hogan | Krugman III 12 Avinash Dixit/trade policies/international trade/Kala Krishna/Kathleen Hogan/Phillip Swagel: Since Dixit’s model (1988)(1) is probably the most influential of [calibration] models to date, we examine how an alternative specification of this model alters the policy recommendations and welfare results of the calibration exercise. As does Dixit, we apply the model to US.-Japan competition in the automobile industry, expanding the years examined to the full range from 1979 to 1985. VsDixit: The specification we employ is richer than Dixit’s in that we allow product differentiation not only between U.S. and Japanese goods, but also between goods made within each of the countries.* >International trade, >Trade policies, >Models, >Economic models, >Calibration, >New trade theory. The advantages of doing so are twofold. First, the richer specification allows us to get estimates for the extent of product differentiation, as well as timevarying behavioral parameters for firms and consumers. Second, it allows us to ask which results from Dixit’s simpler model are robust and which are artifacts of the model specification. Optimal trade policy: The effect of the richer specification is to completely reverse the sign of the resulting optimal trade policy: we find the optimal policy to be a subsidy to rather than a tax on imports. VsDixit: In fact, following the policies recommended by Dixit’s model can result in a welfare loss if the “true” model is as we specify. The more detailed specification also greatly affects the implicit estimates of collusion/competition between firms. >Competition, >Mergers. Competition: Our results suggest that auto industry firms behave more competitively than Bertrand oligopolists**, as opposed to Dixit’s finding of competition somewhere between that of Bertrand and Cournot oligopolists. Dixit’s result is in part a byproduct of his assumption that firms within a nation produce a homogeneous good. Price/marginal cost: With this assumption, the existence of any markup of price above marginal cost implies that behavior is more collusive than Bertrand. On the other hand, some results are robust. For example, the effects on firms’ behavior of trade policies, particularly the voluntary export restraints (VERs) imposed at the end of 1981, correspond to the effects noted by Dixit. Our implicit estimates of demand cross-elasticities are also consistent with other sources. >Cournot Competition, >Bertrand Competition. Krugman III 13 In addition, the targeting of instruments to distortions evident in Dixit’s results seems to carry through. Finally, as is common with most calibrated trade models, the extent of welfare gains from optimal policies, particularly optimal trade policies alone, remains quite limited. As in Dixit (1988)(1), we estimate optimal polices both with and without monopoly (union) labor rents. We then compare our results to Dixit’s. Dixit: Dixit finds that the optimal policy consists of a tariff on imports and a subsidy to domestic production. VsDixit: In contrast, our model indicates a subsidy to both imports and domestic production to be optimal. We suspect that this is related to our demand specification, which increases the importance of consumer surplus in welfare, thereby increasing the attractiveness of import subsidies which raise consumption. In addition, competition in our model appears to be quite vigorous.*** This tends to limit the gains from using the optimal production subsidy, as these gains are largest in the face of less competitive behavior. As does Dixit, we find that the existence of labor rents raises the optimal subsidy to production and reduces, and in some cases reverses, the optimal import subsidy. Cf. >Optimal tariffs. * Dixit (1988)(1), in contrast, assumes that goods produced within a country are perfect substitutes for one another-that a Chevrolet is the same as a Lincoln or a Pontiac. Although our specification allows for imperfect substitution between all products, the separability we impose groups together all U.S. cars and all Japanese cars. That is, our model puts a Chevy in the same group as a Cadillac, and a Civic in the same group as an Acura. ** ((s) In the economics of oligopoly, the Cournot and Bertrand models explore different ways firms can compete. Cournot models focus on quantity competition, where firms choose output levels, while Bertrand models focus on price competition, where firms set prices. In Bertrand competition, firms making identical products often reach an equilibrium where prices are equal to marginal costs, leading to zero economic profits. In contrast, Cournot competition typically leads to higher prices and positive profits for firms, as they limit their output to maximize profits.) *** The direction of optimal trade policy is known to he related to the extent of competition, as parametrized by the choice of the strategic variable and thus in our model by the CVs. For example, in Eaton and Grossman’s (1986)(2) simple model of duopolistic competition in third party markets, a tax on exports turns out to be optimal with price competition, while a subsidy is optimal with quantity competition. 1. Dixit, A. K. 1988. Optimal trade and industrial policies for the US automobile industry. In: Empirical methods for international trade, ed. R. Feenstra. Cambridge: MIT Press. 2. Eaton, J., and G. Grossman. 1986. Optimal trade and industrial policy under oligopoly. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100:383-406. Kala Krishna, Kathleen Hogan, and Phillip Swagel. „The Nonoptimality of Optimal Trade Policies: The U.S. Automobile Industry Revisited, 1979-1985.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Dixit, Avinash | Krishna | Krugman III 12 Avinash Dixit/trade policies/international trade/Kala Krishna/Kathleen Hogan/Phillip Swagel: Since Dixit’s model (1988)(1) is probably the most influential of [calibration] models to date, we examine how an alternative specification of this model alters the policy recommendations and welfare results of the calibration exercise. As does Dixit, we apply the model to US.-Japan competition in the automobile industry, expanding the years examined to the full range from 1979 to 1985. VsDixit: The specification we employ is richer than Dixit’s in that we allow product differentiation not only between U.S. and Japanese goods, but also between goods made within each of the countries.* >International trade, >Trade policies, >Models, >Economic models, >Calibration. The advantages of doing so are twofold. First, the richer specification allows us to get estimates for the extent of product differentiation, as well as timevarying behavioral parameters for firms and consumers. Second, it allows us to ask which results from Dixit’s simpler model are robust and which are artifacts of the model specification. Optimal trade policy: The effect of the richer specification is to completely reverse the sign of the resulting optimal trade policy: we find the optimal policy to be a subsidy to rather than a tax on imports. VsDixit: In fact, following the policies recommended by Dixit’s model can result in a welfare loss if the “true” model is as we specify. The more detailed specification also greatly affects the implicit estimates of collusion/competition between firms. >Competition, >Mergers. Competition: Our results suggest that auto industry firms behave more competitively than Bertrand oligopolists**, as opposed to Dixit’s finding of competition somewhere between that of Bertrand and Cournot oligopolists. Dixit’s result is in part a byproduct of his assumption that firms within a nation produce a homogeneous good. Price/marginal cost: With this assumption, the existence of any markup of price above marginal cost implies that behavior is more collusive than Bertrand. On the other hand, some results are robust. For example, the effects on firms’ behavior of trade policies, particularly the voluntary export restraints (VERs) imposed at the end of 1981, correspond to the effects noted by Dixit. Our implicit estimates of demand cross-elasticities are also consistent with other sources. >Cournot Competition, >Bertrand Competition. Krugman III 13 In addition, the targeting of instruments to distortions evident in Dixit’s results seems to carry through. Finally, as is common with most calibrated trade models, the extent of welfare gains from optimal policies, particularly optimal trade policies alone, remains quite limited. As in Dixit (1988)(1), we estimate optimal polices both with and without monopoly (union) labor rents. We then compare our results to Dixit’s. Dixit: Dixit finds that the optimal policy consists of a tariff on imports and a subsidy to domestic production. VsDixit: In contrast, our model indicates a subsidy to both imports and domestic production to be optimal. We suspect that this is related to our demand specification, which increases the importance of consumer surplus in welfare, thereby increasing the attractiveness of import subsidies which raise consumption. In addition, competition in our model appears to be quite vigorous.*** This tends to limit the gains from using the optimal production subsidy, as these gains are largest in the face of less competitive behavior. As does Dixit, we find that the existence of labor rents raises the optimal subsidy to production and reduces, and in some cases reverses, the optimal import subsidy. Cf. >Optimal tariffs. * Dixit (1988)(1), in contrast, assumes that goods produced within a country are perfect substitutes for one another-that a Chevrolet is the same as a Lincoln or a Pontiac. Although our specification allows for imperfect substitution between all products, the separability we impose groups together all U.S. cars and all Japanese cars. That is, our model puts a Chevy in the same group as a Cadillac, and a Civic in the same group as an Acura. ** ((s) In the economics of oligopoly, the Cournot and Bertrand models explore different ways firms can compete. Cournot models focus on quantity competition, where firms choose output levels, while Bertrand models focus on price competition, where firms set prices. In Bertrand competition, firms making identical products often reach an equilibrium where prices are equal to marginal costs, leading to zero economic profits. In contrast, Cournot competition typically leads to higher prices and positive profits for firms, as they limit their output to maximize profits.) *** The direction of optimal trade policy is known to he related to the extent of competition, as parametrized by the choice of the strategic variable and thus in our model by the CVs. For example, in Eaton and Grossman’s (1986)(2) simple model of duopolistic competition in third party markets, a tax on exports turns out to be optimal with price competition, while a subsidy is optimal with quantity competition. 1. Dixit, A. K. 1988. Optimal trade and industrial policies for the US automobile industry. In: Empirical methods for international trade, ed. R. Feenstra. Cambridge: MIT Press. 2. Eaton, J., and G. Grossman. 1986. Optimal trade and industrial policy under oligopoly. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100:383-406. Kala Krishna, Kathleen Hogan, and Phillip Swagel. „The Nonoptimality of Optimal Trade Policies: The U.S. Automobile Industry Revisited, 1979-1985.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Domains | Gärdenfors | I 22 Domain/Definition Semantic Domain/Gärdenfors: we use the concepts of integral and separable dimensions from cognitive psychology (according to Garner, 1974; Maddox, 1992; Melara, 1992; Kemler Nelson, 1993). (1)(2)(3)(4) Definition integral quality dimension: here one cannot assign a value to a dimension without assigning a value to another dimension. E.g. color hue: cannot be specified without specifying a color saturation. Definition separable quality dimension: here one dimension can be specified independently of others. E.g. size. Definition Domain/Gärdenfors: is a set of integral dimensions, which can be separated from all other dimensions. Many domains consist of only one dimension: e.g. temperature, weight. --- I 23 Gärdenfors thesis: the distribution of cognitive representations to domains is reflected in semantics. --- I 30 Domain/Gärdenfors: dimensions of properties do not usually occur alone, but are grouped together in domains (e.g. colors). Thesis: Learning (language acquisition) is organized by domains. >Language acquisition/Gärdenfors, >Learning/Gärdenfors. --- I 31 Cognitive linguistics/Cognitive semantics/Gärdenfors: their representatives use the concept of the domain that originates from Gestalt psychology (central terms: figure and background). See also: Langacker (2008, p. 44) (5), Clausner and Croft (1999, p.1)(6) Word: its semantic structure consists then of the concept (figure) and the assumed structure of the domain(background). GärdenforsVsLangacker: its concept of the configurable domain should be viewed better than meronomic information about parts and whole. > Domain/Langacker. --- I 33 Higher-level domains/Gärdenfors: if we accept them, we can assume terms in one domain as configurational, but in a different domain as described locally. Solution/Gärdenfors: a hierarchy of domains. --- I 37 Domain/Conceptual domain/Conceptual space/Qualities/Properties/Gärdenfors: a domain that is represented as a coordination system (see forms/Gärdnefors, conceptual space/Gärdenfors) can be used for the representation of general patterns and configurations (Marr and Nishihara, 1978).(7) Clausner and Croft (p.9) argue that intervals and chords are such configurational patterns. --- I 38 Family relationships/Gärdenfors: can also be represented in such spaces (Zwart 2010a) (8) - so not as a family tree, but as a two-dimensional surface. --- I 73 Domain/semantic domains/Gärdenfors: central advantage of semantic domains: sharing of meanings in different domains makes new forms of cooperation possible. 1. Garner, W. R. (1974). The processing of information and structure. Potomac, MD. 2. Maddox, W. T. (1992). Perceptual and decisional separability. In G. F. Ashby (Ed.), Multidimensional models of perception and cognition (pp. 147-180). Hillsdale, NJ. 3. Melara, R. D. (1992). The concept of perceptual similarity: From psychophysics to cognitive psychology. In D. Algom (Ed.) Psychophysical approaches to cognition (pp. 303-388). Amsterdam. 4. Kemler Nelson, D. G. (1993). Processing integral dimensions: The whole view. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 19, 1105-1113. 5. Langacker, R. W. (2008). Cognitive grammar: A basic introduction. Oxford. 6. Clausner, T. C. / Croft, W. (1999). Domains and image schemas. Cognitive Linguistics, 10, 1-31. 7. Marr, D. & Nishihara, K. H. (1978). Representation and recognition oft he spatial organization of three-dimensional shapes. Proceedings oft he Royal Society of London, Series B: Biological Sciences, 200, 269-294. 8. Zwarts, J. (2010a). Forceful Prepositions. In V. Evans & P. Chilton (Eds.) Language, cognition an space: The state of the art and new directions (pp. 193-214). London. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Domains | Maturana | I 126/27 Domain/Maturana: a domain can be established when recursion is possible - e.g. dance, language. >Recursion, >Language/Maturana. I 222 Domain/Maturana: E.g. we can not go through a wall, because it exists in the same domain of operational coherences as we. - Matter, energy, ideas, spirit, concepts, God, etc. require different lifestyles of the observer as explanatory statements. >Matter, >Energy, >Ideas, >Mind, >Concepts, >God, >Explanation. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Double Contingency | Parsons | Habermas IV 320 Double contingency/Parsons/Habermas: (1) Since the regulating power of cultural values does not affect the contingency of decisions, any interaction between two actors who enter into a relationship is subject to the condition of "double contingency": this has the role of a problem-causing fact: it makes regulatory services functionally necessary. In the logical structure of interaction, the double contingency of the freedom of choice of ego and alter takes precedence over the order mechanisms that coordinate action. At the analytical level of the unit of action, the value standards of individual actors are attributed as subjective possession: Habermas IV 321 They therefore require inter-subjective coordination. The element of value orientation is merely intended to exclude the assumption of contingent processes of purpose setting and prevent the autonomy of determining purpose being withdrawn in favour of a rationalist or positivist alignment of action orientations to determinants of the situation. Habermas IV 392 Double Contingency/Parsons/Habermas: in communicative action, double contingency results from the fact that each interaction participant can both raise (and refrain) and accept (and reject) fundamentally criticizable claims; he/she makes his/her decisions on condition that this also applies to the other interaction participants. Double contingent understanding is based on the interpretation of actors who, as long as they are not self-centred towards their own success, but oriented towards understanding, and want to achieve their respective goals through communicative agreement, must strive to reach a common definition of the situation. >Validity claims. Habermas: Actions can only be coordinated through linguistic consensus formation if everyday communicative practice is embedded in a context of everyday life that is determined by cultural traditions, institutional orders and competencies. The performance of interpretation draws on these resources of the world. Habermas IV 393 Problem: The effort of communication and the risk of dissent are awake to the extent that the actors can no longer fall back on such an advance of consensus in the lifeworld. The more they have to rely on their own interpretation, consent will depend on the intersubjective recognition of criticizable claims to validity. Solution/Parsons: Language as an information medium, especially as a coordination mechanism for well-written contexts.(2) >Intersubjectivity, >Communication theory, >Communicative action. 1.Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe 1951, S. 36 2. R.C. Baum, On Societal Media Dynamics in: ders. “Introduction to Generalized Media in Action, in: Festschrift Parsons (1976), Vol. II S. 448ff. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Dreams | Freud | Ricoeur I 101 Dream/Freud/Ricoeur: The thesis that the dream has a meaning is primarily a polemical thesis that Freud defends on two fronts: a) On the one hand, it is opposed to any conception that considers the dream to be a random game of ideas, a remnant of spiritual life, where only the lack of meaning would be problematic: to speak of the meaning of the dream here means to declare that it is an intelligible, even intellectual activity of man; to understand it means to make the experience of intelligibility. b) On the other hand, the thesis is opposed to any hasty organic explanation of the dream; it states that the dream narrative can always be replaced by another narrative, including semantics and syntax, and that these two narratives can be compared with each other like one text with another; Freud even compares (...) this relationship from text to text with the relationship of an original to its translation (...). (...) the interpretation [moves] from a less understandable sense to a more understandable one; the same must apply to the analogy of the picture puzzle, which belongs to the same circle of relationships, the relationship of dark text to clear text. >Sense/Ricoeur, >Interpretation/Ricoeur, >Symptom/Freud. |
Freud I S. Freud Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011 Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Dreams | Nietzsche | Danto III 70 Dream/Nietzsche/Danto: So certain of the two halves of life, the waking and the dreaming half, the first seems to us to be the unequally preferred, more important, more dignified, more worthwhile, more worth living, even lived alone: so I would like, with all appearance of a paradox (...) assert the opposite valuation of the dream.(1) Danto: by this, Nietzsche means that every experience we can understand must already by nature be an apparant one, namely one created by human's primordial ability, whereby this primordial ability lends form to the experience in the first place. Skepticism/Reality/Nietzsche/Danto: Since "empirical reality" is our own creation and ultimately has no existence, the Cartesian fears are more or less superfluous.(2) Danto III 156 Dream/Cause/thinking/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche speaks of merely 'imaginary causes' of our thinking. The dream is to look for and imagine the causes of the excited sensations, i. e. the alleged causes.(3) Explanation/Nietzsche: Just as the human still in his dreams, so mankind also concluded in the state of being awake for many millennia: the first causa, which came to mind in order to explain something that needed an explanation, was sufficient for him and was considered to be the truth.(4) Danto III 157 Danto: Nietzsche later makes the stronger assertion that there is no difference between dreams and being awake in this relationship. >Reality/Nietzsche, >World/thinking/Nietzsche, >Psychology/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche. Die Geburt der Tragödie, 4, KGW III, 1. p. 34. 2. Ibid. p.34f 3. F. Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, KGW IV, 2 p. 28f. 4. Ibid. p. 29. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Dualism | Chalmers | I 125 Dualism/Consciousness/Chalmers: we have seen that materialism failed because of the lack of logical supervenience of conscious experience on physical facts. >Supervenience, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Consciousness, >Materialism. This is followed by a dualism, but not a Cartesian dualism, which assumes a "mind in the machine", which performs extra causal work. Instead, for us, a kind of property duelism follows. > Property dualism/Chalmers, cf. >R. Descartes. I 134 Dualism/Chalmers: you could avoid the dualism by referring to a zombie world that is physically identical to ours as being described as false. >Zombies/Chalmers. I 135 This world would at the same time be identical and different. We could make the physical properties rigid with the operator "dthat", e.g. dthat (plays the role of ...). >"dthat", >Rigidity, >Operators, >Properties. N.B.: then the zombie world would not have some features that our world has. N.B.: then consciousness could metaphysically supervene on other properties. That would be an interesting argument. >Metaphysical possibility, >Metaphysics. ChalmersVsVs: 1. this is speculative. 2. (more direct): it is based on an incorrect semantics of physical concepts. I 136 For example, an electron with unrecognized properties would still be called an electron, but not an electron with the properties of a proton. >Change in meaning, >Change in theory. Metaphysics/Chalmers: semantics is not so decisive here, but the metaphysical question remains. I 154 Dualism/Definition Proto-phanomenal property/Chalmers: involves as the only one not experiencing itself, but several simultaneously existing could have this. This is strange to us, but cannot be excluded a priori. This would suggest a causal role of the phenomenal. Cf. >Emergence, >Emergence/Chalmers, >Causality, >Phenomena, >Experience, >Knowing how. To represent such a theory would simply mean to accept another possible world where something else had the role of causation, but such a world would not be logically excluded. >Causation. I 155 Dualism/Chalmers: if we were to take such a position, we would represent an essential dualism. >Essentialism. ChalmersVsDualism: one can also understand this position non-dualist, albeit not as a materialistic monism. It then provides a network of intrinsic properties that "realizes" the extrinsic physical properties. >Monism, >Extrinsic, >Intrinsic, cf. >Exemplification. The laws are still the physical ones. In extreme form, when all intrinsic properties are phenomenal, we are dealing with a variant of idealism, but according to Berkeley's type. >G. Berkeley, >Idealism. It would most likely correspond to a version of Russel's neutral monism: I 155 Monism/Russell/Chalmers: neutral monism: the fundamental properties of the world are neither physical nor phenomenal, but the physical and the phenomenal are both built up from this fundamental. The phenomenal is formed from the intrinsic natures, the physical from the extrinsic. I 156 Dualism/Definition Interactionistic Dualism/Definition Interactionism/Chalmers: here, experience fills the causal gaps in the physical process. >Experience. ChalmersVs: that creates more problems than it solves. It does not solve the problems with epiphenomenalism. >Epiphenomenalism. Pro: the only argument for interactionist dualism are some properties of quantum mechanics that could be better explained. (> Eccles 1986)(1) I 157 ChalmersVsEccles: the effects would be much too small to cause any eventual behavioral changes. Other counter examples: VsInteractionistic Dualism/VsInteractionism/Chalmers: 1. it contradicts the quantum mechanical postulate that the microscopic "decisions" are random. 2. a behavior that was triggered by these microscopic influences would have to differ from behavior triggered differently. ChalmersVsEccles: such theories are also silent on what should happen in the brain if the wave function collapses. ChalmersVsInteractionistic Dualism: this makes the phenomenal irrelevant. I 158 ChalmersVsEccles: if there are psychons, then they can manage with purely causal interactions, without assumed phenomenal properties. VsChalmers: one might object that psychons (or ectoplasm, or whatever) are constituted by phenomenal properties. ChalmersVsVs: even then their phenomenal properties are irrelevant to the explanation of behavior: in the history of causation, it is only the relational properties that count. Thus this adheres to the causal unity of the physical. ChalmersVsInteractionism/ChalmersVsEccles: even if one were assuming psychones, one could tell a story about zombies, which involved psychones. One would then again have to assume additional phenomenal properties of psychones without being able to prove them. I 162 Definition Interactionist Dualism/Chalmers: Chalmers accepts that consciousness is non-physical (VsMaterialism) but he denies that the physical world is causally closed so that consciousness can play an autonomous causal role. >Causal role, >Causality, >Causation. I 162 Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: so I characterize my own view: Thesis: Consciousness supervenes naturally on the physical, without supervening logically or "metaphysically". >Supervenience. I argue that materialism is wrong and that the realm of physical is causally completed. I 171 Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: my position is already implicitly shared by many who still call themselves "materialists". All I have done is to make the ontological implications of the naturalistic view explicit - that consciousness "emerges" from the physical. We do not have to give up much, what is important for our scientific world. Cf. >Emergence, >Emergence/Chalmers. 1. Eccles, J.C. (1986) Do Mental Events Cause Neural Events Analogously to the Probability Fields of Quantum Mechanics? Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 227, 411-428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1986.0031 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Dualism | Pauen | Pauen I 35 Dualism/Pauen: two types of states that can also occur independently - interactionist dualism: mutual influence: Descartes. >Dualism/Descartes, >Eccles/Popper, >Property dualism: certain neural processes have not only their physical characteristics but additionally also mental characteristics that are theoretically independent of the neural - Typical theory: computer analogy. >Computation), >Martians, >Computer model. I 60 Consciousness as an autonomous property. >Consciousness, cf. >Monism. I 38 Dualism/Pauen: 1. explanation for the uniformity of our experiences in light of the diversity of physical realizations >Multiple realization. Integration performance of the free mind. >Mind, >Thinking. 2. Explanation of >Free will. I 39 3. Pro dualism: VsMonism: Problem of qualitative varied experience by uniform activity of nerve cells. I 56 VsDualism: Dualism has no concrete research subject. I 44 Descartes/Pauen: the distinction of substances can be justified by the imaginability of such a distinction. >R. Descartes, >res extensa, >res cogitans. The argument still plays an important role today: - Kripke uses it as the basis for its objection VsIdentifikation of mental and neural processes. >Identity Theory. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Dualism | Schiffer | I 151 Property dualism/Schiffer: assumes the same physicalist and irreducible mental (intentional) properties. SchifferVs: this is superfluous, leading to over-determination. >Property Dualism. I 156 ff Sententialistic dualism/Schiffer: true statements about belief instead of existing belief-properties. >Substitutional quantification, >Belief properties. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Dumping | Feenstra | Feenstra I 7-2 Dumping/Feenstra: We suggest that this phenomena can be viewed as a natural attempt of imperfectly competitive firms to enter each others markets, as in the “reciprocal dumping” model of Brander (1981)(1) and Brander and Krugman (1983)(2). As such, it is likely to bring gains to consumers through lower prices. These gains will be offset by the use of anti-dumping duties, especially since these duties must be treated as endogenous: their application will depend on the prices charged by the exporting firms. Cf. >Tariffs/Feenstra. Exporting firms will have an incentive to raise their prices even if there is only a threat of antidumping duties being imposed, and to raise them even further if the duties are actually imposed. For these reasons, consumer and social losses due to antidumping actions are particularly high. We review empirical work by Prusa (1991(3), 1992(4)), Staiger and Wolak (1992)(5) and Blonigen and Haynes (2002)(6), who estimate the price and quantity effects of antidumping actions. Feenstra I 7-44 If there is a case to be made for infant industry protection, whereby an increase in the import price allows a firm to survive, then the reverse should also be true: a decrease in the import prices might lead a firm to shut down. >Infant industry/Feenstra. This would be an example of “predatory dumping,” whereby a foreign exporter would lower its prices in anticipation of driving rivals in the domestic country out of business. A model of predatory dumping is developed by Hartigan (1996)(7), and like the infant industry argument, it relies on a capital market imperfection that prevents the home firm from surviving a period of negative profits. To the extent that predatory dumping occurs at all, it is presumably rare. In contrast, allegations of dumping are a widespread phenomena and growing ever more common. Furthermore, charges of dumping are often made against trading partners in the same industry, e.g. the U.S. will charge European countries and Japan with dumping steel in the U.S., and likewise those other countries will charge the U.S. with dumping steel there! This does not sound like “predatory dumping” at all, but must have some other rationale. In his classic list of reasons for dumping, Jacob Viner referred to “long-run” or “continuous” dumping, to “maintain full production from existing facilities without cutting prices” (Viner, 1966(8), p. 23, as cited by Staiger and Wolak, 1992(5), p. 266). This can occur in markets with oligopolistic competition and excess capacity. Ethier (1982)(9) presents a model emphasizing demand uncertainty and excess capacity, leading to dumping. Feenstra I 7-45 But subsequent literature has focused on a simpler framework without uncertainty, where dumping is a natural occurrence under imperfect competition as oligopolists enter each other’s markets. This is demonstrated (…) using the “reciprocal dumping” model of Brander (1981)(1) and Brander and Krugman (1983)(2). 1. Brander, James A., 1981, “Intra-industry Trade in Identical Commodities,” Journal of International Economics, 11, 1-14. 2. Brander, James A. and Paul R. Krugman, 1983, “A Reciprocal Dumping Model of International Trade,” Journal of International Economics, 15, 313-323. Reprinted as chapter 1 in Gene M. Grossman, 1992, Imperfect Competition and International Trade. Cambridge: MIT Press, 23-30. 3. Prusa, Thomas J., 1991, “The Selection of Anti-Dumping Cases for Withdrawal,” in Robert E. Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago and NBER. 4. Prusa, Thomas J., 1992, “Why Are So Many Antidumping Petitions Withdrawn?” Journal of International Economics, 33, 1-20. 5. Staiger, Robert W. and Frank A. Wolak, 1992, “The Effect of Antidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopoly,” Journal of International Economics, 32, May, 65-287. 6. Blonigen, Bruce A. and Stephen E. Haynes, 2002, “Antidumping Investigations and the Pass-through of Antidumping Duties and Exchange Rates,” American Economic Review, forthcoming. 7. Hartigan, James C., 1996, “Predatory Dumping,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 29(1), February, 228-39. 8. Viner, Jacob, 1966. Dumping: A Problem in International Trade. New York: Augustus M. Kelley, Publishers. 9. Ethier, Wilfred J., 1982, “Dumping,” Journal of Political Economy, 90(3), June, 487-506. |
Feenstra I Robert C. Feenstra Advanced International Trade University of California, Davis and National Bureau of Economic Research 2002 |
| Dyslexia | Bradley | Slater I 133 Dyslexia/Bradley/Bryant: Bradley and Bryant (1983)(1): in order to decide whether the connection between rhyming and alliteration skills and progress in reading was causal, two research methods need[ed] to be combined. A longitudinal approach, in which a large sample of children was followed over time to see whether early rhyme and alliteration skills could determine progress in reading and spelling, had to be combined with a training study. If sound categorization was indeed important for learning to read and to spell, then children who received intensive training in sound categorization should show gains in reading and spelling in comparison to children who did not receive such training. >Reading acquisition/Bradley/Bryant. This combination hat not been used in studies of reading development before. Slater I 135 Bradley and Bryant (1983)(1) concluded that they had shown a causal link between categorizing sounds and learning to read. They speculated that experiences at home, before the children went to school, might underlie individual differences in rhyming and alliteration skills at school entry. Slater I 139/140 Causality/VsBradley/VsBryant: it is the question whether Bradley and Bryant’s (1983)(1) study really established a causal connection between categorizing sounds and learning to read. Even though the study used only pre-reading children (as measured by the Schonell standardized test), some critics have argued that most children who grow up in literate Western societies have some letter knowledge before entering school, for example being able to print their own name and being aware of popular logos and printed signs (e.g., Castles & Coltheart, 2004)(2). 1. Bradley, L., & Bryant, P. E. (1983). Categorising sounds and learning to read: A causal connection. Nature, 310, 419–421. 2. Castles, A., & Coltheart, M. (2004). Is there a causal link from phonological awareness to success in learning to read? Cognition, 91, 77–111. Usha Goswami, „Reading and Spelling.Revisiting Bradley and Bryant’s Study“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Brad I F. H. Bradley Essays on Truth and Reality (1914) Ithaca 2009 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Dyslexia | Bryant | Slater I 133 Dyslexia/Bradley/Bryant: Bradley and Bryant (1983)(1): in order to decide whether the connection between rhyming and alliteration skills and progress in reading was causal, two research methods need[ed] to be combined. A longitudinal approach, in which a large sample of children was followed over time to see whether early rhyme and alliteration skills could determine progress in reading and spelling, had to be combined with a training study. If sound categorization was indeed important for learning to read and to spell, then children who received intensive training in sound categorization should show gains in reading and spelling in comparison to children who did not receive such training. >Reading acquisition/Bradley/Bryant. This combination hat not been used in studies of reading development before. Slater I 135 Bradley and Bryant (1983) concluded that they had shown a causal link between categorizing sounds and learning to read. They speculated that experiences at home, before the children went to school, might underlie individual differences in rhyming and alliteration skills at school entry. Slater I 139/140 Causality/VsBradley/VsBryant: it is the question whether Bradley and Bryant’s (1983)(1) study really established a causal connection between categorizing sounds and learning to read. Even though the study used only pre-reading children (as measured by the Schonell standardized test), some critics have argued that most children who grow up in literate Western societies have some letter knowledge before entering school, for example being able to print their own name and being aware of popular logos and printed signs (e.g., Castles & Coltheart, 2004)(2). 1. Bradley, L., & Bryant, P. E. (1983). Categorising sounds and learning to read: A causal connection. Nature, 310, 419–421. 2. Castles, A., & Coltheart, M. (2004). Is there a causal link from phonological awareness to success in learning to read? Cognition, 91, 77–111. Usha Goswami, „Reading and Spelling.Revisiting Bradley and Bryant’s Study“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Each/All/Every | Geach | I 9 Each/all/any/a/Geach: "Every boy loves a girl", misunderstanding: ambiguous: a) harmless with "kisses", b) devastating with "marries". Solution: Bracket: God can (everything he can): not trivial - but: God can do anything (what he can): - trivial. I 78 Each/Geach: is not a name, also not an incomplete object. Problem with negation. - E.g. "Wisdom is something that is not possessed by everyone." Solution: here "wisdom" is not a singular term but corresponds to "is wise". I 113f Each/Geach: real: "Everyone loves Smith and everyone loves Brown." - fake: (6) "Everyone loves himself". This can be true, even if "every man loves ---" appeals to no one. - But: Problem: "Someone hates himself" - "Someone hates everyone" - both must be wrong if there is no one of whom "someone hates ---" is true. - (+) - criterion: "casus" (assumed situation with all combinations) must not have a false conclusion from true premises. >Universal Quantification, >Existential quantification, >Domain, >Individuation, >Identification, >Reference, >Self-reference. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Ecological Footprint | Climatology | Edwards I 461 Ecological Footprint/climatology/Edwards: The “fingerprint” metaphor suggests that climate forcings from human activity, such as greenhouse gases and aerosols from fossil fuels, may produce different patterns from those caused by natural forcings such as volcanic eruptions and sunspots. Such fingerprints would be multivariate - that is, they would appear in the relationships among multiple variables, rather than in single-variable climate statistics such as global average temperature. Also, they would be four-dimensional: part of the pattern would be temporal, related directly to the increases or decreases in forcings. Once you identify a likely fingerprint, you will Edwards I 462 need a data set that includes all the fingerprint variables, and you will need these data to be temporally consistent. That sounds like reanalysis. Predicting a fingerprint requires forcing climate models with a realistic array of relevant factors on a time-evolving or “transient” basis.(1) You also calculate the amount of “noise” produced by natural variability in the control runs. If your fingerprint signal remains after subtracting this noise, you’ve found a candidate for a unique anthropogenic effect, one that could not be caused by any known combination of natural events. Then you check the observational data. If you see the same fingerprint there, you’ve found some evidence of anthropogenic change. (…) in 2003 and 2004, a group led by Ben Santer at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory used ERA-15 and then ERA-40 reanalysis data to clearly identify one model-predicted fingerprint: a significant change in the height of the tropopause.(2) Heating in the troposphere and cooling in the stratosphere would cause the height of the tropopause to rise. Both are GCM-predicted responses to anthropogenic greenhouse gases and stratospheric ozone depletion. GCM runs including only natural forcing factors, such as solar and volcanic activity, do not produce this result. Though still not fully confirmed, this and similar results reached from reanalysis data have created cautious optimism that the tropopause height changes seen in the ERA-40 reanalysis are real, and that they represent a significant fingerprint of anthropogenic climate change. >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research. 1. G. A. Meehl et al., “Low-Frequency Variability and CO Transient Climate Change,” Climate Dynamics 8, no. 3 (1993): 117–; S. H. Schneider and S. L. Thompson, “Atmospheric CO and Climate: Importance of the Transient Response,” Journal of Geophysical Research 86, no. C4 (1981): 3135–. 2. The tropopause marks the boundary between the troposphere, or lower atmosphere, and the stratosphere. Within this shallow horizontal band occurs a relatively abrupt transition from a steady cooling with height (characteristic of the troposphere) to a steady increase of temperature with height (in the stratosphere). Tropopause height varies with latitude as well as with weather conditions, but should maintain a steady climatological average in the absence of forcing. B. D. Santer et al., “Behavior of Tropopause Height and Atmospheric Temperature in Models, Reanalyses, and Observations: Decadal Changes,” Journal of Geophysical Research-Atmospheres 108, no. D1 (2003): 4002; B. D. Santer et al., “Identification of Anthropogenic Climate Change Using a Second-Generation Reanalysis,” Journal of Geophysical Research 109 (2004): D21104, 35; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007. |
Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013 |
| Ecological Imperative | Jonas | Brocker I 609 Ecological Imperative/Jonas: based on Kant's Categorical Imperative, Jonas develops an "ontological imperative" based on being itself. JonasVsKant: his categorical imperative is located differently. Def ontological imperative/Jonas: "Act in a way that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of real human life on earth. "Do not endanger the conditions for the indefinite survival of mankind." (1) Elsewhere, this Jonasian imperative is also called "ecological imperative". Another formulation by Jonas: "Act in a way that the consequences of your actions are compatible with a future humane existence, i.e. with the claim of humanity to survive for an unlimited time". (2) Brocker: The formulations show that Jonas is not only concerned with physical survival, but also with the quality of this life ("real human life"). (s)VsJonas: the formulations are, if one does not want to call them circular anyway, weaker than the ones by Kant, because they do not refer to a principle. Solution/Jonas: Jonas makes demands that should determine individual and collective life from now on: "Heuristics of Fear"/Jonas: Starting from a "Heuristics of Fear" (3), everyone must gather as much knowledge as possible about the conceivable consequences and "distant effects" of their actions before taking any action (4). The bad prognosis must always be given priority over the good prognosis. For ethical reasons see Teleology/Jonas, Ethics/Jonas, Humanity/Jonas, Existence/Jonas, Being/Jonas. 1.Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 36 2. Hans Jonas, »Warum wir heute eine Ethik der Selbstbeschränkung brauchen«, in: Elisabeth Ströker (Hg.), Ethik der Wissenschaften? Philosophische Fragen, München/Paderborn u. a. 1984, 75-86. 3. Jonas 1979, p. 8, 64 4. Ibid. p. 9, 28. Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 Also see >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. |
Jonas I Hans Jonas Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Ecology | Evolutionary Psychology | Corr I 268 Ecology/evolutionary psychology/Figueredo: However, as BED (see below) theory elucidates, ecological cues are typically neither completely reliable and valid nor unreliable and invalid; they are instead characterized by some ecological validity coefficient ranging between zero and one. Under those conditions, a hybrid theory would predict that organisms would show a combination of developmental plasticity and genetic diversity to collectively fill the available ecological niche space. Interestingly enough, the partial heritability and partial environmentality of personality variation in humans conforms precisely to the predictions of this synthetic model. BED: According to Brunswikian Evolutionary Developmental (BED) theory, ecologies that are variable over evolutionary time select for organisms that are phenotypically plastic enough to adapt by means of learning over developmental time (Figueredo, Hammond and McKiernan 2006)(1). >Niches/Figueredo, >Adaption/evolutionary psychology. 1. Figueredo, A. J., Hammond, K. R. and McKiernan, E. C. 2006. A Brunswikian evolutionary developmental theory of preparedness and plasticity, Intelligence 34: 211–27 Aurelio José Figueredo, Paul Gladden, Geneva Vásquez, Pedro Sofio, Abril Wolf and Daniel Nelson Jones, “Evolutionary theories of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Econometrics | International Trade Theory | Krugman III 4 Econometrics/Quantification/ International Trade Theory/Krugman: It is not an easy task to arrive at quantitatively operational conclusions from models of imperfect competition. In international economics, however, such a state of affairs has been viewed as unacceptable by all concerned. Ideally one would estimate models of imperfectly competitive industries econometrically. In practice this is extremely hard to do, because of the difficulty of identifying firm behavior. In fact, it is actually very hard to estimate models even of perfectly competitive industries; adding the potential complexities of oligopoly is beyond what anyone has managed to do. >Imperfect competition, >International trade. Dixit: In a seminal paper, however, Dixit (1988)(1) offered a way to make some progress. (Harris and Cox (1984)(2)independently developed a similar approach.) He suggested using a “calibration” technique similar to that used in computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. In this technique, parameter estimates are drawn from econometric and engineering estimates wherever possible; the number of remaining parameters of the model is then narrowed down by a priori assumptions until the model can be fully identified by requiring that it match data for some base period. Dixit used this technique to quantify a simple model of the U.S. auto industry. Once the model has been quantified, it then becomes possible to carry out policy experiments. It is also possible to carry out sensitivity analysis, to see whether the conclusions of these experiments are crucially dependent on the particular a priori assumptions made. In general, this technique is no worse when applied to the new trade theory than in conventional constant-returns models (e.g., Whalley 1985)(9). Imperfect competition: In imperfect competition, however, there is a special problem: the need to represent the behavior of firms. In the theoretical literature in trade (and for that matter in industrial organization) it is generally simply assumed that firms act noncooperatively, either as Bertrand price-setters or as Cournot quantity-setters. When one tries to calibrate a model, however, the data generally seem to be inconsistent with either assumption. Dixit’s answer to this problem was to represent firms’ behavior by the device of conjectural variations, leaving the conjectural variation parameter to be decided by the data. >Cournot Competition, >Bertrand Competition, >New trade theory. Problems: The problems with this method are, 1) first, that the use of conjectural variations cannot be properly justified analytically and, 2) second, that there is no reason to expect the conjectural variations parameter to remain stable in the face of alternative policies. Krugman III 5 This has not stopped other authors from using the conjectural variations technique-Baldwin and Krugman (1988b)(3), for example, is an early post-Dixit paper that complains about the approach but uses it nonetheless. In another key early paper, however, Venables and Smith (1 986) proposed an alternative. They suggested that the modeler assume either Bertrand or Cournot* behavior and reconcile this with the data by positing an unobserved elasticity of substitution between the products of different firms. This approach has the virtue of theoretical tightness; it has the defect that the data are not given the chance to tell us anything about the behavior of firms. Quantification: By 1985, then, an approach had been developed that allowed quantification of imperfect-competition models of trade and industrial policy. It was by no means an ideal method-most papers in this area contain some kind of disclaimer, an acknowledgment that the results should not be taken too seriously - but it at least allowed research to go beyond purely theoretical speculation. Literature: There is now a reasonably large selection of calibrated new trade models, including Dixit (1988)(1), Baldwin and Krugman (1988a(3), 1988b(4)), Smith and Venables (1988)(5), Venables and Smith (1986)(6), Baldwin and Flam (1989)(7), and others. Three main points seem to have emerged. 1) VsTradition: (…) the models generally suggest that the positive economics of trade policy-its consequences for output and trade flows-are quite different from the predictions of conventional trade theory. In particular, protection, by encouraging entry of domestic firms, often promotes exports. In some cases, as in Baldwin and Krugman (1988b)(4), this result alone is of some importance for policy disputes. 2) Tariffs/subsidies: the models have for the most part supported the view that modest tariffs and/or subsidies, if imposed unilaterally, do improve on free trade. Dixit’s(1) initial model suggested that tariff rates in the low doubledigit range were optimal; similar results have recurred in a number of other papers. 3) Free trade: however, the calibrated models generally suggest quite large costs to trade war and, conversely, large gains from mutual removal of trade barriers. These pro-free-trade results have actually played a significant role in two key policy debates in recent years: Harris and Cox (1984)(2) provided some valuable ammunition to Canadian advocates of free trade with the United States, and Venables and Smith provided much of the technical background to the Cecchini Report (Emerson et al. 1989)(8) that stated the economic case for the completion of the European internal market in 1992. *((s) In the economics of oligopoly, the Cournot and Bertrand models explore different ways firms can compete. Cournot models focus on quantity competition, where firms choose output levels, while Bertrand models focus on price competition, where firms set prices. In Bertrand competition, firms making identical products often reach an equilibrium where prices are equal to marginal costs, leading to zero economic profits. In contrast, Cournot competition typically leads to higher prices and positive profits for firms, as they limit their output to maximize profits.) 1. Dixit, A. 1988. Optimal trade and industrial policies for the US automobile industry. In Empirical research in international trade, ed. R. Feenstra. Cambridge: MIT Press. 2. Harris, R., and D. Cox. 1984. Trade, industrial policy, and Canadian manufacturing. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 3. Baldwin, R., and P. Krugman. 1988a. Industrial policy and international competition in wide-bodied jet aircraft. In Trade policy issues and empirical analysis, ed. R. Baldwin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 4. Baldwin, R., and P. Krugman. 1988b. Market access and international competition: A simulation study of 16K random access memories. In Empirical methods for international trade, ed. R. Feenstra. Cambridge: MIT Press. 5. Smith, A., and A. Venables. 1988. Completing the internal market in the European Community: Some industry simulations. European Economic Review 32: 150 1-25. 6. Venables, A,, and A. Smith. 1986. Trade and industrial policy under imperfect competition. Economic Policy 1522-72. 7. Baldwin, R., and H. Flam. 1989. Strategic trade policy in the market for 30-40 seat aircraft, Weltwirtschafrliches Archiv 125 (3): 484-500. 8. Emerson, M. et al. 1989. The economics of 1992: An assessment of the potential economic effects of completing the internal market of the European economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 9. Whalley, J. 1985. Trade liberalization among major world trading areas. Cambridge: MIT Press. Paul Krugman. (1994). „Introduction“. In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Econometrics | Neoclassical Economics | Harcourt I 38 Econometrics/Neoclassical Economics/Harcourt: The neoclassical procedure can be regarded as an examination of virtual displacements around an equilibrium point, so that any relative price changes may be ignored and capital may be measured in terms of „an equilibrium dollar's worth“. Measurements: With this procedure it is legitimate - and essential - for individual economic actors to take all prices as given (they are, after all, price-takers) and it is market forces - the overall outcome of their individual but, consciously anyway, uncoordinated actions - which are responsible for actual price changes, changes which cease, by definition, at equilibrium. Accumulation: Moreover, any accumulation which is conceived to have taken place is marginal so that any change in the value of meccano sets in terms of product is confined to this marginal addition, and so may be ignored. Comparisons/comparability/problems: The trouble is that when either comparisons are made between different economies with different equilibrium wages, rates of profits and factor endowments - what Swan calls 'structural comparisons in the large' - or, far worse, when accumulation is analysed, these equilibrium points with all their accompanying (instantaneous) rates of change cannot be extended into visible curves associated with the same equilibrium values. >Econometrics/Swan. Change: An enormous revaluation of existing capital stocks occurs whenever an actual change (as opposed to a virtual one), no matter how small, is contemplated. Hence the need either for meccano sets (and the accompanying unacceptable assumption of perfectly timeless and costless malleability) or for resort to Champernowne's chain index which both he and Swan argue also allows an analysis of slow accumulation, in Champernowne's case, without technical progress. >Method/Champernowne. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Economic Calculation | Mises | Coyne I 11 Calculation/Mises/Coyne/Boettke: „The fundamental objection advanced against the practicability of socialism refers to the impossibility of economic calculation. It has been demonstrated in an irrefutable way that a socialist commonwealth would not be in a position to apply economic calculation ... A socialist management ofproduction would simply not know whether or not what it plans and executes is the most appropriate means to attain the ends sought. It will operate in the dark, as it were. It will squander the scarce factors of production both material and human (labour). Chaos and poverty for all will unavoidably result.“ Ludwig von Mises (1922/ 1981(1)), 535. Coyne I 12 Coyne/Boettke: Economic calculation is the ability of economic actors to determine the expected value added of a potential use of a scarce resource. By comparing the expected value across potential alternatives, decision-makers are able to gauge which activities will have the highest value from the perspective of consumers. Judging the expected value across alternatives requires market-determined prices, which capture the relative scarcity of resources while allowing for a common unit for comparison. Mises: Mises argued that without property rights in the means of production, which the socialists wanted to abolish, there could be no economic calculation because there would be no money prices. His argument proceeded in three steps. First, without private ownership of the means ofproduction, a market for the means of production would not exist. You cannot have voluntary trade without the ownership of resources that allows for the exchange of those resources by owners. Second, without this market, there would not be money prices for the means of production. Monetary prices, which arise through market trade, are exchange ratios that capture the opportunity cost of a resource. If a cup of coffee is $ 1 and a bottle of soda is $2, this means that the price of a soda is two cups of coffee. By providing a common unit for comparison across goods and services, money prices allow people throughout the economy to judge the opportunity cost, or trade off, of engaging in one course of action over another. >Opportunity costs. Finally, without money prices for the means of production rational economic calculation is not possible because there is no way for decision-makers to judge the expected value added of alternative courses of action. Price/Mises: Money prices, according to Mises, emerge as the unintended outcome of the voluntary interaction of a multitude of individuals pursuing their separate and often conflicting plans in a market setting characterized by private ownership allowing for exchange. >Price. Coyne I 12 The prices that emerge in the market convey general knowledge about the relative scarcities of particular goods, and thus serve as "aids to the human mind" for calculating how resources should be used. MisesVsSocialism: In the absence of a market for the means of production, Mises asked, how would the Central Planning Board know which projects were economically feasible and which were not? Example: (…) how would planners know whether or not to use platinum to construct railroad tracks? Platinum, after all, is technologically feasible as an input to construct railways. In a market system, economic decisionmakers responsible for constructing the railroad would look at the price of platinum, which captures its relative scarcity, and attempt to gauge whether they expected to make a profit given the cost of the inputs (platinum being one). MisesVsSocialism: Abolishing prices - through the joint abolition of property rights and mone - would mean that planners would be unable to determine whether platinum or some other good should be used to construct railroad tracks. The result would be economic chaos in contrast to the rational order promised by proponents of the socialist system. SocialsmVsVs: The socialists took Mises's critique seriously and revised their vision. The result was a model of "market socialism," offered by Oskar Lange and Abba Lerner, which sought to maintain the desirable features of the socialist system while addressing the critiques raised by Mises. Solution: The market socialist model included the use of money and allowed for a free market in final consumer goods and in labour markets. The means of production would still be nationalized. A Central Planning Board would be responsible for providing provisional ("shadow") prices for inputs to firms. Based on these provisional prices, firms would be instructed to select the combination of inputs that minimized the cost ofproducing the level of outputs that maximized profits. Problem: But how were firms to know this level of output? Solution: The Central Planning Board would instruct firms to follow the dictates of the perfectly competitive model by setting their prices equal to the marginal costs ofproduction and to produce those levels of output that minimize average costs. >Planned economy, >Planned Economy/Soviet Union, >Socialism/Mises, >Socialism/Hayek. 1. Ludwig von Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis (Indianapolis: Liberty Press/Liberty Classics, 1981). German editions, 1922, 1932. English translation by J. Kahane, 1936; enlarged with an Epilogue, Planned Chaos, 1951; Jonathan Cape, 1969. |
EconMises I Ludwig von Mises Die Gemeinwirtschaft Jena 1922 Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020 |
| Economic Cycle | Marx | Rothbard II 428 Economic cycle/Marx/Rothbard: A final variant of Marx's attempt to demonstrate the inevitability of the proletarian revolution was closely related to the doctrine of absolute impoverishment. >Capitalism/Marx. This variant, however, stressed, not a steady secular trend toward growing impoverishment or an industrial reserve army, but rather increasingly destructive business cycle crises and depressions, marked by impoverishment and cyclical unemployment. >Unemployment/Marx. Underconsumption: The underconsumption explanation of depression was Marx's dominant variant of cycle theory, as evidenced for example, by his and Engels's repeated attacks on Say's law, and on Ricardo's adherence to that law. The point, as elaborated particularly in Marx's Theories ofSurplus Value (written 1861— 63), is that as capitalist accumulation and production advances, it outstrips the ability of the exploited workers, who earn far less than the value of their product, to consume. Rothbard II 429 RothbardVsMarx: The most obvious and blatant problem with an underconsumptionist theory of economic crises is that it explains too much. For if the consumption of the masses is never enough to buy back the product and keep business profitable, why is there no permanent depression? Why are there booms as well as busts? Both Marx and Engels apparently sensed this problem, and hence saw the need for at least a supplementary theory. Thus, in Volume III of Capital, Marx, (…) conceded that there are at least temporary boom periods before crises, when wages rise and workers obtain a larger share of the product. Engels/Rothbard: Engels, too, in Anti-Dühring, first states that 'large-scale industry, which hunts all over the world for new consumers, restricts the consumption of the masses at home to a starvation minimum and thereby undermines its own internal market'. But, then, a bit later in the same work, Engels, after asserting that 'the underconsumption of the masses is therefore also a necessary condition of crises', admits the concept cannot explain 'Why crises exist today' while 'they did not exist at earlier periods'. Rothbard II 430 Problem/RothbardVsMarx: In short, why did businessmen make [a] cluster of severe forecasting errors that mark the period of economic crisis? None of this, of course, could be considered by Marx and by the underconsumptionists, who do not bother considering the price system. Moreover, Marx, like Smith and Ricardo before him, has no conception of the entrepreneur or of the function of entrepreneurship. >Entrepreneurship. Crises/Rothbard: Finally, it is well known that crises invariably begin, not in the consumer goods industries that underconsumptionism would lead us to expect, but precisely in capital goods industries, and in those industries farthest and most remote from the consumer. The problem it would seem - correctly - is too much rather than too little consumption.(1) >Market/Marx. Rothbard II 433 Business cycle/James Mill/Rothbard: (…) Millian non-monetary cycle theory permeated the ranks of economists, and encouraged economists, including Marx, to blame the capitalist market economy for the recurrence of business cycles. The insights of the vanished currency school, the realization that money and credit as a necessary condition was Close to saying a cause, and the original insight that it takes bank credit expansion to distort the market's signals to entrepreneurs and create a boom-bust cycle, remained buried, to be discovered or rediscovered by Ludwig von Mises in 1912. 1. For a further critique of underconsumptionism, see Murray N. Rothbard, America's Great Depression (4th ed., New York: Richardson & Snyder, 1983), pp. 55-8. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Economic Cycle | Mises | Rothbard IV 21 Economic cycles/business cycles/Mises/Rothbard: Tradition: Economists had attempted many explanations, but even the best of them suffered from one fundamental flaw: none of them attempted to integrate the explanation of the business cycle with the general analysis of the economic system, with the “micro” theory of prices and production. >Microeconomics. Equilibirum: In fact, it was difficult to do so, because general economic analysis shows the market economy to be tending toward “equilibrium,” with full employment, minimal errors of forecasting, etc. Whence, then, the continuing series of booms or busts? Solution/Mises: Ludwig von Mises saw that, since the market economy could not itself lead to a continuing round of booms and busts, the explanation must then lie outside the market: in some external intervention. He built his great business cycle theory on three previously unconnected elements. 1) One was the Ricardian demonstration of the way in which government and the banking system habitually expand money and credit, driving prices up (the boom) and causing an outflow of gold and a subsequent contraction of money and prices (the bust). Mises realized that this was an excellent preliminary model, but that it did not explain how the production system was deeply affected by the boom or why a depression should then be made inevitable. >Ricardian theory, >David Ricardo. 2) Another element was the Böhm-Bawerkian analysis of capital and the structure of production. >Capital/Böhm-Bawerk, >Production/Böhm-Bawerk. 3) A third was the Swedish “Austrian” Knut Wicksells’ demonstration of the importance to the productive system and to prices of a gap between the “natural” rate of interest (the rate of interest without the interference of bank credit expansion) and the rate as actually affected by bank loans. >Knut Wicksell. Mises: From these three important but scattered theories, Mises(1) constructed his great theory of the business cycle. Into the smoothly functioning and harmonious market economy comes the expansion of bank credit and bank money, encouraged and promoted by the government and its central bank. >Central Bank, >Money supply/Mises. As the banks expand the supply of money (notes or deposits) and lend the new money to business, they push the rate of interest below the “natural” or time-preference rate, i.e., the free-market rate which reflects the voluntary proportions of consumption and investment by the public. As the interest rate is artificially lowered, the businesses take the new money and expand the structure of production, adding to capital investment, especially in the “remote” processes of production: in lengthy projects, machinery, industrial raw materials, and so on. The new money is used to bid up wages and other costs and to transfer resources into these earlier or “higher” orders of investment. Then, when the workers and other producers receive the new money, their time preferences having remained unchanged, they spend it in the old proportions. But this means that the public will not be saving enough to purchase the new high-order investments, and a collapse of those businesses and investments becomes inevitable. >Time preference/Böhm-Bawerk. Rothbard IV 22 Depression: The recession or depression is then seen as an inevitable re-adjustment of the production system, by which the market liquidates the unsound “over-investments” of the inflationary boom and returns to the consumption/investment proportion preferred by the consumers. Microeconomics: Mises thus for the first time integrated the explanation of the business cycle with general “micro-economic” analysis. The inflationary expansion of money by the governmentally-run banking system creates over-investment in the capital goods industries and underinvestment in consumer goods, and the “recession” or “depression” is the necessary process by which the market liquidates the distortions of the boom and returns to the free-market system of production organized to serve the consumers. Recovery arrives when this adjustment process is completed. MisesVsKeynes/MisesVsKeynesianism/Rothbard: The policy conclusions implied by the Misesian theory are the diametric opposite of the current fashion, whether “Keynesian” or “post-Keynesian.” If the government and its banking system are inflating credit, the Misesian prescription is (a) to stop inflating posthaste, and (b) not to interfere with the recession-adjustment, not prop up wage rates, prices, consumption or unsound investments, so as to allow the necessary liquidating process to do its work as quickly and smoothly as possible. The prescription is precisely the same if the economy is already in a recession. Rothbard IV 63 Interventions/Government/Central Banks/Mises: (…) in contrast to interventionists and statists who believe that the government must intervene to combat the recession process caused by the inner workings of free-market capitalism, Mises demonstrated precisely the opposite: that the government must keep its hands off the recession, so that the recession process can quickly eliminate the distortions imposed by the government-created inflationary boom. >Credit/Mises, >Inflation/Mises, >Central Banks/Mises. 1. Ludwig von Mises. 1912. The Theory of Money and Credit (Theorie des Geldes und der Umlaufsmittel, Translated by H.E. Batson in 1934; reprinted with “Monetary Reconstruction» (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953). Reprinted by the Foundation for Economic Education, 1971; reprinted with an Introduction by Murray N. Rothbard, Liberty Press Liberty Classics, 1989. |
EconMises I Ludwig von Mises Die Gemeinwirtschaft Jena 1922 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Economic Cycle | Rothbard | Rothbard II 210 Business cycle/Rothbard: Great Britain had [in the first half of the 19th century] experienced the pain and deprivation of what would become a classic 'business cycle', i.e. the expansion of money, the rise in prices, the euphoric boom, all fuelled by the monetary inflation of a fractional-reserve banking system, succeeded by a monetary contraction, with attendant depression, fall in prices, bankruptcies, unemployment and dislocations. >Inflation, >Money. And behind this boom and bust, guiding, organizing, centralizing, and directing the monetary expansion and contraction, was the powerful central bank created and privileged by the central government. In short, it was forcefully impressed upon the public that fractional-reserve banks, especially when organized under a central bank, can and do create and then destroy money, distorting and impoverishing the public and the economy in their wake. It is no wonder that severe critics of fractional-reserve banking quickly arose, indicting the banks' actions and the system itself, and noting their responsibility for the boom-bust cycle. Rothbard: Professor Frank W. Fetter notes the 'groundswell of criticism of all banks', but he describes the 'invective' against banks as 'exploiters' of the common people With an air ofbemusement at the public's irrationality. But surely this 'populist' invective was well justified: the banks were indeed privileged by the government, enabled to inflate, and thus to set in motion a two-fold great injury upon the public: an inflationary boom dislocating production and investment and wiping out the savings of the thrifty, followed by a painful contractionary bust necessary to correcting the distortions of the boom. All oft his could properly be laid to the door of the privileged, central bank-run, fractional-reserve banking system. Looked at in that light, the radical denunciations of banks.(1) >Central Banks, >Bullionism. Rothbard III 402 Economic cycles/consumer’s spending/Rothbard: A common fallacy, fostered directly by the net-income approach, holds that the important category of expenditures in the production system is consumers’ spending. Rothbard III 403 Many writers have gone so far as to relate business prosperity directly to consumers’ spending, and depressions of business to declines in consumers’ spending. “Business cycle”: (…) there is little or no relationship between prosperity and consumers’ spending; indeed almost the reverse is true. Prosperity: For business prosperity, the important consideration is the price spreads between the various stages - i.e., the rate of interest return earned. >Interest rates/Rothbard. It is this rate of interest that induces capitalists to save and invest present goods in productive factors. The rate of interest (…) is set by the configurations of the time preferences of individuals in the society. It is not the total quantity of money spent on consumption that is relevant to capitalists’ returns, but the margins, the spreads, between the product prices and the sum of factor prices at the various stages - spreads which tend to be proportionately equal throughout the economy. There is, in fact, never any need to worry about the maintenance of consumer spending. >Production structure/Rothbard. The proportion spent on capital in its various stages and in toto gives a clue to the important consideration - the real output of consumers’ goods in the economy. >Production/Rothbard, >Investments/Rothbard, >Capital/Rothbard, >Capitalism/Rothbard. Money: The total amount of money spent, however, gives no clue at all. Rothbard III 404 The important consideration, therefore, is time preferences and the resultant proportion between expenditure on consumers’ and producers’ goods (investment). >Time preference/Rothbard. Rothbard III 852 Crises/Business cycles/Rothbard: Historical events can be explained by laws of praxeology, which isolate causal connections. >Praxeology/Rothbard. Some of these events can be explained (…): a general price rise could result from an increase in the supply of money or from a fall in demand, unemployment from insistence on maintaining wage rates that have suddenly increased in real value, a reduction in unemployment from a fall in real wage rates, etc. >Money supply, >Demand for money, >Wages, >Unemployment. Free market: But one thing cannot be explained by any economics of the free market. And this is the crucial phenomenon of the crisis: Why is there a sudden revelation of business error? >Free market/Rothbard. Crisis: Suddenly, all or nearly all businessmen find that their investments and estimates have been in error, that they cannot sell their products for the prices which they had anticipated. This is the central problem of the business cycle, and this is the problem which any adequate theory of the cycle must explain. Interventions/pattern: (…) since the eighteenth century there has been an almost regular pattern of consistent clusters of error which always follow a boom and expansion of money and prices. In the Middle Ages and down to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, business crises rarely followed upon booms in this manner. They took place suddenly, in the midst of normal activity, and as the result of some obvious and identifiable external event. Thus, Scott lists crises in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England as irregular and caused by some obvious event: famine, plague, seizures of goods in war, bad harvest, crises in the cloth trade as a result of royal manipulations, seizure of bullion by the King, etc.(2) >Interventions, >Interventionism. But in the late seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there developed the aforementioned pattern of the business cycle, and it became obvious that the crisis and ensuing depression could no longer be attributed to some single external event or single act of government. >Depression. „Overoptimism“/“overpessimism“: We must search for the objective reasons that cause businessmen to become "overoptimistic." And they cannot be found on the free market.(3) >Business cycle/Schumpeter. 1. Frank W. Fetter, Development of British Monetary Orthodoxy 1 797—1875 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 69-70. 1. Cited in Wesley C. Mitchell, Business cycles, the Problem and lts Setting (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1927), pp. 76-77. 2. See V. Lewis Bassie: The whole psychological theory of the business cycle appears to be hardly more than an inversion of the real causal sequence. Expectations more nearly derive from objective conditions than produce them.... It is not the wave of optimism that makes times good. Good times are almost bound to bring a wave of optimism with them. On the other hand, when the decline comes, it comes not because anyone loses confidence, but because the basic economic forces are changing. (V. Lewis Bassie, "Recent Development in Short-Term Forecasting," Studies in Income and Wealth, XVII [Princeton, N.J.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1955), 10-12) |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Economic Cycle | Schumpeter | Rothbard III 854 Business cycle/Schumpeter/Rothbard: Joseph Schumpeter's business cycle theory is one of the very few that attempts to integrate an explanation of the business cycle with an analysis of the entire economic system. The theory was presented in essence in his Theory of Economic Development, published in 1912. This analysis formed the basis for the "first approximation" of his more elaborate doctrine, presented in the two-volume Business cycles, published in 1939.(1) Rothbard: The latter volume, however, was a distinct retrogression from the former, for it attempted to explain the business cycle by postulating three superimposed cycles (each of which was explainable according to his "first approximation"). Periodicity: Each of these cycles is supposed to be roughly periodic in length. They are alleged by Schumpeter to be - the three-year "Kitchin" cycle; - the nine-year "Juglar"; and - the very long (50-year) "Kondratieff." These cycles are conceived as independent entities, combining in various ways to yield the aggregate cyclical pattern.(2) RothbardVsSchumpeter: Any such "multicyclic" approach must be set down as a mystical adoption of the fallacy of conceptual realism. Cf. >Conceptual realism. Rothbard III 855 Economic cycles: Rothbard: There is no reality or meaning to the allegedly independent sets of "cycles." The market is one interdependent unit, and the more developed it is, the greater the interrelations among market elements. It is therefore impossible for several or numerous independent cycles to coexist as self-contained units. It is precisely the characteristic of a business cycle that it permeates all market activities. Clycles/Economic theories: Many theorists have assumed the existence of periodic cycles, where the length of each successive cycle is uniform, even down to the precise number of months. T RothbardVsEconomic cycles: the quest for periodicity is a chimerical hankering after the laws of physics; in human action there are no quantitative constants. Praxeological laws can be only qualitative in nature. Therefore, there will be no periodicity in the length of business cycles. It is best, then, to discard Schumpeter's multicyclical schema entirely and to consider his more interesting one-cycle "approximation" (as presented in his earlier book), which he attempts to derive from his general economic analysis. Circular flow equilibrium: Schumpeter begins his study with the economy in a state of "circular flow" equilibrium, i.e., what amounts to a picture of an evenly rotating economy. Rothbard: This is proper, since it is only by hypothetically investigating the disturbances of an imaginary state of equilibrium that we can mentally isolate the causal factors of the business cycle. First, Schumpeter describes the ERE (Evenly Rotating Economy), where all anticipations are fulfilled, every individual and economic element is in equilibrium, profits and losses are zero - all based on given values and resources. >Evenly Rotating Economy/Rothbard. Changes: Then, asks Schumpeter, what can impel changes in this setup? Demand: First, there are possible changes in consumer tastes and demands. This is cavalierly dismissed by Schumpeter as there are possible changes in population and therefore in the labor supply; but these are gradual, and entrepreneurs can readily adapt to them. Saving/investment: (…) there can be new saving and investment. Wisely, Schumpeter sees that changes in saving-investment rates imply no business cycle; new saving will cause continuous growth. Sudden changes in the rate of saving, when unanticipated by the market, can cause dislocations, of course, as may any sudden, unanticipated change. But there is nothing cyclic or mysterious about these effects. (…) Rothbard III 856 Innovation: Schumpeter turned to a fourth element, which for him was the generator of all growth as well as of business cycles - innovation in productive techniques. >Technology, >Inventions, >Progress. Innovations/RothbardVsSchumpeter: (…) innovations cannot be considered the prime mover of the economy, since innovations can work their effects only through saving and investment and since there are always a great many investments that could improve techniques within the corpus of existing knowledge, but which are not made for lack of adequate savings. This consideration alone is enough to invalidate Schumpeter's business-cycle theory. >Innovations/Rothbard. Clusters of innovation: Finally, Schumpeter's explanation of innovations as the trigger for the business cycle necessarily assumes that there is a recurrent cluster of innovations that takes Place in each boom period. Why should there be such a cluster of innovations? Why are innovations not more or less continuous, as we would expect? Schumpeter cannot answer this question satisfactorily. The fact that a bold few begin innovating and that they are followed by imitators does not yield a cluster, for this process could be continuous, with new innovators arriving on the scene. Schumpeter offers two explanations for the slackening of innovatory activity toward the end of the boom (a slackening essential to his theory). On the one hand, the release of new products yielded by the new investments creates diffculties for Old producers and leads to a period of uncertainty and need for „rest“. >Innovations/Schumpeter. 1. Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 193 6), and idem, Business Cycles (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939). Reprinted by Porcupine Press, 1982. 2. Warren and Pearson, as well as Dewey and Dakin, conceive of the business cycle as made up of superimposed, independent, periodic cycles from eachfield of production activity. See George F. Warren and Frank A. Pearson, Prices (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 193 3); E.R. Dewey and E.F. Dakin, cycles: The Science of Prediction (New York: Holt, 1949). |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Economic Development | Acemoglu | Acemogu I 83 Economic Development/Acemoglu/Robinson: Political and economic institutions, which are ultimately the choice of society, can be inclusive and encourage economic growth. Or they can be extractive and become impediments to economic growth. Nations fail when they have extractive economic institutions, supported by extractive political institutions that impede and even block economic growth. But this means that the choice of institutions - that is, the politics of institutions - is central to our quest for understanding the reasons for the success and failure of nations. >Institutions/Acemoglu, >Prosperity/Acemoglu, >Political Institutions/Acemoglu. Acemogu I 106 The divergent paths of English, French, and Spanish societies in the seventeenth century illustrate the importance of the interplay of small institutional differences with critical junctures. >Institutions/Acemoglu. During critical junctures, a major event or confluence of factors disrupts the existing balance of political or economic power in a nation. These can affect only a single country, such as the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976, which at first created a critical juncture only for Communist China. Often, however, critical junctures affect a whole set of societies, in the way that, for example, colonization and then decolonization affected most of the globe. Such critical junctures are important because there are formidable barriers against gradual improvements, resulting from the synergy between extractive political and economic institutions and the support they give each other. For economic development see also >Economic growth/Acemoglu, >Technology/Acemoglu, >Economic Institutions/Acemoglu, >Political Institutions/Acemoglu. Acemoglu I 109 The richly divergent patterns of economic development around the world hinge on the interplay of critical junctures and institutional drift. Existing political and economic institutions - sometimes shaped by a long process of >institutional drift and sometimes resulting from divergent responses to prior >critical junctures - create the anvil upon which future change will be forged. E.g., the Black Death and the expansion of world trade after 1600 were both major critical junctures for European powers and interacted with different initial institutions to create a major divergence. Acemoglu I 272 Reversed development in developing countries: E.g., India: The East India Company looted local wealth and took over, and perhaps even intensified, the extractive taxation institutions of the Mughal rulers of India. This expansion coincided with the massive contraction of the Indian textile industry, since, after all, there was no longer a market for these goods in Britain. The contraction went along with de-urbanization and increased poverty. It initiated a long period of reversed development in India. Soon, instead of producing textiles, Indians were buying them from Britain and growing opium for the East India Company to sell in China. >Developing countries/Acemoglu. Africa: The Atlantic slave trade repeated the same pattern in Africa, even if starting from less developed conditions than in Southeast Asia and India. Many African states were turned into war machines intent on capturing and selling slaves to Europeans. The South African state created a dual economy, preventing 80 percent of the population from taking part in skilled occupations, commercial farming, and entrepreneurship. All this not only explains why industrialization passed by large parts of the world but also encapsulates how economic development may sometimes feed on, and even create, the underdevelopment in some other part of the domestic or the world economy. Acemoglu I 282 Development in individual countries: Australia, like the United states, experienced a different path to inclusive institutions than the one taken by England. ((s) For „inclusive institutions“ see >Terminology/Acemoglu.) The same revolutions that shook England during the Civil War and then the Glorious Revolution were not needed in the United States or Australia because of the very different circumstances in which those countries were founded—though this of course does not mean that inclusive institutions were established without any conflict, and, in the process, the United States had to throw off British colonialism. In England there was a long history of absolutist rule that was deeply entrenched and required a revolution to remove it. In the United States and Australia, there was no such thing. The inclusive institutions established in the United States and Australia meant that the Industrial Revolution spread quickly to these lands and they began to get rich. The path these countries took was followed by colonies such as Canada and New Zealand. Literature: The notion that the development of the rich countries of the West is the mirror image of the underdevelopment of the rest of the world was originally developed by Wallertsein (1974–2011)(1), though he emphasizes very different mechanisms than we do. 1.Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974–2011). The Modern World System. 4 Vol. New York: Academic Press. |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Economic Development | Robinson | Acemogu I 83 Economic Development/Acemoglu/Robinson: Political and economic institutions, which are ultimately the choice of society, can be inclusive and encourage economic growth. Or they can be extractive and become impediments to economic growth. Nations fail when they have extractive economic institutions, supported by extractive political institutions that impede and even block economic growth. But this means that the choice of institutions - that is, the politics of institutions - is central to our quest for understanding the reasons for the success and failure of nations. >Institutions/Acemoglu, >Prosperity/Acemoglu, >Political Institutions/Acemoglu. Acemogu I 106 The divergent paths of English, French, and Spanish societies in the seventeenth century illustrate the importance of the interplay of small institutional differences with critical junctures. >Institutions/Acemoglu. During critical junctures, a major event or confluence of factors disrupts the existing balance of political or economic power in a nation. These can affect only a single country, such as the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976, which at first created a critical juncture only for Communist China. Often, however, critical junctures affect a whole set of societies, in the way that, for example, colonization and then decolonization affected most of the globe. Such critical junctures are important because there are formidable barriers against gradual improvements, resulting from the synergy between extractive political and economic institutions and the support they give each other. For economic development see also >Economic growth/Acemoglu, >Technology/Acemoglu, >Economic Institutions/Acemoglu, >Political Institutions/Acemoglu. Acemoglu I 109 The richly divergent patterns of economic development around the world hinge on the interplay of critical junctures and institutional drift. Existing political and economic institutions - sometimes shaped by a long process of >institutional drift and sometimes resulting from divergent responses to prior >critical junctures - create the anvil upon which future change will be forged. E.g., the Black Death and the expansion of world trade after 1600 were both major critical junctures for European powers and interacted with different initial institutions to create a major divergence. Acemoglu I 272 Reversed development in developing countries: E.g., India: The East India Company looted local wealth and took over, and perhaps even intensified, the extractive taxation institutions of the Mughal rulers of India. This expansion coincided with the massive contraction of the Indian textile industry, since, after all, there was no longer a market for these goods in Britain. The contraction went along with de-urbanization and increased poverty. It initiated a long period of reversed development in India. Soon, instead of producing textiles, Indians were buying them from Britain and growing opium for the East India Company to sell in China. >Developing countries/Acemoglu. Africa: The Atlantic slave trade repeated the same pattern in Africa, even if starting from less developed conditions than in Southeast Asia and India. Many African states were turned into war machines intent on capturing and selling slaves to Europeans. The South African state created a dual economy, preventing 80 percent of the population from taking part in skilled occupations, commercial farming, and entrepreneurship. All this not only explains why industrialization passed by large parts of the world but also encapsulates how economic development may sometimes feed on, and even create, the underdevelopment in some other part of the domestic or the world economy. Acemoglu I 282 Development in individual countries: Australia, like the United states, experienced a different path to inclusive institutions than the one taken by England. ((s) For „inclusive institutions“ see >Terminology/Acemoglu.) The same revolutions that shook England during the Civil War and then the Glorious Revolution were not needed in the United States or Australia because of the very different circumstances in which those countries were founded—though this of course does not mean that inclusive institutions were established without any conflict, and, in the process, the United States had to throw off British colonialism. In England there was a long history of absolutist rule that was deeply entrenched and required a revolution to remove it. In the United States and Australia, there was no such thing. The inclusive institutions established in the United States and Australia meant that the Industrial Revolution spread quickly to these lands and they began to get rich. The path these countries took was followed by colonies such as Canada and New Zealand. Literature: The notion that the development of the rich countries of the West is the mirror image of the underdevelopment of the rest of the world was originally developed by Wallertsein (1974–2011)(1), though he emphasizes very different mechanisms than we do. 1.Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974–2011). The Modern World System. 4 Vol. New York: Academic Press. |
EconRobin I James A. Robinson James A. Acemoglu Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 Robinson I Jan Robinson An Essay on Marxian Economics London 1947 Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Economic Growth | Acemoglu | Acemoglu I 83 Economic growth/Acemoglu/Robinson: Political and economic institutions, which are ultimately the choice of society, can be inclusive and encourage economic growth. Or they can be extractive and become impediments to economic growth. Nations fail when they have extractive economic institutions, supported by extractive political institutions that impede and even block economic growth. But this means that the choice of institutions - that is, the politics of institutions - is central to our quest for understanding the reasons for the success and failure of nations. >Institutions/Acemoglu, >Properity/Acemoglu, >Political Institutions/Acemoglu. Question: Wouldn’t every citizen, every politician, and even a predatory dictator want to make his country as wealthy as possible? Acemoglu I 84 Unfortunately for the citizens of many countries in the world, the answer is no. Economic institutions that create incentives for economic progress may simultaneously redistribute income and power in such a way that a predatory dictator and others with political power may become worse off. Institutions: The fundamental problem is that there will necessarily be disputes and conflict over economic institutions. Different institutions have different consequences for the prosperity of a nation, how that prosperity is distributed, and who has power. The economic growth which can be induced by institutions creates both winners and losers. Even though mechanization led to enormous increases in total incomes and ultimately became the foundation of modern industrial society, it was bitterly opposed by many. Not because of ignorance or shortsightedness; quite the opposite. Rather, such opposition to economic growth has its own, unfortunately coherent, logic. >Institutions/Acemoglu. Schumpeter: Economic growth and technological change are accompanied by what the great economist Joseph Schumpeter called creative destruction.New firms take business away from established ones. New technologies make existing skills and machines obsolete. Conservatism: The process of economic growth and the inclusive institutions upon which it is based create losers as well as winners in the political arena and in the economic marketplace. Fear of creative destruction is often at the root of the opposition to inclusive economic and political institutions. Acemoglu I 86 The logic of why the powerful would not necessarily want to set up the economic institutions that promote economic success extends easily to the choice of political institutions. Acemoglu I 92 Extractive institutions: There are two distinct but complementary ways in which growth under extractive political institutions can emerge. 1) (...) even if economic institutions are extractive, growth is possible when elites can directly allocate resources to high-productivity activities that they themselves control. E.g. the economic growth and industrialization of the Soviet Union from the first Five-Year Plan in 1928 until the 1970s. Political and economic institutions were highly extractive, and markets were heavily constrained. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was able to achieve rapid economic growth because it could use the power of the state to move resources from agriculture, where they were very inefficiently used, into industry. 2) The second type of growth under extractive political institutions arises when the institutions permit the development of somewhat, even if not completely, inclusive economic institutions. >Institutions/Acemoglu. Acemoglu I 124 Growth with extractive institutions: (...) if most societies in history are based on extractive political and economic institutions, does this imply that growth never takes place? Obviously not. Extractive institutions, by their very logic, must create wealth so that it can be extracted. A ruler monopolizing political power and in control of a centralized state can introduce some degree of law and order and a system of rules, and stimulate economic activity. Acemoglu I 149 The growth generated by extractive institutions (>Terminology/Acemoglu) is very different in nature from growth created under inclusive institutions (...). Most important, it is not sustainable. By their very nature, extractive institutions do not foster creative destruction and generate at best only a limited amount of technological progress. The growth they engender thus lasts for only so long. >Soviet Union/Acemoglu. |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Economic Growth | Bensuan-Butt | Harcourt I 78 Economic growth/ Bensuan-Butt/Harcourt: An approach (…) to analyse the development through accumulation of an economy from the handicrafts industry stage to mechanized, capital-intensive industries, industry by industry, is used by Bensusan-Butt [1960] in On Economic Growth(1). (…) it is one man's vision of the historical process of growth over centuries, a process whereby techniques of production and institutions change endogenously and the macro aggregates which have become so fashionable in the post-General Theory(2) era are shown to be the complicated outcomes of micro happenings in individual industries and firms. >J. M. Keynes, >Keynesianism, >Neo-Keynesianism. Harcourt: Indeed, Bensusan-Butt is properly sceptical of the role of these aggregates in growth theory, 'suspect [ing] that national income aggregates have, when stretched over centuries and not kept to their proper role in short-period analysis, little significance' (Bensusan-Butt [1960](1), p. 4). Again factor prices and competition are the means by which the processes occur and a slowly falling rate of profits, the value of which at each moment is determined within the system, plays a key role. Unless there is a shortage of land, the real wage rises as productivity in each industry, and in turn, rises. Economy/history: Bensusan-Butt envisages an economy consisting, initially, entirely of handicraft industries in which labour alone is required. There are no capital goods and no accumulation. Harcourt I 79 There exist, though, known mechanized techniques of production which can be constructed by labour alone, i.e. the investment-goods sector is a handicraft industry, a very common assumption in this literature: see Solow [1962a](3), p. 207, for a justification. When these machines are manned by the appropriate team of workers, the productivity of the latter is raised. There is perfect competition in the goods and factor markets, perfect foresight and labour is homogeneous in all uses. It follows from these assumptions that if we inject an accumulation process into this economy, industries will become mechanized, labour both to man machines and to make them being absorbed from the handicrafts sectors, and prices of products will be forced down, and therefore real wages raised, in order that the additional products may be sold. (There will, however, be alternating phases of constant and falling prices, of one product only in turn, depending upon whether one industry's mechanization is being completed or another's just begun.) Rate of profit: The rate of profits at any moment of time is determined by the physical productivity of the machines in the industry which is on the margin of being mechanized, competitively determined factor and product prices being the agents by which this is achieved. In this way there emerges a recognizable process of accumulation, absorption of labour from handicraft to mechanized sectors, and falling rates of profits and rising real wages. (There is as yet no population growth and, therefore, no land shortages and accompanying diminishing returns puzzles to worry about. These are, however, introduced in the second model.) Coincident with these processes there occurs a falling general price level (measured in terms of current labour time, the standard of value in these economies), accompanied by a relative price structure which reflects the current rate of profits and the different productivities of the mechanized methods either existing or currently being introduced. At each step the author discusses the conditions of supply and demand in each industrial market. 1. Bensusan-Butt, D. M. [1960] On Economic Growth: An Essay in Pure Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 2. Keynes, J. M. [1936] The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London: Macmillan). 3. Solow, R. M. [1962a] 'Substitution and Fixed Proportions in the Theory of Capital', Review of Economic Studies, xxrx, pp. 207-18. |
Bensuan-Butt I David Bensuan-Butt On Economic Growth. An Essay in Pure Theory. Oxford 1960 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Economic Growth | Classical Economics | Kurz I 247 Economic growth/Classical economics/Kurz: Interpreters from Adolph Lowe (1954)(1) to Walter Eltis (1984)(2) have stressed that economic growth and socio-economic development in the classical authors from Adam Smith to David Ricardo and Karl Marx were considered endogenous phenomena. In their writings, the behaviour of agents, their creativity and need for achievement and distinction, and social rules and institutions defined the confines within which the process of the production, distribution and use of social wealth unfolded. Exogenous groth/neoclassical economics: The concept of exogenous growth, as it was introduced by Gustav Cassel(3) and then made central in Robert Solow's growth model (Solow 1956)(4), was totally extraneous to the way the classical economists thought. In their view the main problem the social sciences were confronted with consisted of the fact, in the words of Smith's teacher Adam Ferguson, that history is 'the result of human action, but not of human design'. What was needed was to come to grips, as best as one could, with the consequence of purposeful human actions, both intended and unin tended. Kurz I 248 Classical economics on groth/Kurz: [here we assume] essentially a one-sector economy in which 'corn' is produced by means of doses of labour-cum-capital, where Capital consists only of corn and each dose of labour-cum-capital exhibits the same proportion of labour to corn. This means that labour-cum-capital can be treated as if it were a Single factor of production. This bold simplification of the 'classical' approach to the problem of economic growth can only be justified if it does not misrepresent an important aspect of at least a variant of that approach. One generally engages in such simplifications only for heuristic reasons, and the heuristic perspective underlying this chapter is to prepare the ground for a comparison with prominent contributions to the so-called 'new' growth literature (see Kurz and Salvadori 1996(5), 1998a(6), 1998b(7), 1999(8), 2003(9)). Kurz I 249 (…) it is argued that the endogenisation of the growth rate in a class of models belonging to the so-called 'new' growth theory is carried out in a manner reminiscent of classical economics. Growth/Solow: While in the Solow growth model, for example, labour is treated as a non-producible and non-accumulable factor of production whose fixed rate of growth constrains the long-term expansion of the economic system, in some new growth models this factor is replaced by 'human capital' or 'knowledge' , which are taken to be producible and even accumulable (or costlessly transferable among subsequent generations of the population). „New growth“: Very much like the classical assumption of a given real wage rate this is equivalent to the assumption that there is a mechanism generating 'labour'. >Endogenous growth, >Exogenous growth. 1. Lowe, A. (1954) 'The Classical Theory of Growth', Social Research, 21: 127-58. 2. Eltis, W. (1984) The Classical Theory of Economic Growth, London: Macmillan. 3. Cassel, G. (1932) The Theory of Social Economy, revised English translation of the 5th German edition of Cassel (1918), Theoretische Sozialökonomie, by L. Barron, New York: Harcourt Brace. 4. Solow, R. M. (1956) 'A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70: 65-94. 5. Kurz, H. D. and Salvadori, N. (1996) 'In the Beginning All the World Was Australia. in M. Sawyer (ed.), Festschrift in Honour Of G C. Harcourt, London: Routledge, vol. 11:425-43. 6. Kurz, H. D. and Salvadori, N. (1998a) 'The "New" Growth Theory•. Old Wine in New Goatskins', in F. Coricelli, M. Di Matteo and F. H. Hahn (eds), New Theories in Growth and Development, London: Macmillan, and New York: St. Martin's Press: 63-94. 7. Kurz, H. D. and Salvadori, N. (1998b) ' "Endogenous" Growth Models and the "Classical" Tradition', in H. D. Kurz and N. Salvadori, Understanding 'Classical' Economics, London: Routledge: 66—89. 8. Kurz, H. D. and Salvadori, N. (1999) 'Theories of "Endogenous" Growth in Historical Perspective', in Murat R. Sertel (ed.), Contemporary Economic Issues. Proceedings Of the Eleventh World Congress of the International Economic Association, Tunis. Volume 4, Economic Behaviour and Design, London: Macmillan, and New York: St. Martin's Press: 225-61. 9. Kurz, H. D. and Salvadori, N. (2003) 'Theories of EconomicGrowth Old and New', in Neri Salvadori (ed.), The Theory of Economic Growth: A 'Classical'Perspective, Cheltenham (UK): Edward Elgar: 1-22. Kurz, Heinz D. and Salvadori, Neri. „Endogenous growth in a stylised 'classical' model“.In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Economic Growth | Neoclassical Economics | Harcourt I 37 Economic growth/Neoclassical theories/Swan/Harcourt: We find in Swan's appendix(1) perhaps the first and certainly the clearest statement of the notorious malleability assumption which underlies many neoclassical growth models and econometric exercises, for example, Swan [1956](1), Solow [1956b(2), 1957(3)], Meade [1961](4). Capital/measurements: By measuring capital in terms of its own technical unit (and by assuming that the quantity of capital in terms of this unit is uniquely associated with, say, the annual flow of services from it, measured in machine years), it is in the appropriate form for inclusion in a production function viewed as an engineering description of the flow of output which may be expected from the inputs of certain flows of man and machine years: on this, see Bruno, Burmeister and Sheshinski [1968](5). >Production function. Marginal product: The marginal product of capital, so measured, is equal to the rate of profits multiplied by the price of the technical unit of capital in terms of product (p). But if this price does not change when accumulation occurs, as Swan assumes, capital may also be measured in value units, in which case its marginal product equals the rate of profits. Harcourt I 38 Neoclassical approach: The neoclassical procedure can be regarded as an examination of virtual displacements around an equilibrium point, so that any relative price changes may be ignored and capital may be measured in terms of „an equilibrium dollar's worth“. Measurements: With this procedure it is legitimate - and essential - for individual economic actors to take all prices as given (they are, after all, price-takers) and it is market forces - the overall outcome of their individual but, consciously anyway, uncoordinated actions - which are responsible for actual price changes, changes which cease, by definition, at equilibrium. Accumulation: Moreover, any accumulation which is conceived to have taken place is marginal so that any change in the value of meccano sets in terms of product is confined to this marginal addition, and so may be ignored. Comparisons/comparability/problems: The trouble is that when either comparisons are made between different economies with different equilibrium wages, rates of profits and factor endowments - what Swan calls 'structural comparisons in the large' - or, far worse, when accumulation is analysed, these equilibrium points with all their accompanying (instantaneous) rates of change cannot be extended into visible curves associated with the same equilibrium values. >Econometrics/Swan. Change: An enormous revaluation of existing capital stocks occurs whenever an actual change (as opposed to a virtual one), no matter how small, is contemplated. Hence the need either for meccano sets (and the accompanying unacceptable assumption of perfectly timeless and costless malleability) or for resort to Champernowne's chain index which both he and Swan argue also allows an analysis of slow accumulation, in Champernowne's case, without technical progress. >Method/Champernowne. 1. Swan, T. W. [1956] 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation', Economic Record, xxxn, pp. 334-61. 2. Solow, R. M. [1956b] 'A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXX, pp. 65-94. 3. Solow, R. M. [1957] 'Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function', Review of economics and Statistics, xxxix, pp. 312-20. 4. Meade, J. E. [1961] A Neoclassical Theory of Economic Growth (London: Allen and Unwin). 5. Bruno, M., Burmeister, E. and Sheshinski, E. [1966] 'Nature and Implications of the Reswitching of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 526-53. Kurz I 258 Growth/exogenous growth/Neoclassical economics/Kurz: A theory based on the typical marginalist set of data (M1)-(M3) is hardly able to determine growth endogenously. (M 1) the set of technical alternatives from which cost-minimising producers can choose, (M 2) the preferences of consumers, and (M 3) the initial endowments of the economy and the distribution of property rights among individual agents. (…) the majority of neoclassical authors have been concerned with developing theories that revolved around the concept of an exogenously given long-term rate of economic growth. It sumces to recall the efforts of some of the leading advocates of marginalism. Thus, in Chapter V of Book V of his Principles of Economics, Alfred Marshall first introduced the 'famous fiction of the stationary state' and then tried to weaken the strong assumptions required by it. >Alfred Marshall. The Stationary State has just been taken to be one in which population is stationary. But nearly all its distinctive features may be exhibited in a Place where population and wealth are both growing, provided they are growing at about the same rate, and there is no scarcity of land: and provided also the methods of production and the conditions of trade change but little; and above all, where the character of man himself is a constant quantity. For in such a state by far the most important conditions of production and consumption, of exchange and distribution will remain of the same quality, and in the same general relations to one another, though they are all increasing in volume. (Marshall [1890] 1977: 306)(1) The resulting economic system grows at a constant rate that equals the exogenous rate of growth of population. Income distribution and relative prices are the same as in the stationary economy. In modern parlance: the system expands along a steady-state growth path. 1. Marshall, A. (1977) Principles of Economics, reprint of the 8th edn (1920), Ist edn 1890, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan. Kurz, Heinz D. and Salvadori, Neri. „Endogenous growth in a stylised 'classical' model“.In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Economic Growth | Rothbard | Rothbard III 962 Economic Growth/Rothbard: The discussion is replete with comparisons of the higher rate of country X which "we" must hurriedly counter, etc. Amidst all the interest in growth, there are many grave problems (…) First and foremost is the simple query: "What is so good about growth?" Problem: The economists, discoursing scientifically about growth, have illegitimately smuggled an ethical judgment into their science - an ethical judgment that remains unanalyzed, as if it were self-evident. Ethics/justification/values: But why should growth be the highest value for which we can strive? What is the ethical justification? There is no doubt about the fact that growth, taken over as another dubious metaphor from biology, "sounds" good to most people, but this hardly constitutes an adequate ethical analysis. Free market/Rothbard: Many things are considered as good, but on the free market every man must choose between different quantities of them and the price for those forgone. Similarly, growth, (…) must be balanced and weighed against competing values. Given due consideration, growth would be considered by few people as the only absolute value. If it were, why stop at 5 percent or 8 percent growth per year? Why not 50 percent? Economics: It is completely illegitimate for the economist qua economist simply to endorse growth. What he can do is to contrast what growth means in various social conditions. In a free market, for example, every person chooses how much future growth he wants as compared to present consumption. Living standard: "Growth," i.e., a rise in future living standards, can be achieved (…) only in a few definable ways. Growth/Rothbard: Either more and better resources can be found, or more and better people can be born, or technology improved, or the capital goods structure must be lengthened and capital multiplied. Rothbard III 963 Saving/investment: In practice, since resources need capital to find and develop them, since technological improvement can be applied to production only via capital investment, since entrepreneurial skills act only through investments, and since an increased labor supply is relatively independent of short-run economic considerations and can backfire in Malthusian fashion by Iowering per capita output, the only viable way to growth is through increased saving and investment. Free market/decisions: On the free market, each individual decides how much he wants to save - to increase his future living standards - as against how much he wants to consume in the present. The net resultant of all these voluntary individual decisions is the nation's or world's rate of capital investment. The total is a reflection of the voluntary, free decisions of every consumer, of every person. Economics: The economist, therefore, has no business endorsing "growth" as an end; if he does so, he is injecting an unscientific, arbitrary value judgment, especially if he does not present an ethical theory in justification. Rothbard III 964 Coercion/saving: (…) in cases of coerced saving the saver reaps none of the benefit of his sacrifice, which is instead reaped by government offcials or other beneficiaries. Free market: This contrasts to the free market, where people save and invest precisely because they will reap some tangible and desired rewards. Free rider/coercion: In a regime of coerced growth, then, "society" cannot grow, and conditions are totally different from those of the free market. Indeed, what we have is a form of the "free rider" argument against the free market and for government; here the various "free riders" band together to force other People to be thrifty so that the former can benefit. >Free rider. Def Economic growth/Rothbard: Any proper definition must surely encompass an increase of economic means available for the satisfaction of people's ends - in short, increased satisfactions of people's wants, or as P.T. Bauer has put it, "an increase in the range of effective alternatives open to people." On such a definition, it is Clear that compulsory saving, with its imposed losses and restrictions on people's effective choices, cannot spur economic growth; and also that government "investment," With its neglect of voluntary private consumption as its goal, can hardly be said to add to people's alternatives. Quite the contrary.(1) Rothbard: Finally, the very term "growth" is an illegitimate import of a metaphor from biology into human action.(2) "Growth" and "rate of growth" connote some sort of automatic necessity or inevitability and have for many People a value-loaded connotation of something self-evidently desirable.(3) 1. P.T. Bauer, Economic Analysis and Policy in Underdeveloped Countries (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1957), pp. 113 ff. On Soviet economic growth Bauer and Yamey make this salutary comment: „The meaning of national income, industrial output and capital formation is also debatable in an economy when so large a part of output is not governed by consumers' choices in the market; the diffculties of interpretation are particularly obvious in connection With the huge capital expenditure undertaken by government without reference to the valuation of output by consumers.“ (Bauer and Yamey, Economics of Under-Developed Countries, p. 162). Also see Friedman, "Foreign Economic Aid," p. 510. 2. For a critique of various metaphors illegitimately and misleadingly imported from the natural sciences into economics, see Rothbard, "The Mantle of Science." 3. The presumably excessive growth of cancerous cells, for example, is generally overlooked. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Economic Models | Gelbach | Parisi I 33 Economic models/Gelbach/Klick: Econometric studies come in two basic flavors: structural and reduced form. Structural modeling involves writing down an explicit mathematical and statistical representation of the determinants of individual, firm, or organizational behavior, such that these relationships can be captured with a finite collection of parameter estimates Reduced form: Reduced form work instead involves attempting to estimate more generally defined contextual objects such as the average treatment effect of past implementations of policy changes. (...) it is possible that one doesn’t learn as much from reduced form estimation as from valid structural estimation. Thus, the choice between structural and reduced form approaches can involve trading off the need to make stronger assumptions (structural work) against the prospect of learning less information (reduced form work) that could prove to be valuable. Parisi I 34 Omitted variables: The fundamental challenge in this context is omitted variable bias. >Empirism/Economic theories. That is, when attempting to isolate the causal effect of policy P on outcome Y through, say, the use of multiple regression analysis, it is necessary to rule out the possibility that any estimated effect is driven by unobserved (or at least uncontrolled for) variables that happen to be correlated with P. Terminology: This general omitted variable bias problem goes by many names (e.g., endogeneity, selection effects, reverse causality, simultaneity, etc.),(...). Suppose we are interested in how changes in a policy P affect some continuous outcome variable Y. Traditional solution: A traditional way to model the relationship between these variables was to assume that there is a parametric function F that relates them structurally, through a combination of assumptions on individual behavior, organizations’ cost functions, and market forces (or other aggregating forces) relating them to each other, such that Y = F(P;τ,ε), where τ is a parameter and ε is an unobserved term. The causal effect of a policy change from P1 to P2 is thus to shift Y from F(P1;τ,ε) to F(P2;τ,ε). If we assume that F is linear in P and ε, then the structural relationship between Y and P is captured by the equation Y = Pτ+ε together with the claim that when ε is held fixed, a change in P’s value from P1 to P2 will induce a change of τ units in Y’s value. On this account, the parameter τ measures the causal effect on Y of a one-unit change in P. If P and ε are uncorrelated, then the OLS estimator is consistent for this causal effect. On the other hand, if P and ε are correlated, then the OLS estimator will differ from τ even in large samples. (...) Parisi I 37 Policies: The key to policy-relevant empirical work, then, involves two questions. First, is it reasonable to assume that ε and P are mean-independent, or that there is a linear structural relationship between Y and P, with P and ε uncorrelated? The second key question is how to estimate causal effects when it is not reasonable to assume that either situation (A) or (B) holds. An enormous amount of modern empirical work is focused on answering this question. Random assignment: One approach to solving the problem of dependence between ε and P is to assign policy levels to units randomly. This approach, common in studies involving the effects of medical and psychological interventions, is frequently used in empirical economics (...).The advantage of random assignment is that it directly imposes the mean independence of ε and P, so that τ may be regarded as the causal effect of the policy, at least within the particular population studied experimentally. For this reason, it is common in the empirical economics literature to consider randomized controlled trials (RCTs) the conceptual benchmark against which other study types are measured. Parisi I 38 Randomized controlled trials/problems: This is surely too strong a claim, as Heckman and Smith (1995)(1) and Deaton (2010)(2) have ably discussed, because RCTs do have potentially important drawbacks. One drawback is that not all questions are susceptible to study using RCTs. RCTs cannot measure what are sometimes called “general equilibrium effects,” that is, effects that a policy change has to behavior outside the study’s domain of impact. >Randomized assignment/Economic theories. 1. Heckman, James J. and Jeffrey A. Smith (1995). “Assessing the Case for Social Experiments.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(2): 85–110. 2. Deaton, Angus (2010). “Instruments, Randomization, and Learning about Development.” Journal of Economic Literature 48(2): 424–455. Gelbach, Jonah B. and Jonathan Klick „Empirical Law and Economics“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Economic Policies | Acemoglu | Acemoglu I 67 Economic policies/poverty/Acemoglu/Robinson: (...) to understand world inequality we have to understand why some societies are organized in very inefficient and socially undesirable ways. Nations sometimes do manage to adopt efficient institutions and achieve prosperity, but alas, these are the rare cases. Most economists and policymakers have focused on “getting it right,” while what is really needed is an explanation for Acemoglu I 68 why poor nations “get it wrong.” Getting it wrong is mostly not about ignorance or culture. >Ignorance/Acemoglu, >Cultural differences/Acemoglu. (...) poor countries are poor because those who have power make choices that create poverty. They get it wrong not by mistake or ignorance but on purpose. |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Economic Policies | Political Philosophy | Mause I 304 Economic Policy/Political Theories: Many politicians argue that money and the financial markets should be decoupled from the real economy. This thesis was widely discussed in political science in the 1980s and 1990s (including Strange 1988).(1) Vs: In recent years, the "counter-argument" that, conversely, financial markets of the real economy determine the heartbeat and thereby both systems show increasing similarities and interlocking possibilities (Overbeck and van Apeldoorn 2012)(2). >Economy, >Financial markets. 1. Susan Strange, States and markets, 2. Aufl. London/ New York 1988. 2. Henk Overbeek & Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Hrsg. Neoliberalism in Crisis. International Political Economy Series. Houndmills/ Basingstoke/ Hampshire 2012. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Economic Rent | Ricardo | Kurz I 280 Economic Rent/Ricardo/classical economics/Kurz: In the Principles Ricardo defines rent rigorously in the following way: „Rent is that portion of the produce of the earth, which is paid to the landIord for the use of the original and indestructihle powers of the soil.“ (Ricardo 1951 : 67)(1). „It is often, however, confounded with the interest and profit of capital, and, in popular language, the term is applied to whatever is annually paid by a farmer to his landlord. If, of two adjoining farms of the same extent, Kurz I 281 and of the same natural fertility, one had all the conveniences of farming buildings, and, besides, were properly drained and manured, and advantageously divided by hedges, fences and walls, while the other had none of these advantages, more remuneration would naturally be paid for the use of one, than for the use of the other; yet in both cases this remuneration would be called rent. But it is evident, that a portion only of the oney annually to be paid for the improved farm, would be given for the original and indestructible powers of the soil; the other portion would be paid for the use of the capital which had been employed in ameliorating the quality of the land, and in erecting such buildings as were necessary to secure and preserve the produce.“ (Ricardo 1951: 67)(1) RicardoVsSmith, Adam: Adam Smith, Ricardo goes on to argue, did not stick to a rigorously defined concept when using the word rent. In Part II of Chapter XI of Book I of The Wealth of Nations ( WN)(2), 'Of the Produce of Land which sometimes does, and sometimes does not, afford Rent', Smith gives an example of the timber business, timber clearly being a reproducible resource, in which he confounds the concepts of profits and rent (WN I.xi.c.5)(2): „He [Smith] tells us, that the demand for timber, and its consequent high price, in the more southern countries of Europe, caused a rent to be paid for forests in Norway, which could before afford no rent. Is it not, however, evident, that the person who paid what he thus calls rent, paid it in consideration of the valuable commodity which was then standing on the land, and that he actually repaid himself with a profit, by the sale of the timber? If, indeed, after the timber was removed, any compensation were paid to the landlord for the use of the land, for the purpose of growing timber or any other produce, with a view to future demand, such compensation might justly be called rent, because it would be paid for productive powers of the land; but in the case stated by Adam Smith, the compensation was paidfor the liberty of removing and se/ling the timber, and not for the liberty of growing it.“ (Ricardo 1951(1): 68) Kurz I 282 Profit/rent/Ricardo: In Ricardo's view the distinction between profits and rent is crucial, because as capital accumulates and the population grows the two component parts of the social surplus are typically affected differently: „This is a distinction of great importance, in an enquiry concerning rent and profits; for it is found, that the laws which regulate the progress of rent, are widely different from those which regulate the progress of profits, and se/dom operate in the same direction. In all improved countries, that which is annually paid to the landlord, partaking of both characters, rent and profit, is sometimes kept stationary by the effects of opposing causes; at other times advances or recedes, as one or the other of these causes preponderates. In the future pages of this work, then, whenever I speak of the rent of land, I wish to be understood as speaking of that compensation, which is paid to the owner of land for the use of its original and indestructible powers.“ (Ricardo 1951:68-9(1)) RicardoVsSmith, Adam: Hence what Smith called 'rent' of coal mines or stone quarries is to Ricardo profits and not rent. >Profit, >Economic Rent, >Royalties. 1. Ricardo, D. (1951 [1817]) On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, in P. Sraffa (ed.) with the collaboration Of M.H. Dobb, The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, Vol. I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (P/b edn 2004, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.) 2. Smith, A. (1976 [1776]) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,in R.H. Campbell, AS Skinner and WB. Todd (eds), The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, Oxford. (In the text quoted as WN, book number, chapter number, section number, paragraph number.) Kurz, Heinz D. and Salvadori, Neri. „Ricardo on exhaustible resources, and the Hotelling Rule.“ In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. Rothbard II 83 Rent/land/Ricardo/Rothbard: Rent served as the linchpin of the Ricardian system. For, according to Ricardo's rather bizarre theory, only land differed in quality. Labour, as we have seen, was assumed to be uniform, and therefore wage rates are uniform, and, as we shall see, profits are also assumed to be uniform because of the crucial postulate of the economy's always being in long-run equilibrium. >Labour, >Ricardo, >Wages/Ricardo. Land is the only factor which miraculously is allowed to differ in quality. Next, Ricardo assumes away any discovery of new lands or improvements in agricultural productivity. His theory of history therefore concludes that people always begin by cultivating the most fertile lands, and, as population increases, the Malthusian pressure on the food supply forces the producers to use ever more inferior lands. In short, as population and food production rise, the cost of growing corn must inexorably rise over time. Rent, in Ricardo's phrase, is payment for the ‘use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil’. This hints at a productivity theory, and indeed Ricardo did see that more fertile and productive lands earned a higher rent. But unfortunately, as Schumpeter put it, Ricardo then ‘embarks upon his detour’. In the first place, Ricardo made the assumption that at any moment the poorest land in cultivation yields a zero rent. He concluded from that alleged fact that a given piece of land earns rent not because of its own productivity, but merely because its productivity is greater than the poorest, zero-rent, land under cultivation. Remember that, for Ricardo, labour is homogeneous and hence wages uniform and equal, and, as we shall see, profits are also uniform and equal. Land is unique in its permanent, long-run structure of differential fertility and productivity. Hence, to Ricardo, rent is purely a Rothbard II 84 differential, and Land A earns rent solely because of its differential productivity compared to Land B, the zero-rent land in cultivation. Rent/land/Ricardo: To Ricardo, several important points followed from these assumptions. First, as population inexorably increases, and poorer and poorer lands are used, all the differentials keep increasing. Thus, say that, at one point of time, corn lands (which sums up all land) range in productivity from the highest, Land A, through a spectrum down to Land J, which, being marginal, earns a zero rent. >Marginal costs/Ricardo. Rothbard II 95 RothbardVsRicardo/Problems: (…) in discussing the rise in cost of producing corn, Ricardo reverses cause and effect. Ricardo states that increasing population ‘obliges’ farmers to work land of inferior quality and then causes a rise in its price. But as any utility theory analyst would realize, the causal chain is precisely the reverse: when the demand for corn increases, its price would rise, and the higher price would lead farmers to grow corn on higher-cost land. But this realization, of course, eliminates the Ricardian theory of value and with it the entire Ricardian system. (…) as numerous critics have pointed out, it is certainly not true historically that people always start using the highest-quality land and then sink gradually and inevitably down to more and more inferior land. Rothbard II 91 VsRicardo/Rothbard: One of the greatest fallacies of the Ricardian theory of rent is that it ignores the fact that landlords do perform a vital economic function: they allocate land to its best and most productive use. Land does not allocate itself; it must be allocated, and only those who earn a return from such service have the incentive, or the ability, to allocate various parcels of land to their most profitable, and hence most productive and economic uses. >Allocation. Ricardo himself did not go all the way to government expropriation of land rent. His short-run solution was to call for lowering of the tariff on corn, or even repeal of the Corn Laws entirely. Rothbard II 108 VsRicardo: The Ricardian theory of rent was effectively demolished by Thomas Perronet Thompson (1783–1869) in his pamphlet, The True Theory of Rent (1826)(1). Thompson weighed in against this fallacious capstone to the Ricardian system: ‘The celebrated Theory of Rent’, Thompson charged, ‘is founded on a fallacy’, for demand is the key to the price of corn and to rent. The fallacy lies, in assuming to be the cause what in reality is only a consequence... [I]t is the rise in the price of produce... that enables and causes inferior land to be brought into cultivation; and not the cultivation of inferior land that causes the rise of rent. 1. Thomas Perronet Thompson. 1826. The True Theory of Rent, in Opposition to Mr. Ricardo and Others. Being an Exposition of Fallacies on Rent, Tithes, &C. In the Form of a Review of Mr. Mill's Elements of Political Economy. London. |
EconRic I David Ricardo On the principles of political economy and taxation Indianapolis 2004 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Economic Systems | Rawls | I 265 Economic systems/Political economy/Rawls: Political economy deals with the public sector and institutions that influence economic life through taxes, property rights and market structures, etc. An economic system regulates which goods are produced and by which means, who receives them in return for what compensation and what proportion of social resources is spent on the conservation of public goods (e. g. infrastructure). >Political Economy. Public sector/Rawls: has two aspects: 1. Characteristic: relates to the ownership of means of production. Thus, for example, the public sector in socialism is larger than in capitalism. It is smaller in privately organised systems and mainly affects public institutions and transport. 2. Characteristic: relates to the proportion of resources spent on public goods (infrastructure, etc.). Public goods/Rawls: are above all indivisible and open to the public(1). If citizens want to benefit from this, it must be set up in such a way that everyone benefits to the same extent. National defense, for example. I 267 This means that public goods have to be steered by the political process and not by the market. >Politics, >Markets. I 268 For example, environmental damage is not normally regulated by the market. For example, raw materials may be produced at a much lower cost than their marginal social costs. Here there is a difference between private and social accounting that the market does not register. In this case, the indivisibility of public goods (e. g. infrastructure, freedoms, etc.) requires the state to take over the scheme. Problem: even in a society of people of justice, the isolation of individual decisions does not lead to the fulfilment of the general interest. >Public goods. 1. See J. M. Buchananan, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Chicago, 1968, ch. IX. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Economic Uncertainty | Economic Theories | Rieth I 5 Economic Uncertainty/Economic theories/Boer/Rieth: The standard approach is to assume exclusion restrictions between first and second moment shifts (Bloom, 2009(1); Baker et al., 2016(2); Caldara et al., 2020(3)). However, their is little theoretical guidance for such restrictions and in practice some researchers order uncertainty first and others the level of variables. In addition to the theoretical doubts, Kilian et al. (2022)(4) show that exclusion restrictions are empirically invalid for identifying uncertainty shocks. A few articles allow for simultaneous feedback between first and second moments (Piffer and Podstawski, 2018(5); Berger et al., 2020(6); Ludvigson et al., 2021)(7). These propose using instruments, shock restrictions, a combination of both, or options prices to disentangle level and uncertainty shocks. They study the impact of general macroeconomic or financial uncertainty.* >Market uncertainty, >Tariffs, >Tariff impacts, >Tariff responsivity, >Tariff history. *Aonther difference to the articles that look at macroeconomic or financial uncertainty is that these uncertainty measures affect domestic firms directly, whereas trade policy uncertainty is more relevant for foreign exporters. 1. Bloom, N. (2009). The impact of uncertainty shocks. econometrica, 77(3):623–685. 2. Baker, S. R., Bloom, N., and Davis, S. J. (2016). Measuring economic policy uncertainty. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(4):1593–1636. 3. Caldara, D., Iacoviello, M., Molligo, P., Prestipino, A., and Raffo, A. (2020). The economic effects of trade policy uncertainty. Journal of Monetary Economics, 109:38–59. 4. Kilian, L., Plante, M., and Richter, A. W. (2022). Macroeconomic responses to uncertainty shocks: the perils of recursive orderings. 5. Piffer, M. and Podstawski, M. (2018). Identifying uncertainty shocks using the price of gold. The Economic Journal, 128(616):3266–3284. 6. Berger, D., Dew-Becker, I., and Giglio, S. (2020). Uncertainty shocks as second-moment news shocks. The Review of Economic Studies, 87(1):40–76. 7. Ludvigson, S. C., Ma, S., and Ng, S. (2021). Uncertainty and business cycles: exogenous impulse or endogenous response? American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 13(4):369–410. |
Rieth I Malte Rieth Lukas Boer The Macroeconomic Consequences of Import Tariffs and Trade Policy Uncertainty. IMF Working Paper 24/13. International Monetary Fund. Washington, D.C. 2024 |
| Economics | Buchanan | Boudreaux I 79 Economics/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: In one of his earlier papers, “Economics, Welfare, and Political Economy,” published in 1959, Buchanan identified two distinct yet related roles that the economist can legitimately play. The first is that of the “economist” as such; the second is that of the “political economist.” The sole role of the economist per se is to improve humankind’s understanding of the workings of the economy, including how economic activity is likely to be altered when changes in the economic environment occur. Boudreaux I 80 Politics: These might be policy changes, such as changes in tax rates or new regulations, but these might instead be changes in other factors, such as adverse weather that cuts crop yields. Economists pursue this goal through research and analyses that permit them to make predictions about the effects of such changes in the economic environment. Political economics: In contrast, when the economist steps into the role of political economist, the reason for doing so is to help citizens choose better rules under which they live. Nevertheless, like the economist, the political economist’s task is not to impose his or her own values or preferences on others. Political decisions: It is not the job of either the economist or the political economist to recommend, much less insist upon, this policy or that. Such a role, Buchanan believed, is reserved for individuals only in their capacity as citizens. The political economist’s function is merely to propose changes in rules and institutions to which individual citizens can either agree or disagree - accept or reject. Ideally, in Buchanan’s view, agreement would require unanimity, or something very close to it. Politics as exchange: if all, or nearly all, people must agree to a change in rules, then any proposed rule change that is approved by such a vote can confidently be assumed to be one that is truly socially beneficial rather than one that benefits some individuals at the expense of others. >Agreement/Buchanan. That is the essence of the idea of politics as exchange. likely to be altered when changes in the economic environment occur. These might be policy changes, such as changes in tax rates or new regulations, but these might instead be changes in other factors, such as adverse weather that cuts crop yields. Economists pursue this goal through research and analyses that permit them to make predictions about the effects of such changes in the economic environment. Political economics: In contrast, when the economist steps into the role of political economist, the reason for doing so is to help citizens choose better rules under which they live. Nevertheless, like the economist, the political economist’s task is not to impose his or her own values or preferences on others. It is not the job of either the economist or the political economist to recommend, much less insist upon, this policy or that. Such a role, Buchanan believed, is reserved for individuals only in their capacity as citizens. The political economist’s function is merely to propose changes in rules and institutions to which individual citizens can either agree or disagree - accept or reject. Ideally, in Buchanan’s view, agreement would require unanimity, or something very close to it. If all, or nearly all, people must agree to a change in rules, then any proposed rule change that is approved by such a vote can confidently be assumed to be one that is truly socially beneficial rather than one that benefits some individuals at the expense of others. That is the essence of the idea of politics as exchange. >Social Contract/Buchanan, >Society/Buchanan. Boudreaux I 96 Economics/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: Def Economics/Samuelson: „Economics is the study of how men and society end up choosing, with or without the use of money, to employ scarce productive resources that could have alternative uses, to produce various commodities and distribute them for consumption, now or in the future, among various people and groups in society” (Samuelson, 1973)(2). Def Economics/Robbins: “Economics is a science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses” (Robbins, 1932)(3). BuchananVsSamuelson/BuchananVsRobbins: Buchanan saw two problems with this approach to economics. 1) The first problem is that in the twentieth century economists came to assume that each individual has a set of preferences, what economists call a “utility function,” that is fixed and fully known to him or her. Choices: But, Buchanan noted, if this assumption accurately describes reality, then individuals would not truly choose. If you know with 100 percent certainty that eating the peach will give you greater satisfaction than eating the pear, “choosing” the peach over the pear is a purely mechanical act. Popular language recognizes this fact with the phrase, “It’s not much of a choice,” as in, for example, saying “It’s not much of a choice” when confronted with the “choice” to pay $5 for a glass of beer or $6 for that same glass of beer. For Buchanan, the act of human choice necessarily involves some uncertainty about the merits of one option over another. As he concluded: “If I know what I want, a computer can make all of my choices for me. If I do not know what I want, no possible computer can derive my utility function since it does not really exist” (Buchanan, 1964(4): 217). Buchanan emphasized the open-endedness of choice even further by insisting that human preferences do not exist independently of the very choices that individuals make. >Rational Choice/Buchanan. Boudreaux I 97 2) A second problem with the standard textbook approach to economics is more serious. It judges how well or poorly resources are being used as if society itself is a sentient creature with its own preferences. That is, economists treat society as an individual with preferences, and then they ask if society uses (“allocates”) its resources in ways that best satisfy its preferences. >Society/Buchanan, >Agreement/Buchanan, >Decision-making/Buchanan, >Unamity/Buchanan. 1. James M. Buchanan. (1959). “ Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy ” The Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 2 (Oct., 1959), pp. 124-138. 2. Samuelson, Paul A. (1973). Economics, 9th ed. McGraw-Hill. Smith, Adam. (1776/1937). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Modern Library Edition. 3. Robbins, Lionel (1932). The Nature and Significance of Economic Science. Macmillan. 4. Buchanan, James M. (1964). “What Should Economists Do?” Sothern Economic Journal (January). |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 |
| Economics | Samuelson | Boudreaux I 96 Def Economics/Samuelson/Boudreaux/Holcombe: (…) the American economist Paul Samuelson (1915–2009) in his highly influential introductory textbook offered a similar definition, elaborating considerably on the nature of those choices: “Economics is the study of how men and society end up choosing, with or without the use of money, to employ scarce productive resources that could have alternative uses, to produce various commodities and distribute them for consumption, now or in the future, among various people and groups in society” (Samuelson, 1973)(1). >Economics/Buchanan. 1. Samuelson, Paul A. (1973). Economics, 9th ed. McGraw-Hill. Smith, Adam. (1776/1937). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Modern Library Edition. |
EconSamu I Paul A. Samuelson The foundations of economic analysis Cambridge 1947 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 |
| Economy | Buchanan | Boudreaux I 97/98 Economy/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: Buchanan insisted that the focus of economic analysis should be on markets, that is, on institutions of exchange, rather than on resource allocation. Buchanan says of economists who “are wholly concerned with the allocation of scarce resources among competing ends or uses… that theirs is not legitimate activity for practitioners of economics, as I want to define the discipline” (Buchanan, 1964(1): 216). The reason Buchanan insisted on this distinction (…) is that to conceive of economic activity as an exercise in resource allocation is to unwittingly assume that society is rather like a giant sentient individual with preferences all its own. Given its preferences and its income, society has only one “correct” way to “choose” - that there is one optimal allocation of resources. >Group behavior/Buchanan. Society/Buchanan: But, (…) society is not a giant sentient individual with its own preferences and brain for choosing. Society is the complex interactions of many individuals each in pursuit of his or her own goals. >Society/Buchanan. Solution/Buchanan: An “economy,” Buchanan observed, is the name that we give to the on-going process of many different individuals (and other organizations, including households and firms) pursuing their own individually chosen goals but with no overarching shared goal such as “the goal of the national economy.“(2) Boudreaux I 100 The engineering perspective that Buchanan warned against leads to individuals and firms being seen as mere cogs in a great machine, as a means for helping the economy achieve some grand outcome. As a value judgment, Buchanan, working as he did in the individualist, classical-liberal tradition, rejected this understanding of individuals. In addition, as an objective matter of economic science, Buchanan pointed out that this engineering conception of the economy is simply incorrect. Because the economy isn’t a sentient creature with purposes, it has no goals that can be pursued and met. The economy is nothing more than that which emerges, undesigned and unintended, when countless sentient individuals, in pursuit of their own goals, exchange with each other. 1. Buchanan, James M. (1964). “What Should Economists Do?” Sothern Economic Journal (January). 2. Ibid. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 |
| Economy | Fanon | Brocker I 387 Economy/Postcolonialism/Fanon: Thesis: The post-colonial bourgeoisies have neglected to change the colonial economic Brocker I 388 structures that were strongly geared to the export of raw materials and agricultural raw products. Instead of taking measures of industrialisation and economic modernisation, they would have cultivated local handicrafts - for their own profit (1), and under the seal of tourism organized "recreational centres and amusement cures for the Western bourgeoisie", thus making "their country a brothel of Europe" (2). >Colonialism, >Postcolonialism. Agricultural production/post-colonialism/Fanon: exploitation has even intensified here. (3) Government budget: mostly feeds on bonds and economic aid from the former metropolises, leading to a "neo-colonialist structure". Ultimately its therefore to combat the national bourgeoisies that carry these structures. Solution/Fanon: a nationalisation of the service sector through the creation of decentralised, democratically organised sales and purchasing cooperatives. (4) 1. Frantz Fanon, Les damnés de la terre, Paris 1961. Dt.: Frantz Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde, Frankfurt/M. 1981, S. 129 2. Ibid. p. 131 3. Ibid. p. 132 4. Ibid. p. 153f. Ina Kerner „Frantz Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolFanon I Frantz Fanon Les Damnés de la Terre, Paris 1963 - Engl Transl. The Wretched of the Earth, New York 1963 German Edition: Die Verdammten dieser Erde Reinbek 1969 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Economy | Neoclassical Economics | Mause I 51f Economy/Neo-Classicism: Political economy is being replaced by "pure" economy in the form of Neo-Classicism. This is called the "marginalist" revolution. 1) All economic issues are considered from the point of view of optimization under constraints. It is always a matter of optimizing an objective function (e.g. the utility function of a budget) under consideration of certain constraints (e.g. the amount of the household budget) (in the example case to maximize). For this purpose, a marginal value analysis is carried out, i.e. a marginal analysis. (> Rational Choice). 2) The neoclassical analysis focuses on equilibrium - a situation in which there is no reason to change behaviour. Of central importance here is the question of the existence of market equilibria and their characteristics. 3) The principle of methodological individualism applies, according to which all economic phenomena must be explained by individual actions. This implies in particular that society is merely a sum of individuals and that their preferences are independent of each other. I 52 Main representatives: Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1877), who established the foundation of price theory (Cournot 1838 (1); Hermann Heinrich Gossen (1810-1858), who founded consumer theory (Gossen 1854) (2); and Johann Heinrich von Thünen (1783-1850), who laid the foundations of production and distribution theory (Thünen 1826) (3). In the following period, these approaches were further developed and implemented by William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) and Léon Walras (1834-1910) (Jevons 1871) (4); Walras 1874/ 1877) (5). NeoclassicismVsClassic: all three basic components of the neoclassical paradigm are foreign to classic: this is most evident in the case of the optimization and equilibrium principle; but the classics also did not represent strict methodological individualism, but recognized the social nature of human beings and therefore considered the analytical use of supra-individual concepts to be justified (without therefore conceding this one real existence independent of individuals). The neoclassicists were always striving for a "scientificization" of economics, for the establishment of their discipline as one of the natural sciences, and here above all physics. (optimization, balance). Classic: considers economic action, i.e. the emergence and distribution of material wealth. Neoclassicism: this analysis is not compatible with the new formal understanding. The neoclassical economy is microeconomic, i.e. the analysis focuses on the behaviour of individual economic entities, i.e. individual households (consumption theory) and companies (production and price theory). 1. A. Cournot, Recherches sur les Principes Mathématiques de la Théorie des Richesses. Paris, 1838. 2. H.H.Gossen, Entwickelung der Gesetze des menschlichen Verkehrs, und der daraus fließenden Regeln für menschliches Handeln. Braunschweig 1854 3. J.H. von Thünen, Der isolirte Staat in Beziehung auf Landwirthschaft und Nationalökonomie. Hamburg 1826 4. W.St.Jevons, 1871. The theory of political economy. London 1871 5. L. Walras, Eléments d’Economie Politique Pure. Teile I– III (1874), Teile IV– VI (1877). Lausanne 1874/ 1877. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Economy | Policy of Russia | Krastev I 134 Economy/Policy of Russia/Krastev: Post-communist Russia illustrates how a handful of politically unaccountable and self-enriching rulers have, despite internal rivalries, managed to stay atop the country's fragmented society without resorting to historically significant levels of mass violence. Economist Gabriel Zucman calculated that, in 2015 , 52 per cent of Russia's wealth resided outside of the country.(1) Krastev: This political model, neither democratic nor authoritarian, neither exploitative of a working-class majority in the Marxist sense nor repressive of all individual freedoms in the liberal sense, is an image ofthe future that should keep us awake at night. This is the nightmare the Kremlin wants us to have.(2) Power/Krastev: What is causing anxiety among some Western liberals is not the fear that Russia will run the world, but that much of the world will be run the way Russia is run today. 1. Gabriel Zucman, The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax Havens (University of Chicago Press, 2016). 2. Franklin Foer, 'How Kleptocracy Came to America', The Atlantic (March 2019). |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Economy | Republicanism | Mause I 51 Economy/Politics/Republicanism: Republicanism Thesis: the economy - especially under market economy conditions - has to comply with the determination of aims of politics, which guarantees the state extensive rights of intervention in the market politically-theoretically, whose practical and political implementation certainly poses difficult challenges for the territorial state in view of the increasing globalization of markets and transnational economic actors since the 19th century. >State, >Society, >Politics, >Intervention, >Interventionism, >Legislation. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Economy | Ricardo | Rothbard II 82 Economy/Ricardo/Rothbard: In contrast to Adam Smith, for whom the output, or wealth, of nations was of supreme importance, Ricardo neglected total output to place overriding emphasis on the alleged distribution of a given product into macro-classes. Specifically, into the three macro-classes of landlords, labourers and capitalists. Thus, in a letter to Malthus, who on this question at least was an orthodox Smithian, Ricardo made the distinction clear: ‘Political economy, you think, is an enquiry into the nature and causes of wealth; I think it should rather be called an enquiry into the laws which determine the division of the produce of industry amongst the classes who concur in its formation.’ Since entrepreneurship could not exist in Ricardo's world of long-run equilibrium, he was left with the classical triad of factors. His analysis was strictly holistic, in terms of allegedly homogeneous but actually varied and diverse classes. Ricardo avoided any Say-type emphasis on the individual, whether he be the consumer, worker, producer or businessman. SchumpeterVsRicardo: In Ricardo's world of verbal mathematics there were, as Schumpeter has astutely pointed out, four variables: total output or income, and shares of income to landlords, capitalists, and workers, i.e. rent, profits (long-run interest) and wages. Problem: [Ricardo] had four variables, but only one equation with which to solve them: Total output (or income) = rent + profits + wages. To solve, or rather pretend to solve, this equation, Ricardo had to ‘determine’ one or more of these entities from outside his equation, and in such a way as to leave others as residuals. >Wages/Ricardo, >Rent/Ricardo, >Land/Ricardo, >Marginal costs/Ricardo, >Ricardian economics. Rothbard II 195 Money/Prices/Rocardo/Rothbard: For money to be strictly neutral to everything except a general level of prices, Ricardo had to assert a strict, radical dichotomization between the monetary and the real worlds, with values, relative prices, production and incomes determined only in the 'real' sphere, while overall prices were set exclusively in the monetary sphere. >Bullionism. RothbardVsRicardo: And never the two spheres could meet. And here began the fateful and all-pervasive modern fallacy of a severe split between two hermetically sealed worlds: the 'micro' and the 'macro', each with its own determinants and laws. Furthermore, as Salerno(1) writes, fit was Ricardo's strong affrmation of the neutral-money doctrine in his bullionist writings that was to serve as the source of the classical conception of money as merely a "veil" hiding the "real" phenomena and processes of the economy".(1) In particular, if money is neutral, then value, or relative prices, had to have only 'real' determinants, which Ricardo discovered in embodied quantities of labour. 1. Joseph Salerno, 'The Doctrinal Antecedents of the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments' (doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University, 1980), p. 447. Salerno goes on to point out that Ricardo's strict, mechanistic split between the money and the real, leading to the doctrine that money is a 'veil', led also to the seeming paradox of Ricardo, in his Principles, flip-flopping to a highly misleading purely real, non-monetary, 'barter' analysis of the balance of payments. The paradox is only seeming, for a severe split enables someone to leap back and forth between the purely monetary and the purely real. It was the barter analysis of Ricardo's Principles, Salerno notes, 'which served as the foundation for the classical theory of the balance of payments'. Ibid., p. 449. |
EconRic I David Ricardo On the principles of political economy and taxation Indianapolis 2004 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Ecosystemic Approach | Bronfenbrenner | Upton I 16 Ecosystemic Approach/Bronfenbrenner/Upton: Bronfenbrenner’s biocological systems theory (Bronfenbrenner 1977)(1) provides us with a framework for looking at the different factors that influence human development. Bronfenbrenner acknowledges the importance of biological factors for development, but also points to the fact that, more than any other species, humans create Upton I 17 the environments that help shape their own development. Development always occurs in a particular social context and this context can change development. Bronfenbrenner maintained that human beings can therefore develop those environments to optimise their genetic potential. >Environment. Aspects of the environment: Microsystem: this includes the immediate environment we live in and any immediate relationships or organisations we interact with, such as the family, school, workplace, peer group and neighbourhood. Mesosystem: this level describes the connections between immediate environments. According to Bronfenbrenner, the way in which the different groups or organisations in the microsystem work together will have an effect on how we develop as individuals. Exosystem: this refers to the external environmental settings that only indirectly affect development, such as a parent’s workplace. Macrosystem: this is the larger cultural context and includes cultural and social norms and attitudes, national economy, political culture and so on. Although this layer is the most remote from the individual, it still influences development, for example by shaping how the micro- and exosystems are organised. >Norms, >Attitudes, >Socialization, >Social identity. Upton I 18 Chronosystem: this system refers to the dimension of time as it relates to an individual’s environments. Elements within this system can be either external, such as the timing of a loved one’s death, or internal, such as the physiological changes that occur with ageing. As individuals get older, they may react differently to environmental changes and may be more able to determine more how those changes will influence them. >Aging. 1. Bronfenbrenner, U. (1977) Toward an experimental ecology of human development. American Psychologist, 32: 513–31. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Education | Acemoglu | Acemoglu I 78 Education/Acemoglu/Robinson: The low education level of poor countries is caused by economic institutions that fail to create incentives for parents to educate their children and by political institutions that fail to induce the government to build, finance, and support schools and the wishes of parents and children. The price these nations pay for low education of their population and lack of inclusive markets is high. >Prosperity/Acemoglu, >Institutions/Acemoglu, >Economic policies/Acemoglu. |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Education | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 97 Education/schooling/developmental psychology/Upton: The experiences children are exposed to in school, whether through discovery learning or direct instruction,(…) seem to influence cognitive development. But how does school influence development and is school necessary? Although the topic may be the same, the content may not, and variations are seen in terms of the depth and breadth of information that children are expected to cover (NRC, 1996)(1). >Cognitive development, >Learning, >Learning theory. In maths and science, for example, an international survey found that the content covered was dictated in part by the social and cultural setting in which the child lives and the expectations of that culture (NRC, 1996)(1). Curriculum delivery has also been found to be different within as well as across cultures (NRC, 1996(1); Moor et al., 2006)(2). There has been a lot of debate in education about the extent to which schooling and curriculum content matter for intellectual development (e.g. Hanushek, 2003(3); Sammons et al., 2004)(4). Separating learning and development – often expressed as the influence of school versus individual ability – is particularly difficult (Carneiro et al., 2001)(5). Cultural differences: Cross-cultural studies have shown that cognitive skills develop at different rates and may manifest themselves in different ways depending on the context in which a child lives (Cole, 1990)(6). Nunes et al. (1993)(7) showed, for example, how child street traders in Brazil who had not been exposed to formal schooling had difficulty finding the correct solution to hypothetical mathematical problems when these problems were given to them in written form. However, they did statistically better when the same problem was presented orally. >Cultural differences. Upton I 98 Logic: Development of logical thought is not influenced by schooling – it will develop anyway. However, what school does influence is how those skills develop and are manifest, by teaching the language and expectations of a specific cultural setting in relation to particular cognitive tasks (Cole, 1990)(6). This happens in two ways. First, children learn the jargon necessary to access academic tests of cognitive ability at school. Second, they learn how to manipulate a new set of linguistic symbols by learning to read and write. >Symbolic communication, >Symbolic reference, >Writing, >Reading, >Reading acquisision. 1.National Research Council (NRC) (1996) Mathematics and Science Education Around the World: What can we learn from the Survey of Mathematics and Science Opportunities (SMSO) and the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS)? Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 2. Moor, H, Jones, M, Johnson, F, Martin, K, Cowell, E and Bojke, C (2006) Mathematics and Science in Secondary Schools:the Deployment of Teachers and Support Staff to Deliver the Curriculum (DfES Research Report 708). London: DfES. Available at www.dfes.gov.uk/research/data/uploadfiles/RR708.pdf 3. Hanushek, EA (2003) The Economics of Schooling and School Quality. London: Edward Elgar. 4. Sammons, P, Elliot, K, Sylva, K, Melhuish, M, Siraj-Blatchford and Taggart, B (2004). The impact of pre-school on young children’s cognitive attainments at entry to reception. British Education Research Journal, 30 (5): 691–712. 5. Carneiro, P, Heckman, JJ and Vytlacil, E (2001) Estimating the Return to Education when it Varies among Individuals. Available online at www.iza.org/en/papers/Vytlacil131101.pdf (accessed 12 March 2011). 6. Cole, M (1990) Cognitive development and formal schooling: the evidence from cross-cultural research, in Moll, LC (ed.) Vygotsky and Education. New York: Cambridge University Press. 7. Nunes, T, Schliemann, AD and Carraher, DW (1993) Street Mathematics and School Mathematics, New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Education | Economic Theories | Mause I 513 Education/investment/Economic Theory: How are pensions (welfare gains of human capital investment) divided between employers and employees? Each party will try to take in the largest part. See Williamson 1985 (1). Varieties of Capitalism analysis: emphasises the complementarity of human capital and labour input on the one hand and the qualification system on the other. In addition, the financial institutions, social policy and coordination mechanisms are part of the overall institutional structure (Hall and Soskice 2001) (2). Education/Economic Theory: Question: Is class size decisive for educational effects? For the USA this has been investigated (Hanushek 2002) (3). The result is that smaller classes do not improve students' performance. The 1995 TIMSS study found for Germany that larger classes even lead to better performance. Statistical problem: it must be taken into account that worse pupils often go to lower secondary schools that have smaller classes. However, this aspect was taken into account in the study. 1. Williamson, Oliver E. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational contracting. New York 1985. 2. Hall, Peter A., und David Soskice. 2001. Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford 2001. 3. Hanushek, Eric A. Publicly provided education. In Handbook of public economics, Hrsg. Alan J. Auerbach und Martin Feldstein, 4. Aufl., 2045– 2141. Amsterdam 2002. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Education | Gandhi | Brocker I 59 Education/Gandhi: Gandhi doubts the need for compulsory education. The farmer does not need to be able to read or write in order to earn a living. "He has a basic knowledge of the world. He knows how to behave towards his parents, his wife, his children and his village neighbours. (1) Gandhi complains, "our best newspapers are in English" and "we [...] write each other letters in incorrect English. If this state continues for a long time, posterity will[...] curse us". (2) English as an administrative language should be expelled.(3) Cf. >Colonialism, >Postcolonialism, >Nationalism, >Language Acquisition, >Education, >Educational Policy, >Culture, >Cultural Values, >Cultural Tradition, >Culture Shift, >Governance, >Civil Disobedience. 1. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule, Ahmedabad 1938 (zuerst 1909). Dt.: Mahatma Gandhi, Hind Swaraj oder Indische Selbstregierung, in: ders., Ausgewählte Werke. Grundlegende Schriften, herausgegeben von Shriman Narayan, bearbeitet von Wolfgang Sternstein, Göttingen 2011, Bd. 3. S. 147 2. ibid. p. 149 3. ibid. p. 151. Dietmar Rothermund, Mahatma Gandhi in: Brocker, Manfred, Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Education | Hegel | Gadamer I 17 Education/Hegel/Gadamer: In fact, Hegel has most sharply emphasized what education is. We follow him first(1). He has also seen that philosophy "has the condition of its existence in education", and we add: with it the humanities. For the existence of the spirit is intrinsically linked to the idea of education. Man is characterized by the break with the immediate and natural, which is expected of him by the spiritual, rational side of his being. "According to this side he is not by nature what he should be" - and therefore he needs education. What Hegel called the formal nature of Gadamer I 18 education is based on its generality. From the concept of an elevation to the general public, Hegel is able to understand uniformly what his time understood by education. >Generality. Generality/Hegel/Gadamer: It is the general nature of human education to make itself a general spiritual being. Whoever abandons himself to particularity is uneducated, e.g. whoever gives in to his blind anger without measure or proportion.. Abstraction/Hegel: Hegel shows that such a person basically lacks the power of abstraction: he cannot disregard himself and look at a general from which his particularity is determined by measure and proportion. >Abstractness/Hegel. Work on consciousness: In the "Phenomenology of the Spirit" Hegel develops the genesis of a really "in and of itself" free self-consciousness and shows that the essence of work is to form the thing instead of consuming it(2). Gadamer I 19 Theoretical and practical education/Hegel: Already in [Hegel's] description of practical education one recognizes the basic determination of the historical spirit: to reconcile with oneself, to recognize oneself in being different. It becomes completely clear in the idea of theoretical education. For theoretical behaviour as such is already alienation, namely the imposition of "dealing with something that is not immediate, something alien, with something belonging to memory, remembrance and thinking". >History/Hegel. Theoretical education thus leads beyond what man knows and experiences directly. It consists in learning to accept other things and to find general points of view in order to grasp the matter, "the objective in its freedom" and without selfish interest(3). Basic idea/Gadamer: To recognize one's own in the unknown, to become at home in it, is the basic movement of the spirit, whose being is only a return to oneself Gadamer I 20 from being different. >Generality/Gadamer. 1. Hegel, Philosophische Propädeutik, S41—45. [Vgl. inzwischen die Textsammlung von J. -E. Pleines, Bildungstheorien. Probleme und Positionen. Freiburg 1978.] 2. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (Phil. Bibl. 114), ed. Hoffmeister, S. 148ff. 3. Hegel XVIII, S. 62. Mause I 47 Education/Hegel: the Republican identification of the citizen with the political community takes place through institutionally secured processes of "education" (1), in which citizens gain the ability to look beyond the limits of their private interests and to recognize themselves as parts of a moral whole. The education from bourgeois to citoyen takes place (...) through the competence to change perspective acquired gradually and in a reflexive way in different interaction and socialisation contexts. An important role in this is played by I 48 the institution of the 'corporation', still treated by Hegel in the context of 'civil society', together with the 'police' (2): professional associations in which the market participant experiences - beyond concrete profit orientation - recognition and solidarity by fellow professionals and thus a social integration still in the sphere of the 'bourgeois society', which enables him to cross the horizon of selfish pursuit of interests and thereby prepares him for his civic role. >Bourgeois/Citoyen, >Citizenship, >State, >Community, >Society. 1. G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Werke 7, Hrsg. Eva Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt a. M. 1989, S. 343-345. 2. Ibid. p. 382, 393-398. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Education | Multiculturalism | Gaus I 253 Education/religion/multiculturalism/Kukathas: Kymlicka (1995a(1): 163), for example, recognizes the dilemma liberals face here, but suggests that in the end children need to be educated so that they choose for themselves the paths they will take. Others, however, have been more insistent that the education of children is without doubt of fundamental importance, both from the perspective of the individual child and from the perspective of the Gaus I 254 liberal state - and should take priority over religious or other claims. Education is education for citizenship. Macedo: Stephen Macedo, for example, argues that those who embrace multiculturalism should not forget that 'liberal citizens do not come into existence naturally' that diversity 'must be consti- tuted for liberal democratic purposes'. Children, in his view, must be educated so that they become liberal citizens (Macedo, 1995a(2): 68; and also Macedo, 1995b(3); 2000(4)). Gutmann; A similar view is advanced by Amy Gutmann, even as she is at pains to emphasize the importance of a multicultural education and the dangers of a schooling that ignores the diversity of traditions found in a society. Education must, in the end, be education for democratic citizenship, even if not only for citizenship (Gutmann, 1996(5)). Walzer: That it will also tend to assimilate minorities, and work toward the transformation of religious communities, cannot be denied, and so must be accepted (Walzer, 1995(6): 29). Callan: As Eamonn Callan observes, 'schools must somehow honour both the interest in identity formation that rightly belongs to parents and the interest we all share as members of a civic community' (2000(7): 66; see also Callan, 1997)(8). Religion/groups/state: The tension between the claims of state and religious community when the treatment and education of children are at issue has surfaced on numerous occasions in legal cases, which have in turn generated considerable debate in political theory. Example: In 1972, in the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, the United States Supreme Court decided in favour of Old Order Amish parents who wished to withdraw their children from Wisconsin state schools after eighth grade, two years earlier than statutory requirements for compulsory education permitted. Explanation: A number of theorists have argued that this was a poor decision, either because it neglects the interests of the child, though this should not be exaggerated since only two additional years of education were at issue (Feinberg, 1980(9); Gutmann, 1980(10)), or because it fails to recognize the importance of education for citizenship (Arneson and Shapiro, 1996)(11). Others, however, have argued that the liberal state should resist usurping parental authority in order to impose its opinion on what is the best way of life for the child (Burt, 1996(12): 432). Problems: (...) liberal theorists have been divided on the limits of parental authority and the scope for exemptions based on religious or cultural beliefs (compare Callan, 1997(8) and Tomasi, 2001(13)). One of the dilemmas posed by such circumstances is whether to bear the costs of granting exemptions or the costs of refusing them. If the cost of granting parents exemptions is that their children will not be exposed to a diversity of views (which, presumably, would make them better citizens), the cost of denying parents exemptions might be that more parents decide to home school their children, thereby cutting them off even more seriously from the democratic mainstream (Reich, 2002(14)). Headscarves affair: [France 1989]: in this instance, a problem arose because three North African immigrant women in a French public secondary school chose to wear their headscarves in class, in a gesture that was interpreted as a challenge to the national policy of secularism in schools. As Bhikhu Parekh notes, this issue 'went to the heart of the French conceptions of citizenship and national identity and divided the country' (2000(15): 250). But it also divided political theorists (Galeotti, 1993(16); 1994; Moruzzi, 1994a(17); 1994b(18)). Kukathas: in this, as with other controversies surrounding the matter of dress, the problem is that dress is not unambiguously a private matter. Laicism: in the headscarves case, however, the problem was deepened by the French educational system and its philosophical principle, laicité, which demands state neutrality towards 'all kinds of religious practices, institutionalized through a vigilant removal of sectarian religious symbols, signs, icons, and items of clothing from official public spheres' (Benhabbib, 2002(19): 95—6). Kuikathas: how this was to be squared with other public commitments to freedom of religion and liberty of conscience, as well as personal liberty, became entirely obscure. Cf. >Customs/Morality/Multiculturalism. 1. Kymlicka, Will (1995a) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Macedo, Stephen (1995a) 'Multiculturalism for the religious right? Defending liberal civic education'. In Yael Tamir, ed., Democratic Education in a Multicultural State. Oxford: Blackwell, 65—80. 3. Macedo, Stephen (1995b) 'Liberal civic education and religious fundamentalism: the case of God v. John Rawls'. Ethics, 105:468-96. 4. Macedo, Stephen (2000) Democracy and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5. Gutmann, Amy (1996) 'Challenges of multiculturalism in democratic education'. In Robert K. Fullinwider, ed., Public Education in a Multicultural Society: Policy, Theory, Critique. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 156-79. 6. Walzer, Michael (1995) 'Education, democratic citizenship, and multiculturalism'. In Yeal Tamir, ed., Democratic Education in a Multicultural State. Oxford: Blackwell, 23-32. 7. Callan, Eamonn (2000) 'Discrimination and religious schooling'. In Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, eds, Citizenship in Diverse Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 45—67. 8. Callan, Eamonn (1997) Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 9. Feinberg, Joel (1980) 'The child's right to an open future'. In William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette, eds, Whose Child? Children's Rights, Parental Authority, and State Power. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield Adams. 10. Gutmann, Amy (1980) 'Children, paternalism and education'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9 (4): 338—58. 11. Arneson, Richard and Ian Shapiro (1996) 'Democratic autonomy and religious freedom: a critique of Wisconsin v. Yoder'. In Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin eds, Political Order: NOMOS XXXVIII. New York: New York University Press, 365—411. 12. Burt, Shelley (1996) 'In defense of Yoder. parental authority and the public schools'. In Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin, eds, Political Order: NOMOS XXXVIII. New York: New York Umversity Press, 412—37. 13. Tomasi, John (2001) Liberalism Beyond Justice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 14. Reich, Rob (2002) Bridging Liberalism and Multiculturalism in American Education. Chicago: Umversity of Chicago Press. 15. Parekh, Bhikhu (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. London: Macmillan. 16. Galeotti, Anna Elisabetta (1993) 'Citizenship and equality: the place for toleration'. Political Theory, 21 (4): 585-605. 17. Moruzzi, Norma Claire (1994a) 'A problem with headscarves: contemporary complexities of political and social identity'. Political Theory, 22 (4): 653—72. 18. Moruzzi, Norma Claire (1994b) 'A response to Galeotti'. Political Theory, 22 (4): 678_9. 19. Benhabib, seyla (2002) The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Umversity Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Education | Smith | Otteson I 51 Education/Adam Smith/Otteson: Smith(1) considers that the only aspects of education that everyone would need, regardless of the occupation or field or industry into which one goes, is reading, writing, and what he calls "accounting," or arithmetic. The necessity of anything beyond that would depend on one's particular needs given the field in which one works - and would thus be different for different people. Thus Smith suggested that public funding (…) might be a justifiable government intervention, but nothing beyond that. Hence: primary schooling only. In addition, however, he thought the public subsidy should be less than half the total cost - the rest being borne by the students themselves (or their families or sponsors) - to make sure that incentives are aligned properly. Teachers, Smith thought, would, like anyone else, naturally pay more attention to whoever is paying the majority of their fees. If that is the government, they will pay more attention to, and be more solicitous of, the government than they would be of students. If, on the other hand, students (or their families or sponsors) pay the majority of their fees, teachers will naturally pay more attention to the students (families, sponsors) - which they should. Hence: partial subsidization only. >Social policy/Adam Smith. 1. Smith, Adam. (1776) The Wealth of Nations. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell. |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Otteson I James R. Otteson The Essential Adam Smith Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2018 |
| Education Policy | Economic Theories | Mause I 509f Education policy/Economic Theory: Education policy is a topic that concerns various institutions such as schools, universities, further education measures, vocational promotion, etc. Educational goals can be: e.g. purpose-free personality development, acquisition of skills that are necessary for socio-cultural integration, development of professional, economically usable competencies for the world of work. University policy: "Clark's Triangle" (1): The cornerstones are: State, market, civil society. Based on this, types of higher education policy are characterized: A. "State model of authority": originates in Napoleonic higher education in France. Control through interventions covering finance, admission, curricula, human resources policy, etc. B. The Humboldt model of the "self-governing scientific community". Internal governance is achieved through a collegial system of negotiation and a professorial chair. C. Anglo-Saxon "market model": largely free of state control. Internal competition governs governance. Internally, universities and business enterprises are centrally controlled. Private resources play an important role. Similar models and configurations can also be found in adult education and continuing education (2) and in the approaches to "Varieties of Capitalism" (3). Right to education/Dahrendorf: The basic consensus in education policy today includes a right to education, irrespective of the possibilities for its exploitation by those seeking human capital (Dahrendorf 1965) (4). By investing in education, the productivity of the labour provider is increased. The wage then corresponds to the marginal productivity of the work. Offer-oriented education policy serves the interests of the learner. Individuals decide on costs and benefits by allocating their time budget. If the individual now knows the costs of the training and the future additional profits that he or she will achieve through his or her higher qualification, it can, on the assumption of a certain planning horizon and a market interest rate, determine the present value of its possible investment. If the logic of the investment calculation is followed, the investment with the highest cash value is to be preferred. 1. Clark, Burton R. 1983. The higher education system. Academic organisation in cross-national perspective. Berkeley 1983. 2. Käpplinger, Bernd, und Steffi Robak, (Hrsg). Changing configurations of adult education. Changing configurations of adult education in transitional times. Frankfurt a. M. 2014 3. Hall, Peter A., und David Soskice. 2001. Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford 2001. 4. Ralf Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1965. Bildung ist Bürgerrecht. Plädoyer für eine aktive Bildungspolitik. Hamburg 1965. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Education Policy | Macroeconomics | Mause I 513f Education Policy/Eonomic Growth/Macroeconomics: the relationship between education and economic growth is examined in Wößmann and Piopiunik (2009)(1) and Wößmann (2009)(2). See also the education reports of the German Federal Government.(3) The discussion is based on macroeconomic models (Wößmann and Piopunik 2009; Hanushek and Wößmann 2007 (4)), which are used to attempt to predict the costs of lack of support and education in the form of lost economic growth. Macroeconomics: examines educational policy decisions with regard to their economic consequences. Neoclassical theories: here education is an accumulative production factor (see Human Capital/Economic Theories). Endogenous growth models: argue with a necessary technical choice: new technological knowledge helps to implement innovations. Models of technological diffusion: this is not primarily about creating new knowledge, but about implementing new technologies, where learning and understanding are essential prerequisites. 1. Wößmann, Ludger, und Marc Piopiunik. Was unzureichende Bildung kostet. Sonderauswertung für Nordrhein-Westfalen. Eine Sonderberechnung der Folgekosten durch entgangenes Wirtschaftswachstum. Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh 1999 2. Wößmann, Ludger, und Marc Piopiunik. 2009. Was unzureichende Bildung kostet. Eine Berechnung der Folgekosten durch entgangenes Wirtschaftswachstum. Gütersloh 2009 3. Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung, Bildung in Deutschland 2014 Ein indikatorengestützter Bericht mit einer Analyse zur Bildung von Menschen mit Behinderungen. Bielefeld 2014. 4. Hanushek, Eric A., und Ludger Wößmann. 2007. The role of school improvement in economic development. NBER Working Paper Nr. 12832. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Education Policy | United States | Haslam I 217 Educational Policies/United States: In 1954, the landmark Brown v. Board of Education US Supreme Court case no longer allowed ‘separate but equal’ racial segregation in the schools. In the mid-1960s, the United States adopted sweeping civil rights legislation. In the aftermath, the decade of the 1970s was a period of experimentation with concrete policies to implement these principles. School busing, in which African American and White students were transported to predominantly White or African American schools respectively, was one way that public (state) schools were racially desegregated. Busing to achieve desegregation, though, was highly contested politically and often opposed by communities (…). these efforts were challenged in terms both of the seemingly more limited academic achievement of African American and White students in newly desegregated schools and the social friction that busing caused in these schools. It was in the context of this national controversy and unrest that Elliot Aronson and his students initiated their work on the jigsaw classroom. >Jigsaw method/Aronson; Cf. Aronson et al. (1978)(1). 1. Aronson, E., Stephan, C., Sikes, J., Blaney, N. and Snapp, M. (1978) The Jigsaw Classroom. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. John F. Dovidio, „ Promoting Positive Intergroup Relations. Revisiting Aronson et al.’s jigsaw classroom“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Efficiency | Hicks | Parisi I 278 Efficiency/Kaldor/Hicks: The Kaldor–Hicks efficiency criterion asks whether the beneficiaries from the change (in legal rule or policy) could theoretically fully compensate the losers for their losses, and still remain better off. To satisfy the Kaldor–Hicks efficiency criterion, “Resources are allocated efficiently in a system of wealth maximization when there is no reallocation that would increase the wealth of society” (Posner, 1980(1), p. 243). The compensation to losers is possible in principle and need not actually occur. The Kaldor–Hicks criterion is generally seen as the efficiency objective of the aggregate wealth maximizer who tries to assign legal rights so as to maximize the total value of all goods and services. >Compensation. This policy amounts to assigning ownership to the would-be highest bidder—the party who, in the outside observer’s estimation, would end up owning the right if costless bargaining had taken place in a hypothetical market with zero transaction costs (Harper, 2013(2), p. 64). Thus in the law and economics literature this weaker form of the optimality criterion is used as a normative standard. The key requirement for conducting Kaldor–Hicks analysis is the ability to gather and sum up people’s willingness to pay attached to different outcomes. This assumes a higher level of knowledge in the hands of the policymaker, judge, or economist. For economists using the Austrian approach, this is a pivotal and problematic assumption. Kaldor–Hicks analysis requires objective data to aggregate individuals’ willingness to pay and therefore uses existing prices. However, existing prices tell us about exchanges to which individuals have consented, whereas Kaldor–Hicks analysis requires consideration of hypothetical exchanges that have not taken place, and which will perhaps never take place, making the discovery of the requisite information difficult (Stringham, 2001(3), p. 43). In real-life examples of legal cases, Kaldor–Hicks analysis is used when there is a dispute that is complex and there is no willingness to exchange, and where similar cases with objective data that may be substituted is difficult to come by. This automatically limits the applicability of this type of cost–benefit analysis in traditional law and economics. >Cost-Benefit Analysis. 1. Posner, R. A. (1980). “The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication.” Hofstra Law Review 8: 487–507. 2. Harper, D. A. (2013). “Property rights, entrepreneurship and coordination.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 88: 62–77. 3. Stringham, E. P. (2001). Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and the problem of central planning. Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 4(2): 41–50. Rajagopalan, Shruti and Mario J. Rizzo “Austrian Perspectives on Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
EconHicks I John R. Hicks Mr. Keynes and the "classis"; a suggested reinterpreation 1937 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Efficiency | Posner | Parisi I 281 Efficiency/Posner: The important question is whether the system of legal rules facilitates greater coordination in society by enhancing expectational certainty. When the law succeeds in enhancing the order of actions, it is “praxeologically coherent.” On the other hand, other approaches to legal analysis emphasize the “logical coherence” of the law. Prominent among these is the idea that common law areas (property, contract, and tort) can be understood in a unified way as the expression of social wealth maximization. Posner made a bold claim in the first edition of the Economic Analysis of Law (1973(1)), that common law rules are “efficient,” that is, wealth-maximizing. According to Posner, the common law provides a coherent and consistent system of incentives that induce efficient behavior, not merely in explicit markets, but in all social contexts. Posner argues that there is an economic logic to these common law rules—an economic logic that is subtle, and non-obvious, but nevertheless present. >Coordination. 1. Posner, Richard (1972). Economic Analysis of Law. Boston, MA: Little, Brown. Rajagopalan, Shruti and Mario J. Rizzo “Austrian Perspectives on Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
LawPosn I Richard A. Posner Economic Analysis of Law, Ninth Edition New York 2014 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Egocentrism | Habermas | III 111 Egocentrism/Habermas: assuming that egocentrism renews itself at every stage ((s) of learning), the processes of learning are followed by the shadows of systematic errors.(1) >Learning. Self-centrism/Elkind: in infancy: the idea that objects are identical with their perception. This is overcome by the unfolding of the symbol function. At preschool age: the assumption that symbols contained the same information as the objects they represented. This is overcome by the emergence of concrete operations. In preadolescence: the idea that one's own mental concepts correspond to a higher form of perception reality prevails. This is overcome by employing formal-operational thinking and the ability to establish counterfactual hypotheses. In early adolescence: the imagination, the thoughts of others were entirely focused on the own self. This is overcome by the experience of the divergence of the reactions anticipated by the adolescent and the reactions actually occurring.(2) >Stages of development, >Psychological theories on egocentrism, >Adolescence. 1.D. Elkind Egozentrismus in der Adoleszenz, in: Döbert, Habermas, Nummer-Wikler (Hrsg.) Entwicklung des Ichs, Köln 1977, 1070ff, 2. Elkind ibid. 177f. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Egoism | Smith | Otteson I 43 Egoism/Adam Smith/Otteson: "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages" (WN(1): 27). Note the phrases "their own interest," "self-love," and "their advantages." Otteson: What do you hear when you read that passage? Do you hear selfishness? That is what Karl Marx (1818-1883), author of the 1848 Communist Manifesto(2), thought when he read Smith - and he did read Smith. MarxVsSmith, Adam: Here, Marx thought, not even twenty pages into the Wealth of Nations, was the smoking gun: Adam Smith, the father of economics, admitting - even celebrating - the fact that Smithian political economy is founded on selfishness. Marx would go on to argue that this system of political economy, which Marx called "capitalism," is built on recommending to people that they should be selfish and should consider other people as mere means to their own ends, as mere tools to be manipulated rather than moral agents with dignity to be respected. Whatever its material virtues might be, capitalism, Marx thought, was thus founded upon an immoral base, and thus its gains were ill-gotten. Otteson: Was Smith arguing that we should all be selfish in our dealings Sith one another? Certainly not in our moral dealings with one another: remember that in his Theory of Moral Sentiments(3) Smith argued that we all desire mutual sympathy of sentiments, which drives us to into mutually supportive relationships with others. But in our economic dealings with one another? Is Smith telling us we should be selfish in the market - as it were, to check our morality at the marketplace door? Smith did not believe so. What he saw in these dealings with the butcher, the brewer, and the baker was not a narrow, let alone odious, selfishness, but something rather different: respect. >Recognition. Otteson I 44 Because of our peculiar liabilities, human beings need the help of others; and it is by making mutually advantageous offers "that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of" (WN(1): 26). Now the assumption Smith makes in this argument is indeed that we are driven by self- interest. Because, however, of the twin constraints of (1) our desire for mutual sympathy of sentiments and (2) living in a "well-governed society," we are driven - both by our own desires and by our public institutions - to meet one another as peers, as moral equals, and to make offers to one another that either of us is free to decline. Each of us has an "opt-out option" that is protected by our society's commitment to Smithian justice, and this disciplines us from any notion we might otherwise have had about merely trying to steal from or defraud one another. >Sympathy/Adam Smith, >Community/Adam Smith, >Division of Labour/Adam Smith, >Equality/Adam Smith, >Inequalities/Adam Smith. And because each of us desires mutual sympathy of sentiments, we desire to conduct ourselves in ways that others will approve of. So when we seek our meat from butchers, our ale from brewers, and our bread from bakers, we make them offers that recognize that they are our equals, that they have interests and obligations of their own, and that our interests and obligations do not trump theirs. Recognition: For Smith, then, the act of making a person an offer is a recognition of the inherent value of others; it reflects the equal dignity that each of us has, and it is a shining example of proper moral relations among people. The mutually voluntary and thus mutually beneficial transaction that is the cornerstone of a Smithian market economy is, then, not only the key to increasing general prosperity, but it is also the instantiation of truly moral human relations. >Marx/Adam Smith. 1. Smith, Adam. (1776) The Wealth of Nations. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell. 2. Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels (1994) [1848]. The Communist Manifesto. In Lawrence H. Simon (ed.), Karl Marx, Selected Writings. Hackett. 3. Smith, Adam (1982) [1759]. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie, eds. Liberty Fund. |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Otteson I James R. Otteson The Essential Adam Smith Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2018 |
| Egoism | Tajfel | Haslam I 173 Egoism/self-interest/Tajfel: VsTajfel: Problem: ruling out the role of self-interest in the minimal group studies (>Minimal group/Tajfel, >Group behavior/Tajfel, >Social identity theory/Tajfel) has proven no easier than ruling it out in instances of altruism (a debate that continues to rage in psychology more generally). Minimal group/psychological theories: in the minimal group paradigm, participants always allocate rewards to another ingroup or outgroup member but never to themselves. Formally, then, there is no opportunity for self-interest. However, researchers have argued that there may be an expectation that ingroup members will favour their own group, and so it makes sense (and is rational) to favour other members of the ingroup. In other words, there are assumptions of interdependence or reciprocity within the ingroup that could explain ingroup favouritism. (Rabbie et al. 1989)(1). Interaction/Rabbie: (Rabbie et al. 1989)(1) proposed a ‘Behavioural Interaction Model’ to formalize this interdependence and reciprocity argument. To test this, they devised an experiment with different conditions that made it explicit whether participants would receive reward allocations from (i.e., be dependent on) the ingroup (ID), the outgroup (OD) or both (IOD). VsRabbie: participants still tended to favour the ingroup in the more balanced IOD condition and, in a critique of this research, Richard Bourhis and colleagues (1997)(2) point out that parity or fairness would be a more valid prediction in this case if only reciprocity was at work. Haslam i 174 Self-interest may help explain why participants strive to maximize ingroup profit, but it struggles to explain why they sacrifice ingroup profit in order to deprive an outgroup of benefits. >Reciprocity/psychologcal theories. 1. Rabbie, J.M., Schot, J.C. and Visser, L. (1989) ‘Social identity theory: A conceptual and empirical critique from the perspective of a behavioural interaction model’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 19: 171–202. 2. Bourhis, R.Y., Turner, J.C. and Gagnon, A. (1997) ‘Interdependence, social identity and discrimination’, in R. Spears, P.J. Oakes, N. Ellemers and S.A. Haslam (eds), The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 273–95. Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Elasticity (Economics) | Krishna | Krugman III 21 Elasticity/international trade/demand/Kala Krishna/Kathleen Hogan/Phillip Swagel: That the elasticity of substitution between U.S. goods is always smaller than that for Japanese goods suggests that [e.g.,] U.S. autos are less interchangable than Japanese autos. This seems plausible as U.S. cars seem more differentiated from one another than are Japanese cars. This is reflected in the elasticities of demand. That (…) shows that demand for Japanese cars with respect to other Japanese cars is more price elastic than demand for U.S. cars with respect to other U.S. cars. Indeed, the demand for Japanese cars in general reacts more to price changes, by both national and international competitors. >Calibration, >Demand, >Price. Kala Krishna, Kathleen Hogan, and Phillip Swagel. „The Nonoptimality of Optimal Trade Policies: The U.S. Automobile Industry Revisited, 1979-1985.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Elasticity (Economics) | Rothbard | Rothbard III 127 Elasticity/demand/Rothbard: A striking feature of the total outlay curve ((s) of buyers and sellers) is that, in contrast to the other curves (such as the demand curve), it can slope in either direction as the price increases or decreases. The possibility of a slope in either direction stems from the operation of the two factors determining the position of the curve. Outlay = Price × Quantity Demanded (of purchase good). But we know that as the price decreases, the demand must either increase or remain the same. Therefore, a decrease in price tends to be counteracted by an increase in quantity, and, as a result, the total outlay of the sale good may either increase or decrease as the price changes. Def Elastic/: For any two prices, we may compare the total outlay of the sale good that will be expended by buyers. If the lower price yields a greater total outlay than the higher price, the total outlay curve is defined as being elastic over that range. Def Inelastic: If the lower price yields a lower total outlay than the higher price, then the curve is inelastic over that range. Rothbard III 129 Any two prices on the schedule may be compared. It is evident that an examination of the entire outlay curve demonstrates that the foregoing demand curve is basically elastic. It is elastic over most of its range, with the exception of a few small gaps. If we compare any two rather widely spaced prices, it is evident that the outlay is less at the higher price. If the price is high enough, the demand for any good will dwindle to zero, and therefore the outlay will dwindle to zero. Demand/supply: Contrary to what might be thought at first, the concept of “elasticity of supply” is not a meaningful one, as is “elasticity of demand.” Rothbard III 130 The reason is that its other determinant, quantity supplied, changes in the same direction as the price, not in the inverse direction as does quantity demanded. As a result, supply is always “elastic,” and the concept is an uninteresting one.(1) Rothbard III 406 Elasticity/service/factors of production/Rothbard: Labor services are also likely to be inelastic with respect to the interest discount, but probably less so than land, since labor has a reservation demand, a subjective use-value, even in the aggregate labor market. This special reservation demand stems from the value of leisure as a consumers’ good. Higher prices for labor services will induce more units of labor to enter the market, while lower prices will increase the relative advantages of leisure. Here again, however, the difference that will be made by relatively large changes in the interest rate will not be at all great, so that the aggregate supply-of-labor curve (or rather curves, one for each homogeneous labor factor) will tend to be inelastic with regard to the interest rate. >Factors of production/Rothbard, >Interest rates/Rothbard, >Production/Rothbard, >Production structure/Rothbard. Capitalism/Rothbard: It is true that capitalists, after investing in a stage of production, demand present goods in exchange for their product. This particular demand is inelastic in relation to interest changes since these capital goods also can have no subjective use-value for their producers. This demand, however, is strictly derivative and dependent. In the first place, the product for which the owner demands present goods is, of course, a future good, but it is also one stage less distantly future than the goods that the owner purchased in order to produce it. >Capitalism/Rothbard. 1. The attention of some writers to the elasticity of supply stems from an erroneous approach to the entire analysis of utility, supply, and demand. They assume that it is possible to treat human action in terms of "infinitely small" differences, and therefore to apply the mathematically elegant concepts of the calculus, etc., to economic problems. Such a treatment is fallacious and misleading, however, since human action must treat all matters only in terms of discrete steps. If, for example, the utility of x is so little smaller than the utility of Ythat it can be regarded as identical or negligibly different, then human action will treat them as such, i.e., as the same good. Because it is conceptually impossible to measure utility, even the drawing of continuous utility curves is pernicious. (…) |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Elasticity (Economics) | Saez | Saez I 12 Elasticity/capital/labour/Saez/Zucman: Tax incidence: The question of who pays the taxes collected by governments today is (...) what economists call, quite confusingly, “tax incidence.” For example, what would happen if the corporate tax rate were cut? Saez I 100 Elasticity: the most inelastic factor of production bears the burden of taxes, while the most elastic factor dodges them. Concretely, if capital is very elastic - saving and investment collapse whenever capital is taxed—then labor bears the burden of capital taxation. But just as capital taxes can be shifted to labor, so too can labor taxes be shifted to capital. This happens if labor is very elastic - that is, if people work substantially less when the taxation of their earnings rises. In one of the oldest and most famous analyses of tax incidence, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations explained how taxes on wages could be shifted to capital. If farmers are at the subsistence level (they earn no more than what they need to barely survive), taxing their wage would make them starve. Question: How elastic are capital and labor? Does the capital stock, in particular, vanish when capital taxes Saez I 101 rise? If it does, then taxing capital is indeed harmful and slashing corporate taxation can be in the long-run interest of workers. >Tax incidence/Saez. Tradition: According to most commentators, capital’s extreme elasticity is a law of nature, as certain as gravity. But this belief—like other stark predictions from basic economic theory (for instance, that the minimum wage must destroy employment)—needs a reality check. Saez I 105 Capital/SaezVsTradition/ZucmanVsTradition: Capital is not very elastic, but it can be obscured. Rich people can hide wealth offshore. Multinational companies can shift profits to Bermuda. Corporation profits: The same conclusion holds true for the taxation of corporate profits, the form of capital income that’s widely seen as most elastic. The way that corporations respond to international differences in tax rates is not primarily by moving their factories to low-tax places, but by shifting paper profits to tax havens. Saez I 131 Elasticity/Ramsey/Saez/Zucman: In the 1920s, the prodigy mathematician and economist Frank Ramsey formally proved that if all taxpayers faced the same tax rate, the rate that maximizes government revenue is inversely proportional to the elasticity of taxable income.(1) What does this mean? >Taxation/Ramsey. If taxable income is inelastic, it means that when tax rates rise, reported income does not change much. Example: In that case, the US Treasury mechanically collects more revenue by hiking tax rates. By contrast if taxable income is very elastic, then high tax rates reduce the tax base so significantly that they don’t raise much revenue and are undesirable. Ramsey rule: That’s the cardinal rule of optimal taxation, called the Ramsey rule: governments should not tax too much what’s elastic. >Ramsey rule/Saez. 1. Ramsey, Frank P. “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation.” Economic Journal 37, no. 145 (1927): 47–61. |
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| Elasticity (Economics) | Zucman | Saez I 12 Elasticity/capital/labour/Saez/Zucman: Tax incidence: The question of who pays the taxes collected by governments today is (...) what economists call, quite confusingly, “tax incidence.” For example, what would happen if the corporate tax rate were cut? Saez I 100 Elasticity: the most inelastic factor of production bears the burden of taxes, while the most elastic factor dodges them. Concretely, if capital is very elastic - saving and investment collapse whenever capital is taxed—then labor bears the burden of capital taxation. But just as capital taxes can be shifted to labor, so too can labor taxes be shifted to capital. This happens if labor is very elastic - that is, if people work substantially less when the taxation of their earnings rises. In one of the oldest and most famous analyses of tax incidence, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations explained how taxes on wages could be shifted to capital. If farmers are at the subsistence level (they earn no more than what they need to barely survive), taxing their wage would make them starve. Question: How elastic are capital and labor? Does the capital stock, in particular, vanish when capital taxes Saez I 101 rise? If it does, then taxing capital is indeed harmful and slashing corporate taxation can be in the long-run interest of workers. >Tax incidence/Saez. Tradition: According to most commentators, capital’s extreme elasticity is a law of nature, as certain as gravity. But this belief—like other stark predictions from basic economic theory (for instance, that the minimum wage must destroy employment)—needs a reality check. Saez I 105 Capital/SaezVsTradition/ZucmanVsTradition: Capital is not very elastic, but it can be obscured. Rich people can hide wealth offshore. Multinational companies can shift profits to Bermuda. Corporation profits: The same conclusion holds true for the taxation of corporate profits, the form of capital income that’s widely seen as most elastic. The way that corporations respond to international differences in tax rates is not primarily by moving their factories to low-tax places, but by shifting paper profits to tax havens. Saez I 131 Elasticity/Ramsey/Saez/Zucman: In the 1920s, the prodigy mathematician and economist Frank Ramsey formally proved that if all taxpayers faced the same tax rate, the rate that maximizes government revenue is inversely proportional to the elasticity of taxable income.(1) What does this mean? >Taxation/Ramsey. If taxable income is inelastic, it means that when tax rates rise, reported income does not change much. Example: In that case, the US Treasury mechanically collects more revenue by hiking tax rates. By contrast if taxable income is very elastic, then high tax rates reduce the tax base so significantly that they don’t raise much revenue and are undesirable. Ramsey rule: That’s the cardinal rule of optimal taxation, called the Ramsey rule: governments should not tax too much what’s elastic. >Ramsey rule/Saez. 1. Ramsey, Frank P. “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation.” Economic Journal 37, no. 145 (1927): 47–61. |
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| Electoral Fraud | Levitsky | Levitsky I 72 Electoral Fraud/Levitsky/Ziblatt: Electoral fraud has happened Levitsky I 73 very rarely in the United States(1), and since elections are organized by state and local authorities, nationwide electoral fraud is virtually impossible. Nevertheless, during the 2016 campaign, Trump continued to claim that millions of illegal immigrants and deceased people on voter rolls would be counted as votes for Hillary Clinton(2). Levitsky I 213 The reason for enacting a Voter Identification Act was the false assertion that electoral fraud was widespread in the United States(3). According to all reliable investigations, the extent of election fraud in this country is low(4). Nevertheless, Republicans began to press for measures to address this non-existent problem. The first two states to pass a Voter Identification Act in 2005 were Georgia and Indiana. John Lewis, a member of the House of Representatives from Georgia and a civil rights campaigner, described his state's law as a "modern poll tax(5). An estimated 300,000 voters did not possess any of the now required proofs of identity, and African Americans were five times more likely to do so than whites(6). Indiana's Voter Identification Act, which Judge Terence Evans of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals called a "reasonably well-disguised attempt" to "prevent the participation in the election of certain people who are believed to be inclined toward the Democrats,"(7) was brought before the Supreme Court, which approved it in 2008. After that, such laws were introduced in many places, between 2010 and 2012 in 37 states (8). By 2016, strict laws requiring photo identification had been passed in 15 states, but only ten of them were in effect in time for the election(9). Levitsky I 215 An election observation project led by the media organization ProPublica found no evidence of electoral fraud,(10) and Philip Bump of the Washington Post found only four documented cases of electoral fraud in the 2016 election during his research(11). >Political elections, >Electoral rules, >Democracy, >Parliamentary system. 1. On electoral fraud in general see Richard L. Hasen, The Voting Wars. From Florida 2000 to the Next Election Meltdown, New Haven, Connecticut, 2012; Lorraine C. Minnite, The Myth of Voter Fraud, Ithaca, New York, 2010. On the fact that there was no electoral fraud in 2016, see Jessica Huseman/Scott Klein, »There’s No Evidence Our Election Was Rigged«, in: ProPublica, 28th November 2016. 2. Darren Samuelsohn, »A Guide to Donald Trump’s ›Rigged‹ Election«, in: Politico, 25th Oktober 2016. 3. Justin Levitt, »The Truth About Voter Fraud«, The New York University School of Law Brenner Center for Justice (2007), https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/truth-about-voter-fraud; siehe auch Minnite, The Myth of Voter Fraud; Hasen, The Voting Wars, p. 41–73; Sharad Goel/Marc Meredith/Michael Morse/David Rothschild/Houshmand Shirani-Mehr, »One Person, One Vote. Estimating the Prevalence of Double-Voting in U. S. Presidential Elections«, unveröffentlichtes Manuskript, Januar 2017. 4. See e.g. Levitt, »The Truth About Voter Fraud«; Minnite, The Myth of Voter Fraud. 5. Quoted in Berman, Give Us the Ballot, p. 223. 6. Ibid. 7. Quoted in ibid., p. 254. 8. Ibid., p. 260 f. 9. Highton, »Voter Identification Laws and Turnout in the United States«, p. 151–153. 10. Huseman/Klein, »There’s No Evidence Our Election Was Rigged«. 11.»There Have Been Just Four Documented Cases of Voter Fraud in the 2016 Election«, Election«, in: The Washington Post, 1st Dezember 2016. |
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| Electoral Rules | Constitutional Economics | Parisi I 206 Electoral Rules/Constitutional economics/Voigt: Electoral rules refer to the way votes translate into parliamentary seats: under majority rule (also called plurality or first-past-the-post), only the candidate who secured the most votes in a district is elected. Under proportional representation, parties are allocated seats according to the proportion of votes they obtain. Electoral systems include more dimensions than electoral rules, in particular district size and ballot structure. District size refers to the number of parliamentarians sent from one district. The ballot structure determines whether citizens can vote only for a party, only for individuals, or some combination thereof. Although theoretically distinct, these dimensions are highly correlated empirically: countries using majority rule (MR) often have minimum district size (single-member districts) and allow voting for individual candidates. Proportional rule: Countries relying on proportional representation (PR) often have large districts and restrict the possibility of deviating from party lists. Political parties: It has been known for many years that electoral rules can have a crucial effect on the number of parties. Duverger's (1954)(1) observations that MR is conducive to two-party systems, whereas more parties are apt to arise under PR, has even been called "Duverger's law." The analysis of the economic consequences of electoral systems is of a more recent vintage. Political coalitions: It has been argued (Austen-Smith, 2000)(2) that since coalition governments are more likely under PR than under MR, a common pool problem among governing parties will emerge. Parties participating in the coalition will want to please different constituents, which explains why both government spending and tax rates are, on average, higher under PR than under MR. Government spending: Lizzeri and Persico (2001)(3) compare the composition of government spending under alternative electoral rules. They distinguish between a) the provision of a genuine public good on the one hand, and b) pork-barrel projects that serve to re- distribute wealth on the other, and ask whether incentives to provide these goods differ systematically between MR and PR. Under MR, politicians have an incentive to cater to those who can help them obtain a plurality of the votes and they will do so by promising pork barrel projects. Under PR, on the other hand, targeting makes less sense because every vote counts, leading politicians to provide more general public goods. >Constitutional Economics/Tabellini/Persson, >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, >Direct Democracy/Constitutional economics. 1. Duverger, M. (1954). Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. New York: Wiley. 2. Austen-Smith, D. (2000). "Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1235-1269. 3. Lizzeri, A. and N. Persico (2001). "The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives." American Economic Review 91(1): 225—239. Voigt, Stefan, “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Electoral Systems | Policy of the United States | Levitsky I 48 Electoral Systems/Policy of the United States/Levitsky/Ziblatt: The American presidents (...) are not members of parliament, and they are not elected by Congress. Levitsky I 49 Dilemma: On the one hand, [the authors of the American Constitution] did not want to install a monarch at the head of the state, but an elected president, one who fulfilled their idea of a republican people's government and reflected the will of the people. On the other hand, they did not fully trust the people's ability to decide whether a candidate was suitable for office. >Political Elections/Hamilton. Levitsky I 50 Political Parties: The rise of political parties in the early 19th century changed the way our electoral system functions. The electors became party representatives, which means that the electoral college handed over its guardian function to the parties, which have kept it ever since. Parties thus became the guardians of American democracy. Levitsky I 51 19th century: Delegates were not elected by the people, but were sent by local and state party committees, and they were not tied to any particular candidate. However, they usually followed the instructions of the party leaders, who sent them to the convents(1). Levitsky I 52 Solution: In the Progressive Era (the 1890s to 1920s), primary elections were introduced, first in Wisconsin in 1901; in 1916, primary elections were held in two dozen states. Problem: (...) [these primaries] changed little, partly because this tool was not used in many states, but mainly because delegates were not required to support the successful candidate in the primary. Levitsky I 60 20th century: The so-called Battle of Michigan Avenue encroached upon the Congress Hall itself. In his nomination speech for anti-war candidate George McGovern, Senator Abraham Ribicoff from Connecticut condemned the "gestapo methods" of the Chicago police, looking directly at Mayor Daley - live on television. NBC presenter Chet Huntley, who watched in horror, exclaimed: "This is certainly the first time that police officers have ever entered a convention hall. His co-host David Brinkley added: "In the United States."(2) The events in Chicago triggered a profound reform. Since the political system was at stake, the party felt compelled to fundamentally revise the nomination process for presidential candidates (3) (...). The result was a system of binding pre-elections. Since 1972, the vast majority of Democratic and Republican convention delegates have been elected in state primaries and caucuses (party conferences). A preliminary selection of delegates is made by the candidates for the presidential candidacy themselves in order to be sure of their loyalty. >Political Parties/Levitsky/Ziblatt, >Political Elections/Alexander Hamilton. 1. James W. Ceaser, Reforming the Reforms. A Critical Analysis of the Presidential Selection Process, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1982, p. 19-21. 2. »A Look Back at the 1968 Democratic Convention«, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aUKzSsVmnpY, last retrieved on 11/05 2017. 3. Ceaser, Presidential Selection, p. 273. |
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| Element Relation | Geach | I 53 Two-class theory/GeachVs: this theory is even worse than the Two-names theory. >Two-names theory. Two-class theory: E.g. the general term "philosopher" denotes "class of philosophers". - Socrates is then only a member of the class. >General term, >Denotation. GeachVs: the element relation is very different from the subclasses relation: E.g. A parliamentary committee is not a member of Parliament. >Element relation, >Subsets. But: "a philosopher" means the same in both applications. Copula: fallacy of division: as if two varieties existed: one for "is a philosopher" and one for "is an element of the class of philosophers". >Copula/Geach. Geach: equivalent sets must not be divided into equivalent subsets - "every logician" is not equivalent to "class of logicians". >Equivalent class. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Element Relation | Quine | IX 23 Element relation/identity/classes/individuals: "ε" before individuals have the property of "=". IX 113 ff Definition element relation/ordinal: "E" stands for "{ : y ε z}". Ru: y is a number, but not z (z must be a quantity). Pair of number and quantity, also the number is part of the quantity. If this is true, it is an e-relation - E should arrange the ordinals. IX 119 NO: class of ordinal numbers (≠ ordinal numbers) Element relation/ordinals/Quine: here, "ε" means "smaller" and it is interchangeable with "contains" with respect to ordinals. Therefore x U {x} is the next ordinal after x if there are still ordinals behind x at all - it is not sufficient to meet the element conditions to belong to a class. The existence is necessary. Proof of "NO ε ϑ ((s) the class of ordinals does not exist"). It is now obvious: if NO existed, 23.9 and 24.3 (see above) would be a contradiction to 23.7 - >Paradoxon of Burali-Forti. IX 219 Element relation/Epsilon/induction/Quine: the primitive predicate "ε" divides the determination of classes (a) behind the Epsilon into the requirement of having elements and (b) in front of the epsilon into the requirement of being an element. Problem of Induction: always one with the existence of classes that have been used only for the requirement (a) - Induction: in order to derive it from the definition of n we need a class {x:Fx} or N n {x: Fx} or {x:x <= z u ~Fx} as a value of a variable of this definition and this is a variable that stands only on the right hand side of "ε". >Set theory, >Sets. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Elimination | Eliminate, Elimination, philosophy: the replacement of a linguistic expression by another in the case of a theory revision. The elimination is usually done either by a definition or by merging various observations under a common concept. See also reduction, reductionism, eliminative materialism, eliminative reductionism, meaning change, theory change, incommensurability. |
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| Elimination | Churchland | Schiffer I 159 Eliminativism/Churchland/Schiffer: (Paul Churchland 1981)(1): his eliminativism is quite different from that of Quine: Here the irreducibility of intentional vocabulary is denied. Folk Psychology/Churchland: is a functional theory. Belief is a functional state, with a functional role but future neuroscience will show that no inner states have these roles and therefore the folk psychology is wrong. Schiffer: this is a completely different route to eliminativism than that belief cannot be realized physically because our intentional vocabulary was irreducible. I 164 ... SchifferVsChurchland: his eliminativism would then have the consequence that no one believes anything. 1. Churchland, Paul (1981). "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes". Journal of Philosophy. 78 (2, February): 67–90. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Elimination | Hintikka | II 180 Elimination/eliminability/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in order to eliminate seemingly denotative descriptions, one must assume that the quantifiers and bound variables go over individuals that are identified descriptively. Otherwise the real Bismarck would not be an admissible value of the variables with which we express that there is an individual of a certain kind. Problem: then these quantifiers must not be constituents of the propositions, for their domains of values consists not merely of objects of acquaintance. So Russell's mistake was a twofold one. 1. Quantifier/variable/Russell/Hintikka: in 1905 he had already stopped thinking that quantifiers and bound variables are real constituents of propositions. Def Apparent Variable/Russell/Hintikka: an apparant variable is a bound variable. 2. Acquaintance/Russell: values of the variables should only be objects of the acquaintance (HintikkaVsRussell). >Quantifiers, >Quantification, >Propositions, >Acquaintance. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Elimination | Lewis | IV 33 Elimination/eliminate/Lewis: e.g. singular terms must be eliminated before translation into another theory - after that they can be introduced again - e.g. descriptions before they are eliminated, they must get a range - ((s) Whether rigid or non-rigid) - various ranges provide non-equivalent translations. Cf. >meaning change, >theory change. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Elimination | Quine | I 319 Elimination of singular descriptions: through no more truth-value gaps, but now all are false: "..y..und exclusively y" instead of "y=(ix)(..x..)" when not applicable to anything. I 323 Elimination of singular term: trough the fusion of "=" with a piece of text. "=" remains together with variables in a predicative position - "=" predicative general term (> Equal sign). II 206 Eliminate: one can eliminate attached variables, relative clauses, then predication - > predicate functor logic. ("padding", "homogenize"). >Predication/Quine. V 156 Definition/eliminability/Quine: Problem: E.g. Definition of substitutional quantification by truth conditions: does not allow elimination - i.e. we have already assumed irreducibility. (Vs). >Substitutional Quantification. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Elimination | Simons | I 263 Elimination/description: we eliminate K with the scheme of Russell: (N) (A (ix B) ≡ (Ex)[(y)[B[y/x] ≡ y = x] ∧ A(x)]). ((s) "The A that is this B (description)" is the same as something that will be replaced by it in all occurrences of these descriptions, and which has the defining property A"?). >Theory of descriptions/Russell, >Descriptions. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Elite | Fanon | Brocker I 387 Elite/colonization/postcolonialism/Fanon: Fanon, he primarily goes to court with the national bourgeoisies ((s) in the colonized countries), the native "university and business elites" of the capital(1). Fanon accuses this class of not being interested in building a new, fairer social system, but only being interested in mediation and in replacing the former European population(2). It has "the psychology of small businessmen, not of captains of industry"(3), and in its luxury consumption follows "the Western bourgeoisie in its negative and decadent stage"(4). 1. Frantz Fanon, Les damnés de la terre, Paris 1961. Dt.: Frantz Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde, Frankfurt/M. 1981, S. 128 2. Ibid. p. 130 3. Ibid. p. 128 4. Ibid. p. 131. Ina Kerner „Frantz Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolFanon I Frantz Fanon Les Damnés de la Terre, Paris 1963 - Engl Transl. The Wretched of the Earth, New York 1963 German Edition: Die Verdammten dieser Erde Reinbek 1969 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Elm/Beech Example | Searle | II 254f Meaning/SearleVsPutnam/Searle: meaning is in the head, they depend on >Satisfaction conditions of intentionality. Putnam: meanings are not in the head and conditions in the world are decisive. An indexical determination and not the concept fixes the meaning. Searle: meaning is not determined by ideolect. Cf. >Twin earth, >Idiolect. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Emanation | Neoplatonism | Gadamer I 427 Emanation/Neoplatonism/Gadamer: If it thinks one and the other, it rather means that it knows what it is doing with it, and that means that it knows how to connect one with the other. In this respect, then, there is no temporal relationship here, but rather a spiritual process, an emanatio intellectualis. With this Neo-Platonic term Thomas Aquinas seeks to describe the process character of the inner word as well as the process of the Trinity. This brings out something that was actually not included in Plato's Logos philosophy. The concept of emanation has always contained more in Neo-Platonism than what the physical phenomenon of emanation as a process of movement is. It is the image of the source that is above all. In the process of emanation, that from which something flows out, the One, is not thereby robbed or less. >Trinity/Thomas Aquinas, >Thinking/Trinitarian Doctrine, >Word/Augustine, >Word/Thomas, >Word of God/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Emancipation | Mbembe | Brocker I 924 Emancipation/Membe/Herb: Emancipatory politics cannot be made with Mbembe's postcolony. He thus joins those representatives of postcolonialism who combine their political abstinence with an ethical turn(1). VsMbembe: Similar to Mudimbe and Spivak, Mbembe obviously finds it difficult to design political strategies for the time after. At any rate, according to a disappointed critic (Hiddleston 2009(2)), he does not show a way to liberate dehumanized Africa. In the young history of ideas of post-colonialism, one must therefore count his work among the anxious, ambivalent and worried designs. In the end, Mbembe was content with a mere ethical criticism of the violence of representation (Hiddleston 2009(2), 176). Brocker I 925 And indeed, his analysis of the present suggests the suspicion that what is saving post-colonial Africa must come not from danger, that is, from its own forces, but from outside. >Nihilism/Mbembe. 1. Achille Mbembe, De la postcolonie. Essai sur l’imagination politique dans l’Afrique contemporaine, Paris 2000. Dt.: Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie. Zur politischen Vorstellungskraft im Afrika der Gegenwart, Wien/Berlin 2016 2. Hiddleston, Jane, Understanding Postcolonialism, Stocksfield 2009. Karlfriedrich Herb, „Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie (2000)“. In: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Embedding | Perry | Frank I 449 Variables: Variables have no sense, merely designation ((s) designating is actually naming). >Designation, >Naming. Problem: embedded sentences must transport their sense to the outside. >Clauses. Variables have no intension. >Variables, >Intensions. John Perry (1983a): Castaneda on He and I, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed.) Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World: Essays Presented to Hector-Neri Castaneda. Hackett (1983), 15-39 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Emigration | Hirschman | Krastev I 28 Emigration/Hirschman/Krastev: In his most famous work, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, published in 1970, Hirschman contrasted two strategies that people adopt when confronted with an unbearable status quo. People can ‘exit’, that is, they can vote with their feet, expressing their displeasure by taking their business elsewhere. Or they can decide to ‘voice’ their concerns by staying put, speaking up, and choosing to fight for reform from within. Krastev: For economists, exit is the favoured method for improving the performance of producers and service providers. It is the strategy employed by the average consumer. Because they can inflict debilitating revenue losses on poorly performing businesses, customers who threaten to switch suppliers can induce a ‘wonderful concentration of the mind’ in a company’s managers akin to what Samuel Johnson attributed to the prospect of being hanged. This is how exit (and the threat of exit) can help improve the performance of firms. But having experienced political tyranny first-hand in 1930s Europe, Hirschman also knew, like Michnik, that oppressive governments can reduce domestic pressure for change by granting the noisiest and most prominent activists an opportunity to exit.(1) >Emigration/Michnik. Krastev I 29 In 1990, Hirschman spent a year in post-communist Berlin and decided to revisit his theory of exit, voice and loyalty in an attempt to understand the demise of the German Democratic Republic.(2) He focused first on the unique possibility of defection open to East Germans alone among all members of the Warsaw Pact. East Germans who managed to leave or escape, unlike Poles who did the same, would become neither linguistically isolated émigrés nor branded as betrayers of the nation. The GDR, in Hirschman’s view, did not have its 1956, 1968 or 1980 because most of those dissatisfied with the regime dreamed of absconding privately rather than organizing to voice their grievances collectively. 1989: (...)contrary to expectations that the ‘safety valve’ of emigration would drain the energy from civic engagement, the very scale of the departures increased rather than decreased pressure on the regime. Indeed, it drove the disenchanted millions who stayed behind to take to the streets and demand change in the hope of convincing their fellow citizens to stay. The downfall of the GDR was a case where mass exodus and the fear that it Krastev I 30 might continue triggered a society-wide outburst of voice and demands for political reform at home. Rather than some East Germans leaving and others staying, the entire country relocated to the West. Eastern Europe/Krastev: In the rest of Eastern Europe, the story unfolded quite differently. There are no signs today that East and West Europeans – from Bratislava and Bucharest to Lisbon and Dublin – see themselves as ein Volk, a single people with a shared identity, even if they all presumably aspire to a European normality. 1. A. Michnik. „Why You Are Not Emigrating … A Letter from Białołęka 1982’ in Adam Michnik, Letters from Prison and Other Essays (University of California Press, 1987). 2. Albert O. Hirschman, ‘Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History’, World Politics 45:2 (January 1993), pp. 173–202. |
PolHirschm I Albert O. Hirschman The Strategy of Economic Development New Haven 1958 Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Emigration | Holmes | Krastev I 32 Emigration/post-communist Eastern Europe/Krastev/Holmes: The dream of a collective return of formerly communist countries to Europe made the individual choice to abscond abroad both logical and legitimate. Why should a young Pole or Hungarian wait for his country to become one day like Germany, when he can start working and raising a family in Germany tomorrow? When borders were opened after 1989, exit was favoured over voice (>Emigration/Hirschman) because political reform requires the sustained cooperation of many organized social interests, while the choice to emigrate is basically a solo or single-family operation, even though (like a bank run) it can become a cascade. The mistrust of ethno-nationalist loyalties and the prospect of a politically united Europe also helped make emigration the political choice for many liberal-minded Central and East Europeans. This, alongside the vanishing of anti-communist dissidents, is again why Michnik’s moral excoriation of emigration lost all moral and emotional resonance after 1989. >Emigration/Michnik. |
LawHolm I Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The Common Law Mineola, NY 1991 Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Emigration | Krastev | Krastev I 32 Emigration/post-communist Eastern Europe/Krastev: The dream of a collective return of formerly communist countries to Europe made the individual choice to abscond abroad both logical and legitimate. Why should a young Pole or Hungarian wait for his country to become one day like Germany, when he can start working and raising a family in Germany tomorrow? When borders were opened after 1989, exit was favoured over voice (>Emigration/Hirschman) because political reform requires the sustained cooperation of many organized social interests, while the choice to emigrate is basically a solo or single-family operation, even though (like a bank run) it can become a cascade. The mistrust of ethno-nationalist loyalties and the prospect of a politically united Europe also helped make emigration the political choice for many liberal-minded Central and East Europeans. This, alongside the vanishing of anti-communist dissidents, is again why Michnik’s moral excoriation of emigration lost all moral and emotional resonance after 1989. >Emigration/Michnik. |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Emission Permits | Stavins | Stavins I 171 International Tradable Permits/Carbon Pricing Coordination/Stavins: Under an international tradable permit scheme, all participating countries would be allocated permits for “net emissions,” that is, emissions minus sequestration. A permit would define a right to emit a given volume over some time period, such as a year. In each period, countries would be free to buy and sell permits on an international exchange. Initial permit allocations could reflect a variety of criteria, such as previous emissions, gross domestic product, population, and fossil fuel production. Whatever the initial allocation, subsequent trading can, in theory, lead to a cost-effective outcome (Montgomery, 1972)(1), if transaction costs are not significant (Stavins, 1995)(2). This potential for pursuing distributional objectives while assuring cost-effectiveness is an important attribute of the tradable permit approach. From a distributional point of view, developing countries would receive compensation, whereas developed countries would have to pay for their own emission abatement and for permit purchases from abroad to cover the balance of their emissions (Olmstead & Stavins, 2012)(3). An important obstacle to the successful operation of such a system is that by its very nature, the trading would be among nations (Hahn & Stavins, 1999)(4). Nation states are hardly simple cost-minimizers, like private firms, so there is no reason to anticipate that competitive pressures would lead to equating of marginal abatement costs across countries. Even if nations were cost-minimizers, they do not have sufficient information about the marginal abatement costs of firms within their jurisdiction to define their own aggregate marginal costs. If every country participating in such a system were to devolve the tradable permits to firms within its jurisdiction, that is, if each country instituted a domestic tradable permit system as its means of achieving its national target, then the trading could be among firms, not governments, both within countries and internationally (Hahn & Stavins, 1999)(4). Such a system could indeed be cost-effective. In the near term, this Stavins I 172 trading system could be integrated with an emission-reduction-credit system, such as the CDM [Clean Development Mechanism], for countries that do not take on emission caps. >Carbon Pricing Coordination/Stavins. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Montgomery, D. W. (1972). Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs. Journal of Economic Theory, 5, 395-418. 2. Stavins, R. N. (1995). Transaction costs and tradeable permits. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 29, 133-148. 3. Olmstead, S. M., & Stavins, R. N. (2012). Three key elements of post-2012 international climate policy architecture. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 6(2), 1-22. 4. Hahn, R. W., & Stavins, R. N. (1999). What has the Kyoto Protocol wrought? The real architecture of international tradeable permit markets. Washington, DC: The AEI Press. Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180. |
Stavins I Robert N. Stavins Joseph E. Aldy The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 2012 |
| Emission Reduction Credits | Stavins | Stavins I 159 Emission-Reduction-Credit Systems/ERC/Aldy/Stavins: An emission-reduction-credit (ERC) system delivers emission mitigation by awarding tradable credits for “certified” reductions. Generally, firms that are not covered by some set of regulations—be they command-and-control or market-based — may voluntarily participate in such systems, which serve as a source of credits that entities facing compliance obligations under the regulations may use. Individual countries can implement an ERC system without having a corresponding cap-and-trade program. A firm earns credits for projects that reduce emissions relative to a hypothetical “no project” baseline. In determining the number of credits to grant a firm for a project, calculation of the appropriate baseline is therefore as important as measuring emissions. VsEmission-Reduction-Credit: Dealing with this unobserved and fundamentally unobservable hypothetical baseline is at the heart of the so-called “additionality” problem. While ERC systems can be self-standing, as in the case of the CDM [Clean Development Mechanism], governments can also establish them as elements of domestic cap-and-trade or other regulatory systems. These ERC systems—often referred to as offset programs—serve as a source of credits that can be used by regulated entities to meet compliance obligations under the primary system. >Carbon Pricing/Stavins. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180. |
Stavins I Robert N. Stavins Joseph E. Aldy The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 2012 |
| Emission Targets | Economic Theories | Mause I 418 Emission targets/intervention/environmental policy/Economic Theory: if the state intervenes in private sector activities, the extent to which certain environmental impacts are to be permitted must be specified. (Zimmermann et al. 2012, p. 500 f.)(1) The preservation of so-called protected goods (e.g. safeguarding life and health, guaranteeing ecological sustainability) requires the definition of "emission targets" (environmental quality standards) for their further specification in relation to individual fields of environmental policy (air pollution control, water protection, noise abatement, etc.). "Emission targets" are then derived from these immission targets, which consist of regulations on the level of pollutant emissions at an individual source of pollutants (e.g. in the form of a limit value for fine dust) or the amount of pollutant input into an individual environmental good (e.g. in the form of the maximum permissible quantity of pesticides per hectare of agricultural land). Among other things, a distinction is made here between the polluter-principle and the principle of origin. In connection with compensation issues, there is also the beneficiary principle. See Principles/Economic Theory, Environmental Damage/Economic theory. cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Zimmermann, Horst, Klaus-Dirk Henke, und Michael Broer. 2012. Finanzwissenschaft. Eine Einführung in die Lehre von der öffentlichen Finanzwirtschaft, München 2012. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Emissions | Policy of the United States | Kiesling I 34 Emissions/Policy of the US/Kiesling: In 1970 the US Congress passed the Clean Air Act (CAA), enacting regulatory standards for a specific set of emissions. Geographic areas were required to meet specific National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), and companies that were the sources of emissions faced limits on their emission rates and regulation of the particular technologies that could be used in production processes. One of the “criteria pollutants” regulated under the CAA was sulphur dioxide (SO2), produced primarily from burning coal to generate electricity. When airborne SO2 combines with water, sulfuric acid is the result; it falls as acid rain and harms aquatic life, trees, and the carved faces of sculptures on buildings. Airborne SO2 also causes respiratory illness and consequent health costs. The CAA regulations led power plant owners to build tall smokestacks to reduce local SO2 emissions, but that SO2 entered the jet stream and was transported to other regions where the resulting acid rain caused harm. The CAA regulations had not reduced the harms associated with SO2 emissions, but had relocated them, and many areas were still not meeting the CAA’s air quality standards. Economists working on environmental policy suggested a different approach. |
Kiesling I L. Lynne Kiesling The Essential Ronald Coase Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2021 |
| Emissions | Shue | Norgaard I 330 Emissions/United States/Shue: (…) if the US has caps on its emissions and other countries with which it competes economically do not, its industries and thus the country as a whole will be unfairly harmed. The counter‐argument depends on a different assessment of the background conditions. In particular, the underlying rationale for the entire UNFCCC framework of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities,’ reflected in the Kyoto Protocol and other aspects of the convention, is that the extent of poverty in developing countries justifies exempting them from emissions reduction obligations that might reduce their rate of economic growth. Moreover, (…) it is hard to ethically justify the complete (prior to 2009 in any case) refusal of the US to reduce its emissions (Brown 2002(1); Shue 1994(2)). >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Brown, D. A. 2002. American Heat: Ethical Problems with the United States' Response to Global Warming. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2. Shue, H. 1994. After you: May action by the rich be contingent on action by the poor? Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 1: 343–66. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Emissions Trading | Economic Theories | Mause I 440 Emissions Trading/Economic Theories: emissions trading took effect in 2005. Weidner and Mez 2008, p. 364.(1) As it is irrelevant to the impact on the climate where and how greenhouse gases are saved, emissions should be reduced where the costs of prevention across technologies, sectors and countries are minimal. In principle, market instruments such as CO2 taxes or emissions trading systems can contribute to an efficient achievement of climate policy objectives. Ströbele: "What was initially a national task, (...) has now become a club good for the entire EU with the introduction of the CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The CO2 price now reflected the scarcity of CO2 emission rights in all EU installations integrated into the system". (Ströbele et al. 2012, p. 349 f.)(2) >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Weidner, Helmut, und Lutz Mez. 2008. German climate change policy: A success story with some flaws. The Journal of Environment & Development 17( 4): 356– 378. 2. Ströbele, Wolfgang, Michael Heuterkes, und Wolfgang Pfaffenberger. 2012. Energiewirtschaft. Einführung in Theorie und Politik, 3. Aufl. München 2012 |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Emissions Trading | Fankhauser | Fankhauser I 1 Emissions Trading/Fankhauser: Until now, emissions trading has been the carbon pricing instrument of choice in most jurisdictions. In the European Union, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) covers almost half of total greenhouse gas emissions. Carbon is also traded in Canada, China, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States, although most of these schemes are limited in their regional or sectoral scope (World Bank, 2016)(1). Cf. >Emissions Trading/Narassimhan. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. Stefano Carattini, Maria Carvalho & Sam Fankhauser, 2018: “Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes”. In: Stéphane Hallegatte, Mike Hulme (Eds.), WIREs Climate Change, Vol. 9/5, pp. 1-26. |
Fankhauser I Samuel Fankhauser Stefano Carattini Maria Carvalho, Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes 2018 |
| Emissions Trading | Hansen | Singer I 225 Emissions trading/climate change/altruism/J. E. HansenVsEmissions Trading/Hansen/Singer, P.: any system setting a general upper limit in a trading system, and... I 226 ...divides them into rights for nations, companies and individuals. Problem: such schemes have a negative effect on altruistic behaviour: when I as an individual buy a hybrid vehicle, it does not reduce the total emissions of my country. These are rather cut by the agreed upper limit. My behaviour rather causes the price of conventional fuel to fall and makes it cheaper for other people to drive conventional vehicles. Solution/Hansen: a tax on the carbon dioxide content in fuels. (Carbon Tax). The proceeds from this should be distributed equally among all inhabitants. That is what he calls the fee and dividend scheme. This rewards those who reduce their carbon footprint and this reduces total emissions. (J. E. Hansen et al.(2008)(1), J. E. Hansen 2009)(2). Paul KrugmanVsHansen: Emissions trading will reduce altruism in relation to the climate (like J. E. Hansen), but this altruism will not have the necessary effect anyway. >KrugmanVsHansen. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. J. E. Hansen et al."Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Shold Humanity Aim?" in: Open Atmosphere Science Journal, 2 (2008), pp. 17-31. 2. J. E. Hansen, "Cap and Fade", The New York Times, Dec 7,2009) |
Hansen I James E. Hansen Storms of My Grandchildren: The Truth About the Coming Climate Catastrophe and Our Last Chance to Save Humanity London 2010 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Emissions Trading | Krugman | Singer I 226 Emission Trading/Carbon Tax/Altruism/Climate Change/KrugmanVsHansen, J. E. /Krugman/Singer, P.: 1. Emissions trading will reduce altruism in relation to the climate (like J. E. Hansen), but this altruism will not have the necessary effect anyway. 2. the market mechanism means that emission rights fall to the lowest price. Problem: why should someone then reduce these emission rights by paying a high price themselves, while at the same time someone else can reduce them at a lower cost and also benefits from it by selling them to you? (P. Krugman 2010(1)). Singer, P.: for Krugman and most of his colleagues, the carbon tax is therefore less efficient than a >Cap and trade system. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. P. Krugman, "Building a Green Economy", The New York Times Sunday Magazine, Apr. 5, 2010. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Emissions Trading | Narassimhan | Narassimhan I 968 Emissions Trading/Emissions Trading System/ETS/Carbon Pricing Mechanisms/Narassimhan: Carbon pricing mechanisms fall into three main categories: cap-and-trade (i.e. emissions trading systems (ETS)), carbon taxation or hybrid mechanisms that combine elements of both. >Emissions Trading/Fankhauser. An ETS establishes a cap either on total emissions or on emissions intensity, as measured by emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP). An ETS may include emissions from all GHGs [greenhouse gases] or just some, such as CO2. Governments then provide allowances in the primary market, typically for free or through an auction, equal to the level of the cap (Aldy & Stavins, 2012)(2) (Cf. >Cap-and-Trade Systems/Aldy/Stavins). A hybrid approach of partial auctioning and free allocation of some emission allowances is common in ETS markets. Firms may then trade allowances during a specified compliance period, after which they are surrendered to the government. Firms with lower abatement costs are expected to sell their allowances to firms with higher abatement costs in the secondary market, and overall, emissions reductions are theoretically achieved at least cost. Key design considerations for an ETS include determining which GHGs and which sectors will be regulated under the cap; at what point of regulation emissions will be regulated (upstream or downstream); the stringency of the cap (or the total allowable emissions); costs of abatement, compliance and ETS administration; method of allowance allocation and distribution; monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of emissions and allowances; and impacts on international competitiveness (PMR and ICAP, 2016(3); Schmalensee & Stavins, 2017)(4). Additional considerations include policies that provide system flexibility such as banking credits for future compliance and borrowing credits from future compliance periods, creation of an allowance reserve to stabilize secondary market prices and ensure liquidity, creation of new trading registries to monitor and track carbon allowance markets, accounting for carbon offsets, international linkage, revenue management and stakeholder engagement (PMR and ICAP, 2016(3); Schmalensee & Stavins, 2017)(4). >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. World Bank. (2016). State and trends of carbon pricing 2016. Washington, DC: Author. 2. Aldy, J. E., & Stavins, R. N. (2012). The promise and problems of pricing carbon: Theory and experience. The Journal of Environment & Development, 21(2), 152–180. 3. PMR & ICAP. (2016). Emissions trading in practice: A handbook on design and implementation. Washington, DC: Partnership on Market Readiness (PMR), International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), and World Bank. 4. Schmalensee, R., & Stavins, R. N. (2017). The design of environmental markets: What have we learned from experience with cap and trade? Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 33(4), 572–588. Easwaran Narassimhan, Kelly S. Gallagher, Stefan Koester & Julio Rivera Alejo, 2018: “Carbon pricing in practice: a review of existing emissions trading systems”. In: CLIMATE POLICY, Vol. 18/8, pp. 967–991. |
Narassimhan I Easwaran Narassimhan Carbon pricing in practice: a review of existing emissions trading systems 2018 |
| Emissions Trading | Policy of the United States | Kiesling I 34 Emissions permit trading/Policy of the US/Kiesling: The CAA regulations had not reduced the harms associated with SO2 emissions, but had relocated them, and many areas were still not meeting the CAA’s air quality standards. Economists working on environmental policy suggested a different approach. This different approach was emission permit trading. Emission permit trading built on a “netting” program that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had established in the mid-1970s to allow new sources of SO2 in a region if they purchased emission credits from an existing source in the region. However, that program had substantial bureaucratic requirements that created high transaction costs (Tietenberg, 2010(1): 362). The EPA worked with economists to design a market for SO2 emission permits, or allowances. The design of this new market was also part of the process of negotiating the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), which Congress passed in 1990 and authorized the EPA to design and administer. Title IV of the CAAA aimed to reduce SO2 levels by 10 million tons from their 1980 levels in a decade, implemented in two five-year phases. (In 1985 electricity generation accounted for around 70 percent of SO2 emissions in the US and coal-fired power plants accounted for 96 percent of that amount.) The design of this program, called the EPA Acid Rain Program, involved considerable bargaining and its implementation was extremely detailed. Kiesling I 35 Focusing on the most essential design details indicates how important Coase’s ideas were for the design and the ultimate success of the program. The Acid Rain Program included several innovative features (see Stavins, 1998(2); Ellerman et. al., 2000(3); and Sandor, 2012(4)). The CAAA targeted a total national quantity of SO2 emissions rather than individual source emission rates or technologies. It laid out an emissions reduction timeframe to meet the target in 2000. The total quantity, or cap, declined over time to deliver more emissions reductions. In Phase I (1990-1995), the 263 largest SO2 -emitting coal-fired power plants were required to reduce their annual emissions every year. In Phase II almost all fossil fuel-fired power plants were subject to the national emissions cap. The EPA used a formula to determine each plant’s allowable emissions, and each plant received emission allowances based on its historic emission rates (so that it could not manipulate its current emissions to affect its allowance allocation). The mechanism for meeting the Phase I and II requirements was trading emission allowances. Utilities would be required to have emission allowances, each of which permitted the owner of the allowance to emit one ton of SO2 in the year it was issued or in any subsequent year. If annual emissions exceeded allowable emissions, the utility had three choices: use an allowance it already owned, abate (i.e., reduce emissions), or purchase an allowance. If emissions were below allowable emissions, the utility could sell the difference. The number of annual allowances decreased over time, tightening the cap and ensuring emission reductions. This “cap-and-trade” system created incentives for utilities to find the least-cost ways to reduce SO2 emissions. >Cap and trade system/Policy of the US. 1. Tietenberg, Tom, 2010. "Cap-and-Trade: The Evolution of an Economic Idea," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 39(3), pages 1-9, October. 2. Stavins, Robert N. (1998). What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES. VOL. 12, NO. 3, SUMMER 1998. (pp. 69–88) 3. Ellerman, A. Denny, Paul L. Joskow, Richard Schmalensee, Juan-Pablo Montero, and Elizabeth M. Bailey (2000). Markets for Clean Air: The US Acid Rain Program. Cambridge University Press. 4. Sandor, Richard L. (2012). Good Derivatives: A Story of Financial and Environmental Innovation. John Wiley & Sons. |
Kiesling I L. Lynne Kiesling The Essential Ronald Coase Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2021 |
| Emissions Trading | Singer | I 225 Emissions trading/P. Singer: emissions trading is based on the simple economic principle that if you can buy something cheaper than you can make it yourself, it is better to buy it than to produce it. In this case, these are transferable rights to pollute the environment, which can be traded. They are calculated on the basis of an equal share per capita. >Trade, >Markets, >Price, >Climate Change, >Climate Protection. For international trade, this means that cuts in carbon dioxide pollution are made at the lowest possible cost, thus causing the least damage to the global economy. In addition, nations with a low level of pollution - usually poorer countries - will be encouraged to keep their emissions low, so that they will have more emission rights available to sell to rich countries. This would mean a transfer of resources from rich to poor countries - without altruism. VsEmissions Trading: Problem: 1. Lack of verifiability. 2. Payments from richer to poorer countries only make sense if the money reduces poverty and does not disappear into the pockets of the elite, which often happens in dictatorships. 3. J. E. HansenVsEmissions Trading: Hansen proposes a carbon tax system instead. >HansenVsEmissions Trading. I 228 Emissions trading/Henry Shue/Singer, P. (H. Shue, 1993)(1): Thesis: it is necessary to distinguish between emissions that contribute to livelihoods, such as methane emissions from rice cultivation areas and "luxury emissions" caused by urban car traffic. >Carbon tax. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. H. Shue, „Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions“, in: Law and Policy, 15 (1993), pp. 39-59. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Emotional Intelligence | Psychological Theories | Corr I 64/65 Emotional Intelligence/psychological theories/Reisenzein/Weber: In 1990, Salovey and Meyer proposed that the capacity to regulate one’s emotions in situationally appropriate ways should be viewed as but one facet of a broader capacity termed emotional intelligence, which they defined as: the ability to recognize one’s own and other’s emotions, to use the information contained in emotional experience to guide judgement and action, and to manage the experience and expression of emotions (Salovey and Mayer 1990(1) see also, Mayer, Salovey and Caruso 2004)(2). VsEmotional Intelligence: (…) studies found that emotional intelligence has a small to moderate positive correlation to performance (Van Rooy and Viswesvaran 2004)(3) and to mental and physical health (Schutte, Malouff, Thorsteinsson et al. 2007)(4). Although measures of emotional intelligence also correlate substantially with measures of more traditional personality dispositions, including coping style (e.g., Day, Therrien and Carroll 2005(5); Van Rooy and Viswesvaran 2004)(6), they appear to retain some predictive validity even when these correlations to traditional measures are taken into account. >Personality traits, >Personality, >Behavior, >Environment, >Dispositions, >Self-knowledge, >Emotions. 1. Salovey, P. and Mayer, J. D. 1990. Emotional intelligence, Imagination, Cognition and Personality 9: 185–211 2. Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P. and Caruso, D. R. 2004. Emotional intelligence: theory, findings, and implications, Psychological Inquiry 15: 197–215 3. Van Rooy, D. L. and Viswesvaran, C. 2004. Emotional intelligence: a meta-analytic investigation of predictive validity and nomological net, Journal of Vocational Behaviour 65: 71–95 4. Schutte, N., Malouff, J., Thorsteinsson, E., Bhullar, N. and Rooke, S. 2007. A meta-analytic investigation of the relationship between emotional intelligence and health, Personality and Individual Differences 42: 921–33 5. Day, A. L., Therrien, D. L. and Carroll, S. A. 2005. Predicting psychological health: assessing the incremental validity of emotional intelligence beyond personality, type A behaviour, and daily hassles, European Journal of Personality 19: 519–36 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Emotions | Pinker | I 457 Emotions/Pinker: Thesis: feelings are adjustments, software modules - with their help copies of the genes should be reproduced, which they have caused. >Mind, >Perception, >Thinking, >Psychology, >Causality, >Nature, >Sensation, >Emotion system. I 499 Feelings/explanation/Trivers: strategies in retaliation game: affection: aimed at those who are apparently ready for a return favor. Anger: protects from being betrayed. Gratitude: calculates costs and benefits of the first act. Compassion: should bring us gratitude. >Compassion. Shame: should maintain a relationship. I 500 Simultaneous evolution of incentive, faking feelings. - It follows the evolution of discernment - Emotions do not help anyone, but they have helped his ancestors. - (s) Separation of situation and feeling. I 510 Emotions/PinkerVsTradition: feelings are no relic of an animal past, no fountain of creativity, not an enemy of the intellect. The intellect transmits control to the emotions, as soon as the situation is such that they can act as a guarantor for its offers, function as promises and threats. >Psychologcial theories on situations. I 522 Cognitive Dissonance/Pinker: one decreases them by inventing a new opinion to resolve an inner contradiction. E.g. so a boring job becomes retroactively interesting. - A feeling of uncertainty stemming from conflicting beliefs. I 523 PinkerVs: that is not true, there is no contradiction between "The work is boring" and "I was forced to lie". Aronson: it is about the contradiction with the statement: "I am nice and have everything under control". >Aronson, Joshua M., >Aronson, Eliot. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Emotions | Psychological Theories | Corr I 54 Emotions/personality psychology/psychological theories/Reisenzein/Weber: there is widespread agreement among emotion researchers that the objects of their inquiry are, centrally, the transitory states of persons denoted by ordinary language words Corr I 55 such as ‘happiness’, ‘sadness’, ‘fear’, ‘anger’, ‘pity’, ‘pride’, ‘guilt’, and so forth. >Lexical hypothesis, >Lexical studies, >Personality traits, >Personality, >States of mind. There is also agreement that emotion episodes normally occur as reactions to the perception or imagination of ‘objects’ (typically events or states of affairs), and that they have both subjective and objective (intersubjectively observable) manifestations. Subjectively, emotions manifest themselves as pleasant or unpleasant feelings that seem to be directed at the eliciting, see Reisenzein 1994(1); Russell 2003(2)). >Intersubjectivity, >Other minds. Objectively, emotions manifest themselves, at least at times, in particular actions. Most classical and many contemporary emotion theorists, following common-sense psychology, identify emotions with the mentioned subjective experiences. However, some theorists (e.g., Lazarus 1991(3); Scherer 1984(4)) define emotions more broadly as response syndromes that include not only mental but also bodily components, such as facial expressions and physiological arousal. ReisenseinVsScherer/ReisenzeinVsLazarus: This definition of emotions is problematic, however, because the correlations between the mental and bodily components of emotion syndromes are typically low (Reisenzein 2007)(5). Today, the dominant theory of emotion generation is the cognitive or appraisal theory of emotion (e.g., Lazarus 1991(3); Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988(6); Scherer 2001(7); see Scherer, Schorr and Johnstone 2001(8), for an overview). Appraisal theory assumes that emotions arise if an event is appraised in a motive-relevant manner, that is, as representing an actual or potential fulfilment or frustration of a motive (= desire, wish). >Appraisal theory/psychological theories. (…) apart from cognitions in the narrow sense (i.e., beliefs), emotions also presuppose motives (Lazarus 1991(3); Roseman 1979(9); see Reisenzein 2006(10), for further discussion). 1. Reisenzein, R. 1994. Pleasure-arousal theory and the intensity of emotions, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67: 525–39 2. Russell, J. A. 2003. Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion, Psychological Review 110: 145–72 3. Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press 4. Scherer, K. R. 1984. On the nature and function of emotion: a component process approach, in K. R. Scherer and P. Ekman (eds.), Approaches to emotion, pp. 293–317. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 5. Reisenzein, R. 2007. What is a definition of emotion? And are emotions mental-behavioural processes?, Social Science Information 46: 424–8 6. Ortony, A., Clore, G. L. and Collins, A. 1988. The cognitive structure of emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press 7. Scherer, K. R. 2001. Appraisal considered as a process of multilevel sequential checking, in K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr and T. Johnstone (eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research, pp. 92–120. Oxford University Press 8. Scherer, K. R., Schorr, A. and Johnstone, T. 2001. Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research. Oxford University Press 9. Roseman, I. J. 1979. Cognitive aspects of emotions and emotional behaviour. Paper presented at the 87th Annual Convention of the APA, New York City, September 1979 10. Reisenzein, R. 2006. Arnold’s theory of emotion in historical perspective, Cognition and Emotion 20: 920–51 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Emotions | Ryle | I 131 Emotion/Ryle: emotion is not the same as mood. A tingling sensation is tickling, feeling sick is not the same as being sick. Mood/Ryle: mood is not recognizing, not understanding - but open, from the heart, not the head. I 137 Emotion/Ryle: it is absurd not to know if you feel better but it is not absurd not to know whether one is healthier now. I 137 Emotion is not linked with arousal or inclination. Sensations are not intentional. >Sensation, >Intentionality, >Arousal/Psychology. I 140 Fantasy (novel) brings real suffering and real tears but spurious indignation. Delight, relief, sorrow: are signs of feelings, not the feelings themselves. I 143 f Emotions/sensations: emotions like itching, tingling, stinging, biting, prickling, drilling, nausea, shock, anxiety and tension are at most accidental explanations for actions. Mood: is delight, joy, sorrow, longing, nostalgia, passion, excitement, disappointment (even in the absence) and also the mood to like to do something (disposition). >Disposition. Mood: is not an experience and not an object of introspection. >Introspection. Cf. >Psychological theories on emotion. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Empirical Content | Quine | Quine II 39 ff Empirical content are categorical observation sentences: they are linking theory and observation. Two theories are equivalent if all categorical observation sentences are identical. The theory implies categorical observation sentences without being implied by them. Theoretical terms do not occur in categorical observation sentences. >Observation Sentences/Quine. II 43 Nevertheless, science cannot get along without the indication of places and points of time. But we have pushed them up into the realm of theoretical concepts, where they belong, at a comfortable distance from observation. This is another step forward in relating theory to their sensory evidence. The relationship is that true categorical observation sets are implied by the theory formulation. And how do we know that a categorical observation is true? We will never get to this end conclusively by observation! But we can falsify. VI 22 Empirical content/Quine: empirical content is something common to sentences, and even mathematical sentences indirectly participate in it. VI 23/24 Def testable/Quine: a sentence or a sentence set is testable if it implies some categorical observational sentences that are synthetic. (It can also be possible to check individual sentences, but mostly considerable quantities of sentences. Holism imposes this burden on us, >Holism/Quine). Def synonymous/Quine: two categorical observation sentences are synonymous if each of the components concerned have the same stimulus significance. Def Empirical Content/Quine: the set of all synthetic categorical observation sentences implied by this sentence. (For a single speaker). They are equivalent for the community if they are equivalent for each individual speaker. Content only applies to sentences and sentence quantities that can be checked. VI 24/25 Science/Review/Quine: a large part of science is shielded from unreal conditional propositions or dispositions from simple experience tests by excuses such as vagueness. VI 75 Indeterminacy/Logic/Logical Connectives/Translation/Meaning/Quine: in fact, translations down to the categorical observational sentences and even the connectives have a certain determination. However, only verifiable sentences have empirical content. XI 27 Empirical Content/Quine/Lauener: no isolated sentence can be attributed a clear empirical content because of the resolution of the separation analytical/synthetic. Only the totality of science makes sense. Cf. >Content. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Empirical Content | Vollmer | II 47 Empirical content/Vollmer: E.g. a causal assertion has more empirical content than a mere assertion of a consequence. - Therefore it is easier to refute. >Theories, >Strength of theories, >Stronger/weaker, >Falsification, >Causality, >Causal laws, >Causal explanation, >Content. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Empirical Laws | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 58 Empirical Laws/Political philosophy/Forbes: The analysis of political facts is often cast in terms of the relations between independent and dependent variables (...). >Theories, >Laws. Causality: Are any of these correlations more than just correlations - that is, evidence of causal connections? What are the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the outcomes of interest?(1) Problems: (...) since the relevant cases are so few, the coding of one or two problematic ones (Spain’s status as a democracy in 1898, Finland’s status as an enemy of the Allied powers from 1941 to 1944) can have a substantial impact on the results of any statistical analysis. „Empirical laws“: Despite these difficulties, there is now a consensus that empirical research generally supports the hypothesis: joint democracy seems to be a sufficient condition for peaceful relations between states (for reviews of the literature see Chan, 1997(2); Ray, 1995(3); 1998(4); Russett, 1993(5); Russett and Oneal, 2001(6)). This now widely accepted ‘empirical law’ about ‘democratic dyads’ provides an outstanding example of statistically based causal theorizing in political science. ((s) For the philosophical discussions in relation to laws see >Laws, >Natural laws, >Causal laws.) 1. King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba (1994) Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2. Chan, Steve (1997) ‘In search of democratic peace: problems and promise’. Mershon International Studies Review, 41: 59–91. 3. Ray, James Lee (1995) Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press. 4. Ray, James Lee (1998) ‘Does democracy cause peace?’ Annual Review of Political Science, 1: 27–46. 5. Russett, Bruce (1993) Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 6. Russett, Bruce and John R. Oneal (2001) Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: Norton. Forbes, H. Donald 2004. „Positive Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Encoding | Shoda | Corr I 476 Encoding/Cognitive-affective processing system/CAPS/ Shoda/Smith: One important set of CAPS (Cognitive-affective processing system) units are the mental categories, or personal constructs, used to encode, or mentally represent, the self, other people and events. People differ in how they customarily encode both internal and external stimuli (Higgins 1990)(1). >Social Cognition/Shoda/Smith. For example, performers differ in how they construe physiological arousal during performance situations (Jones and Swain 1992(2)). Some interpret the arousal cues as something that will aid their performance, whereas for others, arousal is an indication that they are ‘choking’. In the course of their social learning history, people also develop relational schemas (Baldwin 1999)(3), cognitive representations of how social relationships are expected to play out, or ‘work’. These schemas influence how they encode and respond to social interactions. Among the most significant encodings are the personal constructs used to represent one’s own characteristics (i.e., the self-schema). For example, research has shown that athletes differ in the extent to which their personal identity revolves around the role of ‘athlete’ (Brewer, Van Raalte and Linder 1993)(4). >Control processes/Shoda/Smith. 1. Higgins, E. T. 1990. Personality, social psychology, and person-situation relations: stand-ards and knowledge activation as a common language, in L. A. Pervin (ed.), Handbook of personality: theory and research, pp. 301–38. New York: Guilford Press 2. Jones, G. and Swain, A. B. J. 1992. Intensity and direction dimensions of competitive state anxiety and relationships with competitiveness, Perceptual and Motor Skills 74: 467–72 3. Baldwin, M. W. 1999. Relational schemas: research into social-cognitive aspects of inter-personal experience, in D. Cervone and Y. Shoda (eds.), The coherence of personality: social-cognitive bases of consistency, variability, and organization, pp. 127–54. New York: Guilford Press 4. Brewer, B. W, Van Raalte, J. L and Linder, D. E. 1993. Athletic identity: Hercules’ muscles or Achilles heel?, International Journal of Sport Psychology 24: 237–54 Ronald E. Smith and Yuichi Shoda, “Personality as a cognitive-affective processing system“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Encoding | Smith | Corr I 476 Encoding/Cognitive-affective processing system/CAPS/ Shoda/Smith: One important set of CAPS (Cognitive-affective processing system) units are the mental categories, or personal constructs, used to encode, or mentally represent, the self, other people and events. People differ in how they customarily encode both internal and external stimuli (Higgins 1990)(1). >Social Cognition/Shoda/Smith. For example, performers differ in how they construe physiological arousal during performance situations (Jones and Swain 1992(2)). Some interpret the arousal cues as something that will aid their performance, whereas for others, arousal is an indication that they are ‘choking’. In the course of their social learning history, people also develop relational schemas (Baldwin 1999)(3), cognitive representations of how social relationships are expected to play out, or ‘work’. These schemas influence how they encode and respond to social interactions. Among the most significant encodings are the personal constructs used to represent one’s own characteristics (i.e., the self-schema). For example, research has shown that athletes differ in the extent to which their personal identity revolves around the role of ‘athlete’ (Brewer, Van Raalte and Linder 1993)(4). >Control processes/Shoda/Smith. 1. Higgins, E. T. 1990. Personality, social psychology, and person-situation relations: stand-ards and knowledge activation as a common language, in L. A. Pervin (ed.), Handbook of personality: theory and research, pp. 301–38. New York: Guilford Press 2. Jones, G. and Swain, A. B. J. 1992. Intensity and direction dimensions of competitive state anxiety and relationships with competitiveness, Perceptual and Motor Skills 74: 467–72 3. Baldwin, M. W. 1999. Relational schemas: research into social-cognitive aspects of inter-personal experience, in D. Cervone and Y. Shoda (eds.), The coherence of personality: social-cognitive bases of consistency, variability, and organization, pp. 127–54. New York: Guilford Press 4. Brewer, B. W, Van Raalte, J. L and Linder, D. E. 1993. Athletic identity: Hercules’ muscles or Achilles heel?, International Journal of Sport Psychology 24: 237–54 Ronald E. Smith and Yuichi Shoda, “Personality as a cognitive-affective processing system“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| End of History | Fukuyama | Brocker I 809 End of History/Fukuyama: Thesis: One of the global political consequences of democracy (see Democracy/Fukuyama, Universal History/Fukuyama, Recognition/Fukuyama) is that the power principle of international politics is replaced by economic competition. States no longer perceive themselves as threatening, but merely as competitors. The prerequisite is a higher density of democracies, a fact that makes wars less likely according to Fukuyama. Post-historical world: This situation has been realized in Europe, North America and partly in Latin America. Outside there is the historical world, which is essentially congruent with the Islamic world, in which international politics is still characterized by power politics. In liberal democracy, where the struggle for recognition is largely realized, there are few social differences. Human development Brocker I 810 is finished. The type of human being that has emerged is the last of its kind ("Last Man"/Fukuyama). Problem: this state has new problems, e.g. boredom (Fukuyama relies on Nietzsche here). People rebel against being undifferentiated members of a universal and homogeneous state. The mutual recognition of people leads to a value relativism that leads to the dissolution of a firm attachment to tradition, authority and community-building values. >War/Fukuyama. Anja Jetschke, „Francis Fukuyama, Das Ende der Geschichte“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolFuku I Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man New York 1992 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Endogenous Growth | Feenstra | Feenstra I 10-1 Endogenous growth/Ricardo/Feenstra: The link between trade and growth has long been a question of interest from both a theoretical and policy point of view. David Ricardo developed a dynamic model of corn and velvet production, with corn produced by land and labor and velvet produced with labor alone.* The need to pay labor from a “wage fund” established prior to production prevents all labor from being employed initially (i.e. there is a liquidity constraint on firms). Ricardo showed that in autarky the gradual expansion of the wage fund and growth of velvet production would lower ist relative price, until a long-run equilibrium was reached. Opening trade, however, would allow the relative price of velvet to be maintained at world levels, thereby benefiting capitalists at the expense of landowners. Feenstra: This remarkable model has many of the issues that are of interest in modern discussions of trade and growth: the possibility that growth will be associated with continual changes in prices, and conversely, the impact of trade on prices and growth rates themselves. >Economic growth, >Exogenous growth, >Trade, >International trade, >Price, >Terms of trade. * See Findlay (1984, pp. 187-191)(1), who cites this model to Ricardo’s Essay on the Influence of a Low Price of Corn upon the Profits of Stock (in Volume IV, pp. 1-42, of Ricardo, 1951(2)). 1. Findlay, Ronald, 1984, “Growth and Development in Trade Models,” in Ronald W. Jones and Peter B. Kenen, eds., Handbook of International Economics, vol. 1. Amsterdam, New York: North Holland, 325-365. 2. Ricardo, David, 1951, The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, P. Sfaffa, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Feenstra I 10-16 Endogenous growth/Feenstra: Many of the “endogenous growth” models build upon the monopolistic competition framework (…), but rather than thinking of differentiated final products, we instead consider differentiated intermediate inputs. The idea is that an increase in the variety (N) of differentiated inputs will allow for an increase in output, much like an increase in variety of final goods allowed for higher consumer utility (… )* >Monopolistic competition, >Economic growth, >Exogenous growth. Feenstra I 10-30 (…) [an] implication of the endogenous growth model was that, with international spillovers of knowledge, trade should increase growth rates. >Knowledge spillover. There is an active debate over whether this hypothesis holds empirically. Advocates of this view includes Dollar (1992)(2), Sachs and Warner (1995)(3), Edwards (1998)(4), Ben-David (1993(5), 1998(6), 2001(7)), and Frankel and Romer (1999)(8). But these empirical results are all dismissed by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000)(9), and more specific criticisms on individual papers are made by Harrison (1996)(10) and Slaughter (2001)(11). In order to evaluate these papers, it is useful to first relate them to another line of empirical research dealing with the convergence of countries to their steady-state growth rates. * The use of differentiated inputs to generate economy-wide returns to scale is often attributed to Ethier (1979)(1). 1. Ethier, Wilfred J., 1979, “Internationally Decreasing Costs and World Trade,” Journal of International Economics, 9, 1-24. 2. Dollar, David, 1992, “Outward-Oriented Developing Economies Really Do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-1985,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 40(3), 523-544. 3. Sachs, Jeffrey and Andrew Warner, 1995, “Economic Reform and the Precess of Global Integration,” Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1-118. 4. Edwards, Sebastian, 1998, “Openess, Productivity and Growth: What Do We Really Know?” Economic Journal, 108, March, 383-398. 5. Ben-David, Dan, 1993, “Trade Liberalization and Income Convergence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3), August, 653-679. 6.Ben-David, Dan, 1998, “Convergence Clubs and Subsistence Economies,” Journal of Development Economics, 55(1), February, 155-171. 7. Ben-David, Dan, 2001, “Trade Liberalization and Income Convergence: A Comment,” Journal of International Economics, 55(1), October, 229-234. 8. Frankel, Jeffrey A. and David Romer, 1999, “Does Trade Cause Growth?” American Economic Review, 89(3), 379-399. 9. Rodriguez, Francisco and Dani Rodrik, 2000, “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skptic’s Guide to the Cross-Nationa lEvidence,” in Ben S. Gernanke and Kenneth Rogoff, eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, 261-325. 10. Harrison, Ann E., 1996, “Openess and Growth: A Time-series, Cross-section Analysis for Developing Coutnries,” Journal of Development Economics, 48, 419-447. 11. Slaughter, Matthew J., 2001, “International Trade and Labor-Demand Elasticities,” Journal of International Economics, 54, 27-56. |
Feenstra I Robert C. Feenstra Advanced International Trade University of California, Davis and National Bureau of Economic Research 2002 |
| Endogenous Growth | Ricardo | Feenstra I 10-1 Endogenous growth/Ricardo/Feenstra: The link between trade and growth has long been a question of interest from both a theoretical and policy point of view. David Ricardo developed a dynamic model of corn and velvet production, with corn produced by land and labor and velvet produced with labor alone.* The need to pay labor from a “wage fund” established prior to production prevents all labor from being employed initially (i.e. there is a liquidity constraint on firms). Ricardo showed that in autarky the gradual expansion of the wage fund and growth of velvet production would lower ist relative price, until a long-run equilibrium was reached. Opening trade, however, would allow the relative price of velvet to be maintained at world levels, thereby benefiting capitalists at the expense of landowners. Feenstra: This remarkable model has many of the issues that are of interest in modern discussions of trade and growth: the possibility that growth will be associated with continual changes in prices, and conversely, the impact of trade on prices and growth rates themselves. >Economic growth, >Exogenous growth, >Trade, >International trade, >Price, >Terms of trade. * See Findlay (1984, pp. 187-191)(1), who cites this model to Ricardo’s Essay on the Influence of a Low Price of Corn upon the Profits of Stock (in Volume IV, pp. 1-42, of Ricardo, 1951(2)). 1. Findlay, Ronald, 1984, “Growth and Development in Trade Models,” in Ronald W. Jones and Peter B. Kenen, eds., Handbook of International Economics, vol. 1. Amsterdam, New York: North Holland, 325-365. 2. Ricardo, David, 1951, The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, P. Sfaffa, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
EconRic I David Ricardo On the principles of political economy and taxation Indianapolis 2004 Feenstra I Robert C. Feenstra Advanced International Trade University of California, Davis and National Bureau of Economic Research 2002 |
| Endowments | Feenstra | Feenstra I 1-27 Endowments/Feenstra: if endowments change, how do the industry outputs change? To answer this, we hold the product prices fixed (…). Feenstra I 1-30 International trade: (…) we assume(d) industry 1 to be labor-intensive. This implies that the share of the labor force employed in industry 1 exceeds the share of the capital stock used there, λ1L − λ1K > 0 , so that λ > 0 (…). Suppose further that the endowments of labor is increasing, while the endowments of capital remains fixed such that K = 0. (…) we see that the output of the labor-intensive industry 1 expands, whereas the output of industry 2 contracts. We have therefore established [the Rybczynski (1955)(1) Theorem]. >Rybczynski Theorem, >International trade. Feenstra I 1-34 With the economy fully specialized in good 1, factor prices are determined by the marginal products of labor and capital in that good, and the earlier “factor price insensitivity” Lemma no longer applies. >Factor price insensitivity. 1. Rybczynski, T.N., 1955, “Factor Endowments and Relative Commodity Prices,” Economica, 22, 336-341. |
Feenstra I Robert C. Feenstra Advanced International Trade University of California, Davis and National Bureau of Economic Research 2002 |
| Endurantism | Inwagen | Schwarz I 34 Endurantism/Van Inwagen/Schwarz: e.g. caterpillar/butterfly: thesis: there is no insect, nothing that exists beyond the pupation. Recombination/mereology/Schwarz: the existence of temporal parts follows directly from the mereological universalism together with the rejection of the presentism. Then there are also example aggregates from Socrates and the Eiffel Tower (mereological sum). Socrates is a temporal part of it, which at some point ceases to exist, just as e.g. a dried-out lake that fills up again during the rainy season. Temporal parts/van Inwagen: (van Inwagen 1981)(1) van Inwagen basically rejects temporal parts. >Mereology, >Parts, >Part-of-relation, >Temporal parts, >Mereological sum. SchwarzVsInwagen: then he has to radically limit the mereological universalism or be a 'presentist'. Cf. >Perdurantism. 1. Peter van Inwagen [1981]: “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 123–137. |
Inwagen I Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Fourth Edition Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Energy Policies | Economic Theories | Mause I 432 Energy Policy/Economic Theory: Apart from the regulatory framework, the discussion on energy policy focuses on possible market failures in the context of energy and measures to correct them, such as in the context of (i) natural monopolies in the field of grid-bound energy sources, (ii) external effects of air pollutants and CO2, (iii) asymmetric information in energy efficiency investments or (iv) learning effects in renewable energies. The complexity of these questions (1). State interventions: are usually justified by the natural monopoly in the case of interventions in the energy supply. >Natural Monopolies/Neoclassical Economics. Vs: this is no longer seen as such today. Cf. Ströbele et al. 2012 p. 333 (2) 1. Düngen, Helmut, Zwei Dekaden deutscher Energie- und Umweltpolitik. Leitbilder, Prinzipien, Konzepte. In Energie, Politik, Geschichte. Nationale und internationale Energiepolitik seit 1945, (Historische Mitteilungen, Beiheft 5). Hrsg. Jens Hohensee und Michael Salewski, 35– 50. Stuttgart 1993. 2. Ströbele, Wolfgang, Michael Heuterkes, und Wolfgang Pfaffenberger. 2012. Energiewirtschaft. Einführung in Theorie und Politik, 3. Aufl. München 2012 |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Enlightenment | Ancient Philosophy | Taureck I 35 Enlightenment/Taureck: Question. Can we compare the modern features of Sophists with the Enlightenment? E.g. Nomos/Sophists: "Laws of the Gods" are no longer enough to explain the social binding forces. Enlightenment/Taureck: 18th century; Main representatives are d'Alembert, Diderot, Rousseau and Voltaire. They were not strongly interested in the Sophists. >d'Alembert, >Rousseau, >Voltaire. Encyclopédie 1765. I 36 Enlightenment/Taureck: today one can see 5 characteristics of the Enlightenment: 1. Nature-legal justification of political and legal norms. Non-factual traditional norms, but natural determinations of people who demand freedom, equality and fraternity. (Rousseau, however, is against the abolition of social institutions, which means only the replacement of corruption by brigandage (gangsterism)). At that time the absolute monarchy was the most common form of government almost everywhere in Europe. I 37 Sophists/Taureck: sophists were in a situation where they were looking for foundations for the practice of a "direct" democracy that was lived in Athens and other cities without being bound to universal value judgments, because these did not exist. The physis could obviously be understood (according to Plato's Callicles) as a legal title for an empowerment of the strong against the community. Enlightenment/Taureck: 2. Characteristic: Definition Deism: deism is a natural religion, which includes rationality and tolerance of religions: God as the creator of nature, reason enables human beings to fulfill the moral prescriptions of the creator. >Deism. I 39 Enlightenment/Taureck: 3. Characteristic: Replacement of metaphysics by epistemology. Definition Metaphysics/Encyclopedie: "Science about the reasons of things". Because all painters, musicians, surveyors, poets need reasons, everyone has their own metaphysics. This leads to an empty and "contemptuous" science. I 39 Metaphysics/Sophists/Taureck: the sophists did not yet know the concept which was later developed by Plato and Aristotle. In any case, they were more oriented towards epistemology. Enlightenment/Taureck: 4. Characteristic: Reorientation of the natural sciences. I 40 Newton, GalileoVsAristotle: Movement is no longer to be understood as a goal-directed phenomenon, but by causality. >Natural science. Mechanics/Physics/Sophists/Taureck: the sophists did not yet know the teleology of Aristotle. >Epistemology. Enlightenment/Taureck: 5. Characteristic: Aesthetic theory, according to which beauty is to be judged independent of social standards. >Aesthetics. |
Taureck I B. H.F. Taureck Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995 |
| Enlightenment | Condorcet | Habermas III 212 Enlightenment/Condorcet/Habermas: Enlightenment becomes ((s) at Condorcet's time) the practical term for the emancipation of prejudices through the practically momentous dissemination of scientific knowledge. In Condorcet's words: for the impact of philosophy on public opinion. Scientists must make the principles of their own work into principles of social intercourse in general.(1) >Prejudice, >Science, >Knowledge, >Recognition, >Empiricism, >Rationalism. 1. Condorcet, Entwurf einer historischen Darstellung der Fortschritte des menschlichen Geistes, (Ed.) W. Alff, Frankfurt, 1963, p. 275. |
Condo I N. de Condorcet Tableau historique des progrès de l’ esprit humain Paris 2004 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Entrepreneurship | Austrian School | Parisi I 283 Entrepreneurship/Austrian school: An important and recurring theme in Austrian economics is the role of entrepreneurial alertness in seizing profit opportunities, and thereby enhancing the level of coordination in the market. Krecké: Krecké argues that the Austrian concept of entrepreneurship is, in principle, applicable to legal decision-making. Decisions on which course to follow in a given case, and on which sources to rely, can be supposed to involve entrepreneurial judgments (2002(1), p. 8). Legal entrepreneurs, like their counterparts in the market, are alert to the “flaws, gaps and ambiguities in the law” (Krecké, 2002(1), p. 10). Whitman: Whitman (2002)(2) also extends the idea of entrepreneurship to the role played by lawyers and litigants. He examines how legal entrepreneurs discover and exploit opportunities to change legal rules—either the creation of new rules or the reinterpretation of existing ones to benefit themselves and their clients. Harper: Harper (2013)(3) believes that the entrepreneurial approach lays the groundwork for explaining the open-ended and evolving nature of the legal process—it shows how the structure of property rights can undergo continuous endogenous change as a result of entrepreneurial actions within the legal system itself. The most important differentiating factor separating the entrepreneurship of the market process from legal entrepreneurship is the absence of the discipline of monetary profit and loss in the latter case. Although money may change hands in the process of legal entrepreneurship, its outputs may not be valued according to market prices, especially when there is a public-goods quality to the rule at issue. Whether effective feedback mechanisms exist in the contexts is therefore an open question. 1. Krecké, E. (2002). “The Role of Entrepreneurship in Shaping Legal Evolution.” Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 12(2): 1–16. 2. Whitman, D. G. (2002). “Legal Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change.” Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 12(2): 1–11. 3. Harper, D. A. (2013). “Property rights, entrepreneurship and coordination.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 88: 62–77. Rajagopalan, Shruti and Mario J. Rizzo “Austrian Perspectives on Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Entrepreneurship | Schumpeter | Sobel I 8 Entrepreneurship/Schumpeter/Sobel/Clemens: „As it is the carrying out of new combinations that constitutes the entrepreneur, it is not necessary that he should be permanently connected with an individual firm … On the other hand, our concept is narrower than the traditional one in that it does not include all heads of firms or managers or industrialists who merely may operate an established business, but only those who actually perform that function. … But whatever the type, everyone is an entrepreneur only when he actually “carries out new combinations,” and loses that character as soon as he has built up his business, when he settles down to running it as other people run their businesses. This is the rule, of course, and hence it is just as rare for anyone always to remain an entrepreneur throughout the decades of his active life as it is for a businessman never to have a moment in which he is an entrepreneur, to however modest a degree.“ (TED(1): 75, 78) „The entrepreneur is never the risk bearer … even if the entrepreneur finances himself out of former profits, or if he contributes the means of production belonging to his “static” business, the risk falls on him as a capitalist or as possessor of goods, not as entrepreneur. Risk-taking is in no case an element of the entrepreneurial function. Even though he may risk his reputation, the direct economic responsibility of failure never falls on him.“ (TED: 137) Sobel I 9 …“the entrepreneur may, but need not, be the “inventor” of the good or process he introduces” (BC1(2): 103). Schumpeter IV 11 Innovation/economicy/Sobel/Clemens: A growing, vibrant economy depends not only on entrepreneurs discovering, evaluating, and exploiting opportunities to create new goods and services, but also on the speed at which ideas are labeled as successes or failures by the profit-and-loss system. >Disruption/Schumpeter, >Innovation/Schumpeter. 1. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1934). The Theory of Economic Development [TED]. Harvard University Press. 2. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1939). Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, Volume 1 [BC1]. McGraw-Hill Book Company. |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Sobel I Russell S. Sobel Jason Clemens The Essential Joseph Schumpeter Vancouver 2020 |
| Entropy | Kanitscheider | I 256/257 Entropy/Universe/Kanitscheider: the photons of the background radiation supply the lion's share to the entropy of the universe. All photons produced later by stars during nuclear fusion are vanishing in comparison. Now the number of photons forms a measure for the entropy of the universe. And this is because they are the least ordered state of the thermal energy of a system, because here the number of possible states is the largest, while the nucleons represent a correspondingly larger type of order, because of fewer possible combinations. This is not affected by the pure expansion itself! (The expansion is adiabatic and therefore isentropic (sic)). Because of the small entropy production of the stars the entropy of the universe remains nearly constant. The high specific entropy of the universe (the number of photons per baryon) s = N(γ)/N(b) +108 already existed at the time of plasma recombination or at the transition from the radiation-dominated to the matter-dominated era. This suggests weighty dissipative smoothing processes in the early time. But even this leads to a much too high value, if one assumes an initial chaotic state. The actual value demands that the universe 10 35 sec after the big bang was already homogeneous. I 257/58 If one lets a space-like hypersurface intersect by our past light cone and considers the individual events on this hypersurface, then it can be asserted on the basis of the above connections that all events presumably possess a singularity in their past, because the high degree of homogeneity at early times conditions the convergence of the time-like geodesics directed from these event points. >Universe/Kanitscheider, >Space-Time/Kanitscheider. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Environment | AI Research | Norvig I 401 Environment/planning/real world/representation/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: algorithms for planning (…) extend both the representation language and the way the planner interacts with the environment. >Planning/Norvig, >Agents/Norvig. New: [we now have] a) actions with duration and b) plans that are organized hierarchically. Hierarchy: Hierarchy also lends itself to efficient plan construction because the planner can solve a problem at an abstract level before delving into details 1st approach: “plan first, schedule later”: (…) we divide the overall problem into a planning phase in which actions are selected, with some ordering constraints, to meet the goals of the problem, and a later scheduling phase, in which temporal information is added to the plan to ensure that it meets resource and deadline constraints. Norvig I 404 Critical path: Mathematically speaking, critical-path problems are easy to solve because they are defined as a conjunction of linear inequalities on the start and end times. When we introduce resource constraints, the resulting constraints on start and end times become more complicated. Norvig I 405 Scheduling: The “cannot overlap” constraint is a disjunction of two linear inequalities, one for each possible ordering. The introduction of disjunctions turns out to make scheduling with resource constraints NP-hard. >NP-Problems. Non-overlapping: [when we assume non-overlapping] every scheduling problem can be solved by a non-overlapping sequence that avoids all resource conflicts, provided that each action is feasible by itself. If a scheduling problem is proving very difficult, however, it may not be a good idea to solve it this way - it may be better to reconsider the actions and constraints, in case that leads to a much easier scheduling problem. Thus, it makes sense to integrate planning and scheduling by taking into account durations and overlaps during the construction of a partial-order plan. Heuristics: partial-order planners can detect resource constraint violations in much the same way they detect conflicts with causal links. Heuristics can be devised to estimate the total completion time of a plan. This is currently an active area of research (see below). Norvig I 406 Real world planning: AI systems will probably have to do what humans appear to do: plan at higher levels of abstraction. A reasonable plan for the Hawaii vacation might be “Go to San Francisco airport (…)” ((s) which might be in a different direction). (…) planning can occur both before and during the execution of the plan (…). Solution: hierarchical decomposition: hierarchical task networks (HTN). Norvig I 407 a high-level plan achieves the goal from a given state if at least one of its implementations achieves the goal from that state. The “at least one” in this definition is crucial - not all implementations need to achieve the goal, because the agent gets Norvig I 408 to decide which implementation it will execute. Thus, the set of possible implementations in HTN planning - each of which may have a different outcome - is not the same as the set of possible outcomes in nondeterministic planning. It can be shown that the right collection of HLAs can result in the time complexity of blind search dropping from exponential in the solution depth to linear in the solution depth, although devising such a collection of HLAs may be a nontrivial task in itself. Norvig I 409 Plan library: The key to HTN planning, then, is the construction of a plan library containing known methods for implementing complex, high-level actions. One method of constructing the library is to learn the methods from problem-solving experience. (>Representation/AI research, >Learning/AI research). Learning/AI: In this way, the agent can become more and more competent over time as new methods are built on top of old methods. One important aspect of this learning process is the ability to generalize the methods that are constructed, eliminating detail that is specific to the problem instance (…). Norvig I 410 Nondeterministic action: problem: downward refinement is much too conservative for a real world environment. See >Terminology/Norvig for “demonic nondeterminism” and “angelic nondeterminism”. Norvig I 411 Reachable sets: The key idea is that the agent can choose which element of the reachable set it ends up in when it executes the HLA; thus, an HLA with multiple refinements is more “powerful” than the same HLA (hig level action) with fewer refinements. The notion of reachable sets yields a straightforward algorithm: search among highlevel plans, looking for one whose reachable set intersects the goal; once that happens, the algorithm can commit to that abstract plan, knowing that it works, and focus on refining the plan further. Norvig I 415 Unknown environment/planning/nondeterministic domains: [problems here are] sensorless planning (also known as conformant planning) for environments with no observations; contingency planning for partially observable and nondeterministic environments; and online planning and replanning for unknown environments. Norvig I 417 Sensorless planning: In classical planning, where the closed-world assumption is made, we would assume that any fluent not mentioned in a state is false, but in sensorless (and partially observable) planning we have to switch to an open-world assumption in which states contain both positive and negative fluents, and if a fluent does not appear, its value is unknown. Thus, the belief state corresponds exactly to the set of possible worlds that satisfy the formula. Norvig I 423 Online replanning: The online agent has a choice of how carefully to monitor the environment. We distinguish three levels: a) Action monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that all the preconditions still hold, b) Plan monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that the remaining plan will still succeed, c) Goal monitoring: before executing an action, the agent checks to see if there is a better set of goals it could be trying to achieve. Norvig I 425 Multi-agent planning: A multibody problem is still a “standard” single-agent problem as long as the relevant sensor information collected by each body can be pooled - either centrally or within each body - to form a common estimate of the world state that then informs the execution of the overall plan; in this case, the multiple bodies act as a single body. When communication constraints make this impossible, we have Norvig I 426 what is sometimes called a decentralized planning problem: (…) the subplan constructed for each body may need to include explicit communicative actions with other bodies. Norvig I 429 Convention: A convention is any constraint on the selection of joint plans. Communication: In the absence of a convention, agents can use communication to achieve common knowledge of a feasible joint plan. Plan recognition: works when a single action (or short sequence of actions) is enough to determine a joint plan unambiguously. Note that communication can work as well with competitive agents as with cooperative ones. Norvig I 430 The most difficult multi-agent problems involve both cooperation with members of one’s own team and competition against members of opposing teams, all without centralized control. Norvig I 431 Time constraints in plans: Planning with time constraints was first dealt with by DEVISER (Vere, 1983(1)). The representation of time in plans was addressed by Allen (1984(2)) and by Dean et al. (1990)(3) in the FORBIN system. NONLIN+ (Tate and Whiter, 1984)(4) and SIPE (Wilkins, 1988(5), 1990(6)) could reason about the allocation of limited resources to various plan steps. Forward state-space search: The two planners SAPA (Do and Kambhampati, 2001)(7) and T4 (Haslum and Geffner, 2001)(8) both used forward state-space search with sophisticated heuristics to handle actions with durations and resources. Human heuristics: An alternative is to use very expressive action languages, but guide them by human-written domain-specific heuristics, as is done by ASPEN (Fukunaga et al., 1997)(9), HSTS (Jonsson et al., 2000)(10), and IxTeT (Ghallab and Laruelle, 1994)(11). Norvig I 432 Hybrid planning-and-scheduling systems: ISIS (Fox et al., 1982(12); Fox, 1990(13)) has been used for job shop scheduling at Westinghouse, GARI (Descotte and Latombe, 1985)(14) planned the machining and construction of mechanical parts, FORBIN was used for factory control, and NONLIN+ was used for naval logistics planning. We chose to present planning and scheduling as two separate problems; (Cushing et al., 2007)(15) show that this can lead to incompleteness on certain problems. Scheduling: The literature on scheduling is presented in a classic survey article (Lawler et al., 1993)(16), a recent book (Pinedo, 2008)(17), and an edited handbook (Blazewicz et al., 2007)(18). Abstraction hierarchy: The ABSTRIPS system (Sacerdoti, 1974)(19) introduced the idea of an abstraction hierarchy, whereby planning at higher levels was permitted to ignore lower-level preconditions of actions in order to derive the general structure of a working plan. Austin Tate’s Ph.D. thesis (1975b) and work by Earl Sacerdoti (1977)(20) developed the basic ideas of HTN planning in its modern form. Many practical planners, including O-PLAN and SIPE, are HTN planners. Yang (1990)(21) discusses properties of actions that make HTN planning efficient. Erol, Hendler, and Nau (1994(22), 1996(23)) present a complete hierarchical decomposition planner as well as a range of complexity results for pure HTN planners. Our presentation of HLAs and angelic semantics is due to Marthi et al. (2007(24), 2008(25)). Kambhampati et al. (1998)(26) have proposed an approach in which decompositions are just another form of plan refinement, similar to the refinements for non-hierarchical partial-order planning. Explanation-based learning: The technique of explanation-based learning (…) has been applied in several systems as a means of generalizing previously computed plans, including SOAR (Laird et al., 1986)(27) and PRODIGY (Carbonell et al., 1989)(28). Case-based planning: An alternative approach is to store previously computed plans in their original form and then reuse them to solve new, similar problems by analogy to the original problem. This is the approach taken by the field called case-based planning (Carbonell, 1983(29); Alterman, 1988(30); Hammond, 1989(31)). Kambhampati (1994)(32) argues that case-based planning should be analyzed as a form of refinement planning and provides a formal foundation for case-based partial-order planning. Norvig I 433 Conformant planning: Goldman and Boddy (1996)(33) introduced the term conformant planning, noting that sensorless plans are often effective even if the agent has sensors. The first moderately efficient conformant planner was Smith and Weld’s (1998)(34) Conformant Graphplan or CGP. Ferraris and Giunchiglia (2000)(35) and Rintanen (1999)(36) independently developed SATPLAN-based conformant planners. Bonet and Geffner (2000)(37) describe a conformant planner based on heuristic search in the space of >belief states (…). Norvig I 434 Reactive planning: In the mid-1980s, pessimism about the slow run times of planning systems led to the proposal of reflex agents called reactive planning systems (Brooks, 1986(38); Agre and Chapman, 1987)(39). PENGI (Agre and Chapman, 1987)(39) could play a (fully observable) video game by using Boolean circuits combined with a “visual” representation of current goals and the agent’s internal state. Policies: “Universal plans” (Schoppers, 1987(40), 1989(41)) were developed as a lookup table method for reactive planning, but turned out to be a rediscovery of the idea of policies that had long been used in Markov decision processes (…). >Open Universe/AI research). 1. Vere, S. A. (1983). Planning in time: Windows and durations for activities and goals. PAMI, 5, 246-267. 2. Allen, J. F. (1984). Towards a general theory of action and time. AIJ, 23, 123-154. 3. Dean, T., Kanazawa, K., and Shewchuk, J. (1990). Prediction, observation and estimation in planning and control. In 5th IEEE International Symposium on Intelligent Control, Vol. 2, pp. 645-650. 4. Tate, A. and Whiter, A. M. (1984). Planning with multiple resource constraints and an application to a naval planning problem. In Proc. First Conference on AI Applications, pp. 410-416. 5. Wilkins, D. E. (1988). Practical Planning: Extending the AI Planning Paradigm. Morgan Kaufmann. 6. Wilkins, D. E. (1990). Can AI planners solve practical problems? Computational Intelligence, 6(4), 232-246. 7. Do, M. B. and Kambhampati, S. (2003). Planning as constraint satisfaction: solving the planning graph by compiling it into CSP. AIJ, 132(2), 151-182. 8. Haslum, P. and Geffner, H. (2001). Heuristic planning with time and resources. In Proc. IJCAI-01 Workshop on Planning with Resources. 9. Fukunaga, A. S., Rabideau, G., Chien, S., and Yan, D. (1997). ASPEN: A framework for automated planning and scheduling of spacecraft control and operations. In Proc. International Symposium on AI, Robotics and Automation in Space, pp. 181-187. 10. Jonsson, A., Morris, P., Muscettola, N., Rajan, K., and Smith, B. (2000). Planning in interplanetary space: Theory and practice. In AIPS-00, pp. 177-186. 11. Ghallab, M. and Laruelle, H. (1994). Representation and control in IxTeT, a temporal planner. In AIPS-94, pp. 61-67. 12. Fox, M. S., Allen, B., and Strohm, G. (1982). Job shop scheduling: An investigation in constraint directed reasoning. In AAAI-82, pp. 155-158. 13. Fox, M. S. (1990). Constraint-guided scheduling: A short history of research at CMU. Computers in Industry, 14(1–3), 79-88 14. Descotte, Y. and Latombe, J.-C. (1985). Making compromises among antagonist constraints in a planner. AIJ, 27, 183–217. 15. Cushing,W., Kambhampati, S.,Mausam, and Weld, D. S. (2007). When is temporal planning really temporal? In IJCAI-07. 16. Lawler, E. L., Lenstra, J. K., Kan, A., and Shmoys, D. B. (1993). Sequencing and scheduling: Algorithms and complexity. In Graves, S. C., Zipkin, P. H., and Kan, A. H. G. R. (Eds.), Logistics of Production and Inventory: Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Volume 4, pp. 445 - 522. North-Holland. 17. Pinedo, M. (2008). Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems. Springer Verlag. 18. Blazewicz, J., Ecker, K., Pesch, E., Schmidt, G., and Weglarz, J. (2007). Handbook on Scheduling: Models and Methods for Advanced Planning (International Handbooks on Information Systems). Springer-Verlag New York, Inc. 19. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1974). Planning in a hierarchy of abstraction spaces. AIJ, 5(2), 115–135. 20. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1977). A Structure for Plans and Behavior. Elsevier/North-Holland 21. Yang, Q. (1990). Formalizing planning knowledge for hierarchical planning. Computational Intelligence, 6, 12–24. 22. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1994). HTN planning: Complexity and expressivity. In AAAI-94, pp. 1123–1128. 23. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1996). Complexity results for HTN planning. AIJ, 18(1), 69–93. 24. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2007). Angelic semantics for high-level actions. In ICAPS-07. 25. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2008). Angelic hierarchical planning: Optimal and online algorithms. In ICAPS-08. 26. Kambhampati, S., Mali, A. D., and Srivastava, B. (1998). Hybrid planning for partially hierarchical domains. In AAAI-98, pp. 882–888. 27. Laird, J., Rosenbloom, P. S., and Newell, A. (1986). Chunking in Soar: The anatomy of a general learning mechanism. Machine Learning, 1, 11–46. 28. Carbonell, J. G., Knoblock, C. A., and Minton, S. (1989). PRODIGY: An integrated architecture for planning and learning. Technical report CMU-CS- 89-189, Computer Science Department, Carnegie- Mellon University. 29. Carbonell, J. G. (1983). Derivational analogy and its role in problem solving. In AAAI-83, pp. 64–69. 30. Alterman, R. (1988). Adaptive planning. Cognitive Science, 12, 393–422. 31. Hammond, K. (1989). Case-Based Planning: Viewing Planning as a Memory Task. Academic Press. 32. Kambhampati, S. (1994). Exploiting causal structure to control retrieval and refitting during plan reuse. Computational Intelligence, 10, 213–244 33. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117. 34. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117. 35. Smith, D. E. and Weld, D. S. (1998). Conformant Graphplan. In AAAI-98, pp. 889–896. 36. Rintanen, J. (1999). Improvements to the evaluation of quantified Boolean formulae. In IJCAI-99, pp. 1192–1197. 37. Bonet, B. and Geffner, H. (2005). An algorithm better than AO∗? In AAAI-05. 38. Brooks, R. A. (1986). A robust layered control system for a mobile robot. IEEE Journal of Robotics and Automation, 2, 14–23. 39. Agre, P. E. and Chapman, D. (1987). Pengi: an implementation of a theory of activity. In IJCAI-87, pp. 268–272. 40. Schoppers, M. J. (1987). Universal plans for reactive robots in unpredictable environments. In IJCAI- 87, pp. 1039–1046. 41. Schoppers, M. J. (1989). In defense of reaction plans as caches. AIMag, 10(4), 51–60. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Environment | Deci | Corr I 444 Social Environment/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Psychology/Deci/Ryan: Thesis: social environments that facilitate satisfaction of the basic psychological needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness will lead to more autonomous types of motivation – namely, identified, integrated and intrinsic – whereas social environments that are thwarting of the basic needs will lead to either controlled motivation or amotivation. >Motivation/Deci/Ryan, >Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan. Initial work on the motivational effects of social environment environments was a set of laboratory experiments that examined how various factors such as rewards, feedback and deadlines affect intrinsic motivation. In the first studies, Deci (1971)(1) found that when participants received monetary rewards for solving an interesting spatial-relations puzzle, they were subsequently less intrinsically motivated for the activity than were participants who had done the same activity without receiving the rewards. The extrinsic rewards seemed to undermine the participants’ intrinsic motivations. This finding has been replicated dozens of times, and a meta-analysis (Deci, Koestner and Ryan 1999)(2) confirmed this effect across more than 100 experiments. Studies (e.g., Vallerand and Reid 1984)(3) further showed that positive feedback enhanced the intrinsic motivation of participants relative to those who did not get the feedback. Thus, it appears that feedback that affirms competence when accompanied by a sense of autonomy typically enhances intrinsic motivation (Ryan 1982(4)). Corr I 447 Effects of the environment o internalization: SDT is built on the assumption that people are naturally inclined to internalize values and behaviours that are exhibited by important others in their socializing environment. (…) [but] only to the extent that people experience satisfaction of the basic needs as they are acquiring the values and behaviours. That is, environments that support need satisfaction will lead people to accept the structures that are endorsed by the social world, but those that are rejecting or controlling will impair internalization, leaving the people controlled either by external or introjected regulatory processes. >Regulation/Deci/Ryan. 1. Deci, E. L. 1971. Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 18: 105–15 2. Deci, E. L., Koestner, R. and Ryan, R. M. 1999. A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation, Psychological Bulletin 125: 627–68 3. Vallerand, R. J. and Reid, G. 1984. On the causal effects of perceived competence on intrinsic motivation: a test of cognitive evaluation theory, Journal of Sport Psychology 6: 94–102 4. Ryan, R. M. 1982. Control and information in the intrapersonal sphere: an extension of cognitive evaluation theory, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 43: 450–61 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Environment | Easton | Brocker I 492 Environment/Political System/Easton: as environments of the political system, Easton distinguishes between internal and external social environments. Inner Society Environment/Easton: other social systems such as the economic system, but also personality systems and the ecological and biological system. Outer Society Environment: political systems of other countries, the international economic system, international organizations such as the NATO and the United Nations (1). 1. David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York 1965, S. 23. Dieter Fuchs, “David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolEast I David Easton A Systems Analysis of Political Life New York 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Environment | Economic Theories | Mause I 408 Environment/Economic Theories: from an economic and political science perspective, environmental goods have structural characteristics that include scarcity and characteristics of social goods (e.g. free rider problem). These structural features serve as a basis for the economic justification of state environmental policy. Problem: if environmental goods are to be managed via the market, this requires a) the existence of individual preferences for these goods and b) a functioning price mechanism in advance if a "market failure" is not to occur. Endress 2000, p. 16f. (1) >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Alfred Endress, Umweltökonomie, Stuttgart 2000. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Environment | Morozov | I 260 Environment/Measuring/Morozov: It is a misunderstanding to take the decision to measure the consumption of resources such as water and electricity as a real reform of how WATER AND electricity enters our homes. The measurement itself should ideally only be a small step towards better behaviour. I 261 Problem: it is not possible to tell a good story about improvements that insist only on such measurements, without a picture of how water, gas and electricity come into our homes. Measuring does not deliver this story. >Technology, >Technocracy, >Progress. Environment/Resources/Anonymity/Maria Kaika/Morozov: anthropologist Maria Kaika writes: the supply of water, electricity and gas seems to come from nowhere (...) similarly our garbage disappears in some hole in the wall... (1) I 262 Resource Consumption/Veronica Strang: Thesis: measuring focuses us on private property ((s) of energy companies) and not on the population as a whole when it comes to the use of resources.(2) This also reinforces the isolation in which individuals have the feeling that the consumption of resources takes place in their own fortress.(3) Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Maria Kaika, City of Flows: Modernity, Nature, and the City (Oxford: Psychology Press, 2005), 46. 2. Veronica Strang, The Meaning of Water (London: Berg, 2004), 228. 3. ibid. 230. |
Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Environment | Norvig | Norvig I 401 Environment/planning/real world/representation/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: algorithms for planning (…) extend both the representation language and the way the planner interacts with the environment. >Planning/Norvig, >Agents/Norvig. New: [we now have] a) actions with duration and b) plans that are organized hierarchically. Hierarchy: Hierarchy also lends itself to efficient plan construction because the planner can solve a problem at an abstract level before delving into details 1st approach: “plan first, schedule later”: (…) we divide the overall problem into a planning phase in which actions are selected, with some ordering constraints, to meet the goals of the problem, and a later scheduling phase, in which temporal information is added to the plan to ensure that it meets resource and deadline constraints. Norvig I 404 Critical path: Mathematically speaking, critical-path problems are easy to solve because they are defined as a conjunction of linear inequalities on the start and end times. When we introduce resource constraints, the resulting constraints on start and end times become more complicated. Norvig I 405 Scheduling: The “cannot overlap” constraint is a disjunction of two linear inequalities, one for each possible ordering. The introduction of disjunctions turns out to make scheduling with resource constraints NP-hard. >NP-Problems. Non-overlapping: [when we assume non-overlapping] every scheduling problem can be solved by a non-overlapping sequence that avoids all resource conflicts, provided that each action is feasible by itself. If a scheduling problem is proving very difficult, however, it may not be a good idea to solve it this way - it may be better to reconsider the actions and constraints, in case that leads to a much easier scheduling problem. Thus, it makes sense to integrate planning and scheduling by taking into account durations and overlaps during the construction of a partial-order plan. Heuristics: partial-order planners can detect resource constraint violations in much the same way they detect conflicts with causal links. Heuristics can be devised to estimate the total completion time of a plan. This is currently an active area of research (see below). Norvig I 406 Real world planning: AI systems will probably have to do what humans appear to do: plan at higher levels of abstraction. A reasonable plan for the Hawaii vacation might be “Go to San Francisco airport (…)” ((s) which might be in a different direction). (…) planning can occur both before and during the execution of the plan (…). Solution: hierarchical decomposition: hierarchical task networks (HTN). Norvig I 407 a high-level plan achieves the goal from a given state if at least one of its implementations achieves the goal from that state. The “at least one” in this definition is crucial - not all implementations need to achieve the goal, because the agent gets Norvig I 408 to decide which implementation it will execute. Thus, the set of possible implementations in HTN planning - each of which may have a different outcome - is not the same as the set of possible outcomes in nondeterministic planning. It can be shown that the right collection of HLAs can result in the time complexity of blind search dropping from exponential in the solution depth to linear in the solution depth, although devising such a collection of HLAs may be a nontrivial task in itself. Norvig I 409 Plan library: The key to HTN planning, then, is the construction of a plan library containing known methods for implementing complex, high-level actions. One method of constructing the library is to learn the methods from problem-solving experience. (>Representation/AI research, >Learning/AI research). Learning/AI: In this way, the agent can become more and more competent over time as new methods are built on top of old methods. One important aspect of this learning process is the ability to generalize the methods that are constructed, eliminating detail that is specific to the problem instance (…). Norvig I 410 Nondeterministic action: problem: downward refinement is much too conservative for a real world environment. See >Terminology/Norvig for “demonic nondeterminism” and “angelic nondeterminism”. Norvig I 411 Reachable sets: The key idea is that the agent can choose which element of the reachable set it ends up in when it executes the HLA; thus, an HLA with multiple refinements is more “powerful” than the same HLA (hig level action) with fewer refinements. The notion of reachable sets yields a straightforward algorithm: search among highlevel plans, looking for one whose reachable set intersects the goal; once that happens, the algorithm can commit to that abstract plan, knowing that it works, and focus on refining the plan further. Norvig I 415 Unknown environment/planning/nondeterministic domains: [problems here are] sensorless planning (also known as conformant planning) for environments with no observations; contingency planning for partially observable and nondeterministic environments; and online planning and replanning for unknown environments. Norvig I 417 Sensorless planning: In classical planning, where the closed-world assumption is made, we would assume that any fluent not mentioned in a state is false, but in sensorless (and partially observable) planning we have to switch to an open-world assumption in which states contain both positive and negative fluents, and if a fluent does not appear, its value is unknown. Thus, the belief state corresponds exactly to the set of possible worlds that satisfy the formula. Norvig I 423 Online replanning: The online agent has a choice of how carefully to monitor the environment. We distinguish three levels: a) Action monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that all the preconditions still hold, b) Plan monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that the remaining plan will still succeed, c) Goal monitoring: before executing an action, the agent checks to see if there is a better set of goals it could be trying to achieve. Norvig I 425 Multi-agent planning: A multibody problem is still a “standard” single-agent problem as long as the relevant sensor information collected by each body can be pooled - either centrally or within each body - to form a common estimate of the world state that then informs the execution of the overall plan; in this case, the multiple bodies act as a single body. When communication constraints make this impossible, we have Norvig I 426 what is sometimes called a decentralized planning problem: (…) the subplan constructed for each body may need to include explicit communicative actions with other bodies. Norvig I 429 Convention: A convention is any constraint on the selection of joint plans. Communication: In the absence of a convention, agents can use communication to achieve common knowledge of a feasible joint plan. Plan recognition: works when a single action (or short sequence of actions) is enough to determine a joint plan unambiguously. Note that communication can work as well with competitive agents as with cooperative ones. Norvig I 430 The most difficult multi-agent problems involve both cooperation with members of one’s own team and competition against members of opposing teams, all without centralized control. Norvig I 431 Time constraints in plans: Planning with time constraints was first dealt with by DEVISER (Vere, 1983(1)). The representation of time in plans was addressed by Allen (1984(2)) and by Dean et al. (1990)(3) in the FORBIN system. NONLIN+ (Tate and Whiter, 1984)(4) and SIPE (Wilkins, 1988(5), 1990(6)) could reason about the allocation of limited resources to various plan steps. Forward state-space search: The two planners SAPA (Do and Kambhampati, 2001)(7) and T4 (Haslum and Geffner, 2001)(8) both used forward state-space search with sophisticated heuristics to handle actions with durations and resources. Human heuristics: An alternative is to use very expressive action languages, but guide them by human-written domain-specific heuristics, as is done by ASPEN (Fukunaga et al., 1997)(9), HSTS (Jonsson et al., 2000)(10), and IxTeT (Ghallab and Laruelle, 1994)(11). Norvig I 432 Hybrid planning-and-scheduling systems: ISIS (Fox et al., 1982(12); Fox, 1990(13)) has been used for job shop scheduling at Westinghouse, GARI (Descotte and Latombe, 1985)(14) planned the machining and construction of mechanical parts, FORBIN was used for factory control, and NONLIN+ was used for naval logistics planning. We chose to present planning and scheduling as two separate problems; (Cushing et al., 2007)(15) show that this can lead to incompleteness on certain problems. Scheduling: The literature on scheduling is presented in a classic survey article (Lawler et al., 1993)(16), a recent book (Pinedo, 2008)(17), and an edited handbook (Blazewicz et al., 2007)(18). Abstraction hierarchy: The ABSTRIPS system (Sacerdoti, 1974)(19) introduced the idea of an abstraction hierarchy, whereby planning at higher levels was permitted to ignore lower-level preconditions of actions in order to derive the general structure of a working plan. Austin Tate’s Ph.D. thesis (1975b) and work by Earl Sacerdoti (1977)(20) developed the basic ideas of HTN planning in its modern form. Many practical planners, including O-PLAN and SIPE, are HTN planners. Yang (1990)(21) discusses properties of actions that make HTN planning efficient. Erol, Hendler, and Nau (1994(22), 1996(23)) present a complete hierarchical decomposition planner as well as a range of complexity results for pure HTN planners. Our presentation of HLAs and angelic semantics is due to Marthi et al. (2007(24), 2008(25)). Kambhampati et al. (1998)(26) have proposed an approach in which decompositions are just another form of plan refinement, similar to the refinements for non-hierarchical partial-order planning. Explanation-based learning: The technique of explanation-based learning (…) has been applied in several systems as a means of generalizing previously computed plans, including SOAR (Laird et al., 1986)(27) and PRODIGY (Carbonell et al., 1989)(28). Case-based planning: An alternative approach is to store previously computed plans in their original form and then reuse them to solve new, similar problems by analogy to the original problem. This is the approach taken by the field called case-based planning (Carbonell, 1983(29); Alterman, 1988(30); Hammond, 1989(31)). Kambhampati (1994)(32) argues that case-based planning should be analyzed as a form of refinement planning and provides a formal foundation for case-based partial-order planning. Norvig I 433 Conformant planning: Goldman and Boddy (1996)(33) introduced the term conformant planning, noting that sensorless plans are often effective even if the agent has sensors. The first moderately efficient conformant planner was Smith and Weld’s (1998)(34) Conformant Graphplan or CGP. Ferraris and Giunchiglia (2000)(35) and Rintanen (1999)(36) independently developed SATPLAN-based conformant planners. Bonet and Geffner (2000)(37) describe a conformant planner based on heuristic search in the space of >belief states (…). Norvig I 434 Reactive planning: In the mid-1980s, pessimism about the slow run times of planning systems led to the proposal of reflex agents called reactive planning systems (Brooks, 1986(38); Agre and Chapman, 1987)(39). PENGI (Agre and Chapman, 1987)(39) could play a (fully observable) video game by using Boolean circuits combined with a “visual” representation of current goals and the agent’s internal state. Policies: “Universal plans” (Schoppers, 1987(40), 1989(41)) were developed as a lookup table method for reactive planning, but turned out to be a rediscovery of the idea of policies that had long been used in Markov decision processes (…). >Open Universe/AI research). 1. Vere, S. A. (1983). Planning in time: Windows and durations for activities and goals. PAMI, 5, 246-267. 2. Allen, J. F. (1984). Towards a general theory of action and time. AIJ, 23, 123-154. 3. Dean, T., Kanazawa, K., and Shewchuk, J. (1990). Prediction, observation and estimation in planning and control. In 5th IEEE International Symposium on Intelligent Control, Vol. 2, pp. 645-650. 4. Tate, A. and Whiter, A. M. (1984). Planning with multiple resource constraints and an application to a naval planning problem. In Proc. First Conference on AI Applications, pp. 410-416. 5. Wilkins, D. E. (1988). Practical Planning: Extending the AI Planning Paradigm. Morgan Kaufmann. 6. Wilkins, D. E. (1990). Can AI planners solve practical problems? Computational Intelligence, 6(4), 232-246. 7. Do, M. B. and Kambhampati, S. (2003). Planning as constraint satisfaction: solving the planning graph by compiling it into CSP. AIJ, 132(2), 151-182. 8. Haslum, P. and Geffner, H. (2001). Heuristic planning with time and resources. In Proc. IJCAI-01 Workshop on Planning with Resources. 9. Fukunaga, A. S., Rabideau, G., Chien, S., and Yan, D. (1997). ASPEN: A framework for automated planning and scheduling of spacecraft control and operations. In Proc. International Symposium on AI, Robotics and Automation in Space, pp. 181-187. 10. Jonsson, A., Morris, P., Muscettola, N., Rajan, K., and Smith, B. (2000). Planning in interplanetary space: Theory and practice. In AIPS-00, pp. 177-186. 11. Ghallab, M. and Laruelle, H. (1994). Representation and control in IxTeT, a temporal planner. In AIPS-94, pp. 61-67. 12. Fox, M. S., Allen, B., and Strohm, G. (1982). Job shop scheduling: An investigation in constraint directed reasoning. In AAAI-82, pp. 155-158. 13. Fox, M. S. (1990). Constraint-guided scheduling: A short history of research at CMU. Computers in Industry, 14(1–3), 79-88 14. Descotte, Y. and Latombe, J.-C. (1985). Making compromises among antagonist constraints in a planner. AIJ, 27, 183–217. 15. Cushing,W., Kambhampati, S.,Mausam, and Weld, D. S. (2007). When is temporal planning really temporal? In IJCAI-07. 16. Lawler, E. L., Lenstra, J. K., Kan, A., and Shmoys, D. B. (1993). Sequencing and scheduling: Algorithms and complexity. In Graves, S. C., Zipkin, P. H., and Kan, A. H. G. R. (Eds.), Logistics of Production and Inventory: Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Volume 4, pp. 445 - 522. North-Holland. 17. Pinedo, M. (2008). Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems. Springer Verlag. 18. Blazewicz, J., Ecker, K., Pesch, E., Schmidt, G., and Weglarz, J. (2007). Handbook on Scheduling: Models and Methods for Advanced Planning (International Handbooks on Information Systems). Springer-Verlag New York, Inc. 19. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1974). Planning in a hierarchy of abstraction spaces. AIJ, 5(2), 115–135. 20. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1977). A Structure for Plans and Behavior. Elsevier/North-Holland 21. Yang, Q. (1990). Formalizing planning knowledge for hierarchical planning. Computational Intelligence, 6, 12–24. 22. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1994). HTN planning: Complexity and expressivity. In AAAI-94, pp. 1123–1128. 23. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1996). Complexity results for HTN planning. AIJ, 18(1), 69–93. 24. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2007). Angelic semantics for high-level actions. In ICAPS-07. 25. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2008). Angelic hierarchical planning: Optimal and online algorithms. In ICAPS-08. 26. Kambhampati, S., Mali, A. D., and Srivastava, B. (1998). Hybrid planning for partially hierarchical domains. In AAAI-98, pp. 882–888. 27. Laird, J., Rosenbloom, P. S., and Newell, A. (1986). Chunking in Soar: The anatomy of a general learning mechanism. Machine Learning, 1, 11–46. 28. Carbonell, J. G., Knoblock, C. A., and Minton, S. (1989). PRODIGY: An integrated architecture for planning and learning. Technical report CMU-CS- 89-189, Computer Science Department, Carnegie- Mellon University. 29. Carbonell, J. G. (1983). Derivational analogy and its role in problem solving. In AAAI-83, pp. 64–69. 30. Alterman, R. (1988). Adaptive planning. Cognitive Science, 12, 393–422. 31. Hammond, K. (1989). Case-Based Planning: Viewing Planning as a Memory Task. Academic Press. 32. Kambhampati, S. (1994). Exploiting causal structure to control retrieval and refitting during plan reuse. Computational Intelligence, 10, 213–244 33. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117. 34. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117. 35. Smith, D. E. and Weld, D. S. (1998). Conformant Graphplan. In AAAI-98, pp. 889–896. 36. Rintanen, J. (1999). Improvements to the evaluation of quantified Boolean formulae. In IJCAI-99, pp. 1192–1197. 37. Bonet, B. and Geffner, H. (2005). An algorithm better than AO∗? In AAAI-05. 38. Brooks, R. A. (1986). A robust layered control system for a mobile robot. IEEE Journal of Robotics and Automation, 2, 14–23. 39. Agre, P. E. and Chapman, D. (1987). Pengi: an implementation of a theory of activity. In IJCAI-87, pp. 268–272. 40. Schoppers, M. J. (1987). Universal plans for reactive robots in unpredictable environments. In IJCAI- 87, pp. 1039–1046. 41. Schoppers, M. J. (1989). In defense of reaction plans as caches. AIMag, 10(4), 51–60. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Environment | Russell | Norvig I 401 Environment/planning/real world/representation/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: algorithms for planning (…) extend both the representation language and the way the planner interacts with the environment. >Planning/Norvig, >Agents/Norvig. New: [we now have] a) actions with duration and b) plans that are organized hierarchically. Hierarchy: Hierarchy also lends itself to efficient plan construction because the planner can solve a problem at an abstract level before delving into details 1st approach: “plan first, schedule later”: (…) we divide the overall problem into a planning phase in which actions are selected, with some ordering constraints, to meet the goals of the problem, and a later scheduling phase, in which temporal information is added to the plan to ensure that it meets resource and deadline constraints. Norvig I 404 Critical path: Mathematically speaking, critical-path problems are easy to solve because they are defined as a conjunction of linear inequalities on the start and end times. When we introduce resource constraints, the resulting constraints on start and end times become more complicated. Norvig I 405 Scheduling: The “cannot overlap” constraint is a disjunction of two linear inequalities, one for each possible ordering. The introduction of disjunctions turns out to make scheduling with resource constraints NP-hard. >NP-Problems. Non-overlapping: [when we assume non-overlapping] every scheduling problem can be solved by a non-overlapping sequence that avoids all resource conflicts, provided that each action is feasible by itself. If a scheduling problem is proving very difficult, however, it may not be a good idea to solve it this way - it may be better to reconsider the actions and constraints, in case that leads to a much easier scheduling problem. Thus, it makes sense to integrate planning and scheduling by taking into account durations and overlaps during the construction of a partial-order plan. Heuristics: partial-order planners can detect resource constraint violations in much the same way they detect conflicts with causal links. Heuristics can be devised to estimate the total completion time of a plan. This is currently an active area of research (see below). Norvig I 406 Real world planning: AI systems will probably have to do what humans appear to do: plan at higher levels of abstraction. A reasonable plan for the Hawaii vacation might be “Go to San Francisco airport (…)” ((s) which might be in a different direction). (…) planning can occur both before and during the execution of the plan (…). Solution: hierarchical decomposition: hierarchical task networks (HTN). Norvig I 407 a high-level plan achieves the goal from a given state if at least one of its implementations achieves the goal from that state. The “at least one” in this definition is crucial - not all implementations need to achieve the goal, because the agent gets Norvig I 408 to decide which implementation it will execute. Thus, the set of possible implementations in HTN planning - each of which may have a different outcome - is not the same as the set of possible outcomes in nondeterministic planning. It can be shown that the right collection of HLAs can result in the time complexity of blind search dropping from exponential in the solution depth to linear in the solution depth, although devising such a collection of HLAs may be a nontrivial task in itself. Norvig I 409 Plan library: The key to HTN planning, then, is the construction of a plan library containing known methods for implementing complex, high-level actions. One method of constructing the library is to learn the methods from problem-solving experience. >Representation/AI research, >Learning/AI research. Learning/AI: In this way, the agent can become more and more competent over time as new methods are built on top of old methods. One important aspect of this learning process is the ability to generalize the methods that are constructed, eliminating detail that is specific to the problem instance (…). Norvig I 410 Nondeterministic action: problem: downward refinement is much too conservative for a real world environment. See >Terminology/Norvig for “demonic nondeterminism” and “angelic nondeterminism”. Norvig I 411 Reachable sets: The key idea is that the agent can choose which element of the reachable set it ends up in when it executes the HLA; thus, an HLA with multiple refinements is more “powerful” than the same HLA (hig level action) with fewer refinements. The notion of reachable sets yields a straightforward algorithm: search among highlevel plans, looking for one whose reachable set intersects the goal; once that happens, the algorithm can commit to that abstract plan, knowing that it works, and focus on refining the plan further. Norvig I 415 Unknown environment/planning/nondeterministic domains: [problems here are] sensorless planning (also known as conformant planning) for environments with no observations; contingency planning for partially observable and nondeterministic environments; and online planning and replanning for unknown environments. Norvig I 417 Sensorless planning: In classical planning, where the closed-world assumption is made, we would assume that any fluent not mentioned in a state is false, but in sensorless (and partially observable) planning we have to switch to an open-world assumption in which states contain both positive and negative fluents, and if a fluent does not appear, its value is unknown. Thus, the belief state corresponds exactly to the set of possible worlds that satisfy the formula. Norvig I 423 Online replanning: The online agent has a choice of how carefully to monitor the environment. We distinguish three levels: a) Action monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that all the preconditions still hold, b) Plan monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that the remaining plan will still succeed, c) Goal monitoring: before executing an action, the agent checks to see if there is a better set of goals it could be trying to achieve. Norvig I 425 Multi-agent planning: A multibody problem is still a “standard” single-agent problem as long as the relevant sensor information collected by each body can be pooled - either centrally or within each body - to form a common estimate of the world state that then informs the execution of the overall plan; in this case, the multiple bodies act as a single body. When communication constraints make this impossible, we have Norvig I 426 what is sometimes called a decentralized planning problem: (…) the subplan constructed for each body may need to include explicit communicative actions with other bodies. Norvig I 429 Convention: A convention is any constraint on the selection of joint plans. Communication: In the absence of a convention, agents can use communication to achieve common knowledge of a feasible joint plan. Plan recognition: works when a single action (or short sequence of actions) is enough to determine a joint plan unambiguously. Note that communication can work as well with competitive agents as with cooperative ones. Norvig I 430 The most difficult multi-agent problems involve both cooperation with members of one’s own team and competition against members of opposing teams, all without centralized control. Norvig I 431 Time constraints in plans: Planning with time constraints was first dealt with by DEVISER (Vere, 1983(1)). The representation of time in plans was addressed by Allen (1984(2)) and by Dean et al. (1990)(3) in the FORBIN system. NONLIN+ (Tate and Whiter, 1984)(4) and SIPE (Wilkins, 1988(5), 1990(6)) could reason about the allocation of limited resources to various plan steps. Forward state-space search: The two planners SAPA (Do and Kambhampati, 2001)(7) and T4 (Haslum and Geffner, 2001)(8) both used forward state-space search with sophisticated heuristics to handle actions with durations and resources. Human heuristics: An alternative is to use very expressive action languages, but guide them by human-written domain-specific heuristics, as is done by ASPEN (Fukunaga et al., 1997)(9), HSTS (Jonsson et al., 2000)(10), and IxTeT (Ghallab and Laruelle, 1994)(11). Norvig I 432 Hybrid planning-and-scheduling systems: ISIS (Fox et al., 1982(12); Fox, 1990(13)) has been used for job shop scheduling at Westinghouse, GARI (Descotte and Latombe, 1985)(14) planned the machining and construction of mechanical parts, FORBIN was used for factory control, and NONLIN+ was used for naval logistics planning. We chose to present planning and scheduling as two separate problems; (Cushing et al., 2007)(15) show that this can lead to incompleteness on certain problems. Scheduling: The literature on scheduling is presented in a classic survey article (Lawler et al., 1993)(16), a recent book (Pinedo, 2008)(17), and an edited handbook (Blazewicz et al., 2007)(18). Abstraction hierarchy: The ABSTRIPS system (Sacerdoti, 1974)(19) introduced the idea of an abstraction hierarchy, whereby planning at higher levels was permitted to ignore lower-level preconditions of actions in order to derive the general structure of a working plan. Austin Tate’s Ph.D. thesis (1975b) and work by Earl Sacerdoti (1977)(20) developed the basic ideas of HTN planning in its modern form. Many practical planners, including O-PLAN and SIPE, are HTN planners. Yang (1990)(21) discusses properties of actions that make HTN planning efficient. Erol, Hendler, and Nau (1994(22), 1996(23)) present a complete hierarchical decomposition planner as well as a range of complexity results for pure HTN planners. Our presentation of HLAs and angelic semantics is due to Marthi et al. (2007(24), 2008(25)). Kambhampati et al. (1998)(26) have proposed an approach in which decompositions are just another form of plan refinement, similar to the refinements for non-hierarchical partial-order planning. Explanation-based learning: The technique of explanation-based learning (…) has been applied in several systems as a means of generalizing previously computed plans, including SOAR (Laird et al., 1986)(27) and PRODIGY (Carbonell et al., 1989)(28). Case-based planning: An alternative approach is to store previously computed plans in their original form and then reuse them to solve new, similar problems by analogy to the original problem. This is the approach taken by the field called case-based planning (Carbonell, 1983(29); Alterman, 1988(30); Hammond, 1989(31)). Kambhampati (1994)(32) argues that case-based planning should be analyzed as a form of refinement planning and provides a formal foundation for case-based partial-order planning. Norvig I 433 Conformant planning: Goldman and Boddy (1996)(33) introduced the term conformant planning, noting that sensorless plans are often effective even if the agent has sensors. The first moderately efficient conformant planner was Smith and Weld’s (1998)(34) Conformant Graphplan or CGP. Ferraris and Giunchiglia (2000)(35) and Rintanen (1999)(36) independently developed SATPLAN-based conformant planners. Bonet and Geffner (2000)(37) describe a conformant planner based on heuristic search in the space of >belief states (…). Norvig I 434 Reactive planning: In the mid-1980s, pessimism about the slow run times of planning systems led to the proposal of reflex agents called reactive planning systems (Brooks, 1986(38); Agre and Chapman, 1987)(39). PENGI (Agre and Chapman, 1987)(39) could play a (fully observable) video game by using Boolean circuits combined with a “visual” representation of current goals and the agent’s internal state. Policies: “Universal plans” (Schoppers, 1987(40), 1989(41)) were developed as a lookup table method for reactive planning, but turned out to be a rediscovery of the idea of policies that had long been used in Markov decision processes (…). >Open Universe/AI research). 1. Vere, S. A. (1983). Planning in time: Windows and durations for activities and goals. PAMI, 5, 246-267. 2. Allen, J. F. (1984). Towards a general theory of action and time. AIJ, 23, 123-154. 3. Dean, T., Kanazawa, K., and Shewchuk, J. (1990). Prediction, observation and estimation in planning and control. In 5th IEEE International Symposium on Intelligent Control, Vol. 2, pp. 645-650. 4. Tate, A. and Whiter, A. M. (1984). Planning with multiple resource constraints and an application to a naval planning problem. In Proc. First Conference on AI Applications, pp. 410-416. 5. Wilkins, D. E. (1988). Practical Planning: Extending the AI Planning Paradigm. Morgan Kaufmann. 6. Wilkins, D. E. (1990). Can AI planners solve practical problems? Computational Intelligence, 6(4), 232-246. 7. Do, M. B. and Kambhampati, S. (2003). Planning as constraint satisfaction: solving the planning graph by compiling it into CSP. AIJ, 132(2), 151-182. 8. Haslum, P. and Geffner, H. (2001). Heuristic planning with time and resources. In Proc. IJCAI-01 Workshop on Planning with Resources. 9. Fukunaga, A. S., Rabideau, G., Chien, S., and Yan, D. (1997). ASPEN: A framework for automated planning and scheduling of spacecraft control and operations. In Proc. International Symposium on AI, Robotics and Automation in Space, pp. 181-187. 10. Jonsson, A., Morris, P., Muscettola, N., Rajan, K., and Smith, B. (2000). Planning in interplanetary space: Theory and practice. In AIPS-00, pp. 177-186. 11. Ghallab, M. and Laruelle, H. (1994). Representation and control in IxTeT, a temporal planner. In AIPS-94, pp. 61-67. 12. Fox, M. S., Allen, B., and Strohm, G. (1982). Job shop scheduling: An investigation in constraint directed reasoning. In AAAI-82, pp. 155-158. 13. Fox, M. S. (1990). Constraint-guided scheduling: A short history of research at CMU. Computers in Industry, 14(1–3), 79-88 14. Descotte, Y. and Latombe, J.-C. (1985). Making compromises among antagonist constraints in a planner. AIJ, 27, 183–217. 15. Cushing,W., Kambhampati, S.,Mausam, and Weld, D. S. (2007). When is temporal planning really temporal? In IJCAI-07. 16. Lawler, E. L., Lenstra, J. K., Kan, A., and Shmoys, D. B. (1993). Sequencing and scheduling: Algorithms and complexity. In Graves, S. C., Zipkin, P. H., and Kan, A. H. G. R. (Eds.), Logistics of Production and Inventory: Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Volume 4, pp. 445 - 522. North-Holland. 17. Pinedo, M. (2008). Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems. Springer Verlag. 18. Blazewicz, J., Ecker, K., Pesch, E., Schmidt, G., and Weglarz, J. (2007). Handbook on Scheduling: Models and Methods for Advanced Planning (International Handbooks on Information Systems). Springer-Verlag New York, Inc. 19. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1974). Planning in a hierarchy of abstraction spaces. AIJ, 5(2), 115–135. 20. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1977). A Structure for Plans and Behavior. Elsevier/North-Holland 21. Yang, Q. (1990). Formalizing planning knowledge for hierarchical planning. Computational Intelligence, 6, 12–24. 22. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1994). HTN planning: Complexity and expressivity. In AAAI-94, pp. 1123–1128. 23. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1996). Complexity results for HTN planning. AIJ, 18(1), 69–93. 24. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2007). Angelic semantics for high-level actions. In ICAPS-07. 25. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2008). Angelic hierarchical planning: Optimal and online algorithms. In ICAPS-08. 26. Kambhampati, S., Mali, A. D., and Srivastava, B. (1998). Hybrid planning for partially hierarchical domains. In AAAI-98, pp. 882–888. 27. Laird, J., Rosenbloom, P. S., and Newell, A. (1986). Chunking in Soar: The anatomy of a general learning mechanism. Machine Learning, 1, 11–46. 28. Carbonell, J. G., Knoblock, C. A., and Minton, S. (1989). PRODIGY: An integrated architecture for planning and learning. Technical report CMU-CS- 89-189, Computer Science Department, Carnegie- Mellon University. 29. Carbonell, J. G. (1983). Derivational analogy and its role in problem solving. In AAAI-83, pp. 64–69. 30. Alterman, R. (1988). Adaptive planning. Cognitive Science, 12, 393–422. 31. Hammond, K. (1989). Case-Based Planning: Viewing Planning as a Memory Task. Academic Press. 32. Kambhampati, S. (1994). Exploiting causal structure to control retrieval and refitting during plan reuse. Computational Intelligence, 10, 213–244 33. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117. 34. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117. 35. Smith, D. E. and Weld, D. S. (1998). Conformant Graphplan. In AAAI-98, pp. 889–896. 36. Rintanen, J. (1999). Improvements to the evaluation of quantified Boolean formulae. In IJCAI-99, pp. 1192–1197. 37. Bonet, B. and Geffner, H. (2005). An algorithm better than AO∗? In AAAI-05. 38. Brooks, R. A. (1986). A robust layered control system for a mobile robot. IEEE Journal of Robotics and Automation, 2, 14–23. 39. Agre, P. E. and Chapman, D. (1987). Pengi: an implementation of a theory of activity. In IJCAI-87, pp. 268–272. 40. Schoppers, M. J. (1987). Universal plans for reactive robots in unpredictable environments. In IJCAI- 87, pp. 1039–1046. 41. Schoppers, M. J. (1989). In defense of reaction plans as caches. AIMag, 10(4), 51–60. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Environment | Ryan | Corr I 444 Social Environment/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Psychology/Deci/Ryan: Thesis: social environments that facilitate satisfaction of the basic psychological needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness will lead to more autonomous types of motivation – namely, identified, integrated and intrinsic – whereas social environments that are thwarting of the basic needs will lead to either controlled motivation or amotivation. >Motivation/Deci/Ryan, >Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan. Initial work on the motivational effects of social environment environments was a set of laboratory experiments that examined how various factors such as rewards, feedback and deadlines affect intrinsic motivation. In the first studies, Deci (1971)(1) found that when participants received monetary rewards for solving an interesting spatial-relations puzzle, they were subsequently less intrinsically motivated for the activity than were participants who had done the same activity without receiving the rewards. The extrinsic rewards seemed to undermine the participants’ intrinsic motivations. This finding has been replicated dozens of times, and a meta-analysis (Deci, Koestner and Ryan 1999)(2) confirmed this effect across more than 100 experiments. Studies (e.g., Vallerand and Reid 1984)(3) further showed that positive feedback enhanced the intrinsic motivation of participants relative to those who did not get the feedback. Thus, it appears that feedback that affirms competence when accompanied by a sense of autonomy typically enhances intrinsic motivation (Ryan 1982(4)). Corr I 447 Effects of the environment o internalization: SDT is built on the assumption that people are naturally inclined to internalize values and behaviours that are exhibited by important others in their socializing environment. (…) [but] only to the extent that people experience satisfaction of the basic needs as they are acquiring the values and behaviours. That is, environments that support need satisfaction will lead people to accept the structures that are endorsed by the social world, but those that are rejecting or controlling will impair internalization, leaving the people controlled either by external or introjected regulatory processes. >Regulation/Deci/Ryan. 1. Deci, E. L. 1971. Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 18: 105–15 2. Deci, E. L., Koestner, R. and Ryan, R. M. 1999. A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation, Psychological Bulletin 125: 627–68 3. Vallerand, R. J. and Reid, G. 1984. On the causal effects of perceived competence on intrinsic motivation: a test of cognitive evaluation theory, Journal of Sport Psychology 6: 94–102 4. Ryan, R. M. 1982. Control and information in the intrapersonal sphere: an extension of cognitive evaluation theory, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 43: 450–61 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Environment | Self-Determination Theory | Corr I 444 Social Environment/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Psychology/Deci/Ryan: Thesis: social environments that facilitate satisfaction of the basic psychological needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness will lead to more autonomous types of motivation – namely, identified, integrated and intrinsic – whereas social environments that are thwarting of the basic needs will lead to either controlled motivation or amotivation. >Motivation/Deci/Ryan, >Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan. Initial work on the motivational effects of social environment environments was a set of laboratory experiments that examined how various factors such as rewards, feedback and deadlines affect intrinsic motivation. In the first studies, Deci (1971)(1) found that when participants received monetary rewards for solving an interesting spatial-relations puzzle, they were subsequently less intrinsically motivated for the activity than were participants who had done the same activity without receiving the rewards. The extrinsic rewards seemed to undermine the participants’ intrinsic motivations. This finding has been replicated dozens of times, and a meta-analysis (Deci, Koestner and Ryan 1999)(2) confirmed this effect across more than 100 experiments. Studies (e.g., Vallerand and Reid 1984)(3) further showed that positive feedback enhanced the intrinsic motivation of participants relative to those who did not get the feedback. Thus, it appears that feedback that affirms competence when accompanied by a sense of autonomy typically enhances intrinsic motivation (Ryan 1982(4)). Corr I 447 Effects of the environment o internalization: SDT is built on the assumption that people are naturally inclined to internalize values and behaviours that are exhibited by important others in their socializing environment. (…) [but] only to the extent that people experience satisfaction of the basic needs as they are acquiring the values and behaviours. That is, environments that support need satisfaction will lead people to accept the structures that are endorsed by the social world, but those that are rejecting or controlling will impair internalization, leaving the people controlled either by external or introjected regulatory processes. >Regulation/Deci/Ryan. 1. Deci, E. L. 1971. Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 18: 105–15 2. Deci, E. L., Koestner, R. and Ryan, R. M. 1999. A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation, Psychological Bulletin 125: 627–68 3. Vallerand, R. J. and Reid, G. 1984. On the causal effects of perceived competence on intrinsic motivation: a test of cognitive evaluation theory, Journal of Sport Psychology 6: 94–102 4. Ryan, R. M. 1982. Control and information in the intrapersonal sphere: an extension of cognitive evaluation theory, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 43: 450–61 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Environment | Singer | I 238ff Environment/ecology/ethics/Singer, P.: What kinds of ethical values are relevant when it comes to assessing measures that involve environmental impact? For example, the construction of a dam in a valley that is difficult to access and serves as a recreational area for only a few people,... I 239 ...For example, the construction of a paper mill whose effluent is discharged into the sea, for example the commissioning of a new mine on the edge of a national park. Western tradition is strongly influenced by the Biblical creation myth. This is about mankind subjecting the earth. >Christianity, cf. >Bible, >Bible criticism, >Morality >Ethics. I 240 Today, many people interpret this as an administrative office. If one then takes it as a yardstick, mankind can orientate itself on God's actions and still justify the greatest interventions. Nature/Environment/Aristotle/Singer, P.: according to Aristotle plants serve animals, animals serve humans. >Nature/Aristotle. I 241 Since nothing in nature happens in vain or futile, everything ultimately serves mankind. (Aristotle(1)). Nature/Environment/Augustinus/Singer, P.: Augustine follows Aristotle and adds that there is no sin against non-human animals or against the world of nature. (Augustine, Summa Theologica(2)) Environmental protection/Christian tradition/Singer, P.: according to the Christian tradition, everything is oriented towards people. However, preserving the environment can become important when it comes to protecting people's interests. >Environment. I 242 Environmental destruction/Singer, P.: the economic value that can be acquired today through the destruction of an irretrievable natural resource, such as a primeval forest, will account for only a fraction of this in a hundred years due to inflation. I 243 Future generations could not even buy back the lost property if it were available. >Generational justice. cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Aristotle, Politics (London 1916). 2. Augustine, Summa Theologica, II, ii, qu. 64, art.1, I, ii, qu. 72, art 4. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Environmental Damage | Economic Theories | Mause I 402f Environmental Damage/Economic Theory: Environmental damage is often the result of the economic use of natural resources. They are caused by production and consumption as well as the absorption of pollutants within the existing environmental media (air, water, soil). These forms of use can also be described as functions of the natural environment (production, consumption, landfill function). On the other hand, increasing land use for settlement, transport and production purposes is contributing to environmental damage because natural ecosystems are being reduced, biodiversity is declining, the landscape is being affected and the soil is increasingly sealed (Cansier 1993, p. 3 (1); Hartwig 1992, p. 126ff (2)). Environmental Policy/Federal Republic of Germany: The environmental policy pursued in Germany for more than 40 years (see for an overview Böcher und Töller 2012, p. 6ff. (3)) has contributed to a significant improvement in Germany's environmental quality status, particularly in the recent past, according to the latest OECD environmental assessment report (2012) (4). For example, Germany's total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2, methane, etc.) in 2010 were 24 % below 1990 levels, although Germany is one of the few OECD countries to have completely decoupled greenhouse gas emissions and economic growth in the 2000s, not least due to a reduction in the energy intensity of industrial production. Externality: The need for government action in the field of environmental policy can be justified from an economic point of view by the concept of external effects in addition to the public good properties of the elimination of environmental damage (Feess und Seeliger 2013, p. 39ff.(5); Endres 2000, p. 18ff.(6)). Environmental damage and improvements can then be understood as a consequence of negative or positive side effects of production or consumption. Like public goods, these effects are not covered by the market price mechanism. Problem: If the state does not ensure the "internalisation of external effects" within the framework of its environmental policy, i.e. for the charging of external costs or a renumeration of the external benefits from the polluter, this leads to a misallocation in the provision of private goods, which is accompanied by an overuse of environmental resources or too little improvement in environmental quality.(7) >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Cansier, Dieter. 1993. Umweltökonomie. Stuttgart/ Jena: 2. Hartwig, Karl-Hans, Umweltökonomie. In Vahlens Kompendium der Wirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftspolitik, ed. Dieter Bender, Hartmut Berg, Dieter Cassel, Günter Gabisch, Karl-Hans Hartwig, Lothar Hübl, Dietmar Kath, Rolf Peffekoven, Jürgen Siebke, H. Jörg Thieme und Manfred Willms, Vol. 2, 5. ed., 122– 162. München 1992 3. Böcher, Michael, und Annette E. Töller, Umweltpolitik in Deutschland. Eine politikfeldanalytische Einführung. Wiesbaden 2012. 4. OECD. 2012. OECD-Umweltprüfberichte. Deutschland 2012. Paris: OECD Publishing. 5. Feess, Eberhard, und Andreas Seeliger, Umweltökonomie und Umweltpolitik, 4. ed. München 2013 6. Endres, Alfred, Umweltökonomie, 3. ed. Stuttgart: 2000. 7. Ibid. p. 19 |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Environmental Damage | Rawls | I 268 Environmental Damage/Costs/Rawls: (See Public Sector/Rawls): Second characteristic of public goods: Externality. The production of these goods is also at the expense of those who never profit from them. Not all wishes are considered. For example, environmental damage is not normally regulated by the market. For example, raw materials may be produced at a much lower cost than their marginal social costs. Here there is a difference between private and social accounting that the market does not register. In this case, the indivisibility of public goods (e. g. infrastructure, freedoms, etc.) requires the state to take over the scheme. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Environmental Economics | Daly | Mause I 78f Environmental Economics/DalyVsNeoclassicism/Daly: traditional neoclassical environmental economics neglects the laws of physics and must therefore be supplemented by a macro-environmental policy that sets absolute limits on the economic system - for example in the form of absolute limits for resource and energy consumption.(1) Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Elements of environmental macroeconomics. In Ecological economics: The science and management of sustainability, Hrsg. Robert Costanza, 32– 46. New York 1991. |
EconDaly I Herman Daly Elements of environmental macroeconomics. In Ecological economics: The science and management of sustainability New York 1991 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Environmental Ethics | Pelluchon | Environmental Ethics/Pelluchon: (...) the holistic vision defended by environmental ethics in the 1970s was too abstract: because it only addressed reason and not affects, it could not persuade individuals to change their lifestyle. Nor did this thinking succeed in inspiring an ecological policy to put the economy at the service of living things and to reorganize production in such a way that it takes into account the limits of the planet and frees certain sectors such as agriculture, livestock and care from the economic dictates of maximum efficiency. >Existence/Pelluchon, >Ecology/Pelluchon. If you ask what we live on, it no longer makes sense to bring the ecological end of the world and the empty wallet at the end of the month, humanism and animal welfare in opposition to each other. Because the moment I eat, live, work or travel somewhere, I am (...) in relation to the people who produce foodand build my house. I am also in a relation with the animals and the natural resources. >Body/Pelluchon. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. Corine Pelluchon. „Wovon leben wir?“ in: Die ZEIT Nr. 38. 10.09.2020 |
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| Environmental Goods | Economic Theories | Mause I 408f Environmental Goods/Preferences/Economic Theories: There are individual environmental areas in which the long-term effects of environmental impairments are not always fully assessed individually (e.g. preservation of mountain forests due to avalanche danger) and therefore an at least partial correction of individual preferences through so-called meritorial interventions by the state (e.g. prohibition of deforestation of "protective forests") is necessary (Zimmermann et al. 2012, p. 498) (1). For the vast majority of environmental goods, however, it can be assumed in principle that corresponding environmental protection preferences exist in society without, however, sufficient quantities and quality of these goods being offered via the market. Mause I 409 Environmental goods have the typical characteristics of public goods. >Public Goods. a) Non-rivalry in consumption: consumption by one citizen does not diminish that of another. Example air. This means that no market prices arise here. b) The exclusion principle cannot be applied: nobody can be excluded from the use by assignment of exclusive property rights. This means that a private supplier could not achieve cost-covering prices with these goods. Conclusion: Clean environment cannot be sold via a market. Common goods/Common: these are goods for which rival consumption may occur. Although there is no market here either, the lack of ownership rights means that there is no incentive to treat the environmental goods concerned with care. Example Overfishing (2). Prisoner's Dielmma/Ostrom. Cfl. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Horst Zimmermann, Horst, Klaus-Dirk Henke, und Michael Broer, Finanzwissenschaft. Eine Einführung in die Lehre von der öffentlichen Finanzwirtschaft, 11. ed. München 2012. 2. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge 1990. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Environmental Groups | Public Choice Theory | Parisi I 184 Environmental Groups/Public Choice theory/Farber: collective action problems may allow concentrated minority interests such as monopolists to exploit diffuse majorities. Interest group theories predate public choice but have been a focal point of one prong of public choice scholarship (Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, 2006(1), pp. 85-9). Early public choice theorists told a simple and very plausible story about the differential political power of groups (Mashaw, 2010(2)). Transaction costs: Organizing a group involves transaction costs, including the need to motivate participation in the face of incentives to free-ride. It seems very reasonable to postulate that these costs increase along with the size of the group, all else being equal. It is obviously easier to get one person with a $ 1000 stake to join an organization and take action than it is to get a thousand people with $1 stakes to do so (Stearns and Zywicki, 2009(3), pp. 55-62). >Collective action. Small groups: Early public choice theorists then concluded that politics would be dominated by smaller, easily organized special interests at the expense of the public as a whole (Stigler, 1971)(4). So government should mostly function as a mechanism for transferring wealth from the public to special interest groups of various kinds (Mashaw, 2010)(2). Vs: This is a seductive argument but turns out to be far too facile, as well as inconsistent with much recent evidence about collective action (Ginsburg, 2002(5), pp. 1144-1149). Environmental groups: It suggests, for instance, that environmental groups should not form at all, and that environmental legislation should not exist. Yet groups such as the Sierra Club are very much alive and well, and industry complains constantly about the burdens created by environmental legislation (Mashaw, 2010(2), pp. 28—31; Croley, 2010(6), pp. 52-53). Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Eskridge, W. N., P. P. Frickey, and E. Garrett (2006). Legislation and Statutory Interpretation. 2nd edition. St. Paul, MN: Foundation Press. 2. Mashaw, J. (2010). "Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and Rapprochement," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 19-48. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 3. Stearns, M. L. and T. J. Zywicki (2009). Public Choice Concepts and Applications in Law. St. Paul, MN: Thomas Reuters. 4. Stigler, G. J. (1971). "The Theory of Economic Regulation." Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2(1):3-21. 5. Ginsburg, T. (2002). "Ways of Criticizing Public Choice: The Uses of Empiricisms and the Theory in Legal Scholarship." University of Illinois Law Review 4: 1 139-1166. 6. Croley, S. (2010). "Interest Groups and Public Choice," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 49—86. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Farber, Daniel A. “Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Environmental Organisations | Economic Theories | Mause I 413f Environmental Organizations/Economic Theory: According to a 1965 (1) thesis by Mancur Olson on collective action, there is an asymmetry in the organizational and conflict capacity of economic and environmental associations. VsOlson: the situation of environmental associations is not quite as it should be according to Olson's logic. Protest as a central form of action has lost importance in the last 20 years. (Roose, 2009, p. 111) (2) The asymmetries mentioned above have also eased (von Winter, 2001, p. 218) (3) Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Revised ed.). Harvard University Press 1965. 2. Jochen Roose, Unterstützungslogik und Informationslogik. Zu zwei Formen der Interessenvertretung im Umweltbereich. In Interessenvermittlung in Politikfeldern, Hrsg. Britta Rehder, Thomas Winter und Ulrich Willems, 109– 131. Wiesbaden 2009. 3. Thomas von Winter, Verbändemacht im kooperativen Staat. In Zukunft der Demokratie in Deutschland, Hrsg. Andrea Gourd und Thomas Noetzel, 211– 234. Opladen 2001. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Environmental Policy | Economic Theories | Mause I 404/405 Environmental policy/Economic Theory: from the point of view of economic theory, a central regulation is only desirable in the case of spatially homogeneous environmental protection preferences, cross-border damage effects (regional spillover effects) or implementation-related cost degression effects. (1) Apart from that, a more regional structure is to be welcomed, as it not only offers the possibility of better implementation of the subsidiarity principle in the national distribution of competences (Döring and Voigt 2006, p. 206 (2)), but also the chance of increased federal competition in the field of environmental protection (Mammen 2007, p. 125 (3); Koch and Krohn 2006 (4). Vs: a fragmentation of environmental legislation could lead to a "race to the bottom" with a multitude of environmental standards (Benz et al. 2008 (5); Ingerowski 2006 (6)). Market forces can do little to mitigate environmental damage. >Environmental goods/Economic theories). The reason is the free rider problem. >Prisoner's Dilemma/Ostrom. Free riders: For example, if the installation of a catalytic converter costs 1,00.00 Euros and the individual benefit from clean air is evaluated at the same time at 1,500.00 Euros, then it is rational for the individual not to install the catalytic converter. This even applies if everyone else dispenses with installation. For society as a whole, this leads to the worst result. Therefore, in most cases, the state must intervene to contain environmental damage. (Nordhaus 1993, p. 18) (7), Hartwig 1992, p. 132) (8). >Externalities. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Klaus W. Zimmermann & Walter Kahlenborn, Umweltföderalismus. Einheit und Einheitlichkeit in Deutschland und Europa. Berlin 1994. 2.Thomas Döring & Stefan Voigt. 2006. Reforming federalism German style. Intereconomics 41: 201– 208. 3. Lars Mammen. 2007. Der neue Typus der konkurrierenden Gesetzgebung mit Abweichungsrecht. Die öffentliche Verwaltung 9: 376– 379. 4. Hans-Joachim Koch, &Susan Krohn. 2006. Umwelt in schlechter Verfassung? Der Umweltschutz nach der Föderalismusreform. Natur und Recht 28: 673– 680. https://link.springer.com/ article/10.1007%2Fs10357-006-1144-3 5. Arthur Benz, Arthur, Hans-Joachim Koch, André Suck & Anna Fizek, Verwaltungshandeln im Naturschutz: Herausforderungen und Folgen veränderter Rahmenbedingungen. Münster 2008.. 6. Jan B. Ingerowski, J2006. Die Föderalismusreform: Chance auf ein stringentes, an den aktuellen Herausforderungen des Umweltschutzes orientiertes Umweltrecht vertan. KGV-Rundbrief 3 + 4/ 2006. 7. William D. Nordhaus. 1993. Reflections on the economics of climate change. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 7: 11– 25. 8. Karl-Hans Hartwig, Umweltökonomie. In Vahlens Kompendium der Wirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftspolitik, Hrsg. Dieter Bender, Hartmut Berg, Dieter Cassel, Günter Gabisch, Karl-Hans Hartwig, Lothar Hübl, Dietmar Kath, Rolf Peffekoven, Jürgen Siebke, H. Jörg Thieme und Manfred Willms, Bd. 2, 5. Aufl., 122– 162. München 1992. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Environmental Policy | International Institutions | Mause I 404f Environmental Policy/International Institutions: over the past 20 years, the importance of international organisations and international environmental regimes (...) has increased enormously.(1) United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP): founded in 1972. UN-Conferences: Rio de Janairo 1992: international environmental agreements have been in existence since then, which are binding as contributions under international law for the ratifying states.(2) Important climate agreements: Montreal Protocol 1987: on substances that destroy the ozone layer. (3)(4) Federal Republic of Germany: for environmental policy in Germany, this meant above all the introduction of the right of association action and a strengthening of public participation in various planning procedures (Knopp 2005)(5). >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Breitmeier, Helmut. Regieren in der globalen Umweltpolitik. Eine gemischte Bilanz zwischen Erfolgs- und Problemfällen. In Sektorale Weltordnungspolitik. Effektiv, gerecht und demokratisch? Hrsg. Helmut Breitmeier, Michèle Roth und Dieter Senghaas, 150– 171. Baden-Baden 2009. 2. Simonis, Udo E. 2006. Auf dem Weg zur Weltumweltpolitik – und zur notwendigen Reform der Vereinten Nationen. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). 3. Ibid. p. 15ff. 4. Sebastian Oberthür, Die Wirksamkeit von Verrechtlichung. Die Compliance-Mechanismen internationaler Umweltregime. In Politik und Umwelt. PVS-Sonderheft, Hrsg. Klaus Jacob, Frank Biermann, Per-Olof Busch und Peter H. Feindt, Bd. 39, 73– 93. Wiesbaden 2007. OECD. 2012. OECD-Umweltprüfberichte. 5. Lothar Knopp. 2005. Öffentlichkeitsbeteiligungsgesetz und Umwelt-Rechtsbehelfsgesetz. Zeitschrift für Umweltrecht 16: 281– 336. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Environmental Policy | Public Choice | Mause I 413 Environmental Policy/New Political Economy/Public Choice: since the New Political Economy assumes that the respective (short-term) chances of re-election constitute a central restriction to action for politicians, well-informed and influential political actors or groups in environmental policy - contrary to the common good - can shape or even block the choice of environmental policy strategies according to their specific preferences (Döring and Pahl 2003, S. 94)(1), as was already fundamentally explained by Olson (1965)(2) in his reflections on the "logic of collective action". The particular interests of relatively small and financially well-funded interest groups will therefore have a greater chance of asserting themselves. Problem: heterogeneous groups such as taxpayers, consumers and environmental activists are thus subject to asymmetry in terms of influence. >State/Public Choice. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Thomas Döring & Thilo Pahl. Kooperative Lösungen in der Umweltpolitik – eine ökonomische Sicht. In Kooperative Umweltpolitik, Hrsg. Bernd Hansjürgens, Wolfgang Köck und Georg Kneer, 89– 112. Baden-Baden 2003. 2. Mancur Olson, The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge 1965. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Environmental Protection | Economic Theories | Mause I 403/404 Environmental protection/economic policy/economic theory: From an economic point of view, the environmental problems that still exist (...) do not lead to the demand for maximum environmental protection. From an economic point of view (...) the natural environment as such has no intrinsic value, but rather requires a reference to satisfaction of individual needs related to the use of environmental goods. Accordingly, the task of environmental policy is seen as supplying environmental goods for such uses that increase social welfare. From this allocation-theoretical perspective, it is not the minimization of environmental damage, but the realization of an optimal level of environmental protection with consideration of all advantages and disadvantages of environmental protection measures that represents the fundamental objective of an economically expedient environmental policy (Feess und Seeliger 2013, p. 1f.(1); Endres 2000, p. 26 ff.(2)). >Social Good. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Feess, Eberhard, und Andreas Seeliger, Umweltökonomie und Umweltpolitik, 4.ed. München 2013 2. Endres, Alfred, Umweltökonomie, 3. ed. Stuttgart: 2000. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Environmental Protection | Ostrom | Brocker I 726 Environmental protection/Economic theory/Ostrom: Initial question: How can resources that are self-organised and shared by many actors be regulated in such a way that they are preserved for their users and subsequent generations? Brocker I 727 Ostrom's thesis: Public goods (jointly used goods, social goods) can often be managed successfully and sustainably by their users themselves, without the mandatory need for state supervision or individually shared private property. (1) Brocker I 738 VsOstrom: Ostrom's analyses refer to organisational forms with less than 15,000 participants. (See Self-organization/Ostrom, Organization/Ostrom, Institutions/Ostrom, Collective action/Ostrom). She has therefore been accused of being vulnerable to the conclusions she herself draws in subsequent publications on tackling global problems such as climate change. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge 1990. Dt.: Elinor Ostrom, Die Verfassung der Allmende. Jenseits von Staat und Merkt, Tübingen 1999. Markus Hanisch, „Elinor Ostrom Die Verfassung der Allmende“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOstr I Elinor Ostrom Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action Cambridge 1990 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Environmental Protection | Public Choice | Mause I 424 Environmental Protection/New Political Economy/Public Choice: From the perspective of the New Political Economy (Schneider and Kirchgässner 2005(1); Holzinger 1987(2)), politicians should prefer regulatory measures because they suggest a high degree of effectiveness. These measures, because of their direct impact, can be well communicated to voters as a symbol of an active environmental policy, while the costs of environmental protection are often not directly clear and can be better concealed from the majority of voters (Benkert 1993 (3)). Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Schneider, Friedrich, und Gebhard Kirchgässner.Zur Politischen Ökonomie der Umweltpolitik: Hat die Politikberatung etwas bewirkt? Einige Überlegungen aus der Perspektive der Neuen Politischen Ökonomie. In Umweltpolitik und umweltökonomische Politikberatung in Deutschland, Hrsg. Bernd Hansjürgens und Frank Wätzold, 84– 111. Berlin 2005. 2. Holzinger, Katharina. 1987. Umweltpolitische Instrumente aus Sicht der staatlichen Bürokratie. Versuch einer Anwendung der ökonomischen Theorie der Bürokratie. München: ifo-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung. 3. Benkert, Wolfgang, Warum sind Umweltabgaben ebenso populär wie selten? Ein Beitrag zur Theorie der umwelt- und finanzpolitischen Willensbildung. In Umweltpolitik mit hoheitlichen Zwangsabgaben? Hrsg. Klaus Mackscheidt, Dieter Ewringmann und Erik Gawel, 47– 58. Marburg 1993. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Epiphenomenalism | Chalmers | I 150 Epiphenomenalism/Consciousness/Chalmers: Question: when consciousness only supervenes naturally (but not logically) on the physical, there is apparently no causality involved. Then consciousness would only be a side effect and would not exist at all. (Huxley (1874) (1)) argues thus. >Supervenience, >Consciousness/Chalmers. ChalmersVs: the causal unity of our physical world looks only like epiphenomenalism. I 151 VsEpiphenomenalism/Chalmers: a strategy against it would be to deny the causal unity of the physical world. We should not do that. There are better ways that assume more appropriate assumptions of metaphysics and causation. 1. Regularity-Based Causation/Chalmers: Instead of causality, we could assume regularity with Hume. Then one could argue that the behavior itself would have been the same without phenomenological consciousness. >Regularity, >Consciousness, >Behavior, >Causation. ChalmersVs: there are many systematic regularities between conscious experiences and later physical events, each of which leads us to conclude a causal link. >Causality. I 152 2. Causal overdetermination: one might assume that a physical and a phenomenal state, although completely separated, might cause a later physical state. Problem: causal redundancy. Solution: Tooley (1987) (2): we could assume an irreducible causal connection between two physical and one separate irreducible causal connection between a phenomenal and a physical state. This is a non-reducible view of causation. >Reducibility, >Irreducibility. ChalmersVsTooley: it is not easy to show that there is something wrong with it. I do not pursue this, but it has to be taken seriously. 3. Non-supervenience of the causation: facts about consciousness and those about causation are the only facts which do not logically supervene on certain physical facts. Chalmers: it is quite natural to speculate as to whether these two kinds of non-supervenience have a common root. Rosenberg: (1966) (3) has developed this. Rosenberg Thesis: Experience recognizes causation or some aspects of it. After that, causation needs recognition by someone or something. ChalmersVsRosenberg: this is, of course, very speculative, and leads among other things to panpsychism. >Panpsychism, >Aspects. I 153 In addition, the zombie problem would persist. >Zombies. 4. The intrinsic nature of the physical: thesis: a physical theory characterizes above all the relations of its entities, i.e. its propensities to interact with other elements. >Propensity, >Intrinsic. Problem: what is it that causes all these relations of causation and combinations? Russell (1927) (4): This is what the physical theory is silent about. Solution: to adopt an intrinsic nature of the physical elements. Chalmers: the only class of such intrinsic properties would be the class of phenomenal properties. >Phenomena. I 154 There must be no panpsychism following from this. Instead, we can assume proto-phanomenal properties. >Proto-phanomenal. I 159 VsEpiphenomenalism/Chalmers: Arguments against it fall into three classes: 1. Those which concern the relations of experience to normal behavior, 2. Those which concern the relations of experience to judgments about normal behavior, 3. Those which concern the overall picture of the world, which provokes the acceptance of epiphenomenalism. Ad 1. VsEpiphenomenalism: For example, the intuitions about why I withdraw my hand from a flame are strong, on the other hand, we can clarify these intuitions by assuming regularities. We simply perceive experiences more directly than the corresponding brain states. Ad 2. VsEpiphenomenalism: It seems to be extremely counterintuitive that our experiences could be irrelevant to the explanation of our behavior. >Behavior, >Explanation, >Experience, cf. >Subjectivity. I 160 Ad. 3. VsEpiphenomenalism: the image of the world which is drawn by it is implausible because there should be nomological appendages which are not integrated into the system of other natural laws. Epiphenomenalism/Chalmers: I do not describe my own position as epiphenomenalism. The question of the causal relevance of experience remains unanswered. >Relevance. 1. T. Huxley, On the hypothesis that animals are automata. In: Collected Essays, London 1987, pp. 1893-94. 2. M. Tooley, Causation: A Realist Approach, Oxford 1987 3. G. H. Rosenberg, Consciousness and causation: Clues toward a double-aspect theory, Ms Indiana Universwity, 1996. 4. B. Russell, The Analysis of Matter, London 1927 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Epiphenomenalism | Schiffer | I 152 Epiphenomenalism/Schiffer: here the causal relevance is inherited. Epiphenomen = random secondary phenomenon. Schiffer: then it becomes superfluous in the explanation. >Overdetermination. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Epistemic/ontologic | Esfeld | I 379 Epistemic/ontological/Esfeld: epistemic: we cannot distinguish a part of our knowledge from a part that is contributed by nature. Ontological: we, ourselves are a part of nature, it is not a construction of us - the circle closes, if we start from epistemology to come to an ontological statement how knowledge is possible - and from ontology to an epistemological explanation of how ontology is possible. >Recognition, >Knowledge, >Theory of knowledge, >Ontology. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Epistemic/ontologic | Field | II 102 Behavioral explanation/real possibility/epistemic/Stalnaker: behavior must be explained in terms of genuine (non-epistemic) possibility. Intelligent behavior/Stalnaker: may only be explained in terms of possibilities that represent these possibilities. Field: without using the concept of "meaning". >Meaning. II 105 Epistemic/Field: E.g. epistemic term of truth conditions: "is verified in the long term". FieldVs: this is not a good definition of truth conditions. With this, truth is defined in terms of verification. >Truth conditions, >Verification. II 286 Epistemic Theory/Vagueness/Field: Epistemic Theory: accepts facts. >Facts. Non-epistemic theory: can assert that it is conceptually impossible in certain cases that we can decide. - For example, if something is a borderline case of a property. >Vagueness, >Sorites. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Epistemology | Berkeley | I 213 Knowledge/Berkeley/VsLocke: if our knowledge is based only on feelings, it must be shown conversely, how the outside world may be the result of a production, which is based solely on our sensory perceptions. 1. Perception must be purified from all mind ingredients 2. Reality must not become a figment of imagination. >Knowledge, >Reality, >World, >Perception. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
| Epistemology | Dilthey | Gadamer I 222 Epistemology/Dilthey/Gadamer: The tension between the aesthetic-hermeneutic and the historical-philosophical motif in the historical school reaches its peak with Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey's rank is based on his real recognition of the epistemological problem that the historical view of the world implies in relation to idealism. Gadamer I 223 The root of the ambivalence (...) lies in the already marked intermediate position of the historical school between philosophy and experience. It is not dissolved by Dilthey's attempt at an epistemological foundation, but finds its own culmination. Dilthey's effort to establish a philosophical foundation for the humanities seeks to draw the epistemological consequences from what Ranke and Droysen tried to claim with respect to German idealism. Dilthey himself was fully aware of this. DiltheyVsHistorism: [Dilthey] saw the weakness of the historical school in the lack of consistency of its reflections: "Instead of going back to the epistemological presuppositions of the historical school and those of idealism from Kant to Hegel and thus recognizing the incompatibility of these presuppositions, they connected these points of view uncritically"(1). Thus he was able to set himself the goal of building a new epistemologically sustainable foundation between historical experience and the idealistic heritage of the historical school. This is the purpose of his intention to supplement Kant's critique of pure reason with a critique of historical reason. >Historical Reason/Dilthey. Gadamer I 226 In some ways [the task of epistemology] is easier. It does not need to ask why it is possible that our concepts are in agreement with it. For the historical world, the knowledge of which is at issue here, has always been a world formed and shaped by the human spirit. For this reason Dilthey thinks that generally valid synthetic judgments of history are not a problem here at all(2) and refers to Vico for this. We recall that Vico, in response to the Cartesian doubt and the certainty of mathematical knowledge of nature which he had established, asserted the epistemological primacy of the man-made world of history. Dilthey repeats the same argument. He writes: "The first condition for the possibility of the science of history is that I, myself, am a historical being, that he who studies history is the same who makes history"(3). Gadamer: It is the sameness of subject and object that makes historical recognition possible. >Experience/Dilthey. Gadamer I 228 (...) the problem of history is not how to experience and recognize interrelation, but how to recognize such interrelations that nobody has experienced as such. After all, there can be no doubt how Dilthey sees the clarification of this problem from the phenomenon of understanding. Understanding is understanding of expression. In expression, the expressed is there in a different way than Gadamer I 229 cause in effect. It is present in the expression itself and is understood when the expression is understood. Gadamer I 234 Dilthey himself has pointed out that we only recognize historically because we ourselves are historical. That should be an epistemological relief. Gadamer I 235 GadamerVsDilthey: But can it be? Is Vico's often mentioned formula correct at all? Doesn't it transfer an experience of the human artistic spirit to the historical world, in which one cannot speak at all of "making", i.e. of planning and execution in view of the course of events? Where is the epistemological relief to come from here? Isn't it in fact a complication? Must not the historical conditionality of consciousness represent an insurmountable barrier to its completion in historical knowledge? >Historical Consciousness/Dilthey, >Spirit/Dilthey, >Philosophy/Dilthey, >Epistemology/Gadamer. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften Vll, 281. 2. Ges. Schriften Vll, 278. 3. a.a.O. (GadamerVsDilthey: Aber wer macht eigentlich die Geschichte?) |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Epistemology | Kutschera | Vollmer I 296 Recognition/Kutschera: the step from ignorance to knowledge. Cf. >Learning, >Cognition, >Recognition, >Knowledge, >Beliefs. Knowledge/Kutschera: knowledge is only toi explicate as a true conviction - neither truth nor subjectivity is gradable. >Meaning/Intending, >Truth, >Definition, >Definability, >Explanations, >Subjectivity. |
Kut I F. von Kutschera Einfuehrung in Die Intensionale Semantik (Grundlagen Der Kommunikation) 1976 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Epistemology | Nagel | I 119 ff The mere recognition of a distinction between appearance and reality provides no method for discovering the reality. >Method, >Reality, >World/thinking, >Knowledge, >Cognition. McGinn I 184 McGinn: Epistemology/knowledge/Nagel: The idea of a complete understanding of reality which same time explains at the our ability to reach this understanding is just a dream. Such a theory would have two components. a) a theory of the objects of knowledge b ) a theory of cognitive faculties. Then a connection between the two still has to be explained. >Explanation. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Epistemology | Quine | XII 86/87 Epistemology/Quine: a) conceptual side: is explanation of terms by terms. b) applicability/validity: by truth. II 35 Epistemology is about the question of how we animals managed to produce this ((s) highly differentiated) science in view of the sketchy neural input. This study shows that shifts due to the representative function would not have done any less justice to this input. This does not mean rejecting ontology. We can refuse them! II 36 Truth must not be confused with evidence. Truth is intrinsic and there is nothing about it. See also >Naturalized Epistemology. V 15 Berkeley/Traditional Epistemology: Problem: how do we know that there are objects and that science is true? V 16 Quine: the introduction of the physical sense organs would have appeared to them as a circle. V 17 Epistemology/Quine: the emancipated epistemologist works as an empirical psychologist (with >stimuli instead of >sense data, but without >gestalt theory.) VsGestalt Theory: it is about the connection of stimuli with receptors, not with consciousness. V 38 Epistemology/Quine: main question: if our theory of the outside world is true, how could we ever come up with it? X 12 Inductive Logic/Quine: is indistinguishable from epistemology. X II 86 Epistemology/Quine: we can look at it here analogous to mathematics: just as mathematics should be reduced to logic or to logic + set theory, so should empirical knowledge be somehow based on sensory experience. XII 87 a) conceptual side: is there to explain the concept of the body from the sensory experience b) (validity, truth): is there to justify our knowledge of nature from the sensory experience. Epistemology/Hume: a) conceptual side: here he equated it immediately with sensory experiences. I.e. an apple is a new apple in every moment. b) Validity, truth: Hume failed here and we still have no solution. Problem: general statements as well as singular statements about the future gain nothing in certainty by being understood as if they were talking about sensory impressions. Quine: We are still facing the same problem as Hume. On the conceptual side, however, progress was made. Solution: Bentham: XII 88 Def Theory of Fiction/Context Definition/Entire Sentences/Word/holophrastic/Bentham/Quine: Bentham discovered the Def Context Definition/Bentham/Quine: (Vs normal definition): to explain a term we do not need to specify a reference object, not even a synonymous word or phrase, we just need to show how to translate all complete sentences containing the term. Epistemology/Quine: apart from context theory, epistemology was enriched by set theory. Then you do not have to equate bodies with sense data or context definitions: XII 89 Def Object/Quine: Solution: Objects as sets of sets of sensations; then there may be a category of objects that enjoy the very qualities that bodies are supposed to have. Vs: this is not as untouchable as the context definition. Because of the recourse to the problematic ontology of quantities. Epistemology/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements and statements about the future are uncertain if they are understood to be about sense data or sensory impressions) is still unsolved today. Carnap/Quine: his constructions would have made it possible to translate all sentences about the world into sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory. XII 90 QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observation terms does not mean that it can be proven with logical and set-theoretical means from observation sentences. ((s) Means of expression are not evidence. (> exterior/interior, description levels, circularity). Epistemology/Quine: N.B.: to want to endow the truths about nature with the full authority of immediate experience is just as doomed to failure as the return of the truths of mathematics to the potential insight of elementary logic. >Epistemology/Carnap. XII 91 Epistemology/Psychology/Quine: if sensory stimuli are the only thing, why not just turn to psychology? TraditionVsPsychology/Quine: this used to appear circular. No Circle/QuineVsVs: Solution: we just have to refrain from deducting science from observations. If we only want to understand the connection between observation and science, we need all the information we can get. Also those from science, which is investigating exactly this connection. See > Rational reconstruction. XII 98 Epistemology/Quine: still exists within psychology and thus within empirical sciences. It studies the human subject. Aim: to find out how observation is related to theory and to what extent theory goes beyond observation. XII 99 Epistemology/Quine: old: wanted to include empirical sciences, so to speak, to assemble them from sense data. New: now, conversely, epistemology is part of psychology. Quine: at the same time, the old relationship remains: epistemology is included in the empirical sciences and at the same time science is included in the epistemology. ((s) Epistemology studies the subject and the subject studies epistemology.) This is not a circle because we have given up the dream of deducing all science from sense data. This also solves the old mystery of seeing. See also Seeing/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Epistemology | Rorty | I 16 Rorty thesis: knowledge has no foundations. >Ultimate Justification. I 163 Def recognize/Aristotle: insertion of something material into the soul. I 167 Epistemic problem: the next two centuries of philosophical thought might have been very different if the "epistemic problem" had been formulated in the terminology of relations between propositions and their degree of certainty, rather than in the terminology of alleged components of propositions. Kant: did not undertake the pragmatic turn. He did not talk about sentences, but but about inner ideas. >Kant, >Imagination/Kant, >Experience/Kant, >Epistemology/Kant. I 167 Knowledge/epistemic problem/Rorty: relations between propositions - not between components of propositions. VsKant: then you do not need synthesis. Kant/Rorty: he did not talk about sentences either, but about inner ideas. I 175 Foundations/knowledge/Rorty: arguments instead foundations! - Before Locke, no one would have searched for a foundation of knowledge. >Recognition/Locke, >Experience/Locke. I 191 Def recognize/Rorty: the social justification of opinions. The contrasting of people and situations. This allows us to get rid of the mirror of nature. I 210 Epistemology/SellarsVsEpistemology//Rorty: it confuses a theory of inner episodes with a theory about the right to make certain assertions. I 248 Epistemology/Quine/Rorty: epistemology always wavered between two criteria: a) causal proximity to the physical stimulus - b) the focal point of consciousness. I 249 Solution: The dilemma dissolves, if we merely speak of color spots. >sense data. I 271 Rorty: there’s no way from psychology to epistemology. No way from the discovery of intermediary instances to a critique of opinions about the world. (RortyVsepistemology). I 273 Epistemological Tradition: confused causal explanations of the acquisition of opinions with justifications of opinions. I 278 Epistemology: can be done in an armchair, psychology cannot. V 20f Knowledge/Foucault/Rorty: knowledge and power can never be separated from each other. RortyVFoucault: but these are no "rules of language". >Foucault, >Recognition/Foucault. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Equal Rights | Kant | Höffe I 312 Equal Rights/Kant/Höffe: Although Kant grants sovereignty to the united will of the people, not all citizens receive the right to vote and with it active citizenship. He rightly distinguishes between active and passive citizenship and grants only the latter to minors. But it is not convincing if he derives discrimination under public law, i.e., merely passive citizenship, from an economic position ("journeyman, servant, ") or gender ("woman"), i.e., from private law or even biological circumstances. HöffeVsKant: This is where Kant is subject to prejudices of his time. It would be correct to link active citizenship to legal capacity, i.e. accountability (...). >Citizenship, >Political elections, >Democracy, >Electoral systems, >Society. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Equal Rights | Locke | Höffe I 251 Equal rights/Locke/Höffe: According to Locke, the first social level, the marital community, is already "concluded by a contract between man and woman". Despite the "natural" subordination of women to men, he grants women substantial rights, even the right to political rule. >Contracts, >Contractualism, >Democracy, >Society. 1. J. Locke, Second treatise of Government, 1689/90. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Equal Sign | Quine | IX 9 Equal Sign/Quine: "=" is a two-digit predicate. >Predicates/Quine. IX 10 Sign/Sign Set/Quine: each theory has introduced a basic vocabulary of primitive predicates, perhaps by definition. Mostly there are only finally many, then we do not need to add the equal sign "=". Because we can then define it with the help of the others. ((s) "primitive" does not mean "one-digit"). Equal Sign/Quine: suppose the only basic predicate of a theory is "φ". Then we can define "=" by the following explanation of "x = y": (1) ∀z[(φxz ‹› φyz) u (φzx ‹› φzy)]. For obviously "x= x" proves to be a simple example of a valid formula schema of quantifier logic. The same applies to all special cases of "(x = y u F) > Fy", as far as they are statements which contain no further predicate except "φ". This is seen in the following way: first, look at all results in which the statements made by "Fx" and "Fy" differ only in one place. The immediate context of this single occurrence must then be either "φxv" and "φyv" or "φvx" and "φvy", where "v" denotes any variable, (perhaps either x or y). IX 23 Individuals/Elemental Relation/Extensionality Axiom/Quine: Suggestion: "x ε y", if x is an individual, be true or false, depending on, b x = y or x unequal to y. Thus, the problem of applying the extensionality axiom to individuals disappears. "ε" of individuals has the property of "=". (Elemental relationship of individuals: equality! ("is element of", "is contained": becomes the equal sign before individuals). IX 26 Until then, the equal sign is only defined between class abstraction terms. Between variables we need further tools ...+.... X 88 Logical Truth/Structure/Definition/Quine: our definition of logical truth inevitably referred to the grammatical structure. Problem: this view is called into question when we introduce identity (identity predicate "=", equal sign). Identity/logical truth/Quine: the traceability of logical truth to grammatical structure is questioned when identity is introduced, because e.g. "x = x" or "x = y" may not be a logical truth, because not everything can be used. ((s) >Intension: because of it, not all theorems of identity are logical truths. Quine: it is about the fact that in one logical truth one predicate must be replaced by another, but the equal sign as a predicate cannot be replaced by another predicate. Identity/Logic/Quine: Truths of Identity Theory Example "x = x", "Ey((x = y)" or "~(x = y . ~(y = x))" ((s) symmetry of identity) are not suitable as logical truths according to our definitions of logical truth. >Logical Truth/Quine. Reason: they can be wrong if "=" is replaced by other predicates. Consequence: So should we not count identity to logic, but to mathematics? Together with ">" and "ε"? >Semantic Ascent. III 268 Two different names can stand for the same object, if the equal sign is inbetween, the equation is true. It is not claimed that the names are the same! III 271 Equal Sign/Quine: "=" is a common relative term. The equal sign is necessary because two variables can refer to the same or to different objects. From a logical point of view, the use of the equal sign between variables is fundamental, not that between singular terms. III 293 Equality Sign/expressiveness/stronger/weaker/Quine: we also gain expressiveness by making the equality sign obsolete ((s) when we introduce classes). Instead of "x = y" we say that x and y belong to exactly the same classes. I.e. (a)(x ε a. bik. y ε a) Identity/Quantities/Quine: the identity of classes can be explained in a way in reverse: "a = b" means that a and b have exactly the same elements. Then the equal sign is simply a convenient shortcut. Description/Equal Sign/Quine: if we have the equal sign, we can afford the luxury of introducing descriptions without having to calculate them as primitive basic concepts. Because with the equal sign we can eliminate a description from every sentence. >Descriptions/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Equality | Dworkin | Brocker I 602 Equality/Law/Rights/Dworkin: The right to equal consideration and respect is a fundamental egalitarian norm. It requires that every citizen in his/her state is regarded as an equal. However, it does not necessarily demand Brocker I 603 a strictly equal treatment. Finally, there may be generally acceptable reasons to take particular account of the needy, for example. Treatment as an equal is the basic norm, equal treatment is only significant when derived (1). Even quotas for members of previously disadvantaged minorities could be compatible with the basic right to equal consideration and respect. No one has a valid right to legislation that guarantees access to higher education for the more intelligent or the more successful in examinations, for example. (2) >Society, >Justice, >Inequalities, >Injustice, >Minorities, >Minority rights, >Laws, >Rights. 1. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Mass. 1977 (erw. Ausgabe 1978). Dt.: Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen, Frankfurt/M. 1990, S. 370 2. Ibid. Bernd Ladwig, „Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Dworkin I Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously Cambridge, MA 1978 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Equality | Kelsen | Brocker I 130 Equality/Kelsen: Kelsen refuses to attach a prominent democratic significance to the concept of equality beyond a formal understanding, for in his eyes such a concept of equality, like the individualistic concept of freedom, is at first only negative, insofar as the same refuses to be dominated at all; without domination, however, in Kelsen's eyes social order is impossible(1). >Freedom/Kelsen. 1 Hans Kelsen, »Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie«, in: Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 47, 1920/1921, 50-85 (Separatdruck: Tübingen 1920). Erweiterte Fassung: Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, Tübingen 1929 (seitenidentischer Nachdruck:Aalen 1981), S. 3f Marcus Llanque, „Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Equality | Neo-Republicanism | Gaus I 174 Equality/Neo-republicanism/Dagger: The commitment to equality is hardly distinctive of neorepublicanism, for it is a commitment shared, if Dworkin (1977(1): 179—83) and Kymlicka (1990(2): 4—5 and passim) are correct, by every plausible political theory. It does distinguish them, of course from their classical forebears, whose praise of the equal rule (isonomia) of citizens sometimes went hand-in-hand with a defence of slavery. What makes the neorepublican position truly distinctive, however, is the combination of a belief in the equal moral worth of persons with the traditional republican emphasis on the importance of political equality. Citizenship: Everyone, that is, should have the opportunity to become a citizen, and every citizen should stand on an equal footing, under law and in the political arena, with every other citizen. Independence: In the traditional idiom, these steps may be necessary to free some people from dependence on others. Property: They may also require some redistribution of wealth and limits on the use of money to obtain or exercise political influence. Even so, neorepublicans typically take the Aristotelian view of property - private ownership for the public good - and see no point in 'material egalitarianism' for its own sake (Pettit, 1997(3): 161). Cf. >Egalitarianism. 1. Dworkin, Ronald (1977) Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Kymlicka, Will (1990) Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Oxford: Clarendon. 3. Pettit, Philip (1997) Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Clarendon. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Equality | Singer | I IX Equality/Animal/Human/Equal rights/Ethics/P. Singer: thesis: my book Practical Ethics(1) fights the attitude that all members of the human species would have higher-ranked rights solely because of their belonging to this species. >Animals, >Rights. P. SingerVs: it would be unphilosophical to forbid any comparisons beyond a species. This is about injustice that we inflict on animals and the damage we do to our environment. I 16 Equality/ethics/P. Singer: what does it actually mean when we say that all people are equal? Problem: the more we investigate individual cases, the more the belief in the universal validity of the principle of equality disappears. Example: Intelligence/Jensen/Eysenk/P. Singer: (Debate in the 1970s between Arthur Jensen, psychologist UC Berkeley and Hans Jürgen Eysenk, psychology at the University of London): I 17 Question: to what extent do variances of intelligence depend on genetic differences? This dispute was again taken up by Herrstein/Murray 1994(2). >Intelligence, >A. Jensen, >H.J. Eysenck. Racism: the critics of these authors say their theses, if justified, would justify racial discrimination. Are they right? Similar problem: was Larry Summers a sexist when he - at that time president of the Harvard University - claimed biological factors in connection with difficulties to appoint more women to chairs in mathematics and sciences? Similar question: should disadvantaged groups receive special preferential treatment in access to jobs or to the university? P. Singer: Differences between genders and differences between giftedness exist in any case. Range property/John Rawls: (in Rawls, Theory of Justice)(3) if one belongs to a domain, one simply has the property to belong to this domain and all within the domain have this property alike. I 18 Equality/Rawls/P. Singer: Rawl's thesis: a moral attitude is the basis for equality. >Morals, >Ethics. VsRawls: 1. One might object that this is a gradual matter. 2. Small children are not capable of having a moral personality. Solution/Rawls: small children are potentially moral personalities. I 19 VsRawls: Rawls does not provide a solution for people with irreparable impairments.(3) I 20 Suffering/interest/Third person/P. Singer: Problem: we have to explain whether the pain of a certain person is less undesirable than that of another person. >Suffering, >Pain. I 20 Interest/P. Singer: Principle: When it comes to equality, we should weigh interests as interests and not as interests of persons, as mine or someone else's interests. If then X loses more by an action than Y wins, the action should not be executed. >Interest. I 21 Then the race plays no role anymore in the weighing of interests. This is the reason why the Nazis were wrong: their policy was based only on the interests of the Aryan race. >Racism, >Fascism. 1. Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 3rd ed. Cambridge University Press (2011). 2. Herrnstein, R. J., & Murray, C. The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life. New York, NJ: Free Press (1994). 3. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Original Edition. Belknap Press (1971). |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Equality | Smith | Otteson I 41 Equality/Adam Smith/Otteson: In a Smithian society, do people grow richer? Yes. Do people grow richer equally? No. Although all get richer, some get richer faster, and to greater heights, than others. Is this not morally problematic? Smith himself seems alive to this issue, even in the eighteenth century. He writes, for example: "No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed, cloath and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labor as to be themselves tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged" (WN(1): 96). Otteson I 42 Elsewhere he writes: "By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support oflife, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the Iowest order, to be without.[...] Under necessaries therefore, I comprehend, not only those things which nature, but those things which the established rules of decency have rendered necessary to the Iowest rank of people" (WN(1): 869-70). Together these passages not only reiterate Smith's paramount concern for "the Iowest rank of people," but also express his moral mandate that as society increases in overall prosperity the standard ofliving of the least among us must rise as well. >Inequalities/Adam Smith. 1. Smith, Adam. (1776) The Wealth of Nations. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell. |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Otteson I James R. Otteson The Essential Adam Smith Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2018 |
| Equations | Wittgenstein | II 97 A priori/Wittgenstein: expressions that look a priori must be explained. Just as the same expression can be theorem or hypothesis, the same expression can also be equation or hypothesis. We have to distinguish. >a priori,>Identity, >Explanation. An equation is necessary. It is a rule of grammar and therefore arbitrary (sic). Error: since it is true that mathematics is a priori, it was believed that there must also be metaphysics a priori. Equation/Hypothesis/Wittgenstein: 2 + 2 = 4 is a hypothesis in physical space and requires verification. It cannot happen in the field of vision. Four drops of rainwater in two groups of two can only be seen as four drops, while in the physical world they can converge to form one large drop. II 354 WittgensteinVsRussell: but how do we know that they are assigned to each other? One cannot know this and therefore one cannot know whether they are assigned the same number, unless one carries out the assignment, that is, you write them down. II 354 Moreover, Russell's equal signs can be eliminated, and in this case the equations cannot be written down at all. >Equal sign. Difference: Measuring: e.g. numerical equality of classes or Calculating: e.g. equal number of roots of a 4th degree equation: one is a measurement, the other a calculation. Is there an experiment to determine if two classes have the same number? This may or may not be the case for classes that cannot be overlooked. II 355 It is a damaging prejudice to believe that when using strokes we are dealing with an experiment. II 409 Def Fundamental Theorem of Algebra/Wittgenstein: according to which each equation has a solution is completely different from the theorem of multiplication: 26x13=419. It seems to be an isolated theorem which has no similarity to the latter. When we ask whether every algebraic equation has a root, the question has hardly any content. II 424 If we keep doing the math, it is a matter of physics. The mathematical question refers to the whole equation, not to one side! Identity/Meaning/Sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 The essence of the equation is not that the sides have different meanings but the same meaning. >Intensions, >Meaning. The actual essence is that the equation is not necessary to show that the two expressions that the equal sign connects have the same meaning, as this can be seen from the two expressions themselves. VI 118 Equation/Math/Wittgenstein/Schulte: equations are pseudo-propositions. They do not express thoughts but indicate a point of view - from which you look at the terms in the equation. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Equilibrium | Hayek | Coyne I 13 Equilibrium/Hayek/Coyne/Boettke: There can be no static, fixed equilibrium for two reasons. The first is human error, which leads to opportunities for reallocating resources through the discovery of mistakes. The second is that market conditions are constantly evolving, which makes prior equilibrium conditions irrelevant. Even if some stable equilibrium were obtained, it would be fleeting as conditions changed. It is only by allowing decentralized People to participate in an ongoing process of discovery that the knowledge necessary to make rational economic decisions emerges. These numerous discoveries lead to the emergence of knowledge regarding not only what goods and services are desired by consumers, but also the most effective techniques to produce these outputs in a cost-minimizing manner. HayekVsSocialism: The problems inherent with market socialism, according to Hayek, were not a matter of placing smarter people in charge or in developing new computational techniques to gather more information. Instead, the issue was that the economic knowledge necessary for coordination is dispersed, tacit, and emergent. Coyne I 14 This means that the knowledge used by people to coordinate their economic affairs cannot exist outside the context within which they are embedded. The market socialism model left no space for the very activity that generated the knowledge that was necessary for planners to accomplish their stated ends of advanced material production. As such, Hayek concluded, the model failed to address the dynamic problem that planning would have to confront in practice once the market socialism system was implemented. >Planned economy, >Calculation, >Prices. |
Hayek I Friedrich A. Hayek The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 2) Chicago 2007 Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020 |
| Equilibrium | Leijonhufvud | Henderson I 10 Equilibrium/LeijonhufvudVsKeynesianism/Henderson/Globerman: Leijonhufvud did some early work(1) arguing that most Keynesians had misinterpreted John Maynard Keynes's General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money(2). In follow-on work, Leijonhufvud and Robert Clower argued that when existing market prices, especially wages, depart substantially from prices that would equilibrate supply and demand and there are strong frictions that make this equilibration costly, an economy can remain in disequilibrium for an extended period of time. Leijonhufvud had argued that people misinterpreted Keynes's explanation of less than full-employment equilibrium as a problem of insufficient aggregate demand rather than a problem of inflexible prices. >Supply, >Demand, >Keynesianism. 1. Leijonhufvud, Axel (1968). On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes: A Study in Monetary Theory. Oxford University Press. 2. Keynes, J. M. (1936). The general theory of employment, interest and money. London. |
Leijonhufvud I Axel Leijonhufvud Information and Coordination: Essays in Macroeconomic Theory Oxford: Oxford University Press 1981 Henderson I David R. Henderson Steven Globerman The Essential UCLA School of Economics Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2019 |
| Equilibrium Price | Rothbard | Rothbard III 114 Equilibrium price/Rothbard: The amount offered for sale at each price is called the supply; the amount demanded for purchase at each price is called the demand. Rothbard III 115 As long as the demand exceeds the supply at any price, buyers will continue to overbid and the price will continue to rise. The converse occurs if the price begins near its highest point. Equilibrium price/supply/demand/Rothbard: If the overbidding of buyers will drive the price up whenever the quantity demanded is greater than the quantity supplied, and the underbidding of sellers drives the price down whenever supply is greater than demand, it is evident that the price of the good will find a resting point where the quantity demanded is equal to the quantity supplied (…). Rothbard III 116 Equilibrium: The specific feature of the “clearing of the market” performed by the equilibrium price is that, at this price alone, all those buyers and sellers who are willing to make exchanges can do so. >Market/Rothbard, >Price/Rothbard. Rothbard III 120 Demand/supply: (…) as the price increases, new suppliers with higher minimum selling prices are brought into the market, while demanders with low maximum buying prices will begin to drop out. Equilibrium price: (…) once the zone of intersection of the supply and demand curves has been determined, it is the buyers and sellers at the margin - in the area of the equilibrium point - that determine what the equilibrium price and the quantity exchanged will be. Rothbard III 132 Elasticity/speculation/demand: (…) the new demand curve, including anticipatory forecasting of the equilibrium price, is [more flattened], ((s)starting at a lower price). It is clear that such anticipations render the demand curve far more elastic, since more will be bought at the lower price and less at the higher. Rothbard III 133 Thus, the introduction of exchange-value can restrict demand above the anticipated equilibrium price and increase it below that price, although the final demand - to consume at the - equilibrium price will remain the same. >Speculation/Rothbard. Erroneous speculation: (…) we have assumed that this speculative supply and demand, this anticipating of the equilibrium price, has been correct, and we have seen that these correct anticipations have hastened the establishment of equilibrium. Suppose, however, that most of these expectations are erroneous. Suppose, for example, that the demanders tend to assume that the equilibrium price will be lower than it actually is. Does this change the equilibrium price or obstruct the passage to that price? Solution: As soon as the price settles at ((s) around the equilibirum price), the demanders see that shortages develop at this price, that they would like to buy more than is available, and the overbidding of the demanders raises the price again to the genuine equilibrium price. The same process of revelation of error occurs in the case of errors of anticipation by suppliers, and thus the forces of the market tend inexorably toward the establishment of the genuine equilibrium price, undistorted by speculative errors, which tend to reveal themselves and be eliminated. >Utility/Rothbard. Rothbard III 142 Exchange: exchanges will (…) take place in a quantity and at a final price determined by the intersection of the new combination of supply and demand schedules. This may set a different quantity of exchanges at the old equilibrium price or at a new price, depending on their specific content. Or it may happen that the new combination of schedules - in the new period of time - will be identical with the old and therefore set the same quantity of exchanges and the same price as on the old market. >Stock keeping/Rothbard, >Utility/Rothbard. Equilibrium: The market is always tending quickly toward its equilibrium position, and the wider the market is, and the better the communication among its participants, the more quickly will this position be established for any set of schedules. >Price/Rothbard, >Demand/Rothbard, >Supply/Rothbard. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Equilibrium Price | Samuelson | Harcourt I 20 Equilibrium/Modigliani/Samuelson/Swan: Capital/rate of interest/value/measurement/Robinson/Harcourt: (…) it is impossible to conceive of a quantity of 'capital in general', the value of which is independent of the rates of interest (or interchangeably, profits, given the present assumptions) and wages. Yet such independence is necessary if we are to construct an iso-product curve showing the different quantities of 'capital' and labour which produce a given level of national output, or, as is more usual in the theory of economic growth, if we are to construct a unique relationship between national output per man employed and 'capital' per man employed for any level of total national output. That is to say, if we are to construct the neoclassical production function (…). The slope of this curve plays a key role in the determination of relative factor prices and, therefore, of factor rewards and shares. Problem: However, the curve cannot be constructed and its slope measured unless the prices which it is intended to determine are known beforehand; moreover, the value of the same physical capital and the slope of the iso-product curve vary with the rates chosen, which makes the construction unacceptable. SwanVsRobinson/SamuelsonVsRobinson/ModiglianiVsRobinson: (…) critics have suggested that this particular set of arguments shows a failure to understand both the nature of the solution to a set of simultaneous equations, such as is, for example, the essential nature of the Walrasian general equilibrium system, and the lack of any necessary link between the variables in which the equilibrium values of key magnitudes are expressed, on the one hand, and causation, or determination, or explanation, or what you will, on the other. See, for example, Swan [1956](1), p. 348 n14; Samuelson and Modigliani [1966a](2), pp. 290-1 n1. >Causation, >Equilibrium/Walras. RobinsonVsVs/Harcourt: This criticism is, however, unfair. Thus, for example, to argue that, in equilibrium, the wage rate equals the marginal product of labour is not to argue that one is the cause of the other, or that one determines the other. Moreover, it is abundantly clear from the manner in which Joan Robinson's version of the production function is derived (…) and the constructions which are used, that these are not the points at issue. 1. Swan, T. W. [1956] 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation', Economic Record, xxxn, pp. 334-61. 2. Samuelson, P. A. and Modigliani, F. [1966a] 'The Pasinetti Paradox in Neoclassical and More General Models', Review of Economic Studies, xxxm, pp. 269-301. |
EconSamu I Paul A. Samuelson The foundations of economic analysis Cambridge 1947 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Equivalence | Quine | VI 76 Cognitive Equivalence: is the replacement of a sentence by another. One should not interfere with the empirical content. QuineVs: this is not sure because a representative function is possible - instead: synonymy of stimuly - (but this is only for occasion sentences). Afterwards cognitive synonymy is possible also for terms but not for timeless sentences. X 21ff Sentence Equivalence/QuineVs: in everyday language there is no basic order (like pixels in a photo) - you cannot assign the sensual proof clearly to individual sentences ((s) formulations) - Quine: Because of the network of theories - (>underdetermination of empiricism). II 66 Sentence Equivalence: when are two sentences considered equivalent? Frequent answer: if their use is the same! Or, if the stimuli are the same. Obviously it does not work that way! The two sentences cannot be uttered at the same time. The utterance of one must exclude that of the other! Moreover, at every opportunity when one of the two possible sentences has been uttered, there must be a reason, however trivial, for the utterance of one instead of the other! We are obviously asking too much when we are asking for all the irritations in question to be identical. In any case, one criterion would be illusory in practice if it demanded that the stimulus conditions are actually being compared. All in all, statements are practically unpredictable. The motives for the utterance of a sentence can vary inscrutably. Solution/Quine: >Cognitive Equivalence: II 67 Cognitive Equivalence: here we are spared speculations about motives and circumstances. Instead, we can arrange circumstances and say sentences ourselves. If you make a mistake with your verdicts, it does not matter, you will make a mistake with both sentences. II 68 Def Cognitive Equivalence: two occasional sentences are cognitively equivalent if they cause consent or rejection on every occasion. >Cognition/Quine. II 45ff Empirical equivalence of theories: is discovered when one discovers the possibility of reinterpretation. Both theories are true, but may be logically incompatible. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Equivalence Theorem | Barro | Mause I 277 Equivalence Theorem/government debt/Ricardo/Barro: Thesis: the financing of public expenditure via taxes or via government debt is equivalent. However, this requires a number of restrictive assumptions. The theorem goes back to Ricardo, but was only brought into its present form by Barro. (1) N.B.: The question is whether additional expenditure makes sense in consideration of the need for private cutting consumption to finance it, but not in what way it is financed. Reason: If government debt rises, private households will anticipate future tax increases and adjust their consumption patterns accordingly. VsEquivalence Theorem: the empirical relevance of these questions can be questioned. For example, there could be altruism between the generations: Parents plan with a basically infinite time horizon. Another problem: it is also assumed that the path of expenditure policy is independent of the financial instrument used. This is only plausible if intergenerational altruism works and voters are perfectly informed. Behavioral Economics/BuchananVsRicardo/BuchananVsBarro/BuchananVsEquivalence theorem: if government debt is perceived less strongly than taxes, debt-financed higher spending may be politically enforceable. Then Ricardo's equivalence collapses. (2) This problem also exists when the capital markets are not perfect, allowing households to easily shift consumption between the present and the future, even without public debt instruments. VsBarro: another problem: distorting taxes: If you move away from the first best tax system, it may well play a role for the welfare of individuals whether the state is in debt. Hereto: Solution/Barro: subsequently introduced the argument of tax smoothing into the discussion. (3) In this case, it makes sense to compensate for fluctuations in tax revenue by increasing and reducing government debt, but to keep tax rates relatively constant. BarroVsKeynesianism: The reason for this is not an economic policy countermeasure for Keynesian motives, but the fact that welfare losses caused by distorting taxes increase disproportionately with tax rates. For further problems see >Growth/Diamond. 1. Robert J. Barro. 1974. Are government bonds net wealth? Journal of Political Economy 82 (6): 1095– 1117. 2. James M. Buchanan & Richard E. Wagner. Democracy in deficit. The political legacy of Lord Keynes. New York 1977. 3. Robert J. Barro. 1979. On the determination of the public debt. Journal of Political Economy 87 (5): 940– 971. |
EconBarro I Robert J. Barro Rational expectations and the role of monetary policy 1976 EconBarro II Robert J. Barro David B. Gordon Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policcy 1983 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Equivalence Theorem | Ricardo | Mause I 277 Equivalence Theorem/government debt/Ricardo/Barro: Thesis: the financing of public expenditure via taxes or via government debt is equivalent. However, this requires a number of restrictive assumptions. The theorem goes back to Ricardo, but was only brought into its present form by Barro. (1) N.B.: The question is whether additional expenditure makes sense in consideration of the need for private cutting consumption to finance it, but not in what way it is financed. Reason: If government debt rises, private households will anticipate future tax increases and adjust their consumption patterns accordingly. VsEquivalence Theorem: the empirical relevance of these questions can be questioned. For example, there could be altruism between the generations: Parents plan with a basically infinite time horizon. Another problem: it is also assumed that the path of expenditure policy is independent of the financial instrument used. This is only plausible if intergenerational altruism works and voters are perfectly informed. Behavioral Economics/BuchananVsRicardo/BuchananVsBarro/BuchananVsEquivalence theorem: if government debt is perceived less strongly than taxes, debt-financed higher spending may be politically enforceable. Then Ricardo's equivalence collapses. (2) This problem also exists when the capital markets are not perfect, allowing households to easily shift consumption between the present and the future, even without public debt instruments. VsBarro: another problem: distorting taxes: If you move away from the first best tax system, it may well play a role for the welfare of individuals whether the state is in debt. Hereto: Solution/Barro: subsequently introduced the argument of tax smoothing into the discussion. (3) In this case, it makes sense to compensate for fluctuations in tax revenue by increasing and reducing government debt, but to keep tax rates relatively constant. BarroVsKeynesianism: The reason for this is not an economic policy countermeasure for Keynesian motives, but the fact that welfare losses caused by distorting taxes increase disproportionately with tax rates. For further problems see >Growth/Diamond. 1. Robert J. Barro. 1974. Are government bonds net wealth? Journal of Political Economy 82 (6): 1095 – 1117. 2. James M. Buchanan & Richard E. Wagner. Democracy in deficit. The political legacy of Lord Keynes. New York 1977. 3. Robert J. Barro. 1979. On the determination of the public debt. Journal of Political Economy 87 (5): 940– 971. |
EconRic I David Ricardo On the principles of political economy and taxation Indianapolis 2004 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Errors | Strawson | II 266 Mistake/deception/elm/beech/ Strawson: e.g., "there is a parrot in the room" - "No, that’s a cockatoo". This can be a) a linguistic or b) an effective mistake. It depends on whether I would stay with my statement, on closer examination. In the first case, the other speaks of a language requirement in the second case of the bird - which is also possible independently of a speech act. >Elm/beech example, >Language/Cavell, >Deceptions. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Essence | Searle | V 246 Nature/SearleVsMetaphysics: an object is not a combination of essence (without property) and properties. >Essentialism, >Metaphysics. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Ethics | Brentano | Chisholm II 276 Ethics/Brentano/Moore/Koller: Brentano and Moore converge in amazing ways. Ethics/Brentano/Moore: The ultimate goal of right action: "the best thing you can do": II 279 The greatest possible sum of the good which can be attained. VsMoore/VsBrentano: that does not only assume that we already know what the good is, but also that we can recognize the best among the achievable good. So that there is something that is intrinsic and recognizable good. Brentano/Moore: assert for this reason that there is a direct, immediate knowledge of what is good in itself. Immediate evidence. Good/Ethics/Value/Brentano/Moore: the good is what you should desire and should be taken for good. Brentano: what it is worth to love it with a love that is properly characterized for its own sake. II 280 E.g. (Brentano): pleasure, clear insight, knowledge, joy (if it is not joy in the bad), correctness of our judgment and of our emotions, (of our love, hate, and will). Brentano: Principle of summation (of the good: 1. Something good is better than something bad 2. The existence of good is better than its non-existence 3. A greater good is better than a smaller one. II 280 Ethics/Value/Good/Moore: Question: What things in isolation are to be considered for good on their own? This also requires the determination of levels of value. II 281 Method of isolation. This is why pleasure, taken alone, is of no great value for Moore. Only together with the experience of beautiful things it has a valuable force. This leads to the Principle of Organic Units: Many things take on quite different properties, depending on the context. (MooreVsBrentano). ((s) "syncategorematic" values.) MooreVsBrentano: since the inner value is characterized by connecting several simple properties, it can not simply match the sum of its parts. For example, when no one is aware of a beautiful object, it has no value. II 282 Method of Isolation/Moore: that are now applied again to recognize the value of such organic units. Thesis all things that have real value are complex organic entities. E.g. the joys of human intercourse, enjoying beautiful things. E.g. Bad: Enjoying ugly things, cruelty, hating the good, etc. Exception: Pain: is already an evil without any connection to others. Mixed virtues/Moore: as whole things clearly good, but contain something bad: e.g. courage, compassion, (hating the bad) knowledge of bad or ugly things. II 283 Acting/ethics/Brentano/Moore: that is sufficient as a basis to answer the question: what action is right? Of several possibilities for action is only the one right that either produces more or at least not less good things in the world. It is indifferent whether this good is beneficial to the agent himself, or to others. An action is therefore correct, if it has correct consequences. Criterion/Ethics/Moore/Brentano: the purpose of doing as much good as possible in the world is then the criterion for correct action. Judgement: Problem: in regard to this our knowledge is always incomplete. II 284 Moore/Brentano: therefore ethics cannot provide general rules. We have "rules of medium generality". These then apply in the majority of cases. Ethics/values/ontology/intrinsic properties/Moore/Brentano/Koller: ontological question: what are the objects of the intrinsic value concepts, on which things can the concepts of the intrinsic good and bad be applied at all? What is the logical structure of these concepts, can the method of isolation always be applied? II 287 KollerVsBrentano/KollerVsMoore: the questions about the epistemological justification of intrinsic valuations and the question of their suitability for a sustainable foundation of ethics are precisely the questions that make the approach of Brentano and Moore appear doubtful. Chisholm II = Peter Koller Ethik bei Chisholm in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Ethics | Freud | Rorty V 69 Ethics/Moral/Psychology/Rorty: from such a striving nothing more is gained than the continuous swinging pendulum between moral dogmatism and moral skepticism. --- V 70 What metaphysics has failed to accomplish, psychology (and even if it so deep) cannot accomplish it either. There is also no explanation for "moral motives" in Freud. >Motives, >Motivation, >Morality, >Intention, >Morals, >Behavior, >Psychology, >The Good. |
Freud I S. Freud Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Ethics | Harman | Wright I 224 Ethics/Explanation/Harman: e.g. instead of moral judgment without assessment, we take psychological characteristics and education. We look at characteristics of the assessor, not of the action. >Judgments, >Actions, >Education. Wright I 244 SturgeonVsHarman: e.g. that our belief that Hitler was morally corrupt is based on things that he did precisely because he was morally corrupt, so his depravity is part of the explanation of our belief that he actually was. >Explanations, >Causal explanation, >Circularity. I.e. we must be prepared for this kind of explanation simply because of the realization that moral discourses are at least minimally capable of truth and that thus the missing analogies (to science) will appear elsewhere. <Discourses, >Morality, >Discourse theory, >Analogies, >Minimalism, >Capacity for Truth. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Ethics | Hume | Stegmüller IV 167 Ethics/Hume: thesis: no feature can be seen in the actions themselves, which would make it possible to distinguish whether they are justified or not. >Actions. Cf. >Ethics/Harman. Stegmüller: but one can even find prescriptive passages in Hume. IV 243 Ethics/morality/Hume: thesis: 1. Facing scarce resources, people must cooperate in order to survive. >Life. 2. HumeVsHobbes: all humans own sympathy - would everything be available in abundance, of course, respect to other people's property would be superfluous. >Sympathy/Hume, >Sympathy.- IV 245 The key driving force is self-interest. IV 247 Ethics/morality/Hume: e.g. the two rowers: 1. Pure coordination problem. 2. No one wants to make an effort. Stabilization of cooperation: 1. only artificial virtue is assumed, 2. there is no verbal communication and 3. only rational egoism. E.g. help at the harvest: the first helps the other. Then then there is a time lag: the second does not help the other -> free riders problem -> sanctions. IV 283 Reason/morals/ethics/Hume/Stegmüller: reason can never be the motive for or against an action. >Reason/Hume, >Actions, >Reasons. Passions and preferences are logically independent of conclusions. Yet, there are practical-rational preferences. Mackie: also dispassion does not allow a clear view on things. >Ethics/Mackie. --- Stuhlmann I 64 Ethics/Hume: at its reason moral statements are always required. >Morals. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Ethics | Jonas | Brocker I 608 Ethics/Jonas: Jonas' thesis: The changed nature of human activity today requires "a change in ethics"(1). Context: At the end of the 1970s a sharpened ecological awareness emerged, among other things triggered by the report of the Club of Rome (see Progress/Club of Rome) on the risks that humanity could wipe itself out. See Responsibility/Jonas, Duties/Jonas, Nature/Jonas. Ethics/Jonas: the area of human responsibility has expanded from the "sphere of action" (2). Modern technology, however, has created an expanded dimension of responsibility that extends to the entire biosphere. Problem: human knowledge is no longer equal to the potential expansion beyond the actual field of action. A "gap arises between the power of knowing before and the power of action" (3). Brocker I 610 "The commandment of deliberation": The commandment of deliberation and self-limitation must stop the "going for the whole" of modern technology (4), "cautiousness" must become the core of our everyday activities (5). At another point Jonas also speaks of the "curbing of greed for pleasure to curbing our (technical) ability and our performance" (6). Ethics/Jonas: Jonas is concerned with an "ethics (...) of prevention and not of progress". (7) Politics/Jonas: Jonas relies entirely on politics and its coercive means to enforce these ethical imperatives. Education alone is not able to achieve the ethical reconsideration of people. According to Jonas, "a maximum of politically imposed social discipline" (8) is necessary, in the sense of a "policy of renunciation" (Jonas 1984, 86), a "subordination of the present advantage to the long-term imperative of the future" (9). 1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, S. 15 2. Ibid. p. 23. 3. Ibid. p. 28. 4. Ibid. p. 71 5. Ibid. p. 82, 323. 6. Hans Jonas, »Warum wir heute eine Ethik der Selbstbeschränkung brauchen«, in: Elisabeth Ströker (Hg.), Ethik der Wissenschaften? Philosophische Fragen, München/Paderborn u. a. 1984, S. 84f. 7. Jonas, 1979, S. 249. 8. Ibid. p.. 255. 9. Ibid. Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Jonas I Hans Jonas Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Ethics | Mackie | Stegmüller IV 169 Ethics/moral/Mackie: (similar to Field): our everyday understanding calls for a realm of moral characteristics, which should be as autonomous as material objects, but which do not exist. Moral error theory: (Field, Mackie): our search for a true-making realm of facts is caused by a semantic error. >Truth makers. The correct explanation of the truth conditions of moral judgments deprives those judgments of the valuation by everyday reasoning. (Due to the metaphysical hair-raising properties). >Truth condition, >Metaphysics. Ethics/Mackie: Thesis: there are no objective values (ontologically). >Ontology. Stegmüller IV 173 Objectivistic ethics/MackieVsObjectivism/Stegmüller: leads to strange entities like "Shall Be Done". MacKieVsintuitionism/VsEmotivism: Riddle of income: what is the link between the natural fact that murder is cruel and the moral fact that it is wrong? IV 179 Metaethical fallacy: - Conclusion of beliefs on their accuracy. >Belief, >Correctness, cf. >Naturalistic fallacy. IV 280 Morality/ethics/wisdom/generalizability/generalization/universalization/Mackie/Stegmüller: everyone wants to live according to his conscience - that tends to raise the tension between morality and self-interest . Under these circumstances, however, what is wise, does not coincide with, what would be wise if we do not have a moral sense. >Generalization. Stegmüller IV 263 Morality/Ethics/Mill: Mill believed in gradual change of human nature toward a "general love of man". StephenVsMill: "impartial charity" could also lead to Stalinism. Mackie ditto - MackieVsMill. IV 269 Freedom/Mill/Stegmüller: Thesis: The only justification for interfering with the freedom of others is to prevent harm to others. MackieVsMIll: This is too weak. Freedom of thought cannot be justified with this. Instead: "Principle of legitimate intervention. >Freedom. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Ethics | Nagel | III 109f Ethics/Nagel. Consequentialism: thesis: the consequences of action are important - not how the action feels for the actor. >Consequentialism, >Action. NagelVs: it about the permission to lead one’s own life. III 111 Internal perspective: Problem: that murder is prohibited does not command to prevent others from committing it. Utilitarianism: good/bad. Internal perspective: legal/illegal. >Subjectivity/Nagel, >Utilitarianism. III 112 Ethics/Nagel: core question: how far may the internal point of view be included? Life is always the individual life. - It cannot be lived sub specie aeternitatis. - The limits are always the individual possibilities. >Limits. III 87ff Ethics/Nagel: the acting from one’s own perspective has such a strong value that deontological paradoxes cannot be excluded. - They would only be avoidable at the cost of the impersonal world. >Deontology. III 86 Parallel objectivity/consciousness/ethics/Nagel: the objective world must contain the subjective perspectives. >Objectivity, >Objectivity/Nagel. Ethics: the neutral reasons that consider the actions of the subject with all its seemingly superstitious reasons. >Recognition, >Intersubjectivity. II 49 Determinism/ethics/Nagel: responsibility also exists in deterministic actions when the determination is intrinsic. - Actions that are determined by nothing are incomprehensible. >Determinism. II 54 Ethics/law/moral/God/theology/Nagel: an act is not converted into something wrong just because God exists. >Morals, >God, >Justification, >Theology. II 54 Categorical imperative/NagelVsKant: nothing but a direct interest in the other can be considered as a basis of ethics. >Categorical imperative. II 55 But: the reason not to do evil to someone else cannot be anchored in the individual person - II 61 Problem: Moral should not depend on the strength of interest in others. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Ethics | Rorty | III 310 Ethics/Rorty: it’s not about the fact that we are morally obliged to feel solidarity. Literature does not help with appeals, but with a detailed description. III 314 Solidarity is made, not found. RortyVsKant. ((s) Kant proposes principles, Cf. >Categorical Imperative.) II (d) 79ff Walzer, Michael: skeptical of terms like "reason" and "universal moral obligation." VsKant: there is no idea or principle common to all. Def Thin morality/Walzer: Kant’s image of the beginning: a basis that will be expanded. WalzerVs. Def Dense morality/Walzer: all morality is "dense" from the beginning: it is culturally integrated. The road goes from initially "dense" to a "thin", more abstract morality. II (d) 83f RortyVsKant: we cannot dissolve conflicting loyalties by completely turning away from them towards something categorically different from loyalty - the universal moral obligation to act justly. Rorty: we go with Hegel and Marx: the so-called moral law is, at best, a handy abbreviation for a specific network of moral practices. >Hegel, >Marx, >Kant. VI 256 categorical imperative/moral/ethics/RortyVsKant: brotherhood of all humans cannot be justified by neutral criteria. Material determination: >Utilitarianism. Formal determination: >Principles. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Ethics | Spencer | Habermas IV 80 Ethics/Spencer/DurkheimVsSpencer/Habermas: Durkheim sees Spencer as a typical representative of an ethics with an empirical approach. This has the following problem: how can a secularized morality then last? Certainly it will not last if secularisation has meant a profanation. (See Holiness/Durkheim). For this would make the basic moral phenomenon of the compulsory character disappear, as in all empirical ethics. DurkheimVsSpencer: Spencer's ethics show a complete ignorance of the nature of commitment. For him, the punishment is nothing more than the mechanical consequence of the action. But that means misunderstanding the characteristics of the moral obligation from the bottom up.(1) 1.E. Durkheim, Sociologie et philosophie, Paris 1951, German Frankfurt 1967, p.95 |
Spencer I Herbert Spencer The Man versus the State Indianapolis 2009 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Ethics | Weber | Habermas III 286 Ethics/Worldviews/Weber/Habermas: a world attitude (Weber distinguishes it from worldviews) expresses rationalisation to the extent that it is directed towards nature and society as a whole and thus presupposes a systematic concept of the world. >Worldviews, >Rationalization, >World, >Society. A worldview can be considered rationalized to the extent that it highlights the "world" as a sphere of moral probation under practical principles and separates it from all other aspects. It presents the world a) As a field of practical activity at all b) As a stage on which the actor can fail ethical, c) As a totality of situations to be judged according to "last" moral principles and to be dealt with according to moral judgements and therefore d) As an area of objects and occasions of moral action. Habermas III 287 The world thus faces the actor as something outer and external. World Negation/Weber/Habermas: a negative attitude towards the world (see World Negation/Weber) is not in itself conducive to ethical rationalization of lifestyle. It only leads to an objectification of the world if it is combined with an active, worldly lifestyle. Habermas III 289 Weber distinguishes mystical religions with a negative worldview, such as Hinduism, from ascetic religions that are world-affirmative: Judaism and Christianity. The latter ultimately aim at world domination through inner-worldly action. >Religion, >Religious belief, >Judaism, >Christianity, >Ethics of Conviction. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Eurocentrism | Braidotti | Braidotti I 52 Eurocentrism/Braidotti: [there is] the issue of Eurocentrism in terms of ‘methodological nationalism’ (Beck, 2007(1)) and its long-standing bond to Humanism. Contemporary European subjects of knowledge must meet the thical obligation to be accountable for their past history and the long shadow it casts on their present-day politics.* The new mission that Europe has to embrace entails the criticism of narrow-minded self-interests, intolerance and xenophobic rejection of otherness. Symbolic of the closure of the European mind is the fate of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers who bear the brunt of racism in contemporary Europe. A new agenda needs to be set, which is no longer that of European or Eurocentric universal, rational subjectivity, but rather a radical transformation of it, in a break from Europe’s imperial, fascistic and undemocratic tendencies. (…) since the second half of the twentieth century, the crisis of philosophical Humanism - also known as the death of ‘Man’ - both reflected and amplified larger concerns about the decline of the geo-political status of Europe as an imperial world-power. >Anti-humanism, >Humanism. I believe that the posthuman condition can facilitate the task of redefining a new role for Europe in an age where global capitalism is both triumphant and clearly deficient in terms of sustainability and social justice (Holland, 2011)(6). >Posthumanism/Braidotti. * As Morin (1987)(2), Passerini (1998)(3), Balibar (2004)(4) and Bauman (2004)(5) have also argued. 1. Beck, Ulrich. 2007. The cosmopolitan condition: Why methodological nationalism fails. Theory, Culture & Society, 24 (7/8), 286–90. 2. Morin, Edgar. 1987. Penser l’Europe. Paris: Gallimard. 3. Passerini, Luisa (ed.) 1998. Identità Culturale Europea. Idee, Sentimenti, Relazioni. Florence: La Nuova Italia Editrice. 4. Balibar, Etienne. 2004. We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 5. Bauman, Zygmunt. 2004. Europe: An Unfinished Adventure. Cambridge: Polity Press. 6. Holland, Eugene. 2011. Nomad Citizenship. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. |
Braidotti I Rosie Braidotti The Posthuman Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 2013 |
| Europe | Braidotti | Braidotti I 53 Europe/Braidotti: The posthuman turn can support and enhance this project[of Europe] in so far as it displaces the exclusive focus on the idea of Europe as the cradle of Humanism, driven by a form of universalism that endows it with a unique sense of historical purpose. The process of becoming-minoritarian or becomingnomad of Europe involves the rejection of the self-appointed missionary role of Europe as the alleged centre of the world. >Universalism. Braidotti I 54 If it is the case that a socio-cultural mutation is taking place in the direction of a multi-ethnic, multi-media society, then the transformation cannot affect only the pole of ‘the others’. It must equally dislocate the position and the prerogative of ‘the same’, the former centre. The project of developing a new kind of post-nationalist nomadic European identity is certainly challenging in that it requires dis-identification from established, nation-bound identities. This project is political at heart, but it has a strong affective core made of convictions, vision and active desire for change. We can collectively empower these alternative becomings. >Posthumanism/Braidotti, >Critical Posthumanism/Braidotti, >Humanism/Braidotti, >Eurocentrism/Braidotti. |
Braidotti I Rosie Braidotti The Posthuman Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 2013 |
| Europe | Post-communist Countries | Krastev I 9 Europe/Post-communist Countries/Krastev: (...) the Central and East European countries ostensibly being democratized were compelled, in order to meet the conditions for EU membership, to enact policies formulated by unelected bureaucrats from Brussels and international lending organizations.(1) Krastev I 10 The core complaint motivating anti-liberal politics in the region today is that the attempt to democratize formerly communist countries was aiming at a kind of cultural conversion to values, habits and attitudes considered ‘normal’ in the West. >Imitation/Krastev. 1. Trapped in its economics-centred understanding of politics, Brussels finds messianic provincialism in Budapest and Warsaw easy to ridicule but almost impossible to understand. For European bureaucrats, the fact that Poland and Hungary are among the greatest net beneficiaries of EU funding has made their revolt against the EU seem totally irrational. In 2016, for example, Hungary received 4.5 billion euros of European funds, an equivalent of 4 per cent of the country’s economic output. Poland received more than 11 billion euros. That such exceptionally favoured beneficiaries have no right to complain is the master premise of the EU’s Ostpolitik, such as it is. |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Europe | Rousseau | Höffe I 280 Europe/Rousseau/Höffe: [Rousseau] describes(1) the European state system Höffe I 281 as a restlessly stable balance that cannot be overcome without the help of political art. In a mid-term review, Rousseau records three truths that he considers undeniable: that there are close, albeit imperfect and that there are links between all the peoples of Europe, "except the Turks"; that imperfection contributes to the present misery, but also allows it to be overcome. >League of Nations/Rousseau. 1. Abbé Castel de Saint-Pierre's Plan for Eternal Peace in Europe (Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe, 1-11: 1713, Ill: 1717), Rousseau wrote a longer excerpt (Extrait), which he supplemented in the same year 1756 with a shorter judgement on eternal peace (Jugement sur la paix perpétuelle) (...) |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Euthyphro | Geach | I 36f Euthyphro: GeachVsSocrates: Questions of fact are not necessarily decidable. - Moral questions are not undecidable in principle. Eutyhphron: GeachVs Socrates: E.g. decisions are as important as definition. >Definition. I 38 Euthyphro/Geach: correct: (1) What is pious is loved by the gods, because it is pious. - ((s) a = b because a - (what is __ is --)). correct: (2) What is beloved by the Gods is loved by the God, because it is loved by the Gods. - ((s) b = b because b - (what is __is, __)). wrong: (3) What is beloved by the Gods is loved by the Gods because it is beloved of God. (circular). - ((s) b = b because b'(what is __, is__)). wrong: (4) What is pious is pious, because it is loved by the Gods. - (s) a = a because b (or because b'!) - (what is __ is __)). >Circular reasoning. I 39 Euthyphro/Geach: Identity/Leibniz Principle: the principle breaks in contexts which are not purely extensional. >Leibniz principle, >Extensionality. It provides opaque contexts: e.g. I beat him because he was my father (because he hit me). - The truth value can differ, although it is the same man. >Opacity, >Truth value, >Reference, >Identification. The falsity of the first sentence does not guarantee that another man is meant. False: that pious acts and humans are not the same classes as those who are loved by God. Wrong solution: John Stuart Mill: God-loved/religious: same denotation/different connotation: This distinction cannot be attributed to Plato. >Connotation, >Plato. Plato: pious: is a form - God-loved: is not a form. Wrong solution: use: explanation: active/passive: e.g. a thing is carried because someone carries it. This is wrong. Wrong: someone carries a thing because it is carried. Geach: this is true. But this cannot be attributed to Plato. I 41f Euthyphro/Geach: McTaggart: instead of "because" (causal but opaque) "in view of" (not causal). GeachVsMcTaggart: missing causality does not rule out error. I do not admire someone in terms of my own belief. - Not even gods. Geach: the attitude is already the reason, but it does not provide the property. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Evenly Rotating Economy | Mises | Rothbard III 320 Evenly Rotating Economy/Mises/Rothbard: Analysis of the activities of production in a monetary market economy is a highly complex matter. An explanation of these activities, in particular the determination of prices and therefore the return to factors, the allocation of factors, and the formation of capital, can be developed only ifwe use the mental construction of the evenly rotating economy. This construction is developed as follows: We realize that the real world of action is one of continual change. Individual value scales, technological ideas, and the quantities of means available are always changing. These changes continually impel the economy in various directions. Value scales change, and consumer demand shifts from one good to another. Technological ideas change, and factors are used in different ways. Both types of change have differing effects on prices. Time preferences change, with certain effects on interest and capital formation. Problem: (…) before the effects of any one change are completely worked out, other changes intervene. Solution: What we must consider, (…) by the use of reasoning, is what would happen if no changes intervened. (…) what would occur if value scales, technological ideas, and the given resources remained constant? What would then happen to prices and production and their relations? Given values, technology, and resources, whatever their concrete form, remain constant. In that case, the economy tends toward a state of affairs in which it is evenly rotating, i.e., in which the same activities tend to be repeated in the same pattern over and over again. Cf. As if/Philosophy. Thus, if values, technology, and resources remain constant, we have two successive states of affairs: (a) the period of transition to an unchanging, evenly rotating economy, and (b) the unchanging round of the evenly rotating economy itself. Final equilibirum: This latter stage is the state of final equilibrium. It is to be distinguished from the market equilibrium prices that are set each day by the interaction of supply and demand. The final equilibrium state is one which the economy is always tending to approach. Rothbard III 321 Problem: In actual life, however, the data are always changing, and therefore, before arriving at a final equilibrium point, the economy must shift direction, towards some other final equilibrium position. Hence, the final equilibrium position is always changing, and consequently no one such position is ever reached in practice. But even though it is never reached in practice, it has a very real importance. Solution: 1) It is never reached in practice and it is always changing, but it explains the direction in which the dog ((s) the economy) is moving. 2) (…) the complexity of the market system is such that we cannot analyze factor prices and incomes in a world of continual change unless we first analyze their determination in an evenly rotating world where there is no change and where given conditions are allowed to work themselves out to the full. |
EconMises I Ludwig von Mises Die Gemeinwirtschaft Jena 1922 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Events | AI Research | Norvig I 446 Events/AI research/Russell/Norvig: [A] situation calculus represents actions and their effects. Situation calculus is limited in its applicability: it was designed to describe a world in which actions are discrete, instantaneous, and happen one at a time. Consider a continuous action, such as filling a bathtub. Problem: Situation calculus can say that the tub is empty before the action and full when the action is done, but it can’t talk about what happens during the action. It also can’t describe two actions happening at the same time (…). Solution/Event calculus: Event calculus reifies fluents ((s) state variables) and events. The fluent At(Shankar , Berkeley) is an object that refers to the fact of Shankar being in Berkeley, but does not by itself say anything about whether it is true. To assert that a fluent is actually true at some point in time we use the predicate T, as in T(At(Shankar , Berkeley), t). Events are described as instances of event categories. The event E1 of Shankar flying from San Francisco to Washington, D.C. is described as E1 ∈ Flyings ∧ Flyer (E1, Shankar ) ∧ Origin(E1, SF) ∧ Destination(E1,DC) . >Events/Philosophical theories. Norvig I 470 The event calculus was introduced by Kowalski and Sergot (1986)(1) to handle continuous time, and there have been several variations (Sadri and Kowalski, 1995(2); Shanahan, 1997(3)) and overviews (Shanahan, 1999(4); Mueller, 2006(5)). van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005)(6) show how the logic of events maps onto the language we use to talk about events. An alternative to the event and situation calculi is the fluent calculus (Thielscher, 1999)(7). James Allen introduced time intervals for the same reason (Allen, 1984)(8), arguing that intervals were much more natural than situations for reasoning about extended and concurrent events. Peter Ladkin (1986a(9), 1986b(10)) introduced “concave” time intervals (intervals with gaps; essentially, unions of ordinary “convex” time intervals) and applied the techniques of mathematical abstract algebra to time representation. Allen (1991)(11) systematically investigates the wide variety of techniques available for time representation; van Beek and Manchak (1996)(12) analyze algorithms for temporal reasoning. There are significant commonalities between the event-based ontology given in this chapter and an analysis of events due to the philosopher Donald Davidson (1980)(13) (>Events/Davidson). The histories in Pat Hayes’s (1985a)(14) ontology of liquids and the chronicles in McDermott’s (1985)(15) theory of plans were also important influences on the field (…). 1. Kowalski, R. and Sergot, M. (1986). A logic-based calculus of events. New Generation Computing, 4(1), 67–95. 2. Sadri, F. and Kowalski, R. (1995). Variants of the event calculus. In ICLP-95, pp. 67–81. 3. Shanahan, M. (1997). Solving the Frame Problem. MIT Press 4. Shanahan, M. (1999). The event calculus explained. In Wooldridge, M. J. and Veloso, M. (Eds.), Artificial Intelligence Today, pp. 409–430. Springer-Verlag. 5. Mueller, E. T. (2006). Commonsense Reasoning. Morgan Kaufmann. 6. van Lambalgen, M. and Hamm, F. (2005). The Proper Treatment of Events. Wiley-Blackwell. 7. Thielscher, M. (1999). From situation calculus to fluent calculus: State update axioms as a solution to the inferential frame problem. AIJ, 111(1–2), 277-299. 8. Allen, J. F. (1984). Towards a general theory of action and time. AIJ, 23, 123–154 9. Ladkin, P. (1986a). Primitives and units for time specification. In AAAI-86, Vol. 1, pp. 354–359. 10. Ladkin, P. (1986b). Time representation: a taxonomy of interval relations. In AAAI-86, Vol. 1, pp. 360–366. 11. Allen, J. F. (1991). Time and time again: The many ways to represent time. Int. J. Intelligent systems, 6, 341-355 12. van Beek, P. and Manchak, D. (1996). The design and experimental analysis of algorithms for temporal reasoning. JAIR, 4, 1–18. 13. Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press. 14. Hayes, P. J. (1985a). Naive physics I: Ontology for liquids. In Hobbs, J. R. andMoore, R. C. (Eds.), Formal Theories of the Commonsense World, chap. 3, pp. 71–107. Ablex. 15. McDermott, D. (1985). Reasoning about plans. In Hobbs, J. and Moore, R. (Eds.), Formal theories of the commonsense world. Intellect Books. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Events | Lévi-Strauss | I 41 Event/Random/Lévi-Strauss: the event is only a mode of coincidence, whose inclusion in a structure creates the aesthetic impression of whatever type of art one may consider. Depending on the style, place and epoch, this coincidence manifests itself in three different aspects of artistic creation: cause execution determination. Only in the first case does coincidence have an event character, i.e. it lies outside the creative act and precedes it. >Structure/Lévi-Strauss, >Order/Lévi-Strauss, >Art/Lévi-Strauss. |
LevSt I Claude Lévi-Strauss La pensée sauvage, Paris 1962 German Edition: Das Wilde Denken Frankfurt/M. 1973 LevSt II C. Levi-Strauss The Savage Mind (The Nature of Human Society Series) Chicago 1966 |
| Events | Lewis | V 56 Event/Lewis: can consist of parts, so great violations of laws of nature can be distinguished from small ones by the number of parts of complex events, not by "many laws", because always an infinite number of laws are violated when a single one is trespassed - or only one fundamental law violated. V 166 Event: always correspond to >propositions. - Hence we can use propositions here - e.g. O(e) says that an event e exists (happens), which complies with the description - in a set of possible worlds - But the proposition is not identical to the event - Problem: if no other event than e could fulfil the description, you would need rigid descriptions - which almost never exist - E.g. "Death of Socrates" is non-rigid. Solution: it is not about a sentence F(e), which is true in all and only the worlds in which e happens - Solution: We just need propositions that may have expressions in our language, but not necessarily do - If two events do not occur in exactly the same worlds, this means that there are no absolutely necessary links between the individual events - but then we can have a 1:1 connection between the events and the propositions - counterfactual dependence between events is simply a D between propositions - the counterfactual dependence between propositions corresponds to the causal dependence between events. - Causal dependence/Lewis: we then conclude it from the counterfactual dependence of propositions. - The dependence lies in the truth of counterfactual conditionals. - (> Causality/Hume, >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis. V 196 Definition Event: bigger or smaller classes of possible spatiotemporal regions - more or less connected by similarity. >Similarity/Lewis, >Possible world/Lewis. V 240 Event/Lewis: E.g. no event: rapidly converging mathematical consequence - is no quick entity - name ultimately uninteresting - probability theory; its events are propositions or sometimes properties - a theory that allows an unlimited number of Boolean operations can lead to unreal events. V 243 Definition Event: property of a spacetime region - always contingent - no event occurs in every possible world - an event happens in exactly one (whole) region - E.g. scattered region: sports championships. - E.g. annual event: not an event - an event does not repeat itself - and does not happen in different space-time regions. - The region of the event is the mereological sum of the regions where it happens - to each event corresponds a property of regions - such a property belongs to exactly one region of each possible world where the event happens - Property: is simply a class here. V 245 Event: two events can happen in the same region (space-time region) - E.g. presence of an electron in an electric field can cause its acceleration. It must be possible that one occurs without the other. Even if some of the laws of nature are violated. For every two events, there is a region in a possible world where one occurs, but not the other. ((s) independence) Two events never necessarily occur at the same time - there are hardly any conditions for eventness - maybe: 1) Regions are individuals that are parts of possible worlds 2) No region is part of various possible worlds - similar to > Montague. V 258 Event/mereology/part/partial event/Essence/Lewis: an event can be part of another. - E.g. movement of the left foot is part of walking. Def essential Part/Event: e is an essential part of f iff. f happens in a region, then also e necessarily in a sub-region that is enclosed in the region (implication of an event). But not necessary: events do not necessarily have their spatiotemporal parts. - E.g. walking could consist of fewer steps. V 259 Part/Whole/Event: Writing of "rry"/"Larry": counterfactual dependence, but not cause/Effect. - They are not causally dependent - nevertheless "rry" can be causally dependent on the writing of "La" - but not of "Larr" (overlapping). - The whole is not the cause of its parts. V 260 Event/mereology/Lewis: Thesis: events do not have a simpler mereology that, for example, chairs. A sum of chairs is not itself a chair, but a conference can be a sum of meetings. >Mereology. E.g. War is the mereological sum of battles - Event/Lewis: should serve as cause and effect - partial event: here the causality is sometimes difficult to determine - Problem: whether a subregion can be determined for a partial event in which it occurs - in simple cases yes. V 261 Non-event/Causal story/Lewis: Non-events cannot be determined as something isolated - they cannot be the cause. Constancy: is not always a non-event! Constancies are needed in causal explanation. >Causal explanation/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Events | Ryle | I 107 States of mind/Ryle: states of mind (mood, inclination) are not events but temporary circumstances. Feelings: feelings are events. >Emotions/Ryle, >Circumstances, >Situations, >Mental states, >Experience, >Sensations/Ryle. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Events | Simons | I 129 Event/occurrents/Simons: events or processes are like continuants in time, but with temporal parts. No identity conditions can be specified. Continuants cannot be eliminated. Brutus-events cannot be seperated into individual events without reference to Brutus. I 131 Event/part/mereology/Simons: spatially and temporally extended events may have parts that are neither purely temporal nor purely spatial, e.g. the part of the football match which is attributable to a single player. Range/span/spn(e): a range or span is a spatiotemporal localization. "Being in": means within larger regions. "Covering": means covering exactly the part. Def spread/spr[e]: a spread is an exact space. Def spell/sp[e]: spell refers to an exact time. Atomic: if pan and spread = 0. Connected: two events are connected, if their span (consisting of span and spell) are topologically connected. Def temporal part: the temporal part contains all simultaneously occurring parts of the event (analog spatial part). Def phase: a phase has temporally related part. Def disc: a disc is a phase with duration 0. Def segment: a segment is a spatially related spatial part. Def section: a section is a segment with expansion 0. I 134 Sum/event/mereology/Simon: for sums of events, it is different than for sums of objects: if events are causally isolated, they cannot form a sum. However, they can be part of a wider whole (they may have an upper limit). Events do not satisfy the full mereology, but the weaker axioms. I 182 Product/events/Simons: problem: the products can exist interrupted. E.g. two objects could alternate between overlapping and separateness, e.g. light spots on a screen, e.g. two bodies share at a time certain members, at others times not. Problem: in the latter case the same product may arise again, but with other elements. >Interrupted Existence. I 183 The change of products requires topological terms. I 182 Coincidence/events: the lack of extensionality allows only one proof of coincidence instead of uniqueness. I 281 Event/reduction/reductionism/Forbes/Simons: events are open to a reduction in such a way as continuants are not, therefore, it is questionable whether there are irreducible truths de re about events ((s) that cannot be traced back to anything else). Essentialism: but as events are also real objects, there should also be essential truth about them. Problem: they are specified by descriptions. Simons: thesis: pro essentialism for events: e.g. the assassination of Franz Ferdinand by principle contains both essentially. E.g. bomb instead of firearm: is a different murder but not with swapped bullets. I 282 It is essential for an event that it is exactly part of those events, of which it is part at this point of time. Different: four-dimensionalism: it does not obey the essentialism. I 305 Event/continuants/Simons: event a: here a formula like "a < b" is complete. Continuants: here we need additionally a time index (with quantification): "ž(Et)[a |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Everyday Language | Cavell | I (a) 39 Skepticism/everyday language/Cavell: one usually assumes that the reference to the everyday language refutes skepticism. Vs: this can be refuted itself. We have to deal with the everyday language, when it is interpreted as the source of independent data, independently of certain philosophical positions or theories. I (a) 40 Otherwise the skeptic would be accused, in a biased way, that the obvious conflict between words and the world would be unclear to him or that he would not be able to address this conflict. Skepticism/Cavell: a serious refutation must show that the person who is as capable of understanding English as we are and knows everything we know has no real use for the words of the everyday language. >Skepticism. How can you show that? A decisive step would be to be able to show the skeptic (also the one who one has inside oneself) that you know what his words say in his opinion. (Not necessarily what they mean according to his opinion, as if they had a special or technical meaning). So we need to understand his position from within. I (a) 41 Skepticism/everyday language/Cavell: the reference to the ordinary language does not refute the skeptic: 1. will not surprise him; 2. one is obviously misunderstanding him. Regarding the use of the language, we agree anyway. >Language use, >Meaning, >Reference. --- II 170 Everyday language/Cavell: here there are three possible types to make statements about them: Type I statement: "We say ...... but we do not say ...." Type II statement: The addition of type I statement by explanations. Type III statement: Generalizations. Ryle: Thesis: when we use the word "voluntarily", it is with an action that we would not normally do. >"voluntarily"/Ryle. II 172 Cavell thesis: Native speakers generally do not need to know what they can say in their language. They, themselves, are the source of such statements. MatesVs intuition and memory in terms of correct speech. CavellVsMates: Intuition is also not necessary at all. I do not need to remember the hour I learned something and not a perfect memory for my speaking. One does not remember the language; it is spoken. >Memory. II 173 CavellVsRyle: requires an explicit explanation (type II statement): for this he is generally also authorized, but precisely in relation to his example "voluntarily", the generalization fails: II 174 E.g. Austin: a voluntary gift. >"voluntarily"/Austin. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Everyday Language | Geach | I 250f Attribution theory: thesis: that you condemn a thing, by "calling it bad". But that must be explained by the more general concept of predication, and such predication can also happen without condemnation; nor can you explain "done deliberately" by attribution of responsibility or characterize "being imposed" without describing the act as such first. Attribution theory/Oxford: here it was not about description but "confirmation". >Description, >Confirmation, >Attribution, GeachVsAttribution theory: you can come up with lots of such theories - the really important distinction is between naming and predication. >Naming, >Predication. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Evidence | Darwin | Gould I 189 Evidence/Darwin/Gould: Darwin represented the view that the fossil finds were extremely incomplete. The history of most fossil species includes two characteristics that are particularly difficult to reconcile with the theory of gradual change. I 191 With the "sympatric" speciation, new forms appear within the distribution area of the previous form. The situation is different on the periphery: isolated small populations here are much more exposed to selection pressure because the periphery marks the limit of the ecological tolerance of the previous living beings. Question: What should fossil finds contain if the majority of evolution takes place in small marginalized groups? I 210 Evidence/Method/Gould: Events which, according to traditional wisdom, cannot "occur" are rarely recognized on the basis of collected evidence, they require a mechanism for their explanation after they can occur. The empirical evidence of that time seems plausible to us today, at that time there were not, because no acceptable force could be named, which would have been able to move ((s) e.g.) whole continents. >Method, >Evolution, >Justification, >Confirmation. Gould IV 33 Evidence/Darwin/Gould: Darwin wrote "The Descent of Man" in 1871(1), at that time there were no fossils, except for the Neanderthal man who is a race of our own kind, neither an ancestor nor a missing link. Gould IV 35 Explanation/evidence/Science/Darwin/Gould: how do we know that evolution controls the world and not any other principle? Darwin's answer was paradoxical. He was not looking for perfection, but for inconsistencies! There are structures and behaviours that endanger the meaningful form of an organism, but ultimately ensure its success. They increase productive efficiency. For example, the tail feathers of the peacocks and the antlers of the moose. They even weaken the species, but still secure the transmission of the genes. This can only be explained by Darwin: in addition to adaptation: sexual selection. IV 36 Sexual selection: competition of the males among each other or election by the females. Thus, the struggle for existence of the individuals drives evolution! It must be exceptionally effective, it is often capable of overcoming other equipment benefits and developments. 1. Ch. Darwin, The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex. John Murray, London 1871. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Evidence | Gould | IV 197 Fossils/evidence: the older, the more incomplete are the finds when it comes to fossils. The finds also reflect the degree of preservation (or conservation ability) rather than the distribution of living beings at that time. However, an empirical increase in the incidence of known fossils could reflect a decline in actual diversity. >Explanation. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Evidence | Nozick | II 237 Knowledge/Riddles/Kripke/Nozick: conundrum: why would you seek evidence against something that you know. - You know then that the evidence must be wrong. Nozick: a theory of knowledge must be able to handle it. >Knowledge, >Theory of knowledge, >Recognition, >Certainty. Solution: conversely, if one does not know that the evidence is misleading, one should not ignore it. >Method. II 250 Evidence/hypothesis/Nozick: often evidence can apply, even if the hypothesis is false. >Truth, >Hypotheses. Test: search for data that would not apply if the hypothesis was true, but the evidence is not. - Then, the hypothesis has not passed the test. II 254f Evidence/hypotheses/Nozick/(s): the initial probability (P0) of the hypothesis must be considered. One cannot just put up any hypothesis. Therefore conclusion from P (evidence e I Hypo h)> = 0.95, P (e,~h) <= 0.05 not sure if e is more likely to follow from h-h or not, depends on which of the two weighted conditional probabilities is greater, P (el h) times P0(h) or P(e l ~ h) times P0(not-h). >Bayesianism, >Conditional probability. II 261 Evidence/hypothesis/theory/Nozick: if e is evidence for hypothesis h, depends on what other theories we have that connects e and h . Problem: the other theories could in turn be embedded in a wider context, etc. - regress. >Regress, >Context, >Dependence. PutnamVsTradition: therefore "evidence for" is not a formal logical relation. - It is rather dependent on other theories. Cf. >Ontological Relativity, >Internal Realism. II 262 Induction/evidence/logic/Nozick: the inductive logic is twofold relative 1. probability is relative to the evidence 2. There must be a principle of total evidence, which is applied to the probability statements. >Induction. Some authors: Solution: an evidence is an evidence for what it explains. >Explanation, >Causal explanation. NozickVs: much evidence is not explanatory - e.g. lightning/thunder do not explain themselves mutually. E.g. a symptom makes probably more, but they do not explain mutually. Perhaps there are quite general statistical relations between statements - e.g. principles of the uniformity of nature. >Symptoms, >Uniformity, >Regularity. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Evidence | Sellars | I 30 Appearance/Sellars: the evidence for the experience differs as little as the experience. I 27 Report/statement/Sellars: phrases like "This is green" both have a facts-declaratory and a reporting use. E.g. Tie seller John must learn to suppress his report. I.e. the report on his own sensory impression which contradicts the fact that he has learned: under different illumination the colors can change. John says now: "this tie is blue". But he makes no reporting use of this sentence. He used it in the sense of a conclusion. Report: experiences, feelings, sensations. On the other hand: Determination: conclusion, facts. >Experience, >Sensations, >Facts, >Conclusion; cf. >Ideal observer, >Standard conditions. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Evolution | Deacon | I 29 Evolution/Selection/Deacon: it seems natural that smarter species prevail over more primitive ones. Is it really always like this? Is it right to order mind and mental deficits on a linear scale? In this context, the extension of consciousness, social progress and evolution are seen as mutually interchangeable terms. This is because we look at the world in terms of design and have borrowed the concept of evolution from the history of technical development. Cf. >Forms of thinking. Biological Evolution/Deacon: this is not additive in contrast to technical evolution. The human genre repertoire is similar to that of the frog or mouse. Also the body structure and even the brain is almost identical in most primates. Evolution: Evolution increased diversification and distribution. But this only occupies other niches. I 317 Evolution/Adaption/Adaptation/Deacon: there is an "evolutionary overdetermination": the apparent independence of many adapted advantages contributes to the same structural change. Since evolution is driven by patterns of tendencies, independent developments tend to strengthen each other in the long run. >Adaption. In this way, certain functions may concentrate on one half of the brain. I 322 Evolution/Baldwin's Evolution/Deacon/Baldwin's Evolution/J. M. Baldwin/Deacon: James Mark Baldwin proposed a modification of Darwinian evolution(1). Baldwin thesis: Learning and behavioural flexibility can influence natural selection through the development of certain skills that enable individuals to populate new niches. Subsequent generations are then subjected to a different type of selection pressure. >Niches, >Selection, >Learning. This does not claim that evolution becomes effective within a lifetime, but that offspring may be given better conditions for further adaptation, e.g. for colonization of colder regions. Thus Baldwin in no way contradicts the doctrine of Darwinism. >Darwinism. I 323 Thus, while no genetic change is initiated immediately, the change in the conditions will cause a change in relation to which of the existing genetic predispositions will be favoured in the future. Lactose intolerance is often cited as an example for this. 1. J. M. Baldwin, (1902): Consciousness and Evolution, Science 2, 212-223, J. M. Baldwin Development and Evolution, NY. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Evolution | Gould | Dennett I 412 Evolution/Gould theory: the key difference in evolution is not simple adaptation but speciation. (DennettVs). Gould: thesis: species are fragile but have unalterable structures. There are no improvements in species, only closed discarding. Correct level: the correct level are not the genes but entire species or clades. Species/Gould/(s): species are not going to be improved, but discarded. Level/explanation/Dennett: as software/hardware: some is better explained on one level, others is better explained on a different level. >Explanation, >Darwinism. Gould I 88ff Evolution/Darwinism/individual/Gould: individuals do not develop evolutionary, they can only grow, reproduce and die. Evolutionary changes occur in groups of interacting organisms. Species are the units of evolution. Orthodox Darwinism/Gould: thesis: gene mutate, individuals are subject to selection and species evolve evolutionary. I 131 Evolution/Gould: Thesis: I do not imagine evolution as a ladder, but rather in the form of a shrub with many branches. Therefore: the more species the better. I 133 The importance of this point can be seen in the development of molecules. The number of differences between amino acids clearly correlates with the time since the diversion of development lines. The longer the separation, the greater the differences. This is how a molecular clock was developed. The Darwinians were generally surprised by the regularity of this clock. After all, the selection should proceed at a noticeably different speed for the different development lines at different times. I 134 VsDarwinism: the Darwinists are actually forced to contemplate that the regular molecular clock represents an evolution that is not subject to selection, but to the random fixation of neutral mutations. We have never been able to separate ourselves from the concept of the evolution of the human being, which puts the brain in the centre of attention. The Australopithecus afarensis disproved what had been predicted by astute evolutionary theorists such as Ernst Haeckel and Friedrich Engels. Tradition: general view: that the upright gait represented an easily attainable gradual development, and the increase in brain volume represented a surprisingly rapid leap. I 136 GouldVs: I would like to take the opposite view: in my opinion, the upright gait is a surprise, a difficult event to achieve, a rapid and fundamental transformation of our anatomy. In anatomical terms, the subsequent enlargement of our brain is a secondary epiphenomenon, a simple transition embedded in the general pattern of human evolution. Bipedality is not an easy achievement, it represents a fundamental transformation of our anatomy, especially of the feet and pelvis. I 191 Evolution/Gould: evolution essentially proceeds in two ways: a) Definition phyletic transformation: an entire population changes from one state to another. If all evolutionary changes were to occur in this way, life would not last long. This is because a phyletic transformation does not lead to an increase in diversity and variety, only to a transformation from one state to another. Now that extinction (by eradication) is so widespread, everything that does not have the ability to adapt would soon be destroyed. b) Definition speciation: new species branch off from existing ones. All speciation theories assume that splits occur quickly in very small populations. With the "sympatric" speciation, new forms appear within the distribution area of the previous form. Large stable central populations have a strong homogenizing influence. New mutations are impaired by the strong previous forms: they may slowly increase in frequency, but a changed environment usually reduces their selective value long before they can assert themselves. Thus, a phyletic transformation of the large populations should be very rare, as the fossil finds prove. It looks different in the periphery: isolated small populations here are much more exposed to the selection pressure, because the periphery marks the limit of the ecological tolerance of the previous living beings. I 266 Evolution/Biology/Gould: evolution proceeds by replacing the nucleotides. II 243 Evolution/Gould: thesis: evolution has no tendency. II 331 Evolution/Gould: official definition of evolution/Gould: evolution is the "change of gene frequencies in populations". (The process of random increase or decrease of the gene frequency is called definition "genetic drift".) The new theory of neutralism suggests that many, if not most, genes in individual populations owe their frequency primarily to chance. IV 199 Evolution/species richness: the change from a few species and many groups to a few groups and many species would occur even in the case of purely coincidental extinction if every speciation process at the beginning of life's history had been accompanied by average major changes. IV 221 Evolution/Gould: pre-evolutionary theory: a pre-evolutionary theory is "the chain of being": it is the old idea that every organism is a link. It confuses evolution with higher development and has been misinterpreted as a primitive form of evolution, but has nothing to do with it! The thesis is emphatically antievolutionary. Problem: there are no links between vertebrates and invertebrates IV 223 Intermediate form: the theory assumed asbestos as an intermediate form between minerals and plants due to the fibrous structure. Hydra and corals were seen as an intermediate form between plants and animals. (Today: both are animals of course.) Absurd: it is absurd to assume a similarity between plants and baboons, because plants lose their leaves and baboon babies lose their hair. IV 346 Evolution/Gould: evolution is not developing in the direction of complexity, why should it? |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Evolution | McDowell | I 151 Evolution/McDowell: quite fruitful approach to explaining philosophical problems. >Understanding/McDowell, >Explanation/McDowell. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Evolution | Nozick | II 334 ff Rationality/Evolution Theory: does not explain why physical state r causes movement b - (if R is the corresponding rational reason and B the rational action). >Causal explanation, >Actions, >Rationality, cf. >Anomalous monism. Nozick: if R is not a rational reason there would be no organism that would be selected for it. - ((s) Because irrational organisms are not selected, one could not recognize rational behavior particularly and describe it. >Reasons, >Reason/cause. II 338 Nozick: nevertheless: if r would not be rational, the organism would not have been selected - "downward causation". - So after all: rationality in the world. II 342 Theory of evolution/Nozick: seems to eliminate values and evaluative facts. >Values, >Ethics, >Morals. Even if action is related to belief, it is not in connection with judgmental facts. >Beliefs, >Facts. III 343 instead, "invisible hand, blind mechanism" - Ethical behavior could be inherit - "Punchline: that does not undermine the role of ethical facts. - Explanation: individual behavior is not - "explained blind" - solution: in addition one needs truth for explanation. >Truth, >Explanation. II 348 Moral belief must ultimately be in connection with its truth. - But that does not show that from a successful explanation of the invisible hand (blind explanation) could not follow that there may be no connection with accuracy. >Correctness. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Evolutionary Psychology | Buss | Corr II 171 Evolutionary Psychology/EP/Buss/Figueredo: (…) we may envision a mass of people escaping a burning building by different exits: main exits, emergency exits, windows and service doors. Personality is similar. Just as everyone has to escape the burning building in the analogy, so there is the evolutionary imperative to reproduce before death; and just as there are many exits, one can foster successful reproduction by being gregarious and charming as with the social extravert, dogged II 172 and persevering like the exceedingly conscientious, or ingratiating and affiliative like the highly agreeable. Thus, different personality styles and strategies have evolved in competition with one another for the same goal of survival and reproduction, but with different ways and means of adaptation. II 173 [Buss] insists that evolution forges the ‘physiological, anatomical and psychological mechanisms’ that inform choice, inclination, aversion and attraction. II 175 (…) the new science of EP correctly represented emitted behaviours as the product of the interactions between evolved psychological mechanisms and specific stimulus inputs from the environment to which they were finely tuned. II 179 Survival/Reproduction: (…) Buss outlined eight exigencies of survival and reproduction in any adaptive landscape populated by concentrations of conspecifics: (1) successful intrasexual competition, (2) mate selection, (3) successful conception, (4) mate retention, (5) reciprocal dyadic alliance formation, (6) coalition-building and maintenance, (7) parental care and socialization and (8) extra-parental kin investment. There follows a continuation of Buss’s claim that EP is an able arbiter of theory in its ability to impose a biologically informed kind of Occam’s razor upon theoretical claims within personality psychology. II 180 A common misconception regarding the evolution of personality, critiqued by Buss (2011)(1), is that selection acts as a homogenizing force leading to single point of optimality in the phenotype distribution. In contrast, evolutionary theory predicts that the location of this point will vary depending upon the type of selective pressures active, in accordance to the relationship between a trait and its fitness. II 182 The alternative explanations summarized by Buss (1991)(2) for the origins of partially heritable personality characteristics and the retention of individual differences remain as possibilities, but the list of alternatives has been expanded [in a volume edited by Buss and Hawley (2011)(3)]. For example, it has been argued as possible that selective sweeps within the past several thousand years (…) are behind the large variation among humans. Gene flow due to accelerated migration of individuals among human populations is also a contender hypothesis. Balancing selection, whereby multiple phenotypes are adaptive in a complementary way, each in a specific subset of the species niches, has remained as a focus of discussion. >Evolution, >Selection, >Adaptation, >Niches, >Species, >Genes, >Heritability. 1. Buss, D. (2011). Evolutionary psychology: The new science of the mind (4th ed.). Hove, UK: Psychology Press. 2. Buss, D. M. (1991). Evolutionary personality psychology. Annual Review of Psychology, 42, 459–491. 3. Buss, D. M., & Hawley, P. H. (2011). The evolution of personality and individual differences. New York: Oxford University Press. Figueredo, Aurelio J.; Fernandes, Heitor B. F.; Peñaherrera-Aguirre, Mateo and Hertler, Steven C.: “The Evolution of Personality Revisiting Buss (1991)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 171-190. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Excess Profits Tax | Rothbard | Rothbard III 926 Excess Profits Tax/EPT/Rothbard: Of all the possible types of taxes, the one most calculated to cripple and destroy the workings of the market is the excess profits tax. Market economy: For of all productive incomes, profits are a relatively small sum with enormous significance and impact; they are the motor, the driving force, of the entire market economy. Incentives: Profit-and-loss signals are the prompters of the entrepreneurs and capitalists who direct and ever redirect the productive resources of society in the best possible ways and combinations to satisfy the changing desires of consumers under changing conditions. Calculation: With the drive for profit crippled, profit and loss no longer serve as an effective incentive, or, therefore, as the means for economic calculation in the market economy. War/profits: It is curious that in wartime, precisely when it would seem most urgent to preserve an effcient productive system, the cry invariably goes up for "taking the profits out of war." This zeal never seems to apply so harshly to the clearly war-borne "profits" of steel workers in higher wages - only to the profits of entrepreneurs. There is certainly no better way of crippling a war effort. Excess/measurements: In addition, the "excess" concept requires some sort of norm above which the profit can be taxed. This norm may either be a certain rate of profit, which involves the numerous diffculties of measuring profit and capital investment in every firm; or it may refer to profits at a base period before the war started. War profits/war production: The latter, the general favorite because it specifically taps war profits, makes the economy even more chaotic. For it means that while the government strains for more war production, the excess profits tax creates every incentive toward Iower and ineffcient war production. VsExcess profits tax: In short, the EP T tends to freeze the process of production as of the peacetime base period. And the longer the war lasts, the more obsolete, the more ineffcient and absurd, the base-period structure becomes. >Taxation/Rothbard, >Income tax/Rothbard, >Cost Principle/Rothbard, >Neutral taxation/Economic theories, >Neutral taxation/Rothbard, >Service/Rothbard, >Bureaucracy/Rothbard, >Benefit principle/Rothbard, >Progressive tax/Rothbard. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Exchange Rate Policy | Friedman | Landsburg I 70 Exchange rate policy/Friedman/Landsburg: Fixed exchange rates: Prior to 1971, much of the world operated on a system of fixed exchange rates. A United States dollar could be bought (or sold) for 360 Japanese yen, or 4.3 73 Swiss francs, or 26 Austrian schillings, or 1.23 grams of gold. Under a system of international agreements, monetary authorities around the world agreed to maintain these exchange rates by adjusting their money supplies ifnecessary. If, say, the yen appeared to be rising in value, then the Japanese authorities increased the supply ofyen to counteract the rise. If traders started offering less than 1.23 grams of gold for a dollar, the US authorities reduced the supply of dollars to restore their value. FriedmanVsFixed exchange rates: Beginning in 1950, Milton Friedman(1) was a vocal critic of this system, arguing (among other things) that, like any attempt to control prices, it was inimical to freedom, it burdened the monetary authorities with obligations that prevented them from doing their jobs properly, and it was in any event doomed to fail as domestic pressures frequently prevented the authorities from fulfilling their nominal obligations. Those periodic failures were a significant source of just the kind of uncertainty and instability that the system was supposed to prevent. Flexible exchange rates: For decades, Friedman was the intellectual leader of a (very) small band of advocates for flexible exchange rates, and produced a series of memoranda detailing exactly how such a system could be made to work. These memoranda proved invaluable in 1971 when the United States announced that it would, for the first time, allow the US dollar to float freely with respect to gold, and the entire system of international agreements came tumbling down overnight. A new system of flexible rates was smoothly ushered into place, largely following the guidelines that Friedman had developed. Had those guidelines not been available, the world might have moved in the opposite direction, toward more extensive and unwieldy capital and exchange controls, likely necessitating new and oppressive restrictions on international trade. >Exchange rates. 1. Regarding exchange rates: Friedman first broached the issue in an essay entitled “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates,” written and circulated in 1950 but published in 1953 as a chapter in Friedman’s book Essays in Positive Economics from the University of Chicago Press. |
Econ Fried I Milton Friedman The role of monetary policy 1968 Landsburg I Steven E. Landsburg The Essential Milton Friedman Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2019 |
| Exchange Rate Volatility | Rogoff | Feldstein I 447 Exchange Rate Volatility/Rogoff: Though simply bringing down inflation is not enough, it is possible in principle to stabilize the yen-dollar and mark-dollar exchange rates should global monetary authorities attach a sufficiently high weight to that objective. For example, the United States and Japan could in principle slavishly peg their currencies to the euro. Other mechanisms for fixing exchange rates might allocate the right to steer global monetary policy more evenly, but as the European experience has shown us, the coordination problems involved in such a system can be quite severe, absent political integration. I will return to these issues in the final section of this paper. Problem: How serious are the costs of exchange rate volatility, and how great would the gains be to removing it? Hedging: An obvious point to make is that the ability of firms and individuals to hedge against exchange rate risk places an upper bound on the size of the costs. Hedging may be expensive, but not infinitely so, especially as international capital markets deepen and opportunities for portfolio diversification multiply. Demand: (…) the ability of individuals and companies to shift demand across time and goods tempers the costs of volatility. >Exchange rates/Rogoff. Problem: there is no way for the world as a whole to hedge against global risks. For this reason, much of literature on risk premiums in forward exchange markets- or in stocks and bonds, for that matter - neglects the inconveniences of the trading of individual risk and focuses on the equilibrium costs of global risks. Feldstein I 448 Even if this risk cannot be diversified away, it is not easy to construct models where the welfare effects are large.(1),(2) Thus the benefits of eliminating exchange rate volatility must lie elsewhere, since the benefits of reducing consumption volatility (and consumption is presumably the ultimate welfare objective) are not likely to be very large even if exchange rates truly are a major cause. Of course, all of this discussion is predicated on the assumption that markets are very complete and global volatility is what matters. This view is too extreme, even if it is true that global capital market innovation is constantly reducing the costs of diversification. Still, these kinds of considerations should cause one to question just how great an evil exchange rate volatility can be. Empirical evidence comparisons on the volatility of output and trade under fixed versus flexible exchange rates tend to underscore the difficulty of detecting the real effects of exchange rate volatility. >Fixed Exchange Rates, >Floating Exchange Rates. The open question, however, is whether real exchange rate volatility has an effect on any Feldstein I 449 other macroeconomic variables. Are trade flows greater under fixed rates than flexible rates? Is output, consumption, or investment more volatile? The small number of studies that have looked at this question tend to find that the exchange rate regime has little or no influence on volatility of macroaggregates (see Baxter and Stockman 1989(3); Flood and Rose 1995(4)). Admittedly, the evidence is far less conclusive or systematic than the evidence on real exchange rate variability. But at the very least, it appears that differences do not (or at least have not yet) jumped out of the data. A (…) reason why exchange rate volatility may not be all that problematic comes out of recent efforts to provide microfoundations for the classic exchange rate theories of the 1970s (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996(5), chap. 10). This new research suggests that while exchange rate volatility may have adverse effects, they are not necessarily first order. If the major distortions in the economy include factors such as labor market distortions, tax distortions, and monopoly distortions, then the welfare effects of exchange rate movements depend to a large extent on whether they exacerbate or ameliorate these distortions. At the moment, the empirics of this question are not resolved. Feldstein I 450 Central banks: (…) the reason exchange rate attacks can still succeed, even where the central bank has more than adequate reserves, is that governments are often extremely reluctant to raise interest rates to the extent necessary to fend off a major sustained attack. Feldstein I 452 Central banks have been remarkably successful in subduing inflation in recent years, but the level of exchange rate volatility among the big three currencies (dollar, euro, and yen) has subsided only slightly. >Exchange rates, >Fixed exchange rates, >Floating exchange rates. 1. Lucas, Robert. 1988. Models of business cycles. Oxford: Blackwell. 2. Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff. 1996. Foundations of international macroeconomics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, September. 3. Baxter, Marianne, and Alan Stockman. 1989. Business cycles and the exchange rate regime: Some international evidence. Journal of Monetary Economics 23 (May): 377-400. 4. Flood, Robert, and Andrew Rose. 1995. Fixing exchange rates: A virtual quest for fundamentals. Journal of Monetary Economics 36 (August): 3-37. 5. Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff. 1996. Foundations of international macroeconomics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, September. Kenneth Rogoff. „Perspectives on Exchange Rate Volatility.“ In: Martin Feldstein (ed). International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. |
Rogoff I Kenneth S. Rogoff The purchasing power parity puzzle 1996 Feldstein I Martin Feldstein (ed.) International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. Chicago 1999 |
| Exchange Rates | Congressional Research Service (CRS) | CRS I 1 Exchange rates/Marc Labonte/CRS: is the value at which two countries trade goods and services and the value at which investors from one country purchase the assets of another country. As such, it is dependent on the two countries’ fundamental macroeconomic conditions, such as its inflation, growth, and saving rates. Thus, it is generally accepted that the value of the exchange rate cannot be predictably altered (for long) unless the country’s macroeconomic conditions are modified relative to those of its trading partners. Many view the volatility of floating exchange rates as proof that speculation and irrational behavior, rather than economic fundamentals, drive exchange rate values. Empirical evidence supports the view that changes in exchange rate values are not well correlated with changes in economic data in the short run.(1) But this evidence does not prove that economic theory is wrong. Although floating exchange rate values change frequently, and at times considerably, there are important economic conditions that change frequently in ways that cannot be measured. Factors such as investors’ perceptions of future profitability and riskiness cannot be accurately measured, yet changes in these factors can have profound influence on exchange rate values. Economists have had more success at correlating long run exchange rate movements with changes in economic fundamentals. Currency policy: A decision by a government to influence the value of its exchange rate, therefore, is likely to succeed only if its overall macroeconomic conditions are altered. >Currency crises, >Capital controls, >Fixed exchange rates, >Floating exchange rates, >International trade, >Currency. 1. For example, see Robert Flood and Andrew Rose, “Fixing exchange rates: A Virtual Quest for Fundamentals,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 36, no. 1, December 1995, p. 1. Congressional Research Service of the Library of congress (CRS) Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? RL31204 (2007) https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL31204 |
CRS I Congressional Research Service (CRS) Marc Labonte Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? Washington: Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress 2007 CRS II Congressional Research Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Marc Labonte, Banking and Cryptocurrency: Policy Issues. CRS Congressional research Service Report R48430. Washington, DC. 2025 CRS III Congressional Research Service (CRS) Corrie E. Clark Heather L. Greenley, Bitcoin, Blockchain, and the Energy Sector. Washington, DC. 2019 CRS IV Congressional Reserch Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Cryptocurrency: Selected Policy Issues Congressional Reserch Service CRS Report R47425 Washington, DC. 2023 |
| Exchange Rates | Dornbusch | Feldstein I 441 Exchange Rates/Dornbusch/Rogoff: If officials’ plans for monetary policy were hard to predict-and during the 1970s, they were hard to predict-then there was no way of ruling out sustained large divergences in countries’ price levels. Even a very loose interpretation of the doctrine of “purchasing power parity” suggests that price level instability is incompatible with exchange rate stability. The theoretical case against the hapless monetary authorities was greatly strengthened by Rüdiger Dornbusch’s (1976)(1) celebrated “overshooting” model. The theoretical case against the hapless monetary authorities was greatly strengthened by Rudiger Dornbusch’s (1976) celebrated “overshooting” model. By introducing forward-looking “rational” expectations into the canonical Keynesian model of open economy macroeconomics (due to Mundell and Fleming), Dornbusch showed that monetary policy shifts can easily lead to disproportionately large movements in exchange rates. Under certain plausible assumptions, the sluggishness of wages and prices means that the exchange rate must bear a disproportionate burden of the adjustment to monetary shocks, at least in the short run. Ergo, a little monetary instability can lead to a lot of exchange rate instability; a lot of monetary instability can lead to near chaospretty much the situation in the 1970s, at least in comparison with the 1950s and 1960s. RogoffVsDornbusch: [Dornbusch’s] theory seemed to fit the facts, and it was intrinsically very elegant to boot (a big selling point in any science). Rogoff: Unfortunately today, as inflation con- Feldstein I 442 tinues to subside, it is becoming increasingly clear that monetary instability is at most a piece of the exchange rate volatility puzzle. It certainly cannot carry the full burden-or the blame-attributed to it by monetary models of the 1970s (or 1980s, for that matter). Inflation: One may well ask, has the conquest of inflation brought any drop at all in major-currency exchange rate volatility? >Exchange rates/Rogoff. 1. Dornbusch, Rudiger. 1976. Expectations and exchange rate dynamics. Journal of Political Economy 84 (December): 1161-76. Kenneth Rogoff. „Perspectives on Exchange Rate Volatility.“In: Martin Feldstein (ed). International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. |
Dornbusch I Rüdiger Dornbusch Expectations and exchange rate dynamics 1976 Feldstein I Martin Feldstein (ed.) International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. Chicago 1999 |
| Exchange Rates | Fischer | Feldstein I 455 Exchange rate systems/fixed/floating/Stanley Fischer: We often announce that to prevent crises countries need to have sound macroeconomic policies and a sound financial system. What about the exchange rate system? We generally say that if you have good macroeconomic policies, you’ll have a stable exchange rate. Really? Did Japan and the United States run unstable macroeconomic policies between 1995 and 1996? Is that why the exchange rate moved 50 percent in that period? The position that exchange rates will be stable provided policies are virtuous is not well supported by the evidence. But we’re not sure what system to recommend. I am skeptical about the notion of free-floating rates, particularly for developing countries, and believe that a country that is trying to develop through integration into the global economy makes the task that much more difficult if it does not seek in some way to stabilize the exchange rate. In an extreme storm, there are probably benefits to being able to let the rate move, but the rate still has to be defended. No doubt there is more to be said; but it is surprising that there is still so much uncertainty about this essential issue. >Exchange Rate Volatility/Rogoff. Stanley Fisher. „Crises that don’t happen.“ In: Martin Feldstein (ed). International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. |
Fischer St I Stanley Fischer Imf Essays From a Time of Crisis Boston: MIT 2005 Feldstein I Martin Feldstein (ed.) International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. Chicago 1999 |
| Exchange Rates | Rogoff | Feldstein I 441 Exchange Rates/Rogoff: During the macroeconomic chaos of the 197Os, the popular perception among economists was that if governments could only manage to whip inflation, calm in foreign exchange markets would surely follow. In the meantime, the only advice economists could give for dealing with exchange rate volatility was to run for cover. The 1970s view laid the blame for unstable exchange rates squarely at the doorstep of the monetary authorities. If officials’ plans for monetary policy were hard to predict-and during the 1970s, they were hard to predict-then there was no way of ruling out sustained large divergences in countries’ price levels.’ Even a very loose interpretation of the doctrine of “purchasing power parity” suggests that price level instability is incompatible with exchange rate stability. The theoretical case against the hapless monetary authorities was greatly strengthened by Rüdiger Dornbusch’s (1976)(1) celebrated “overshooting” model. >Exchange Rates/Dornbusch. RogoffVsDornbusch: [Dornbusch’s] theory seemed to fit the facts, and it was intrinsically very elegant to boot (a big selling point in any science). Rogoff: Unfortunately today, as inflation con- Feldstein I 442 tinues to subside, it is becoming increasingly clear that monetary instability is at most a piece of the exchange rate volatility puzzle. It certainly cannot carry the full burden-or the blame-attributed to it by monetary models of the 1970s (or 1980s, for that matter). Inflation: One may well ask, has the conquest of inflation brought any drop at all in major-currency exchange rate volatility? Feldstein I 444 Inflation/exchange rates/interest rates/Rogoff: (…) overall, exchange rate volatility has indeed fallen somewhat in recent years ((s) written in 1999). Whether one can attribute this decline to the general fall in inflation, or to the switch in central bank operating procedures toward greater emphasis on smoothing fluctuations in very short-term interest rates, is unclear. But what is clear is that despite great successes in the battle against inflation, exchange rate volatility across the major currencies is still quite significant. Exchange rate volatility/Rogoff: In retrospect, economists should have realized that the elegant theories of the 1970s overstated the important of monetary factors-and ergo the role of central banks-in causing exchange rate volatility. Ever since the early 1980s, well before low inflation had settled in, a steady stream of negative empirical results began to cast doubt on monetary instability and overshooting as the key elements of exchange rate volatility. Feldstein I 445 Predicability: Examples of explanatory variables in structural exchange rate equations are countries’ relative output growth, interest rates, and money supplies. Obviously, if these variables are extremely hard to predict (say because one or both countries have highly erratic monetary policy), then of course it will be difficult to predict exchange rates one year hence. Prediction will be difficult no matter how well a model can explain exchange rate changes after the fact. But the inability of models to forecast exchange rates runs deeper than that. It turns out that even if one gives models the (seemingly prohibitive) advantage of forecasting with actual realized (one year hence) values of outputs, interest rates, and the like, they still fail to outperform the naive random walk model. True, this extreme result breaks down at very long horizons, over two years (see Meese and Rogoff 1983b(2); Mark 1995(3)), but again even this success relies on using out-of-sample information about the explanatory variables. Therefore, it is by no means established that monetary models can forecast exchange rates in any meaningful way. Predicability/Lewis: (…) as Lewis (1995)(4) noted, hundreds of studies have consistently found that, if anything, forward exchange rates tend to point in the wrong direction! Feldstein I 446 Solutions/Rogoff: there is an increasing consensus across a broad number of studies that purchasing power parity (PPP) considerations do matter for long-run exchange rate determination (see Froot and Rogoff 1995(5); Rogoff 1996(6)). (…) newer theoretical models emphasizing nonmonetary factors have increasingly come to supplant the classic Keynesian framework of Mundell, Fleming, and Dornbusch. These “new open economy macroeconomics” models emphasize other factors in addition to money, including government spending and productivity shocks. Whereas it is extremely unlikely that even these newer models will be able to explain very short term fluctuations in exchange rates, early evidence suggests that the other factors they emphasize may be at least as important as monetary factors in medium- to long-run exchange rate determination (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996(7), chaps. 4 and 10). 1. Dornbusch, Rudiger. 1976. Expectations and exchange rate dynamics. Journal of Political Economy 84 (December): 1161-76. 2. Meese, Richard, and Kenneth Rogoff. 1983b. The out-of-sample failure of empirical exchange rate models: Sampling error or misspecification? In Exchange rates and international macroeconomics, ed. Jacob Frenkel, 67-105. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 3. Mark, Nelson. 1995. Exchange rates and fundamentals: Evidence on long-horizon predictability. American Economic Review 85 (March): 201-18. 4. Lewis, Karen. 1995. Puzzles in international financial markets. In Handbook of international economics, ed. Gene Grossman and Ken Rogoff, 1913-71. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 5. Froot, Kenneth, and Kenneth Rogoff. 1995. Perspectives on PPP and long-run real exchange rates. In Handbook of international economics, ed. Gene Grossman and Ken Rogoff, 1647-88. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 6. Rogoff, Kenneth. 1996. The purchasing power parity puzzle. Journal of Economic Literature 34 (June): 647-68. 7. Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff. 1996. Foundations of international macroeconomics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, September. Kenneth Rogoff. „Perspectives on Exchange Rate Volatility.“In: Martin Feldstein (ed). International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. |
Rogoff I Kenneth S. Rogoff The purchasing power parity puzzle 1996 Feldstein I Martin Feldstein (ed.) International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. Chicago 1999 |
| Excluded Middle | Lewis | V 329 Principle of the contingently (conditionally) excluded middle/Stalnaker/BSAD/Lewis: Thesis: either wX>wY or wX> w~Y applies in every world - it follows that if Y, Y", ... are a partition and X is possible, then wX>wY, wX>wY", ..., would also be a partition. Explanation: wA>wB: "if A was the case, B would be the case". >Counterfactual conditionals. Then the conjunctions of full patterns are a partition. - Vs: 1) applies to arbitrary selections. --- V 331 2) cannot deal with random events. - LewisVsVs: despite coincidences there is nothing vague or arbitrary in the counterfactual conditionals - They are simply wrong in coincidences. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Excluded Middle | Logic Texts | Read III 108 Similarity metrics/the conditionally excluded middle/Read: the conditionally excluded middle: one or the other member of a pair of conditional sentences must be true. - That equals the assumption that there is always a single most similar world. - Stalnaker pro - LewisVsStalnaker: e.g. Bizet/Verdi: all combinations are wrong - Stalnaker: instead of the only similar one at least one similar - LewisVs: The amount of the possible worlds in the Lewis 2 m + e is large, whereby e decreases suitably; it has no limit. - Solution/Lewis: instead of the selection function: similarity relation: he proposes that "if A, then B" is then true in w if there is either no "A or non-B" world, or some "A" and "B" world that is more similar than any "A and non-B" world. >Similarity metrics. --- III 110 Verdi-Example: where there is no unique, most similar world, the "would" condition sentences are false because there is no similar world for any of the most appropriate similar worlds in which they are fellow country men, in which Bizet has a different nationality. - Example: if you get an A, you will receive a scholarship: will be true if there is a more similar world in which you get both for each world in which you get an A and not a scholarship. - ((s) without conditional sentence of the excluded middle). >Similarity. --- III 263 Law of the excluded middle/constructivism/Read: Constructivists often present so-called "weak counterexamples" against the excluded middle - if a is a real number, "a = 0" is not decidable. Consequently, the constructivist cannot claim that all real numbers are either identical to zero or not. - But this is more of a question of representation. >Constructivism, >Presentation. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Excluded Middle | Quine | XIII 55 Sentence of the Excluded Middle/excluded middle/Quine: Thesis: each sentence is either true or false. You can say a lot about that, pro and contra. Set Theory/Quine: 1. Much in it does not satisfy most standards of intuitionism, i.e. it is assumed that it is neither true nor false (without truth value). This leads from classical logic to intuitionism. >Set Theory/Quine. QuineVsDummett/QuineVsAnti-Realism: the requirement that there must be direct evidence for or against an assertion, but it also obscures the clarity and simplicity of the sciences. QuineVsIntuitionism: is obscure, especially when extended to mathematics. Bivalence/Logic/Quine: the bivalence with the Sentence of the Excluded Middle is the minimal, most streamlined thing that logic has to offer. It comes from the number two, the smallest and simplest number rising from the ground. Assertiveness/Truth/QuineVsIntuitionism: assertiveness is one thing, truth another. XIII 56 Realism/Quine: pro: some truths can be found out, others not. N.B.: then we are also free to call the rest of the (undetectable) sentences false. Future/Sentence of the Excluded Middle/VsSentence of the Excluded Middle/Bivalence/Quine: 3. The Sentence of the Excluded Middle has also come under fire from another side: Thesis: Contingents of predictions are neither true nor false. (See future/Quine). VsSentence of the Excluded Middle/Quine: a further objection is: non-designating terms such as e.g. Pegasus: sentences containing such terms are neither true nor false. Empty singular terms/Quine: we can accept this for everyday language, but not in science or logic. (See singular terms). Vagueness/VsSentence of the Excluded Middle/Sorites/Quine: 4. Objection: vague expressions: here again I would plead for a double standard: in logic we simply want to proceed in such a way that we assume that all expressions are precise. Determination/Quine: we can even introduce an additional convention. XIII 57 Sorites/Quine: we save the mathematical (complete) induction by setting exact limits for what a heap is. Even if we do not specify where it goes! Sentence of the Excluded Middle/Quine: pro: the first two objections are ignored, the other two are overcome by a double standard. Proposition/Sentence of the Excluded Middle/Quine: some authors resort to propositions to explain. Thesis: The lack would concern sentences, but not the corresponding propositions. QuineVsPropositions: this is an empty game with words (see >truth). Sentence of the Excluded Middle/Quine: is not a fact of life, but a norm that governs efficient logical regimentation. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Exhaustible Resources | Parrinello | Kurz I 304 Exhaustible resources/Parrinello/Kurz: In 1983 Parrinello turned to the problem of exhaustible resources, such as oil or gas, and asked critically whether the long-period method Sraffa had adopted can also deal With this case or whether it has to be abandoned in favour of some other method (Parrinello 1983)(1). (…) this paper triggered a number of contributions taking up the challenge. When in 1983 Parrinello published his paper he had to rely exclusively on Sraffa's published works. Therefore he could not yet know what is there in Sraffa's manuscripts and papers kept at Trinity College, Cambridge, regarding Kurz I 305 the problem of exhaustible resources. >Exhaustible resources/Sraffa. Kurz I 307 ParrinelloVsSraffa: (…) 'a problem of compatibility' existed between the long-period method revived by Sraffa and the case of exhaustible natural resources (Parrinello 1983: 188)(1). He went on to interpret the introductory passage of Chapter XI of Sraffa's book(2) and concluded that 'Sraffa seems, in his theory of value; to equate land with mineral resources' (188-9)(1). While it is true that Sraffa considered both non-depletable and exhaustible resources as occupying among means of production a position equivalent to that of non-basics among products, he compared gradual depletion of exhaustible resources With that of machines of an obsolete type. Kurz: Therefore, with the benefit of hindsight we may agree with Parrinello 'that the assimilation of mineral deposits to land, if taken too far, may become misleading' (190). Parrinello: Starting from Sraffa's production equations and seeking a way to preserve the classical approach as much as possible and yet cope with the problem of exhaustible resources, Parrinello then counterposes 'two ways in which exhaustible natural resources cuan be treated in the theory of value' (190)(1). According to the first option there is a given 'number of mines of a certain type and the "mine" [is] equated with a machine which exists but is no longer reproduced“. (191). Sraffa/ Kurz: This coincides essentially with the approach taken by Sraffa in the passage he deleted at the proofreading Stage of his book. According to the second option the natural resource is considered „as an inventory of goods no longer produced. The availability of the resource is in this case measured by the quantity under ground or on the surface and this quantity is considered to be divisible into inputs which can belong to distinct processes of two kinds: extractive processes and conservation processes.“(191) Kurz I 308 Solution/Parrinello: (…) conservation processes and extraction processes must explicitly be distinguished. In conditions of free competition this implies, however, that the price of the in situ stock of the resource must rise, following the Hotelling Rule (Hotelling 1931) (197)(3). >Hotelling Rule. Parrinello then compares this case to the case of 'beans' in Sraffa 's book (1960: 91(2)), which are assumed to exhibit a very Iow rate of own reproduction. The case can only be dealt With in terms of a difference between the price of beans at the beginning of the production period and the price at its end, just as in the Hotelling case. This fact is said to spell trouble for the long-period method, because 'the choice of the system of production is not independent of the quantity of the natural resource in Short supply'. Parrinello concludes: „It therefore becomes impossible, in the absence of particular hypotheses, to maintain the thesis that long-term prices can be explained solely on he basis of the distribution and methods of production used in a self-contained period of time.“ (196)(1) To this he adds that this seems to 'lead the theory of value founded on the concept of surplus towards positions close to the neo-classical approach' (196-7)(1). He insisted, however, that the two theories still exhibit a 'substantial difference' (197)(1) as regards the manner in which the rate of interest is determined whether by time preference or surplus. As regards the first method (resources as mines), 'the extraction of the mineral and its conservation below the ground cannot be considered as two separate processes' (197)(1): they must rather be combined into a Single process in which 'the quantity of the mineral extracted and the quantity which remains in the ground at the end of the period are treated as joint products' (198)(1). Parrinello then draws the attention to the special case in which the natural rate of growth of the resource happens to be such that whatever is extracted in a given period is exactly replenished during the same period. In this case, he insists, 'the royalty [defined as the "user cost of the mine" (190)]' would be zero: 'we would have before us a renewable resource which, With respect to the system of production activated, is equal to land (198)(1). VsParrinello/Kurz: Parrinello's paper triggered a rich literature to which contributed, among others, Salvadori (1987)(4), Schefold (1989(5): ch. 19b, 2001(6)), Kurz and Salvadori (1995(7), 1997(8), 2001(9), 2002(10), 2009(11), 2011(12)), Bidard and Erreygers (2001a(14), 2001b(15)), Lager (2001)(16), Parrinello (2001)(17), Ravagnani (2002)(18) and Hosoda (2001)(19). In addition there were contributions dealing with the problem at hand from a classical point of View, but which were not directly related to Parrinello's paper, including Roncaglia (1983(20), 1985(21)), Gibson (1984)(22), Pegoretti (1986(23), 1990(24)) and Quadrio Curzio (1983(25), 1986(26)). Here we focus attention only on some of the former. >Exhaustible resources/Schefold. 1. Parrinello, S. (1983). 'Exhaustible Natural Resources and the Classical Method of Long-period Equilibrium', in J. Kregel (ed.), Distribution, Effective Demand and International Economic Relations, London: Macmillan, pp. 186-99. 2. Sraffa, P. (1960). Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Hotelling, H. (1931). 'The Economics of Exhaustible Resources', Journal of Political Economy, 39, pp. 137—75. 4. Salvadori, N. (1987). 'Les ressources naturelles rares dans la théorie de Sraffa', in G. Bidard (ed.), La rente, acutalité de Vapproche classique, Paris: Economica, pp. 161-76. 5. Schefold, B. (1989). Mr Sraffa on Joint Production and Other Essays, London: Macmillan. 6. Schefold, B. (2001). 'Critique of the Corn-Guano Model', Metroeconomica, 52(3), pp. 316-28. 7. Kurz, H. D. and Salvadori, N. (1995). Theory of Production. A Long-Period Analysis, Revised paperback edition 1997, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 8. Kurz, H. D. and Salvadori, N. (1997). 'Exhaustible Resources in a Dynamic Input-Output Model With 'Classical' Resources', Economic Systems Research, 9(3), pp. 235-51. 9. Kurz, H. D. and Salvadori, N. (2000). 'Economic Dynamics in a Simple Model With Exhaustible Resources and a Given Real Wage Rate', Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 1 1(1—2), pp. 167—79. 10 Kurz, H. D. and Salvadori, N. (2001). 'Classical Economics and the Problem of Exhaustible Resources', Metroeconomica, 52(3), pp. 282—96. 11. Kurz, H. D. and Salvadori, N. (2002). 'On the Long-period Method. A Comment on Ravagnani', a reply to 'Produced Quantities and Returns in Sraffa's Theory of Normal Prices: Textual Evidence and Analytical Issues', by Fabio Ravagnani, in S. Böhm, Ch. Gehrke, H. D. Kurz and R. Sturn (eds), Is there Progress in Economics? Knowledge, Truth and the History of Economic Thought, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 12. Kurz, H. D. and Salvadori, N. (2009). 'Ricardo on Exhaustible Resources, and the Hotelling Rule', in Aiko Ikeo and Heinz D. Kurz (eds.), The History of Economic Theory. Essays in Honour of Takashi Negishi, London: Routledge, pp. 68—79. 13. Kurz, H. D. and Salvadori, N. (2011). 'Exhaustible Resources: Rents, Profits, Royalties, and Prices', in Volker Caspari (ed.), The Evolution of Economic Theory, Essays in Honour of Bertram Schefold, London: Routledge. 14. Bidard, Ch. and Erreygers, G. (2001 a). 'The Corn-Guano Model', Metroeconomica, 52(3), pp. 243-53. 15. Bidard, Ch. and Erreygers, G. (2001b). 'Further Reflections on the Corn—Guano Model', Metroeconomica, 52(3), pp. 254-67. 16. Lager, Ch. (2001). 'A Note on Non-Stationary Prices', Metroeconomica, 52(3), pp. 297-300. 17. Parrinello, S. (2001). 'The Price Of Exhaustible Resources', Metroeconomica, 52(3), pp. 301-15. 18. Ravagnani, F. (2002). 'Produced Quantities and Returns in Sraffa's Theory of Normal Prices: Textual Evidence and Analytical Issues', in S. Böhm, Ch. Gehrke, H. D.Kurz and R. Sturn (eds.), 1s there Progress in Economics? Knowledge, Truth and the History of Economic Thought, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 19. Hosoda, E. (2001). 'Recycling and Landfilling in a Dynamic Sraman Model: Application of the Corn-Guano Model to a Waste Treatment Problem', Metroeconomica, 52(3), pp. 268-81. 20. Roncaglia, A. (1983). 'The Price of Oil', Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 5, pp. 557-78. 21. Roncaglia, A. (1985). The International Oil Market, London: Macmillan. 22. Gibson, B. (1984). 'Profit and Rent in a Classical Theory of Exhaustible and Renewable Resources', Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, 44, pp. 131—49. 23. Pegoretti, G. (1986). Risorse, produzione, distribuzione, Milan: Franco Angeli. 24. Pegoretti, G. (1990). 'Offerta di risorse non riproducibili, scelta della tecnica e struttura produttiva', in A. Quadrio Curzio and R. Scazzieri (eds.), Dinamica economica e strutturale, Bologna: Il Mulino, pp. 81-121. 25. Quadrio Curzio, A. (1983). 'Primary Commodity Prices, Exhaustible Resources and International Monetary Relations: Alternative Explanations', in J. Kregel (ed.), Distribution, Effective Demand and International Economic Relations, London: Macmillan, pp. 142-52. 26. Quadrio Curzio, A. (1986). 'Technological Scarcity: An Essay on Production and Structural Change', in M. Baranzini and R. Scazzieri (eds.), Foundations of Economics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 311-38. Kurz, Heinz D. and Salvadori, Neri. „The 'classical' approach to exhaustible resources. Parrinello and the others.“ In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Parrinello I Sergio Parrinello Exhaustible Natural Resources and the Classical Method of Long-period Equilibrium London: MacMillan 1983 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Exhaustible Resources | Schefold | Kurz I 289 Exhaustible resources/Schefold/Kurz: Bertram Schefold was keen to extend the classical approach to the theory of value and distribution, as it had already been reformulated and generalized earlier by Piero Sraffa (1960)(1), to exhaustible resources (see the collections of essays in Schefold, 1989(2), 1997(3)). A start had been made by Parrinello(1983)(4) and then Schefold, Who opened up a new field of research to those who adopted the approach under consideration and applied it to many questions not dealt with in Sraffa's classic contribution.l These efforts brought about a rich harvest of works, including contributions to the problem of 'wasting assets', as Sraffa called the case of exhaustible resources in the preparatory notes of his book (see Kurz and Salvadori, 2001(5): 290—3). >Hotelling Rule, >Social Goods/Ricardo. Kurz I 309 Schefold (1989)(2) took up Parrinello's invitation to consider the case of exhaustile resources and argued that the theory of such resources 'is of practical relevance only under exceptional circumstances' and concluded 'that the classicists may be excused for having ignored it by subsuming the incomes of mine owners to the general theory of rent' (1989:228)(2). He felt justified in his defence of the classical authors in terms of four sets of facts: (i) the uncertainty concerning the future course of prices; (ii) the unpredictability of the impact of technical progress on the system; (iii) the relatively slow change of the royalty of any one mine; and (iv) the great importance of cost differentials between mines. >Exhaustible resources/Parrinello. 1. Sraffa, P. (1960). Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Schefold, B. (1989). Mr Sraffa on Joint Production and Other Essays, London: Macmillan. 3. Schefold, B. (1997). Normal Prices, Technical Change and Accumulation, London: Macmillan. 4. Parrinello, S. (1983). Exhaustible natural resources and the classical method of long-period equilibrium, in J. Kregel (ed.), Distribution, Effective Demand and International Economic Relations, London: Macmillan, pp 186—99. 5. Kurz, H. D. and Salvadori, N. (2001). Classical economics and the problem of exhaustible resources, Metroeconomica, 52,3:282—96. Kurz, Heinz D. and Salvadori, Neri. „Exhaustible resources, Rents, profits, royalties and prices.“ In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Schefold I Bertram Schefold Normal Prices, Technical Change and Accumulation. London: Macmillan. London 1997 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Existence | Field | I 80 Necessary existence/KantVs/Field: nothing can be negated with all its predicates, and nevertheless leave a contradiction. - (VsOntological proof of God). >Proofs of God's existence. Existence/Field: should not be part of the logic. - Therefore, mathematics cannot be reduced to logic. - Otherwise, too many properties would have to be assumed. >Infinity, >Properties. I 155 Semantic/syntactic/singular Term/Denotation/Ontology/FieldVsWright: it is not built into the syntax that, e.g. The singular term "4" denotes. - (i.e. that the number is an object). Just as little as "God". - So syntax cannot be the criterion for existence. >Syntax, >Semantics, >Proofs, >Criteria, >Singular terms. I 167 Existence/Ontology/FieldVsWright: existence does not follow from "explanation of the term", otherwise God's existence would follow from the explanation of the term "God". >Explanations. Term explanation is only conditionally: "if there is a God, he is omnipotent". Cf. >Omnipotence. Solution: the term-introducing theory must not be true - existence generalization. >Introduction, >Existential generalization. False: from self-identity no existence can be concluded, only in the reverse direction. >Identity, >Self-identity. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Existence | Hacking | I 373 Existence/ontology/Hacking: the Hall effect does not exist independently of the apparatus. Before, there was no such effect. Therefore, we get a confirmation, not only an explanation. >Method, >Confirmation, >Explanation. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Existence | Maturana | I 14 Existence/Maturana: there are two areas: 1. physicality 2. Relations The two do not overlap. I 15 Existence arises only from the operation of distinction by an observer. >Operation/Maturana. I 141 Existence/reality/Maturana: as the only one remains the observer - and he only if he is observed himself. >Ontology, >Observation. I 213 Existence/Maturana: without observers nothing exists - and for the observer everything exists what exists in explanations. >Explanation/Maturana. Nothing is ahead of the distinction of one self - E.g. recognition of mother - E.g. bubble chamber - any distinction specifies a domain of existence - (a verse in the multiverse). >Domains/Maturana. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Existence | Newton | Dennett I 224 World/Existence/Newton was convinced that the nature of the world can not be explained by simple, natural causes and demanded a Creator. >Explanations, >Causes, >Causal explanation, >World, >Properties. |
PhysNewton I Isaac Newton The Principia : Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy Berkeley 1999 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Existence | Russell | Flor III 127 Existence/Russell: the term existence can only be applied usefully to propositional functions. >Propositional function. Def existence/Russell: There is an argument for a certain propositional function, for which it is true. cf. >Quine: to be is to be a value of a bound variable. >Existence/Quine. ((s) Explanation: according to Quine, there are no properties independent of objects. In other words, one must not quantify about properties). >Second order logic, >Schematic letters, >Bound variable. According to Russell, there are only atomic facts and absolutely simple individuals (> Logical atomism). Russell VI 76 Predicate/propositional function/Russell: some predicates, for example existence, can only be attributed to statement functions (or classes), but not to statements: E.g. "People are numerous, therefore Socrates is numerous". - Therefore, you also know that there are people in Timbuktu, without knowing them: the existence theorem is about a class, not individuals. >Description level, >Unit set, >Things/Russell, >Particulars, >Individual/Russell. Tugendhat I 377 Existence/Russell/Tugendhat: Russell interprets the singular predicative statement as an existential proposition and this as a general statement. - That was already anticipated by Kant and Frege. - Then e.g. "The present King of France is bald", etc. is always wrong -> Generality/Russell. Tugendhat II 43 Existence/Russell: one can only talk about existent things - but past and future are also existent. >Time, >Past, >Future. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Existentialism | Beauvoir | Brocker I 300 Existentialism/Beauvoir: "Our perspective is that of existentialist ethics" (1), Beauvoir explains. Freedom and transcendence are the descriptive and normative basic provisions of this ethics. Transcendence refers to the power of human transgression potency towards infinite possibilities of existence. The individual is free in so far as it exists as a design of itself. Brocker I 304 (Context: this is about the gender ratio man/woman and the gender roles, which are analysed against the background of existentialism in the middle of the 20th century): Beauvoir's thesis: The interplay of female self-abandonment and male alienation can be elucidated in terms of its existential philosophical prerequisites, insofar as namely immanence and transcendence, facticity and freedom as basic determinations of human existence stand in an inescapably tense relationship, for "one can never separate the immanent and the transcendent aspect of living experience" (2). See also Transcendence/Existentialism, Immanence/Beauvoir, Gender Roles/Beauvoir. 1. Simone de Beauvoir, Le deuxième sexe, Paris 1949. Dt.: Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht. Sitte und Sexus der Frau, Reinbek 2005 (zuerst 1951), S. 25. 2.Ibid p. 217. Friederike Kuster, „Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht (1949)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Expectations (Economics) | Friedman | Landsburg I 34 Unemployment/expectations/Friedman/Landsburg: In 1958, the economist William Phillips(1) noticed a striking correlation: Times of high inflation are times oflow unemployment, and Vice versa. Over the next decade, the correlation held strong. >Phillips Curve. Inflation: The lesson most economists drew was that policymakers face a trade-off: You can have less unemployment, provided you're willing to tolerate (and even engineer) a bit more inflation. FriedmanVsPhillips: Milton Friedman, almost a Ione voice in the wilderness, begged to differ. (…) it fell to Friedman to remind the world that correlation is not the same as causation. >Causation, >Correlation. Example: a) Suppose you're a carpenter, currently unemployed because your best job offer is $ 500 a week, and you think you'd rather keep searching for something better. Of course if all prices and wages were to double, you'd be offered $ 1,000 a week, but you still wouldn't take it, because the real value of your job offer is unchanged. b) But let's tweak the story a little: Prices double overnight while you're asleep. In the morning, you're awakened by a phone call from an employer offering you $ 1,000 a week. You're delighted, because you're not yet aware that all prices have risen. You accept the job. After a few days, you visit the grocery store, discover the cruel truth that this week's $ 1,000 goes no farther than last week's $ 500, and submit your resignation. >Inflation. (…) it's not too hard to imagine a realistic version in which prices are rising, workers are not fully aware of the changes, and wage offers start to look better than they really are, fooling some people into taking jobs they don't really want, at least until they figure out they've been fooled. Employer: The same story works on the employer's side: You're a bicycle manufacturer, selling bicycles for $200 each. If all prices and all wages double, you'll go on as before, selling them for $400 each. Unless, of course, the doubling happens while you sleep, and you are awakened the next morning by the news that the price of bicycles has doubled, leading you to believe that the demand for bicycles must have mushroomed, and in turn leading you to expand your plant and hire more metalworkers, at least for a while. Eventually, of course, you'll realize that your plant expansion was ill-advised and you might not be needing those extra workers very long. (…) the morals are these: Expectations: Expected changes in inflation have no effect on employment. Unexpected Change: An unexpected increase in inflation can cause a temporary increase in employment - but not a permanent one. Landsburg I 35 Correlations: When there is a series of unexpected increases in inflation, economists (…) might notice that these increases are correlated with employment, but might fail to realize that the correlation will survive only as long as the inflation continues to be unexpected. Inflation: A policymaker who nevertheless wants to use inflation to reduce unemployment has to engineer an inflation that is higher than expected. This is hard to accomplish for very long. Expected prices: If prices rise by 10 percent in each of January, February, and March, people are going to expect them to rise by 10 percent in April as well. So if l want to keep unemployment down, I might need to engineer a 12 percent inflation rate in April, and then 14 percent in May - leading people to expect a 16 percent rate in June. Now I've got to unexpectedly go for 18 percent in June, and this way lies madness. Deception: Even the temporary reductions in unemployment caused by unexpected inflation are not good things. I do you no favour ifl reduce unemployment by fooling you into taking a job you wouldn't have wanted without the deception. >Phillips Curve. FriedmanVsPhillips/FriedmanvsPhillips Curve: Based on a story like this one, Friedman made his famous forecast that any attempt to exploit the Phillips correlation by keeping inflation high for a sustained period would surely fail - contrary to what pretty much everyone else believed at the time.* the 1970s unfolded, with inflation and unemployment both on the rise, Friedman's prediction proved to be spectacularly accurate (…). Landsburg I 40 Natural rate of unemployment/Friedman: Friedman went on to hypothesize that there is a natural rate of unemployment arising from the fact that we live in a changing and uncertain world, where there will always be some people who prefer to be temporarily unemployed in order to search for a better job or go back to school or deal with family emergencies. Any attempt to use inflation to drive unemployment below that natural rate is doomed to fail, at least in the long run, and is probably not doing anyone any favours even during the brief interval in which it appears to succeed.** This natural rate hypothesis is now one of the central tenets of macroeconomics. *One striking exception was Edmund Phelps, another Nobel-Prize-winner-to-be, who was simultaneously constructing a narrative very similar to Friedman's.(2) ** The natural rate can change, and will if someone finds a better way to match workers to jobs or if training programs become more effective. Friedman's point is that you can't change the natural rate of unemployment by changing the money supply. >Money supply/Friedman. 1. Phillips, William. 1958. The Relation Between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957. Economica, Nov. 1958. 2. Phelps, Edmund. (1967). Phillips Curves, Expectations of Inflation and Optimal Unemployment over Time. Economica 1967. |
Econ Fried I Milton Friedman The role of monetary policy 1968 Landsburg I Steven E. Landsburg The Essential Milton Friedman Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2019 |
| Experience | Experience: a) reflected perception, which can be compared with prior perceptions and can be processed linguistically. See also events, perception, sensations, empiricism. b) an event that is processed in the consciousness of a subject. No mere imagination. See also events, imagination, consciousness. |
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| Experience | Bieri | Metzinger I 63 Experiencing/Bieri: sense sensations, colors, sounds, body sensations, moods such as hatred or gaiety, instincts and needs. These states are not only present in us, they "are felt in a certain way". Cf. >D. Chalmers, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Knowing How. The experiences are only as long as they are conscious. There is no pain and no fear left when the sensations have disappeared. Experiences are the same as they appear. Being experienced is something else than thought, believed or judged. That something feels like this or that is something else than that I take it for this or that. >Emotion, >Reflection, >Representation. The physiological process determines the experience, not vice versa. Metzinger I 72 Causality/explanation/Bieri: if we build it purely physiologically, we know how to continue it, that is, always becoming smaller. This is not possible, however, when the explanation begins with an experience. Then we have to switch to the physiological level somewhere. But then we have changed the subject! Metzinger I 72 Experience/Bieri: it is crucial that there is no difference between appearance and reality. It follows that there is no point in assuming that one can find something else, beyond the sensation, about the nature of an experience. And what would it mean if we had assumed that we had not yet discovered the true nature of pain sensation? We know what pain is! Experience in itself is simple, unstructured. (As for our experience page). Now one might assume that the physiological side, which, for example, can be made visible through PET, would lead us to a hidden complexity! Vs: nevertheless, this only leads us back to our simple experience. Experience/Bieri: maybe we have no experience, maybe our experiences are only opinions? In this way one could dissolve the difference between cognitive consciousness and experience. So cognitive structures without an experience content? This would not help us further, because that would be nothing more than a self-model and self-representation. Metzinger I 63 Experiences/Bieri: experience only exists as long as they are conscious - they are just as they appear - that something feels like this or that is something else than that I take it for this or that. Metzinger I 71 Brain/Consciousness/Experience/Bieri: can we not be satisfied with what we have: covariance, dependency, determination? - no, then we do not understand how our experience can be causally effective - there is a complete causal explanation for everything physiological - therefore consciousness seems to have no significance for any causation - our whole behavior might be alienated - this is not to be excluded because of the causal completeness of physiology. Metzinger I 72 (To) experience/experience/Bieri: the decisive factor here is that there is no difference between appearance and reality - so there is no point in assuming that one can also find something else, beyond the sensation, about the nature of an experience. Metzinger I 74 We have no idea what would count as a solution, as understanding. >Models, >Explanation. |
Bieri I Peter Bieri Was macht Bewusstsein zu einem Rätsel? In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Bieri III P. Bieri Analytische Philosophie des Geistes Weinheim 2007 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Experience | Brentano | Chisholm II 229 Experience/Concept/Brentano: if someone has an inner experience, then he has a concept of this experience. E.g. fear of ghosts. >Concept/Brentano. Then he is also in a position to imagine the corresponding vividly. >Imagination. I cannot currently have the fearsome experience, but I can have the disposition to be able to imagine it vividly. --- II 231 If someone judges a concept of inner experience, then he also knows that what he judges is the case. >Judgement/Brentano. Chisholm II = Johann Christian Marek Zum Programm einer Deskriptiven Psychologie in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Experience | Dilthey | Gadamer I 67 Experience/Dilthey/Gadamer: Something becomes an experience, as long as it was not only experienced, but its being experienced had a special emphasis, which gives it lasting meaning. What is in this way one, completely wins a new state of being in the expression of art. Dilthey's famous book title "Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung" (English: "The Experience and Poetry") brings this connection to a catchy formula. Indeed, it was Dilthey who first assigned a conceptual function to the word, which soon became a popular buzzword and was soon to rise to a term of such a plausible concept of value that many European languages have adopted it as a foreign word. Gadamer I 68 Dilthey's Goethe essay allows us (...) to look back (...) into the unconscious prehistory of the word, because this essay is available in the version of 1877(1) and in the later adaptation of "Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung" (1905). In this essay Dilthey compares Goethe with Rousseau, and in order to describe Rousseau's novel poetry from the world of his inner experiences, he uses the expression "the experience". In the paraphrase of a Rousseau text, the phrase "the experiences of earlier days"(2) can be found. DiltheyVsRationalism: The coinage of the word obviously evokes the criticism of the rationalism of the Enlightenment, which in Rousseau's late times emphasized the concept of life. It is probably Rousseau's influence on German Classicism that set the standard for "being experienced" ("Erlebtsein") and thus enabled the formation of the word experience ("Erlebnis").(3) Life/Idealism/Gadamer: The concept of life forms Gadamer I 69 also the metaphysical background that carries the speculative thinking of German idealism, and plays a fundamental role in both Fichte and Hegel, but also in Schleiermacher. In contrast to the abstraction of understanding as well as to the particularity of feeling or imagination, this concept implies the connection to totality, to infinity. Gadamer: This can be clearly heard in the tone that the word experience has had up to the present day. >Experience/Historical Development/Gadamer, >Given/Dilthey. Gadamer I 71 Dilthey/Gadamer: The entities of meaning we encounter in the humanities may be very strange and incomprehensible to us - they can be traced back to the last units of what is given in consciousness, which themselves no longer contain anything foreign, representational or in need of interpretation. They are the units of experience, which are themselves units of sense. Sensation/DiltheyVsMach/DiltheyVsCarnap/Gadamer: [It was of decisive importance (...) for Dilthey's] thinking (...) that as the last unit of consciousness not sensation or feeling is mentioned, as was taken for granted in Kantianism and still in the positivist epistemology of the 19th century up to Ernst Mach, but what Dilthey says for it. He thus limits the constructive ideal of a construction of knowledge from sensation atoms and opposes it with a sharper version of the concept of the given. >Life/Dilthey. Gadamer I 226 Experience/Dilthey/Gadamer: The question is (...) how the experience of the individual and his or her insight can be elevated to historical experience. History is no longer about interrelations that are experienced as such by the individual or are relived as such by others. Dilthey develops how the individual acquires a life context and from there seeks to gain the constitutive terms that are also important for the historical context and his recognition. In contrast to the categories of the knowledge of nature, these concepts are concepts of life. For the last prerequisite for the knowledge of the historical world, in which the identity of consciousness and object, Gadamer I 227 this speculative postulate of idealism, is still a demonstrable reality and is according to Dilthey the experience. Here is immediate certainty. For what is experience is no longer differentiated into an act, such as becoming one, and a content, that which one is becoming(3). It is rather an inner being that cannot be further dissolved. Context/Dilthey: Already in his ideas "on descriptive and dissecting psychology" Dilthey had distinguished the task of deriving "the acquired context of the soul life" from the explanatory forms of the knowledge of nature(4). He had used the term structure in order to distinguish the experience of soul connections from the causal connections of the natural event. The logical characteristic of "structure" was, that here a whole of a relationship is meant, which is not based on the temporal sequence of being achieved, but on inner relationships. >Subject/Dilthey, >Interrelation/Dilthey. 1. Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie, Bd. X; cf. die Anmerkung Diltheys zu »Goethe und die dichterische Phantasie« (Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung, p. 468 ff.). 2. Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung, 6. Aufl., p. 219; cf. Rousseau, Les Confessions, Partie Il, Livre 9. The exact correspondence cannot be proven. Obviously it is not a translation, but a paraphrase of the description to be read in Rousseau's work. 3. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften Vll, 27f.; 230. 4. VII, 13a. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Experience | Lewis | I (a) 8 Experience/Lewis: the defining feature is its >causal role. - These then belong to certain physical states - identity: e.g. the combination of the positions within a lock is identical when the lock is open: they are introspectively perceptible processes or activities, not the alleged intentional objects of which experiences are knowledge. --- V 10 E.g. pain is not the same as the property of feeling pain! "Pain" is a contingent name, that means it and has different denotations in different possible worlds. (Not rigid). >Pain/Lewis. --- I (a) 13 LewisVsBehaviorism: experiences are something real. I (a) 18 They have to be causes and effects - nothing non-physical can be a cause. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Experience | Maturana | I 216 Experience / Maturana: all dimensions in the range of experiences exist in the language, i.e. as coordination of actions between observers. >Observation/Maturana, >Language, >Language and thought, >Thinking without language, >Thinking/Maturana. I 228 Experience / Maturana: primarily compared to explanation - all experience comes from nowhere - e.g. a car that passed us - Understanding: always happens in practice. >Understanding. I 311 Life practice and experience just happen. Explanations are superfluous. >Explanation/Maturana. I 352 Experience/Maturana: is content-free. In our experience, we encounter not things, not objects nor nature. We live in the experience of life practice as something that we produce ourselves at any moment. Cf. >language/Maturana, >Content. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Experience | Peacocke | I 5 Perception/experience/tradition/Peacocke: experience has a content. >Empirical content, >Content On the other hand: Feeling/sensations/tradition: sensation has no content. - E.g. sensation of smallness. It may nevertheless be a certain sensation. >Knowledge, >Thinking, >World/Thinking, >Distinctions. I 16f Experience/PeacockeVsPerception Theory/Tradition: more than just perception: emotional content, not merely representative content: e.g. tilted cube: jumps over, the network of lines looks completely different (perception). On the other hand: e.g. rabbit-duck-head: the line web does not change, therefore the perception theorist could claim that there are two representational components: a) the lines, b) Rabbit/duck >Rabbit-duck-head, >Perception theory/Peacocke. Perception theory: translation variant: the missing property must be introduced in suitable statements. PeacockeVs: this would only provide a priori knowledge, not empirical knowledge, since the postulated type of experience could not be missing. - Vs added terms: these do not have to be available to the clueless, so they do not change the truth or falsity. >Overdetermination of the representational content. Overdetermined: the angle could be changed by appropriate overlapping without changing the picture. I 199 Experience/Peacocke: also non-inferential experience is possible. Doubts: are inferential, always from conclusion. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Experience | Peirce | Rorty VI 419 Experience/Peirce: "All of our minds are just pieced together from experience where all of our ideas are no more than ideas or transposed experience.". Rorty: Thus he anticipated the best philosophical minds of his time. >Mind, >Empiricism, >Spirit, >Creativity, >Ideas, cf. >Imagination. |
Peir I Ch. S. Peirce Philosophical Writings 2011 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Experience | Say | Rothbard II 15 Experience/learning/Say/Rothbard: Say(1) (…) brilliantly points out why it is impossible for peoples or nations to ‘learn from experience’ and to adopt or discard theories correctly on that basis. Since the early modern era, he notes, wealth and prosperity have increased in western Europe, while at the same time nation-states have compounded restrictions of trade and multiplied the interference of taxation. Most people then superficially conclude that the latter caused the former, that trade and production increased as a result of the interference of government. On the other hand, Say and the political economists argue the reverse, that ‘the prosperity of the same countries would have been much greater, had they been governed by a more liberal and enlightened policy’. How can facts or experience decide between these two clashing interpretations? The answer is that they cannot; that only correct theory, theory deducible from a few universal general facts or principles, can do so. And that is why, notes Say, ‘nations seldom derive any benefit from the lessons of experience’. 1. Say, J.-B. 1803. Traité d'économie politique ou simple exposition de la manière dont se forment, se distribuent et se composent les richesses.translated into English as A Treatise on Political Economy (ed. Clement C. Biddle, 6th Amer. ed., 1834, New York: A. M. Kelley, 1964), based on the final fifth French edition of 1826. |
EconSay I Jean-Baptiste Say Traité d’ Economie Politique Paris 1803 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Experience | Schleiermacher | Gadamer I 69 Experience/Life/Schleiermacher/Gadamer: Of course, the word cannot be found in Schleiermacher yet, and as it seems, not even the word "experience". But there is no lack of synonyms that occupy the circle of meaning of experience(1), and the pantheistic background is always clearly visible. Each act remains connected as a moment of life to the infinity of life that manifests itself in it. Everything finite is expression, representation of the infinite. >Experience/Gadamer, >Experience/Dilthey. 1. Act of life, act of communal being, moment, own feeling, sensation, influence, impulse as free self-determination of the mind, the originally inner, excitement etc. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Experience | Sellars | McDowell I 163 Experience/Sellars/McDowell: experience is not possible without concepts that play a role in the system of beliefs. What we regard as the message of experience, is already a part and no external constraint of the system. >Concepts/Sellars, >Consciousness/Sellars. Experience/experience history/Sellars: experience history not the result of impressions, but of phenomena. Phenomena/Sellars: phenomena are conceptually (in order to establish them in a rational relationship to beliefs). >Beliefs/Sellars. --- I XXXVIII Sellars: Three possible experiences: 1. This is a red object, 2. The object appears to be red (maybe it is white in red light). 3. It looks like it would be an object. (Also hallucination is possible). >Appearance/Sellars. One might assume that they cherish the same thought in all three cases, but obtain a new setting every time towards this thought. (Reductive-materialistic: Armstrong, Dennett). Ambiguity: process or result of process: experience, activities, non-descriptive content - experience object. I 44 Fact/Sellars: the fact that something seems to be red over there, is not experiencing. (Although it is a fact, of course.) >Appearance. But that does not mean that the common descriptive core might be perhaps experiencing. Facts: are experienced but are not experiencing. And also no experience. Experience: we need a name for the experience, which is not only an abbreviation for a description. Does the everyday language have such names? I 44 Experience/Sellars: ambiguity: experiencing: activity, non-descriptive content - experience object: the fact that something over there this seems to be red, is not experiencing. -However: the common descriptive core can be an experiencing - facts: are experienced, but are not an experiencing- and no experience. I 45 Experience/Sellars: Problem: sensation always seems to presuppose an object. - Possible solution: should we align sensations and propositional attitudes? >Sensations. - "Vs: this is the approximation leading to Locke/Descartes - Descartes/Locke: sensations on a stage with ideas. - SellarsVs. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Experience | Simmel | Gadamer I 74 Experience/Life/Simmel/Gadamer: If one examines (...) the more precise definition of what (...) life means and what is effective in the concept of experience, it becomes clear that the relationship between life and experience is not that of a general to a particular. The unity of experience, determined by its intentional content, is rather in a direct relationship to the whole, to the totality of life. >Experience/Natorp. Simmel/Gadamer: It was above all Georg Simmel who analyzed the concept of life as the "reaching out of life beyond oneself"(1) in this aspect. The representation of the whole in the momentary experience obviously goes far beyond the fact of its determination by its object. Gadamer I 75 Every experience is, according to Schleiermacher, "a moment of infinite life"(2). Georg Simmel, who not only accompanies the rise of the word to a buzzword, but also shares the responsibility for it, sees the distinguishing feature of the concept of experience in the fact that "the objective becomes not only, as in cognition, an image and imagination, but moments of the process of life itself"(3). He points out that every experience has something of an adventure(4). But what is an adventure? Gadamer: The adventurer (...) ventures out into the unknown. 1. Georg Simmel, Lebensanschauung, 2. Aufl. 1922, p. 13; (cf. p. 247 ff.). 2. F. Schleiermacher, Über die Religion, II. Abschnitt. 3. Georg Simmel, Brücke und Tür, ed. Landmann, 1957, p. 8. 4. Vgl. Simmel, Philosophische Kultur. Gesammelte Essays 1911, p. 11—28. |
Simmel I G. Simmel Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie: Eine erkenntnistheoretische Studie Boston 2002 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Experience | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 342 Private experiences/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: from Wittgenstein does not follow that there are no private experiences - HintikkaVsAnscombe - Wittgenstein: the essence of private experience is that everyone has his own - but that he does not know whether the other has the same - > Beetle-example: see "privileged access".) II 82 Experience/Wittgenstein: is not differentiated by predicates from what is not experience - it is a logical term - not a term such as "chair" or "table". II 101 Experience/causality/cause/border/Wittgenstein: one can get to all causal laws by experience - that is why we cannot find out what the cause is for the experience - if one provide a scientific explanation, one in turn describes an experience - therefore, no sentence can deal with the cause of >sense data. II 261 Experience/rule/Wittgenstein: both is easily confused: experience: that this is blue because - matches the pattern. - In contrast rule: the statement that both match, is a rule that I set up. --- IV 87 Experience/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: (according to 5552) shows the "how", not the "what" - 5634 no part of our experience is also a priori. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Experimental Economics | Economic Theories | Parisi I 78 Experimental economics/Economic theories/Sullivan/Holt: [there is an] increasingly frequent interaction between two literatures: experimental economics and law and economics. In many ways, these literatures developed as siblings during the heady period of economic research spanning the 1960s and early 1970s. At about the same time that Ronald Coase (1960)(1), Guido Calabresi (1961)(2), and Gary Becker (1968)(3) were authoring seminal papers in the modern law-and-economics movement, acceleration of the experimental economics literature was under way with Vernon Smith’s (1962)(13) experimental challenge to the established notion that theories of efficient, perfect competition were only relevant in idealized settings with large numbers of well-informed traders. Vernon Smith: Smith’s approach to studying market equilibrium was to create a market for an artificial commodity. Adaptations of the experimental approach to other settings quickly followed, eventually bleeding into the also-expanding literature of law and economics. >Experimental economics/Vernon Smith, >Law and Economics/Sullivan/Holt. Parisi I 79 Methodology: (... )the design and implementation of controlled experiments is about as fundamental to scientific inquiry as anything could be. Parisi I 80 Another intuitive use of experiments is as part of a more open-ended search for practical solutions to a novel problem. This is often the case in experiments designed for engineering applications. Economists use experiments in much the same ways as physicists or engineers. Preconditions/hypotheses: Economic theories are typically based on strong assumptions about rationality and foresight, and evaluated on the basis of elegance, sharpness of prediction, and consistency with basic intuition. Idealization/context: features of context, interpersonal frictions, and institutional detail are frequently omitted to achieve greater tractability and generality. Experiments: The resulting theories cry out for experimental tests, where differences in individual personality traits and propensities, limitations in attention and foresight, and other details too intricate to measure or model formally can be accounted for using random assignment and other experimental controls. Example: consider the question whether a cap on damages reduces the frequency of tort suits.* Randomization: randomization or careful selection algorithms could be used to partition the members of society into two identical (or at least nearly identical) groups: one group would remain under the status quo liability rules, while the other would be subject to a cap on damages. With absolutely nothing else changed, the researcher Parisi I 81 could collect data for a few months, and then compare the rates of tort suits in the two groups to see what causal effect the cap on damages had on the outcome of interest. Comparison/control: the researcher exploits control over the experimental environment to apply some treatment to only one of two otherwise identical groups of subjects. Subjects in the experiment then interact according to their normal self-interests, but those in the treatment group act under a slightly different set of rules than those in the control group. The experimenter measures observed behavior in both the treatment and control groups, and any difference in behavior reflects the causal treatment effect of interest.** Experiments without control group: (...) economic experiments are sometimes designed simply to measure and document how subjects behave in a given market structure or incentive environment without reference to any control group. Examples include experiments that test the efficiency of an auction structure, such as an innovative proposal to allow bidding for combinations of spectrum licenses in a way that protects firms from overpaying for pieces of a fragmented network.*** Variations: (...) economic experiments can also be structured to consider a range of treatment effects. An example is an experimental study of equilibrium price formation in a homogenous-good oligopoly as the number of producers drops from five, to four, to three, to two (e.g. Huck, Normann, and Oechssler, 2004(11); Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000(12)). In every case, the conceptual framework of the economics experiment is the same as that of experiments in any other field of science. Induced value theory: >Induced value theory/Economic theories. Experiments/methods: See >Experiments/Experimental economics, >Settlement Bargaining/Experimental conomics. * For economic experiments on the effect of damages caps on the rate of settlement, see Babcock and Pogarsky (1999)(4) and Pogarsky and Babcock (2001)(5). ** For broad surveys of various experimental designs in economics, see Davis and Holt (1993)(6), Kagel and Roth (1995)(7), and Holt (2007)(7). For a practical approach to experimental design for economists, see Friedman and Sunder (1994)(8). *** See Goeree and Holt (2010)(10) for a set of experiments used by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission to design and implement a major auction for spectrum licenses for the provision of wireless communications services in a geographic network. Even this paper, however, had a control treatment without package bidding opportunities, which showed problems that could arise if bidders were not permitted to submit "all or nothing" bids for combinations of licenses. 1. Coase, R. H. (1960). “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1–44. 2. Calabresi, G. (1961). “Some Thoughts on Risk Distributions and the Law of Torts.” Yale Law Journal 70(4): 499–553. 3. Becker, G. S. (1968). “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 76(2): 169–217. 4. Babcock, L. and G. Pogarsky (1999). “Damage Caps and Settlement: a Behavioral Approach.” Journal of Legal Studies 28(2): 341–370. 5. Pogarsky, G. and L. Babcock (2001). “Damage Caps, Motivated Anchoring, and Bargaining Impasse.” Journal of Legal Studies 30(1): 143–159. 6. Davis, D. D. and C. A. Holt (1993). Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 7. Kagel, J. H. and A. E. Roth, eds. (1995). Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 8. Holt, C. A. (2007). Markets, Games, & Strategic Behavior. Boston, MA: Pearson Education, Inc. 9. Friedman, D. and S. Sunder (1994). Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists. New York: Cambridge University Press. 10. Goeree, J. K. and C. A. Holt (2010). “Hierarchical Package Bidding: A Paper & Pencil Combinatorial Auction.” Games and Economic Behavior 70: 146–169. 11. Huck, S., H.-T. Normann, and J. Oechssler (2004). “Two Are Few and Four Are Many: Number Effects in Experimental Oligopolies.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 53(4): 435–446. 12.Dufwenberg, M. and U. Gneezy (2000). “Price Competition and Market Concentration: An Experimental Study.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 18: 7–22. 13. Smith, V. L. (1962). “An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior.” Journal of Political Economy 70(2): 111–137. Sullivan, Sean P. and Charles A. Holt. „Experimental Economics and the Law“ In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Experiments | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 19 Experiments/Developmental psychology/Upton: Dependent variable (DV): the variable of interest. It can be measured when the researcher sets up two or more situations in which this variable can be compared. Independent variable (IV): the conditions can vary only in terms of the variable whose effect is being tested. Causal relationship: in order to test the predicted causal relationship, all other factors that may affect the DV have to be controlled. ((s) For problems in relation to causality and causal explanations see >Causality/Philosophical theories; >Causal explanation/Philosophical theories. Between-group design: compares groups under different conditions. Participants would then be allocated to one of the two study groups using either random sampling or a matched design. With random sampling it is assumed that there is no systematic difference between the two groups. Within-group design: all participants experience the same conditions. This method avoids the need to assume that the different groups are equivalent because everyone experiences everything. VsWithin-group design: Problem: limitations. The researcher has to ensure that the results are not due to participant fatigue or practice when they experience the second condition. Counterbalancing/Solution: One way to control for this is to have half of the group experience the conditions in one order and the other half experience them in the reverse order. This is known as counterbalancing. VsCounterbalancing: Problem: Using a within-group comparison is not always possible. For example, how would we know if it was the [first condition] that had influenced the [resulting] patterns if all [participants] experienced both conditions? VsCausality approach: Problem: One possibility is that the researcher’s choice of factors to control was wrong. There may be other variables that had an influence on the results but were overlooked. Confounding variable: overlooked. If one of these systematically biases the results it is called a confounding variable. This could prevent the researcher from obtaining valid results. Upton I 20 Correlational studies: look for a relationship between variables rather than seeking to establish cause and effect. ((s) These studies use existing empirical material.) |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Experiments | Duhem | I XIII Experiment/Duhem: The experimenter does not merely read the instruments, he uses the instruments. The following are required: 1.Theory about the domain in which measurements are made. 2.Theory of used measuring instruments. In every device there are systematic errors, the experimenter knows that. Duhem: the Ex works constantly with two devices: the concrete measuring device and an ideal structure for which the physical laws "exactly" apply. Between the phenomena ascertained in the experiment and the result of the experiment formulated by the physicist is a complex translation process. The facts which the experimenter determines are already "theoretical facts". The experimenter must always use theories for his work. The results are only useful for other physicists, if it is know which theories he has used. And whether corrections were already made. >Method. I XII An experimentum crucis (whose failure would disprove the whole theory) is rejected. (> Holism). I XXVI VsExperimentum crucis: (for example, by Quine, 1951, as the main attack against logical empiricism: Holistic view of science.) No experiment can show where the fault is located in the system. The examination of a particular hypothesis is only possible by using a whole group of further laws, ultimately the whole theory. Since Bacon, hope was linked to an experimentum crucis: a decision-making experiment between competing theories. E.g. Foucault's attempt to decide between Newton's theory of emission of light and Huygens' undulation theory sees Duhem as an experiment of the experimentum crucis. Foucault was able to show that light actually spreads slower in water, which made Newton look refuted. Duhem shows that this conclusion is not valid. The error could be in a secondary hypothesis. I 189 Experiment/Duhem: disintegrates into two parts. I 190 1. Observation of certain facts. For this, the knowledge of physics is not necessary at all. 2. Interpretation of the observed facts. For this you have to know the physics. The physicist does not write in his protocol that the instrument has indicated a certain stroke, he notes that the gas has reached a certain volume. What are the size of the volume, the temperature, the pressure? Three concrete objects? No, there are three abstract symbols that connect physical theory with facts. I 192 Definition experiment: accurate observation of a group of phenomena, plus interpretation of them. This interpretation replaces the concrete given with the help of the observation of actual ones obtained by abstract and symbolic representations which agree with them on the basis of the theories which the observer accepts as permissible. I 193 Experiment: The result is the establishment of a relationship between different concrete facts. A certain fact was artificially produced, another stems from it. I 210 Experiment/Duhem: We must know the theories that the physicist considers valid. During the experiment, the physicist continued to operate two apparatuses side by side: the actual measuring apparatus and the ideal one defined by mathematical formulas and symbols. I 215 The result of a physical experiment has not a security of the same level as a fact, established by non-scientific methods, from a healthy person by simple observation. The experiment is less direct and more dependent on a whole group of theories. I 273 Experiment/Duhem: The experiment is not the basis of theory, but the highlight. The totality of the theorems gives an ever more similar picture of the totality of the experimental facts. >Theories, >Facts. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Experiments | Dupré | Perler I 298 Experiment/Research/Language/Animal/Interpretation/Dupré: it is disputed whether the monkeys A) are only simply conditioned a la skinner, so that they produce desired results. That is, the monkey does essentially the same as the rat which is pushing a lever. ((s): This could just as well be interpreted as symbol use?). That is, it is claimed that the monkey does not know that a character (used by him) means e.g. "Banana". Then the sign "Give me a banana" would be the same as shaking the tree, so that some fall down. B) Actual use of symbols. This does not have to mean yet that the monkeys have all the abilities that we have in this context. >Animals, >Animal language. I 299 E.g., monkeys can learn to produce utterances that are suitable for different foods. But they do not seem to be able to answer when they are to sort out these objects! A similar separation of production and reception has been established in children. However, this is just the exception, most monkeys can very well generalize. For example, a gorilla from Patterson can supposedly report from the past and utter threats as well as insults: e.g. death: "Pleasant, Heia, Nest" "When gorillas die?" "Problem old". Dupré: these are certainly more than conditioned reflexes. >Conditioning. I 300 Experiment/Research/Language/Animal/Interpretation/Dupré: A) sign language: Gardners, Terrace, Patterson, Fouts: Level of communication as high as possible. Communicative intention exceeds "literal" interpretation. B) Artificial Languages: Premack, Rumbaugh: Possibility to gain clean data has priority. Possible behavior is narrowly limited. Therefore there are only a few characters. >Gestures. Dupré: this dichotomy is actually a caricature: for the representatives of b), on the one hand, criticize the affective connections, and grant particular importance to spontaneous utterances. On the other hand, the representatives of a) are strict with the tests. I 308 Double blind test: even the observer does not know the correct answer. I 309 Dupré: but also here the desired answer can be suggested, if the blind observer wants to figure out what the animal "means". Method/Ockham's razor/animal/experiment/Dupré: commitment to economical explanation: curtails the allegations of the monkey researchers allegedly in two directions: 1. If there is a channel through which the observer might have given the monkey a correct answer,... I 310 ...then we assume that the assumption that exactly this happened is more economical than the one that the monkey has shown an ability. 2. Ockham's razor is mostly directed against the assumption of creative linguistic usage in monkeys. Adoption of an error is more economical. I 311 DupréVsOckham: Economy is hardly an objective, theory-independent concept. Why is it more economical to adopt a complex and hidden communication channel than to assume that the monkey knows what it is doing? "Kluger Hans"/Dupré: also shows that there is a high degree of communication between humans and animals. ((s) This can also be called "sign use", if the animal obviously understands it correctly.) I 312 Typically occurs in activities where there are correct or incorrect answers. N.B.: these are, ironically, precisely the experiments that are supposed to provide unique data. But if the monkey produces new, unexpected utterances, then the criticism cannot work. Ironically, it is precisely the stereotypical reactions that are suspected of being manipulated. >Stereotypes, >Manipulation. I 313 Method/primate research/Dupré: perhaps these standards of animal research are just not appropriate. John Dupré, 1991. "Conversation with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of language". In: Investigating Psychology, Science of Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (ed.) London, New York: Routledge |
Dupré I John Dupré "Conversations with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of Language", in: Investigating Psychology. Sciences of the Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (Ed) London/New York 1991, pp. 95-116 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Perler I Dominik Perler Markus Wild Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 |
| Experiments | Experimental Economics | Parisi I 82 Experiments/Experimental economics/Sullivan/Holt: The capacity to study economic experiments at different scales of observation provides the researcher with a powerful analytical tool. Scaled observation: One way to interpret the different scales of observation is to consider the different uses of experiments for thinking inside and outside the box. A researcher uses economic experiments to look inside the box when value induction, control over institutional structure, and low-level measurement of behavior are used to study concepts not readily observable in the outside world. Another way experiments are used to look inside the box is in the study of activities that are difficult to observe outside the laboratory. Examples include price collusion (because it is illegal) or strategic discussions of bidding strategies (because they are often based on proprietary ideas and information). Parisi I 83 Neuroeconomic experiments: Deeper yet, neuroeconomic experiments measure brain activity in precise spatial and temporal dimensions in order to explore low-level properties of the decision-making process. Cooperators, for example, tend to show greater activity in areas of the brain associated with social situations and visualization than is the case for people who choose self-serving options in experimental trust games (McCabe et al., 2001)(1). Bargaining: In bargaining experiments, areas of the brain associated with emotion are strongly activated when inequitable offers are received, and these areas again activate when such offers are rejected (Sanfey et al., 2003)(2).* Macro scale: at a more macro scale of observation, economic experiments can be used to think outside the box by considering rules and policies that have yet to be implemented. This approach to experimentation has been particularly fruitful in guiding the design of new types of auctions for fishing rights, emissions permits, or combinations of frequency bands in spectrum auctions. >Auctions/Holt. Policies: On the policy side, a relevant example is the use of experimental control to evaluate proposed (but not yet implemented) changes in litigation procedures designed to promote the early settlements of tort claims (Sullivan, 2011)(4). ((s) Cf. >Information/Arrow, >Information economics/Akerlof.) Causality/causal inference: (...) instead of conducting experiments with hundreds of subjects who interact with each other in one large group, most researchers break experiments into separate groups or sessions conducted with smaller subsets of the subject population. Within a session, decision-making and interaction opportunities are often repeated over many rounds. Legal scenarios: (...) many legal scenarios may be better viewed as single-round experiences without opportunities for repeated interaction between individuals. Parisi I 84 Problems: (...) behavior in later stages of a decision process may be affected by the outcomes of random events observed earlier. To a lesser extent, this same concern afflicts observations averaged at the round level, because multi-round experiments leave open the possibility that observed behavior will be affected by experience in prior rounds. Example: A person who encounters cooperative partners in a series of >prisoner’s dilemma games, for example, would presumably be more likely to cooperate in later rounds of the same experiment; “defection” is likewise highly contagious in a series of prisoner’s dilemma pairings.** For experiments on legal institutions: >Settlement bargaining/Experimental economics; for in-court-bargaining see >Jurisdiction/Experimental economics. * See Chorvat, McCabe, and Smith (2005)(3) for a thoughtful discussion of the implications of neuroeconomics for traditional areas of law and economics scholarship. ** For a survey of prisoner's dilemma experiments in which people can choose who to be paired with and who to avoid, see Holt, Johnson, and Schmidtz (2015)(5). 1. McCabe, K., D. Houser, L. Ryan, V. Smith, and T. Trouard (2001). “A functional imaging study of cooperation in two-person reciprocal exchange.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 98(20): 11832–11835. 2. Sanfey, A. G., J. K. Rilling, J. A. Aronson, L. E. Nystrom, and J. D. Cohen (2003). “The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game.” Science 300(5626): 1755–1758. 3. Chorvat, T. K. McCabe, and V. Smith (2005). “Law and neuroeconomics.” Supreme Court Economic Review 13: 35–62. 4. Sullivan, S. P. (2011). An Experimental Study of Settlement Delay in Pretrial Bargaining with Asymmetric Information. Dissertation: University of Virginia, UMI Pub. No. 3501713. 5.Holt, C. A., C. Johnson, and D. Schmidtz (2015). “Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiments,” in M. Peterson, ed., The Prisoner’s Dilemma, 243–246. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sullivan, Sean P. and Charles A. Holt. „Experimental Economics and the Law“ In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. Parisi I 93 Experiments/Experimental economics/Sullivan/Holt: [an] observation in economics experiments is the general inability of informed subjects to introspectively reproduce the judgments of relatively uninformed subjects, even when incentivized to do so - a phenomenon termed the curse of knowledge (Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber, 1989(1)). Hindsight bias/experiments: Unfortunately, substantial experimental evidence indicates that people are not very good at this type of ex post assessment of ex ante probabilities. A particularly uncomfortable problem is hindsight bias - the tendency of people who observe the outcome of a random event to overstate the ex ante probability of that outcome’s occurrence (Fischhoff, 1975(2); Slovic and Fischhoff, 1977(3)). Information asymmetry/introspection: A closely related observation in economics experiments is the general inability of informed subjects to introspectively reproduce the judgments of relatively uninformed subjects, even when incentivized to do so - a phenomenon termed the curse of knowledge (Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber, 1989(1)). a) One way to interpret these results is as a fundamental strike against the validity of culpability determinations under the negligence standard: even the most well-intentioned jurors will be structurally biased toward overstating the dangerousness of the defendant’s conduct, all else equal. b) Alternatively, and more constructively, economic experiments could be seen as a tool for understanding and remedying judgment biases that undermine the standard. Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber (1989)(1), for example, find that participation in a market structure helps to partially reduce the curse of knowledge. Whether jury deliberation performs a similar function is an open empirical question. Similarly, a recent economic experiment by Wu et al. (2012)(4) suggests that providing informed Parisi I 94 subjects with specific details about the evaluative process used by an uninformed subject may help to substantially reduce hindsight bias when the informed subject attempts to assess the judgment of the uninformed subject. Hindsight bias: (...) the influence of hindsight bias on fact-finding is not limited to actions in negligence. Mandel (2006)(5) considers hindsight bias in patent applications, for example, but the problem should be expected to arise generically whenever the fact-finder is required to consider the ex ante probability of an ex post known outcome. Baysian updating: (...) hindsight bias is not the only judgment bias implicating probability determinations under the negligence standard (see e.g. Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982)(6). Experimental evidence of the difficulty of Bayesian updating (Grether 1992(7); see also Koehler and Kaye, 1991(8)) and possible workarounds (e.g. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995(9)) are particularly on-point. 1. Camerer, C., G. Loewenstein, and M. Weber (1989). “The curse of knowledge in economic settings: An experimental analysis.” Journal of Political Economy 97(5): 1232–1254. 2. Fischhoff, B. F. (1975). “Hindsight ≠ Foresight: the Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment under Uncertainty.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 1(3): 288–299. 3. Slovic, P. and B. Fischhoff (1977). “On the Psychology of Experimental Surprises.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 3(4): 544–551. 4. Wu, D. A., S. Shimojo, S. W. Wang, and C. F. Camerer (2012). “Shared visual attention reduces hindsight bias.” Psychological Science 23(12): 1524–1533. 5. Mandel, G. N. (2006). “Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration That the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational.” Ohio State Law Journal 67: 1391–1463. 6. Kahneman, D., P. Slovic, and A. Tversky (1982). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7. Grether, D. M. (1992). “Testing Bayes Rule and the Representativeness Heuristic: Some Experimental Evidence.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 17(1): 31–57. 8. Koehler, J. J. and D. H. Kaye (1991). “Can Jurors Understand Probabilistic Evidence?” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A 154(1): 75–81. 9. Gigerenzer, G. and U. Hoffrage (1995). “How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning Without Instruction: Frequency Formats.” Psychological Review 102(4): 684–704. Sullivan, Sean P. and Charles A. Holt. „Experimental Economics and the Law“ In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Experiments | Festinger | Haslam I 49 Experiment/Festinger/Carlsmith: Festinger and Carlsmith (1959(1): The method they created became the model for research for the next several decades. >Milgram-Experiment. Its rigour and control were matched by its creativity. Indeed arguably, this study became as famous for its ingenious methodology as it did for the findings it produced. A new attitude had to be created in the laboratory. They invented a task for students to perform and made sure that it would be perceived as truly dull and boring by anyone who performed it. That would constitute the attitude that participants would subsequently contradict by their verbal statements. Haslam I 50 Experiment: The experimenter tells the participants. The real purpose of the study, (…) is to see how expectations affect performance on simple, manual tasks. He explains that half of the people who participate are actually in an experimental group. He double-checks with you. He confesses that what he is really testing is whether people who expect the study to be fun perform differently from people – like you – who had no expectation. You had no way to know this, but nothing the experimenter has told you so far was true. The individual participants were pretended to be initiates who, for once, were supposed to convince the other participants of the interesting nature of the experiment. The experimenter offered the participant $1 for talking with the next person or $20, depending on the condition to which [she] had been randomly assigned [as a control person]. Haslam I 51 However, the next “candidate” in the waiting room is no candidate but the experimenter’s paid confederate. She listens to the lie about a supposedly interesting task and then disappears into the examination room. Dissonance: [The] prediction was that the behaviour (i.e., making the statement to the waiting participant that the task was fun) that was discrepant from the attitude (i.e., that the task was dull and boring) would create dissonance. The uncomfortable tension state of dissonance would lead to a change in attitude to bring it in line with the behaviour, but the amount of dissonance would be opposite to the size of the incentive: the higher the incentive for making the statement, the lower the dissonance. Festinger and Carlsmith predicted that participants would therefore express more positive attitudes towards the measures of performance task if they had been paid a trivial amount rather than a large amount for their statement. Measurement: One more ruse was necessary to measure the participant’s attitudes. They were asked to sign some papers at the department’s secretary’s office. The secretary explained that the Psychology Department was conducting a survey about how students enjoyed the tasks they had performed in psychology experiments. The students were asked a series of questions about how interesting the tasks were and how much they enjoyed them. Results: Control participants constituted a group of randomly assigned participants who merely performed the peg-turning task without being asked to make any counter-attitudinal statement. As expected, they expressed boredom with the task and had no interest in doing it again. However, also as predicted, making a statement that was discrepant from their attitude caused participants to change their attitudes to match their behaviour, but only when the incentive for doing so was very low. When participants made the very same statement but received a large financial reward for doing so, the statement produced no effect whatsoever on their attitudes. They held firm to their attitude that the [task] was indeed a boring task. Apparently, and as predicted, dissonance was minimal when there was a large incentive to speak against one’s attitude, but was maximal when the incentive was trivially small. >Dissonance theory/psychological theories. 1. Festinger, L. and Carlsmith, J.M. (1959) ‘Cognitive consequences of forced compliance’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58: 203–10. Joel Cooper, “Cognitive Dissonance. Revisiting Festinger’s End of the World study”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Experiments | Vollmer | II 107 Thought experiment/Vollmer: main task: not illustrative, but case study. Experiences are not clear, but first constructed. >Thought experiments, >Experience, >Knowledge, >Learning, >Imagination. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Explanation | Explanation: making a statement in relation to an event, a state, a change or an action that was described before by a deviating statement. The statement will often try to involve circumstances, history, logical premises, causes and causality. See also description, statements, theories, understanding, literal truth, best explanation, causality, cause, completeness. |
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| Explanation | Anscombe | Frank I 95 I/Explanation/Anscombe: since "I" cannot be aligned to any pronoun, we might ask: "Why align it at all?" (Bishop Butler): "Every thing is what it is and not another thing!" AnscombeVs: then nothing is said with "Every word is what it is." >Self-identity, >Identity, >Predication, >Statements. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Explanation | Aristotle | Wright I 17 Explanation/Aristotle/Galilei/Wright, G. H.: the difference between what is described as an explanation in the Aristotelian (teleological, purpose-oriented) or Galilean (causal or cause-oriented) tradition is not so much a difference in historical order as it is rather representing temporally coinciding groups of different theoretical views. >Teleology, >Causality. Wright I 151 Sources: the loci classici are Galileis Dialoghi sui massimi sistemi tolemaico e copernicano, 1628 or Discorsi e dimonstrazioni matematiche intorno a due nuove scienze, 1638. K. Lewin: „Der Übergang von der aristotelischen zur galileischen Denkweise in Biologie und Psychologie“, Erkenntnis 1 1930/31: According to Lewin it is not about personal nuances, but massive differences in the way of thinking that were decisive for actual research (...). |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Explanation | Armstrong | III 40 Explanation/Armstrong: a fact cannot be used to explain itself. - If a law actually exists, then an appeal to the law is a good explanation. - Explanation does not provide "good reasons": E.g. Smoke is a good reason to expect fire, but does not explain the fire. >Facts/Armstrong. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Explanation | Barrow | I 229 Explanation/computers/description/purpose/Barrow: A computer is only fully described, if the purpose of its program is set out. >Software, >Computers, >Computer programs, >Description. Forerunner of this view: Kant emphasized the role of deliberate action in the life of living beings as a necessary part of any complete description of their behavior. >Intentions, >Intentionality, >Actions, >Behavior. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Explanation | Bateson | I 81 Explanation/Bateson: Explanation principles should not be propagated without necessity. One should not assume two Black Boxes (e.g. two instincts) if you get along with one Black Box. >Method, >Theories, >Black Box, >Principles, cf. >Causal explanation. |
Bt I G. Bateson Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology, San Francisco 1972 German Edition: Ökologie des Geistes. Anthropologische, psychologische, biologische und epistemologische Perspektiven Frankfurt 1985 |
| Explanation | Bieri | I 72 Causality/explanation/Bieri: if we build it purely physiologically, we know how to continue it, that is, always becoming more detailed. >Fine-grained/coarse-grained, >Causality. This is not possible, however, when the explanation begins with an experience. Then we have to change somewhere on the physiological level. But then we have changed the subject! >Experiences. I 74 Explanation/Bieri: always means revealing a certain kind of relationship. >Consciousness/Bieri, >Consciousness/Chalmers. |
Bieri I Peter Bieri Was macht Bewusstsein zu einem Rätsel? In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Bieri III P. Bieri Analytische Philosophie des Geistes Weinheim 2007 |
| Explanation | Bigelow | I 274 Modality/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the explanation of the modalities, the causation can now enter as a local feature. Best in the semantics of possible worlds. >Modalities, >Causation, >Possible worlds, >Semantics of possible worlds. I 275 Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: is always an input for an explanation, never an output. >Causal relationship, >Probability. Probabilistic Theory/Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: it shows that it is misguided to use causation as an undefined concept. Causation rather longs for explanation. We need to find out more about the causal relation. And the probabilistic theory contributes to this. BigelowVsProbabilistic theory: however, it combines causation too closely with modal terms and reverses the priorities. Pro: Nevertheless, there are often connections between causation and modality. Modality/explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: the explanation is based on the causation of modality. But causation cannot be taken as an unexplained basic concept. >Basic concepts. I 286 Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: its explanation creates four problems: I 287 1. Macroscopic forces: how plausible is it that they supervene on fundamental forces, and thus on basic physical causes? >Supervenience. 2. How can we justify the choice of forces instead of other physical ingredients? >Forces 3. How do we explain the connection between causation and different modal terms? 4. Forces and causes: what kind of higher-level universals are they? >Causes, >Universals. I 287 Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: there is a difference between the fundamental forces we assume and the macroscopic forces we encounter in our daily life. Definition causal relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above) as an aggregate of suitable fundamental forces. >Causal relation. Problem: is the supervenience thesis true of the macroscopic on fundamental forces? Fundamental forces: remain the same, even if the special particles and their fields change. They have a strong explanatory power, e.g. they enable us to draw force parallelograms, etc. I 288 Def causation/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: he defines them by causal chains. Causal chain/Bigelow/Pargetter: needs then for every link a basic causation which requires counterfactual conditionals, for the end links there will be a derived causal relation. >Counterfactual conditional. There will always be many parallel chains, with different connections among each other. This can lead to a complex network. Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: the metaphysical apparatus we employ does not claim to be adequate for the totality of the causal relations. But for some. >Metaphysics. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Explanation | Block | II 572 Explanation/Block: the phenomena I mention do not show anything by themselves! Pain/Hypnosis/Block: What reason is there to believe that there is pain at all under hypnosis? Some authors assume a "hidden observer" (part of the person). >Pain. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Explanation | Carnap | Rorty I 215 ff Carnap / Rorty: the motion of anything and everything can be predicted based on the motion of elementary particles. Rorty: with that we should be informed about all that exists to date, but we could not explain it! > Explanation. Elementary particles are well applicable on every section of the universe - the talk of politicians or emerald flowers only in certain contexts. Carnap VI 235 Explanations/Metaphysics/Carnap: all problems of "interpretation"; "explanation"; "foundation" fall into the field of metaphysics. But this does not mean a "gap" of science. >Metaphysics, >Science. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Explanation | Cartwright | I 3 Explanation/Description/Physics/Cartwright: in modern physics, the phenomenological laws are considered as being descriptive, the fundamental laws as being explanatory. >Fundamental laws, >Laws, >Natural laws, >Physics. Problem: the explanatory power comes at the cost of the adequacy of the description. 1) explanatory power (of laws) does not speak for truth 2) even for falsehood, because we need ceteris paribus laws 3) the semblance of truth comes from a false explanation model: wrong connection of laws with reality. >Truth, >Reality, >ceteris paribus. I 4 Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum" View/Cartwright: of explanation: Thesis: the way from theory to reality is this: theory > model > phenomenological law - Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be). Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are only true of the objects in the model - E.: is not a guide to the truth. I 11 E/Physics/Cartwright: wrong question: "which is the correct equation?" - Different models bring different aspects - causal explanation: not in scientific practice, we do not tell sometimes one, sometimes another causal story. >Theories, >Models. I 44 E/CartwrightVsTradition: has nothing to do with truth - ((s)> Truth/M.Williams / >Truth/Horwich). I 47 E/Cartwright: after the laws of nature (LoN) are known, we still have to decide which factors should occur in an explanation - the decision of which is, however, not suggested by our knowledge of the laws of nature. I 50 Laws of Nature are never sufficient to explain something in a particular moment - the reasons to believe in them are not normal reasons, because we have never tested them - only reasons: explanation strategy - I 52 E: is still needed even after complete description. >Description, >Observation. I 70 E/All/Generalization/VsSuper Law/C: E.g. "Why is the quail in my garden shaking its head?" - "Because all of them do it" - no explanation! - Nor: E.g. "All carbon atoms have 5 energy levels" - Super laws in turn require the application of individual laws - and these do not represent facts. I 73 Explanation/Cartwright: Uses causes - ((s) not laws) - (EmpiricismVsCauses). I 92 E/LoN/Cartwright: it is not the fundamental laws (laws of nature) that I need for the explanation, but E.g. properties of electrons - plus assumptions about the specific situation. I 94 f Explanation/Grünbaum: a more comprehensive law G explains a less comprehensive law L which it contains not through the causes of L. I 96 Explanation/Duhem: does not draw a "veil" from reality - Explanation/Cartwright: explaining a set of phenomenological laws means giving a physical theory of them - without explaining these laws. I 103 Explanation/W. Salmon/Richard Jeffries: E. are no arguments. I 152 Explanation/Duhem: Organization (order of knowledge). Hacking I 96~ Explanation/Cartwright/Fraassen: if something is an explanation, it is no reason to believe it. I 99 Anti-Realism: E are not a feature of the truth but of adequacy. >Adequacy. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Explanation | Chalmers | I 50 Explanation/Chalmers: a good explanation is often one that covers many cases. Problem: whether the individual case is satisfied. Cf. >Strength of theories, >Stronger/weaker. Solution: in biological phenomena it is often the case that similar cases have a related background. >Phenomena, >Similarity, >Conditions, >Causal explanation, >Initial conditions. I 84 Explanation/Explication/Chalmers/(s): Chalmers distinguishes between explication and explanation. The latter is used in the context of reduction as a reductive explanation, e.g., of phenomenal properties, while he reserves explication for conceptual explanations. >Concepts, >Reduction. E.g. The property of being Rolf Harris does not constitute a phenomenon that needs an explanation, as opposed to an explication. I 121 Explanation/Consciousness/Chalmers: even if we refined our explanations more and more, they would only provide more refined explanations of cognitive functions, but not explanations of our conscious experience. >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 122 The existence of consciousness will always be an additional fact to our structural and dynamic facts. But we do not have to give up any explanation of consciousness. We just have to say goodbye to the idea that this explanation should be reductive. Cf. >Reductionism. I 177 Explanation/Consciousness/Paradoxy/Chalmers: Problem: Consciousness cannot be explained reductively, judgments about consciousness and phenomenal judgments (about experiences) must be explained, however, because they are in the field of psychology. >Experience. Paradoxically, consciousness is ultimately irrelevant to the explanation of phenomenal judgments. (Avshalom Elitzur (1989) (1), Roger Shepard (Psychologist, 1993) (2). I 178 Solution/Chalmers: the content of my experiences cannot be explained reductively. >Content. Problem: if we treat the judgments ("experience reports") of the zombies deflationistically ((s) as simple quotes), they can be explained reductively. >Zombies/Chalmers. Solution: it is often possible to use higher-level properties in order to make lower-level properties superfluous (e.g. molecular motion instead of heat). >Levels/order, >Description Levels. Problem: the higher-level properties are still logically supervenient on the physical. That is, when an action is explained neurophysiologically, this does not render the appeal to memory (as a phenomenal property) irrelevant. >Supervenience. I 179 This relevance is inherited by the logical supervenience. For example, if a single man has a need for female accompaniment, which is explained by the fact that he is male and unmarried, that does not make the fact that he is a bachelor irrelevant. In general, if two sets of properties are conceptually connected, an explanation in terms of the one set does not render the existence of an explanation in terms of the other set irrelevant. Solution: in physical explanations: when logical supervenience is involved, there is no explanatory irrelevancy: a description of a higher level is logically related to one of a lower level. Problem: the consciousness is not logically supervenient on the physical. There is therefore no conceptual dependence of the levels. >Levels/order, >Description Levels, >Dependency. I 188 Explanation/Consciousness/Chalmers: unlike the explanation of religious belief, where the assumption of divine existence is demanded for the explanation of other phenomena, the explanation of consciousness is different: here consciousness is already given and does not have to be added for an assumption. Consciousness is also not explained by judgments about conscious experience ("This is a red object"). >Experience, >Phenomena, >Qualia. I 191 Explanation/Consciousness/Chalmers: There are three ways to argue against the alleged irrelevancy of consciousness for the explanation of behavior. >Behavior. I 192 1. The argument from the self-knowledge/Chalmers: we know that we have conscious experiences ourselves. But it is hard to argue with this. >Self-knowledge, >Self-awareness. Solution: if experiences were by explanation irrelevant, we could not know that we have some. I 193 1st Argument from the Causal Theory of Knowledge: Problem: if experience is causally irrelevant, I cannot argue with it. Then I have no knowledge about my experiences. Shoemaker (1975)(3) thus argues for a materialism of consciousness and for a reductive functionalism. >Causal theory of knowledge, >S. Shoemaker, >Materialism, >Functionalism. Zombie/Shoemaker: for Shoemaker Zombies are logically impossible. >Zombies. Knowledge/Consciousness/Chalmers: a property dualist must argue that knowledge about conscious experiences is a different kind of knowledge than the knowledge about which one is talking about in the context of causation by objects. >Property dualism. I 194 Reliability Theory/Chalmers: is not appropriate in the case of our knowledge about ourselves. However, the phenomenal judgments of my zombie twins are not reliable. Therefore, one could assume that reliability is a distinguishing feature between me and the zombie. But my self-knowledge about consciousness is of a different kind: it is reflected. We are sure that we have a consciousness, which can be doubted at most "philosophically". >Reliability theory. I 195 Reliability/Chalmers: where is reliability missing? E.g. in situations like those of the brains in a vat. Such examples do not endanger our certainty that we have an awareness since there is no causality involved. >Brains in a vat. I 196 Our approach to our consciousness is quite direct, it is not mediated. >Self-consciousness. I 197 Uncorrigibility/Chalmers: uncorrigibility is not meant with this direct access! >Incorrigibility. I 198 Causation/Consciousness/Chalmers: we do not need any causality to explain our conscious experiences: our knowledge of this is based on a much more direct relationship. It's about how I know about it, not how my brain knows about it, so it's not about a physical relation. Cf. >Causality. Problem: beliefs could also form without experiences. >Beliefs. ChalmersVsVs: but then I have certainty about my beliefs. Zombie: would say exactly the same. I 199 ChalmersVsVs: Of course, from a third-person perspective, we do not know whether others have a consciousness (conscious experiences) anyway. But we know it from ourselves. >First person, >Other minds. Beliefs/Zombies: in the end, the zombie could have the same beliefs as I do. ChalmersVsVs: yes, but the evidence for my beliefs is much simpler: it is the experiences. They are the primary. >Experience, >Evidence. Deflationist/inflationist/Chalmers: our argumentation is here deflationary anyway, i.e. about the purely functional role of beliefs. Cf. >Deflationism. Inflationistically, beliefs themselves would be a part of the phenomenal experience. 1. A. Elitzur, Consciousness and the incompleteness of the physical explanation of behavior. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10, 1989,: pp. 1-20. 2. R. N. Shepard, On the physical baisis, ölinguistic representation and conscious experiences of colors. In: G. Harman (Ed) Conceptions of the human Mind: Essays in Honor of George A. Miller, Hillsdale NJ 1993. 3. Sydney Shoemaker, Functionalism and qualia, Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315 (1975). |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Explanation | Chomsky | Strawson VI 392 Explanation/Chomsky: Chomsky admits that an "explanatory adequate" grammar does not have to be "descriptive-adequate". We need a theory of linguistic universals and why our grammar was selected. >Theories, >Grammar. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Explanation | Churchland | II 470 Explanation/Churchland: Explanations and thus reductions are area-specific. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Explanation | Cognitive Science | Corr I 416 Explanation/Cognitive Science/Pylyshyn/Matthews: proposed a framework that allows for three qualitatively different levels of expelnation (Pylyshyn 1999)(1): 1. Knowledge = Goals, intentions and personal meaning, supporting adaption to external environments 2. Symbol processing a) Algorithm = Formal specification of program for symbol manipulation b) Functional architecture = Real-time processing operations supporting symbol manipulation 3. Biology = Physical, neuronal representation of processing. >Personality, >Personality traits, >Arousal/neurobiology, >Symbol processing, >Algorithms, >Knowledge, >Goals, >Intentions, >Levels of description, >Levels/order. 1. Pylyshyn, Z. W. 1999. What’s in your mind?, in E. Lepore and Z. W. Pylyshyn (eds.), What is cognitive science?, pp. 1–25. Oxford: Blackwell Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Explanation | Comte | Wright I 153 Explanation/Comte/Wright, G. H.: Comte does not provide a systematic theory of the explanation. His main emphasis is on prediction.(1) Causal explanation: Comte rejected the search for "causes". He attributed this to the "pre-positivist", metaphysical phase in the development of the sciences. In positivist science, the role of causes is taken over by general laws (Comte 1844(1) I, 3 as well as Comte, 1830(2). After Comte, science took the decisive step into the positive phase with Bacon and Galilei. (1830, I 5). >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Cause, >Causation, >Effect, >Sociology. 1. Comte, A. Discours sur l' esprit positif, I, 3, 1844. 2. Comte, A.: Cours de philosophie positive, I, 4,1830. |
Comte I A. Comte Cours de Philosophie Positive (Ed.1830) New York 2012 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Explanation | Darwin | Gould IV 35 Explanation/Evidence/Science/Darwin/Gould: how do we know that evolution controls the world and not any other principle? Darwin's answer was paradoxical. He was not looking for perfection, but for inconsistencies! >Method. There are structures and behaviours that endanger the meaningful form of an organism, but ultimately ensure its success. They increase productive efficiency. For example, the tail feathers of the peacocks and the antlers of the moose. They even weaken the species, but still secure the transmission of the genes. This can only be explained by Darwin: in addition to adaptation: sexual selection. IV 36 Sexual selection: competition of the males among each other or election by the females. Thus, the struggle for existence of the individuals drives evolution! It must be exceptionally effective, it is often capable of overcoming other equipment benefits and developments. >Selection, >Evolution. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Explanation | Davidson | Glüer II 99 ff Explaining means re-describing. Thesis: explanations of action can be interpreted as singular causal statements. That is, in contrast to the "logical-connection-thesis" as statements about two distinct events. Caution: It is true that explanations of action do not allow an independent description of the cause, but it is precisely the description of the cause for which this is true, not the cause itself. >Causes, >Reasons, >Reason/Cause, >Motives, >Description/Davidson. Glüer II 112f Explanation of Action/DavidsonVsAristotle: the practical syllogism cannot deal with divergent causal chains (mountaineer-example), and also not with a mere intention (omission, intermittent event), and weakness of will. >Weakness of will. Glüer II 114 Intention/Davidson: Form: Judgment: "x is executable." Weak will/Acrasia/Davidson: irrational judgment - solution: separate action and intention. Glüer II 115 "All things-considered"-judgement: is only possible for omniscient beings. Glüer II 138 Explanation of action/mental/physical/DavidsonVsReductionism: intentionalistic vocabulary is in principle irreducible. There are no strict laws for the prediction of actions. - >Anomalous monism. Horwich I 456 Truth/Explanation/Davidson/Rorty: is not an explanation for something - ((s) A phenomenon is not explained by the fact that a proposition that asserts it is true). - also the existence of truth needs no explanation. Wrong: e.g. "he did not find the house because his beliefs about its location were wrong". Correct: (without truth): "He believed that it was located ---". Explanation: details of what was true or false, not the truth itself - If truth itself was an explanation, it would have to be a cause for something. Explanation: not "he did the right thing", but the circumstances. "Truth" as explanation would be like tertia (e.g. "intended interpretation", "conceptual scheme"). It is an idle wheel. - Putnam ditto. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Explanation | Deacon | I 38 Explanation/Deacon: a complete explanation cannot stop at a description of what is missing. It must provide a functional approach to why a certain organizational structure has been chosen. For example: DeaconVsPinker: Pinker's theory of language instinct repeats only a description of the problem and gives it a new name. >Language/Pinker, >Instincts, >Description, >Functional explanation, >Causal explanation, cf. >Best explanation. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Explanation | Dennett | Rorty VI 144 Explanation/Dennett/Rorty: it is sufficient to explain why there seems to be something phenomenological. This is why it seems to be the case that there is a difference between thinking that something seems to be pink, and that something really seems to be pink. I 137 Explanation/Model/Dennett: models must be neither too difficult nor oversimplified. E.g. it is not about following all the electrons in a calculator. Model/pattern/explanation/Dennett: why are we considering this model and not a different one? In order to justify that we must not only take the real into consideration but also the possible. I 335 We need to develop an idealization of degrees of possibility. Explaining evolution: > Properties: E.g. you ordered a green car and it comes on time: the question is not why this car is green, but: why is this (green) car here. ((s) consider the car as a whole, the green car would otherwise be elsewhere). > "wrong question". Just-about-stories: E.g. Lake Victoria. Unusually many species of perch. Only (conventional) explanation: Too many ponds dried out. But besides the properties of the animals you have no evidence for that. I 416 Dennett: all these stories are "too good to be true". But Gould does not adopt the Pangloss principle when he considers them to be true until the opposite is proven. Coincidence/Evidence/Dennett: e.g. a geyser suddenly erupts on average every 65 minutes. The form of the suddenness is no evidence of coincidence. I 424 Cambrian Explosion/DennettVsGould: here again suddenness is no evidence of coincidence. I 102 Explanation/Justification/Evolution/Dennett: e.g. the advantages of sexuality cannot be taken as a reason for why they are there. The evolution cannot foresee its path. Consequence: the sexuality must have survived as a side effect (>epiphenomenon). |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Explanation | Deutsch | I 88 Our justification does not depend on whether a certain anomaly occured in the past . It has to do with whether it is possible to explain the existence of this anomaly. >Justification, >Verification, >Verificationism, >Existence, >Quantum Mechanics. |
Deutsch I D. Deutsch Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997 German Edition: Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 |
| Explanation | Dray | Schurz I 234 Explanation/Action/History/Dray/Schurz: (Dray: philosopher of historical sciences)(1): Ex assumption: rulers who often involve their country in wars are usually unpopular. Deductive: one would then have to say: "All rulers who ...become unpopular". But every historian knows that such a law cannot be valid without exception. Covering law/Hempel/Schurz: Hempel's covering law can then be justified as follows: "whenever historians or hermeneuticians use the little word "because", they implicitly invoke a general context". I 235 Problem: This cannot be fixed numerically. Solution/Dray: thesis historians have a "normal case hypothesis" or normative hypothesis: ex: rulers who meet the and conditions usually become unpopular. VsDray: in the 1950s, the dominant attitude was that such generalizations were empirically inane because they could not be refuted by any counterexample. VsVs: the identification of substantiveness with falsifiability does not apply here at all. Rational explanation of action/Dray/Schurz: based on Dray's normative rationality principle: Persons normally act (purposively) rationally, i.e. if actor A has goal Z, and believes action H is an appropriate means, then he will normally try to realize H. >Rationality, >Purpose, >Action, >Purpose-rationality. 1. Dray, W. (1957). Laws and Explanation in History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Dray I W. Dray Laws and Explanation in History Westport 1979 Dray I W. H. Dray Perspectives on History Sydney 1980 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Explanation | Droysen | Wright I 19 Explanation/Droysen/Wright, G. H.: Droysen shaped the methodological dichotomy of explanation and understanding. (J. G. Droysen, Grundriss der Historik, 1858). Wright: the methodological distinction made by Droysen originally had the form of a trichotomy: the philosophical method, the physical method and the historical method. The goals were to recognize, explain and understand. Science/Droysen: The aim of science is to explain, the aim of "history" is to understand the phenomena that fall within its domain. |
Droys I J. G. Droysen Grundriss der Historik Paderborn 2011 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Explanation | Duhem | I XVII Explanation/Duhem: Explanations are reserved for the metaphysicians' claim to knowledge. I 6 If a physical theory is to be an explanation, it has only reached its goal when it has eliminated sense perception and has grasped the physical reality. >Perception, >Prediction. I 40 Explanation/Descartes/DuhemVsDescartes: Descartes has never attempted to connect the law of refraction with his explanatory theory of light. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Explanation | Dummett | II 108 Explanation/Dummett: E.g. "b satisfies (S or T) iff b satisfies S or b satisfies T, for example: "B satisfies (If it were the case that b satisfies S, then it would be the case that b satisfies T)": this does not explain the meaning of the logical constants. - Just as "London denotes London" does not explain the meaning of London. >Satisfaction. III (a) 39 Intention/explanation/truth/Dummett: the intention to tell the truth is not sufficient to explain the concept of truth - neither the truth conditions for multiple languages. >Truth conditions/Dummett. III (c) 152 Sense/understanding/Explanation/DummettVsKripke: The erroneous conclusion that the sense of what was said to explain a word can be identified with the sense of the word itself is caused by Kripke’s views - but the means of explanation do allow the meaning to come to light. >Sense/Dummett. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Explanation | Esfeld | I 357 Explanation/theory/Esfeld: connections could not be explained by the expansion of terms. >Concepts, >Theories, >Domains, >Systems, >Models, >Dependence. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Explanation | Feyerabend | I 367 Explanation/VsIncommensurability/Feyerabend: it is said that if one allows for incommensurability in science, one can no longer decide whether a new conception explains what it is supposed to explain or whether it wanders into quite different realms. >Incommensurability. I 368 FeyerabendVsVs: such a knowledge is quite unnecessary. The question does not arise at all. We can no longer ask for the absolute speed of an object. And that is not a loss. I 369 Relativity theory does not have to worry about the fate of classical physics. The concept "explanation" is not all that important. Explanation/Feyerabend: this concept has already proved too narrow: e.g. the requirement of derivability. >Derivability. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Explanation | Field | I 18 Explanation/Field: a) Def intrinsic explanation/Field: does not contain causally irrelevant entities (namely: mathematical entities) b) Def extrinsic explanation/Field: also contains causally irrelevant entities. For example, the attribution of finite sentences for the behavior of animals. Every good extrinsic explanation is based on a good intrinsic explanation. ((s) Field/(s): therefore only causally relevant should occur in the explanation. - in short: intrinsic explanation is causal.) I 20 Problem: then the properties of electrons cannot contain anything that requires mathematical entities. >Mathematical entities, >Platonism, >Ontology. I 111 Explanation/Application/Physics/Mathematics/Field: new: different than in Sience without numbers(1): Physics itself has an explanatory function. You need theories to explain physical phenomena. - This makes a nominalistic theory of proof superfluous. Platonism: Here the proof theory is an instrument of discovery, not just explanation. >Proof theory. Nominalist Model Theory: Problem: one cannot explain the applicability solely from the concept of conservativity. Therefore we need modal logic as an analog of Platonist model theory. >Modal logic, >Model theory. Then model theory is like physics. Otherwise, it is like the theory of proof: then we would not need a nominalistic analog of the model theory because it does not serve as an explanation, but only in order to find out something about possibility. >Nominalism. Then, in turn, we do not need to accept the truth of the statements. >Truth/Field. 1. H. Field, Science without numbers. Princeton New Jersey 1980 |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Explanation | Flusser | I 11 Explanation/Interpretation/Flusser: For example, a cloud is explained by pointing to its causes, a book is interpreted by pointing out its meaning. Cf. >Natural meaning, >Non-natural meaning, >Interpretation, >Signs, >Symptoms. You can humanize everything. It is not possible to speak of the same phenomena when other aspects come to the fore. An interpreted cloud is not that of a meteorologist, an interpreted book has nothing to do with literature. >Description levels, >Levels/order. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
| Explanation | Fodor | Rorty I 269 ff Explanation/Fodor/Rorty: hardware is private. Justification: subjects are public. --- Fodor IV 173 Explanation/Fodor/Lepore: an explanation does not need to assume any necessary relationships. Regularity (reliability) is sufficient, e.g. intentional laws. >Regularity, >Reliability, >Justification, >Analyticity/syntheticity, >Concepts, >Necessity. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Explanation | Forbes | Haslam I 252 Explanation/stereotype threat/Forbes/Schmader: Thesis: we proposed an integrated process model of stereotype threat whereby priming stereotype threat elicits a cascade of stress-based physiological, negative appraisal, self-regulatory and performance-monitoring processes as people try to make sense of and cope with this threat to their identity (Schmader et al., 2008)(1). Manipulations of stereotype threat impair working memory (Schmader and Johns, 2003)(2), impair performance on working- memory-intensive tasks (Beilock et al., 2007)(3), and have their strongest effects on those with lower working-memory capacity (Régner et al., 2010)(4). Furthermore, although the original studies did not find clear evidence of increased anxiety under stereotype threat, subsequent research has established that it increases physiological biomarkers of stress including higher blood pressure (Blascovich, et al., 2001)(5) and skin conductance (Osborne, 2006(6), 2007(7)). This autonomic stress response is coupled with negative appraisal processes as stereotype-threatened individuals sometimes report heightened levels of explicit (Spencer et al., 1999)(8) and implicit anxiety (Johns et aL, 2008(9); Bosson et al., 2004(10)), negative expectations (Sekaquaptewa et al., 2007(10); Stangor et al., 1998(12)), feelings of dejection (Keller and Dauenheimer, 2003)(13), and task-related worries (Beilock et al., 2007(3); Cadinu et al., 2005(14)). >Stereotype threat/Forbes/Schmader, >Stereotype threat/Psychological theories, >Stereotypes/Social psychology. 1. Schmader, T., Johns, M. and Forbes, C. (2008) ‘An integrated process model of stereotype threat effects on performance’, Psychological Review, 115: 336—56. 2. Schmader, T. and Johns, M. (2003) ‘Converging evidence that stereotype threat reduces working memory capacity’,Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85: 440—52. 3. Beilock, S.L., Rydell, R.J. and McConnell, A.R. (2007) ‘Stereotype threat and working memory: Mechanisms, alleviation, and spillover’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 136(2): 256-76 4. Régner, I., Smeding, A., Gimmig, D., Thinus-Blanc, C., Monteil,J. and Huguet, P. (2010) ‘Individual differences in working memory moderate stereotype-threat effects’, Psychological Science, 21: 1646—8. 5. Blascovich,J., Spencer, S.J., Quinn, D. and Steele, C. (2001) ‘African Americans and high blood pressure: The role of stereotype threat’, Psychological Science, 12: 22 5—9. 6. Osborne,J.W. (2006) ‘Gender, stereotype threat and anxiety: Psychophysiological and cognitive evidence’, Journal of Research in Educational Psychology, 8: 109—3 8. 7. Osborne, J.W. (2007) ‘Linking stereotype threat and anxiety’, Educational Psychology, 27: 135—54. 8. Spencer, S.J., Steele, C.M. and Quinn, D.M. (1999) ‘Stereotype threat and women’s math performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35:4—28. 9. Johns, M., Inzucht, M. and Schmader, T. (2008) Stereotype threat and executive resource depletion: Examining the influence of emotion regulation’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 137: 691—705. 10. Sekaquaptewa, D., Waidman, A. and Thompson, M. (2007) So1o status and self-construal: Being distinctive influences racial self-construal and performance apprehension in African American women’, Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 13:321— 7. 11. Stangor, C., Carr, C. and Kiang, L. (1998) ‘Activating stereotypes undermines task performance expectations’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75: 1 191—7. 13. Keller, J. and Dauenheimer, D. (2003) 1Stereotype threat in the classroom: Dejection mediates the disrupting threat effect on womens math performance’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29: 371—81. 14. Cadinu, M., Maass, A., Rosabianca, A. and Kiesner,J. (2005) Why do women underperform under stereotype threat?’, Psychological Science, 16: 5 72—8. Toni Schmader and Chad Forbes, “Stereotypes and Performance. Revisiting Steele and Aronson’s stereotypes threat experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Explanation | Fraassen | I 23 Explanation/FraassenVsReichenbach: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the demand of hidden variables. I 25 Explanation: if mere regularity makes a macroscopic theory poor, then the same happens to a microscopic one - coincidence: also coincidence can have an explanation. I 39 Explanation/FraassenVsAugustinus: the fleeing of the mouse from the cat must not be explained by perception. But with Darwin: the fleeing mice survive. There is no account by reason. Analogously it applies that the successful sciences survive - without this having to be explained. I 86 Theory/Explanation: For example, one could have two types of mechanics, one for physiologies and one for astronomers. Problem: one cannot explain a complex phenomenon with this - e.g. man who is walking on the moon - if both theories have no common models, a new theory on lunar gravitation must be established - empirical adequacy: requires the integration of these "mini-theories". I 87 Explanation: if we consider some kind of questions to be more important, this is no reason to believe that the theory that explains them is more probable - however, the social situation of the researcher plays a role in the evaluation of theories. >Evaluation. I 93 Explanation/Ernest Nagel: explanation is the organization and classification of our knowledge - FraassenVsFeyerabend: he misunderstood the fact: that this is a function of interests - FraassenVsFeyerabend: then one can stop to research if one believes, what one says - naive view of scientific security - then the scientists ought to swear by an oath that they are looking for explanations -FraassVsFeyerabend: in reality one must always doubt the adequacy. I 97f Explanation/FraassenVsTradition: explanation does not have to be true! a) "we have an explanation" (has to do with acceptance) b) "the theory explains" (without acceptance) - e.g. Newton's theory was wrong nevertheless it explains much. ((s) then a theory cannot be a conjunction of sentences, for then no sentence may be false.) Harman: Explanation leads to acceptance. >Acceptability. Explanation/Fraassen: something does not require that theory coincides with the world as a whole. I 98 One cannot assert the truth of a theory before its explanatory power - Explanation: is not an additional property for empirical adequacy - e.g. "the computer computes" - no one would say "the hammer struck the nail". I 106 Explanation/VsHempel/Morton Beckner: e.g. evolution is not deterministic - e.g. the giraffes's neck is not determined by dietary scarcity - only by the compatibility of genetic and natural selection mechanisms - Putnam: also Newton's explanation is no deduction, but a demonstration of compatibilities. I 110 Definition Explanation/Friedman: S explains P iff P is a consequence S which is "relative" to K and S "reduces" or "unifies" the set of its own consequences relative to K. I 111 Explanation: Problem: Incompleteness: disease explains a rare secondary disease that is triggered by it - but not why this patient is affected. Asymmetry: e.g. length of the shadow: is always in relation with a certain sun position. Causation: only goes in one direction. >Causation, >Equations, >Asymmetry. I 111 Why question: does not occur when the spectrum is explained by the atomic structure. I 124 Explanation: has to do with "why" - to find prominent factors in the causal network. Problem: the network as a whole does not explain typical cases - science, however, describes the network - ((s) therefore science does not equal an explanation. Explanation must at least say that there is a structure that can be described in principle - though never fully.) Cf. >Network/Quine. I 146 Explanation: for evaluating a response to a why question as an explanation, it is not a matter of whether this is true - the evaluation uses only the part of the background information that provides the general theory about these phenomena plus additional information that does not include the facts to be explained - ((s) e.g. framework conditions). >Reference frame. I 155 Explanation/Description/Fractions: explanation and description do not differ in the information - but explanation: is a three-digit relation theory-fact-context - description: is two-digit: theory-fact - Explanation: is an applied science (not pure science). I 205 Explanation/Thomas Aquinas/Fraassen: everything that is explained must be explained by something else. I 206 The premises must contain more than the conclusion - in addition: generalization: e.g. that all magnets attract iron. >Generalization. I 213 Explanation/Fraassen: only observable regularities require explanation. >Regularities, >Observability. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Explanation | Freud | Chalmers I 13 Explanation/Freud/Chalmers: although Freud did not make it explicit, it seems that he tried to explain the notions of desire and belief causally. >Causality, >Desire, >Beliefs. Accessibility/Freud/Chalmers: Explicitly, he recognized that accessibility to consciousness is not essential to a stat’s relevance in the explanation of behaviour. That conclusion relies on a notion of mentality that is independent of phenomenal notions. >Consciousness, >Behavior. Consciousness/Freud/Chalmers: a new ”objective” brand of psychological explanation was developed, with no room for consciousness in its explanations. >Unconscious, >Objectivity, >Understanding. |
Freud I S. Freud Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Explanation | Galilei | Wright I 17 Explanation/Aristoteles/Galilei/Wright, G. H.: the difference between what is called explanation in the Aristotelian (briefly teleological, purpose-oriented) and Galilean (causal or cause-oriented) traditions, respectively, is not so much a difference in historical sequence, but rather represents temporally coinciding camps of different theoretical views. >Teleology, >Causal explanations, >Purposes, >Goals, >Processes, >Causality, >Causes, >Effects, >Nature, >Physics, >Science. Wright I 151 Sources: loci classici are Galilei's Dialoghi sui massimi sistemi tolemaico e copernicano, 1628 and Discorsi e dimonstrazioni matematiche intorno a due nuove scienze, 1638. K. Lewin: „Der Übergang von der aristotelischen zur galileischen Denkweise in Biologie und Psychologie“, Erkenntnis 1 1930/31. According to Lewin, it is not a matter of personal nuances, but of massive differences in the way of thinking that were decisive for the actual research (...). |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Explanation | Genz | II 59 Why-Explanation/Newton/Kepler/Genz: Newton's laws explain why Kepler's planets do not move on circular orbits. Kepler could not yet explain this. >Why-questions, >Physics, >Laws of nature, >Nature. II 300 Explanation/understanding/physics/Genz: how can theories explain phenomena (as in quantum mechanics) when they throw so many principles over the top? >Quantum mechanics. Solution/Genz: because the "new" explanations are also based on principles. >Principles. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Explanation | Goodman | IV 165 Explanation: a basic term is not defined, but explained by means of its different varieties. >Definitions. --- II 67 Reduction sentences/Carnap: if we want to construct a language of science, we must take some descriptive (i.e. not logical) expressions as basic expressions. Other expressions can then be introduced by means of reduction sentences. >Reduction, >Reducibility, >Reductionism. II 68 GoodmanVsCarnap/reduction sentences: [the whole thing is] pretty absurd (...) in my opinion. Philosophy has the task of explaining the science (and the everyday language), but not describing it. The explanation must refer to the pre-systematic use of the terms under consideration, but does not have to adhere to the ordering. It is all about economy and unification. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Explanation | Gould | I 321 Explanation/Why-Questions/Gould: evolutionary biology is always concerned with the question "why?" (> Purposes). II 61 Explanation/tradition/Gould: is it not extremely unlikely that haplodiploidism, a prerequisite for the evolution of hymenoter societies, was probably first developed as an adaptation to an almost completely contradictory lifestyle? GouldVsTradition: but this is not unusual at all, but a basic principle that distinguishes evolutionary biology from a common stereotype about science in general. Frequent error: it is a frequent error to assume that the instantaneous usefulness of a property would allow to deduce the reasons for its origin. Origin and current usefulness, however, are two very different subjects. Complex properties are full of possibilities: their conceivable uses are not limited to their original functions. For example, the fish's fins of equilibrium became the driving elements. >Misuse. II 150 Explanation/causality/purpose/Gould: the question "What is it for?" often distracts us from the more earthly but often instructive question: "How is it built?" II 152 We tend to view each structure as if it were created for a specific purpose. II 166 Explanation/causality/causal explanation/chart of knowledge/methods/Gould: a hotly debated topic is the occurrence of transposable elements of DNA, so-called jumping genes. These sequences can repeat themselves and then move independently to other parts of the bacterial chromosome. II 167 Conventional arguments for the existence of DNA repeating itself on average follow traditional Darwinian viewpoints. Primary characteristics of organisms: about 25% of the genetic material cannot be secondary - they must exist in order to secure an advantage for the organisms in the fight for survival. Therefore, we would have to explain the advantage for the supporting body resulting from the DNA, which is repeating itself on average. Wrong answer: if you assume that all functioning genes could only exist in one copy, any possibility of alteration would be blocked. So that must be the reason! Doubling provides the material for evolution. II 168 GouldVs: this is causality in the wrong direction: it cannot move backwards in time, the resulting flexibility cannot be the reason why a doubling of genes occurs in the first place. Future usefulness can only be the beneficial effect of other direct reasons for an immediate advantage. E. g. feathers are excellent for flying, but the ancestors of the birds must have developed them for other reasons, probably to control the temperature as a few feathers on the arms of a reptile do not make it fly. II 169 Definition adaptations/Gould: adaptations are limited exclusively to those structures that have developed because of their current usefulness. Definition exaptations/Gould: we call adaptations structures that have developed for other reasons or without any reason, but are still usable. If the repeating DNA is transposable, why do we need an adaptive explanation at all for it? II 170 It can simply distribute itself from chromosome to chromosome on its own, making copies of itself while "stuck" genes cannot. Solution/Gould: these additional copies must not continue to exist because they are useful, but because the body does not notice them at all! |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Explanation | Hacking | I 98ff Good explanation/Hacking: a good explanation displays context. However, the same entities can always be explained otherwise. >Additional hypotheses. VsReichenbach/VsSalmon: that we arrive at the same result on various ways, that proves nothing. I 98 The reality is not part of the explanation. >Reality. I 100 It follows: VsConvergence theory: convergence theory is only cumulative. Convergence: is not itself focussed on convergence. >Convergence, cf. >Regularities. I 103 HackingVsPopper: success is no confirmation of a declaration. It shows nothing more than that we reasonably live in a reasonable world (>adequacy, as Aristotle). >Adequacy, >Best Explanation, >Confirmation, >Success, >K. Popper. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Explanation | Hegel | Schurz I 224 Explanation/Hegel/Schurz: Thesis: Explanation goes in principle beyond description, it is a kind of "Wesensschau". DuhemVsHegel/WittgensteinVsHegel: Science can only describe at all! (WittgensteinVsExplanation). >L. Wittgenstein, >P. Duhem, >Description, >Explanation/Duhem, >Explanation/Wittgenstein. Law/laws of nature/solution/Hempel: also laws are descriptions - just general descriptions! Explanation/Hempel: goes beyond description in that it establishes a logical connection. >Explanation/Hempel. I 225 Last explanation/Schurz: does not exist in science for exactly this reason: every explanation must presuppose something unexplained. Example gravitation law, example the fact that there was a big bang. Nothing can explain itself, there is no "self-explanation". >Explanation/Schurz, >Explanation/Hempel, >Ultimate justification. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Explanation | Hempel | Bigelow I 299 Explanation/tradition/laws/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Representatives: Hempel and Oppenheim 1948(1), Hempel 1965(2), Mill 1843/50(3), Jevons 1877(4), Ducasse 1925(5), Feigl 1945(6), Popper 1945(7), Hospers 1946(8)). Hempel/terminology/spelling/Bigelow/Pargetter: O: result L: laws C: conditions (sets of sentences, as premises) Then "O" could also be seen as a set of sentences. But we are talking about compound sentences. Then we have: L C O Initial conditions/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: initial conditions are sometimes not needed at all. Sometimes, however, the laws alone do not explain the case: for example, Halley's comet comes back in 60 years, for this we need information about certain facts, it does not only follow from the laws. The facts are contingent, of course. I 301 Non-statistical explanation/Hempel: thesis: if L and C explain O, then they must entail O logically. Otherwise, we have at best a sketch of the explanation that requires further assumptions. Bigelow/Pargetter: this does not yet fully express the idea of the explanation by "deriving from laws": the laws must be used and not only mentioned. In other words, there must be a reliance on laws. BigelowVsHempel/BigelowVsTradition: N.B.: but these are just apparant explanations! I 302 Just as quackers and magicians often provide an explanation with reference to prestigious natural laws, which turns out to be circular on closer inspection. Solution/Hempel: to exclude this, Hempel demands that additionally the premises must be true and O would not have followed if C alone had been without the laws (L). BigelowVsHempel/BigelowVsTradition: there are still a lot of refinements to be made and special cases to consider. Lewis would call that the "one patch per hole" method. Statistical explanation/probabilistic/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Hempel 1965) here it is impossible to find laws that predict the exact result. However, it may be very likely in certain cases. Or more likely if the law is true than if it was not true. I 303 The statistical explanations are something like derivations from the thing to be explained. And indeed such derivatives, which originate from invalid conclusion. Logical form: the conclusion should be probable, given the premises. Variants: one can demand a high probability from the outset. Or it should be higher than O's without the premises or weaker: that O only has to be made to a certain degree likely, etc. (Lit: Salmon 1982). Bigelow/Pargetter: all this does not differ significantly from the non-statistical explanation. Statistical laws are also part of the set of laws. Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: with Hempel's help, we can now broaden our concept of explanation. I 304 If we get the probability of a result, we have explained the result a little bit as well. Statistical explanation/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the end, it is all about whether a result comes out or is likely. We can summarize both cases. "Statistical"/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: "statistical" is only served to attenuate the requirement of logical validity. Explanation/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: an explanation is an open process. This is important. Both the initial conditions can be varied, as well as the laws derived from other laws. Kepler's laws, for example, have been traced back by Newton to deeper ones. These then logically entail the Kepler ones. I 305 Openness/Hempel: openness is that you may be able to find deeper and even deeper laws. Bigelow/Pargetter: that is one of the strengths of his theory. >Laws, >Natural laws. 1.Hempel, C.G. and P. Oppenheim: Studies in the Logic of Explanation PS, 1984, p. 15. 2.Hempel, C. G.: Aspects of Scientific Explanation, in: Aspects of Scientific Explanation in the Philosophy of Science. New York 1965: The Free Press. 3. Mill, J. St.: A System of Logic, 1843. 4. Stevons W. J.: The Principle of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method, 2nd edition London 1877: Macmillan Press. 5. Ducasse, C. J.: Explanation, Mechanism and Teleology. Journal of Philosophy 22. pp. 150-5. 6. Feigl, H.: Operationism and Scientific Method. Psychological Review 52, 1945, pp. 250-9, 284-8 7. Popper, K. R.: The Open Society and Its Enemies. London 1945. 8. Hospers, J.: On Explanation. Journal of Philosophy 43, 1946, pp. 337-56. Schurz I 224 Explanation/Law/Hempel: The law premises can often be omitted! Humanities/Hempel/Schurz: claimed to be able to provide explanations for them, too, by assuming that laws rule here, too. VsHempel: but these laws are not strict. Hempel: late: for it probabilistic explanation. Schurz I 224 Potential Explanation/Hempel: Here merely logical consistency of the premises is required. This is important when evaluating hypotheses in terms of their explanatory power. >Best explanation. Schurz I 225 Explanation/Hempel/Schurz: is the answer to a why-question. Why-question/Hempel: a) Explanation seeker: asks for causes. b) Justification seeker: asks for reasons of belief. I 226 Causes: can serve as reasons for justification. (Also vice versa!). >Causes, >Justification. Structural equality/prediction/explanation/Hempel/Schurz: (early and middle Hempel): Thesis: explanation and prediction are structurally equal. Popper: ditto: causality = prediction-eduction. Explanation and prediction differ only in the pragmatic time circumstances of the becoming known of premises and conclusion. Prediction: here only the premises are known first. Explanation: vice versa. (...) ex ante reasoning/Hempel: = prediction, potential explanation. Explanation: = ex ante reasoning. ManyVs: (...) >Structures, >Microstructure, >Causal explanation/Schurz, >Explanation/Schurz. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Explanation | Holenstein | Münch III 334 Explanation / Holenstein: when it comes to causal explanation, consistency is needed - when it comes to functional explanation, domain-specific alternatives are needed. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 |
Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Explanation | Kauffman | Dennett I 309 KauffmanVsDarwin: a definition of early development and thus the Baerian laws (all embryos of living beings look very similar at the beginning) do not constitute a special mechanism. >Laws, >Laws of nature. Rather, the definition of early development reflects the fact that the number of ways in which living beings can be improved has shrunk faster than the number of ways in later development. >Niches. Dennett I 310 For example, the foundations of the churches are more similar than the upper floors. Reason: Experimenting with decorations does not have such a fatal effect if they are carried out above where not everything can break down. Actually, there really aren't as many solutions at the beginning as there are later. Explanation/Kauffman: to explain this, we do not have to look for steering mechanisms. It's self-explanatory. Evolution finds such paths again and again. >Evolution, >Causal explanations. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Explanation | Leeds | I 458 Semantics/Explanation/Prediction/Theory/Leeds/Arthur Fine/Rorty: you can't use semantics to explain success of predictions. >Circular reasoning, >Predictions, >Success. The circle stems from the attempt to be inside and outside of our investigations at the same time. Decisive point: One does not have to choose between inside/outside, one only has to keep it apart. >Inside/outside, >Levels/order, >Description levels, >Meta Language. |
Leeds I Stephen Leeds "Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Explanation | Lewis | I (b) 36 Explanation/Law/Lewis: Problem: my behavior is always explained by individual facts premises - Solution: the laws are implied by these individual fact premises - the attributions can only be true if something holds the causal role necessary, e.g., for wishes - this role can only be played by states that are connected causally in the right way with the behavior. >Causal explanation, >Individual causation, >Behavior, >Attribution, >Causal role/Lewis. --- V 218 Explanation/Sylvain Bromberger: something that needs time, language, speaker, etc. - Lewis: also something that can perhaps never be given. V 219 Lewis: even things can explain something. V 220 Event patterns can be described with different descriptions - there is also negative information e.g. about Arctic penguins and that there are no arctic penguins. V 211 Lewis: Thesis: there are no non-causal explanations. V 221 Non-causal explanation/LewisVs: 1) E.g. refractive index - Fermat: light must follow the shortest route - the refractive index is that part of the glass that has not yet been reached by the light - the pattern of alternate routes is part of the explanation, but not part the causal story - the explanation consists in relational information - 2) non-causal: star collapse comes to an end, so as not to violate the Pauli principle - 3) non-causal: possession of anti-bodies does not cause immunity - the immunity consists in the possession of anti-bodies - solution/Lewis: the possession is a disposition - it plays a causal role - solution/Lewis: What is explained is that something protects the patient. V 232 Probability explanation/Peter Railton/Lewis: "deductive-nomological model of probabilistic explanation" - it must be distinguished from Fetzer's model: for both are: covering law/Raiton/Fetzer: universal generalization about an individual case chances - FetzerVsRailton: as in Hempel: inductive, not deductive. Explanation: like argument - LewisVsFetzer: But: a good explanation is not necessarily a good argument - LewisVsFetzer/LewisVsRailton: both want an explanation, even if the event is extremely unlikely, but in that case a good explanation is a very bad argument - probability/explanation/Hempel: deviates from his deductive-nomological model. >Explanation/Railton. V 238 Explanation/unity/Lewis: Explanation is not a thing of which one can demand unity - rather something of which you can have more or less. LewisVsWhite, Morton: then a "therefore-response" is not an existential statement. V 269 Explanation/Lewis: partly causal, partly non-causal information. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Explanation | Lloyd Morgan | Perler/Wild I 16 Interpretation/explanation/Science/Animal/Behavior/C.Lloyd-Morgan: maxim: in no case we should regard an action as a result of higher capability, although it can be explained as a result of a simpler capability. ("Morgan's canon"). >Behavior, >Animals, >Actions, >Intention, >Abilities, >Capabilities. |
Lloyd Morg I C. Lloyd Morgan Emergent Evolution The Gifford Lectures 2018 |
| Explanation | Logic Texts | II 94 Explication: for the logic it is between analytic and synthetic definition. The explication of a concept can be more accurate and more fruitful than the original term. >Analyticity/Syntheticity, Cf. >WittgensteinVsExplanation. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 |
| Explanation | Lorenz | Lorenz I 120 Definition "Finalism"/Explanation/Lorenz: the finalist confuses the question "what for?" With the question "Why?". Therefore he believes that the problem of the causal condition has already been solved by the demonstration of the species-preserving sense. For example "propagation drive" is not an explanation for the process concerned. Explanation/Lorenz: In this book we want to give explanations for instances of malfunctions. Therefore, we must not limit ourselves to the "what for". We need the insight into the normal causes to understand those of their disturbances. I 121 A performance of an organism (e.g. food intake, reproduction, self-preservation) which can be named according to the function is never the effect of a single cause or a single impulse. I 122 Lorenz: For example the building blocks of the skeleton are relatively independent of the whole. For example, a hunting dog cannot be cured of his passion by feeding it until it is full. >Psychological theories on behavior, >Psychological theories on drives. |
Lorenz I K. Lorenz Das sogenannte Böse Wien 1963 |
| Explanation | Maturana | I 9 Explanation/Maturana: one explains experience with experience. >Experience/Maturana. I 12 Def statement/Maturana: a generative mechanism that corresponds to the regularities of experience. This mechanism and the explanatory experience do not occur in the same phenomenal area. - The explanation does not replace the experience. - The explanation extends the area in which the observer lives. >Domains, >Niches. I 68 Language/explanation/Maturana: closed area- not to leave by linguistic means. - It follows: the logic of description is the logic of the descriptive (living) system. - Only a complete reproduction is a full explanation. >Description/Maturana. I 96 Explanation/Maturana: 1. delimitation of the to be explained system or phenomenon 2. delimitation of components and relations - Explanation = reproduction. Mechanistical: weight and sum of the weights of the parts Vitalistical: teleonomic: refers to the properties of the parts. I 146 Explanation/Maturana: always the answer to the question of the emergence of a phenomenon. Criteria: are set by the listener. - The criterion creates an explanation area. I 224 Initially our lives proceed regardless of our explanations - but its course is then entirely dependent on them. I 192 Explanation/Maturana: constitutive characteristics are not in need of explanation. I 239 Explanation area/Maturana: depends on preferences for basic assumptions - is not constituted by measuring, quantification or predictions, but by validation criteria - divided scientists belong to different communities. - They do not share the criterion of validation. >Conflicts. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Explanation | Mayr | I 99 Biology: Questions: e.g. unique events: "Why are there no hummingbirds in the old world"? E.g. "Where did Homo sapiens begin?" This leads to historical representation as the only possible form. This approach is fundamentally different from the explanation by means of causal laws. One can never categorically prove that a historical representation is "true". >Single-case causation, >Causality, >Causal explanation, >History, >Historiography. I 100 Reproducibility/Science: the uniqueness is not reserved for the living nature! E.g. each of the nine planets is unique. Every mountain range and stream has unique features on the earth. Hume/Science: cannot say anything satisfying about the cause of any unique phenomenon. >Causes, >Effect, >Causality/Hume. MayrVsHume: the historical representation can often explain unique events satisfactorily and sometimes even make verifiable predictions. >History/Mayr). I 101 History/Causation/Mayr: earlier events usually contribute causally to later ones. "Particularistic causality". I 103 Biology/explanation/Mayr: here we often find more than a causal explanation. Perhaps one has to explain most of the phenomena of biology even with several theories! A theory of science that cannot cope with pluralism is unsuitable for biology. >Theories. I 166 Explanation/biology: by direct causes: molecular biology, functional morphology, developmental biology, physiological genetics Indirect: evolutionary biology, classical genetics, ethology, systematics, comparative morphology, ecology. Problem: separation of morphology and genetics. Overlaps. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Explanation | McDowell | Rorty VI 211 Understanding/explanation/RortyVsMcDowell: we should not talk about comprehensibility. It is very easy to get: if we train two people to have the same manner of speaking. >Language behavior, >Communication, >Understanding/McDowell, cf. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Private language, >Idiolect. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Explanation | Meltzoff | Slater I 77 Explanation/function of imitation/Meltzoff: Thesis: young infants imitate in order to verify the identity of the adult who presents the imitative gesture – “are you the one who stuck his tongue out at me?” If this is the case then maybe Piaget’s infants did not imitate his facial gesture since they already knew him! Similarly, if the infants who are about to be presented with an adult modeling a gesture have previously been introduced to the experimenter the potential imitative response may be weakened. (Meltzoff and Moore 1977)(1). For more recent explanations see >Mirror neurons/psychological theories. 1. Meltzoff, A.N. & Moore, M. K. (1977). Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates. Science, 198, 75-78 Alan M. Slater, “Imitation in Infancy. Revisiting Meltzoff and Moore’s (1977) Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Explanation | Milgram | Haslam I 117 Explanations/experiment//Milgram: studies, Milgram places considerable emphasis on the tension that arises in the studies (>Experiment/Milgram) as participants are torn between ‘the competing demands of two persons: the experimenter and the victim’ (Milgram, 1963(1): 378), and he considers a wealth of factors that pull them towards the one or the other. Factors: a) the importance and prestige of the research b) the status and prestige of the researcher. Obedience: (…) obedience does not just rely on who the experimenter is, but on the relationship between the participant and the experimenter. Thus, Milgram uses the notion of ‘incipient group formation’ as an important element in explaining the effects of proximity on obedience (Milgram, 1965(2): 64). In the remote and voice-feedback variants, experimenter and teacher are alone together in the same room and this helps them bond. Relationship between the participant and the fellow actor-teachers: ‘there is identification with the disobedient confederates and the possibility of falling back on them for social support when defying the experimenter.’ (Milgram 1965 b(3): p. 133). The way that the physical environment impacts on the configuration of social relationships in the studies plays an important part in determining which voice the participant will heed and which he will ignore. Haslam I 118 Alternative explanation/Milgram: “After witnessing hundreds of ordinary people submit to the authority in our own experiments, I must conclude that Arendt’s conception of the banality of evil comes clo*ser to the truth than one might dare imagine. The ordinary person who shocked the victim did so out of a sense of obligation – a conception of his duties as a subject – and not from any peculiarly aggressive tendencies.” (Milgram 1974(4): p. 6) Banality of evil/Arendt: Milgram was influenced by Hannah Arendt’s reports of the trial of Adolf Eichman[n] in The New Yorker, later published as Eichman[n] in Jerusalem (Arendt, 1963/1991)(5). Arendt: Eichmann and his ilk, she suggested, were moved less by great hatreds than by the petty desire to do a task well and to please their superiors. Indeed, they concentrated so much on these tasks that they forgot about their consequences. For this phenomenon Arendt coined the formulation of the “banality of evil”. (Arendt 1963/1994(5): p.287). >Obedience/Milgram. Reicher/Haslam: we really have no firm understanding of why people behaved as they did in the studies (see also Miller, 2016(6); Reicher, Haslam and Miller, 2014(7)). What is clear, however, is that any account must be inadequate if it suggests that there is something inherent in the human psyche which compels us to obey. A convincing explanation must be one that is rich enough to explain the complex patterning of obedience and disobedience that Milgram discovered in the process of worrying the phenomenon to death. 1. Milgram, S. (1963) ‘Behavioral study of obedience’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67: 371–8. 2. Milgram, S. (1965a) ‘Liberating effects of group pressure’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1: 127–34. 3. Milgram, S. (1965b) ‘Some conditions of obedience and disobedience to authority’, Human Relations, 18: 57–76. 4. Milgram, S. (1974) Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View. New York, NY: Harper & Row. 5. Arendt, H. (1963/1994) Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Penguin. 6. Miller, A.G. (2016) ‘Why are the Milgram experiments still so famous — and controversial?’, in A.G. Miller (ed.), The Social Psychology of Good and Evil. New York: Guilford. pp. 185–223. 7. Reicher, S.D., Haslam, S.A. and Miller, A.G. (2014) ‘What makes a person a perpetrator? The intellectual, moral, and methodological arguments for revisiting Milgram’s research on the influence of authority’, Journal of Social Issues, 70: 393–408. Stephen Reicher and S. Alexander Haslam, „Obedience. Revisiting Milgram’s shock experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Explanation | Minsky | Minsky I 50 Explanation/parts/Minsky: The idea of a single, central Self doesn't explain anything. >Self, >I, Ego, Self, >Subject, >Person. This is because a thing with no parts provides nothing that we can use as pieces of explanation! Then why do we so often embrace the strange idea that what we do is done by Someone Else — that is, our Self? Because so much of what our minds do is hidden from the [other] parts of us that are involved with consciousness. >Consciousness, >Unconscious, >Actions, >Complexity, >Simplicity. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Explanation | Nozick | II 10 Explanation/Nozick: not based on arguments - and not on evidence - because an evidence provides no understanding. >Understanding, >Argumentation, >Proofs, >Provability, >Evidence. Hypotheses that are needed in an explanation must not be known to be true. >Hypotheses, >Knowledge. II 12 Explanation/Nozick: locates something in the topicality. >Actuality. Understanding: localizes something in the space of possibilities. >Possibility, >Truth conditions, cf. >Understanding/Dummett. II 115 Existence/explanation/Leibniz/Nozick: each factor that should explain why there is anything at all, will be part itself of what needs to be explained. cf. >Existence/Leibniz. Explanation: always happens in terms of something else - one cannot explain everything, but nothing is inexplicable in principle. >Concepts, >Description levels, >Levels/order. II 116 Explanation/Nozick: is irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive: - irreflexive: nothing explains itself. Asymmetrical: if X explains Y then Y does not explain X (not reversible). II 117 Transitive: if X explains Y and Y explains Z, then X explains Z. - With that a strict partial order is established. >Partial order. II 118f Explanation/existence/Nozick: another possibility: explanation from laws or theories. >Laws, >Theories. Question: why is there then such theories and laws. Ultimate justification/self-explanation: could one last law subsume itself? >Ultimate justification. Last law: must have any characteristic C - all other laws. Problem: truth is not proven from form. >Truth, >Proofs, >Provability. II 120 Explanation/level/stage/Nozick: some authors: the statement must be deeper than the explained. KripkeVs: new theory: statements themselves seek the appropriate level - the highest level/stage/Kripke: those to which the sentence to its reference is applied to. >Truth/Kripke, >S.A. Kripke, >Fixped points/Kripke. Nozick: then P has to be, when used in a deduction, one level lower than its instance - then a deduced statement is lower when it subsumes something than when it is subsumed. >Deduction. II 120 Self-explanation/Nozick: self subsumption explains itself in the quantifier logic - Otherwise:. explanation is irreflexive - that means, it cannot explain itself. Bare facts/Nozick: a) something that cannot be explained by something else b) weaker: something that cannot be explained by something else. Then the explanatory self subsumption is a bare fact that explains itself. >Bare facts. II 305 Explanation/Nozick: one says, an explanation should not have less (for example, semantic) depth than the explained. >Semantics, >Semantic facts. II 308 Causation/Descartes: cannot be less deep than the effect (principle). >Cause, >Effect, >Description levels, >Levels/order, >Principles. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Explanation | Pauen | Pauen I 190ff Explanatory gap/Pauen: there is an explanatory gap between science and folk psychology. >Folk psychology, >Everyday language, >Psychology, >Science. The problem is in principle unsolvable because of the difference between entities. - Everyday terms must be explained causally. >Causality, >Causal explanation. Problem: mental, particularly phenomenal states can not in principle be translated into causal roles. >Intentionality, >Intentions, >Causal role, >Roles. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Explanation | Peacocke | I 71 Explanation/behavior/Peacocke: assuming, the spatial relations of a subject determine its settings. Problem: then we could explain the behavior solely from the accepted beliefs of the subject without mentioning the spatial relations. >Belief attitudes, >Spatial localization, >Behavior, >Behavioral explanation. I 81 Narrow explanation/Peacocke: E.g. someone has only the terms "there is an F", "there are two Fs", "There are three Fs" and "the Fs are numerically equivalent to the Gs". Then operations with higher numbers are explainable with these few terms. >Numerical equality. E.g. He actually arranges 20 pebbles and pieces of gold one to one. Then there is no difference in his intentional actions without one which is formulated with its few terms. >Intentions. Problem: such an unstructured ability would then be necessary and a priori. "Numerically equivalent"/numerical equality: can be treated as an unstructured operator of 2nd order. >Operators, >Description levels, >Levels/order, >Second Order Logic. I 133ff Explanation/Peacocke/Nozick: must rely on the nature of the object, not on the manner of givenness. - ((s) intension: is virtually equated with appearance- "nature" with "real object".) >Way of givenness, >Intensions. I 185 Action explanation/Peacocke: by properties of objects - explanation of thoughts: by specific markings - better: by the object itself. --- I 192 Action explanation/Peacocke: in the case of properties no specific object is meant: E.g. "red lamp", not "John's favorite color" - demonstrative: specific object, descriptively: can also be another object. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Explanation | Pinker | I 54 Explanation/Pinker: bad evolutionary explanation: E.g. Humor weakens tension; - happy people find more allies. Good explanation: brings technical analysis that is independent of the explanatory part. - Begins with objectives in a world with causes and effects. To understand seeing of humans and animals, we need to look at machines. E.g. nausea in pregnancy: defense against toxins. Bad explanation: Freud: desire for oral abortion. I 124 Explanation/Pinker: here it is about according to which principles things function - not about what things are "good examples" for a well-known term. >Principles, >Laws of nature, >Causal explanation, >Understanding, >Evidence, >Observation, >Functional explanation. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Explanation | Putnam | Rorty I 255 Putnam (according to Rorty): e.g. we will never have a microphysical explanation why square pins do not fit into round holes ((s) Vs the thesis, that actually everything could be explained by microphysical facts). --- Münch III 271 Explanation/Putnam: we must distinguish between explanations and "parents of explanations" (e.g. why square pins do not fit into round holes. The explanation would follow through different parameters like stability, outline, microstructures.) (Stephen M. Kosslyn/James R. Pomerantz, Imagery, Propositions and the Form of Internal Representations”, Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76.) --- Putnam I (g) 186 Intrinsic Explanation/Putnam: if there were intrinsic explanations within the world, the world itself would be like a ghost - then materialism cannot be true. >Intrinsicness, >Materialism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Explanation | Pylyshyn | Corr I 416 Explanation/Cognitive Science/Pylyshyn/Matthews: proposed a framework that allows for three qualitatively different levels of expelnation (Pylyshyn 1999)(1): 1. Knowledge = Goals, intentions and personal meaning, supporting adaption to external environments 2. Symbol processing a) Algorithm = Formal specification of program for symbol manipulation b) Functional architecture = Real-time processing operations supporting symbol manipulation 3. Biology = Physical, neuronal representation of processing. >Personality/Neurobiology, >Arousal/Neurobiology. 1. Pylyshyn, Z. W. 1999. What’s in your mind?, in E. Lepore and Z. W. Pylyshyn (eds.), What is cognitive science?, pp. 1–25. Oxford: Blackwell Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
PsychPyly I Zenon W. Pylyshyn Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World Cambrindge, MA 2011 Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Explanation | Railton | Lewis V 233 Probability/Explanation/covering law model/deductive-nomological/Peter Railton: According to Railton's model, an explanation has two parts: 1st. a D-N argument (deductively nomological argument), which satisfies some conditions of the non probabilistic case. Its premises can also include probability laws. 2nd (not part of the argument): The finding that the event has taken place. If the premises say that certain events have taken place, then these are sufficiently given together the laws for the actual event or for probability. >Deductive-nomological. Problem: a subset - given even only a part of the laws - can also be sufficient to explain parts of the events, and produce a number of remnants that are still sufficient under the original laws. Therefore, one must have two conditions when explaining: 1. that certain events together are sufficient for the Explanandum event (under the prevailing laws) 2. that only some of the laws are needed to guarantee the sufficiency of the conditions. >Sufficiency. LewisVsRailton: if we had a covering law for causation, along with our covering law for explanation, that would reconcile my approach with the covering law approach. But that is not available! >Covering laws. V 233/234 Often one element of the sufficient reason of the D-N set (deductive-nomological) will in reality be one of the causes itself. But that must not be! The counter-examples are well known: 1. to the sufficient subset can belong a completely irrelevant reason, the requirement of the minimalism does not help: we could produce an artificial minimalism, by taking weaker laws and leaving stronger laws unconsidered. Example Salmon: A man takes the pill and does not get pregnant! The premise that nobody who takes the pill becomes pregnant must not be omitted! 2 An element of the sufficient subset could be something that is not an event: For example, a premise can determine that something has an extrinsic or highly disjunctive property. that cannot specify any real events. 3. an effect may belong to the subset if the laws say that it can only be produced in a certain way. I.e. the quantity could be minimal in a suitable way, and also be one of events, but that would not be sufficient to make the effect the cause of its cause! 4. such an effect can also be sufficient subset for another effect, e.g. of a later, same cause. For example, that a commercial appears on my TV is caused by the same broadcast as the same commercial appears on your TV, but the one is not the cause of the other. Rather, they have a common cause. 5. a prevented potential cause could be part of the subset because nothing has overridden it. LewisVsRailton: this shows that the common sufficient subset presented by D-N argument may not be a set of causes. V 235 LewisVsRailton: if a D-N argument seems to show no causes, but still seems to be an explanation, this is a problem for my own theory. >Explanation/Lewis. VsHempel: refractive index, VsRailton: in reality there are no non-causal cases. RailtonVsLewis: if the D-N model does not present causes, and therefore does not look like an explanation, then this is a problem for the D-N model. Railton: therefore not every D-N model is a correct explanation. V 236 Question: can any causal history be characterized by the information contained in a D-N argument (deductive-nomological argument)? This would be the case if each cause belongs to a sufficient subset - given the laws. Or in the probabilistic case: under probability laws. And is that so that the causes fall under it? Lewis: That does not follow from the counterfactual analysis of causality! Nevertheless, it may be true. (It will be true in a possible world with sufficiently strict laws. If explanatory information is information about causal history, then one way to deliver it is via D-N arguments. But then there's still something wrong! The D-N arguments are presented as ideal. I.e. they have the right form. nothing too much and not too little. But nobody thinks that everyday explaining fulfills this. Normally the best we can do is to make existential assumptions. "Therefore" assertion/Morton White: we can take as existential assumptions. LewisVsRailton: correct D-N arguments as existence assumptions are not yet a real explanation. Simply because of their form, they do not meet the standard of how much information is sufficient. Lewis: There's always more to know, no matter how perfect the D N arguments are. The D N A always only give a cross-section of the causal history. Many causes may be omitted. And this could be the one we are looking for right now. Perhaps we would like to get to know the mechanisms involved in certain traces of causal history. V 238 Explanation/Lewis/VsRailton: a D-N argument can also be of wrong form: not giving us enough too much at the same time. Explanation/Lewis: it is not that we have a different idea of the unity of the explanation. We should not demand unity at all: an explanation is not something you can have or miss, but something you can have more or less of. Problem: the idea of having "enough" explanation: it nourishes doubts about the knowledge of our ancestors: they rarely or never had complete knowledge of the laws of nature. LewisVsRailton: I.e. they rarely or never had complete D-N arguments. Did they therefore have incomplete explanatory knowledge? I think no! They knew a lot about how things were caused. Solution/Railton: (similar to my picture): together with each Explanandum we have an extended and complex structure. V 239 Lewis: For me these structures are connected by causal dependence Railton: for him they consist of an "ideal text" of D-N arguments (deductively nomological arguments) as in mathematical proofs. >Causal dependence, >Causality, >Causes, >Causal explanation. |
Railt P. Railton Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays toward a Morality of Consequence Cambridge 1999 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Explanation | Ricoeur | II 71 Understanding/explanation/Ricoeur: (...) it may be said, at least in an introductory fashion, that - understanding: is to reading what the event of discourse is to the utterance of discourse and that - explanation: is to reading what the verbal and textual autonomy is to the objective. meaning of discourse. >Discourse/Ricoeur. II 72 Explanation/tradition: finds its paradigmatic field of application in the natural sciences. When there are external facts to observe, hypotheses to be submitted to empirical verification, general laws for covering such facts, theories to encompass the scattered laws in a systematic whole, and subordination of empirical generalizations to hypothetic-deductive procedures, then we may say that we "explain." Understanding/tradition: Understanding, in contrast, finds its originary field of application in the human sciences (the German Geisteswissenschaften), where science has to do with the experience of other subjects or other minds similar to our own. It relies on the meaningfulness of such forms of expression as physiognomic, gestural, vocal, or written signs, and upon documents II 73 and monuments, which share with writing the general character of inscription. The immediate types of expression are meaningful because they refer directly to the experience of the other mind which they convey. Tradition/Ricoeur: The dichotomy between understanding and explanation in Romanticist hermeneutics is both epistemological and ontological. It opposes two methodologies and two spheres of reality, nature and mind. II 75 Understanding/Ricoeur: (...) we have to guess the meaning of the text because the author's intention is beyond our reach. II 79 Interpretation: (...) if it is true that there is always more than one way of construing a text, it is not true that all interpretations are equal. The text presents a limited field of possible constructions. The logic of validation allows us to move between the two limits of dogmatism and scepticism. It is always possible to argue for or against an interpretation, to confront interpretations, to arbitrate between them and to seek agreement, even if this agreement remains beyond our immediate reach. II 81 Structural Linguistics/interpretation/understanding/Ricoeur: [the approach of the structural schools of literary criticism] proceeds from the acknowledgement of what I have called the suspension or suppression of the ostensive reference. (>Reference/Ricoeur). The text intercepts the "worldly" dimension of the discourse - the relation to a world which could be shown - in the same way as it disrupts the connection of the discourse to the subjective intention of the author. According to this choice, the text no longer has an exterior, it only has an interior. To repeat, the very constitution of the text as a text and of the system of texts as literature justifies this conversion of the literary object into a closed system of signs, analogous to the kind of closed system that phonology discovered underlying all discourse, and which Saussure called langue. Literature, according to this working hypothesis, becomes an analogon of langue. >Langue/Ricoeur. II 86 Explanation/literature/texts/Ricoeur: [The] transposition of a linguistic model to the theory of narrative perfectly corroborates my initial remark regarding the contemporary understanding of explanation. Today ((s) 1976) the concept of explanation is no longer borrowed from the natural sciences and transferred into a different field, that of written documents. It proceeds from the common sphere of language thanks to the analogical transference from the small units of language (phonemes and lexemes) to the large units beyond the sentence, including narrative, folklore, and myth. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Explanation | Rorty | Carnap: the movement of anything and everybody can be predicted based on the movement of elementary particles. Rorty: that way we should be on top of all that living things, but we would not have explained it! >Other authors on explaining. Elementary particles are well applicable in any section of the universe, but the talk of politicians or emerald flowers only in particular contexts. >Context, >Natural laws, >Generalization. I 230 Knowledge/Rorty: there is no reason to object to statements about the acquisition of knowledge that refer to internal representations. But explanation and justification must be distinguished: one can put forward such explanations without reviving the traditional mind-body problem. Justification: E.g. through sensual data. Explanation: causal. I 234 Explanation: How can you say when a complete causal explanation of X must contain statements about X. >Justification, >Causal explanation. VI 212 Understanding/Explanation/RortyVsMcDowell: we should not talk about comprehensibility! Comprehensibility is very cheap to have: if we train two people to speak the same way!. >Understanding. Horwich I 452 Explanation/Rorty: something that changes, while everything else remains the same cannot be an explanation. >Covariance, >Absoluteness. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Explanation | Salmon | Fraassen I 122 Definition Explanation/W. Salmon: (new): consists in the demonstration of the relevant part of the causal network that leads to the events that have to be explained. Sometimes it is about investigating forwards and backwards in the network. E.g. Barometer: >Relevance - ->Common cause. Schurz I 234 Probability /Explanation/W.Salmon/Ontology/Schurz: (Salmon 1971(1), 63, 1984(2)): Ex If an improbable event occurs, the explanation must contain the statement of the low probability value! And this is then the reason! Ex In a Mendelian crossing experiment, the probability for red is 75% and for white 25%. Then the occurrence of white must be justified with the probability of 25 % (against 75 %)! Logical form: "p(white(x) I Ax) = 25 %, Ab// (0.25) white(b)". Although the antecedent here lowers the probability of the explanadum event! I 235 Salmon: Therefore, we may only require the antecedent to be positively or negatively relevant. Hempel/Schurz: The late Hempel was convinced that. >Explanation/Hempel. CartwrighVsSalmon: It is counterintuitive to say that the event occurred because some factor was present that made it improbable. Solution/Humphreys/Schurz: (Humphreys 1989(3),117) we refer to these as countercauses. (Schurz pro). We then say that the event occurred even though the antecedent occurred. >Explanation/Cartwright. 1. Salmon, W. et al. (1971). Statistical explanation and Statistical Relvance (with Contributions by R.C. Jeffrey and J.G. Greeno). London: University of Pittsburg Press. 2. Salmon, W. (1984) Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton University Press. 3. Humphreys, P. (1989). The Chances of Explanation. Princeton University Press. |
Sal I Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 German Edition: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sal II W. Salmon The Foundations Of Scientific Inference 1967 SalN I N. Salmon Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II 2007 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Explanation | Schiffer | I 140 Explanation/reduction/Schiffer: if semantics can be reduced to the psychological, the contents of propositional attitudes can be explained without reference to meanings in public language. >Semantics, >Content, >Propositional attitudes, >Meaning, >Everyday language. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Explanation | Schmader | Haslam I 252 Explanation/stereotype threat/Forbes/Schmader: Thesis: we proposed an integrated process model of stereotype threat whereby priming stereotype threat elicits a cascade of stress-based physiological, negative appraisal, self-regulatory and performance-monitoring processes as people try to make sense of and cope with this threat to their identity (Schmader et al., 2008)(1). Manipulations of stereotype threat impair working memory (Schmader and Johns, 2003)(2), impair performance on working- memory-intensive tasks (Beilock et al., 2007)(3), and have their strongest effects on those with lower working-memory capacity (Régner et al., 2010)(4). Furthermore, although the original studies did not find clear evidence of increased anxiety under stereotype threat, subsequent research has established that it increases physiological biomarkers of stress including higher blood pressure (Blascovich, et al., 2001)(5) and skin conductance (Osborne, 2006(6), 2007(7)). This autonomic stress response is coupled with negative appraisal processes as stereotype-threatened individuals sometimes report heightened levels of explicit (Spencer et al., 1999)(8) and implicit anxiety (Johns et aL, 2008(9); Bosson et al., 2004(10)), negative expectations (Sekaquaptewa et al., 2007(10); Stangor et al., 1998(12)), feelings of dejection (Keller and Dauenheimer, 2003)(13), and task-related worries (Beilock et al., 2007(3); Cadinu et al., 2005(14)). >Stereotype threat/Forbes/Schmader, >Stereotype threat/Psychological theories, >Stereotypes/Social psychology. 1. Schmader, T., Johns, M. and Forbes, C. (2008) ‘An integrated process model of stereotype threat effects on performance’, Psychological Review, 115: 336—56. 2. Schmader, T. and Johns, M. (2003) ‘Converging evidence that stereotype threat reduces working memory capacity’,Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85: 440—52. 3. Beilock, S.L., Rydell, R.J. and McConnell, A.R. (2007) ‘Stereotype threat and working memory: Mechanisms, alleviation, and spillover’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 136(2): 256-76 4. Régner, I., Smeding, A., Gimmig, D., Thinus-Blanc, C., Monteil,J. and Huguet, P. (2010) ‘Individual differences in working memory moderate stereotype-threat effects’, Psychological Science, 21: 1646—8. 5. Blascovich,J., Spencer, S.J., Quinn, D. and Steele, C. (2001) ‘African Americans and high blood pressure: The role of stereotype threat’, Psychological Science, 12: 22 5—9. 6. Osborne,J.W. (2006) ‘Gender, stereotype threat and anxiety: Psychophysiological and cognitive evidence’, Journal of Research in Educational Psychology, 8: 109—3 8. 7. Osborne, J.W. (2007) ‘Linking stereotype threat and anxiety’, Educational Psychology, 27: 135—54. 8. Spencer, S.J., Steele, C.M. and Quinn, D.M. (1999) ‘Stereotype threat and women’s math performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35:4—28. 9. Johns, M., Inzucht, M. and Schmader, T. (2008) Stereotype threat and executive resource depletion: Examining the influence of emotion regulation’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 137: 691—705. 10. Sekaquaptewa, D., Waidman, A. and Thompson, M. (2007) So1o status and self-construal: Being distinctive influences racial self-construal and performance apprehension in African American women’, Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 13:321— 7. 11. Stangor, C., Carr, C. and Kiang, L. (1998) ‘Activating stereotypes undermines task performance expectations’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75: 1 191—7. 13. Keller, J. and Dauenheimer, D. (2003) 1Stereotype threat in the classroom: Dejection mediates the disrupting threat effect on womens math performance’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29: 371—81. 14. Cadinu, M., Maass, A., Rosabianca, A. and Kiesner,J. (2005) Why do women underperform under stereotype threat?’, Psychological Science, 16: 5 72—8. Toni Schmader and Chad Forbes, “Stereotypes and Performance. Revisiting Steele and Aronson’s stereotypes threat experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Explanation | Schurz | I 30 Explanation/Schurz: Explanation concerns only facts that have already occurred. Otherwise it refers to a prediction. Both have the form of deductive or probabilistic arguments. >Facts, >States of affairs, >Prediction, >Probability, >Deduction. I 92 Notation: II- : "follows logically". Explanation scheme/logical form/explanation/Schurz: strict all proposition & singular proposition II- singular proposition. All A are K and a is A II- a is K. Falsification scheme/falsification/logical form/Schurz: FS I: singular proposition falsifies strict universal sentence. singular sentence II- negation of strict universal sentence a is A and not K II- not all A are K FS II: existence sentence falsifies strict all proposition There is an A that is not a K II- not all A are K. >Universal sentence. I 225 Explanation/law/Schurz: More important than explanation of events is explanation of laws by higher-level theories. Problem: irrelevance and redundancy. Therefore Hempel considered laws only implicitly. Logical form: "T U A / G" (U: union). T: is a set of laws or axioms of theories, all of which are essentially quantified and some of which are essentially general. A: (antecedent) is a (possibly empty) set of sing propositions or localized existential propositions. G: an essentially general proposition. Ex Theoretical explanation of planetary orbits Ex Theoretical explanation of Piaget's law of development. I 227 Causality/explanation/causal explanation/Schurz: problem: Ex "If A, then E will be the case": is L equivalent with its contraposition. "If Not E, then Not A was the case". Problem: "Not E" cannot be a cause of Not A! >Causal explanation/Schurz. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Explanation | Scriven | Wright I 156 Explanation/Scriven/Wright, G. H.: The arguments by Scriven and Dray are related to my criticism of the scheme, Scriven uses the successful wording that Hempel's approach "gives the individual case away". (Scriven, p. 467). Scriven: an event can move freely within a network of statistical laws, but is located within the "normic network" and explained by this localization. (Scriven(1), p. 467). >Events, >Statistics, >Laws. Schurz I 229 Explanation/Self-Explanation/Scriven: (Scriven 1959a(1), 468 469): Problem: It often happens that we explain an effect E by a real reason A, but our only reason for believing it is that we have observed the effect. >Causal explanation, >Effect, >Cause. "Self-confirming explanation/self-affirmation/self-justification/ Hempel: (1965(2),372): Ex red shift: is explained by the expansion of the universe, but the only reason to think the hypothesis of expansion is confirmed is the red shift itself. ((s) No "side perspective"). Solution/Schurz: a deductive nomological reason must have a prognostic function. There must be in knowledge W a set of evidences that confirm the antecedent without logically implying the event. This requirement is violated in Ex. Redshift. >Redshift. Chaos/explanation/short: it cannot be predicted when the avalanche will depart, but when it has departed, it can be accurately explained that there was a reduction in friction. ((s) post hoc, post festum). I 230 Relevance/explanation: solution to the problem of irrelevance: "irreducible representation" (without redundant elements). Any law premise must also satisfy the relevance condition. >Relevance. Law/explanation/Schurz/(s): if a law is needed for explanation, it is in the premise. 1. Scriven, M. (1959a). Truisms as Grounds for Historical Explanations. IN: P. Gardiner (ed.) Theories of History, New YOrk, The Free Press. 2. Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, New York: Free Press. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Explanation | Searle | III 156 Explanation/Searle: the mechanism explains the behavior and the mechanism is explained by the system of rules, but the mechanism needs not to be a system of rules itself. Yet, there is no behaviorism because social conventions are at work. The rules must not be aware. >Rules. --- V 21 Explanation/Searle: non-extensional statements are not explanations because you have to have an idea of what success/failure is. ((s) E.g. citing a belief is not an explanation.) >Extension, >Intension. V 230 Explanation/Searle: that something follows from a fact is not an explanation of a word and a consequence is not an explanation. >Entailment, >Conditional, >Consequence, >Fact/Searle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Explanation | Strawson | IV 146 explanation/causality/Strawson: if causality is a relationship in nature, then statement is another. >Causality. It is not a relationship between things but between facts and truths. Explanation.: an explanation is a non-natural fact which extends to a natural fact which leads to a knowledge. - Here all objects are intentional. The correct description must always be selected. >Intentionality, >Facts/Strawson, cf. >Causal explanation. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Explanation | Tugendhat | I 206 Explanation/Wittgenstein/Tugendhat: It is always about the how, not the why. >Physics, >Why questions. II 248 Explanation/Tugendhat: We cannot explain what we mean by identity by Leibniz's law. >Leibniz principle, >Indistinguishability, >Identity, >Being. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Explanation | Vollmer | I 228 Explanation / Vollmer: misconception: each cognitive system would have to be more complex than the object that it explains. I 278 Explanation/"too much"/"too little"/Vollmer: a tautological explanation explains too little, an untestable explanation explains too much. >Theories, >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Strength of theories, >Stronger/weaker, >Verification. I 279 Questions/Science/Biology/Evolution/Vollmer: the question "Why?" is in biology always welcome - even if it does not always find an answer. II 58 Why-questions / Science / VollmerVsFeynman / Vollmer: why questions must always be asked - when they are unanswerable, they are therefore not illegitimate. - This shows the relational character of explanations. >Why-questions. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Explanation | Weizenbaum | I 197 Explanation/Weizenbaum: Question: What can explain the solution of a task and what cannot? >Problems, >Problem solving, >Best explanation, >Explanations, >Causal explanation, >Theories, >World/thinking. |
Weizenbaum I Joseph Weizenbaum Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation, W. H. Freeman & Comp. 1976 German Edition: Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft Frankfurt/M. 1978 |
| Explanation | Wilson | I 93 Explanation/Science/Wilson, E. O.: One of the scientific mantras means that physical explanations are necessary but not sufficient. >Necessity, >Sufficiency. There are too many idiosyncrasies in the structure of a cell nucleus and other organelles including their molecules, and there is far too much complexity in the constantly changing chemical exchange of a cell with the environment, than conceptual interconnections of this kind would be possible. >Complexity, >Simplicity. |
WilsonEO I E. O. Wilson Consilience. The Unity of Knowledge, New York 1998 German Edition: Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge New York 1998 |
| Explanation | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 29 Inexplicable/explanation/analysis/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: not the usual language use is unanalysable and inexplicable according to Wittgenstein - but the language games are. I 190 Explanation/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Metaphysics (> Metaphysics/Duhem). Large typescript: "Supposing my face image would be two equal red circles on a blue background: what's here available in a double number, and what just once? One could say we have a color here and two locations. But it was also said that red and circular were properties of two objects, which could be called spots and which are in a certain spatial relationship to each other. Sounds like an explanation of physics. I could also answer: two red lanterns, etc. But an explanation is not required here (trying to solve our dissatisfaction by an explanation is the mistake of metaphysics) (> Metaphysics/Duhem). What is worrying to us, is the ambiguity about the grammar of the sentence "I see two red circles on a blue background." I can also say: "I see the color red in two different locations" but then the grammar of the words "spot", "location" , "color" would need to align to the words of the first sentence. The confusion arises here in that we believe that we have to decide about the presence or absence of an object (spot). Like when you decide whether what I see (in a physical sense) is a red coat or a reflex. I 238 Demonstrate/ostensive definition/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in the lectures of the early 30s the ostensive definition is downright rejected. "The ostensive definition does not lead us beyond the symbolism ... thus we can do nothing further than to replace a symbolism with another." HintikkaVsWittgenstein: that is, one might think, blatantly wrong because gestures of pointing can well lead us away from the field of purely linguistic. WittgensteinVsVs: denies that. He explains what we accomplish through ostensive explanation is not a connection between language and reality, but a connection between the written or spoken language on the one hand and the sign language on the other hand. Ostensive explanation/Wittgenstein: is nothing more than a calculus. I 255 Explanation/WittgensteinVsExplanation/Hintikka: "Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we should see the facts as "primordial phenomena". In the later philosophy the language games are really the measure of all things. --- II 44 Indicative Definition: With this, however, nothing more is done than adding something to the symbolism. II 45 It will not lead us beyond this symbolism. We just replace a set of symbols by another. The explanation of the meaning of symbols will in turn be indicated to the symbols. II 56 Explanation/Science/Wittgenstein: we explain an event in physics by describing another event - Analysis: finding out something new - not so in philosophy. II 60 Music/Language/Wittgenstein: #, b, resolution characters are signals in the strict sense. The language does not consist of signals. A signal must be explained, and the explanation must indicate something, whereby the signal is supplemented. We explain them in the same sense as colors. Besides the word "green" we need something else, additional. II 61 Explanation/Wittgenstein: the sentence with the explanation is not in this way different from the explanation itself. The explanation of a sentence is always something like a definition that replaces a symbol set by another. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Explanation | Wright | I 182 Best Opinion/ethics/morality/Wright: we will see in Chapter 5 that moral issues do not occur in the best explanations of our moral beliefs. >Best Explanation/Wright. I 196f Best explanation/Wright: an explanation cannot be the best if it does not contain certain details. (But this is not supposed to be any naturalistic or scientific reductionist kind of explanation). An explanation will not be considered the best, as long as there is a competing equally good explanation, but which does not use the cognitive susceptibility. If such a declaration is actually equally good, it will explain why the (different) person in his community does not stand out. >Community, >Language community, >Convention. But then, the entire community can be considered deficient. The specific cognitive ability, thus becomes a fifth wheel. >D. Wiggins, >Cognitive Coercion, >Causal Role. I 240 Best explanation/Physics: should the best explanation not always be the same? Finally, the causal antecedents are, so to say, already in place, whatever the fate of the theory will be later. Why should the best explanation go beyond the statement of reasons and laws that precisely explain the forces that generate our beliefs? Wright: There is no reason why the best explanation should refer to any state of affairs which actually conveys truth to the theory, as we assume. Best explanation/Physics/Wright: should consist in scientific heritage, as well as in observations and certain psychological laws. >Explanation/Harman. ((s) So there is no mentioning of the facts.) Could the best explanation not always be "done better" , by always searching for a more fundamental level (for example: subatomic, etc.) If explanations are only best if they are valid, then they will always "overtake" their content. >Assertibility, >Superassertibility, >Ideal assertibility. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Exploitation | Robinson | Harcourt I 231 Exploitation/Robinson/Harcourt: Joan Robinson(1),(2) has placed considerable emphasis on the rate of exploitation - the ratio of net profits to wages - in her explanations of distributive shares in the short run and the rate of profits in the long run. The latest statement of her views is in Robinson [1971](2), also Robinson [1970b](3), p. 315 and Robinson [1970c](4). Thus, in a modern capitalist economy with strongly unionized workers, oligopolistic industries and near full-employment conditions (for Report from Iron Mountain reasons rather than for neo-neoclassical or Kaldorian ones though), mark-ups in different trades tend to become conventionalized.* >Trade Unions, >Full employment, >Wages, >Labour, >Unemployment, >Neoclassicals, >N. Kaldor. This occurs both because stable mark-ups allow firms to have certain retention ratios and because, in a rough-and-ready way, firms find from experience that their conventional mark-ups earn them certain realized rates of profits. Wage: Wages overall therefore tend to rise as fast as overall productivity (sometimes lagging for a while as, for example, in the United States over 1961-5, when the workers were conned into doing their bit to cure inflation while the profit-receivers took advantage of this to lengthen their profit margins: see Evans [1969](5), pp. 540-1, Robinson [1969e](6)). Relative prices: Relative prices may then be treated as if they were determined by technical conditions (which change over time with technical progress,'deepening' and scales of operation) and a uniform structure of rates of profits (or, alternatively, a given real wage at any moment of time). Exploitation/Rate of profit: If, finally, the rate of profits, whether determining or determined, fluctuates around a level of g/sc, because these parameters are related to why the rate-of -exploitation (which in turn reflects the businessmen's ability to realize their investment plans) is what it is in the first place, g being related (via the expected rate of profits) to investment expenditure, sc being related to saving levels from company profits, we have, in outline, a short-run and a long-run theory of distributive shares and prices. The rate of profits would, of course, be considerably greater than the rate of interest, because we have brought back risk and uncertainty. >Entrepreneurship, >Investments, >Business, >Economy. Harcourt I 232 Rate of interest/Harcourt: However, with Davidson's and Joan Robinson's help, plus references to Marshall, Wicksell, Fisher and Keynes, the determination of the rate of interest could also be sketched in >A. Marshall, >K. Wicksell, >F. M. Fisher, >J.M. Keynes. That this may seem slimming fare after the rich diets to which we have become accustomed is unquestioned; but that it is also healthy fare, fitting us for developments in the right direction, seems to me at least a working hypothesis. For „Presumably, no one would deny that there is more hope of understanding what is going on in the world when we recognize that the wage bargain is made in terms of money; that the level of prices is influenced by effective demand and the degree of imperfection of competition; that accumulation is controlled by the policy of firms and governments, not by the propensity to consume of private citizens, and that today is an ever moving break in time between an irrevocable past and an uncertain future. To understand is not easy, but at least we could try.“ (Robinson [1965b](1), p. 68.) * Clearly, this hypothesis is related to Kalecki's degree of monopoly theories. Riach [1971](7) has written an excellent paper in which he shows that the charge that Kalecki's statements are tautological is unfounded and that, in fact, Kalecki has provided a behavioural relationship which leads to a testable set of hypotheses. 1. Robinson, Joan [1965b], Collected Economic Papers, Vol. Ill (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). pp. 173-81, 2. Robinson, Joan [1971] Economic Heresies: Some Old-fashioned Questions in Economic Theory (New York: Basic Books). 3. Robinson, Joan, [1970b] 'Review of C. E. Ferguson, The Neoclassical Theory of Production and Distribution, 1969', Economic Journal, LXXX, pp. 336-9. 4. Robinson, Jaon [1970c] 'Harrod after Twenty-one Years', Economic Journal, LXXX, pp. 731-7. 23. Champernowne, D. G. [1958] 'Capital Accumulation and the Maintenance of Full Employment'. Economic Journal, Lxvin, pp. 211-44 5. Evans, Michael K. [1969] Macroeconomic Activity. Theory, Forecasting, and Control.An Econometric Approach (New York: Harper and Row). 6. Robinson, Joan [1969e] 'The Theory of Value Reconsidered', Australian Economic Papers, vm, pp. 13-19. 7. Riach, P. A. [1971] 'Kalecki's "Degree of Monopoly" Reconsidered', Australian Economic Papers, x, pp. 50-60. |
EconRobin I James A. Robinson James A. Acemoglu Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 Robinson I Jan Robinson An Essay on Marxian Economics London 1947 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Expressions | Lyons | I 63 Expression/Realisation/Linguistics/Lyons: An expression can be realized in any substance. ((s) Different languages are possible). Def substance/Lyons: here: (sound, graphic material) etc. I 64 Substance: is the medium by which the differences are made. It must be sufficiently stable. >Writing, >Language, >Phonemes, >Morphemes. I 68 Expression element/Lyons: (= sounds) their only function (if considered separately from substantial realisation) is I 69 1. Combinatorial function: (combination) their ability to form groups to make words and sentences recognizable. 2. contrastive function: (contrast): mutual distinction. Saussure: Thesis: The elements of expression (generally all linguistic units) are essentially negative (each element is in contrast (opposition) to any other element that may occur in words in the same position. Cf. >F. de Saussure, >Language, >Grammar, >Syntax. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Expressions | Saussure | Lyons I 68 Element of expression/Lyons: (= Phonemes) its only function (if considered detached from substantial realization) is combinatorial function. Lyons I 69 1. combinatorial function: (combination) their ability to group together to make words and phrases recognizable.. 2. Contrastive Function: (contrast): mutual distinction. Saussure: Thesis: The elements of expression (in general, all linguistic units) are essentially negative (each element is in contrast (opposition) to every other element that can occur in the same position in words. >Phonemes, >Words, >Word meaning, >Syntax, >Grammar, >Meaning, >Semantics. |
F. de Saussure I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius) Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Expressions | Tarski | Skirbekk I 142f Linguistic expressions/Tarski: linguistic expressions are physical objects. Proposition: a proposition is an ideal object. Truth: truth is applicable only in respect of a particular language. Truth semantically: semantic truth is fundamentally different from satisfaction, designation, definition. >Satisfaction, >Designation, >Definitions. Mathematics: provability and truth often fall apart. >Provability, >Truth. We need a metalanguage because the object language must not contain the truth predicate ((s) because of possible paradoxes).(1) >Paradoxes, >Metalanguage, >Levels. 1. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
| Extensionality | Brandom | I 499 Extensionality/Homogeneity: a context is extensional if the possible world equivalent relation does not have to be divided more finely than the designation equivalent relation: (Problem: the equivalence of "Snow is white" and "Grass is green"). - Therefore, the relationship between designated inferences and inferetial role of freestanding sentences is not homogeneous. - It is not sufficient to know whether the sentences are true inferences - (because sentences are no inferences at all). Therefore we need a different extensionality at the top level: a sentential context with embedded phrases is extensional in the sense of being part homogeneous iff the substitution of statements with the same inferential role never changes the inferential role of the contained sentence. >Inferential role. I 500 This is not always the case: E.g. the role of the expression "S claims that p" does not depend on the role p has for the speaker, but on the role he has for S. Cf. >Intensionality, >Intensions, >Extensions. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Extensionality | Peacocke | I 36 Extensionality/Peacocke: Problem: It is difficult to explain how an object that is actually red, might have had a different color. - ((s) Counterfactuals can not be explained extensionally). >Extension, >Intension, >Intensionality, >Explanation, >Counterfactuals, >Explanation, >Knowledge, >World/Thinking. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Exterior/interior | Maturana | I 98 Recursion/within/without/Maturana: through recursive distinctions the observer can operate as if he moves outside his circumstances. (Self-reference, application of operations an operations). >Recursion, >Self-reference. I 113f Unity/closed system/Maturana: within/without is only for the observer not by Input/Output describable, otherwise open system. >Systems, >Input/Output. I 121 Distinction from hallucination for nervous system not possible, part of the cognitive domain of the observer. >Observation/Maturana, >Nervous system. I 183 Definition Life/Maturana: in ontogenetic drift push through a range of interference, while a constantly changing niche is realized. >Life, >Niche. Living System/: operates only in the present. - It is open for the passage of molecules (parts of autopoietic systems). Purpose: is part of the observer. >Purposes. Living systems have no within/without - they are in the process of autopoiesis or disintegrated. >Autopoiesis. Environment: is not "used" by the system. - Instead living systems they bring their own niche out. I 194 Life is knowledge - living systems are cognitive systems. >Knowledge, >Cognition. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Exterior/interior | Rorty | I 458 Semantics/explanation/prediction/theory/Leeds/Arthur Fine/Rorty: you cannot use semantics to explain success of predictions. - The circle stems from the attempt to be simultaneously inside and outside of our investigations. - Important argument: you do not have to choose between inside/outside, you just have to keep it apart. >Circularity, >Levels/Order. IV 116 f Distinction/within/without/logical form/Rorty: common form of this problem: you cannot say that only something of type x is understandable. IV 117 If the listener has to know what a non-x is. However, this formulation is also unsatisfactory, because the concept of intelligibility is unclear when applied to things (e.g. noumenon or infinite substance). >Understanding, >Things in themselves, >Context dependence. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Externalism | Burge | Esfeld I 149 Social Externalism/Esfeld: is implied by social holism, since the convictions are at least partly determined by the social environment. >Individuation. (Scientific camp: Tyler Burge, 1979(1)). Burge: E.g. suppose all internal factors of a person remain the same, while the social environment is varied. >Twin earth. I 149/159 This allows to show that the environment contributes to the content of the convictions of a person. The opposite position is what Burge calls "individualism" ((s) The thesis that the convictions do not depend on the environment.) 1. Tyler Burge: 1979. Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73–121. --- Frank I 29 Externalism/Burge: tries to reconcile this with Descartes: no conflict between E. and perception-independent self-consciousness: what determines the thought contents also determines what the thinking subject thinks about them. (Common cause). To think the thought one does not need to know the enabling conditions. It is enough that they are fulfilled. Frank I 664 Externalism/Burge: but there is another way in which external factors are introduced into the determination of the content of thought: "thought experiment" (Davidson: happens to be true for me): For example, until recently, I believed arthritis was a joint inflammation resulting from calcium deposits. I did not know that any joint inflammation, like gout, is also considered to be arthritis. When a doctor told me (falsely) that I have gout, I thought I had gout, but not arthritis. Burge: e.g. let us imagine a possible world in which I am physically the same, but the word "arthritis" is actually applied only to calcium-induced joint inflammations. Then the sentence "gout is not a form of arthritis" would be true and not false. The corresponding conviction would not have been the wrong belief that gout is not a form of arthritis (but it is wrong), but a true conviction about a disease other than arthritis. But in that world all my physical conditions and my behavior are the same as in this world. My conviction would have changed, but I had no reason to believe it, and so in such a case I would not know what I believed. Davidson pro. Burge: That depends on the fact that a concept is only imperfectly mastered and yet a content is believed. >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought, >Mental states, >First Person, >Incorrigibility. Fra I 665 But this is common for a large number of expressions. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Externalism | Danto | I 182f Externalism/Nietzsche: Knowledge describes the way living beings of a certain species imagine the world. >Knowledge, cf. >Internalism, >Imagination. Internalism/Descartes: Knowledge is something to be sought from a point of view within consciousness and its preconditions. >Consciousness, >Inside/outside. I 184 Externalism: lives in a world in which sensory stimuli rain down on us. >Stimuli, >Sensory impressions. I 185 Internalism: the very existence of what the externalist takes as certain is the deepest problem of all, namely whether there is a world outside of us. >World, >World/thinking, >Reality. Internalism, however, brings out certain structural features of the nature of the idea in the first place. >Nature. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Externalism | Davidson | Glüer II 185 Externalism/Putnam/Kripke: Externalism is about correct causal chains between word and object. > Causal theory. Externalism/DavidsonVsKripke, DavidsonVsPutnam: Externalism is about complete sentences and interpretation. Reference of single words/Davidson: is a theoretical construct - ((s) derived from whole sentences). I (a) 8 Def Externalism/Davidson: Events and objects by which a belief is evoked determine at the same time their content. DavidsonVs: (s) nothing outside the mind determines a belief. Externalism: shows the correctness (not infallibility) of the majority of judgments - (Davidson Pro). I (d) 72 Externalism/Davidson: pro this variant: Externalism stems from twin earth examples, not from linguistic division of labor. Therefore it is no threat of the first person authority. Radical interpretation: interpreter has to find out the factors, by means of indirect evidence, that first determine the content of the thought of the others - there is no room for error for one's own content because the same factors determine both thoughts. I (d) 74 Externalism/Burge: two forms: a) social, meaning from linguistic practice (community) b) importance of causal history (learning history) dependent on the individual. Burge: causal relationship to the object in order to comprehend content. DavidsonVsBurge: does not protect against error. Frank I 626ff Externalism/Davidson: It does not matter if mental states are individuated by something outside, just like sunburn ceases to be on the skin because it has an external cause. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), 101-111 - - - Frank I 663 Externalism/first person/authority: If thoughts are externally determined, then the subject does not necessarily need to know what it thinks of - if the externalism is correct, then: VsFrege: thoughts cannot be completely comprehended. VsDescartes: inner states are not certain. Burge: False use of terms: There is the possibility to not know one's own thoughts. DavidsonVsBurge: Beliefs depend on other beliefs, therefore less strong possibility of error - DavidsonVsBurge: Intent of successful communication has no necessary connection to the correct identification of meaning. I 663-667 Externalism: Putnam: Distinguishing inner and "ordinary" external beliefs - Fodor: "methodological solipsism": is only observing internal states. Burge: External factors find their way into the determination of the contents via "thought experiments". - E.g., wrongly used terms: wrong beliefs about oneself e.g. "I have arthrite in the bones".) >Arthrite/shmarthrite. DavidsonVsBurge: initially pro: the content is not determined by what is going on in the person, but: content is determined so strong holistically that individual confusion of ideas cannot be so decisive, and therefore no rigid rules for the attribution of thoughts, we are not compelled to ascribe to the words of another person the same meaning as that person him- or herself. I 676 Mind/tradition/DavidsonVsDescartes: If there were a stage with alleged representatives of the objects, how can the mind pave its way out? - Anyway, the "objects" do not interest him, but their cousins, the propositions. But the mind has not the solution "in mind": externalism: all that helps to determine the object must likewise be grasped by the mind when it should know in which state it is. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Externalities | Buchanan | Boudreaux I 45 Externalities/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: An externality exists when the actions of some people impose costs or convey benefits to others not involved in those actions. One common example is smoke from a factory that pollutes the air that nearby individuals breathe. The typical remedy suggested by economists is to tax the externality-generating activity, or if that is not feasible, to impose a regulation that reduces the external cost - the cost that’s imposed on third parties. Buchanan’s views on the existence of externalities conform to those of mainstream economists, but he departed from those scholars on the desirable remedies for externalities. He maintained that when externalities cause resources to be used inefficiently, individuals have an incentive to find ways to remedy these inefficiencies on their own. If some people impose external costs on others, both parties have an incentive to negotiate to remedy those inefficiencies on their own. Boudreaux I 46 Clubs/Buchanan: There is a parallel between Buchanan’s views on externalities and his theory of clubs - the latter being, (…) an explanation of how people voluntarily form clubs to produce collectively consumed goods. >Clubs/Buchanan. In both cases there is the prospect that resources can be allocated more efficiently, with all parties able to adjust their actions to create mutual gains. Because externalities are rarely global in nature, Buchanan’s discussion of federalism reveals that it is possible for people to have the option of moving out of jurisdictions where external costs are high and into jurisdictions where these costs are lower. Taxation: Also important to keep in mind is that using taxes or regulation to mitigate externalities brings its own problems. Buchanan noted that the theoretical remedies recommended by economists would work only if industries are what economists call “perfectly competitive.” >Taxation/Buchanan, >Perfect competition/Buchanan. Externalities might result in inefficiencies, but there is no guarantee that matters would be improved by a government-directed remedy. (…) this fact did not lead Buchanan to advocate against all government responses to pollution and other externalities, but it did prompt him to advise politicians and the public to temper their enthusiasm about governments’ abilities to improve matters with interventions. Costs: Of course, the problem with externalities, as the name suggests, is that resources are used in ways that some affected persons don’t bargain for - as happens, for example, when a factory emits pollutants into the air that is breathed by all the town’s residents and, thus, harms these residents. Boudreaux I 47 If (say) the town council had a clear property right in the town’s airspace, the factory could negotiate with the council and offer to pay to it a sum to compensate the town for whatever amount of pollution the factory emits. Such a bargain would benefit both the town and factory. Property: But if there is no clear definition of property rights in the air, then the factory will be reluctant to negotiate with the town council. It will likely simply continue to pollute without the town being compensated to bear the cost of the pollution. Clearly defined property rights thus promote bargaining to mutual advantage -that is, toward greater efficiency of resource use - while the absence of such rights stymies such bargaining. Buchanan/Tullock: In The Calculus of Consent, Buchanan and Tullock say „If property rights are carefully defined, should not the pure laissez-faire organization bring about the elimination of all significant externalities? … After human and property right are initially defined, will externalities that are serious enough to warrant removing really be present? Or will voluntary co-operative arrangements among individuals emerge to insure the elimination of all relevant external effects?“ (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962/1999(1): 44) Boudreaux I 48 Politics: A central reason for Buchanan’s caution in recommending government intervention to remedy externalities was his recognition that democratic politics carries with it a built-in externality. If one thinks of an externality as a third-party effect - that is, some people impose costs unilaterally on others - one should then see that when collective decisions are made by majority rule, the majority imposes external costs on the minority. The majority gets what it wants, forcing the minority to accept what it, the minority, does not want. This reality further reinforced Buchanan’s reluctance to recommend government remedies for externalities. Government action would replace one externality with another. This point warrants emphasis: politics contains a built-in externality. Government policies apply to everyone, whether or not they agree, unlike market exchange which only takes place if and when all parties to the exchanges agree. The nature of government means that whatever it does, it unilaterally imposes costs on some people. As Buchanan explains, „The minimum-size effective or dominating coalition of individuals, as determined by the voting rule, will be able to secure net gains at the expense of other members of the political group.… In the simple majority-rule model, this involves, in the limit, fifty plus percent of the total membership in the dominating coalition and fifty minus percent, of the total membership in the losing or minority coalition.“ (Buchanan, 1999(2): 64-65) Buchanan’s point is partly theoretical. This outcome could happen. But his point is also partly practical. If democratic political institutions could be used in this way, individuals then in fact have incentives to use them this way because they can. It is naïve to think that some people can possess the power to manipulate the political process for their own gain without understanding that some people actually will exercise this power in that way. Boudreaux I 49 Government action/Buchanan: This reasoning points directly to Buchanan’s overall approach to analyzing political action. Economists, even in the twenty-first century, tend to evaluate government action as if government officials apolitically implement optimal public policies. Economists derive the theoretical optimal allocation of resources and then assume that government will act to achieve this optimal allocation. BuchananVsTradition: Buchanan’s fundamental contribution was to note that just as resources are not typically allocated in markets with perfect efficiency, neither are they typically allocated by government with perfect efficiency. >Government policy/Buchanan. Boudreaux I 51 In drawing a parallel between market failure and government failure, Buchanan’s insight is that democratic political systems create their own inevitable externalities. Some people can use the system to impose costs on others. >Government failure/Buchanan. 1. Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock (1962/1999). The Calculus of Consent. Liberty Fund. 2. Buchanan, James M. (1999). The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty. Liberty Fund. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 |
| Extinction | Gould | I 291ff Extinction/Evolution/Life/Gould: extinction is not a domino in a development with great consequences, extinction is what all species have in common. They cannot take all their ecosystems with them even when they die out. Therefore, species do not depend very much on each other. New York, for example, could survive without its dogs. II 339 ff Mistake: it is a mistake to say that "any species that is extinct is extinct because of its overspecialization." This is perhaps the most common misunderstanding about the history of life. It is a wrong understanding of progress and a wrong equation of disappearance and ineptitude. If one imagines life as a continuous and constant struggle, disappearance must be the final sign of inadequacy. >Explanation, >Theories. II 340 GouldVs: but the present life does not even come close to perfection. The allegedly classic case of extinction based on competitive inferiority cannot be maintained. For example, when the Andes rose, there was probably a considerable rain shadow over South America and the tropical forests were transformed into dry areas. II 346 Consolation for believers in progress: in the case of mass extinction, an attempt is made with a definition "background rate". The background rate compares the normal development (normal extinction). Discovery: for more than half a billion years, the background rate has been declining slowly but steadily. During the early Cambrian period, at the beginning of adequate fossil records, about 600 million years ago, the average rate stood at 4.6 extinct species per million years. Since then, the rate has been steadily decreasing to about 2.0. If the Cambrian rate had continued, about 710 more genera would have died out! It is interesting to note that the total number of genera has increased since then by almost the same number (680). II 347 No species is immortal. The inevitable should never be depressing. IV 13 Extinction/Gould: extinction is more than just a negative force. IV 178 Mass extinction/Gould: mass extinction must be reinterpreted from four points of view: 1. Mass extinction is not the peak of a continuum, but fractures. 2. Mass extinctions are much more frequent, faster, deeper and very different (in terms of the number of extinct creatures) than we have ever imagined. IV 179 The end of the Ediacara fauna was the first mass extinction. The fauna has been replaced and not improved or strengthened. IV 182 A periodicity of mass extinction has been discovered: it had been 26 million years since the last great death in the Permian period a climax arose. Common cause explanations: common causes for mass extinctions are: mountain formations, volcanism, temperature fluctuations, ... New: a sinking sea level could be considered and has actually been observed before the last mass extinction. But: most mass extinction is preceded by a slow decline in animal groups! Possible explanation: there are only a few fossils, as fewer rocks are suitable for conservation. IV 185 Evolution/classification: some branches of the evolutionary tree contain many species, others, very few. There are strong differences. During normal times, species-rich branches tend to increase their richness. Question: why do they not conquer the entire biosphere for themselves? Solution: in the event of mass extinction, they have worse chances. IV 201 Extinction: each is inevitable forever. An extinct experiment will never be repeated. The chances are mathematically too slim. Biologists speak of the "principle of the irreversibility of evolution". |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Extraversion | Ackerman | Corr I 168 Extraversion/intelligence/Ackerman: The associations between Extraversion and intellectual abilities, and Conscientiousness and intellectual abilities appear to be of a negligible magnitude. Small positive correlations between these traits and abilities are found as often as small negative correlations. However, it is important to keep in mind a central issue with respect to these two personality traits that differs from either the intelligence-related personality constructs or even Neuroticism. >Neuroticism, >Personality traits, >Method. That is, what one considers to be ‘normal’ or optimal is not found at one end of the continuum of the traits, but rather somewhere near the middle. >Neuroticism/intelligence/Ackerman. Theorists who have asserted that individuals who are neither too high nor too low on such traits are optimally adjusted (see e.g., Robinson 1989(1); though cf., Matthews 1985(2) for a differing view (personality traits/MatthewsVsRobinson), have hypothesized that linear correlations are not appropriate measures to assess the relationship between the personality traits and intellectual abilities. 1. Robinson, D. L. 1989. The neurophysiological bases of high IQ, International Journal of Neuroscience 46: 209–34 2. Matthews, G. 1985. The effects of extraversion and arousal on intelligence test performance, British Journal of Psychology 76: 479–93 Phillip L. Ackerman, “Personality and intelligence”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Extraversion | Corr | I 368 Extraversion/CorrVsEysenck/Corr: in the revised RST (Reinforcement SensivityTheory) we have to assume that Eysenck’s Extraversion factor reflects the balance of reward and punishment systems (a central assumption in RST) for a viable explanation as to why Extraversion and arousal are so often associated in experimental studies of personality. >Reinforcement SensivityTheory/Corr, >Behavior/Corr, >Anxiety/Fear/Corr. Philip J. Corr, „ The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Extraversion | Neurobiology | Corr I 331 Extraversion/Neurobiology: Depue’s model of Extraversion is the most thorough and promising to date, linking it to the brain systems that govern sensitivity to reward and related positive emotions (Depue and Collins 1999(1); Depue and Lenzenweger 2005(2); Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky 2005)(3). >R. Depue. This model is largely congruent with Gray’s theory of the BAS, which has been increasingly linked to Extraversion (Smillie, Pickering and Jackson 2006)(4). The dopaminergic component of this reward circuitry may be particularly influential on the ‘agentic’ aspect of Extraversion associated with drive and assertiveness (Depue and Collins 1999)(1), whereas the affiliative aspect of Extraversion may be associated more strongly with the endogenous opioid systems involved in the positive emotions that follow attainment or consumption of reward and that are particularly important in social bonding (Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky 2005)(3). Genetic studies have found associations between Extraversion and several genes involved in the dopaminergic system (Benjamin, Li, Patterson et al. 1996(5); Bookman, Taylor, Adams-Campbell and Kittles 2002(6); Eichhammer, Sand, Stoertebecker et al. 2005(7); Ozkaragoz and Noble 2000(8); Reuter and Hennig 2005(9); Reuter, Schmitz, Corr and Hennig 2005(10); Tochigi, Otowa, Hibino et al. 2006)(11), though these associations are not yet well established. Some aspects of Eysenck’s theory that Extraversion is associated with cortical arousal may be compatible with the reward sensitivity model. >Arousal. Evidence for the cortical arousal theory is complicated by the fact that EEG and fMRI studies have found that the association between Extraversion and arousal is sometimes positive and sometimes negative (Matthews and Gilliland 1999(12); Zuckerman 2005(13)). These seemingly contradictory effects may be moderated by the type of situation in which arousal is measured and by the pattern of cortical arousal in question (Matthews and Gilliland 1999(12); Wacker, Chavanon and Stemmler 2006(14)). >Situations/Neurobiology, >Neuroticism/Neurobiology. 1. Depue, R. A. and Collins, P. F. 1999. Neurobiology of the structure of personality: dopamine, facilitation of incentive motivation, and extraversion, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 22: 491–569 2. Depue, R. A. and Lenzenweger, M. F. 2005. A neurobehavioural dimensional model of personality disturbance, in M Lenzenweger and J Clarkin (eds.), Theories of personality disorders, 2nd edn, pp. 391–454. New York: Guilford Press 3. Depue, R. A. and Morrone-Strupinsky, J. V. 2005. A neurobehavioural model of affiliative bonding: implications for conceptualizing a human trait of affiliation, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 28: 313–50 4. Smillie, L. D., Pickering, A. D. and Jackson, C. J. 2006. The new Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory: implications for personality measurement, Personality and Social Psychology Review 10: 320–35 5. Benjamin, J., Li, L., Patterson, C., Greenberg, B. D., Murphy, D. L. and Hamer, D. H. 1996. Population and familial association between the D4 dopamine receptor gene and measures of novelty seeking, Nature Genetics 12: 81–4 6. Bookman, E. B., Taylor, R. E., Adams-Campbell, L. and Kittles, R. A. 2002. DRD4 promoter SNPs and gender effects on Extraversion in African Americans, Molecular Psychiatry 7: 786–9 7. Eichhammer, P., Sand, P. G., Stoertebecker, P., Langguth, B., Zowe, M. and Hajak, G. 2005. Variation at the DRD4 promoter modulates extraversion in Caucasians, Molecular Psychiatry 10: 520–2 8. Ozkaragoz, T. and Noble, E. P. 2000. Extraversion: interaction between D2 dopamine receptor polymorphisms and parental alcoholism, Alcohol 22: 139–46 9. Reuter M. and Hennig, J. 2005. Association of the functional catechol-O-methyltransferase VAL158MET polymorphism with the personality trait of Extraversion, NeuroReport 16: 1135–8 10. Reuter, M., Schmitz, A., Corr, P. and Henning, J. 2005. Molecular genetics support Gray’s personality theory: the interaction of COMT and DRD2 polymorphisms predicts the behavioural approach system, International Journal of Neuropsychopharmacology 8: 1–12 11. Tochigi, M., Otowa, T., Hibino, H., Kato, C., Otani, T., Umekage, T., Utsumi, T., Kato, N. and Sasaki, T. 2006. Combined analysis of association between personality traits and three functional polymorphisms in the tyrosine hydroxylase, monoamine oxidase A, and catechol-O-methyltransferase genes, Neuroscience Research 54: 180–5 12. Matthews, G. and Gilliland, K. 1999. The personality theories of H. J. Eysenck and J. A. Gray: a comparative review, Personality and Individual Differences 26: 583–626 13. Zuckerman, M. 2005. Psychobiology of personality, 2nd edn rev. and updated. New York: Cambridge University Press 14. Wacker, J., Chavanon, M.-L. and Stemmler, G. 2006. Investigating the dopaminergic basis of Extraversion in humans: a multilevel approach, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 91: 71–87 Colin G. DeYoung and Jeremy R. Gray, „ Personality neuroscience: explaining individual differences in affect, behaviour and cognition“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Extraversion | Neuroimaging | Corr I 306 Extraversion/Neuroticism/psychology/Neuromaging/Canli: Extraversion and Neuroticism are particularly prominent, because they also played a role in other theorists’ thinking (Eysenck 1994(1); Depue and Collins 1999(2)), and because they map onto individual differences in positive and negative affect, respectively (Costa and McCrae 1980(3)). >J. Eysenck, >R. Depue, >P.T. Costa, >R. McCrae, >Neuroticism. Indeed, in our own line of research, we exploited the fact that we can use affective stimuli to draw out individual differences in traits such as Extraversion and Neuroticism (Canli 2004(4)). Our first foray into this subject matter (Canli, Zhao, Desmond et al. 2001(5)) was an imaging study using a passive viewing task, in which participants were presented with alternating blocks of positive and negative pictures selected from the International Affective Picture Series, IAPS (Lang, Bradley and Cuthbert 2001(6)). We found that Extraversion and Neuroticism were indeed associated with individual differences in brain activation to positive and negative emotional stimuli, respectively (Canli, Zhao, Desmond et al. 2001)(7). There were numerous subcortical and cortical activation foci, including brain regions involved in affective and cognitive processing, such as the amygdala, caudate nucleus, ACC and DLPFC. Amygdala activation, for example, was found to vary in response to positive (relative to negative) pictures as a function of Extraversion. Amygdala reactions: a study that focused on the role of the amygdala in facial affect processing: (Canli, Sivers, Whitfield et al. 2002)(8). Corr I 307 Association of Extraversion and amygdala activation: Deckersbach and colleagues (Deckersbach, Miller, Klibanski et al. 2006)(9). On the other hand, Vaidya and colleagues (Vaidya, Paradiso, Andreasen et al. 2007)(10) measured regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) using [(15)O] water PET when they presented pleasant and unpleasant olfactory stimuli, and reported a significant correlation between amygdala response to pleasant scents and individual differences in Extraversion. Corr I 308 We used a non-biased automated analysis approach (voxel-based morphometry) to evaluate high-resolution structural images of the amygdala, to calculate gray matter density and volume as a function of Extraversion and Neuroticism (Omura, Constable and Canli 2005)(11). We found that extraversion correlated positively with gray matter density in the left amygdala, whereas neuroticism correlated negatively with gray matter density in the right amygdala. We and another group (Wright, Williams, Feczko et al. 2006(12); Wright, Feczko, Dickerson et al. 2007(13)) failed to find any significant association between amygdala volume and Extraversion or Neuroticism. On the other hand, another group (Iidaka, Matsumoto, Ozaki et al. 2006)(14), reported a significant correlation between left amygdala volume and harm avoidance, a construct related to Neuroticism but derived from Cloninger’s model of personality (Cloninger, Svrakic and Przybeck 1993)(15), which was only seen in women. 1. Eysenck, H. J. (ed.) 1994. Personality: biological foundations, The Neuropsychology of Individual Differences Series. San Diego, CA: Academic Press 2. Depue, R. A. and Collins, P. F. 1999. Neurobiology of the structure of personality: dopamine, facilitation of incentive, motivation and extraversion, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 22: 491–517 3. Costa, P. T., Jr and McCrae, R. R. 1980. Influence of extraversion and neuroticism on subjective well-being: happy and unhappy people, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 38: 668–78 4. Canli, T. 2004. Functional brain mapping of extraversion and neuroticism: learning from individual differences in emotion processing, Journal of Personality 72: 1105–32 5. Canli, T., Zhao, Z., Desmond, J. E. et al. 1999. fMRI identifies a network of structures correlated with retention of positive and negative emotional memory, Psychobiology 27: 441–52 6. Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M. and Cuthbert, B. N. 2001. International affective picture system (IAPS): instruction manual and affective ratings, Technical Report A-5. Gainesville, FL: Center for Research in Psychophysiology, University of Florida 7. Canli, T., Z. Zhao, et al. 2001. An fMRI study of personality influences on brain reactivity to emotional stimuli. Behavioral Neuroscience 115: 33–42 8. Canli, T., Sivers, H., Whitfield, S. L. et al. 2002. Amygdala response to happy faces as a function of extraversion, Science 296: 2191 9. Deckersbach, T., Miller, K. K., Klibanski, A. et al. 2006. Regional cerebral brain metabolism correlates of neuroticism and extraversion, Depression and Anxiety 23: 133–8 10. Vaidya, J. G., Paradiso, S., Andreasen, N. C. et al. 2007. Correlation between extraversion and regional cerebral blood flow in response to olfactory stimuli, American Journal of Psychiatry 164: 339–41 11. Omura, K., Constable, R. T. and Canli, T. 2005. Amygdala gray matter concentration is associated with extraversion and neuroticism, Neuroreport 16: 1905–8 12. Wright, C. I., Williams, D., Feczko, E. et al. 2006. Neuroanatomical correlates of extraversion and neuroticism, Cerebral Cortex 16: 1809–19 13. Wright, C. I., Feczko, E., Dickerson, B. et al. 2007. Neuroanatomical correlates of personality in the elderly, Neuroimage 35: 263–72 14. Iidaka, T., Matsumoto, A., Ozaki, N. et al. 2006. Volume of left amygdala subregion predicted temperamental trait of harm avoidance in female young subjects. A voxel-based morphometry study, Brain Research 1125: 85–93 15. Cloninger, C. R., Svrakic, D. M. and Przybeck, T. R. 1993. A psychobiological model of temperament and character, Archives of General Psychiatry 50: 975–90 Turhan Canlı,“Neuroimaging of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Extrinsic | Field | I 193 Extrinsic explanation/Loar/Field: E.g. when the role of numbers is only the role of names (descriptions) of properties of the physical system. - Then the properties of numbers will have no effect on the system. >Numbers, >Mathematical entities, >Ontology, >Properties, >Effect. Extrinsic explanation is often useful but it must have an underlying intrinsic explanation. >Explanation, >Intrinsicness, >Terminology/Field. III 44 Extrinsic explanation/Field: E.g. distance and angle size, use real numbers, but these are causally irrelevant. >Real numbers, >Causality. Intrinsic explanation: uses "betweenness" and congruence - (without numbers). Numbers: are eliminated because they are causally ineffective - (as opposed to electrons). Extrinsic explanation/Field: extrinsic explanations are fruitless, if they are to be the final outcome. - Intrinsically: can be arbitrarily: E.g. standard meter. >Standard meter. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Factor Intensity Reversal (FIR) | Feenstra | Feenstra I 1- 15 Factor Intensity Reversal (FIR)/Feenstra: While FIR might seem like a theoretical curiosum, they are actually quite realistic. Consider the footwear industry, for example. Feenstra I 1- 16 While much of the footwear in the world is produced in developing nations, the United States retains a small number of plants. In sneakers, New Balance has a plant in Norridgewock, Maine, where employers earn some $14 per hour.* Some operate computerized equipment with up to 20 sewing machine heads running at once, while others operate automated stitchers guided by cameras, that allow one person to do the work of six. This is a far cry from the plants in Asia that produce shoes for Nike, Reebock and other U.S. producers, using century-old technology and paying less than $1 per hour. (…) when there are two possible solutions for the factor (…) then some countries can be at one equilibrium and others countries at the other. >Equilibrium. Equilibrium: How do we know which country is where? To answer this, it is necessary to consider the full-employment conditions: these will allow us to determine the factor prices prevailing in each country. Notice that we have now re-introduced a link between factor endowments (from the full-employment conditions) and factor prices, as we argued earlier in the one-sector model: when there are FIR in the two-by-two model, it will turn out that a laborabundant country will be at an equilibrium like point A, paying low wages, while a capitalabundant country will be at an equilibrium like point B, paying high wages. >Factor price, >Wages, >Production. Feenstra I 1-19 (…) when only one good is produced, then factor prices are determined by the marginal products of labor and capital as in the one-sector model, and will certainly depend on the factor endowments. This is why the Lemma stated above requires that both goods are produced, or equivalently, that the endowments are inside the “cone of diversification.” Now consider the more complex case (...) where we have re-drawn the two sets of gradient vectors (…) after multiplying each of them by the outputs of their respective industries. These vectors create two cones of diversification, labeled as cone A and cone B. Now we can answer the question of which factor prices will apply in any given country: a labor abundant economy, with a high ratio of labor/capital endowments (…) with low wages; whereas a capital abundant economy with a high ratio of capital/labor endowments (…) will have factor prices (…) with high wages. Thus, factor prices will depend on the endowments of the economy. A labor-abundant country such as China will pay low wages and a high rental (…). In contrast, a capital-abundant country such as the United States will have high wages and a low rental (…).** * The material that follows is drawn from Aaron Bernstein, “Low-Skilled Jobs: Do They Have to Move?”, Business Week, February 26, 2001, pp. 94-95. ** Empirical evidence on whether developed countries fit into the same cone is presented by deBaere and Demiroglu (2000)(1), and the presence of multiple cones is explored by Leamer (1987)(2), Harrigan and Zakrajšek (2000)(3), Schott (2000)(4) and Xu (2002)(5). 1. Debaere, Peter and Ufuk Demiroglu, 2000, “On the Similarity of Country Endowments and Factor Price Equalization for Developed Countries,” University of Texas, Austin, manuscript. 2. Leamer, Edward E., 1987, “Paths of Development in the 3-Factor, N-Good General Equilibrium Model,” Journal of Political Economy, 95, 961-999. 3. Harrigan, James and Egon Zakrajšek, 2000, “Factor Supplies and specialization in the World Economy,” NBER Working Paper no. 7848, August, and Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report, no. 107, August. 4. Schott, Peter, 2000, “One Size Fits All? Heckscher-Ohlin Specialization in Global Production,” Yale University, manuscript. 5. Xu, Bin, 2002, “Capital Abundance and Developing Country Production Patterns,” University of Florida, manuscript. |
Feenstra I Robert C. Feenstra Advanced International Trade University of California, Davis and National Bureau of Economic Research 2002 |
| Factor Market | Rothbard | Rothbard III Factor Market/Rothbard: Every capitalist will attempt to employ a factor (or rather, the service of a factor) at the price that will be at least less than its discounted marginal value product. >Factors of production/Rothbard. The marginal value product is the monetary revenue that may be attributed, or “imputed,” to one service unit of the factor. >Marginal product/Rothbard. It is the “marginal” value product, because the supply of the factor is in discrete units. This MVP (marginal value product) is discounted by the social rate of time preference, i.e., by the going rate of interest. Suppose, for example, that a unit of a factor (say a day’s worth of a certain acre of land or a day’s worth of the effort of a certain laborer) will, imputably, produce for the firm a product one year from now that will be sold for 20 gold ounces. Marginal value product: The MVP of this factor is 20 ounces. But this is a future good. The present value of the future good, and it is this present value that is now being purchased, will be equal to the MVP discounted by the going rate of interest. If the rate of interest is 5 percent, then the discounted MVP will be equal to 19 ounces. To the employer (…) then, the maximum amount that the factor unit is now worth is 19 ounces. The capitalist will be willing to buy this factor at any price up to 19 ounces. Market: Now suppose that the capitalist owner or owners of one firm pay for this factor 15 ounces per unit. (…) this means that the capitalist earns a pure profit of four ounces per unit, since he reaps 19 ounces from the final sale. Rothbard III 457 (He obtains 20 ounces on final sale, but one ounce is the result of his time preference and waiting and is not pure profit; 19 ounces is the present value of his final sale.) But, seeing this happen, other entrepreneurs will leap into the breach to reap these profits. These capitalists will have to bid the factor away from the first capitalist and thus pay more than 15 ounces, say 17 ounces. Discounted marginal value product: This process continues until the factor earns its full DMVP (discounted marginal value product), and no pure profits remain. Evenly Rotating Economy: The result is that in the ERE every isolable factor will earn its DMVP, and this will be its price. >Evenly Rotating Economy. Pure profit: It is clear that if the marginal value of a specific unit of factor service can be isolated and determined, then the forces of competition on the market will result in making its price equal to its DMVP in the ERE. Any price higher than the discounted marginal value product of a factor service will not long be paid by a capitalist; any price lower will be raised by the competitive actions of entrepreneurs bidding away these factors through offers of higher prices. These actions will lead, in the former case to the disappearance of losses, in the latter, to the disappearance of pure profit, at which time the ERE is reached. Rothbard III 458 Factors: It is (…) the nonspecific factors that are directly isolable; a specific factor is isolable if it is the only specific factor in the combination, in which case its price is the difference between the price of the product and the sum of the prices of the nonspecific factors. But by what process does the market isolate and determine the share (the MVP of a certain unit of a factor) of income yielded from production? Let us refer back to the basic law of utility. >Utility/Rothbard. What will be the marginal value of a unit of any good? It will be equal to the individual’s valuation of the end that must remain unattained should this unit be removed. >Value/Rothbard. Rothbard III 463 Business: It is now clear why the temptation in factor-price analysis is for the firm to consider that factor prices are given externally to itself and that it simply varies its production in accordance with these prices. However, from an analytic standpoint, it should be evident that the array of MVPs as a whole is the determining factor, and the lowest-ranking process in terms of MVP will, through the medium of factor prices, transmit its message, so to speak, to the various firms, each of which will use the factor to such an extent that its DMVP will be brought into alignment with its price. But the ultimate determining factor is the DMVP schedule, not the factor price. In short, the prices of productive factors are determined as follows: Where a factor is isolable, its price will tend toward its discounted marginal value product and will equal its DMVP in the ERE. A factor will be isolable where it is nonspecific, i.e., is useful in more than one productive process, or where it is the only specific factor in a process. The nonspecific factor’s price will be set equal to its DMVP as determined by its general DMVP schedule: the full possible array of DMVPs, given various units of supply of the factor in the economy. >Marginal product/Rothbard, >Marginal utility/Rothbard. Rothbard III 560 Factor Market/Rothbard: What if the supply of capital remained the same, while the supply of labor or land factors changed? Thus, suppose that, with the same capital structure, population increases, thus expanding the total supply of labor factors. The result will be a general fall in the MVP (marginal value product) of labor and a rise in the MVP of land factors. This rise will cause formerly submarginal, no-rent lands to earn rent and to enter into cultivation by the new labor supply. Land/Ricardo: This is the process particularly emphasized by Ricardo: population pressing on the land supply. The tendency for the MVP of labor to drop, however, may well be offset by a rise in the MPP (marginal physical product) schedules of labor, since a rise in population will permit a greater utilization of the advantages of specialization and the division of labor. The constant supply of capital would have to be reoriented to the changed conditions, but the constant amount of money capital will then be more physically productive. Hence, there will be an offsetting tendency for the MVPs of labor to rise. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Factor Price Equalization Theorem | Feenstra | Feenstra I 1-20 Factor Price Equalization Theorem/Feenstra: Suppose that two countries are engaged in free trade, having identical technologies but different factor endowments. If both countries are diversified and FIR do not occur, then the factor prices (w, r) are equalized across these countries. Feenstra I 1-21 To illustrate this result, we engage in a thought experiment posed by Samuelson (1949)(1) and further developed by Dixit and Norman (1980)(2). Initially, suppose that labor and capital are free to move between the two countries until their factor prices are equalized. Then all that matters for factor prices are the world endowments of labor and capital, (…). The factor prices determine the demand for labor and capital in each industry, and using these, we can construct the diversification cone (since factor prices are the same across countries, then the diversification cone is also the same). Feenstra I 1-23 More generally, for any allocation of labor and capital within the parallelogram 0A10*A2 both countries remain diversified (producing both goods), and we can achieve the same equilibrium prices as in the “integrated world economy.” It follows that factor prices remain equalized across countries for allocations of labor and capital within the parallelogram 0A10*A2, which is referred to as the Factor Price Equalization (FPE) set. The FPE set illustrates the range of labor and capital endowments between countries for which factor price equalization is obtained. In contrast, for endowments outside of the FPE set such as point B’, then at least one country would have to be fully specialized in one good and FPE no longer holds. The FPE theorem is a remarkable result because it says that trade in goods has the ability to equalize factor prices: in this sense, trade in goods is a “perfect substitute” for trade in factors. We can again contrast this result with that obtained from a one-sector economy in both countries. In that case, equalization of the product price through trade would certainly not equalize factor prices: Feenstra I 1-24 the labor abundant country would be paying a lower wage. Why does this outcome not occur when there are two sectors? The answer is that the labor abundant country can produce more of, and export, the labor-intensive good. In that way it can fully employ its labor while still paying the same wages as a capital abundant country. In the two-by-two model, the opportunity to disproportionately produce more of one good than the other, while exporting the amounts not consumed at home, is what allows factor price equalization to occur. 1. Samuelson, Paul A., 1949, “International Factor Price Equalization Once Again,” Economic Journal, June, 181-197. Reprinted in Edward E. Leamer, ed. 2001, International Economics, New York: Worth Publishers, 19-32. 2. Dixit, Avinash and Victor Norman, 1980, Theory of International Trade. Cambridge University Press. |
Feenstra I Robert C. Feenstra Advanced International Trade University of California, Davis and National Bureau of Economic Research 2002 |
| Factor Price Insensitivity | Feenstra | Feenstra I 1-13 Factor Price Insensitivity/Leamer/Feenstra: Lemma: So long as both goods are produced, and factor intensity reversals (FIR) do not occur, then each price vector (p1, p2) corresponds to unique factor prices (w, r). This is a remarkable result, because it says that the factor endowments (L,K) do not matter for the determination of (w, r). We can contrast this result with a one-sector economy, with production of y = f(L,K), wages of w = pfL , and diminishing marginal product fLL<0. In this case, any increase in the labor endowments would certainly reduce wages, so that countries with higher labor/capital endowments (L/K) would have lower wages. This is the result we normally expect. In contrast, the above Lemma says that in a two-by-two economy, with a fixed product price p, it is possible for the labor force or capital stock to grow without affecting their factor prices! Thus, Leamer (1995)(1) refers to this result as “factor price insensitivity.” Feenstra I 1-19 (…) when only one good is produced, then factor prices are determined by the marginal products of labor and capital as in the one-sector model, and will certainly depend on the factor endowments. This is why the Lemma stated above requires that both goods are produced, or equivalently, that the endowments are inside the “cone of diversification.” Feentra I 2-46 Models: With more factors than goods, the “factor price insensitivity” lemma no longer applies. This can be tested by estimating a GDP function for a country (or a group of countries), and determining whether it is linear in the factor endowments, i.e. whether the functional form (…) holds globally or the elasticities (…) are locally insignificantly different from zero. The results of Kohli (1990(2), 1993a(3)) for the U.S. indicate that the elasticities (…) are non-zero, but only weakly so. Thiscan be interpreted as evidence in favor of “more factors than goods.” One reason for this is that capital might be slow to move between sectors, so with N sectors there are N fixed factors (capital in each sector) plus the additional mobile factors (types of labor). Kohli (1993b(4)) develops a test for this production structure and finds some evidence to support it using annual data for the U.S.. 1. Leamer, Edward E., 1995, “The Heckscher-Ohlin Model in Theory and Practice,” Princeton Studies in International Finance, no. 77. 2. Kohli, Ulrich R., 1990a, “Price and Quantity Elasticities in Foreign Trade,” Economic Letters, 33(3), 277-281. 3. Kohli, Ulrich R., 1993a, “A Symmetric Normalized Quadratic GDP Function and the U.S. Demand for Imports and Supply of Exports,” International Economic Review, 34(1), February, 243-255. 4. Kohli, Ulrich R., 1993b, “U.S. Technology and the Specific Factors Model,” Journal of International Economics, 34, 115-136. |
Feenstra I Robert C. Feenstra Advanced International Trade University of California, Davis and National Bureau of Economic Research 2002 |
| Factors of Production | Rolph | Rothbard III 505 Factors of production/Rolph/Rothbard: Rolph (…) turns to [an] allegedly heinous error of the discount approach, namely, the “doctrine of noncoordination of factors.” This means that some factors, in their payment, receive the discounted value of their product and some do not. >Discounting/Rothbard, >Factors of production/Rothbard, >Factor market/Rothbard. RothbardVsRolph: Rolph, however, is laboring under a misapprehension; there is no assumption of non-coordination in any sound discounting theory. (…) all factors - labor, land, and capital goods - receive their discounted marginal value product. >Marginal product/Rothbard. The difference in regard to the owners of capital capital goods is that, in the ultimate analysis, they do not receive any independent payment, since capital goods are resolved into the factors that produced them, ultimately land and labor factors, and to interest for the time involved in the advance of payment by the capitalists.(1) Rothbard: Rolph believes that non-coordination is involved because owners of land and labor factors “receive a discounted share,” and capital “receives an undiscounted share.” But this is a faulty way of stating the conclusion. Owners of land and labor factors receive a discounted share, but owners of capital (money capital) receive the discount. >Capital/Rothbard, >Capital structure/Rothbard, >Capital goods/Rothbard, >Knut Wicksell. 1. Rolph ascribes this error to Knut Wicksell, but such a confusion is not attributable to Wicksell, who engages in a brilliant discussion of capital and the production structure and the role of time in production. Wicksell demonstrates correctly that labor and land are the only ultimate factors, and that therefore the marginal productivity of capital goods is reducible to the marginal productivity of labor and land factors, so that money capital earns the interest (or discount) differential. Wicksell’s discussion of these and related issues is of basic importance. He recognized, for example, that capital goods are fully and basically coordinate with land and labor factors only from the point of view of the individual firm, but not when we consider the total market in all of its interrelations. Current economic theorizing is, to its detriment, even more preoccupied than writers of his day with the study of an isolated firm instead of the interrelated market. Wicksell, Lectures on Political Economy, I, 148–54, 185–95. |
Rolph I Earl R. Rolph Theory of Fiscal Economics Oakland 1971 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Factors of Production | Rothbard | Rothbard III 37 Factors of Production/Rothbard: Factors of production are valued in accordance with their anticipated contribution in the eventual production of consumers’ goods. Factors, however, differ in the degree of their specifity, i.e., the variety of consumers’ goods in the production of which they can be of service. Certain goods are completely specific - are useful in producing only one consumers’ good. Rothbard III 38 Just as a supply of consumers’ goods will go first toward satisfying the most urgent wants, then to the next most urgent wants, etc., so a supply of factors will be allocated by actors first to the most urgent uses in producing consumers’ goods, then to the next most urgent uses, etc. The loss of a unit of a supply of a factor will entail the loss of the least urgent of the presently satisfied uses. Convertibility: The less specific a factor [of production] is, the more convertible it is from one use to another. >Convertibility. Example: The mandrake weed lost its value because it could not be converted to other uses. Factors such as iron or wood, however, are convertible into a wide variety of uses. If one type of consumers’ good falls into disuse, iron output can be shifted from that to another line of production. On the other hand, once the iron ore has been transformed into a machine, it becomes less easily convertible and often completely specific to the product. Rothbard III 39 Value/production/good: Suppose, (…) that some time after cigars lose their value this commodity returns to public favor and regains its former value. The cigar machines, which had been rendered valueless, now recoup their great loss in value. On the other hand, the tobacco leaves, land, etc., which had shifted from cigars to other uses will reshift into the production of cigars. These factors will gain in value, but their gain, as was their previous loss, will be less than the gain of the completely specific factor. These are examples of a general law that a change in the value of the product causes a greater change in the value of the specific factors than in that of the relatively nonspecific factors. Rothbard III 40 Value/Convertibility: Convertible factors will be allocated among different lines of production according to the same principles as consumers’ goods are allocated among the ends they can serve. Each unit of supply will be allocated to satisfy the most urgent of the not yet satisfied wants, i.e., where the value of its marginal product is the highest. A loss of a unit of the factor will deprive the actor of only the least important of the presently satisfied uses, i.e., that use in which the value of the marginal product is the lowest. This choice is analogous to that involved in previous examples comparing the marginal utility of one good with the marginal utility of another. Rothbard III 41 The value of a unit of a convertible factor is set, not by the conditions of its employment in one type of product, but by the value of its marginal product when all its uses are taken into consideration. >Productive forces, >Production/Rothbard, >Capital goods/Rothbard, >Labour/Rothbard. Rothbard III 319 Factors of production/Rothbard: In the technical combination of factors of production to yield a product, as one factor varies and the others remain constant, there is an optimum point - a point of maximum average product produced by the factor. This is the law of returns. It is based on the very fact of the existence of human action. Rothbard III 328 Factors of Production/Rothbard: Crucial to understanding the process of production is the question of the specificity of factors (…) A specific factor is one suitable to the production of only one product. A purely nonspecific factor would be one equally suited to the production of all possible products. (…) we have seen that human action implies more than one existing factor. Even the existence of one purely nonspecific factor is inconceivable if we properly consider “suitability in production” in value terms rather than in technological terms.(1) In fact,(…) there is no sense in saying that a factor is “equally suitable” in purely technological terms, since there is no way of comparing the physical quantities of one product with those of another. If X can help to produce three units of A or two units of B, there is no way by which we can compare these units. Only the valuation of consumers establishes a hierarchy of valued goods, their interaction setting the prices of the consumers’ goods. (Relatively) nonspecific factors, then, are allocated to those products that the consumers have valued most highly. It is difficult to conceive of any good that would be purely nonspecific and equally valuable in all processes of production. Rothbard III 329 Now let us for a time consider a world where every good is produced only by several specific factors. In this world, a world that is conceivable, though highly unlikely, every person, every piece of land, every capital good, would necessarily be irrevocably committed to the production of one particular product. There would be no alternative uses of any good from one line of production to another. Rothbard III 330 (…) all factors are purely specific, [when] no good is used at different stages of the process or for different goods. >Production/Rothbard, >Production theory/Rothbard. Rothbard III 331 Income from production: Now (…) we must trace the direction of monetary income. This is a reverse one, from the consumers back to the producers. The consumers purchase the stock of a consumers' good at a price determined on the market, yielding the producers a certain income. Two of the crucial problems of production theory are the method by which the monetary income is allocated and the corollary problem of the pricing of the factors of production. First, let us consider only the "Iowest" stage of production, the stage that brings about thefinal product. In that Stage, numerous factors, all now assumed to be specific, co-operate in producing the consumers' good. There are three types of such factors: labor, original nature, and produced capital goods.(2) Rothbard III 366 Costs of production/Rothbard: It must be understood that “factors of production” include every service that advances the product toward the stage of consumption. Thus, such services as “marketing costs,” advertising, etc., are just as legitimately productive services as any other factors.(3) Rothbard III 332 Incom from production: (…) it is clear that, since only factors of production may obtain income from the consumer, the price of the consumers' good - i.e., the income from the consumers' good, equals the sum of the prices accruingto the producing factors, i.e., the income accruing to the factors. Capital good: It is clear that, conceptually, no one, in the last analysis, receives a return as the owner of a capital good. Since every capital good analytically resolves itself into original nature-given and labor factors, it is evident that no money could accrue to the owner of a capital good. Rothbard III 336 Income: (…) the income from sale of a capital good equals the income accruing to the factors of its production. Rothbard III 337 Time: It is obvious that the production process takes time, and the more complex the production process the more time must be taken. During this time, all the factors have had to work without earning any remuneration; they have had to work only in expectation offuture income. Their income is received only at a much later date. Secification: The income that would be earned by the factors, in a world of purely specific factors, depends entirely on consumer demand for the particular final product. >Costs/Rothbard, >Costs of production/Rothbard. Rothbard III 365 Cumulation: Suppose, for example, that a certain machine, containing two necessary parts, can be used in several fields of production. The two parts, however, must always be combined in use in a certain fixed proportion. Suppose that two (or more) individuals owned these two parts, i.e., two different individuals produced the different parts by their labor and land. The combined machine will be sold to, or used in, that line of production where it will yield the highest monetary income. But the price that will be established for that machine will necessarily be a cumulative price so far as the two factors - the two parts – are concerned. The price of each part and the allocation of the income to the two owners must be decided by a process of bargaining. Economics cannot here determine separate prices. This is true because the proportions between the two are always the same, even though the combined product can be used in several different ways.(4) Rothbard III 373 Capital: It is already clear that the old classical trinity of “land, labor, and capital” earning “wages, rents, and interest” must be drastically modified. It is not true that capital is an independent productive factor or that it earns interest for its owner, in the same way that land and labor earn income for their owners. Land/labour: land and labor are not homogeneous factors within themselves, but simply categories of types of uniquely varying factors. Each land and each labor factor, then, has its own physical features, its own power to serve in production; each, therefore, receives its own income from production (…). Rothbard III 474 Factors of production: A factor will always be employed in a production process in such a way that it is in a region of declining APP (average physical product) and declining but positive MPP (marginal physical product). >Returns to scale/Rothbard, >Factor market/Rothbard, >Marginal product/Rothbard. Rothbard III 483 Factors of production/production structure/land/Frank H. Knight/Rothbard: If we base our approach on the present, must we not follow the Knightians in scrapping the production-structure analysis? A particular point of contention is the dividing line between land and capital goods. The Knightians, in scoffing at the idea of tracing periods of production back through the centuries, scrap the land concept altogether and include land as simply a part of capital goods. This change, of course, completely alters production theory. KnightVsBöhm-Bawerk/Rothbard: The Knightians point correctly, for example, to the fact that present-day land has many varieties and amounts of past labor “mixed” with it: canals have been dug, forests cleared, basic improvements have been made in the soil, etc. They assert that practically nothing is pure “land” anymore and therefore that the concept has become an empty one. RothbardVsKnight/MisesVsKnight: As Mises has shown, however, we can revise Böhm-Bawerk’s theory and still retain the vital distinction between land and capital goods. We do not have to throw out, as do the Knightians, the land baby with the average-period-of-production bathwater. We can, instead, reformulate the concept of “land.” >Land/Mises. 1. The literature in economics has been immeasurably confused by writers on production theory who deal with problems in terms oftechnology rather than valuation. For an excellent article on this problem, cf. Lionel Robbins, "Remarks upon Certain Aspects of the Theory of Costs," Economic Journal, March, 1934, pp. 1 - 18. 2. (…) this does not signify adoption of the old classical fallacy that treated each of these groups of factors as homogeneous. Clearly, they are heterogeneous and for pricing purposes and in human action are treated as such. Only the same good, homogeneous for human valuation, is treated as a common "factor," and all factors are treated alike - for their contribution to revenue - by producers. The categories "land, labor, and capital goods" are essential, however, for a deeper analysis of production problems, in particular the analysis ofvarious income returns and of the relation of time to production. 3. The fallacy in the spurious distinction between “production costs” and “selling costs” has been definitely demonstrated by Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. p. 319. 4. See Mises, Human Action, p. 336. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Facts | Brandom | I 466ff Def Deflationism: denies that content in concepts can be explained with truth conditions and compliance with the facts, properties and objects (VsCorrespondence theory). >Deflationism. Fact: "making true": misleading: it is not the fact that p makes true that p. >Truthmakers. I 469 E.g. It is not the fact that the Persians were defeated by the Greeks at Plataea, which makes that the Greeks defeated the Persians at Plataea. Facts: if facts are to be explained, the explanation does not need to refer back to something normative: The planetary orbits would also be elliptical without beings that set standards. --- Rorty VI 179 ff Whether a statement is true does not depend on whether somebody makes it. But our linguistic practices could not be what they are, if the facts were different. However, the non-linguistic facts could be essentially as they are, even if our linguistic practices were completely different. Form of thought. Definition Fact/Brandom, "something assertible" (neologism by Brandom: "claimable"). - There is the act of asserting and there is "the asserted" - facts are not the "true asserted" but the assertible. - Facts make assertions true. However, inferentially. RortyVsBrandom: It is as if I, like Moliere, refer to "the soporific power" as inferential in order to make it seem to be above suspicion. --- Brandom I 476 Fact/Brandom: no contrast between how things are and what we can say and think - Facts are (the content of) true assertions and thoughts - Wittgenstein: we don not stop opinionating when we are facing the facts. I 477 Wittgenstein: Facts are connected and structured by the objects and their properties. I 866 Negative Fact/Brandom: there is no mystery -> distinction between normative and non-normative expressions. - Also > conditional facts > modal facts - realm of facts and norms are not opposites - the normative is part of the factual. >Norms. --- Seel2 III 149 Def Fact/Brandom: Content of true assertions - Assertions/Brandom: obtain their content through the use of concepts in the context of the sentences uttered in each case. So the concept of fact can only be analysed together with the concept of assertion. However, this conceptual dependency is not genetic - the world is the epitome of all the facts, no matter when and with what success thoughts about the world are created. "There was a time when nobody used concepts, because there was no discursive practice - but there was never a time when there were no facts - Seel: therefore, neither concepts nor facts depend on the existence of thinking beings - at the same time, the theory of discursive practice appears to be a theory of the fundamental structure of the world - Seel: KantVsBrandom: Warns just of that - (in the case of Hegel in vain). KantVsBrandom/KantVsHegel: false: Conclusion from thinking to being. >Thinking, >Being. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Facts | Chalmers | I 40 Definition Positive Fact/Chalmers: A positive fact in world W is one that applies in every possible world that contains W as a real part, correspondingly a positive property in W is one that is instantiated in every world containing W as a real part. (Chalmers I 363: Containment of possible worlds.) Lewis (1983a)(1) and Jackson (1993)(2) have noticed that it is pointless to define the relation of containing worlds once and for all. But you can use them as a basic term. ...+...) >Possible worlds/Lewis, >Possible worlds. On the other hand: Negative facts always imply negative existence statements, which cannot be evaluated locally on their part. >Existence sentences. We will restrict ourselves to positive facts and properties when considering supervenience. >Supervenience, >Supervenience/Chalmers, >Properties. I 85 Negative Facts/Chalmers: Facts that involve negative existence statements are not logically determined by any localizable facts. Even facts about conscious experience cannot help here. ((Chalmers I 369 Negative facts and logical supervenience ...+...). >Experience. I 86 Solution/Chalmers: we must introduce a second-level fact which, according to the enumeration of the microphysical, phenomenal, indexical, etc. facts says: "This is all." All the negative facts follow from the fact of the second level together with all the basic single facts. Reductive explanation: negative facts are not a serious problem for reductionist explanations. >Reduction/Chalmers, >Reductionism. 2nd level fact/Chalmers: there will be probably a statement "that is all" for every possible world and such a fact is never included in the single facts. It merely expresses the finite nature of our world or of any other world. It is a simple way to deal with negative and universally quantified facts. (> universal quantification, > lists, exterior/interior, > totality, cf. Lists. I 87 Facts/World/Chalmers: Facts about the world are exhausted by 1. Physical single facts 2. Facts about conscious experience 3. Natural laws 4. A fact of the 2nd level, which means "This is all." 5. An indexical fact about my localization. >Indexicality, >Laws of Nature, >Consciousness/Chalmers. 1. D. Lewis, Extrinsic properties. Philosophical Studies 44, 1983: pp. 197-200 2. F. Jackson, Armchair metaphysics. In: J. O'Leary-Hawthorne and M. Michael (Eds) Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht 1993 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Facts | Kripke | I 39 f Facts are not part of the sense of a name. >Bundle theory/Kripke. I 61 The sense in which facts about nations are not facts "beside and about" the facts about people, can be expressed as follows: a description of the world, which specifies all the facts about individuals, but omits the facts about nations can be a complete description of the world which follow from the facts about nations. >Circular reasoning, >Description/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Facts | Lewis | Schwarz I 158 Facts/colors researcher Mary/Lewis: you can learn special items and representations even if you get information in Russian, - but there are no particular facts for Russians. - Real progress in knowledge: acquisition of new skills. - Mary/Lewis: The main thing is that there are not recent (physical) possibilities excluded, that is not possible. Explanation/(s): Example color researcher Mary/Frank Jackson: the color researcher Mary is in a closed room with a black and white monitor. She has any amount of literature about colors at her disposal. Question: is her knowledge sufficient to say that she knows everything about colors? >Color/Jackson, >Qualia/Jackson. Schwarz I 139 Moore's facts/Schwarz: For example, absences are often causes and effects. Something that only philosophers think about denying. Schwarz I 11 Moore's Facts/Lewis: are more certain than the premises of any philosophical argument that could be used to refute them. Schwarz I 15 Analysis/language/fact/Schwarz: strictly speaking, only words and sentences can be analyzed, not facts. Fact/Schwarz: nothing but true sentences: For example "the fact that it is snowing" means nothing else than "it is snowing". For example, "facts about snow are necessarily determined by facts about precipitation": is equivalent to a long conjunction of sentences like "necessary if there is no precipitation, it does not snow either", etc. Schwarz I 62 Mathematics/actuality/fact/Lewis/black: as with possible worlds, there is no actual information: For example, that 34 is the root of 1156 tells us nothing about the world. Schwarz: For example that there is nobody who shaves those who do not shave themselves is analogously no information about the world. Schwarz I 133 Fact/Schwarz: if you understand them as classes of space-time regions, this is not an alternative at all, but only a terminological variant. Def Fact/Lewis/Schwarz: true propositions (1986f(1),189,Fn 15). I.e. classes of possible worlds. Then there are facts that unambiguously correspond with Lewis's classes of space-time regions, but one can no longer distinguish "right" causes and effects from wrong ones. Cause/Effect/Event/Event/Act/LewisVsBennett/Schwarz: Event as fact: Problem: To Distinguish "Right Causes": Similarity is not a solution here: Example Xanthippe's becoming a widow: here one cannot refer to similarity of regions. 1. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Facts | Logic Texts | Read III 26 Russell: wants to differentiate the fact from the statement. There are false statements, but no "false facts." VsRussell: but the cost of this explanation is that it undermines the distinction between language and the world! Wittgenstein: has a much more insubstantial view of the statement. Facts are facts relating to objects. Thus, it is characteristic of reality what facts there are. The objects must be common to all possibilities. Signs: are arbitrary and conventional. >Signs, >Statement. Read III 242 Facts: What makes statements about these things true or false are not the things themselves, but the facts. Truthmaking: it is not the bear which makes "the bear is black" true, but the fact that the bear is black. >Truth maker. There could be Tarski's theory without any ontological link to facts. >Truth/Tarski, >Truth definition/Tarski, >Truth theory/Tarski. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Facts | Morozov | I 118 Facts/truth/fact checking/politics/fake news/Morozov: The Truth Goggles project, developed by an MIT graduate and widely acclaimed in the media, is a step towards automating at least some of the steps involved in verifying the facts. (1) I 119 If the ((s) examined) article contains one of the more than 6,000 (and growing) entries in the PolitiFact database, these facts are highlighted in yellow while the rest of the text is blurred. When you click on the marked claim, a pop-up window is displayed showing what PolitiFact thinks of this particular claim, i. e. whether it is true, half true, mostly true, mostly false, false, etc., and also provides some contextual information. MorozovVsPolitifact/MorozovVsTruth-Goggles: This brings us back to the double-click mentality:"Truth" sneaks magically into our browsers, while the noble efforts of the truth seekers at PolitiFact and the innovators at MIT usually remain invisible and mostly unexplained. But who will observe the truth seekers and innovators? Glenn GreenwaldVsPolitifact/Morozov: PolitiFact called it "mostly false that the American citizens are vulnerable to ... I 120 ...assassination" by their own government, after the operative definition of the Ministry of Defence of al-Qaida and the Taliban had been reformulated in a very vague way. As Greenwald noted (...); many prominent lawyers and the American Civil Liberties Union shared such views. And yet, PolitiFact chose two supposedly neutral "experts" who, if you can believe Greenwald, are anything but neutral and are simply neoconservatives in disguise.(2) >Social Media, >Social Networks, >Internet, >Internet culture, >False information. Morozov: Thus, the semi-automatic factual verification offers some solutions - it can reveal factual errors - but these solutions could be at the expense of maintaining ideological frameworks that should be challenged and perhaps even overturned. >Politics. I 122 Facts/hypocrisy/Politics/Ruth Grant/Morozov: Grant's Thesis: The blanket condemnation of hypocrisy must be seen as a political deputy, especially if what counts for an honest policy is not a principled policy, but the sincere self-interest of those realists who are in reality only cynics. (3) I 122 Hypocrisy/Politics/David Runciman/Morozov: Runciman's thesis: Some types of political hypocrisy are even desirable and encouraging. (...) It is not the case that there is more hypocrisy today; it is just that, with a political presence of 24 hours in the media, it is much easier to find. (4) Mendacity/Politics/Martin Jay/Morozov: Martin Jay's thesis: To tell the truth can be a weapon of the powerful while lying is a tactic of the weak. (5) A politics without lies and hypocrisy would not be politics. >Power. Morozov: According to Jay, "Politics, however we choose to define its essence and limit its contours, will never be a completely fibre-free zone of authenticity, sincerity, integrity, transparency and righteousness. And maybe that's a good thing after all." (6) I 123 Ambiguity/Politics/Debora Stone/Morozov: Stone's thesis: Ambivalence has many positive uses in democratic politics; it is more an art than a science. Ambiguity enables the transformation of individual intentions and actions into collective results and purposes. Without them, cooperation and compromise would be far more difficult, if not impossible. (7) For example, defining a policy in vague terms could help politicians to get support from many different sides. "Ambiguity facilitates negotiations and compromises because it allows opponents to claim victory from a single resolution ((s) respectively for themselves).(8) >Ambiguity. 1. see Andrew Phelps, “Are You Sure That’s True? Truth Goggles Tackles Fishy Claims at the Moment of Consumption,” Nieman Journalism Lab, July 12, 2012, http:// www.niemanlab.org/ 2012/ 07/ are-you-sure-thats-true-truth-goggles-tackles-fishy-claims-at-the-moment-of-consumption. 2. Glenn Greenwald, “PolitiFact and the Scam of Neutral Expertise,” Salon, December 5, 2011, http:// www.salon.com/ 2011/ 12/ 05/ politifact_and_the_scam_of_neutral_expertise. 3. Ruth W. Grant, Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1999), 180. 4. David Runciman, Political Hypocrisy: The Mask of Power, from Hobbes to Orwell and Beyond (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. 5. Martin Jay, The Virtues of Mendacity: On Lying in Politics, reprint ed. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012), 180. 6. ibid. ibid., 159. 7. Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, Revised Edition, 3rd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001). 8. ibid. 159 |
Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Facts | Russell | Armstrong II 102 General fact/Russell/Armstrong: a certain large accumulation of facts which is the totality of the facts of the first level. Lewis: if this collection of less than all possible states (facts) is 1st level, then this state of higher level automatically excludes countless states from existence. Armstrong: The situation with nomic connections seems the same. Armstrong II 131 General fact/Russell/Martin: this could be a uniformity or regularity, but also different or disjunctive relations. - i.e. a "mixed world": "uniform and/or non-uniform". The disjunction itself could be general and not space-time-specific. B. Russell, ABC of Relativity Theory 144/145 Facts/Russell: can never be inferred from laws, only from other facts. >((s) explanation: Naturals laws do not evoke anything.) >Natural laws/Ryle. R V 38ff Fact/Russell/Stegmüller: it is inadmissible to regard attributes and relations together with individuals as components of facts - (violates type theory, different levels). >Type theory. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Falsification | Duhem | I 245 Verification/Confirmation/Examination/Duhem: If the announced fact does not arise, the theorem is falsified. In the examination one applies a whole group of theories (according to which the instruments are built and without which they cannot be read). The occurrence or non-occurrence of the phenomenon does not result from the contentious theorem alone, but from the connection with the whole group. The failing experiment merely teaches that among all the theorems which have served to predict or to state the phenomenon, at least one must be false. If the experimenter declares that the error lies precisely in the proposition to be tested, he presupposes that all others are true. Confidence in the other sentences (for example, according to which the instruments are constructed and according to which they are read) does not occur with logical necessity. >Verification, >Confirmation. I 249 Physics is not a machine that can be dismantled. It is a system when a disturbance occurs, it has indeed been evoked by the whole system. (> System). The physicist must find the organ without being able to isolate it, because then the system does no longer work. >Physics. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Falsification | Leibniz | Holz I 55 Falsification/Leibniz: the progress of experience allows the elimination of the false propositions by discovering their immanent contradiction. Holz: this has nothing to do with Popper's falsification. >Contradictions, >Existence/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Falsification | Schurz | I 92 Notation: II- : "follows logically". Explanation scheme/logical form/explanation/Schurz: strict all proposition & singular proposition II- singular proposition. All A are K and a is A II- a is K. Falsification scheme/falsification/logical form/Schurz: FS I: singular proposition falsifies strict universal sentence. singular sentence II- negation of strict universal sentence a is A and not K II- not all A are K FS II: existence sentence falsifies strict all proposition There is an A that is not a K II- not all A are K. >Universal sentence. I 98 Def Verifiability/Schurz: A hypothesis H is verifiable iff there is a finite and consistent set B of observation propositions from which H follows logically. This means only possible (actual) verifiability. >Verification, >Actuality, >Hypotheses, >Confirmation. Def Falsifiability/Schurz: H is falsifiable iff there is a finite consistent set B of observation propositions, from which the negation of H follows logically. This means only possible falsifiability (actual). Def Confirmability/Schurz: (resp. weakenable) is hypothesis H if there is a finitely consistent set B of observation propositions, which hears resp. degrades the validity resp. plausibility of H. Falsification/Asymmetry/Popper: Falsification is restricted to strict spatiotemporally unrestricted empirical all-hypotheses. Dual to this, unrestricted existence propositions Ex "There is a white raven" are verifiable, but not falsifiable. I 99 Spatiotemporally restricted hypotheses: are in principle verifiable and falsifiable by observing the finitely many individuals of a domain. Verifiability: no unrestricted generalization and no theoretical theorem is verifiable. Allexistence theorem/statistical generalization: not verifiable also not falsifiable because they do not imply observation theorems. Theories/falsification: neither whole theories nor single theoretical hypotheses are falsifiable. Even if they are strictly general. And this is because of holism. >Holism. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Fascism | Holmes | Krastev I 57 Fascism/Communism/Krastev/Holmes: In the framework of democratic transitions, it was commonplace to view fascism and communism as two sides of the same totalitarian coin. When it comes to the potentially murderous consequences of the two ideologies and their associated regimes, this is a completely legitimate comparison. But viewing communism and fascism as twins misleadingly suggests that, in the democratic age, nationalism itself (of which fascism is an extreme version and distortion) will eventually fade away just as communism disappeared in 1989–91. KrastevVs: This was never realistic. The reason is that communism was a radical political experiment based on abolishing inheritable private property, while democracy presupposes the existence of a bounded political community and is therefore inherently national. >Communism. |
LawHolm I Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The Common Law Mineola, NY 1991 Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Fascism | Krastev | Krastev I 57 Fascism/Communism/Krastev: In the framework of democratic transitions, it was commonplace to view fascism and communism as two sides of the same totalitarian coin. When it comes to the potentially murderous consequences of the two ideologies and their associated regimes, this is a completely legitimate comparison. But viewing communism and fascism as twins misleadingly suggests that, in the democratic age, nationalism itself (of which fascism is an extreme version and distortion) will eventually fade away just as communism disappeared in 1989–91. KrastevVs: This was never realistic. The reason is that communism was a radical political experiment based on abolishing inheritable private property, while democracy presupposes the existence of a bounded political community and is therefore inherently national. >Communism. |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Fascism | Schmitt | Brocker I 170 Fascism/Bolshevism/Schmitt: Schmitt regarded these movements as complex movements in which motives and energies of Marxism, anarchism and nationalism became effective in different ways, and he imputed to them an irrationalist "philosophy of concrete life"(1), which Sorel had captured in a prototype. >Marxism, >Anarchism, >Nationalism. Schmitt thus moved away from the self-image of the movements and developed his own strong and speculative interpretation. His view of "Moscow" was influenced by a typical contemporary Slavophilia (after Tolstoy and Dostoevsky). >Dostoevsky. Schmitt quoted Sorel and Mussolini for his assessment that "the energy of the national is greater than that of the class struggle myth"(2). In the end, he played Mussolini off against liberal parliamentarianism like Bolshevism. Brocker I 173 Fascism/Schmitt: Schmitt regarded Italian fascism (...) as the current "counterrevolutionary" answer to Bolshevism. >Bolshevism. 1. Carl Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, in: Bonner Festgabe für Ernst Zitelmann zum fünfzigjährigen Doktorjubiläum, München/Leipzig 1923, 413-473. Separatveröffentlichung in der Reihe: Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen und Reden zur Philosophie, Politik und Geistesgeschichte, Bd. 1, München/Leipzig 1923. Zweite, erweiterte Auflage 1926, p. 76. 2. Ibid. p. 88. Reinhard Mehring, Carl Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus (1923), in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Schmitt I Carl Schmitt Der Hüter der Verfassung Tübingen 1931 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Fashion | Gadamer | I 42 Fashion/Gadamer: A phenomenon that is closely linked to taste is fashion. Here, the moment of social generalization that the concept of taste contains becomes a defining reality. But it is precisely this opposition to fashion that makes it clear that the generalisation that is due to taste has a completely different basis and does not only mean empirical generality. (This is the essential point for Kant). >Taste/Kant. In the concept of fashion [German "Mode"] lies already linguistically that it is about a changeable how (modus) within a lasting whole of social behaviour. What is merely a matter of fashion contains in itself no other norm than that set by the acting of all. Fashion regulates at its discretion only those things that can be just as different. For it, indeed, empirical generality, consideration for others, comparison, and thus putting oneself in a general perspective is constitutive. In this respect, fashion creates a social dependence that is difficult to escape. Fashion/Kant/Gadamer: Kant is quite right, if he thinks it is better to be a fool in fashion than against I 43 fashion.(1) Taste/Gadamer: on the other hand, is to be determined as a mental discrimination. >Taste/Gadamer, >Taste/Kant. 1. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, § 71, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Federalism | Constitutional Economics | Parisi I 210 Federalism/Constitutional Economics/Voigt: (…) the conjectured economic benefits of federalism are expected to arise from the competition between constituent governments; its costs are based on the necessity of cooperating on some issues. Hayek: Thus, Hayek (1939)(1) argues that competition between governments will reveal information on efficient ways to provide public goods. Assuming that governments have incentives to make use of that information, government efficiency should be higher in federations, ceteris paribus. Tiebout: In Tiebout's ( 1956)(2) famous model, the lower government levels compete Parisi I 211 for taxpaying citizens, thus giving lower-level governments an incentive to cater to these citizens' preferences. Costs: (…) if the number of states is large, economies of scale in the provision of public goods could remain unrealized. For example, Tanzi (2000)(3) suspects that those providing public goods will be insufficiently specialized. Moral hazard: Also, federal states need to deal with a moral hazard problem that is not an issue in unitary states.* The federal government will regularly issue "no-bail-out clauses" but they will not always be credible.** With regard to the issue of overborrowing, Wildasin (1997)(6) argues that large states can become "too big to fail." On the other hand, it has been argued (Rodden and Wibbels, 2002)(7) that large member states can internalize more of the benefits generated by responsible fiscal policies. Solution: A number of factors might mitigate this free-rider problem: If strong, disciplined parties are active throughout most of the federation and one party is in charge of the federal as well as most of the constituent governments, then party leaders may be able to prevent state officials from externalizing the negative effects of overborrowing (Rodden and Wibbels, 2002)(7). Corruption: To the question of whether corruption is more prevalent under federal or unitary constitutions, there is one standard answer: constituent governments are closer to the people, play infinitely repeated games with local constituents, and hence are subject to local capture (see, e.g., Tanzi, 2000)(3). Therefore, corruption levels will be higher under federal than under unitary constitutions. Vs: The standard argument against the local capture hypothesis is that the behavior of constituent governments is more transparent in federations and politicians are, hence, more accountable for their actions. This would imply that corruption is lower under federal constitutions. Additionally, corruption can signal an inadequacy in the relevant rule system; under dysfunctional rules, even welfare- enhancing activities will often require corrupt behavior. This assumption leads to the argument that since the constituent units of federal states are closer to the people, it is likely that their rules will be more adequate than those in unitary states. Parisi I 212 Government spending: For a long time, the evidence concerning the effects of federalism on overall government spending was mixed. Over the last several years, though, this appears to have changed. Rodden (2003)(8) shows for a cross-country study covering the period 1980 to 1993 that in countries in which local and state governments have the competence to set the tax base, total government expenditure is lower. >Direct Democracy/Constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics. * The relationship between the central government and the lower units in unitary states might be more aptly described drawing on principal-agent theory with its familiar monitoring problems. For such a view, see Seabright (1996)(4). ** Rodden (2002(5), p. 6 72) points out that the creditworthiness of the federal level might be jeopardized if it does not bail out the constituent governments. 1. Hayek, F. (1939). "Economic Conditions of Inter-State Federalism." New Commonwealth Quarterly 2: 131-149. 2. Tiebout, Ch. (1956). "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures." Journal of Political Economy 64: 416-424. 3. Tanzi, V. (2000). "Some politically incorrect Remarks on Decentralization and Public Finance," in J.-J. Dethier, ed., Governance, Decentralization and Reform in China, India and Russia, 47-63. Boston, MA: Kluwer. 4. Seabright, Paul (1996). "Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model." European Economic Review 40:61-89. 5. Rodden, J. (2002). "The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance around the World." American Journal of Political Science 46(3): 670-687. 6. Wildasin, D. (1997). "Externalities and Bailouts: Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations." Nashville, TN: Mimeo. 7. Rodden, J. and E. Wibbels (2002). "Beyond the Fiction of Federalism - Macroeconomic Management in Multitiered Systems." World Politics 54: 494-531. 8. Rodden, J. (2003). "Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government." International Organization 57: 695-729. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Federalism | Public Choice Theory | Parisi I 190 Federalism/Public choice theory/Farber: One theory of federalism, dating back at least to Tiebout, contemplates a competitive market, with the population as the consumers and local jurisdictions as sellers of policies. Under the right circumstances, this process could lead to an optimum alignment between individual preferences and local policies, but the conditions for this optimum turn out to be very restrictive (Hills, 2010(1), pp. 208-213). Optimum: To obtain an optimum, there must be enough jurisdictions to provide all of the combinations of public policies desired by members of the public, but the jurisdictions must be large enough to avoid spillover effects and to provide employment opportunities for those seeking to live there. In addition, the public needs complete information about local policies across all the regimes, so as to allow informed choice.(…) for instance, it is hard to find states with low taxes, permissive rules on abortion, strong environmental regulations, and draconian criminal penalties.* Decentralization: A more fundamental problem is that the exit and voice arguments support decentralization, but they do not explain why decentralization needs to be constitutionally entrenched. For instance, state governments may obtain many of these benefits by legislatively delegating power to local governments. Even at the national level, the federal government does not preempt all state laws even when it has the power to do so, apparently preferring to allow local diversity. >Constitutional structures/Public choice theory. Discrimination: In some circumstances, geographic regions might correspond with persistent economic or cultural divisions, so constitutional federalism could prevent a persistent national majority from oppressing a local minority. In that situation, federalism solves a discrimination problem. Equilibrium/majority/minorities: Unless the minority group is somehow politically isolated from the majority group, however, it is hard to see how exploitation of geographic regions could be a stable equilibrium. The losers could upset the majority coalition by offering better terms to some subgroup to peel them away from the coalition. Centralization: An alternative theory is that national politicians have an incentive to overexpand the power of the central government. But this theory requires an explanation of why politicians would want to expand their power, particularly on controversial issues or unpopular measures like raising taxes, rather than leaving those issues to local officials. For instance, this theory of federalism is in tension with the view that legislators delegate too much power to administrators, since the same arguments would often support delegation by national legislators to state governments (Levinson, 2005)(3). Public choice theory: public choice does offer some striking arguments for decentralization, but does not provide a satisfying explanation for entrenchment of decentralization through constitutional federalism, except in limited circumstances. * For a thorough review of these models and their limitations, see pp. 186-202 of Mueller (2003)(2). 1. Hills, R. M. (2010) "Federalism and Public Choice," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds. Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 207-233. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 2. Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public Choice 111. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Levinson, D. J. (2005). "Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law." Harvard Law Review 118:916-972. Farber, Daniel A. “Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Feminism | Ball | Gaus I 23 Feminism/Ball: 1) A feminist or gender-centred approach to the history of political thought began in the 1960s when women were looking for a ‘usable past’, a history that connected present struggles with previous ones largely neglected by historians, most of whom were male. Feminist historians of political thought sought heroines – and heroes – who had championed the cause of women’s rights and related causes. 2) In [an] angrier - and arguably more accurate - second phase, feminist scholars set out to expose and criticize the misogyny lurking in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Gaus I 24 Rousseau, Bentham, Mill, and Marx, amongst many others. >Plato, >Aristotle, >N. Machiavelli, >Th. Hobbes, >J. Locke, >J.-J. Rousseau, >J. Bentham, >J.St. Mill, >K. Marx. The public/private dichotomy and the concept of consent in liberal theory are a sham, the social contract is a ‘fraternal’ construct, and the modern welfare state is a covertly patriarchal institution (Pateman, 1989)(1). >C. Pateman. 3) A third phase followed in which the ostensibly civic virtues of men were turned into vices – the hunger for power, domination, or simply showing off – that women supposedly lacked. Men are domineering, women nurturing; men competitive, women co-operative; men think and judge in abstract and universal categories, women in concrete and particular instances; and so on. A new phrase – ‘maternal thinking’ – was coined to cover this gently militant momism (Ruddick, 1989)(2). On this view, men are absent fathers and domineering patriarchs; women are caring and concerned mothers speaking ‘in a different voice’ (Gilligan, 1982)(3). This represents something of a return to the ‘biology-is-destiny’ essentialism and ‘functionalism’ criticized so vigorously by Okin and others. >S.M. Okin. It also accepts the public/private distinction criticized by Pateman and others, upending and reifying that dichotomy so that the ‘private’ realm of the family is taken to be superior to the ‘public’ area of politics, power, aggression, and war (Elshtain, 1987)(4). >J.B. Elshtain. Maternalism: The new ‘maternal thinking’ – and the new maternalists’ approach to the history of political thought, in particular – did not want for critics. Against the maternalists’ valorization of the private realm and the celebration of mothering, Mary Dietz (1985)(5) and other feminist critics held out the prospect of an active and engaged civic feminism, or ‘citizenship with a feminist face’. 1. Pateman, Carole (1989) The Disorder of Women. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 2. Ruddick, Sara (1989) Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace. Boston: Beacon. 3. Gilligan, Carol (1982) In a Different Voice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 4. Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1987) Women and War. New York: Praeger. 5. Dietz, Mary G. (1985) ‘Citizenship with a feminist face: the problem with maternal thinking’. Political Theory, 13: 19–37. Ball, Terence. 2004. „History and the Interpretation of Texts“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Feminism | Butler | Brocker I 743 Feminism/Butler: Problem: when a political movement identifies with the subject identity that poses a problem, a logic of its own develops. "Feminist critique must also understand how the category "wom(en)" is the subject of feminism, created and restricted precisely by those power structures by means of which the goal of emancipation is to be achieved.(1) >Emancipation, >Equality, >Method, >Power. Brocker I 745 Feminism would benefit from a more open and diverse understanding of gender. (2) Brocker I 746 Feminists have criticized that femininity is socially overdetermined, forced into forms that seem to go far beyond biological differences that may be necessary to preserve the species. >Overdetermination. ButlerVsFeminism: Butler asks more radically - not how much of "gender" is exuberant and based on the unjustified exercise of power, but whether the feminist movement should not generally work with the identity determination "woman" without a subject? >Identity/Butler, Gender/Butler. 1. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, New York/London 1999 (zuerst 1990); Dt. Judith Butler, Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter, Frankfurt/M. 1991, S. 17 2.Ibid. final chap.. Christine Hauskeller, “Judith Butler, Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Feuerbach, Ludwig | Marx | Rothbard II 362 Feuerbach/communism/Marx/Rothbard: By recasting the dialectic in materialist and atheist terms, however, Marx gave up the powerful motor of the dialectic as it operated throughout history: either Christian messianism or providence or the growing self-consciousness of the world spirit. How could Marx find a 'scientific' materialist replacement, newly grounded in the ineluctable 'laws of history' that would explain the inevitability of the imminent apocalyptic transformation of the world into communism? It is one thing to base the prediction of a forthcoming Armageddon Rothbard II 363 upon the Bible; it is quite another to deduce this event from allegedly scientific laws. Setting forth the specifics of this engine of history was to occupy Karl Marx for the rest ofhis life. Although Marx found Feuerbach indispensable for adopting a thoroughgoing atheist and materialist positions, Marx soon found that Feuerbach had not gone nearly far enough. Even though Feuerbach was a philosophical communist, he basically believed that ifman forswore religion, then his alienation from his selfwould be over. To Marx, religion was only one of the problems. The entire world of man (the Menschenwelt) was alienating, and had to be radically overthrown, root and branch. Only apocalyptic destruction of this world of man would permit true human nature to be realized. Only then would the existing 'un-man' (Unmensch) truly become man (Mensch). As Marx thundered in the fourth ofhis 'theses on Feuerbach', 'one must proceed to destroy [the] 'earthly family' [as it is] 'both in theory and in practice'.(1) Feuerbach: In particular, declared Marx, true man, as Feuerbach had argued, is a 'communal being' {Gemeinwesen) or 'species being' (Gattungswesen). Although the state as it exists must be negated or transcended, man's participation in the state operates as such a communal being. The main problem comes in the private sphere, the market, or 'civil society', in which un-man acts as an egoist, as a private person, treating others as means, and not collectively as masters of their fate. And in existing society, unfortunately, civil society is primary, while the state, or 'political community', is secondary. What must be done to realize the full nature of mankind is to transcend the state and civil society by politicizing all of life, by making all of man's actions collective. Then real individual man will become a true and full 'species being'.(2) 1. Robert C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), p. 101. 2. Ibid. p. 105. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Fictions | Cartwright | I 204 fictional features / fiction / science / physics / QM / Cartwright. E.g. infinite number of degrees of freedom - E.g.correlation time = 0 - E.g. interaction with an observer - not used in quantum statistics. >Explanations, >Experiments, >Observation, >Theoretical terms, >Method, >Theories. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Fictions | Gadamer | I 138 Literature/Fiction/Gadamer: For the poet, free invention is always only one side of a mediocrity bound by given validity. He does not freely invent his fable, no matter how much he imagines it. Rather, to this day something remains of the old foundation of the mimesis theory. >Mimesis. The free invention of the poet is the representation of a common truth which also binds the poet. Other forms of art are not different, especially the fine arts. The aesthetic myth of the freelance imagination, which transforms experience into poetry, and the cult of the genius that belongs to it, only attest that in the 19th century the mythical-historical traditional good is no longer a self-evident possession. But even then the aesthetic myth of imagination and ingenious invention represents an exaggeration that cannot withstand what is real. Still, the choice of material and the design of the chosen material does not originate from a free will of the artist and is not merely an expression of his inwardness. Rather, the artist appeals to prepared minds and chooses for it what promises him effect. He himself is in the same tradition as the audience he means and collects. In this sense, it is true that he is not an individual, a thinking consciousness that needs to know explicitly what he is doing and what his work says. It is never just a strange world of magic, intoxication, dream, to which the player, creator or spectator is enraptured, but it is still his own world, to which he is actually transferred by recognizing himself deeper within it. There remains a continuity of meaning that unites the work of art with the world of existence and from which even the alienated consciousness of an educational society never completely detaches itself. >Literature, >Education, >Second Nature, >Cultural Tradition, >Cultural Values, >Culture, >Society. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Fictions | Lewis | IV 261 Fiction/Truth/Lewis: (Meinongian view) E.g. one can indeed say that Holmes and Nixon belong to the same category: humans. - Unlike E.g. intelligences from steam - E.g. collection: E.g. assuming a large choir in a story: we should not say that its members do not exist because we cannot specify their number - and that is because we can already say something true about the choir. IV 265 Truth/Fiction/Lewis: E.g. Holmes stories would be true in a possible world, where the corresponding things occur - difficult problem: Holmes and Watson could be reversed! - Problem: capturing the "plot" of a Holmes story (in order to exclude the irrelevant) - Kripke: if by chance in the actual world someone was like Holmes, "Holmes" would still not refer to this person. IV 265 Fiction/Lewis: not abstract number of sentences, but rather the act of narration - different on different occasions - could simultaneously bring 2 different fictions: a) harmless for children - b) explosive for the initiated - the possible world that we should look at is the one in which the story is told, but as a known fact rather than fiction -> E.g. Pierre Menard, Author of the Don Quixote: not copied, but told again. IV 267 Fiction/Name/Lewis: The way the name is used in fiction, it is not rigid - it depends more on the designation. IV 269 Truth/Fiction/Lewis: read as >counterfactual conditionals. Def truth in fiction: thesis: an unreal conditional clause (counterfactual conditional) of the form "if f, then it would be the case that y" is non-trivially true if a possible world, in which both are true, differs less from our real world than any possible world in which f is true and y is not true. (The rear part is not true) - ((s)> similarity metrics) - ((s) actual world as third, as a reference point for measuring similarity between possible worlds) - absurd question: what blood type was Holmes? - Solution: bundle of possible worlds - "the worlds of Holmes" - it all depends on which possible world is our real world. IV 272 Truth in fiction: should not depend on our assumptions about the background, otherwise this truth would be constantly changing - Solution: the crucial background is the one shared by the community at the time when the fiction arose. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Fields | Genz | II 105 Field/Genz: Field has replaced the ether. It is something that assigns numbers to every place and time, for example, temperature distribution. The field is the assignment itself. Here you need a number per location For example, wind distribution: here you need two numbers per location: one for strength and one for direction. Field/Abstraction/Genz: as an abstraction the field is no problem. Problem: that there are fields that represent the last reality. There is no material substrate here. Reality/Genz: the term is thus forced to change. Field/immaterial: light, for example, can simply be abstract field sizes that oscillate when light propagates, which cannot be traced back to any material reality. II 106/107 Fields: e.g. the speed of a river from shore to shore, e.g. angle of inclination of grasses of a meadow, e.g. the speed of the clouds, e.g. the ups and downs of points of a violin string, e.g. the bow wave of a ship (a moving deformation) e.g. alignment of iron chips by a magnet. Reality/Genz: we attribute them to fields when they obey equations that describe them. >Equations, >Reality. Maxwell's equations/Genz: (for electric and magnetic fields): Maxwell's equations only differ from the equations describing water currents in their mathematical details. Mathematical substrate/Fields/Genz: mathematical substrate could not be found. Thus the fields became more and more the last reality. Field: creates its particles! And they always have to. >Substrate. II 108 Therefore, there is no empty space without fields. Fields: are not a substrate of vibrations, but the vibrations themselves. This is also the reason why elementary particles of the same type are always absolutely identical. Field/Newton: his theory did not use any fields, but instead had to assume instantaneous propagation, i. e. long-distance effect. >Isaac Newton. Transmission/gravity/Field/Genz: the body that exerts an effect usually has already left the place when the force begins to act. For example, the sun is standing in a place 8 minutes away from where it was standing when the effect was exerted by it. Field: one has tried to eliminate fields by assuming the effect of particles on particles. This turned out to be extremely complicated, especially since one had to explain time delay. II 109 Gravitation/Field/Genz: gravity can transfer energy (impulse and angular momentum). Therefore, a theory that would only know cause and effect instead of fields would have to override conservation laws during transmission (?). Fields/Genz: the same applies to all fields. >Gravitation. Existence/Field/Genz: whether they exist is a pointless question outside the theories which accept them. The status of the fields can only be described by if-then sentences. II 115 Field/Genz: Fields can never be completely absent. They have to fluctuate by zero. In their basic state they disappear net but not gross. Material property/object/thing/Genz: that fields must always be present may appear to some as a possible property of a material thing, but not to others. Material/matter/Genz: when something is material, it forms a medium in relation to which an observer is always in a measurable speed. Field/Genz: for fields in the ground state, however, the theory implies that this is impossible, since an observer determines his speed in relation to it. >Matter, >Observation. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Financial Sanctions | Itskhoki | Itskhoki I 10 Financial Sanctions/Itskhoki/Ribakova: Financial sanctions operate by limiting the ability of countries to borrow to finance trade deficits, reducing the ability for risk sharing and intertemporal consumption smoothing. Countries that do not rely on international financing of trade flows and export commodities, which can be elastically relocated to different markets, are particularly immune to the effects of sanctions provided many third countries are not part of the sanctioning coalition. Payment Systems: Nonetheless, payment system sanctions may result in significant barriers and disrupt trade flows with third countries. In conventional macrotrade analysis, payment system sanctions have no effect provided the country has access to elastic spot currency markets. However, this is not the case in the new generation of models with limited elasticity of substitution in the currency market. Empirical evidence suggests that sanctions that restrict payment system have a substantial bite in practice, and hence highlight the need to work with such frameworks. Finally, we discuss the important policy issue of the optimal sanctions mix. >Sanctions, >Sanctions consequences, >Sanctions debate, >Payment systems, >Sanctions effectiveness, >Sanctions evasion, >Sanctions history, >Sanctions policies, >Sanctions theory, >Trade sanctions. Itskhoki I 18 The aim of financial sanctions is to curb the ability of intertemporal trade - whether borrowing internationally, or using accumulated foreign assets to pay for current imports, or using current export proceeds to buy future imports. [We] relied on the idea that all exported revenues can be used to buy imports to achieve balanced trade, while financial sanctions disrupt this logic. Sanctioning accumulated financial assets is politically easiest, as it avoids the mutual economic costs of trade sanctions discussed above, but this may carry reputational consequences in the asset markets. Financial sanctions are most effective when a sanctioned country relies on international financing to procure imported inputs. In this case, sanctions can trigger or amplify a sudden stop in financial flows, which in turn creates a disruption in procuring imports and possibly cause a full-scale bank run. This is the case in which international sanctions can have the largest impact by disrupting the functioning of the entire financial system beyond the direct international trade consequences. However, if the country is neither an active net borrower in international markets, nor has a large accumulation of gross foreign asset positions, financial sanctions may have only limited effects that can be mitigated with financial repression of capital outflows. Russia: In case of Russia, which had a sizeable net foreign asset position and little gross foreign debt, financial sanctions were mostly targeting foreign assets. This turned out to be insufficient to trigger a persistent financial crisis, in part because of the large concurrent trade surplus that provided strong currency inflow into the economy and appreciated the ruble. This current account surplus was sufficient to stabilize the financial system even without continued use of financial repression and austerity in expenditures. While the welfare costs from frozen assets and disrupted imports were real, there was no financial strain associated with a typical balance-of-payment crisis. Indeed, this was an unusual situation of temporary abundance of foreign exchange liquidity driven by effective import sanctions under soaring export revenues from high commodity prices. |
Itskhoki I Oleg Itskhoki Elina Ribakova The Economics of Sanctions: From Theory Into Practice. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2024. The Brookings Institution 2024 |
| Fine-grained/ coarse-grained | Block | Fodor IV 169 Fine-Grained/Twin Earth/Conceptual Role/Conceptual Role Theory/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: Problems with the twin earth point in to a different direction than Frege's problems (intension/extension). Frege: needs more fine-grained concepts as extensions Putnam: needs less fine-grained than extensional equivalence. (Narrower conception): Synonymous expressions must be treated as extensionally distinguished. (Water/Twin-Earth Water). Therefore, a common theoretical approach (CRT) will hardly work. Solution/Block: "Two Factors" version of the CRT. The two are orthogonal to each other: A) Actual CRT: covers the meaning aspect of Frege IV 170 B) Independent, possibly causal, theory of the reference: (Twin Earth/Water/Twin-Earth Water). Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: this has almost nothing to do with CRT. Moreover, neither a) (meaning) nor b) (causality) is available. But let's assume it anyway: For example, we make the distinction of meaning/reference with the "two-factor" theory: we then have enough distinction ability, but pay a high price: Question: What actually holds the two factors together? E.g. what prevents the existence of an expression whose inferential role corresponds to the expression "4 is a prime number" and whose content is "water is wet"? But what would it mean? And what would be expressed? The problem is repeated at the level of metatheory: What holds a theory of extension and a theory of meaning together? BlockVsVs: it is clear to him, and what he says about it is puzzling: "the conceptual role is primarily in the determination of the nature of the reference, but not vice versa." IV 171 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: precisely in the case of the twin earth, the conceptual role cannot determine the reference! Conceptual Role/Block: seems to say that it is indeed not the conceptual role of water that determines what it refers to, but the conceptual role of names! Their reference is, after all, causally determined according to Kripke. Conceptual Role/(s): Difference: a) Conceptual role of a particular concept, e.g. water, B) a word class, e.g. name. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but that does not solve the problem! We need something that excludes the confusion between extension and intension. What is it that excludes an expression like (see above) "prime number/wetness"? Block: T is not a kind-term, if the causal theory of kind-terms is not true for it. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that just does not prevent "water" from having the extension of a kind-concept and at the same time the logic of a number concept. >Twin Earth, >Extension, >Intensions, >Causal theory of names. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Firms | Neoclassical Economics | Kiesling I 10 Firms/Neoclassical Economics/Kiesling: In the neoclassical economic theory Coase was learning in the 1930s, called the cost-based theory of the firm, economists modeled firms based on their input costs, with inputs falling into two categories: labour and capital. Having decided what to produce, firms choose combinations of inputs that maximize their profits. The neoclassical theory of the firm focuses on how firms allocate resources to their highest-valued uses and how they make profitmaximizing investment decisions over time. This theory does not explore what determines the use of hierarchies over markets, or which transactions firms choose to perform internally. It also says little about how firms as organizational structures enable innovation, or how entrepreneurship is expressed in the forms or the actions that firms take. >Firms/Coase. |
Kiesling I L. Lynne Kiesling The Essential Ronald Coase Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2021 |
| Fiscal Policy | Congressional Research Service (CRS) | CRS I 2 Fiscal policy/Marc Labonte/CRS: Fiscal policy refers to increasing or decreasing the government’s budget surplus (or deficit) in order to increase or decrease the amount of aggregate spending in the economy.(1) Monetary policy refers to increasing or decreasing short-term interest rates through manipulation of the money supply in order to decrease or increase the amount of aggregate spending in the economy.(2) Interest rates: For example, other things being equal, lower interest rates lead to more investment spending, one component of aggregate spending. Furthermore, fiscal and monetary policy influence interest rates differently, and interest rates are the key determinant of the exchange rate. Expansionary fiscal policy is likely to raise interest rates and “crowd out” private investment while expansionary monetary policy, or reducing short-term interest rates, is likely to temporarily lower interest rates. Fixed exchange rates: Maintaining a fixed exchange rate requires continuous policy adjustment. Although perhaps theoretically feasible, it would be impossible in practice to operate a timely or precise enough fiscal policy to maintain a fixed exchange rate as long as fiscal policy must be legislated. Thus, maintaining a fixed exchange rate has been delegated to the monetary authority in practice. Intervening in foreign exchange markets directly is equivalent to changing monetary policy if the intervention is “unsterilized.” When a central bank sells foreign currency to boost the exchange rate, it takes the domestic currency it receives in exchange out of circulation, decreasing the money supply. Often, it prints new money to replace the domestic currency that has been removed from circulation—referred to as sterilization—but economic theory suggests that when it does so, it negates the intervention’s effect on the exchange rate.(3) CRS I 3 Monetary and fiscal policy are not regularly or systematically used to influence the exchange rate.(4) CRS I 4 Floating exchange rates: The maintenance of a floating exchange rate does not require support from monetary and fiscal policy. This frees the government to focus monetary and fiscal policy on stabilizing the economy in response to domestic changes in supply and demand. Fiscal and monetary policy usually can be focused on domestic goals, such as maintaining price and output stability, without being constrained by the policy’s effect on the exchange rate. >Currency crises, >Capital controls, >Fixed exchange rates, >Floating exchange rates, >International trade, >Currency. 1. For more information, see CRS Report RL31235, The Economics of the Federal Budget Deficit, by Brian W. Cashell. 2. For more information, see CRS Report RL30354, Monetary Policy and the Federal Reserve: Current Policy and Conditions, by Gail E. Makinen and Marc Labonte. 3. Similarly, if exchange rate intervention was undertaken by a government’s treasury, theory suggests it would have no lasting effect on the exchange rate because the treasury cannot alter the money supply. 4. From time to time, governments and central banks in countries with floating exchange rates may enter the foreign exchange market in an attempt to influence the exchange rate value. This is known as “managed floating” or “dirty floating.” Historically, such interventions have had patchy success. When they have failed, it has frequently been due to the fact that intervention was not coupled with a change in monetary policy. Managed floating is very different from a fixed exchange rate regime, where monetary policy is devoted to maintaining the exchange rate value on a continual basis as its primary goal. Congressional Research Service of the Library of congress (CRS) Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? RL31204 (2007) https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL31204 |
CRS I Congressional Research Service (CRS) Marc Labonte Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? Washington: Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress 2007 CRS II Congressional Research Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Marc Labonte, Banking and Cryptocurrency: Policy Issues. CRS Congressional research Service Report R48430. Washington, DC. 2025 CRS III Congressional Research Service (CRS) Corrie E. Clark Heather L. Greenley, Bitcoin, Blockchain, and the Energy Sector. Washington, DC. 2019 CRS IV Congressional Reserch Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Cryptocurrency: Selected Policy Issues Congressional Reserch Service CRS Report R47425 Washington, DC. 2023 |
| Five-Factor Model | Developmental Psychology | Corr I 195 Five-Factor Model/Developmental psychology/personality traits/Donnellan/Robins: recent studies on the absolute and differential stability in the Big Five (>Five-Factor Model, >Personality traits) are (Donnellan and Lucas 2008(1); Terracciano, McCrae, Brant and Costa 2005(2); Srivastava, John, Gosling and Potter 2003(3)), meta-analytic reviews (Roberts, Walton and Viechtbauer 2006(4); Roberts and DelVecchio 2000(4a)), and narrative reviews (Helson, Kwan, John and Jones 2002(5); Trzesniewski, Robins, Roberts and Caspi 2004(6)). Corr I 196 Roberts, Walton and Viechtbauer (2006) (…) divided the Extraversion domain into two facets: Social Dominance (traits related to independence and dominance) and Social Vitality (traits related to positive affect, activity level and sociability). Average levels of Social Vitality tended to be fairly stable across the lifespan, although there was a slight spike upward from adolescence to young adulthood followed by a plateau in the average level until the mid-fifties when there was a slight decline. Social Dominance, on the other hand, showed a more pronounced and consistent absolute increase from adolescence to the early thirties where mean-levels remained consistent until the mid-fifties, after which the lack of studies precluded further analyses. Agreeableness and Conscientiousness showed gradual increases in absolute scores across the lifespan whereas Neuroticism showed gradual decreases. Finally, Openness showed a mean-level increase from adolescence to young adulthood and then mean-levels remained constant until the mid-fifties when it started to show a slight decline in average levels. There are two dominant explanations for absolute changes in the Big Five. a) The intrinsic maturational position holds that normative age-related changes in personality are driven by biological processes (e.g., Costa and McCrae 2006)(7) whereas b) The life course position posits that changes stem from involvement in particular social roles and the life experiences that accompany them (e.g., Roberts, Wood and Smith 2005)(8). (RobertsVsCosta, RobertsVsMcCrae). Corr I 197 Donnellan/Robins: Thesis: we believe there are compelling findings linking experiences within the important domains of adult life to personality changes. For example, Robins, Caspi and Moffitt (2002)(9) found that individuals who were involved in distressed romantic relationships in their early twenties demonstrated increases in Neuroticism compared to those in relatively satisfying relationships. Likewise, Roberts, Caspi and Moffitt (2003)(10) found that work experiences were tied to a variety of changes in basic personality traits, including the finding that greater autonomy at work was tied to increases in the Social Dominance aspects of Extraversion. Elder and Shanahan: Thesis: that ‘the interplay of social context and the organism [is] the formative process, making people who they are’ (Elder and Shanahan 2006, p. 670)(11). Absolute Changes: Research on absolute changes in the Big Five challenges the assumption that adolescence is the critical period of maturation in personality (Roberts, Walton and Viechtbauer 2006)(4). Instead, Roberts et al. found that most of the action in terms of mean-level changes in personality occurs during young adulthood. Differential stability: A meta-analysis involving test-retest correlations from 152 longitudinal studies showed that the Big Five become increasingly stable across the lifespan (Roberts and DelVecchio 2000)(12). 1. Donnellan, M. B. and Lucas, R. E. 2008. Age differences in the Big Five across the life span: evidence from two nationally representative samples, Psychology and Aging 23: 558–66 2. Terracciano, A., McCrae, R. R., Brant, L. J. and Costa, P. T., Jr 2005. Hierarchical linear modeling analyses of the NEO-PI-R scales in the Baltimore Longitudinal Study of Aging, Psychology and Aging 20: 493–506 3. Srivastava, S., John, O. P., Gosling, S. D. and Potter, J. 2003. Development of personality in early and middle adulthood: set like plaster or persistent change?, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84: 1041–53 4. Roberts, B.W., Walton, K.E. and Viechtbauer, W. 2006. Patterns of mean-level change in personality traits across the life course: a meta-analysis of longitudinal studies, Psychological Bulletin 132: 1–25 5. Helson, R., Kwan, V. S. Y., John, O. P. and Jones, C. 2002. The growing evidence for personality change in adulthood: findings from research with personality inventories, Journal of Research in Personality 36: 287–306 6. Trzesniewski, K. H., Robins, R. W., Roberts, B. W. and Caspi, A. 2004. Personality and self-esteem development across the life span, in P. T. Costa, Jr and I. C. Siegler (eds), Recent advances in psychology and aging, pp. 163–85. Amsterdam: Elsevier 7. Costa, P. T., Jr and McCrae, R. R. 2006. Age changes in personality and their origins: comment on Roberts, Walton, and Viechtbauer (2006), Psychological Bulletin 132: 26–8 8. Roberts, B. W., Wood, D. and Smith, J. L. 2005. Evaluating the five factor theory and social investment perspective on personality trait development, Journal of Research in Personality 39: 166–84 9. Robins, R. W., Caspi, A. and Moffitt, T. E. 2002. It’s not just who you’re with, it’s who you are: personality and relationship experiences across multiple relationships, Journal of Personality 70: 925–64 10. Roberts, B. W., Caspi, A. and Moffitt, T. E. 2003. Work experiences and personality development in young adulthood, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84: 582–93 11. Elder, G. H., Jr and Shanahan, M. J. 2006. The life course and human development, in W. Damon and R. Lerner (Series eds.), Handbook of Child Psychology, vol. I, Theoretical Models of Human Development, 6th edn, pp. 665–715. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley 12. Roberts, B. W. and DelVecchio, W. F. 2000. The rank-order consistency of personality from childhood to old age: a quantitative review of longitudinal studies, Psychological Bulletin 126: 3–25 M. Brent Donnellan and Richard W. Robins, “The development of personality across the lifespan”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Five-Factor Model | Reisenzein | Corr I 59 Five-Factor Model/Big Five/Psychological Theories/Reisenzein/Weber: The Five-Factor Model of personality posits five main, relatively independent, broad personality dimensions: neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience (see e.g., John and Srivastava 1999(1); McCrae and Costa 1999(2)). Of these traits, four (neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness and openness) are related to emotional dispositions. This is suggested by an examination of the theoretical definitions of these factors, by content analyses of the questionnaires used to measure them (Pytlik Zillig, Hemenover and Dienstbier 2002(3)), and by their correlations to explicit measures of emotional dispositions, such as the trait form of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) (a frequently used instrument for the assessment of pleasant and unpleasant affect; Watson, Clark and Tellegen 1988(4)). See also >Personality/Allport, >Neuroticism, >Extraversion, Agreeableness, >Openness to experience, >Conscientiousness, >Introversion. 1. John, O. P. and Srivastava, S. 1999. The Big Five trait taxonomy: history, measurement, and theoretical perspectives, in L. A. Pervin and O. P. John (eds.), Handbook of personality: theory and research, 2nd edn, pp. 102–38. New York: Guilford Press 2. McCrae, R. R. and Costa, P. T., Jr 1999. A five-factor theory of personality, in L. A. Pervin and O. P. John (eds.), Handbook of personality: theory and research, 2nd edn, pp. 139–53. New York: Guilford Press 3. Pytlik Zillig, L. M., Hemenover, S. H. and Dienstbier, R. A. 2002. What do we assess when we assess a ‘Big Five’ trait?: a content analysis of the affective, behavioural, and cognitive (ABC) processes represented in Big Five personality inventories, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 28: 847–58 4. Watson, D., Clark, L. A. and Tellegen, A. 1988. Development and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: the PANAS scales, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54: 1063–70 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Fixed Exchange Rates | Congressional Research Service (CRS) | CRS I 0 Fixed Exchange Rates/CRS: Stable currency exchange rate regimes are a key component to stable economic growth. In fixed exchange rate regimes, the central bank is dedicated to using monetary policy to maintain the exchange rate at a predetermined price. In theory, under such an arrangement, a central bank would be unable to use monetary policy to promote any other goal; in practice, there is limited leeway to pursue other goals without disrupting the exchange rate. Currency boards and currency unions, or “hard pegs,” are extreme examples of a fixed exchange rate regime where the central bank is truly stripped of all its capabilities other than converting any amount of domestic currency to a foreign currency at a predetermined price. The main economic advantage of fixed exchange rates is that they promote international trade and investment, which can be an important source of growth in the long run, particularly for developing countries. >Floating Exchange rates, >Developing countries, >Exchange rates, >Markets, >International trade, >Trade, >Currency. If a country’s economy is highly reliant on its neighbors for trade and investment and experiences economic shocks similar to its neighbors’, there is little benefit to monetary and fiscal independence, and the country is better off with a fixed exchange rate. If a country experiences unique economic shocks and is economically independent of its neighbors, a floating exchange rate can be a valuable way to promote macroeconomic stability. VsFixed exchange rates: Recent experience with economic crisis in Mexico, East Asia, Russia, Brazil, and Turkey suggests that fixed exchange rates can be prone to currency crises that can spill over into wider economic crises. This is a factor not considered in the earlier exchange rate literature, in part because international capital mobility plays a greater role today than it did in the past. >Currency policy, >Fiscal policy, >Monetary policy. CRS I 8 Fixed exchange rates/Marc Labonte/CRS: In a traditional fixed exchange rate regime, the government has agreed to buy or sell any amount of currency at a predetermined rate. That rate may be linked to one foreign currency or (unlike a currency board) it may be linked to a basket of foreign currencies. In theoretical models, where capital is perfectly mobile and investors consider all countries to be alike, fixed exchange rates would necessarily be functionally equivalent to a currency board. Any attempt to unilaterally influence one’s interest rates, through monetary or fiscal policy, would be unsustainable because capital would flow in or out of the country until interest rates had returned to the worldwide level. In reality, results are not quite so stark. There are transaction costs to investment. Investors demand different risk premiums of different countries, and these risk premiums change over time. There is a strong bias among investors worldwide, particularly in developed countries, to keep more of one’s wealth invested domestically than economic theory would suggest. Due to these factors, interest rate differentials, which should be theoretically impossible, are abundant. For instance, interest rates in France and Germany should entail similar risks. Thus, anytime French interest rates exceeded German rates, capital should flow from Germany to France until the rates equalized again. Yet the commercial interest reference rate, as measured by the OECD, between these two countries has varied by as much as 1.61 percentage points between 1993 and the adoption of the euro in 1999. As a result, countries with fixed exchange rates have limited freedom to use monetary and fiscal policy to pursue domestic goals without causing their exchange rate to become unsustainable. By contrast, countries that operate currency boards or participate in currency unions have no monetary or fiscal autonomy. For this reason, fixed exchange rates can be thought of as “soft pegs,” in contrast to the “hard peg” offered by a currency board or union. But compared to a country with a floating exchange rate, the ability of a country with a fixed exchange rate to pursue domestic goals is highly limited. If a currency became overvalued relative to the country to which it was pegged, then capital would flow out of the country, and the central bank would lose reserves. When reserves are exhausted and the central bank can no longer meet the demand for foreign currency, devaluation ensues, if it has not already occurred before events reach this point.(1) CRS I 9 The typical reason for a fixed exchange rate to be abandoned in crisis is due to an unwillingness by the government to abandon domestic goals in favor of defending the exchange rate. Interest rates can almost always be increased to a point where capital no longer flows out of the country, but a great contraction in the economy may accompany those rate increases. It is not uncommon to see interest rates reach triple digits at the height of an exchange rate crisis. Crises ensue because investors do not believe that the government will have the political will to accept the economic hardship required to maintain those interest rates in defense of the currency. Political advantages: In previous decades, it was believed that developing countries with a profligate past could bolster a new commitment to macroeconomic credibility through the use of a fixed exchange rate for two reasons. First, for countries with inflation rates that were previously very high, the maintenance of fixed exchange rates would act as a signal to market participants that inflation was now under control. For example, inflation causes the number of dollars that can be bought with one peso to decline just as it causes the number of apples that can be bought with one peso to decline. Thus, a fixed exchange rate can only be maintained if large inflation differentials are eliminated. Second, a fixed exchange rate was thought to anchor inflationary expectations by providing stable import prices. For a given change in monetary policy, economy theory suggests that inflation will decline faster if people expect lower inflation. After the many crises involving fixed exchange rate regimes in the 1980s and 1990s, this argument has become less persuasive. Unlike a currency board, a fixed exchange rate regime does nothing concrete to tie policymakers’ hands and prevent a return to bad macroeconomic policy.(2) Resisting the temptation to finance budget deficits through inflation ultimately depends on political will; if the political will is lacking, then the exchange rate regime will be abandoned, as was the case in many 1980s exchange rate crises. Thus burnt in the past, investors may no longer see a fixed exchange rate as a credible commitment by the government to macroeconomic stability, reducing the benefits of the fixed exchange rate. Furthermore, some currency board proponents claim that this lack of credibility means that investors will “test” the government’s commitment to maintaining a soft peg in ways that are costly to the economy. By contrast, they claim that investors will not test a currency board because they have no doubt of the government’s commitment. For this reason, many economists who previously recommended fixed exchange rates on the basis of their political merits have shifted in recent years towards support of a hard peg. >Hard pegs, >Soft pegs, >Floating exchange rates. CRS I 15 Costs: Floating and fixed exchange rates both impose costs on economies. Floating exchange rates impose a cost by discouraging trade and investment. Fixed exchange rates impose a cost by limiting policymakers’ ability to pursue domestic stabilization, thereby making the economy less stable. CRS I 16 But there is a fundamental difference in the types of costs they impose. In most countries, the cost of floating exchange rates is internalized and can be managed through the market in the form of hedging.(2) 1. The problem is asymmetric. If a fixed exchange rate became undervalued, then capital would flow into the country and the central bank would accumulate reserves. As long as the central bank is willing to increase its foreign reserves, an undervalued exchange rate can be sustained. This is believed to be the case with China in recent years. 2. If floating exchange rates do fluctuate irrationally as some economists have posited, this imposes another cost on an economy, a cost that can be eliminated with no sacrifice by a fixed exchange rate. Congressional Research Service of the Library of congress (CRS) Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? RL31204 (2007) https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL31204 |
CRS I Congressional Research Service (CRS) Marc Labonte Fixed Exchange Rates and Floating Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned? Washington: Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress 2007 CRS II Congressional Research Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Marc Labonte, Banking and Cryptocurrency: Policy Issues. CRS Congressional research Service Report R48430. Washington, DC. 2025 CRS III Congressional Research Service (CRS) Corrie E. Clark Heather L. Greenley, Bitcoin, Blockchain, and the Energy Sector. Washington, DC. 2019 CRS IV Congressional Reserch Service (CRS) Paul Tierno Cryptocurrency: Selected Policy Issues Congressional Reserch Service CRS Report R47425 Washington, DC. 2023 |
| Fixed Points | Gärdenfors | I 97 Fixed point/communication/Gärdenfors: a fixed point in a communication is reached when, for example, a person sees that the other person looks in the direction of the object they are referring to. --- I 99 There should also be a consistency between the mental representations for the consistency of word meanings. Communication is also possible without this: e.g. children often have fewer domains in the representation of their terms or the domains are differently weighted. Equilibrium: Communication can work restrictedly before the equilibrium of the partners (the same level of information) is reached. --- I 100 Signal game/Jäger/Rooij/Gärdenfors: (Jäger & van Rooij, 2007)(1): randomly selected color samples are ordered by a second person. The goal of the game is to achieve an equal division of the color space in regions. (Nash-equilibrium or fixed point). Gärdenfors: thesis: this is achieved if the conceptual spaces are convex and compact. --- I 101 Equilibrium/Fixed point/Gärdenfors: further experiments have shown that repeated interactions lead to a stable communication system. (E.g. Hurford, 1999,(2) Kirby, 1999,(3) Steels, 1999,(4) Kaplan, 2000,(5) Steels & Belpaeme, 2005(6)). --- I 102 Meanings: do not necessarily have to change when the composition of the communicators involved changes or new parties join or disappear. Fixed point/Dewey/Gärdenfors: (Dewey 1929, p. 178) (7): in order for V to understand A's moves, he must react to the thing from A's standpoint of view. So not I-centered and vice versa. Thus, something is literally made into a common. --- I 104 Fixed point theorem/Gärdenfors: in order to achieve fixed points, it is not necessary for the conceptual spaces of the participants to be identical, nor that they divide the spaces equally. ---- I 105 We assume that the rooms are convex and compact. The following theorem from Warglien & Gärdenfors (2013)(8) is a consequence of Brouwer's fixed point theorem (Brouwer 1910)(9): Theorem: every semantic reaction function, which is a continuous mapping of a convex compact set on itself, has at least one fixed point. That is, there will always be a fixed point representing a Meeting of Minds. Conceptual spaces: that they are assumed to be convex makes the communication flowing and memory performance efficient. --- I 106 Gä |