Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 213 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actualism | Kanitscheider | Kan I 358 Def actualism / Kanitscheider: claims the spatio-temporally unrestricted validity of our laws of nature. >Natural laws, >Validity. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Analogies | Genz | II 209 Machine/addition/calculator/Genz: the functioning of a machine that adds only positive integers cannot be described by the calculation rules, but is ultimately based on the behavior of particles inside that behave quantum-mechanically. Their behaviour cannot be recorded by the calculation rules. >Quantum mechanics, cf. >Rules, >Rule following, >Facts. Quantum mechanics/calculation/Genz: quantum electrodynamics stands for the calculation possibilities that the universe must have in order to enable simple computation. >Natural laws. Analogy/Genz: it could be that highly complicated laws of nature have a surface that corresponds to the keys of the simple calculator. Then it would be impossible to formulate their underlying mathematics. Analogy/Genz: the mathematics of the real laws of nature is also not already identical to the mathematics accessible to us for logical reasons. Natural Laws/Genz: it is therefore possible that the laws of nature may have a greater effect than is accessible to us. Logic/Genz: logic is among other things also a consequence of the laws of nature. It is limited by physics. >Logic, >Logical possibility, >Metaphysical possibility. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Analogies | Kauffman | Kau I 424 Analogy / Kauffman: could reflect the laws of chemistry as a formal grammar - accordingly it could then be undecidable whether a particular chemical is synthesized from an original multitude. >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Grammar, >Decidability, >Undecidability, >Possibility. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 |
| Anthropic Principle | Gould | IV 314 Anthropic Principle/Gould: (physicist Freeman Dyson took this term from an opponent): Dyson: "I don't feel like a stranger in this universe; I find more and more evidence that the universe somehow must have known we were coming".(1) Only evidence: there are some laws of nature that would have prevented life if the initial conditions had been a little different. Example Dyson: "Suppose the distances of the galaxies were 10 times smaller (than an average of 32 trillion km), then it would be very likely that in the 3.5 billion years at least one celestial body would have come so close that it would have directed the Earth out of orbit around the Sun and destroyed all life."(2) Dyson: "The special harmony between the structure of the universe and the needs of life and intelligence is a manifestation of the meaning of the mind in the scheme of things".(3) IV 315 GouldVsAnthropic principle: that is an argument that has already been moth-eaten. Central error: results from the nature of history: every complex historical event represents a summation of improbabilities and thus becomes absolutely improbable itself. But something must always happen, even if a certain "something" amazes us by its improbability. We could look at any event and say, "Isn't that amazing?" For example, let us assume that the universe consists of little more than diprotons. Would that be bad? Would we have to conclude that some God looked or loved like coupled hydrogen nuclei, or that no God or Spirit existed at all? But if there is a God, why does he have to prefer a cosmos that creates a life like ours? Why should diprotons not be witnesses of a pre-existent intelligence, even if no chronicler could be found? Does all intelligence have to have an uncontrollable urge to embody itself in a universe of its choice? 1. F. Dyson,. (1979). Disturbing the universe. New York: Harper and Row. 2. F. Dyson, ibid. 3. F. Dyson, ibid. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Antiphon the Sophist | Taureck | I 19 Antiphon/Sophist/Taureck: (~ 480-441). Thesis: Antiphon questioned the laws made by human beings. In contrast to these (Nomoi), which limit the humans, the laws of nature (physique) are necessary. Whether the sophist Antiphon is identical with the speaker and politician of the same name is still controversial. >Justice/Antiphon, >Laws/Antiphon, >Physis/Antiphon, >Sophists. Additional literature on Antiphon: Gerard Pendrick, Antiphon the Sophist: The Fragments, Cambridge University Press 2002 Additional literature on the Sophists: W. K C. Guthrie, The Sophists, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1971. A. Laks and G. W. Most, Early Greek Philosophy 2016. Richard Winton. "Herodotus, Thucydides, and the sophists" in: C.Rowe & M.Schofield, The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought, Cambridge 2005. Hermann Diels & Rosamond Kent Sprague (eds.) The Older Sophists a Complete Translation by Several Hands of the Fragments in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. With a New Ed. Of Antiphon and of Euthydemus. University of South Carolina Press 1972. John Dillon and Tania Gergel. The Greek Sophists. UK: Penguin Group 2003. |
Taureck I B. H.F. Taureck Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995 |
| Arbitrariness | Wittgenstein | II 230 Arbitrary/Arbitrariness/Convention: number systems are arbitrary. - Otherwise a different notation would correspond to different facts. II 231 Of course you can give sense to new sentences and symbols. - That is why the conventions are called arbitrary. >Conventions, >Symbols, >Sentences, >Sense. II 236 Arbitrariness/Arbitrary/Law/Physics/Laws of Nature/Wittgenstein: E.g. perturbations: it is arbitrary whether we declare our laws to be right, and say we just do not see the planet, or whether we call the laws incorrect. - If we say that a planet must be nearby, we define a grammatical rule. >Grammar, >Rules, >Laws. II 238 The laws of logic, such as those of the sentence of the excluded third are arbitrary! - In fact, we often use contradictions. - E.g. I like it and I do not like it. >Contradictions. --- VI 115 Arbitrariness/Arbitrary/Grammar/Rules/Purpose/Wittgenstein/Schulte: E.g. the rules of cooking are not arbitrary, because they are defined by the purpose of cooking. - On the other hand: Grammar: is not defined by the purpose of language - only the grammatical rules constitute the meaning. - Therefore, they are not committed to any meaning. >Meaning. - ((s) Grammar/Wittgenstein: = logic). --- IV 31 Not Arbitrary/Tractatus: the sign of the complex does not dissolve arbitrarily. - E.g. aRb. >Signs, >Complexes. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Atomic Sentences | Popper | I 117 PopperVsWittgenstein/Tractatus: any "meaningful sentence" should be logically reducible to ’elementary propositions’. All meaningful sentences are "images of reality". His sense criterion thus coincides with the demarcation criterion of induction logic. This fails due to the problem of induction. The positivist radicalism destroyed metaphysics and natural science: the laws of nature are not logically reducible to elementary empirical propositions. >Protocol sentences, >Atomism, > Elementary Sentences, >Induction/Popper. After Wittgenstein’s criterion of meaning even the laws of nature are meaningless, i.e. not true (legitimate) sentences. This is not a distinction but an identification with metaphysics. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Atomism | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 25 Atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Thesis: all logical forms can be constructed from the shapes of objects. Hintikka I 175 Logical Independence/Elementary Proposition/Atomism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: (1931) Wittgenstein eventually abandons the quest for logical independence of elementary propositions. - It was a real failure. - Reason: color attributes (color predicates) are not independent - E.g. red exists in the degree q1r and red exists in the degree q2r, then it follows: if q2>q1, q1r follows from q2r. - Later Vs: does not work with impure and opaque colors either. I 176 Atomism/Middle Period/Wittgenstein/Waismann/Hintikka: new: atomic sentences are no longer individually compared with the world, but as a sentence systems. - ("Holistic"). - WittgensteinVsAtomism: middle period: - New: I apply the whole color scale at once. - That is the reason why a point cannot have more than one color. -> Measuring/Wittgenstein, More autors on measurements. - If I apply a set system to reality, then it is thereby said that only one fact can exist at a time. --- II 138 WittgensteinVsAtomism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: 2 errors: 1) assuming the infinite to be a number and assuming that there would be an infinite number of sentences. - 2) that there are statements that express degrees of qualities - atomism; requires, however, that if p and q are contradictory, they may be further analysed until t and ~t result. II 157 Atomism/Atom Sentence/WittgensteinVsRussell: in the analysis of atomic sentences you do not encounter "particulars", not unlike in chemical analysis. --- IV 14 Atomism/Substance/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: if the world had no substance, ((s) = unchangeable objects), the atomic sentences would not be independent of each other. ad IV 36ff Tractatus/Atomism/Wittgenstein/(s): Atoms: undefined objects, quasi material things, (sounds), primitive signs - unclear whether thing (object) or immaterial, only components of the sentence are translated. - Thus, they are open to meaning theory which simultaneously derives from complex of objects, facts as well as connection of words, but (4.0312) the logic of the facts cannot be represented - the logical constants (and, or, not) do not represent. - Representative: sign for the object - internal properties: in the sentence different than the relations to the world (external). WittgensteinVsRussell, VsFrege: confusion mention/use: internal/external. >Mention, >Use, >Representation, >Logical constants, >Facts, >Signs. --- VII 122 Atomism/Atom Sentence/Truth Value/Truth Functions/Tr. fnc./Laws of Nature/LoN//Tractatus/Te Tens: the truth values of the atom sentences determine the truth of all remaining sentences with logical necessity, also those of the Laws of Nature - but then you should not say that something is only possible impossible or necessary by virtue of natural law or causality. - (6.37) - Laws of Nature are the truth functions of elementary propositions. - Therefore, the world as a whole cannot be explained. >Truth values, >Truth functions. VII 124 Laws of Nature: are not the ultimum; that is logical space. >Laws of Nature. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Atoms | Feynman | I 270 Atom/Laws of Nature/Law/Analogies/Feynman: the atom behaves differently than all other objects, it is a completely different object. It cannot be compared with anything. Why should it behave like great objects? Why should the electrons circulate around the core like planets? The atom is like nothing we are familiar with! >Analogies/Feynman, >Explanations, >Laws of Nature, >Principles, >Quantum Mechanics. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Axioms | Genz | II 184 Axioms/mathematics/Einstein/Genz: the axioms themselves are not safe, only their connection with their conclusions. And thus the consequences of the axioms are not safe either. II 188 Axioms/recognition/logic/Kant/GenzVsKant: Kant still thought that the content-related axioms of the Euclidean geometry with the parallel axiom were just as certainly true as the connections of geometry created by the logical conclusions. So there was safe knowledge for him. >Certainty, >Objectivity, >Physics, >Mathematics, >Truth/Hilbert, >Cognition, cf. >Laws of Nature/Cartwright. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Causal Explanation | Schurz | I 227 Causal explanation/Schurz: exists only if there is a natural law connection. No causal explanation: e.g. "All apples in this bag are red, therefore this apple is red". I.e. That this apple is (naturally) red is not an explanation why it is red. ((s) >Dennett: Wrong question: "Why is this car green?"). >Explanation/Dennett, >Why-questions, >Causality, >Laws of nature. Prediction/justification/Schurz: here law-likeness is not required. I 228 Ex "All apples in the bag are red": is a completely sufficient prediction or reason (just not an explanation). Causality/Explanation/Schurz: the majority of authors first tried to explicate the concept of explanation independently of causality. Vs: this does not meet the narrower concept of explanation. Schurz: supplying real reasons ((s) here: = cause) belongs to the core of the concept of event explanation. >Prediction. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Causal Explanation | Wright | I 18 Causal explanation/Wright, G. H.: consists in the subsumption of individual facts under hypothetically accepted general laws of nature, including laws of "human nature". >Generalization, >Explanation, >Classification, >Categorization. I 153 Human Nature in Causal Explanation/Mill: (J. St. Mill(1)):.... it can be said that the science of human nature is present to the extent that the existing truths which form the practical knowledge of human nature can be represented as corollaries from the universally general laws of human nature on which they are based. >Human nature, >Laws, >Laws of nature. 1. J. St. Mill, A System of Logic, Buch VI, Kap. iii, Abschn. 2. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Causality | Aristotle | Bubner I 129 Causality/Aristotle: for aristotle there is not causality in the modern sense: according to Aristotle, the reasons had to be known as true! This does not correspond to a law at all! >Laws of nature/Aristotle, >Nature/Aristotle, >Knowledge/Aristotle. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Causality | Davidson | Glüer II 104 ff Davidson: the causal relation itself is independent of description. It exists between event tokens, no matter how they are described. Causal laws, however, operate on the level of description, so they refer to event types. Causal laws are strict laws, i.e. they apply without distinction. Such laws can only exist in a sealed frame, i.e. a system of nomological sentences. McDowell I 100 Causality/Concepts/Davidson/McDowell: the objects that fulfill the sui generis concepts have causal relations with their kind and other things. But that does not endanger the thesis that causal relations only exist between residents of the realm of the laws of nature. McDowell: A reason may therefore be a cause, although it is not in causal relations by virtue of its rational relations. Rorty VI 179 ff Causality/Rorty: plays an indispensable role in determining what we say and believe. It is generally impossible to determine beliefs first and then their meaning, and then ask what its causes are. Davidson I 59 Causality/Davidson: the causal relations between world and belief are not decisive, because they provide evidence, but because they are recognizable also for others. >Communication/Davidson. Horwich I 452 Causality/Belief/Davidson/Rorty: explanation does not require causality - E.g. how we explain communication with simultaneous presence at same place - we do not know what it would be like for people if they were not there - similarly: e.g. truth has no explanatory use - we do not know what it would be like if most beliefs were wrong. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Causality | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 101 Experience/Causality/Cause/Border/Wittgenstein: all causal laws are reached through experience, therefore we cannot ascertain the cause of experience! If you give a scientific explanation, you describe an experience. >Experiences. II 123 Causality/Wittgenstein: is actually a description of a style of investigation. For the physicist, causality stands for a way of thinking. >Physics. IV 105 Causality/Law/Law of Nature/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 6:32 the law of causality is not a law but the form of a law 6.321 law of causality is a generic name. E.g. as in mechanics. >Natural laws. IV 108 6:36 If there were a law of causality, it might be: There are laws of nature but it turns out that you cannot determine this. IV 109 6.362 What can be described, can also happen, and what is excluded by the law of causality, cannot even be described. >Description. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Causation | Armstrong | III 155 Causation/necessity/Armstrong: 1) irreflexive: Nothing causes itself, relative to itself no relation. 2) nontransitive: cause is not transmitted, but a new universal, even probability = 1, requires new law. 3) allows no contra-position (reversal), the effect cannot be the cause of the cause 4) not symmetric, special case: causes in chain, but not reverse causality, merely necessary "precondition". A chain of causes isnot reverse causality, only: each state has a necessary conditio.n - Conditions do not cause! - Analogy: Laws of nature do not evoke anything. - Therefore causal laws are only a subclass of laws of nature. Martin III 168 Constitution is not causation. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Causation | Martin | Armstrong III 155 Causation/necessity/Armstrong: 1) irreflexive: Nothing causes itself, relative to itself no relation. 2) nontransitive: cause is not transmitted, but a new universal, even probability = 1, requires new law. 3) allows no contra-position (reversal), the effect cannot be the cause of the cause 4) not symmetric, special case: causes in chain, but not reverse causality, merely necessary "precondition". A chain of causes isnot reverse causality, only: each state has a necessary conditio.n - Conditions do not cause! - Analogy: Laws of nature do not evoke anything. - Therefore causal laws are only a subclass of laws of nature. Martin III 168 Constitution is not causation. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Causes | Davidson | McDowell I 92 Davidson: VsReduction of terms from the space of reasons to those from the space of the laws of nature. Doubling. Cf. >Reasons, >motives, >space of reasons. Rorty IV 48 Reason/Cause/Davidson: reasons can be causes: any given event can be described by physiological, unintentional terminology just as well as by psychological, intentional terminology. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Causes | Mayr | I 101 Cause/Bbiology: it can be difficult or even impossible to find the exact the cause for an interaction of complex systems. >Causality, >Effect. I 102 Strict causality: can usually be determined by considering the selected option at each step of the action chain in retrospect. In retrospect, even randomly chosen components can be regarded as causal. >Causal explanation. I 102 Causes/Mayr: Every phenomenon is the result of two causes, an indirect one ("why, genetic program") and an direct one (functional, "how"). I 103 Cause: in the inanimate world there is only one kind of causes, that of the natural laws (often in combination with random processes). >Laws of nature, >Random, >Necessity, >Initial conditions. I 162 Cause: E.g. "Indirect cause": choice of a moderate time of year for the rearing of the offspring. Indirect: abundance of food direct cause: length of days. I 163 Cause/Paul Weiss/Mayr: all biological systems have two sides: they are both causal mechanisms and products of evolution.(1) 165 Cause/Biology: direct: affect the phenotype: morphology and behavior, mechanically, here and now, decoding a genetic code discovery by experiments Indirect: affect the genotype - probabilistic - effective and emerged over long periods of time, emergence and alteration of genetic programs discovery by conclusions from historical representations. >Terminology/Mayr. 1. P. Weiss (1947). The Place of Physiology in the Biological Sciences. In: Federation Proceedings 6, p. 523-525. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Chance | Armstrong | III 32 Def Chance/Armstrong: = probability to t. Ojective chance: property of having a certain chance (higher-level property). Ramsey/Mellor pro, Ramsey/MellorVsArmstrong: VsLaws of Nature as relation between universals. ArmstrongVsVs: "objective chances" are ontologically questionable, universals avoid it. >Natural Laws/Armstrong, >Universals/Armstrong, >Laws/Armstrong. III 34 Chance: logical possibility in re (instead determinist law: necessarily de re). - These forces must be understood as bare powers: their nature seems to exhaust itself in their manifestation. I.e. they cannot be understood a posteriori as the result of an empirical study, as a categorical structure S. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Church-Turing Thesis | Genz | II 329 Church-Turing-Thesis/Church/Genz: (Church 1936): thesis: everything that is calculable at all can be calculated by a Turing machine. Genz: whether this is true, is a physical question. It cannot be determined by logical evidence. For example, if nature allowed a Turing machine that would take infinite logical steps in finite time, the Church-Turing thesis would be wrong. It would also be wrong, e. g. if there could be countless physical states in a physical system. Analogous calculations would then be possible, and this exceeded the machine's repertoire. Quantum mechanics: rescues the thesis from refutation by classic computers by prohibiting to build some that could do this. On the other hand, quantum mechanics could allow to build computers that falsify the Church Turing thesis! Cf. >Quantum mechanics. Vs: But according to experts, this is not the case. II 330 Question: could one not add the "secret calculations" of nature to our repertoire and thus refute the Church-Turing thesis? Vs: without understanding the corresponding laws of nature we cannot know what nature calculates. >Laws of nature, >Laws, >Rules, >Knowledge, >Understanding, >Rule following. II 332 Church-Turing-Thesis/Genz: if it were wrong, it is an empirical question whether it can be valid in a weakened form ((s) after all, it has not yet been refuted). II 333 Weaker/variant: thesis: nature provides us with the mathematical and logical means by which its laws can be recognized. VsChurch-Turing-Thesis/Genz: the antithesis would be that at least the action of the human mind requires unpredictable functions to describe it. Then they are random, seen from the Turing machine (representative/group: Penrose). >Mind, >Dependence. 1. Alonzo Church (1936). A note on the entscheidungsproblem. Journal of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):40-41 (1936) |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Coherence Theory | Bigelow | I 234 Humean theories/natural laws/VsCorrespondence theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: are rivals of correspondence theory. Coherence theory: Humeans pro coherence theory. >D. Hume, >Causality/Hume, >Causality/Bigelow, >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory. Coherence theory: Humean pro coherence theory. >Coherence, >Laws of nature. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Conceptualism | Armstrong | Place I 25 Def Conceptualism/Place: (PlatoVs, Aristotle pro, Place pro). Everything belongs to one of these 4 categories: 1) concrete particular 2) property of a particular 3) situation 4) property of a situation (II 31 also property of a property e.g. syntactic relations within a sentence are relations between words. >Universals, >Property, >Situation, >Particulars. Def words: consist in certain formal properties either of an event (of vocal expression) or particular: (characters). >Words. II 26 Conceptualism/Armstrong: i.e. there are no abstractions such as numbers, sets or laws of nature (as states in the world, only as formulas that describe something. Universals/Conceptualism: exist in two respects: 1) in the sense in which its instances exist (they really occur) 2) in the sense that living organisms are predisposed to classify particulars, and that the classifications are represented in the semantic conventions of natural language - i.e. as abstractions due to similarities between particulars. Place II 49 ConceptualismVsAbstractions/Place: VsNominalization of "fragility" in subject position - VsPossible Worlds. >Possible worlds, >Abstraction. II 56 Conceptualism/Place: but conceptualism does not deny universals. Place III 110 Conceptualism/Similarity/Place: (pro like Martin): there must be a sense in which two things are similar, so that they can be "of the same kind" - in this sense they cannot be "inexactly" similar U/Species/Conceptualism/Place: U not in addition to the similarities between their instantiations - solution: "species", "U": viewed from the perspective of the object: which properties do the particulars need to have - "concept", "intention": affect the disposition of the mind for classification. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Conceptualism | Place | Place I 25 Def Conceptualism/Place: (PlatoVs, Aristotle pro, Place pro). Everything belongs to one of these 4 categories: 1) concrete particular 2) property of a particular 3) situation 4) property of a situation (II 31 also property of a property e.g. syntactic relations within a sentence are relations between words. >Universals, >Property, >Situation, >Particulars. Def words: consist in certain formal properties either of an event (of vocal expression) or particular: (characters). >Words. Armstrong II 26 Conceptualism/Armstrong: i.e. there are no abstractions such as numbers, sets or laws of nature (as states in the world, only as formulas that describe something. Universals/Conceptualism: exist in two respects: 1) in the sense in which its instances exist (they really occur) 2) in the sense that living organisms are predisposed to classify particulars, and that the classifications are represented in the semantic conventions of natural language - i.e. as abstractions due to similarities between particulars. Place II 49 ConceptualismVsAbstractions/Place: VsNominalization of "fragility" in subject position - VsPossible Worlds. >Possible worlds, >Abstraction. II 56 Conceptualism/Place: but conceptualism does not deny universals. Place III 110 Conceptualism/Similarity/Place: (pro like Martin): there must be a sense in which two things are similar, so that they can be "of the same kind" - in this sense they cannot be "inexactly" similar U/Species/Conceptualism/Place: U not in addition to the similarities between their instantiations - solution: "species", "U": viewed from the perspective of the object: which properties do the particulars need to have - "concept", "intention": affect the disposition of the mind for classification. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Conditions | Genz | II 59 Initial conditions/Newton/Genz: Newton was the first to distinguish between initial conditions and the laws of nature. >Laws/Newton. II 195 Initial conditions/initial states/nature/gas: in nature there are countless initial states. But a Turing machine could not list them all, because it could not represent them all differently. >Initial conditions, >Turing machine, cf. >Determinism. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Conditions | Spinoza | Genz II 312 Natural laws/Initial conditions/Spinoza/Genz: Spinoza does not distinguish between laws and initial conditions. Or he recognizes only one initial condition of the universe and assigns law character to it. >Understanding, >Sense, >Hermeneutics, >Initial conditions, >Determinism, >Order, >Laws, >Laws of nature, >History. |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Constants | Genz | II 327 Units/unit/laws of nature/constants/natural constants/quantum mechanics/Relativity Theory/Genz: the basic units for length, mass and time appear in the natural laws of quantum mechanics and relativity theory only covertly as natural constants: c, gravitational constant G, Planck's constant h. >Natural constants. Together they can be converted into a length, a mass and a time and provide when not using numerical factors like 2 or 1023 the Planck units above. Experiment/Genz: there are no experiments that come close to Planck's time or length, but close to Planck's mass, which is strangely large. It corresponds approximately to a dust particle. Question: why are the elementary particles so much smaller than the Planck mass? Solution: a solution is the "ongoing coupling" of quarks and gluons in the standard model. From the small value of the planck length, the coupling increases extremely slowly and only reaches the value of Planck's length that is greater with the factor 1020 that allows the existence of a bound state of quarks and gluons - the proton. Proton/Genz: for the proton - and thus for all strong interactions - the relevant length scale is not the Planck scale, but the 1020-times length scale of quantum electrochromodynamics (QCD). II 328 Planck mass/intuitive/Genz: its alleged giganticness damages the notion that all physical quantities should be discrete. Density/Genz: "worse still": if we want to place the Planck mass in a Planck length we get the 1093-times density of water. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Contingency | Genz | II 208 Calculating/physics/nature/Genz: that the laws of nature determine our calculation possibilities does not mean that they themselves can be described by them. Because the physical restrictions are contingent. >Mathematics, >Physics, >Reality, >Levels of description, >Levels (order). |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Contractualism | Gauthier | Gaus I 107 Contractualism/liberalism/Gauthier/Gaus: (...) the last 20 years has witnessed the induction of Hobbes as a core member of the liberal pantheon. In addition to his relentless individualist analysis on humans in society, the liberalization of Hobbes has been driven by his contractualism, and the way in which it lends itself to game-theoretic modelling, most importantly in the work of Jean Hampton (1986(1); for a discussion see Kraus, 1993(2)). At first blush one might think that Hobbes did not offer a moral contractualist theory at all: the laws of nature are pre-contractual moral norms, and the contract concerns the institution of a political sovereign, not agreement on moral norms. Gauthier: However, as David Gauthier (1995(3)) has stressed, the Hobbesian contract involves an authorization of the sovereign’s use of reason as right reason, including his reasoning about what morality requires; it is thus a political contract that subsumes morality. In any event, recent analyses inspired by Hobbes - most importantly Gauthier (1986)(4) -have converted the Hobbesian approach into an account of justified morality which, in turn, endorses liberal arrangements (for doubts about the Hobbesian pedigree of Gauthier, see Lloyd, 1998(5)). >Hobbes/Economic theories. Gaus I 108 Gauthier argues that, in order to best pursue their goals, rational maximizers would agree to stop making maximizing choices. If individuals could adopt a disposition to obey the social contract the second problem, that of compliance, would be solved; once they have this disposition – this tendency to act – they no longer make choices by calculating what would best advance their goals, but on the basis of what would advance their goals in ways allowed for by the contract. If people adopted this disposition, then, somewhat paradoxically, they would do better at maximization, as they could honour the agreement that benefits all. Gauthier calls this ‘constrained maximization’ (1986(4): 158). Problem: (...) the truly rational thing to do is to appear to turn yourself into a constrained maximizer while others really turn themselves into constrained maximizers. Gauthier has a two-part response. (1) Constrained maximizers do not adopt an unconditional disposition to constrain themselves no matter with whom they interact. They are only disposed to act in a constrained manner with those who are also constrained maximizers. (2) Gauthier insists that we are not totally opaque to each other; to some extent we can see into others and know their dispositions. As he puts it, we are ‘translucent’. Thus, concludes Gauthier, a rational agent would not seek to remain an unconstrained maximizer when others turn themselves into constrained maximizers. >Rational choice/Gauthier. 1. Hampton, Jean (1986) Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Kraus, Jody S. (1993) The Limits of Hobbesian Contractualism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Gauthier, David (1995) ‘Public reason’. Social Philosophy & Policy, 12 (Winter): 19–42. 4. Gauthier, David (1986) Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon. 5. Lloyd, S. A. (1998) ‘Contemporary uses of Hobbes’s political philosophy’. In Jules S. Coleman and Christopher Morris, eds, Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Conventionalism | Poincaré | Wright I 31 Definition Conventionalism/Wright, G. H.: a view of natural laws that is alternative to the classical positivist view: a scientific law can thereafter be immune to empirical refutation, since it is analytical, logical true. >Laws of nature, >Conventions, >Necessity, >Logical necessity, >Mathematics, >Logical truth, >Positivism. Assuming that all A are B. If it turns out that something that is supposedly an A is not a B, then in reality it is not an A after all. >Conditions, >Identity. I 157 Conventionalism/Poincaré/Wright: The position that is called conventionalism in science theory is originally related to the name Henri Poincaré. The main source is H. Poincaré 1902(1). In its most extreme form, I believe, this position is reflected in the works of Hans Cornelius and Hugo Dingler. Most representatives of conventionalism were philosophically close to positivism. 1. H. Poincaré, La science et l’hypothèse, 1902, Kap. V – VII. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Bigelow | I 112 Counterfactual Conditional/Axioms/Necessity Conditional/Possibility Conditional/Bigelow/Pargetter: (would > would, would > could). 1. The axioms of the normal conditionals are not considered for counterfactual conditionals. E.g. If van Gogh had not painted the sunflowers, someone else would have done it. On the other hand, indicative If van Gogh has not painted the sunflowers, someone else has done it. The first sentence is false, the second true. So they must differ in meaning. >Truth conditions, >Meaning, >Conditional, >Implication. I 113 Possibilia/Counterfactual Conditional/Bigelow/Pargetter: Counterfactual conditionals often require that we consider Possibilia, even if we know that they are not actual. >Possibilia, >Possibilism, >Actualism. I 250 "Backtracking". Pro Bigelow/Pargetter, Pollock (1976): In the case of counterfactual conditionals, no possible worlds may be included in which exceptions to natural laws are allowed. >Possible worlds. Vs: Lewis (1973a), Jackson (1977a), Stalnaker Accessibility/Laws of Nature/Possible Worlds/backtraining/Bigelow/Pargetter: There are still compelling counter-examples to the theory that there is no accessible possible world in which natural laws are violated. >Accessibility. Counterfactual conditional: there are many counterfactual conditionals whose truth seems to presuppose the existence of such a possible world. Counterlegals: counterfactual conditionals which determine what the case would be if certain laws did not apply. Problem: our theory says that there is no such world. Definition backtracking/Lewis: we imagine a hypothetical change of an event at a certain time, and then we describe how the preceding events should have been so that the hypothetical event could have happened. ((s) To make a miracle superfluous) Bigelow/Pargetter: this is not a problem for our theory. Problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: not all counterfactual conditionals are backtrackers. Often we do not consider, how the past must have been,... I 251 ...but assume that it is fixed. Instead, we ask ourselves how the future consequences of the changed event would look like. This is a forward-tracking. Forward-tracking: Problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: if we are considering a different future with the same past, we must assume that it is possible to violate the laws of nature. Lewis: then we need "little miracles". E.g. You might say that if there was a drink in front of you, you would drink it. But how could it get there? In many ways. But which is the one which corresponds to the most accessible possible world? If you had brought the drink yourself, you would have drunk it in the kitchen. So the above sentence would not be true. Nevertheless, there could have been a drink in front of you. N.B.: so we must assume here that the past would have been the same. So we must assume magic! Problem: a world in which the past would have been the same so far, and suddenly the glass was there - that would be a world in which natural laws are violated. How can such a world be accessible? I 252 Counterfactual conditional: seems that it cannot be true (nontrivial) if we are dealing with normal counterfactual conditionals that are not backtracking. BigelowVsVs: the solution is based on a distinction between counterfactual conditionals in fundamental and everyday-language ones. I 254 Forward-tracking/Counterfactual conditional/Bigelow/Pargetter: must be irritated: if it were possible, then if it were like this, then ... - forward-tracking: past remains the same - event changes ("little miracle") - at that moment violation of the natural laws (Heimson world) - afterwards again regular course. 1. Pollock, J.L. (1976). Subjunctive reasoning. Dordrecht: Reidel. 2.Lewis, D.K. (1973) Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell Publisher. 3.Jackson, F. (1977a) A causal theory of counterfactuals. Australasian Journal of Philosphy 55, pp.3-21 4. 1. Stalnaker, R. C. (1968) A theory of conditional. In: Studies in logical theory (Ed. N.Rescher), pp. 98-112. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Fraassen | I 13 Counterfactual conditional/Fraassen: objectively neither true nor false. I 115f Counterfactual conditionals/Fraassen: truth conditions use similarities between possible worlds: "If A, then B" is true in possible world w iff B is true in most similar world to w in which A is also true. - Similarity: is again context-dependent E.g. "Three Barbers"/Carroll: one in three must always be there: 1) if A is ill, B must accompany him, but 2) if C is gone as well, B has to stay there. Contradiction: if A is ill, B must be there and gone. VsCarroll: 1) and 2) are not in contradiction. Material conditional: "either B or not A". Solution/Fraassen: everyday language: not material conditional. >Everyday language. Solution/Fraassen: Context Dependency: 1) is true if we only consider the illness, 2) is true if we only consider the shop - general: what situation is more like ours? -> Lewis: E. g. Bizet/Verdi, Similarity Metrics. I 118 FraassenVsCounterfactual conditionals: but they are no solution here: scientific statements are not context-dependent. Therefore science implies no counterfactual conditionals (if they, as I believe, are context-dependent. Counterfactual Conditionals/Laws of Nature/Reichenbach/E. Goodman: only laws, not general statements imply counterfactual conditionals. - Therefore they are a criterion for laws. FraassenVsGoodman, E.: conversely: if laws imply counterfactual conditionals, it is because they are context-dependent. >Context. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Counterfactuals | Lewis | V 32 Alternatives/Counterfactual/Lewis: E.g. Assuming I would do something else today, then tomorrow would be a little different - but I cannot say anything about it in a clear sense. V 63f Counterfactual possibility/Possible worlds/Lewis: E.g. quasi-miracle (highly unlikely, but no violation of laws of nature) Ambiguity: Rear part: be a) could have been (CHB): all most similar worlds are those where it is possible. b) would not (NWN) - some of the most similar worlds are those where it happens. Then: 1) If Nixon had pressed the button, no QW would have happenend - and 2) "... there would have been a slim chance" they are true together. - But 1 conflicts with NWN and 2 implies CHB. >Possible world/Lewis, >Causality/Lewis, >Determinism/Lewis, >Counterfactual dependence/Lewis, >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis. --- I (c) 42 The winner could have lost (true). But: It could have been that the winner loses ((s) wrong). |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Covering Laws | Dray | Schurz I 224 Covering law/Dray/Schurz: (Dray 1957)(1): simplest case of a deductive nomological explanation: here antecedent and explanandum are implicatively connected by a single law. logical form: (x)(Ax > Ex), Aa/Ea. HempelVsDray/HempelVscovering law: its own model includes more complex explanations e.g. planet positions explained from initial conditions plus laws of nature. >Models, >Theories, >Explanations. 1. Dray, W. (1957). Laws and Explanation in History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Dray I W. H. Dray Perspectives on History Sydney 1980 Dray I W. Dray Laws and Explanation in History Westport 1979 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Deductive-nomological Explanation | Schurz | I 223 Deductive-nomological explanation/Hempel/Schurz: (Hempel 1942(1), Hempel/Oppenheim 1948(2), Vs: Stegmüller 1969(3), Salmon 1989(4)). Deductive-nomological: Explanans: set of premises: from strictly general propositions G and antecedent A (singular propositions). Explanandum: conclusion E. (sing proposition). Consequence condition: E is a deductive consequence of G and A. Ex G: All metals conduct electricity A: This vase is metallic E: Therefore it conducts electricity. Law: law premises are never definitely verifiable. Model: therefore the epistemic model version is more important. I.e. it is about acceptance and not about truth against a background knowledge. >Background, >Knowledge, >Models, >Model theory. I 224 Potential Explanation/Hempel: Here merely logical consistency of the premises is required. This is important when evaluating hypotheses in terms of their explanatory power. >Best explanation. I 224 Covering law/Dray/Schurz: (Dray 1957)(5): simplest case of a deductive nomological explanation: here antecedent and explanandum are implicatively connected by a single law. Logical form: (x)(Ax > Ex), Aa/Ea. >Covering laws. HempelVsDray/HempelVsCovering law: Hempel's own model includes more complex explanations. Ex. planetary positions explained from initial conditions plus laws of nature. I 228 Law/Explanation/Schurz: Deductive-nomological explanation of law by higher-level theories cannot be directly applied to the causality requirement. ((s) Schurz/(s): laws are explained by higher-level theories). Law of nature/problem/Schurz: A law is not a spatiotemporally localized fact and can therefore not be the subject of a causal relation. Law/causality/explanation/Schurz: Many laws are not causal: E.g. the laws of evolution are not causal. Also in physics: Explanation due to symmetry principles, Ex many explanations in quantum mechanics. >Explanation/Hempel, >Explanation/Hegel, >Explanation/Scriven, >Causality, >Causal explanations, >Laws, >Law-likeness, >Laws of nature. 1. Hempel, C. (1942). "The Function of General Laws in History". In: The Journal of Philosophy 39, (abgedruckt in ders. 1965, 221-243.) 2. Hempel, C. & Oppenheim, P. (1948). "Studies in the Logic of Explanation", >Philosophy of Science 39, 135-175. 3. Stegmüller, W. (1969). Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie. Band I:Wissenschaftliche Erklärung und Begründung. Berlin: Springer. 4. Salmon, W. (1989). Four Decades of Scientific Explanation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 5. Dray, W. (1957). Laws and Explanation in History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Definability | Genz | II 14 Natural Laws/Introduction/Concept/Genz: the laws of nature introduce concepts and objects which they cannot and do not have to define explicitly. >Terms, >Definitions, >Laws of nature, >Levels of description, >Levels (order). For example, potential: potential can only be clearly defined by a postulate. >Potential. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Definitions | Feynman | I 174 Laws Definition//Meaning/Laws of Nature/Feynman: it is generally believed that laws of nature represent some kind of genuine knowledge. What does that mean? What does F = ma mean? What is the meaning of force, mass, acceleration? We can feel mass intuitively and we can define acceleration. Definition e.g. "when a body accelerates, a force acts upon it". Definitions/Feynman: such definitions cannot be the content of physics, because they are circular. Nevertheless, the Newtonian statement above appears to be the most precise definition of force. But it is completely pointless, because no predictions can be made from it. (From no definition!). >Laws of nature, >Forces/Bigelow, >Forces/Cartwright, >Forces/Leibniz, >Forces/Russell, >Knowledge, >Circularity. The way in which objects behave is completely independent of the choice of definitions. For example, we define something new: Def "Gorce"/Fictitious Force/Terminology/Feynman: temporal change of position with a new law: everything stands still, except when a gorce is effective. This would be analogous to the old force and would not contain any new information. (But: see below...) >Cause/Cartwright, >Cause/Fraassen, >Cause/Vollmer, >Cause/Lewis, >Cause/Bigelow, >Cause/Armstrong. I 175 Forces/Laws of Nature/Newtonian Laws/Theory/Feynman: their true content is that the force, in addition to the law F = ma, should have some independent properties. But these specific properties have not not been described by Newton, nor by anyone else, and therefore F = ma is an incomplete law. It implies that we will find some simple properties when studying the forces. It is an indication that forces are simple. This is a good program for analyzing nature. Laws/Laws of Nature/Theory/Feynman: if nothing but gravitation existed, then the combination of the law of gravitation and the law of force would be a complete theory. We need further properties of the force: e.g. if no physical object is present, the force equals zero, if it is different from zero, and something is found in the neighborhood, then that must be the cause. That is the difference to "gorce" (see above). That power has a material origin is one of its most important properties, and that is not only a definition. I 175 Definition/Law/Feynman: e.g. second Newtonian Law. Action equals response: that is not quite precise. If it were a definition, we would have to say that it is always precise, but it is not! >Natural laws/Cartwright. Feynman: every simple thought is approximated. E.g. chair: superposition of atoms, constant decrease and increase, depending on the accuracy of the measurement. I 176 Mathematical definitions can never work in the real world. I 233 Empiricism/Definition/Mach/Feynman: you can only define what you can measure. FeynmanVsMach: whether a thing is measurable or not cannot be decided a priori solely by reasoning! It can only be decided in experiments. >Experiments, >Measurements, >Ernst Mach. Feynman: it is clear that absolute speed has no meaning. Whether or not it can be defined is the same as the problem, whether you can prove if you are moving or not! I 642 Definition/Temperature/Physics/Chemistry/Feynman: two different definitions: 1) Assuming the kinetic energy of the molecules is proportional to the temperature, this assumption defines a temperature scale: "Scale of the ideal gas". We call the correspondingly measured temperatures kinetic temperature. 2) Other temperature definition: independent of any substance: "Great thermodynamic absolute temperature". |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Dependence | Bigelow | I 312 Functional dependence/Counterfactual conditional/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: For example, an icon on the screen obeys the movements of a joystick. We formulate this with counterfactual conditionals. Counterfactual dependence: is expressed by a series of counterfactual conditionals: p1 would> be q1 p2 would be> q2 ... pi would be > would be qi E.g. Joystick: the four directions p1 - p4. There can also be an infinite series of alternatives. E.g. Acceleration. Logical form: Px would be > would be q f(x) Natural laws/Bigelow/Pargetter. Many are in reality equations, which together with initial conditions contain series of counterfactual conditionals expressing counterfactual dependence. >Counterfactual conditional, >Counterfactual dependency, >Natural Laws, >Equations. I 313 Counterfactual conditionals/natural laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: the counterfactual conditionals are thus in a connection with the laws of nature. It may be that e.g. the joystick does not work properly. Nobody would come to the idea to say that the movement of the icon is legally related to the stick. This only happens when the device is in good condition. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: With the establishment of the series of counterfactual conditionals, we set up only conditions for laws. Counterfactual dependence/Bigelow/Pargetter: (series of counterfactual conditionals) provides indirect information about laws. And thus provide information about causes. And ultimately, why explanations. --- I 314 E.g. p1 would be > would be q1 p2 would be > would be q2 p3 would be > would be q3 p4 would be > would be q4 Let p3 be true and q3 true. Then we can say that q3 is true because p3 is true. The icon moves in this direction because the stick has been moved in this direction. >Causality, >Causal explanation. In the context of the alternatives we can also say q3 is true instead of q1, q2, or q4. Why Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: E.g. a priest asked a bank robber why he was robbing banks - "Because there is the money". Explanations: often serve to exclude alternatives. Objectivity/explanation/objective/Bigelow/Pargetter: what is objective is whether counterfactual conditionals are true or false in a given row (expressing the counterfactual dependence). >Why-Questions. Why-Questions/Context/Counterfactual dependence/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: thus, the counterfactual dependence also takes into account the context dependency in the case of why explanations. >Context dependency. I 315 Why explanation: but is limited to prominent possibilities. Counterfactual Conditional/Bigelow/Pargetter: restrict the laws Laws: restrict the causes. >Cause, >Effect. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Description Levels | Genz | II 47 Description/level/Genz: systems in which everything really depends on everything do not allow for a delimitation of levels. The laws apply on all levels, the system is "self-similar". >Levels (order). Self-similarity/laws/system/Genz: if you know a little bit about self-similar systems, you know the whole thing. The big is created by enlarging the small. >Self-similarity. II 304 Level/natural law/legislative level/description/Genz: different levels of description can be delimited, on which laws apply that use terms that do not require the deeper levels to be used for their definition. For example, the physician can draw conclusions about a disease of the liver from the blood count without knowledge of chemistry. >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Inferences, >Conclusions, >Symptoms. II 304 Level/natural laws/legislative level/description/Genz: levels are possible because not everything depends on everything. Levels/Genz: why they can be delimited at all can only be answered anthropically: if there are no laws, we could not have formed ourselves. Cf. >Anthropic Principle, >Explanations. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Descriptions | Cartwright | I 3 Explanation/Description/Physics/Cartwright: in modern physics the phenomenological laws are considered as being descriptive, the fundamental laws as being explanatory. Problem: the explanatory power comes at the cost of the adequacy of description Explanatory power (of laws) The semblance of truth comes from a false explanation model: wrong connection of laws with reality. I 4 Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum" View/Cartwright: of explanation: Thesis: the way from theory to reality is this: theory > model > phenomenological law Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be). Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are only true of the objects in the model. >Fundamental laws/Cartwright. Explanation/Cartwright: is not a guide to the truth. I 57 Description/Laws of Nature/LoN/Physical Laws/Cartwright: E.g. the gravitation law does not describe the behavior of the objects, because electrical forces also play a role - (Coulomb's law) - no charged body behaves according to the gravitation law. And every massive body is a counter-E.g. to Coulomb's law. Solution: "... if no other forces..." - without ceteris paribus. >ceteris paribus. I 131 Description/Physics/Cartwright: false: that we have to depart from existence assumptions to come to a description according to which we can set up the equations. Correct: the theory has only few principles to move from descriptions to equations - these principles certainly require structured information. - And the "descriptions" on the right side have to satisfy many mathematical requirements. >Equations, >Principles. The best descriptions are those that best match the equations. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Determinism | Genz | II 250 Time/Newton/mechanics/Genz: in Newtonian mechanics, not only the earlier point of time determines the later point of time, but also vice versa the later determines the earlier one. >Isaac Newton. Deterministic/Genz: we must distinguish between forward deterministic laws and forward and backward deterministic laws. >Laws, >Natural laws. II 251 Question: are there also purely backwards deterministic laws? Definition Time/Genz: as long as we do not know anything else, we can simply define time as the direction in which deterministic laws of nature apply. This is necessarily identical to the direction in which the order cannot increase. >Time, >Space, >Time reversal, >Time arrow, >Order, >Symmetries, cf. >Chirality. II 252 Deterministic/time/forward/backwards/quantum mechanics/Genz: the deterministic laws of quantum mechanics are deterministic in both temporal directions. II 253 N.B.: but it does not say whether they are the same in both time directions! The fact that they are not the same was first shown directly by an experiment in 1998. Before: the "CPT theorem" had already made the same prediction: CPT-Theorem/Genz: the CPT-Theorem says together with the "CP violation" that backwards deterministic laws of quantum mechanics must differ from forward deterministic laws. Experiment 1998: a K-Meson (neutral) can develop into its anti-particle. This can also be done in the opposite direction, but the process must then proceed more quickly (asymmetry). II 254 N.B.: then we can decide from the laws of nature alone, whether we have a real process that takes place in time, or whether a backwards running film is shown by a physical process. Not time-reversal-invariant: for example, the transformation of a K-Meson into its anti-particle is not time-reversal-invariant. Experiment: has of course not been observed directly, but by observations on numerous particles in the same state. Asymmetry/Genz: asymmetry only applies to the duration of the process, not to it itself. >Asymmetry. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Determinism | Montague | Lewis V 37 Definiton determinism/Possible worlds/Lewis: if two worlds obey the laws perfectly, then they are either exactly the same all the time or in no two time sections equal. >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity. For the sake of the argument, let us assume that the laws of nature are deterministic. >Natural laws, >Natural laws/D. Lewis. My definition of determinism stems from Montague, but diverges from it in two points: LewisVsMontague: 1. I avoid his mathematical construction of ersatzworlds (substitute worlds ((s) = sets of sentences)). >ersatz worlds. 2. I take temporal equality of worlds as a simple relation. Montague instead takes the relation, to have the same complete description in a particular language as a basic relation, which he leaves unspecified. >Description. My definition presupposes that we can identify different time segments from one world to another. For problems: cf. >Similarity metrics. For D. Lewis cf. >Counterparts, >Counterpart relation, >Counterpart theory. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Dispositions | Armstrong | II 1 f Disposition/Armstrong: Problem of unobservability. Place III 113 Verification/Place: Verification of dispositional properties: this is about what is likely to happen, not about what is observable. Armstrong II 4f Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Mellor: also categorical (not only dispositional) properties fulfil counterfactual conditionals. Armstrong: Dispositions are not made true by counterfactual conditionals. >Truthmaker/Armstrong. Martin: a counterfactual conditional can also be true, while a linked property is not realized - Dispositions cannot be reduced to the facts that are determined by the counterfactual conditionals which often contain them. II 5 Armstrong: Thesis: Dispositional = categorical properties = microstructure (therefore dispositions are no possibilia). - Other authors: categorical properties "realize" dispositional properties. >Microstructure/Armstrong. II 6 Dispositions/Martin: just as actual - it would be perverse to call them non-actual. Dispositions/Armstrong: dispositions are not in themselves causes - (others dito). - Dispositions are always actual, just not their manifestations. II 6 Example wire/Martin: Problem: a counterfactual conditional can be true without being true by virtue of the prescribed disposition: when the wire contacts, a current flows: can also be true if the wire is dead: e.g., "electro-finch": brings the wire to life the same moment: ((s) This would be a wrong cause). Place II 62 Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsArmstrong: Genes are not the propensity (tendency) to disease, the propensity is explained by the genes (categorical property), therefore they cannot be identical with the dispositional properties. II (c) 90 Dispositions/Armstrong/Place/Martin: Dispositions are "in" the objects. Martin: E.g. remote elementary particles which never interact with our elementary particles. - > This would require irreducible dispositions. ArmstrongVsMartin: there are no irreducible dispositions. Armstrong: why suppose that particles have properties in addition to have the manifested purely categorical property? II (c) 90/91 Martin-Example: Conclusion/Martin: Thesis: II 92 but the non-disp properties plus "strong" laws of nature which connect these non-disp properties are sufficient true makers - no unknown way of interaction is necessary. II 93 Armstrong: certain counterfactual conditionals apply, but their consequent must remain indeterminate, not only epistemically but also ontologically. >Counterfactual conditionals/Armstrong. II (c) 94 Intentionality/Armstrong: Vs Parallel to dispositions: in the mental, the pointing is intrinsic, in the case of dispositions it is only projected. Place III 108 Dispositions/Martin: Solution: we have to assume particles without structure. Place III 109 Martin-Example/Place: his example with distant particles which themselves have no microstructure allows him to investigate the subtleties of the relation of the properties of the whole and the properties of the parts, but forbids him to examine the relations between categorical and dispositional properties. Place III 119 Purely dispositional properties/PlaceVsMartin: have a structural basis in the carrier, the two are separate entities in a causal relation. Parts/wholesPlace: are separate entities, they are suitable as partners in a causal relation. - Dispositional properties of the whole are an effect of the dispositional properties of the parts and their arrangement. Martin III 163 Dispositions/Place: Dispositions are outside the entities, they are properties of interaction. (MartinVsPlace: This brings a confusion with manifestation. Armstrong: Should the dispositions be within? No. Rather in the connection. - Martin: they can be reciprocal reaction partners. Dispositions/Ryle: are not localized, but belong to the person or object. Martin III 165 Dispositions/MartinVsPlace: Place's introduction of "causal interaction" between the dispositions is a doubling of causality. Martin III 166 Dispositions/Martin: dispositions are always completely actual, even without manifestation. II 174 Armstrong: Dispositions are not in the eye of the beholder - unlike abilities. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Dispositions | Place | Armstrong II 1 f Disposition/Armstrong: Problem of unobservability. Place III 113 Verification/Place: Verification of dispositional properties: this is about what is likely to happen, not about what is observable. Armstrong II 4f Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Mellor: also categorical (not only dispositional) properties fulfil counterfactual conditionals. Armstrong: Dispositions are not made true by counterfactual conditionals. >Truthmaker/Armstrong. Martin: a counterfactual conditional can also be true, while a linked property is not realized - Dispositions cannot be reduced to the facts that are determined by the counterfactual conditionals which often contain them. Armstrong II 5 Armstrong: Thesis: Dispositional = categorical properties = microstructure (therefore dispositions are no possibilia). - Other authors: categorical properties "realize" dispositional properties. Armstrong II 6 Dispositions/Martin: just as actual - it would be perverse to call them non-actual. Dispositions/Armstrong: dispositions are not in themselves causes - (others dito). - Dispositions are always actual, just not their manifestations. Armstrong II 6 Example wire/Martin: Problem: a counterfactual conditional can be true without being true by virtue of the prescribed disposition: when the wire contacts, a current flows: can also be true if the wire is dead: e.g., "electro-finch": brings the wire to life the same moment: ((s) This would be a wrong cause). Place II 62 Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsArmstrong: Genes are not the propensity (tendency) to disease, the propensity is explained by the genes (categorical property), therefore they cannot be identical with the dispositional properties. Armstrong II (c) 90 Dispositions/Armstrong/Place/Martin: Dispositions are "in" the objects. Martin: E.g. remote elementary particles which never interact with our elementary particles. - > This would require irreducible dispositions. ArmstrongVsMartin: there are no irreducible dispositions. Armstrong: why suppose that particles have properties in addition to have the manifested purely categorical property? Armstrong II (c) 90/91 Martin-Example: Conclusion/Martin: Thesis: Armstrong II 92 Armstrong II 93 Armstrong: certain counterfactual conditionals apply, but their consequent must remain indeterminate, not only epistemically but also ontologically. >Counterfactual conditionals/Armstrong. Armstrong II (c) 94 Intentionality/Armstrong: Vs Parallel to dispositions: in the mental, the pointing is intrinsic, in the case of dispositions it is only projected. Place III 108 Dispositions/Martin: Solution: we have to assume particles without structure. Place III 109 Martin-Example/Place: his example with distant particles which themselves have no microstructure allows him to investigate the subtleties of the relation of the properties of the whole and the properties of the parts, but forbids him to examine the relations between categorical and dispositional properties. Place III 119 Purely dispositional properties/PlaceVsMartin: have a structural basis in the carrier, the two are separate entities in a causal relation. Parts/wholesPlace: are separate entities, they are suitable as partners in a causal relation. - Dispositional properties of the whole are an effect of the dispositional properties of the parts and their arrangement. Martin III 163 Dispositions/Place: Dispositions are outside the entities, they are properties of interaction. (MartinVsPlace: This brings a confusion with manifestation. Armstrong: Should the dispositions be within? No. Rather in the connection. - Martin: they can be reciprocal reaction partners. Dispositions/Ryle: are not localized, but belong to the person or object. Martin III 165 Dispositions/MartinVsPlace: Place's introduction of "causal interaction" between the dispositions is a doubling of causality. Martin III 166 Dispositions/Martin: dispositions are always completely actual, even without manifestation. II 174 Armstrong: Dispositions are not in the eye of the beholder - unlike abilities. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Emergence | Chalmers | I 129 Emergence/Consciousness/Chalmers: it is sometimes asked why I do not assume that consciousness emerges from physical facts. >Consciousness/Chalmers. ChalmersVsEmergence: the well-known examples of emergence, e.g. Self-organization in biological systems or patterns in bird flocks are not analogous to consciousness. >Self organisation. Consciousness: should be emergent in a much stronger sense. E.g. Broad 1925 (1): >Determinism, >Predictions, >Levels/order. Emergence/Broad: According to his thesis, emergent properties are not even predictable from all known physical properties of a more basic level. ChalmersVsBroad: this is a strong variant of the property dualism. I 130 It would require additional fundamental laws. >Property dualism, >Laws of nature, >Completeness. 1. C. D. Broad, Mind and Its Place in Natur, London 1925 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Empiricism | Goethe | Carnap VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Color theory): one should remain in the field of sensory perceptions themselves and determine the laws existing between them in the field of perceptions themselves. >Positivism, >Theory of Colors. CarnapVsGoethe: so we would have to find the laws there (in the perception). But physical laws do not apply there, of course, but certain other laws do if the constitution of the physical world is to be possible at all. >Perception, >Sensory impressions, >Seeing, >Laws of nature. But these laws are of much more complicated form. Carnap VI 180 Physical world/CarnapVsGoethe: to be distinguished from the world of perception. Mere quadruples of numbers to which state variables are ascribed. VI 181 Only it is accessible to intersubjectivity, not the world of perception. >Nature, >World, >World/Thinking. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Essence | Kuhn | I 116 Essence/Tradition/Science/Kuhn: consequence of Newton's work: the statement that a stone falls because its "essence" drives it to the center of the universe (Aristotle) had now become a purely tautological play on words, which it had not been before! >Laws of nature, >Tautology. Henceforth, the whole stream of sensory phenomena, including color, taste, and even weight, had to be explained in terms of the size, shape, position, and motions of the elementary particles of basic matter. To attribute other properties to the elementary atoms was from now on something occult and out of question for science. During this period Moliere's mockery of the doctor who believed in the "soporific power" (vis dormitiva). After that, scientists preferred to attribute the calming effect to the round shape of the opium elementary particles. >Mysticism. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 |
| Events | Lewis | V 56 Event/Lewis: can consist of parts, so great violations of laws of nature can be distinguished from small ones by the number of parts of complex events, not by "many laws", because always an infinite number of laws are violated when a single one is trespassed - or only one fundamental law violated. V 166 Event: always correspond to >propositions. - Hence we can use propositions here - e.g. O(e) says that an event e exists (happens), which complies with the description - in a set of possible worlds - But the proposition is not identical to the event - Problem: if no other event than e could fulfil the description, you would need rigid descriptions - which almost never exist - E.g. "Death of Socrates" is non-rigid. Solution: it is not about a sentence F(e), which is true in all and only the worlds in which e happens - Solution: We just need propositions that may have expressions in our language, but not necessarily do - If two events do not occur in exactly the same worlds, this means that there are no absolutely necessary links between the individual events - but then we can have a 1:1 connection between the events and the propositions - counterfactual dependence between events is simply a D between propositions - the counterfactual dependence between propositions corresponds to the causal dependence between events. - Causal dependence/Lewis: we then conclude it from the counterfactual dependence of propositions. - The dependence lies in the truth of counterfactual conditionals. - (> Causality/Hume, >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis. V 196 Definition Event: bigger or smaller classes of possible spatiotemporal regions - more or less connected by similarity. >Similarity/Lewis, >Possible world/Lewis. V 240 Event/Lewis: E.g. no event: rapidly converging mathematical consequence - is no quick entity - name ultimately uninteresting - probability theory; its events are propositions or sometimes properties - a theory that allows an unlimited number of Boolean operations can lead to unreal events. V 243 Definition Event: property of a spacetime region - always contingent - no event occurs in every possible world - an event happens in exactly one (whole) region - E.g. scattered region: sports championships. - E.g. annual event: not an event - an event does not repeat itself - and does not happen in different space-time regions. - The region of the event is the mereological sum of the regions where it happens - to each event corresponds a property of regions - such a property belongs to exactly one region of each possible world where the event happens - Property: is simply a class here. V 245 Event: two events can happen in the same region (space-time region) - E.g. presence of an electron in an electric field can cause its acceleration. It must be possible that one occurs without the other. Even if some of the laws of nature are violated. For every two events, there is a region in a possible world where one occurs, but not the other. ((s) independence) Two events never necessarily occur at the same time - there are hardly any conditions for eventness - maybe: 1) Regions are individuals that are parts of possible worlds 2) No region is part of various possible worlds - similar to > Montague. V 258 Event/mereology/part/partial event/Essence/Lewis: an event can be part of another. - E.g. movement of the left foot is part of walking. Def essential Part/Event: e is an essential part of f iff. f happens in a region, then also e necessarily in a sub-region that is enclosed in the region (implication of an event). But not necessary: events do not necessarily have their spatiotemporal parts. - E.g. walking could consist of fewer steps. V 259 Part/Whole/Event: Writing of "rry"/"Larry": counterfactual dependence, but not cause/Effect. - They are not causally dependent - nevertheless "rry" can be causally dependent on the writing of "La" - but not of "Larr" (overlapping). - The whole is not the cause of its parts. V 260 Event/mereology/Lewis: Thesis: events do not have a simpler mereology that, for example, chairs. A sum of chairs is not itself a chair, but a conference can be a sum of meetings. >Mereology. E.g. War is the mereological sum of battles - Event/Lewis: should serve as cause and effect - partial event: here the causality is sometimes difficult to determine - Problem: whether a subregion can be determined for a partial event in which it occurs - in simple cases yes. V 261 Non-event/Causal story/Lewis: Non-events cannot be determined as something isolated - they cannot be the cause. Constancy: is not always a non-event! Constancies are needed in causal explanation. >Causal explanation/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Events | McDowell | I 161 Event/Quine: subjected to the laws of nature. - > Experience/McDowell. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Evolution | Kauffman | Dennett I 303 Self-organization/Evolution/Kauffman/Dennett: main representative: By means of simulation, we are now able to simulate complex evolutionary scenarios and recognize principles that remained unknown to Darwin. >Simulation. Order/Evolution/Dennett: not every order offers the possibility of evolution or selection: e. g. variations of Conway's "Game of Life". Self-organization/Kauffman: it is not only probable, but almost certain that the evolutionary ability itself undergoes an evolution, it develops because it is a forced move in the design game. >Self-organization. Either you find the path that leads to evolutionary capacity, or you don't get anywhere, but finding that path is not a tour de force, it's obvious. It should be surprisingly simple. Dennett I 306 Self-organization/Kauffman/Dennett: Kauffman's laws are not those of form, but of design, the compulsions of meta technology. >Laws, >Laws of nature. --- Kauffman I 30 Evolution/Kauffman's thesis: if the record of life were to be replayed, then the individual branches in the family tree of life might look different, but the patterns of the branches, which at first diverge greatly and then become more and more detailed, probably follow a deeper regularity. >Levels/order, >Description Levels. Evolution may also be a historical process, but it ran regularly at the same time. The phenomena of species formation and extinction most likely reflect the spontaneous dynamics of a community of species. >Species, >Species/Kauffman, >Species/Mayr. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Existence | Spinoza | Genz II 313 Miracle/SpinozaVsMiracle/Genz: there are no miracles. Therefore, we should recognize God's existence from the natural laws. >Miracles, >God, >Proofs of God, >Laws of Nature, >Religion, >Theology, >World. |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Experiments | Mayr | I 54 Experiment/Mayr: one could say that the discoveries by Galileo and his contemporaries were based on experiments "of nature itself". (Earthquakes, solar eclipses, volcanic eruptions). I 58 Reproducibility, Repeatability of experiments: every ocean current is unique, and yet we can make laws and theories about ocean currents. >Single case causation, >Causality, >Regularities, >Theories, >Generalization, >Laws, >Laws of Nature. I 72 Experiment/Reproducibility/Confirmation/Mayr: e.g. after an earlier researcher found 48 chromosomes, this false result was confirmed by many other researchers. The correct number was 46! This was discovered only after the introduction of new techniques. >Verification, >Falsification, >Review, >Confirmation, >Measurements, >Observation. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Explanation | Cartwright | I 3 Explanation/Description/Physics/Cartwright: in modern physics, the phenomenological laws are considered as being descriptive, the fundamental laws as being explanatory. >Fundamental laws, >Laws, >Natural laws, >Physics. Problem: the explanatory power comes at the cost of the adequacy of the description. 1) explanatory power (of laws) does not speak for truth 2) even for falsehood, because we need ceteris paribus laws 3) the semblance of truth comes from a false explanation model: wrong connection of laws with reality. >Truth, >Reality, >ceteris paribus. I 4 Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum" View/Cartwright: of explanation: Thesis: the way from theory to reality is this: theory > model > phenomenological law - Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be). Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are only true of the objects in the model - E.: is not a guide to the truth. I 11 E/Physics/Cartwright: wrong question: "which is the correct equation?" - Different models bring different aspects - causal explanation: not in scientific practice, we do not tell sometimes one, sometimes another causal story. >Theories, >Models. I 44 E/CartwrightVsTradition: has nothing to do with truth - ((s)> Truth/M.Williams / >Truth/Horwich). I 47 E/Cartwright: after the laws of nature (LoN) are known, we still have to decide which factors should occur in an explanation - the decision of which is, however, not suggested by our knowledge of the laws of nature. I 50 Laws of Nature are never sufficient to explain something in a particular moment - the reasons to believe in them are not normal reasons, because we have never tested them - only reasons: explanation strategy - I 52 E: is still needed even after complete description. >Description, >Observation. I 70 E/All/Generalization/VsSuper Law/C: E.g. "Why is the quail in my garden shaking its head?" - "Because all of them do it" - no explanation! - Nor: E.g. "All carbon atoms have 5 energy levels" - Super laws in turn require the application of individual laws - and these do not represent facts. I 73 Explanation/Cartwright: Uses causes - ((s) not laws) - (EmpiricismVsCauses). I 92 E/LoN/Cartwright: it is not the fundamental laws (laws of nature) that I need for the explanation, but E.g. properties of electrons - plus assumptions about the specific situation. I 94 f Explanation/Grünbaum: a more comprehensive law G explains a less comprehensive law L which it contains not through the causes of L. I 96 Explanation/Duhem: does not draw a "veil" from reality - Explanation/Cartwright: explaining a set of phenomenological laws means giving a physical theory of them - without explaining these laws. I 103 Explanation/W. Salmon/Richard Jeffries: E. are no arguments. I 152 Explanation/Duhem: Organization (order of knowledge). Hacking I 96~ Explanation/Cartwright/Fraassen: if something is an explanation, it is no reason to believe it. I 99 Anti-Realism: E are not a feature of the truth but of adequacy. >Adequacy. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Explanation | Genz | II 59 Why-Explanation/Newton/Kepler/Genz: Newton's laws explain why Kepler's planets do not move on circular orbits. Kepler could not yet explain this. >Why-questions, >Physics, >Laws of nature, >Nature. II 300 Explanation/understanding/physics/Genz: how can theories explain phenomena (as in quantum mechanics) when they throw so many principles over the top? >Quantum mechanics. Solution/Genz: because the "new" explanations are also based on principles. >Principles. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Explanation | Hegel | Schurz I 224 Explanation/Hegel/Schurz: Thesis: Explanation goes in principle beyond description, it is a kind of "Wesensschau". DuhemVsHegel/WittgensteinVsHegel: Science can only describe at all! (WittgensteinVsExplanation). >L. Wittgenstein, >P. Duhem, >Description, >Explanation/Duhem, >Explanation/Wittgenstein. Law/laws of nature/solution/Hempel: also laws are descriptions - just general descriptions! Explanation/Hempel: goes beyond description in that it establishes a logical connection. >Explanation/Hempel. I 225 Last explanation/Schurz: does not exist in science for exactly this reason: every explanation must presuppose something unexplained. Example gravitation law, example the fact that there was a big bang. Nothing can explain itself, there is no "self-explanation". >Explanation/Schurz, >Explanation/Hempel, >Ultimate justification. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Explanation | Kauffman | Dennett I 309 KauffmanVsDarwin: a definition of early development and thus the Baerian laws (all embryos of living beings look very similar at the beginning) do not constitute a special mechanism. >Laws, >Laws of nature. Rather, the definition of early development reflects the fact that the number of ways in which living beings can be improved has shrunk faster than the number of ways in later development. >Niches. Dennett I 310 For example, the foundations of the churches are more similar than the upper floors. Reason: Experimenting with decorations does not have such a fatal effect if they are carried out above where not everything can break down. Actually, there really aren't as many solutions at the beginning as there are later. Explanation/Kauffman: to explain this, we do not have to look for steering mechanisms. It's self-explanatory. Evolution finds such paths again and again. >Evolution, >Causal explanations. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Explanation | Pinker | I 54 Explanation/Pinker: bad evolutionary explanation: E.g. Humor weakens tension; - happy people find more allies. Good explanation: brings technical analysis that is independent of the explanatory part. - Begins with objectives in a world with causes and effects. To understand seeing of humans and animals, we need to look at machines. E.g. nausea in pregnancy: defense against toxins. Bad explanation: Freud: desire for oral abortion. I 124 Explanation/Pinker: here it is about according to which principles things function - not about what things are "good examples" for a well-known term. >Principles, >Laws of nature, >Causal explanation, >Understanding, >Evidence, >Observation, >Functional explanation. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Explanation | Railton | Lewis V 233 Probability/Explanation/covering law model/deductive-nomological/Peter Railton: According to Railton's model, an explanation has two parts: 1st. a D-N argument (deductively nomological argument), which satisfies some conditions of the non probabilistic case. Its premises can also include probability laws. 2nd (not part of the argument): The finding that the event has taken place. If the premises say that certain events have taken place, then these are sufficiently given together the laws for the actual event or for probability. >Deductive-nomological. Problem: a subset - given even only a part of the laws - can also be sufficient to explain parts of the events, and produce a number of remnants that are still sufficient under the original laws. Therefore, one must have two conditions when explaining: 1. that certain events together are sufficient for the Explanandum event (under the prevailing laws) 2. that only some of the laws are needed to guarantee the sufficiency of the conditions. >Sufficiency. LewisVsRailton: if we had a covering law for causation, along with our covering law for explanation, that would reconcile my approach with the covering law approach. But that is not available! >Covering laws. V 233/234 Often one element of the sufficient reason of the D-N set (deductive-nomological) will in reality be one of the causes itself. But that must not be! The counter-examples are well known: 1. to the sufficient subset can belong a completely irrelevant reason, the requirement of the minimalism does not help: we could produce an artificial minimalism, by taking weaker laws and leaving stronger laws unconsidered. Example Salmon: A man takes the pill and does not get pregnant! The premise that nobody who takes the pill becomes pregnant must not be omitted! 2 An element of the sufficient subset could be something that is not an event: For example, a premise can determine that something has an extrinsic or highly disjunctive property. that cannot specify any real events. 3. an effect may belong to the subset if the laws say that it can only be produced in a certain way. I.e. the quantity could be minimal in a suitable way, and also be one of events, but that would not be sufficient to make the effect the cause of its cause! 4. such an effect can also be sufficient subset for another effect, e.g. of a later, same cause. For example, that a commercial appears on my TV is caused by the same broadcast as the same commercial appears on your TV, but the one is not the cause of the other. Rather, they have a common cause. 5. a prevented potential cause could be part of the subset because nothing has overridden it. LewisVsRailton: this shows that the common sufficient subset presented by D-N argument may not be a set of causes. V 235 LewisVsRailton: if a D-N argument seems to show no causes, but still seems to be an explanation, this is a problem for my own theory. >Explanation/Lewis. VsHempel: refractive index, VsRailton: in reality there are no non-causal cases. RailtonVsLewis: if the D-N model does not present causes, and therefore does not look like an explanation, then this is a problem for the D-N model. Railton: therefore not every D-N model is a correct explanation. V 236 Question: can any causal history be characterized by the information contained in a D-N argument (deductive-nomological argument)? This would be the case if each cause belongs to a sufficient subset - given the laws. Or in the probabilistic case: under probability laws. And is that so that the causes fall under it? Lewis: That does not follow from the counterfactual analysis of causality! Nevertheless, it may be true. (It will be true in a possible world with sufficiently strict laws. If explanatory information is information about causal history, then one way to deliver it is via D-N arguments. But then there's still something wrong! The D-N arguments are presented as ideal. I.e. they have the right form. nothing too much and not too little. But nobody thinks that everyday explaining fulfills this. Normally the best we can do is to make existential assumptions. "Therefore" assertion/Morton White: we can take as existential assumptions. LewisVsRailton: correct D-N arguments as existence assumptions are not yet a real explanation. Simply because of their form, they do not meet the standard of how much information is sufficient. Lewis: There's always more to know, no matter how perfect the D N arguments are. The D N A always only give a cross-section of the causal history. Many causes may be omitted. And this could be the one we are looking for right now. Perhaps we would like to get to know the mechanisms involved in certain traces of causal history. V 238 Explanation/Lewis/VsRailton: a D-N argument can also be of wrong form: not giving us enough too much at the same time. Explanation/Lewis: it is not that we have a different idea of the unity of the explanation. We should not demand unity at all: an explanation is not something you can have or miss, but something you can have more or less of. Problem: the idea of having "enough" explanation: it nourishes doubts about the knowledge of our ancestors: they rarely or never had complete knowledge of the laws of nature. LewisVsRailton: I.e. they rarely or never had complete D-N arguments. Did they therefore have incomplete explanatory knowledge? I think no! They knew a lot about how things were caused. Solution/Railton: (similar to my picture): together with each Explanandum we have an extended and complex structure. V 239 Lewis: For me these structures are connected by causal dependence Railton: for him they consist of an "ideal text" of D-N arguments (deductively nomological arguments) as in mathematical proofs. >Causal dependence, >Causality, >Causes, >Causal explanation. |
Railt P. Railton Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays toward a Morality of Consequence Cambridge 1999 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Facts | Cartwright | I 54 "Facticity view"/facts/laws of nature/Physics/ Perry/Cartwright: thesis: the laws of nature fix facts. - CartwrightVs, PerryVs. Either the natural laws are ideal (e.g. some suppose, Schrödinger equation, Maxwell equations, etc.are ideal), then they are not historical facts - or they are taken as a description of facts: then they are wrong. >Description, >Theories, >Natural laws, >Laws, >Fundamental law/Cartwright. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Facts | Chalmers | I 40 Definition Positive Fact/Chalmers: A positive fact in world W is one that applies in every possible world that contains W as a real part, correspondingly a positive property in W is one that is instantiated in every world containing W as a real part. (Chalmers I 363: Containment of possible worlds.) Lewis (1983a)(1) and Jackson (1993)(2) have noticed that it is pointless to define the relation of containing worlds once and for all. But you can use them as a basic term. ...+...) >Possible worlds/Lewis, >Possible worlds. On the other hand: Negative facts always imply negative existence statements, which cannot be evaluated locally on their part. >Existence sentences. We will restrict ourselves to positive facts and properties when considering supervenience. >Supervenience, >Supervenience/Chalmers, >Properties. I 85 Negative Facts/Chalmers: Facts that involve negative existence statements are not logically determined by any localizable facts. Even facts about conscious experience cannot help here. ((Chalmers I 369 Negative facts and logical supervenience ...+...). >Experience. I 86 Solution/Chalmers: we must introduce a second-level fact which, according to the enumeration of the microphysical, phenomenal, indexical, etc. facts says: "This is all." All the negative facts follow from the fact of the second level together with all the basic single facts. Reductive explanation: negative facts are not a serious problem for reductionist explanations. >Reduction/Chalmers, >Reductionism. 2nd level fact/Chalmers: there will be probably a statement "that is all" for every possible world and such a fact is never included in the single facts. It merely expresses the finite nature of our world or of any other world. It is a simple way to deal with negative and universally quantified facts. (> universal quantification, > lists, exterior/interior, > totality, cf. Lists. I 87 Facts/World/Chalmers: Facts about the world are exhausted by 1. Physical single facts 2. Facts about conscious experience 3. Natural laws 4. A fact of the 2nd level, which means "This is all." 5. An indexical fact about my localization. >Indexicality, >Laws of Nature, >Consciousness/Chalmers. 1. D. Lewis, Extrinsic properties. Philosophical Studies 44, 1983: pp. 197-200 2. F. Jackson, Armchair metaphysics. In: J. O'Leary-Hawthorne and M. Michael (Eds) Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht 1993 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Facts | Mayr | I 49 Facts/Mayr: there are no pure facts, all are theory-laden. >Theories, >Theory dependence, >Observation, >Theory ladenness. I 49 Def knowledge/Mayr: facts and their interpretation. >States of affairs, >Interpretation. I 93 Fact/theory/law/Mayr: after the discovery of Pluto a theory became a fact. The laws of thermodynamics were just able to be called facts. >Laws, >Laws of nature. E.g. that birds have feathers is, however, a fact and not a law. >Generalization, >Generality. I 96 Biology/Mayr: here concepts play a bigger role than laws. >Concepts, >Classification/Mayr, >Order/Mayr. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Forms | Pinker | I 218 Design/shape/Evolution/Chomsky: It is wrong to make selection responsible for all design - often there is simply a physical explanation. Explanation/selection/PinkerVsChomsky: Selection is usually not needed to explain utility, but something improbable. >Selection, >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Laws of nature. I 219 Definition design/Pinker: if the function cannot be described more economical than the structure, it is no design. - The term function will not add anything new. Cf. >Gestalt theory, >Gestalt psychology. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Free Will | Lewis | V 291 Freedom of Will/Laws of Nature/violate Laws of Nature/Lewis: the fact that we apparently can violate the Laws of Nature depends on the assumption of an intermediate determinism. >Determinism/Lewis. The thesis that we sometimes willingly do what we are predetermined to do and that we might act differently in such cases, although the history and the laws of nature determine that we will not act differently. Compatibilism: thesis that the soft determinism might be true, but there may be a physical foundation for a predetermination. - E.g. I could have raised a hand. Then I would have a violated a Law of Nature. Soft determinism: this is assumed here only for the sake of the argument of soft determinism. V 292 Important argument: it does not follow, however, that there is something that is both a law of nature and broken. - For broken laws of nature are a contradiction in adjecto. >Law of nature/Lewis. V 293 The assumption here serves the differentiation of two theses: weak thesis: an actually unbroken law could have been broken. - Strong: I can break laws of nature. - Important argument: if no act of mine is a law of nature breaking event, then it could not be true that I had broken a law of nature. - ((s) not "as long as ..."). V 295 Freedom of will/break laws of nature/Lewis: E.g. Assuming I raised my hand 10 minutes ago, although it was predetermined that I should not raise it. - Then there was a time before that when the laws were broken. - Important argument: then the causation is the other way around. - The breaking of the laws caused the raising of the hand. - (See "miracle"). - But the act itself is not the miracle - therefore you do not need any supernatural powers for moderate determinism. - Problem: the effect would precede the cause. - Nevertheless, right counterfactual dependence pattern. >Counterfactual dependence/Lewis. V 296 InwagenVsLewis/Determinism, moderate. V 297 Lewis: distinction act/event. - It is the act that causes the event of breaking laws. - The act does not falsify a law but only a conjunction of history and law. >Event/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Generality | Bigelow | I 232 Natural Laws/Realism/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: a Humean theory of natural laws cannot be as realistic as ours. >Humean world. Generalisation/Regularity/Hume: the Humean can be realistic with regard to generalisations. >Laws of nature, >Regularities, >Generalization, >D. Hume, >Causality/Hume. I 233 "Total generality"/"pure" generality/Hume/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: may not contain a reference to an individual: It is too weak and too strong. a) too strong: for example, Kepler's laws refer to all planets but also to an individual, the sun. b) too weak: it is still not a law. For example, that everything moves towards the center of the earth. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| God | Chalmers | I 87 God/Creation myth/Chalmers: everything that God had to do was to create the following facts: 1. Physical single facts 2. Facts about conscious experience 3. Natural laws 4. A fact of the 2nd level, which means "This is all." 5. An indexical fact about my localization. In the first instance, he will have created the laws of nature and then laws for conscious experience for economical reasons. It seems to lie beyond God's power to fix facts about my indexical circumstances. Another reason to be skeptical. >Facts, >Experience, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Indexicality, >Laws of Nature, >Omnipotence, >Omniscience. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| God | Swinburne | Stegmüller IV 420 Laws of nature/Swinburne: Natural laws are not themselves explainable. This makes the hypothesis of the existence of God more likely. Vs: from the inexplicable follows no greater likelihood for any divine authority. >Natural laws, >Explanation, >Existence, >Necessity, >Ontology, >Proofs of God's existence. |
Swinburne I R. Swinburne Justification of Induction Oxford 1974 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| History | Marx | Höffe I 368 History/Marx/Höffe: [Marx](1) begins with the analysis of commodity and money as the factual preconditions and formal elements. He concedes to capital the world-historical task of developing all productive forces of labor. On the other hand, however, it prevents what is indispensable for a truly humane economy: that work or the worker becomes the subject of social processes. Determinism: Freely borrowing from Hegel's philosophy of history, Marx thinks deterministically. For in his view, the allegedly undeniable "impoverishment of the masses" follows a mechanism that inevitably leads to the self-absorption of capital. In his view, there is a growing concentration of capital, in the course of which more and more owners of capital are expropriated, which should have an obvious consequence: As misery grows, so does the indignation of an ever larger organized labor force. >History/Hegel, >World history/Hegel, >Weltgeist/Hegel. 1. K. Marx Das Kapital Vol. I 1867, Vol. II & II 1885 (= MEW 23-25) Gaus I 80 History/Marx/Levine, Andrew: Hegel’s philosophy of history was, of course, the immediate inspiration for Marx’s attempt to make sense of history as such. But Marx broke ranks with Hegel and the entire tradition that his work culminated in by rejecting teleology and, with it, the project of discovering what historical events mean. Marx retained Hegel’s sense of history’s intelligibility; he sought to provide an account of real historical structures and of the direction of historical change. >History/Hegel. MarxVsHegel: But, for Marx, history is as meaningless as nature is. Like nature too, it has properties that are independent of investigators’ interests and that are in principle capable of being known. The philosophers of history, Hegel especially, had grasped aspects of real history, but through the distorting lens of their own teleological convictions. Marx set them right, without succumbing to the atheoreticism of contemporary historians. History/MarxismVsMarx: Western Marxisms, for all their differences, were of one mind in distancing themselves from Marx’s theory of history. The historical materialist orthodoxy of the Second and Third Internationals was, in the eyes of Western Marxists, too fatalistic to pass muster. It failed to accord human agency its due. Its commitment to historical inevitability even seemed to render the very idea of politics otiose. If the end is already given, one can perhaps hasten its coming, but nothing can fundamentally change the ultimate outcome. This, it seemed to them, was a formula for quiescence, for passively awaiting the revolution. But the historical materialism Western Marxists faulted was not exactly the historical materialism Cohen defended. >History/Cohen. Levine, Andrew 2004. A future for Marxism?“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. Rothbard II 417 History/economy/Marx/Rothbard: (…) Marx was not particularly interested in explanatory laws for the workings of the capitalist system. He was interested in pressing on to what he called the 'laws of motion' (a revealingly mechanistic term!) of the capitalist system, that is, in its inevitable march towards the victory of revolutionary communism, a march that would proceed 'with the inexorability of the laws of nature'. How and where, then, was capitalism bound to move? One crucial aspect of the inevitable doom of capitalism is the inescapable law of the falling rate of profit. >Rate of Profit/Marx. Rothbard II 419 Accumulation/Marx: Whichever course the Marxists take, it is crucial for them to salvage the continuing accumulation of capital, since it is through such accumulation that increased productivity and particularly technological innovations take place and are instituted in the economy. And we must remember that it is through technological innovation that capitalists dig their own grave, for the capitalist system and capitalist relations become the fetters that block technological development. Some technological method that capitalism cannot encompass, which Marx late in life thought would be electricity, would provide the spark, the necessary and suffcient base for the inevitable overthrow of capitalism and the seizing power by the 'final' historical class, the proletariat. To Marx, two consequences followed necessarily from the alleged tendency to the accumulation of capital and the advance oftechnology. The first is the 'concentration of capital', by which Marx meant the inexorable tendency of each firm to grow ever larger in size, for the scale of production to enlarge.(1) Certainly, there is a great amount of expansion of scale ofplant and firm in the modern world. RothbardVsMarx: On the other hand, the law is scarcely apodictic. Why may not the accumulation of capital be reflected in a growth in the number of firms, rather than merely in increasing the size of each? 1. Thus, Marx wrote, in Volume I of Capital, that 'It is a law, springing from the technical character of manufacture, that the minimum amount of capital which the capitalist must possess has to go on increasing', and 'the development of capitalist production makes it necessary constantly to increase the amount of capital laid out in a given industrial undertaking'. Cf. C David Conway, A Farewell to Marx: An Outline and Appraisal of His Theories (Harmondsworth, Mddx: Penguin Books, 198 7), pp. 126-7. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Holism | Schurz | I 190 Verification holism/Holism/Schurz: deduction-logical background: if the set of premises (H1...Hn) logically implies the prediction P, then (per modus tollens) the negation of the prediction, ~P implies the negation of the conjunction of all premises, i.e. ~(H1,...Hn). The latter is logically equivalent to the disjunction of all negated premises, i.e. ~H1 v ...v ~Hn i.e. at least one of the premises Hi is false. ((s) "i" instead of "n", because n would be merely the last hypothesis). Theory net/Schurz: consists of different theory associations. There are at least 3 kinds of relations between the theory elements of a theory net: 1. through the relation of specialization: hierarchical theory associations are formed 2. the relation of the Vortheoretizität: can exist both within and between theory federations. These two relations connect only theoretically homogeneous theory elements with each other. Terms that are identical in expression are identified with each other. Elements connected in this way can never compete. Anders: 3. between different theory associations there are intertheoretical cross connections: (a) simplest case: again identity connections. I 191 Ex electrostatic force within a mechanical model. b) Bridging principles: Ex between phenomenological thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, according to which temperature is proportional to the mean kinetic energy of molecules. c) approximate theory reduction. Ex Newtonian mechanics Relativity. >Theories, >Relativity theory, >Bridge laws, >Laws of nature, >Laws. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Humean World | Bigelow | I 243 Humean World/slippery slope argument/Jackson/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Jackson 1977a) pro Humean World: (slippery slope) For example, a world in which laws of the 1st level are not only not necessary, but also have exceptions. >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Causality, >Determinism. For example, suppose it is pure coincidence whether an F is a G or not. Any non-G would be a contingent thing that would not have existed. If it exists, it does not affect any F. Then there is a world where it is also coincidental whether an F is a G, but where there is one F less, which is a non-G. >Possible worlds, >Random. From this world we can deduce the existence of another world that still has one less F, which is a non-G. etc. In the end, this proves that there is a world where every F has a 0.5 chance to be a G and yet all F's are G's! This is completely consistent with a theory of probability theory. From this we conclude that it is quite possible that there is a Humean World for every possible world. Humean World/Bigelow/Pargetter: is easy to define when we are dealing with laws in the form of simple sentences (describing regularities). >Regularities. It is more difficult with more complex shapes. (See below Chapter 6). Accessibility/Bigelow/Pargetter: the Humean World obliges us to an accessibility relation that does not supervene on properties of the 1st level and relations. >Accessibility, >Supervenience. I 245 Counterfactual conditionals: those that are valid for laws in the actual world fail in the Humean World. >Counterfactual conditional. Therefore, the accessibility of the Humean world would differ from the actual world in its accessibility without differing from its properties of the 1st level. >Actual world. Accessibility/Bigelow/Pargetter: nevertheless, there are strong reasons to believe in a supervenience of the accessibility relation on the contents of the world. This leads us to assume that the contents of the 1st level do not exhaust all the contents of the world. >Modal properties. Combinatorial theories: they must therefore adopt universals of higher level and therefore also the property theory of world properties. >Universals. I 279 Causal World/Bigelow/Pargetter: be a world in which some things cause some others. How many such worlds may there be? Some authors: all worlds are causal worlds. From reflections on individuality. Individual/some authors/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to some theories, they are just "bundles of properties". >Individuals. Question, what holds them together? Thesis: properties are held together causally. Causal world/some authors/Bigelow/Pargetter: say that every possible world is causal because no possible world is timeless. >Time, >Timeless, >Impossible world. Time/Bigelow/Pargetter: we believe in the causal theory of the time arrow and in the asymmetry of past and future, but not in a causal theory of time itself. >Time arrow, >Past, >Future, >Present. Therefore, we do not think that all possible worlds are causal. We believe that there are Humean Worlds and Heimson Worlds. What we need now is a Humean world. Humean World/Bigelow/Pargetter: it does not matter whether it is accessible or not. Only their existence counts. We need to show their logical possibility. (i.e. the possibility of a world like ours in terms of regularities of the 1st level, but without causes and without laws). I 280 Modality: the difference between the actual world and a Humean world cannot be merely modal. Modal differences must be based on differences in the content of the possible world. They cannot be identical in terms of their content and can still be modally different. There must be something present in the causal world, and absent in the non-causal. >Content. Def Humean World/Bigelow/Pargetter: it therefore cannot be defined by the absence of causality. We define it as a world that corresponds to ours on the 1st level of properties and relations. But they differ in relation to relations between properties and relations of relations. >Properties, >Relations. They differ in terms of higher-level universals. Some of these will not supervene on those of the 1st level. Def Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a relation of the 2nd level between events. (Relation between properties). It does not supervene on intrinsic properties of the 1st Level of events. >Events, >Supervenience. The relations of the 2nd level apply contingently if we allow Humean Worlds. >Contingency. I.e. effect and cause could also occur, with the same properties of the 1st level, if they are not in the relevant relations of the 2nd level. These are external. >Levels/order, >Description levels. Events: can have the same properties of the 1st level and yet still differ in properties of the 2nd level. Therefore, the Humean world can be similar to the actual one. I 281 If they occur in the same possible world, on the other hand, they will be the same on both levels. (Because we treat them as universals). >Degrees/Graduals. Degree/Level/Order/Terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: therefore, one match on the 1st level implies a match of 2nd degree (sic) for all event pairs in the same world. >Quantities/Bigelow. Degree/Properties: (see above I 53) Properties 2nd degree: the commonality of properties. For example, green includes all shades of green. Causation: but because of their local character (see above) it may be that the pairs of events are causally different! This means that causation is a relation of the 2nd level which does not supervene, neither on properties of the 1st Level, nor on the 2nd degree and relations. N.b.: causation connects not only universals, but structures that involve both. Universals of higher level and individual items. Causal relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: must therefore be of a higher level itself. Question: Which properties and relations do they constitute? For this, we look at another difference between the Humean world and the actual world. Definition Berkeley World/Bigelow/Pargetter: one in which causation is an act of will (of God). Berkeley, for example, thought that the distant planets could not possibly exert a force on the sun. So it was God who caused the sun to be moved away a little from its place. Hume: removed the act of will from the Berkeley World and so his world became a world without causation. Humean World/Bigelow/Pargetter: is first and foremost a world without powers. >Forces. 1.Jackson, F. (1977a) A causal theory of counterfactuals. Australasian Journal of Philosphy 55, pp.3-21 |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Humean World | Lewis | V IX Humean supervenience/HS/Lewis: Thesis: everything in the world is a large mosaic of local facts - there is a geometry: a system of external relations of spatiotemporal distances between points - at the points we have local qualities, perfectly natural intrinsic properties - everything is an arrangement of qualities (AoQ). Everything supervenes on it. Important argument: there is no distinction without difference. - That does not mean that two possible worlds could not be different without having a difference in the AoQ. Cf. >Causality/Hume. Example 1) possible worlds with Humean supervenience, 2) possible worlds without! - ((s) i.e. Humean supervenience is contingent). Lewis: for our inner sphere of possibilities there is no such distinction. V VII Arrow of time: only in one direction - the Humean supervenience has to consider this asymmetry. - Humean supervenience/(s): does not mean here that causality is denied. --- V X Materialism/Humean supervenience/Lewis: materialism is a metaphysics that is to confirm the truth of known physics. Humean supervenience: it may be that the Humean supervenience is true and all our physics wrong. V 111 Humean supervenience/Coincidence/Lewis: If the Humean supervenience is wrong, there is a fatal counter e.g., which is made by coincidences - then coincidences and coincidence theories do not supervene on facts. Problem: a theory of coincidence is not something that itself may only have a certain chance - (which also says the Principal Principle PP) - an equally likely deviant pattern would lead to an entirely different coincidence theory. Right: chances are contingent because they depend on contingent facts, but not because they depended on a theory of coincidence - then the Humean supervenience is maintained. --- Schwarz I 112 Humean supervenience/Lewis/Schwarz: From description which property exists at point X and which at point y we learn which properties these are, thus in which the laws of nature apply. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Individual Causation | Vollmer | II 56 Uniqueness/Unique/explanation/uniqueness/unique items/Science/Vollmer: Pauli: the unique does not have to be less essential - uniqueness/Vollmer: only when something is in principle and necessary or proven unique the arguments can be applied VsExplanation. >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Essence. II 57 E.g. cosmology: refers to the principle unique. II 58 Uniqueness/Unique/explanation/uniqueness/unique items/Science/Vollmer: Problem: then law of nature is indistinguishable from boundary conditions. >Natural laws, >Conditions. E.g. Why the gravitational constant G has the value G = 6.67 has 10 -8, does not follow from the whole classical physics - all the constants have random values. >Natural constants. Law of nature/Vollmer: also the laws of nature are random. >Contingency, >Random. II 63 Mistake: to assume that only the repeating is based on laws of nature, but not the unique - solution: causality as energy transfer. >Energy. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Induction | Genz | II 303 Uniformity/Hume: we assume a uniformity of past and future. >Regularity, >David Hume. Physics/theory/explanation/Genz: but we assume more than mere uniformity when we explain why. >Why-questions. Physics also hopes for a certain outcome of experiments that have never been conducted before. Merely uniformity is not enough. Expectation/Genz: expection is justified by an understanding of the past. It is better than regularity. Therefore, there is no "problem of induction". >Predictions. II 304 Induction/GenzVsPopper: there is no "problem of induction". Understanding is the solution rather than the acceptance of regularities. >Induction/Goodman. Principle/Genz: the disguised reality of the laws of nature is such that we can understand it by principles. >Natural laws, >Laws, >Principles. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Induction | Mayr | I 78 Induction/Francis Bacon/Mayr: large rehabilitation (and actually the first introduction) of induction. For two centuries decisive. >F. Bacon. Justus von LiebigVsBacon: Liebig 1863(1) first rejection of Bacon. "Induction alone cannot produce new theories". Biology: for them, practically none of the universal laws of physics apply. This is why it was largely excluded from science philosophy. >Laws of nature, >Physics. I 80 MayrVsPopper: it is often very difficult, if not impossible, to falsify a useless theory convincingly. The categorical statement that in a single falsification the whole theory falls does not apply to evolutionary biology. >Falsification, >K. Popper, >Theories. I 219 Def Induction/Biology/Mayr: Influence of already existing tissues on the development of other tissues. By proteins. It is important for almost all organisms. 1. J. v. Liebig (1863). The natural laws of husbandry. Boston: D. Appleton and company. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Information | Bigelow | I 68 Information/Movement/Causality/Speed of Light/Bigelow/Pargetter: an image can be transmitted faster than light: e.g. a laser cannon on earth can swing on the surface of the Jupiter moon Callisto and move an image from one point to another through the angular speed, which is faster than the speed of light. I 69 This is possible because there is no causal process under way here. The point at a time is not the same thing as the point at another time, the point is not an object. >Causality, >Causation. N.B.: then in the case of this point there is only one Ockhamistic speed, no vector. Saying "it" moved was misleading. It also has no identity in time. >Temporal identity. Cause: is the movement of the laser cannon on Earth. >Causes. N.B.: therefore, the existence of a pattern of 2nd level of positions does not imply the existence of a property of the 1st level of the instantaneous velocity. >Levels/order, >Description levels. Newton: shows again that instantaneous velocity (property of the 1st level) does not imply properties of the 2nd level (sequence of positions). Flux theory: this is what it needs, the logical independence of properties 1st and 2nd level. Nevertheless, it must accept an intimate connection between the two. >Flux/Bigelow. False solution: to say that the point of light receives its identity from the numerical identity. That would be a dubious combination of first and second level properties. I 70 Vs: if, for example, a world of Malebranche - God creates the moving objects at any time in any place - is a logical possibility, then there is no implication (entailment) between Ockhamistic speed and velocity according to the flux theory (2nd and 1st level of properties). >Malebranche, >Entailment, >Implication, >William of Ockham. Bigelow/Pargetter: That is why we say that the connection between Ockham speed and flux speed is not guaranteed by a metaphysically necessary connection, but by a contingent natural law. >Laws of nature, >Contingency. Motion/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Ockham's change of location is often explained by instantaneous speed. The reason is that there is no other possibility according to the laws of nature. >Motion, >Change. Moment/Bigelow/Pargetter: this vector understands velocity among itself. Moment is not an intrinsic property (or "invariant"), but is relativized to a frame of reference. >Reference systems. Vector/Natural Laws/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Vectors play an important role in natural laws. It is they who give the natural laws their explanatory power. Intrinsic property/Vector/Bigelow/Pargetter: each vector constitutes an intrinsic characteristic of an object at a time. ((s) No contradiction to above, if related to point of time). Velocity/acceleration/Bigelow/Pargetter: their connection is mediated by their role in natural laws. Gravitational Acceleration/Galilei/Bigelow/Pargetter: is actually not quite constant, because gravitation becomes stronger when approaching the center of gravity. And it is increasingly accelerating. Galilei, however, assumes constancy. I 71 Explanation/Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: not all quantities play an explanatory role such as acceleration and velocity. For example, the change in acceleration (see above gravitational acceleration) does not play an explanatory role. That is why we do not assume a vector for them. All we need here is "Ockham's" pattern of acceleration. No flux. However, we do need the flux for the underlying vectors of velocity and acceleration. >Intrinsic. Vector/Physics/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: there is no reason to assume vectors above the level of acceleration, neither flux vectors nor Ockhamist vectors. >Vectors. Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: this shows an explanatory link between flux vectors and patterns in time. >Explanations, >Causal explanation. This connection is not a close logical or metaphysical one, but a looser, a nomological one. >Metaphysics, >Metaphysical possibility, >Nomothetic/idiographic. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Instrumentalism | Genz | II 299 Instrumentalism/Genz: the program "Grail" corresponds to the long known instrumentalism. Instrumentalism/Genz: thesis: one does not need any laws of nature, only correct predictions. Only things that can be observed by people are of interest. Different theories are the same if they lead to the same perceptions. >Predictions, cf. >Operationalism. Reality: the question of one that would be independent of perception is pointless for instrumentalism (and positivism). >Perception, >Positivism, >Realism. Positivism: goes beyond that and denies existence to unobservable things. II 300 Pragmatic theories/physics/Genz: here is the question: can the theory specify a mechanism that leads from cause to effect? >Causes, >Effects, >Equations. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Intrinsicness | Chalmers | Schwarz I 226 Intrinsic properties/Nature/Panpsychism/Panprotopsychism/Chalmers/Schwarz: Chalmers (Chalmers 2002)(1)takes advantage of this gap: starting point is a kind. Def Quidditism: Thesis: Our physical theories describe how physical things and properties behave with each other, what they are, but leave their intrinsic nature in the dark. >Properties, >Laws of nature, >Naturalism, >Physics, >Explanation. Def Pan(proto)psychism: thesis: this intrinsic nature of things and qualities is mental. For example, what we know, from the outside as charge -1, turns out to be a pain from within. ((s) See also > two aspects theory, >Panpsychism. If our physical vocabulary is rigid (i.e., always refers, in the domain of modal operators, to what plays the causal structural role in us, that is to say pain), then the physical truths necessarily imply the mental, but the implication does not need to be a priori. >Rigidity, >Reference. Problem: The physical truths are not sufficient to tell us exactly what situation we are in, especially in regard to the intrinsic nature of the physical quantities. Cf. >Possible Worlds, >Twin Earth. 1. D. Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (Hg.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Introduction | Millikan | I 82 New words/novelty/introduction/Millikan: the newly introduced word has an eigenfunction which is derived not only from the speaker's intentions, but also from the public stabilization function of the introduction. As such, it has a public significance. I 144 Introduction/Conviction/Belief/Intentional Icon/Millikan: 1. People have mechanisms - "consistency testers" - who test the consistency of their sentences. 2. Syntactic forms are produced by programs that are tested themselves. Problem: we must show why a sentence should be an intentional icon. The key will be to find an eigenfunction... I 145 ...for each sentence used by the consistency testers as a standard. >Terminology/Millikan. Ad 1. Assume that a token is repeated and has survived, is recognized, and acquires an eigenfunction. The fact that it passes the text, helps to stabilize itself. If all aspects of a sentence are elements of families, the sentence as a whole must meet condition 1. Ad 2. the consistency-tester distinguishes between pairs of sentences that are a) contradictions, b) say the same, c) are neither contradictions, nor say the same. For this, the author has to recognize the sentences that say the same, and recognize negation as a negation. New words: must be new due to the phonetic structure. Tester: must be genetically programmed to invent new words. I 146 New words and testers are designed to fit together. New programs: are only good when they help to produce sentences according to rules that have reasons. The reasons must mention the conditions under which they often work, and they must also mention laws of nature that connect sentences with what is mapped. Information: in this way sentences must transport information. (> F. Dretske: Knowledge and the Flow of Information, 1981). Solution: the consistency tester does this by comparing sentences produced by other programs with a sentence S. If S performs an eigenfunction according to the same mapping function, the consistency tester adapts to the conditions in the world so that it can now test these other programs! N.B.: hence S is an intentional icon. I 183 Introduction/reference/definite description/inner name/Millikan: If you translate a description into an inner name, must it be one that already exists, or can it be coined newly? For the moment, it is enough to distinguish these two possibilities. Terminology/Millikan: we then speak of "old" and "new" referents. Inner name/definite description/Millikan: The inner name used by the listener for the definite description must be governed by a concept. >Description. I 184 E.g. I have a concept of the members of my family. ((s) "concept" instead of "idea"). I 186 Introduction/identifying/identification/description/Millikan: a description that (by chance) introduces a referent does not express this by itself. >Identification. Necessarily identifying: a necessarily identifying description, however, expresses that it is identifying. ((s) self-reference: is something else than expressing its own function in the execution). I 211 Introduction/novelty/new/Millikan: When we introduce a whole new expression with referencing quotes, we refer to a reproductively determined family. In addition, the new symbol should at least in part consist of already known elements or aspects. Otherwise, the token does not fall within any schema equal/different, which is necessary to recognize the progeny of this expression (tokens of the same type). |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Judgments | Brandom | I 146f Correct judgments are normative terms. Not natural. Conflicting judgments are not prohibited by the laws of nature. I 235 Judgment/Dummett/Brandom: judgments do not act as an expression of an inner judgment act, but as an internalization of the external act of assertion. >Assertions. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Lawlikeness | Schurz | I 237 Laws of nature/natural laws/Schurz: Laws of nature do not refer to specific physical systems but express what is valid for any systems in all physically possible universes. E.g. Newton's nuclear axioms (E.g. total force = mass times acceleration, E.g. force = counterforce, E.g. gravitational force is proportional to the product of masses). Only if they are used system conditions, which explicitly list the present forces, we get a concretely solvable differential equation. There are only a few fundamental ones and they are found only in physics. However, most of the laws of physics are: Def system laws/Schurz: involve concrete contingent system conditions. Therefore they are not physically necessary but contingent. Example law of fall, example law of pendulum, example law of planets etc. Law-likeness/law-like/Schurz: a) in the broad sense: the law-like character of spatiotemporally limited general propositions is gradual. In this sense not only the laws of nature but also all system laws are law-like. Counterfactual conditionals: if we would agree to them are an indication of law-likeness. Problem: the counterfactual conditional also characterizes spatiotemporally bounded laws Ex "All ravens are black". Counterfactual conditionals/Schurz: on the other hand: we would not say Ex "If this apple had not been in the basket, it would not be green." >Counterfactual conditionals, >Laws of nature, >Laws. I 237 Similarity-metris/Possible Worlds/Counterfactual Conditional/RescherVsLewis/Schurz: (Lewis 1973b(1)): for philosophy of science, Lewis' logical semantics for counterfactual conditionals yields little, because the substantive interpretation of the similarity metric between Possible Worlds presupposes that we already know a distinction between laws and contingent facts. (Stegmüller 1969(2), 320-334). I 238 Law-like/law-like/Schurz: b) in the narrower sense: = physical necessity (to escape the vagueness resp. graduality of the broad term). Problem: Not all spatiotemporally unrestricted laws are law-like in the narrow sense. Universal but not physically necessary: Ex "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than one kilometer". Universality: is not a sufficient, but a necessary condition for law-likeness. E.g. the universal proposition "All apples in this basket are red" is not universal, even if one replaces it by its contraposition: Ex "All non-red objects are not apples in this basket". (Hempel 1965(3), 341). Strong Hume-thesis/Hume/Schurz: universality is a sufficient condition for law-likeness. SchurzVs: this is wrong Weak-Hume thesis/Schurz: universality is a necessary condition for law-likeness. >Causality/Hume. Stronger/weaker/(s): the claim that a condition is sufficient is stronger than that it is necessary. BhaskarVWeak Hume-thesis. Solution/Carnap/Hempel: Def Maxwell conditional/law-like: laws of nature or nomological predicates must not contain an analytic reference to particular individuals or spacetime points (spacetime points). This is much stronger than the universality condition. >Stronger/weaker. Ex "All emeralds are grue": is spatiotemporally universal, but does not satisfy Maxwell's condition. >Grueness. I 239 Laws of nature/Armstrong: Thesis: Laws of nature are implication relations between universals. Therefore no reference to individuals. >Laws of nature/Armstrong, >Causality/Armstrong. Maxwell-Conditioning/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979): represent a physical symmetry principle: i.e. laws of nature must be invariant under translation of their time coordinates and translation or rotation of their space coordinates. From this, conservation laws can be obtained. Symmetry principles/principles/Schurz: physical symmetry principles are not a priori, but depend on experience! >Symmetries/Feynman, >Symmetries/Kanitscheider. Maxwell-condition/Schurz: is too weak for law-like character: e.g. "no lump of gold has a diameter of more than 1 km" also this universal theorem fulfills it. Law-likeness/Mill/Ramsey/Lewis/Schurz: proposal: all those general propositions which follow from those theories which produce the best unification of the set of all true propositions. (Lewis 1973b(1), 73). Vs: problem: it remains unclear why one should not add the proposition Bsp "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than 1 km". Because many true singular propositions also follow from it. Solution/Schurz: we need a clear notion of physical possibility. Problem: we have no consistent demarcation of natural laws and system laws. 1. Lewis, D. (1973b). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 2. Stegmüller, W. (1969). Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie. Band I:Wissenschaftliche Erklärung und Begründung. Berlin: Springer. 3. Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, New York: Free Press. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Laws | Armstrong | I 117 Laws of Nature/LoN/sings/Armstrong: there is no sign for the law of gravity! Phenomena are only clues! Sign/Ex Black Clouds: there must be a true inductive generalization, probability. Designated thing: is like the sign always a particulate fact. There is no sign for the general! (i.e. neither is there for the validity of the laws of nature! III 26f Local Laws (below cosmic range): local laws force all theories to distinguish exactly between laws (laws of nature) and law statements: II 28 There may then be local laws that can never be determined as a full law statement. III 112 Uninstantiated Laws/UIL/Armstrong: I'll allow them, but as second-class cases of laws. - But there are no uninstantiated universals. III 121 Uninstantiated Laws/Armstrong: disguised counterfactual conditionals, truth depends entirely on the actual (higher-level laws) - probability does not require the law of the excluded third, the non-true is not a fact - (VsWessel: Wessel has an operator for "unfact": >Operators/Wessel). Probability laws are only instantiated if probability is realized. III 140 Laws with universal scope: "Everything is F" - is that at all possible? - How can a U to make itself necessary? III 141 Law/Form/Armstrong: every law must have a dyadic structure, because otherwise it could not be used for inferences - universal law: Rel between "being something in the universe" and "being F". Universe/Armstrong:The universe is really big garden! - (>Smith's garden is idiosyncratic) - Law in Smith's Garden: relation between quasi-Universals: "fruit in Smith's Garden" and genuine universal: "being an apple". III 147f Def Iron Laws/Armstrong: tell us that under certain conditions a state is necessary (or has a certain probability). - No matter what further conditions prevail - they apply, apply no matter what happens (but within certain conditions must be given for the particular). III 148 Def Oaken Laws/Armstrong: are under certain conditions invalid - but only real universals can be involved. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Laws | Barrow | I 54f Laws/Natural Laws/Barrow: there is no system of mechanical rules or laws that can be verified other than statistically. - There are always uncertainties, which can be reduced only by repetition. >Repetition, >Laws of nature, >Experiments, >Verification, >Knowledge, >Ignorance. I 55 A statistical law can never be falsified because the result of observations in the future may always be different. >Falsification, >Rules, cf. >Rule following. I 186 Universal Law/Laws/Theory of everything/TOE/Great Unifying theory/GUT/Universality/Eugene Wigner: if the universal law of nature should be discovered, invariance principles would only be mathematical transformations that leave the law invariant. >Theory of Everything, >Invariants. I 187 Relativity/Barrow: when we say that the natural laws match that does not mean that different observers will measure the same quantities. >Observation, >Relativity, >Measurement, >Coordinate systems, >Quantities/Physics. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Laws | Cartwright | I 12 Theoretical Laws/Cartwright: determine the contribution of individual causes. I 12 Physical Laws/Cartwright: do not determine facts - because they are tailored for individual areas. >Causes, >Facts. I 46f Physical Laws/(s)/Laws of Nature/LoN/Cartwright: never exclusively valid - E.g. Snell's law of refraction of light at the interface between two dielectric materials: different with isotropic/anisotropic optical properties. In the textbook at first only the 1st version - this then not literal -> principle of charity. Important argument: most cases fall under the 2nd version - therefore, "ceteris paribus" here particularly bad. >ceteris paribus, >Literal truth, >Theories, >Models, >Description. I 50f Law/Science/Physics/LoN/Explanation/Cartwright: there are never enough laws, because we have no theory about what happens at the boundary regions of E.g. optics, genetics, hydrodynamics, laser theory, etc. - there are no laws for cases where theories overlap. I 55 Biology/Laws/Cartwright: its laws actually state - unlike those of physics - how objects of the theory behave: - E.g. swordfish hides during the day - Smart: Thesis: Biology has no own laws. I 111 Law/Truth/Cartwright: if there was a law that covers one case exactly, it would hardly apply to any other case. I 139 Law/Physics/Cartwright: the laws of physics lie, because we destroy our image by adapting mathematical structures. >Structures. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Laws | Chalmers | I 86 Physical Laws/Causes/Supervenience/Reduction/Chalmers: Natural laws are not logically supervenient on the physical facts of our world with their spatio-temporal history. There could be another world, indistinguishable from our world, on which other physical laws apply. >Laws of nature, >Possible worlds, >Indistinguishability, >Twin earth, >Supervenience, cf. >Determinism. Regularity/Chalmers: on such arguments one can see that causality must be a bit above and independent of regularities (Hume's view of laws and causation: see Lewis 1986b(1), Mackie 1974(2), Skyrms 1980(3). VsHueme's view: Armstrong 1982(4), Carroll 1994(5), Dretske 1977(6), Molnar 1969(7), Tooley 1977)(8) .. Laws and causality have something irreducible. I 213/214 Laws/Consciousness/Chalmers: we will need psychophysical laws to explain consciousness together with a underlying physical structure. I 216 Data: we have at least data about regularities between physical processes and conscious experiences, from which we can conclude the best explanation. First Person/Chalmers: Problem: with the perspective of the first person, a number of contradictory theories are possible: e.g. Solipsism, panpsychism, etc. >Regularities. I 308 Laws/psychophysical laws/Chalmers: some questions need to be answered: 1. If the information space is phenomenologically realized, then why in one way and not in another? E.g. With inverted Qualia? >Qualia/Chalmers, >Exchanged spectra. 2. Is the nature of the phenomenal information defined by the structure of space? I 309 How can complex emotional experiences be explained? >Explanation/Chalmers. 4. What kind of formal structure best captures the structure of phenomenal information? >Phenomena, >Experience. 5. How can the unity of consciousness within our framework be captured? >Consciousness/Chalmers. 6. What are the criteria according to which information in my brain corresponds to my conscious experiences? 1. D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers Vol II, New York 1986 2. J. L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe, Oxford 1974 3. B. Skyrms Causal Necessity, New Haven 1980 4. D. M. Armstrong, Metaphysics and supervenience, Critica 42, 1982: pp. 3-17 5. J. W. Caroll, Laws of Nature, Cambridge 1994 6. F. Dretske, Laws of Nature, Philosophy of Science 44, 1977: pp. 248-68 7. G. Molnar, Kneale's argument revisited. Oghilosophical Review 78, 1969: pp. 79-89 8. M. Tooley, The Nature of Laws. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7, 1977: pp. 667-98 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Laws | Chisholm | II 29 Law/Rutte: A law never has causal effects. >Causation, >Causes, >Causality, >Causal relation, >Laws of Nature. Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Laws | Cicero | Höffe I 85 Laws/Natural Justice/ Cicero/Höffe: [Laelius] declares justice a natural justice in the sense of a law of reason: "The true law (vera lex) is the right reason (recta ratio), which is in harmony with nature (naturae congruens), which is granted to all humans (diffusa in omnis), permanent (constans), eternally valid (sempisterna)" (III 33). A few lines later, Cicero adds three more elements to these five: no instance can release people from the law, there is no need for an explicator or interpreter, and the common teacher and master is God (III 33; for natural law, Book I of De legibus/About the laws is also important). Höffe: These provisions, influenced by the Stoa, can be regarded as a classic formulation of natural justice. Vs: But the opponent present in Philus' speech questions all five elements or gives them a different meaning, for example: True law follows the principle of utility; it consists in prudence; nature, which is bestowed upon all men, looks out for its own benefit; not least, the supposed laws of nature are in truth fickle and changeable. VsVs: Instead of giving such counter-arguments and then invalidating them, the counter-position to natural law is labelled as sacrilege, in which the Roman horizon of thought could be hinted at: To deviate from the established custom is absolutely reprehensible. Höffe: As in the preceding natural law thinking, Cicero also lacks more detailed provisions on the content. However, Cicero explains what corresponds in legal theory to a legal moralism and contradicts a legal positivism: Positive laws can only be "law" if they are in accordance with nature and reason. >Natural justice, >Legal positivism, >Reason, >Nature. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Laws | Dennett | I 137 Laws of nature/Dennett: a calculator that for some reason spits out incorrect results from time to time, would still obey the laws of nature. ((s) See e.g. the computer worms "spectre" and "meltdown".) >Natural laws, >Functions. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Laws | Deutsch | I 263ff Laws of Nature: the laws of nature to which the counterfactual implicitly refers are the laws that are actually obeyed in other universes, namely the laws of quantum theory! (Other authors: there are probably universes in which certain laws of nature are suspended). >Natural laws, >Counterfactuals, >Quantum mechanics. I 300 Simulation/Laws of Nature: in virtual reality you can travel at the speed of light, or even build a perpetuum mobile. No matter how reasonable considerations concerning virtual reality can prove, a certain process is allowed by laws of nature (even though one can prove that it is not allowed). >Simulation. If we had come to an opposite conclusion, based on the Turing principle, time travel would be physically impossible. >Time travel. |
Deutsch I D. Deutsch Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997 German Edition: Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 |
| Laws | Genz | II 152 Things/laws/Genz: with mathematisation, the primacy of things over laws was broken and the laws of nature were at the beginning. II 248 Natural Laws/laws of nature/Genz: could it be that the laws of nature we consider necessary do not apply in other parts of the universe because other conditions are realized there? Then these laws of nature are not fundamental. System: a system is important for laws: e. g. Galileo's laws of falling bodies are only valid in the space close to earth. System: e.g. stone and earth together with their masses. Small G/constant/Galilei: g is the gravitational acceleration. It applies only in the space close to earth and it is part of the stone/Earth system itself. II 249 Large G/Newton: G is the gravitational constant. It applies also to a greater distance from Earth. Proximity to Earth/System/Newton: proximity to Earth is a characteristic of the system for Newton, not the system itself. >Laws/Newton. Natural Laws/laws/system/property/condition/Genz: when we speak of unknown laws, it is impossible to reliably distinguish between the system and its possible states and its initial conditions! Cf. >Regularities, >Natural laws. Phenomenal Laws/appearances/Law/Genz: phenomenal laws may have preconditions that are not lawful (e.g. initial conditions). >Laws/Cartwright, II 269 Definition laws of the first type/1st type/Eddington/Genz: laws of the first type are e. g. deterministic laws such as the Newtonian ones, the ones of the elastic shock, Maxwell's equations or laws of quantum mechanics. They ban things that are impossible. Definition laws of the second type/2nd type: laws of the second type are e.g. those of the kinetic gas theory (more general: of thermodynamics) and in particular the Second Principle. II 270 They forbid things that are so unlikely that they can never happen (statistical laws). II 274 Laws of the 1st type/Schrödinger/Genz: from the fact that there is such a 2nd type, one cannot conclude that there are laws of the 1st type at all. Regularless microscopic processes can also lead to the same macroscopic laws that result from averaging as they do. These averages show their own purely statistical regularity. This would also be present if it had come about through rolling a dice. Schrödinger: thesis: therefore, the microscopic processes do not actually run causally. Many authors: VsSchrödinger. >Quantum mechanics. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Laws | Kauffman | Dennett I 313 Laws/Natural Laws/Kauffman: describes his work as "Physics of Biology". Here there are many regularities, but no laws such as "nutritional laws" or "laws of locomotion". >Regularities, >Laws of nature. These regularities result from a cost benefit account. In the car, for example, almost any form can be explained in this way. Not by law but by norms. >Norms. For example, the fact that the mouth is almost always at the front of living beings is a regularity. Why talk about the law? |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Laws | Kuhn | I 195 Law/Definition/Correction/Corrigibility/Kuhn: Laws can be corrected step by step, definitions can only be discarded completely as they are tautologies. I 199 But: e.g. Newton's second law of motion is generally written as F = ma - which does not imply that anyone would at least agree with the meaning or the application. >Laws of nature, >Progress, >Science, >Definition. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 |
| Laws | Lewis | V 126 Coincidence/Law/Lewis: a random truth is one that never had a chance to be true - it does not enter the law system, because it does not contribute enough to the simplicity and strictness. >Simplicity, >natural laws. --- V 131 Law/Laws of Nature/Explanation/Humean supervenience/Lewis: I want to save Humean supervenience with the theory of the best system (as an explanation of laws). >Supervenience, >Humean supervenience. Solution: The prehistory-chance conditionals must supervene trivially by being non-contingent. Problem: this creates strong restrictions for reasonable belief. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Laws | Mayr | I 44 Laws/Biology: at the molecular level all, and on the cell level most of the functions of the organisms follow the laws of physics and chemistry. There is nothing left that would require a vitalist explanation. >Vitalism, >Explanation, >Causal explanation. Genetic program: contains historically acquired information (3.8 billion years of evolution). >Evolution, >Genetic information, >Heredity, >Inheritance, >Physics, >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Genes. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Laws | Nozick | II 144 Law/Laws of Nature/LoN/Language/Interpretation/WittgensteinVsArmstrong/Nozick: laws cannot be formulated linguistically, because they can always be interpreted differently. >Rule Following, >Interpretation, >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Laws/Armstrong, >L. Wittgenstein, >D. Armstrong. II 145 Event/Law/LoN/Relation/Hume/Nozick: Hume: the relations between events are not logical. - The connection between the event and the law cannot be causal. >Causality/Hume, >Causal laws, >Causal relation, >Events. Another problem: logical connections have to be interpreted in turn. >Logic, >Necessity, >de re necessity. II 146 If the interpretation should be fixed, then the law should include something analogous to reflexive self reference. - This is mysterious itself. >Self-reference. Hence, we must not treat laws related with statements. - Because of Gödel there is probably not a "picture of all the facts" from which all factual statements can be derived. Determinism/Nozick: therefore should not rely on derivability from causal laws. >Derivation, >Derivability, >Determinism, >K. Gödel. II 146 Law/fact/general/special/make true/Nozick: if a law is not treated as a quasi-statement but as a general fact, how can it make individual states true? - How can "make true" be a real relation between facts? Then it must be related to causality. Thereby, the problems would be repeated. - That laws should limit facts, only names the problem. >Truth, >Description levels, >Levels/order. II 147 If laws are mere descriptions, they explain nothing. - If they are to be mere conjunctions of events, then there is no fundamentality and no hierarchy. >Conjunction. But: Fundamental orders may be variously interpreted or axiomatized again. >Order, >Facts, >World, >Totality. II 148 Instead fundamental order: "organic unity". Problem: this is not a justification. - Analogous to the artwork. Problem: Justification needs again a fundamental order. Possible Worlds with reflexive self-subsumption could be more coherent, than those without reflexivity. >Possible worlds. Then the question of why a particular statement applies, is repeated. - The problem of the relationship between facts and laws cannot be solved here. >Explanation. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Laws | Popper | I 122 Laws of nature/Popper: they are called laws not without reason: they say the more, the more they prohibit. I 123 Science: the question of the empirical character of special laws, however, plays no role in scientific practice. >Laws of nature, >Science, >Natural sciences. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Laws | Ramsey | Lewis V 122 Law/laws of nature/Ramsey: (Foundations)(1): "... those consequences of sentences which we took as axioms if we knew everything and would bring them into the simplest possible deductive system. >Natural laws. Lewis: strange here is the unnecessary mention of knowledge. - This suggests that an ideal system would imply all truths. - Which may not have been Ramsey’s intention, because he has not made such a stupid mistake: that would mean all regularities emerge as laws. >Regularity. Regularity/Lewis: is not a law by itself but qua axiom or theorem of a system. >Laws, >Axioms, >Systems. 1. Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1931). The foundations of mathematics and other logical essays. Ed. R. B. Braithwaite. New York: Harcourt, Brace and company. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Laws | Wittgenstein | Popper I 117 Laws of Nature/Wittgenstein (oral communication, Schlick, I 136): "Instructions for the formation of statements". >Natural laws. --- Kursbuch 8 IV 98 (German) Infinity/Law/Wittgenstein: only finite series determine the course of the law. >Rules, >Rule following, >Infinity. II 35f Infinity/Wittgenstein: "infinite" is not an answer to the question "how many? The word "all" refers to an extension, but it is impossible to refer to an infinite extension. Infinity is the property of a law, not an extension. >Extensions, >Intensions, II 101 Experience/Causality/Cause/Border/Wittgenstein: all causal laws are reached through experience, therefore we cannot find out what is the cause of experience! If you give a scientific explanation, you describe an experience. >Experience. II 236 It is arbitrary whether we declare our laws right and say that we simply do not see the planet, or whether we call the laws wrong. Here we have a transition between a hypothesis and a grammatical rule. II 237 Hertz's mechanical theory replaces the three Newtonian laws with a single new one. But this is not a new mechanism. However, this is a new part of mathematics. II 238 Logic/Convention/Arbitrariness/Wittgenstein: the laws of logic, e.g. the sentences of the excluded third and the one of the contradiction to be excluded are arbitrary! To forbid this sentence means to adopt what may be a highly recommended system of expression. >Conventions, >Logic. II 417 Determining the number of bodies by law is something completely different from counting them. >Measurements, >Descriptions. IV 105 Causality/Law/Natural Law/Tractatus: 6.32 the causality law is not a law, but the form of a law. 6.321 "Causality Law" is a generic name. For example, as in the mechanics. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Laws, fundamental | Genz | II 332 Fundamental Laws/Genz: the Fermatian principle (the shortest time, refractive index) is not a fundamental law. But it can be a model for fundamental laws. Principle/Genz: from today's point of view, the fundamental laws of nature can be deduced without exception from the demand that a function called the effect of base variables is as small as possible. Problem: to find out the base parameters and their function. >Laws, >Natural laws, >Principles. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Lists | Putnam | V 243 List/theory/Putnam: lists must in turn be interpreted. V 247 Laws of Nature/Putnam: it was discovered that laws of nature are not in a closed list, but that there are less strict laws to be added: the laws of evolution, which are actually descriptions of tendencies or statements about the disposition of groups or even individuals. Science/list/Putnam: why then the listing of lists? It is believed that lists could be comprehensive enough to indicate the aims of science. --- I 63 "Cluster Term"/bundle concept/Putnam: there is a view that "man" or "swan" are bundle terms containing lists of properties and corresponding laws. >Theoretical terms, >Observation language, >Everyday language. PutnamVs: speakers who use "electron" do not need to be expected to know the corresponding laws. Even if this theory were correct as a conception of the social purpose of reference, it cannot be correct as a conception of what each speaker implicitly "means". >Meaning(Intending). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Local/global | Kauffman | Dennett I 308 Local/Global/Self-organization/Technology/Kauffman: Local rules create global order. >Rules, >Order, >Laws, >Laws of nature. Dennett: mankind's technology is not governed by this principle. For example, pyramids are organized from top to bottom, but the y.ilding activity is of course from bottom to top. >Technology. Until the evolution of rational human technology, the rules run from local to global, then the direction is reversed. >Evolution, >Progress. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Logic | Genz | II 183 Logic/mathematics/Genz: the statements of logic are also based on physics. Every piece of evidence is a physical process. Therefore, it is physics that says what can and cannot be proven. Unity of Sciences/Genz: we achieve the unity of science more easily if mathematics and logic thus also become empirical sciences. >Science. II 209 Logic/Genz: logic is among other things also a consequence of the laws of nature. It is limited by physics. >Natural laws. II 217 Logic/Physics/Genz: For example, "the smallest number that can only be determined by more than thirteen words": leads to a relationship between logic and physics. This sentence consists of thirteen words. I. e. there is the number, but it cannot be calculated. There must be numbers that need more than thirteen words because otherwise it would be possible to express infinite numbers by finite many characters in finite many places. Incalculability/non-calculability/non-calculable/calculability/Genz: if there are any numbers that can be defined by 13 words, then even a smallest number. However, this can only be defined by exactly 13 words. Therefore, it is unpredictable. >Incalculability. Incalculability/non-calculability/non-calculable/calculability/Chaitin/Genz: if a physical theory provided the statement that a pole is an incalculable number of centimetres long, (i. e. that a natural law would produce this) we would have to change our concept of calculability. This would make an incalculable number measurable. >Gregory Chaitin. Incalculability/non-calculability/non-calculable/calculability/Genz: for proof that a number cannot be calculated, its definition by an impracticable rule is not sufficient. For example "the smallest number that can only be determined by more than thirteen words": e.g. we define a number called NOPE. II 218 Definition NOPE/Genz: the smallest number that can only be determined by more than thirteen words minus the smallest number that can only be determined by more than thirteen words N.B.: the rule is impracticable, but we still know that NOPE = 0! II 301 Logic/quantum mechanics/Genz: in order to achieve logical consistency for quantum mechanics, assumptions about nature, which we tend to take for granted, had to be banned from their system. >Quantum mechanics. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Many-Worlds Interpretation | Kanitscheider | II 122 Many-worlds-interpretation/coincidence/existence/life/Kanitscheider: Brandon Carter 1974(1) Suggestion: to accept an ensemble of worlds in which a real subset has a life-favorable tuning of the constants. The fact that our world belongs to the knowable subset is then logically necessary, otherwise we could not make such a consideration. ((s) Reversal: many worlds instead of a one-off coincidence. The anthropic principle works in reverse). Kanitscheider: This reduces the astonishment that we exist. Cf. >Anthropic principle. Many worlds/Epicurus(2): There are countless worlds, some similar to ours, some dissimilar. After all, atoms are not built for one world, nor for a limited number of worlds. Nothing stands in the way of the assumption of an infinite number of worlds. II 123 Many worlds/Giordano Bruno(3): It is a general, empty, immeasurable space in which countless globes float like this one. Space is infinite because there is no reason or possibility to limit it. Many worlds/Huygens(4): (1629 - 1695): "Principle of Plenitudo" as justification. Nature harbors unlimited potential, one would restrict its creative power too much if one only assumed one world. Many worlds/tradition/Kanitscheider: In traditional theses, very different ideas are assumed, some of these worlds are presented as alien planets, but always with a causal connection among these "worlds". Many worlds/modern cosmology/Kanitscheider: causal decoupling is assumed here. Among other things, because of infinite distances. >Causality. Many worlds/laws of nature/George Gamov(5): One could assume that the fundamental laws of relativity, quantum mechanics and thermodynamics apply to all worlds, but the natural constants have different values. >Natural constants. II 124 Some of these worlds are perfectly imaginable, while others, which are logically possible simply because they contain no internal contradictions, elude our imagination. Many worlds/Kanitscheider: Which processes take place in worlds with any but constant legal structure can hardly be determined. But you can override individual laws in a thought experiment. Eg second law suspended: anti-entropic worlds already have such bizarre properties that we probably cannot understand them properly. Empiricism/observation/Kanitscheider: Even in very close areas there are zones that are inaccessible to measuring devices for physical reasons. E.g. the interior of the sun. We will never observe it directly. >Quantum mechanics, >Measuring. II 125 Many worlds/Kanitscheider: If there was a proof from the principles of physics that quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity are the only ones that make our world possible, the matter would have been superfluous. But there is no such proof whatsoever. Simplicity/Theory/Kanitscheider: Whether the one-world hypothesis is the simplest depends on the respective theoretical situation. For example, in chaotic inflation, where quantum fluctuations in high-dimensional superspace represent the natural state of reality, a single world would be a difficult assumption. Many Worlds Interpretation/EWG/Everett(6)(9)/Wheeler/Graham: here the wave function contains all possibilities of states in superposition. Quantum cosmology/Kanitscheider: The traditional separation of measuring device, observer and object cannot be maintained here, since there is no outside. >Quantum mechanics. Everett/Wheeler/Graham/EWG: This thesis now proposes that the state vector (the geometric counterpart of the wave function in Hilbert space) never collapses. Instead, splitting up into parallel worlds. >Wave function. II 126 Simplicity/Theory/Kanitscheider: In view of the many-worlds interpretation, one can ask which quantum mechanics of measurement should be considered simpler: 1. The one that works with an acausal, discontinuous, untimely, indeterministic collapse process, or 2. The one that is based on a more comprehensive reality, but also on a deterministic, causal, continuous, dynamically describable measurement process. >Simplicity. Elementary particle physics/today/Kanitscheider: Everything that is not forbidden actually occurs. So decays that do not violate the conservation laws. >Conservation laws. Many Worlds/Sciama(7): The theory means no violation of Occam's razor if one interprets this as the lowest number of restrictions that are compatible with the observational material. Cf. >Conservativity. II 127 Einzigigkeit/Leibniz(8): Metaphysical justification: there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God. >Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Cf. >Possible Worlds. 1. Brandon Carter (1974). Large Number Coincidence amd the Anthropic Principle in Cosmology. In: M.S. Longair (Ed): Cosmological Theories in Confrontation with Cosmological Data. In: International Astronomical Union Symposium Nr. 63. Dordrecht. pp.291-298. 2. Diogenes Laertius: LEben und Meinungen berühmter Philosophen. Buch X, 45, 2. Aufl. Hamburg: Meiner. 1967. S. 243f. 3. Giordano Bruno: De L'infinito universo et mondi. Zitiert nach: A. Koyré: Von der geschlossenen Welt zum unendlichen Universum. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. 1969. 4. Ch. Huyghens;: The Celestial Worlds discovered: or, Conjectures concerning the inhabitants, planets and productions of the worlds in the planets. London 1698. 5. George Gamov: Mr. Tompkins seltsame Reisen durch Kosmos und Mikrokosmos. Braunschweig: Vieweg 1980. 6. B. S. DeWitt: The Everett-Wheeler-Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. In: C. DeWitt/J.A. Wheeler (eds.): Bettelle Rencontres, 1967, Lectures in Mathematics and Physics. New York: W.A. Benjamin 1968, S. 318-332 7. D.W. Sciama: The Anthropic Principle and the non-uniqueness of the Universe. In: F. Bertola/U. CUri (eds.): The Anthropic Principle. Cambridge: UP 1993, pp. 107-110. 8. G.W. Leibniz: Monadologie. Hamburg: Meiner 1976 § 53. 9. Hugh Everett (1957). “Relative State” Formulation of Quantum Mechanics. In: Reviews of modern physics. Vol. 29, 1957, S. 454–462 |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Materialism | Adorno | Grenz I 116 Materialism/Adorno/Grenz: Thesis: Materialism would be secularized theology. BlochVsAdorno/Grenz: Bloch has attacked this very sharply.(1) >Theology, >History/Adorno. Grenz I 127 Dialectical Materialism/Alfred Schmidt/Grenz: "Like all materialisms, the dialectically one recognizes that the laws and movements of external nature exist independently and outside any consciousness. This in-itself, beomes however, [and thus the dialectic modifies the general materialism] only relevant insofar as it becomes a for-us, that is, insofar as nature is involved in human-social purposes."(2) >Dialectic, >Laws of nature, >Relevance. 1. E. Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung III p. 1602ff. 2. A. Schmidt Der Begriff der Natur, p. 151. --- Adorno XIII 171 Materialism/Adorno: materialism has a certain trait of the polemic, which differs fundamentally from the affirmative trait of all idealistic philosophies. XIII 174 It is the attitude which opposes naturalness to every manifestation of the mind and ultimately leads to represent the necessity of living as that which decides at all. XIII 175 He does not only recourse to the subject through the recognition and through reality constituted through recognition, but he refers directly to reality itself from the protest against the illusionary moment in the mind. XIII 219 Materialism/Adorno: in his monistic as well as in his Marxist-dialectical form, he placed the concept of development in the center, for obvious anti-theological reasons. If neither a creatio ex nihilo nor an eternally self-identical and unchanging being is accepted, the concept of development receives a strong accent. This is surprisingly also found in > Epicurus. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Mathematics | Wigner | Wilson I 67 Mathematics/Logics/Wigner/Wilson, E. O.: (E. Wigner 1969)(1): Wilson: Wigner spoke of the illogical effects of mathematics in the natural sciences. For reasons that have been closed to scientists and philosophers alike, the agreement between mathematical theory and experimental physics is so great that the conclusion that mathematics is the natural language of science in a deeper sense is virtually imposed. Wigner: The enormous usefulness of mathematics for the natural sciences is something that borders on a mystery and for which there is no reasonable explanation. It is not natural that "laws of nature" exist, and even less so that the human is able to recognize them. >Natural laws, >Knowledge, >Science, >Cognition, >Physics. 1. E. Wigner, The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences, in: Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematis 13 (1969), p. 1. -14. |
Wigner I Eugene P. Wigner Symmetries and Reflections: Scientific Essays Carbridge, MA 1970 WilsonEO I E. O. Wilson Consilience. The Unity of Knowledge, New York 1998 German Edition: Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge New York 1998 |
| Measurements | Schurz | I 169 Measurement laws/measurement/Schurz: Ex. assignment laws for mass, ~"..if x is put on the spring balance the spring is stretched or compressed by k units". For beam balance, "...x is balanced by k units of mass". I 170 Mass/weight/Schurz: both spring and beam balance are based on the weight effect of mass. i.e. on the existence of acting gravity. >Assignment/Schurz, >Laws, >Laws of Nature. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Metaphysics | Barrow | I 57 Metaphysics/Science/Barrow: metaphysical conditions under which we as effectively as possible can proceed from the simple experience of the world to knowledge: 1. There is an outer world 2. The world is ultimately rational (not A and non-A non-simultaneously) 3. The world can be locally explored , without losing its essential structure 4. The elementary variables have no free will 5. The separation of events and their perception is a harmless simplification 6. In nature, there are regularities, and these are predictable in some ways 7. There are space and time 8. The world can be described mathematically 9. These assumptions apply equally anywhere, anytime. I 58 Holism/Barrow: if it were true, 3. would not apply. >Cosmological principle, >Copernican principle, >Principles, >Laws of nature, >Science, >Holism, >Space, >Time, >Regularity, >Freedom of will, >Reality, >External world, >Events, >Perception, >World, >World/thinking. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Method | Feynman | I 343 Method/Science/Law/Differential Equation/Feynman: Why are linear systems so important? 1) Because we can solve them! 2) The basic laws of physics are often linear. (Also in quantum mechanics). >Laws of nature, >Laws, >Equations, >Physics. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Method | Galilei | Feyerabend I 201 Galileo/Feyerabend: he has introduced refuted theories so that they support each other. He has replaced old facts with novel experience, which he invented straight away! >Theories, >Evidence, >Science, >Fake, cf. >False information. I 203 Method/Galileo/Theory/Science/Feyerabend: Galileo's method also works in other fields. It can, for example, be used to exclude the existing arguments against materialism, thus burying the philosophical body-soul problem (the corresponding scientific problems, on the other hand, remain unaffected). >Mind Body Problem, >Materialism. Nevertheless, their universal applicability in the sciences is not yet an argument in their favor. There are both ethical and scientific reasons that occasionally force us to proceed quite differently. Galileo/Feyerabend: he made progress by changing unfamiliar links between words (he introduced new terms) and between words and perceptions (he introduced new natural interpretations). He also introduced new and unusual principles: the Law of Inertia and the general principle of relativity. >Principles, >Laws, >Laws of Nature. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Method | Helmholtz | Gadamer I 13 Methods/Humanities/Helmholtz/Gadamer: There is no separate method in the humanities. But with Helmholtz, one can ask how much method means here, and whether the other conditions under which the humanities operate are not perhaps much more important for their working methods than inductive logic. Helmholtz had correctly hinted at this when, in order to do justice to the humanities, he emphasised memory and authority and spoke of the psychological tact that takes the place of conscious inference here. On what is such tact based? How is it acquired? In the end, does the scientific nature of the humanities lie more in it than in its methodology? GadamerVsHelmholtz: The answer that Helmholtz and his century gave to this question cannot be enough. They follow Kant by using the concept of science and knowledge oriented on the model of the natural sciences and the distinguishing Gadamer I 14 Search for the specificity of the humanities in the artistic moment (artistic feeling, artistic induction). Yet the image Helmholtz gives of work in the natural sciences may be one-sided enough if he does not think anything of the "quick flashes of inspiration" (i.e. what are called ideas) and only preserves "the iron work of self-conscious reasoning" in them. He refers to John Stuart Mill's testimony that "in recent times the inductive sciences have done more for the advancement of logical methods" "than all philosophers of subject"(1). They are his model of scientific method par excellence. Nevertheless Helmholtz knows that historical knowledge is determined by an experience quite different from that which serves to investigate the laws of nature. He therefore seeks to explain why the inductive method is under different conditions for historical knowledge than for the study of nature. For this purpose he refers to the distinction between nature and freedom, which underlies Kantian philosophy. Historical knowledge is so different because in its field there are no laws of nature, but voluntary subordination to practical laws, i.e. to commandments. GadamerVsHelmholtz: However, this train of thought is not very convincing. Neither does it correspond to Kant's intentions if one bases an inductive exploration of the human world of freedom on his distinction between nature and freedom, nor does it correspond to his own thought of the logic of induction itself. Method/Mill/Gadamer: Mill had been more consistent by methodically excluding the problem of freedom. See >Humanities/Mill. 1. H. Helmholtz, Vorträge und Reden, 4. Aufl. I. Bd., Über das Verhältnis der Naturwissenschaften zur Gesamtheit der Wissenschaften, S. 167 ff. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Method | Mayr | I 154 "Kinship"/biology: can only be determined by comparisons! (VsPhysicists, who dispute the science of biology). >Comparisons, >Comparability, >Systems, >Theories, >Science, >Laws of Nature, >Physics. I 153 Biology: expression coined around 1800 by Lamarck. I 154 1870: Division: a) Biology of evolutionary causes (research by comparisons and conclusions) b) biology of immediate causes, (experiments and physiology) With the discovery that the cell mechanisms in plants and animals are the same, the old separation between botany and zoology seemed no longer useful. Practically all molecular processes are the same. I 156 Misleading classification: descriptive - functional - experimental biology. I 189 E.g. Homology/Mayr: Relationship between species and higher taxa is shown by the occurrence of homologous characteristics. That is, a feature that is derived from the same feature of its next common ancestor. >Features/Mayr, >Homology. I 373 One always has to conclude homology! For homology there are many proofs, e.g. position of a structure in relation to other structures, also transitional forms with fossil ancestors. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Miracles | Lewis | V 46 Miracles/wonder/similarity/possible worlds/counterfactual dependency/Lewis: the similarity relation between possible worlds should not require miracles to be needed in deviant worlds. Similarity relations/Lewis: I don't think they often guide our explicit judgement, but the overall similarity must be part of the similarity relation we are looking for.- Consistency of local facts is not important, but avoiding major violations of natural laws is. >Laws of nature/Lewis, >Determinism/Lewis, >Similarity/Lewis, >Possible world/Lewis, >Similarity metrics/Lewis, >Identity across worlds. For example a small miracle: Nixon presses the button, but the signal is suppressed. Big miracle: in addition, all traces are covered, Nixon's memoirs are falsified, etc., i.e. the worlds become indistinguishable. V 48 Small wonder: deviation is allowed. - Big miracle: convergence is allowed. V 49 Divergence is much easier to achieve than convergence. - Counterfactual asymmetry: exists because the appropriate standards of similarity are themselves symmetrical and correspond to the asymmetry of miracles. >Counterfactuals/Lewis, >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis. V 53 It is very much a question of weighting different similarities. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Miracles | Spinoza | Genz II 313 Miracles/SpinozaVsMiracles/Genz: there are no miracles. Therefore we are to recognize God's existence from the laws of nature. >Laws of nature, >God, >Proofs of God, >Order. |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Natural Justice | Aristotle | Gadamer I 324 Natural Law/Aristotle/Gadamer: [Aristotle] does not already recognize the true law par excellence in a set law, but sees at least in the so-called consideration of equity a task of supplementing the law. Thus he opposes extreme conventionalism or law positivism by explicitly distinguishing between a natural law and a legal law.(1) The difference he has in mind, however, is not simply that between the immutability of natural law and the mutability of positive law. Gadamer: It is true that Aristotle was generally understood in this way. But the true depth of his insight is missed. He may well know the idea of an absolutely unchanging law, but he expressly limits this to the gods and declares that among humans not only the law as it is laid down but also natural law is changeable. According to Aristotle such changeability is quite compatible with the fact that it is "natural" law. The meaning of this assertion seems to me to be the following: There is indeed law which is entirely a matter of mere agreement (e.g. a traffic rule such as driving on the right) - but there is also and above all that which does not permit any human agreement, because "the nature of things" defends itself. Gadamer I 325 [Aristotle gives this example, among others] (...) the best state [is] "everywhere one and the same (...)" and yet not in the way "in which the fire burns everywhere in the same way, here in Greece as there is in Persia". Gadamer: The later theory of natural law, in spite of Aristotle's clear wording, referred to this passage as if he had thereby compared the immutability of law with the immutability of the laws of nature!(2) GadamerVsTradtion: The opposite is the case. In truth, as this very comparison shows, the idea of natural law according to Aristotle has only a critical function. One must not make dogmatic use of it, i.e. one must not label certain legal contents as such with the dignity and inviolability of natural law. Gadamer: [the function of natural law in Aristotle] is a critical one in that only where there is a discrepancy between law and justice is it legitimate to invoke natural law. >Morality/Aristotle, >Self-Knowledge/Aristotle, >Techne/Aristotle. 1. Eth. Nic. E 10. As is well known, the distinction itself is of sophistic origin, but through the Platonic "binding" of the Logos it loses its destructive meaning and through Plato's "Politikos" (294ff) and with Aristotle its positive inner-legal meaning becomes clear. 2. Cf. Melanchthon Ethik, ed. by H. Heineck (Berlin 1893). p. 28. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Natural Justice | William of Ockham | Gaus I 346 Natural justice/natural right/natural law/Ockham/Kilcullen: In his political writings Ockham makes much use of the theory of natural law* which originated in ancient philosophy ** and had been taken up again by medieval theologians and lawyers. Thomas Aquinas: The essential idea of the theory, as Thomas Aquinas and Ockham hold it, is that the human mind, reflecting on and analysing human experience, can 'see' the truth of various fundamental moral norms, which are thus 'self-evident', not in need of proof, and too fundamental to be capable of proof (Thomas Aquinas, Summa, 1-2, q. 91, a. 3, and q. 94, a. 2). *** Ockham distinguishes several kinds of natural law (1995(1): 286-93), including natural laws 'on supposition': supposing certain contingent facts, natural reason sees intuitively that certain kinds of action are on that supposition morally right or wrong. Given the consequences of Original Sin, human communities have a natural Right **** to establish institutions of government and property; given the establishment of those institutions, individuals have a natural right to acquire property (or to live without property, relying on the generosity of those who have property); given that some thing has become some person's property, others have a natural duty not to use the thing without that person's permission; and so on. Christianity: The Christian community's right to depose a heretic pope and choose a replacement is, for Ockham, such a natural right, in the same category as the right of any 'people' to depose a tyrant and establish a just regime. **** Human kind: 'Natural' rights belong to human beings as such, to pagans as well as to Christians; thus the powers of the pope and clergy are limited by lay rights that pre-exist Christianity Gaus I 347 (1992(2): 51-8; not only natural rights but also rights under human positive law limit the pope's power). >Original Sin/Ockham, >Natural Justice/Hobbes. * This has sometimes been regarded as an inconsistency on Ockham's part, in the belief that his non-political writings advance a 'divine command' theory of morality. For a rejection of this interpretation see Kilcullen (2001 a)(3). ** It underlies Aristotle's discussion of slavery (Politics, 1.6) and is explicit in the Roman law texts (e.g. Justinian, Institutes, 1.2.2: 'according to natural law, all men were originally born free'). Cicero gave clear expression to the idea of natural law, e.g. in Republic, Ill.xxii.33 (...). *** The argument in the latter text is not meant to prove laws of nature, but to order them. For Ockham see the quotations in Kilcullen (2001a). (According to Ockham some natural laws are not fundamental but derived; 1995(1): 273—4.) The theory as held by Aquinas and Ockham is a species of what Sidgwick called 'intuitionism' (1930(4), Book l, ch. 8, esp. 101). **** That is, a right implied by natural law. The concept of a right is not found in the work of Thomas Aquinas, but it was common in the works of other medieval lawyers and theologians. On the history of the notion of natural rights, see Tierney (1997)(5). ***** In reaction against conciliarist parallels between Church and political society, Cajetan emphasized that the Church is not a 'free community' with the power to erect its own government, but is subject to Christ's commands (see Burns, 1991(6); Burns and Izbicki, 1997(7)). Ockham also recognized that Christ's commands had established a papal monarchy, but nevertheless held that the Christian community could vary the constitution of the Church at least for a time, arguing that necessity and utility may make exceptions even to Christ's commands (see 1995(1): 171-203, especially 181-90). The decree Haec sancta of the Council of Constance can be interpreted as relating to a situation of necessity. 1. William of Ockham (1995) A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings, ed. Arthur Stephen McGrade, ed. and trans. John Kilcullen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. William of Ockham (1992) A Short Discourse on the Tyrannical Government Usurped by Some Who Are Called Highest Pontiffs, ed. Arthur Stephen McGrade, trans. John Kilcullen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Kilcullen, John (2001a) 'Natural law and will in Ockham'. In John Kilcullen and John Scott, trans., William of Ockham, Work of Ninety Days. Lewiston: Mellen, 851-82. 4. Sidgwick, Henry (1930) The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. London: Macmillan. 5. Tierney, Brian (1997) The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Chumh Law 1150-1625. Atlanta: Scholars. 6. Burns, J. H. (1991) 'Conciliarism, papalism, and power, 1511-1518'. In Diana Wood, ed., The Church and Sovereignty c. 590—1918: Essays in Honour of Michael Wilks. Oxford: Blackwell for the Ecclesiastical History Society. 7.Burns, J. H. and Thomas M. Izbicki, eds (1997) Conciliarism and Papalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kilcullen, John 2004. „Medieval Politial Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Natural Laws | Laws of Nature, philosophy: laws of nature (physical laws) are descriptions of dependencies of physical quantities among each other. From the fact that these are descriptions, it follows that these are no regulations in the sense of e.g. legal regulations. N. Goodman suggests in “Fact, Fiction and Forecast” (1954) that natural laws should be formulated in the form of irreal conditional sentences (also known as counterfactual conditionals); If A were the case, B would have been the case. |
||
| Natural Laws | Aristotle | Bubner I 129 Nomos/Physis/Laws of Nature/Antiquity: Nomos and physis are separated: Nomos: valid order, separated from Physis: actually counters the concept of order (primitive). With that the law acquires a character of coercion and arbitrariness (Sophists). In "Gorgias" and "the State" Plato shows the special case of human life, where nature and legality coincide. >Nature/Plato. Causality/Aristotle: no causality in the modern sense: according to Aristotle, the reasons had to be known as true! This does not correspond to any law! |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Natural Laws | Armstrong | III 137 Laws of Nature/LoN/Natural Laws/Science/Form/Identification/Armstrong: theoretical identification of water and H2O is not a law of nature. - Intead there are two all-quantifications on molecules and water. - Each law of nature must have double-digit form of premise-conclusion. Ontology/Armstrong: what entities exist is inextricably linked with laws of nature. - But also distinguishable from it. III 158 Laws of nature/Armstrong: contingent - but not because they are discovered - the distinction a priori/a posteriori an epistemic one. II (a) 17 Laws of nature/Armstrong: Laws are not true >statements of law, but >truth-makers. ArmstrongVsHume: strong LoN: contain regularities, but cannot be reduced to them (because dispositions do not always show) - Def Natural law/Armstrong: can be identified with relations between universals (properties). Scientific camp: realistic view: e.g., possession of a property leads to possession of another property. - Laws of nature/Armstrong: are contingent! - But the regularity seems to be contained analytically. >Regularity. Place I 25 Law of nature/Armstrong: is a relation between categorical properties (not dispositional ones) - PlaceVsArmstrong: this smuggles modality into the laws (because the relations then have to be intentional or modal). >Modality. III 44 Laws of nature/Armstrong: laws are no causal factors. - A law exists only when it is instantiated. - That three values of volume, pressure, temperature always are connected is not because of the law! (Boyle's law is no law of nature). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Natural Laws | Bigelow | I 113 Natural Laws/Counterfactual Conditional/Bigelow/Pargetter: are often formulated in terms of "ideal systems". To do this, they need the counterfactual conditionals. I 114 Similarly, thought experiments need counterfactual conditionals. I 214 Law/Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: For example,"What goes up must fall". Lucrez: what consists mainly of soil or water has to move downwards. "Down" was a marked direction. Atomism: Representative: Lucrez: Little astronomical knowledge yet. Aristotle/Ptolemaios: believed that everything that consists mainly of earth or water moves to the center of the cosmos, and since it moves to the center of the earth, it must be the center of the cosmos. I 215 Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: in one respect Aristotle is closer to the truth, in other respects it is Lucrez. He was right that the center of the earth is not marked. Natural Laws/Physics/Biology/Bigelow/Pargetter: a one-sided diet with examples from physics does not necessarily lead to a correct view of the natural laws. Instead, here are some examples from biology: Generalization/Biology: For example, a living being has father and mother of the same species as it itself. (Today we know that this has some exceptions). I 216 It was a surprise to discover that this also applies to some plants. I 217 Generalization: most of them have an exception. For example, without exception: perhaps the generalization "All mammals have a mother". Exceptions/counter-examples/Bigelow/Pargetter: one should not overestimate the threat posed by exceptions to laws. Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: we are looking for two things: a) something that is more than regularity, on the other hand b) less than a regularity without exception. It may be that we have discovered with a law an important property of the cases that are sufficient for it, even if not all cases satisfy it. Modal/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: the commonalities that satisfy the law are modal. Law/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not always need a law, for example to know that our cat is pregnant. >Generality, >Generalization. I 220 Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are improved: e.g. Aristotle - Copernicus - Newton. Copernicus: still thought that the material of the moon does not fall towards the earth, but towards the moon center. Therefore the moon is round. Newton/(s): first explained the circular motion of the moon. Aristotle: thesis: everything (earthly and watery) falls to a center and this is coincidentally the center of the earth. N.B.: thus he fulfils the quasi-copernican theory! I 221 VsAristotle: his theory was nevertheless wrong. But not because any movement would have been different, but because the reasoning was wrong: it is about gravity, Aristotle considered the center of the earth to be the center of the cosmos. Error: was not that Aristotle thought that no object would fall in a different direction, but because he thought that no object could fall in a different direction. (Necessity). I 221 Law/Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are generalizations (description of regularities) plus attribution of necessity. (Dretske 1977(1), Tooley 1977(2), Armstrong 1978(3), 1983(4)) >Possibilia, >Counterfactual conditional. Bigelow/Pargetter: if they are wrong, they must be strictly wrong or empty. (Cartwright 1983(5), Hacking 1983(6)). I 222 Definition Laws/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: are truths about Possibilia. Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: Actualia cannot be fully understood without understanding Possibilia. ((s) Here understanding is associated with objects, not sentences.) >Understanding. Possible Worlds/Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: we understand the actual world only by locating it in the logical space of possible worlds. >Possible worlds, >Possible worlds/Bigelow, >Actual world. Natural Law/Laws of nature/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: cannot be adequately described in a non-modal language. Because a natural law is not just a regularity. >Regularities, >Regularity theory, >Modalities, >Theory language. Logical form: i.e. a natural law cannot be merely defined as (x)(Fx > Gx). Logical form: of a natural law will often be a universal generalization (UG). >Universal generalization. But it can also be another generalization or other form of sentence. >Universal generalization. >Generality, >Generalization We assume, however, that natural laws (UG) will be involved and therefore have the following form: I 223 natN (x)(Fx > Gx). Natural necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: entails that natural laws involve counterfactual conditionals. Because they are about what would happen, not just what already happens. And even if things were different in certain respects. I.e. in addition to regularity (x)(Fx > Gx) it will be true that every F would be a G ((s) Logic of 2nd level!) Logical form/(s) counterfactual conditional instead of quantification of 2nd level: (x) Fx would be > would be Gx) we take this together as a truthmaker of the proposition natN (x)(Fx > Gx) (see above). >Truthmakers. Natural Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: this is the view of natural laws that we defend. LewisVsBigelow: (Lewis, 1979)(7) the theory is circular. >Natural laws/Lewis. I 226 Non-modal Theory/Natural Laws/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: (instead of relative necessity:) most non-modal theories of natural law are derived from Hume. Then we can accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity, without falling into a circle. >Necessity, >Necessity/Bigelow, >Necessity/Hume. N.B.: then we can simply accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity and rely on it being based on independent access to laws! Explanation: so it makes sense to use laws to explain nomic necessity rather than vice versa. And this is much less obscure than modal arguments. >Modalities. I 227 BigelowVsVs: modal explanations are not so mysterious. BigelowVsHume: Humean theories are not able to explain these non-modal properties of the laws, they have less explanatory power. >Explanations, >Causal explanation. 1. Dretske, F.I. (1977). Laws of nature. Philosophy of Science 44, pp. 248-68 2. Tooley, M. (1977). The nature of laws. Canadian Journal of Philosphy 7, pp. 667-98. 3. Armstrong, D.M. (1978). Universals and scientific realism. Cambridge University Press. 4. Armstrong, D.M. (1983). What is a law of nature? Cambridge University Press. 5. Cartwright, N. (1983). How the laws of physics lie. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 6. Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and intervening: Introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science. Cambridge University Press. 7. Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Natural Laws | Carnap | VI 35/36 Laws of nature/Carnap: lead to mere assignment of objects or concepts. The "actual effect" falls into the metaphysics- VI 228 Natural laws/laws/Carnap: logical form: implication between attributions. >Attributions, >Observation, >Measurements, >Theories, >Generalization, >Metaphysics, >Effect. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Natural Laws | Cartwright | I 3 Natural Laws/Truth// Cartwright: thesis: the truly explanatory (theoretical) laws of physics do not tell us the truth. >Explanations, >Physics, >Truth, >Reality. I 21 Laws of nature / Cartwright: two ways: a) Association / Hume: e.g. the equations of physics: whenever force acts on an object, the acceleration f/m. >Equations. b) causal laws: E.g. Smoking causes cancer. >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Causal laws, >Fundamental law/Cartwright. Hacking I 56 Laws of nature / Nancy Cartwright: deceptive, only phenomenological laws > possibility of truth. But it is possible that we know about causally effective communication. I 70 Laws do not reflect facts and do not evoke anything. CartwrightVsHume: the regularities are features of the processes by which we theorize - per Entity -Realism VsTheory-Realism. >Regularity. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Natural Laws | Hacking | I 87 Laws of Nature/Schlick: laws of nature do not prescribe what is happening, but rather describe it. They are explanation of regularities. >Regularities/Hempel, >Regularities, >Laws, >Determinism, >Moritz Schlick. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Natural Laws | Kant | I 113 Laws of nature/Kant: nature is not to be understood by laws of nature. - We understand analogies. - But the causality that we transfer to our own body is not even an analogue of life.(1) >Nature/Kant, >Recognition/Kant, >Knowledge/Kant, >Experience/Kant, >Analogies/Kant. 1. I. Kant Critique of Judgement, 293 |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 |
| Natural Laws | Lewis | V 171 Laws of nature/LoN/Lewis: May not be sacrosanct - i.e. it must be possible to violate them - otherwise one would have to change the entire past in order to avoid a side effect (epiphenomenon) - if they were sacrosanct, the smallest counterfactual assumption (the smallest change in the present) would be only conceivable when assuming a completely different story - but there is no reason why a later deviation required more injury than an earlier one. Cf. >traces/Lewis. V 191 Laws of Nature/LoN/regularities/Lewis: cause nothing themselves. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Natural Laws | Maturana | I 349 Laws of nature/truthTMaturana: these terms would only apply to an independent reality (objectivity without parentheses) - I do not use them. >Objectivity/Maturana, >Reality, >Observation. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Natural Laws | Place | Armstrong III 137 Laws of Nature/LoN/Natural Laws/Science/Form/Identification/Armstrong: theoretical identification of water and H2O is not a law of nature. - Intead there are two all-quantifications on molecules and water. - Each law of nature must have double-digit form of premise-conclusion. Ontology/Armstrong: what entities exist is inextricably linked with laws of nature. - But also distinguishable from it. III 158 Laws of nature/Armstrong: contingent - but not because they are discovered - the distinction a priori/a posteriori an epistemic one. Armstrong II (a) 17 Laws of nature/Armstrong: Laws are not true >statements of law, but >truth-makers. ArmstrongVsHume: strong LoN: contain regularities, but cannot be reduced to them (because dispositions do not always show) - Def Natural law/Armstrong: can be identified with relations between universals (properties). Scientific camp: realistic view: e.g., possession of a property leads to possession of another property. - Laws of nature/Armstrong: are contingent! - But the regularity seems to be contained analytically. >Regularity. Place I 25 Law of nature/Armstrong: is a relation between categorical properties (not dispositional ones) - PlaceVsArmstrong: this smuggles modality into the laws (because the relations then have to be intentional or modal). >Modality. Armstrong III 44 Laws of nature/Armstrong: laws are no causal factors. - A law exists only when it is instantiated. - That three values of volume, pressure, temperature always are connected is not because of the law! (Boyle's law is no law of nature). |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Natural Laws | Popper | I 122 Natural laws/poppers: not without reason they are called laws: the more they prohibit, the more they say. I 123 Science/Popper: the question of the empirical character of special laws, on the other hand, hardly plays a role in scientific practice. >Empirical laws, >">Laws, >Science. I 117 Laws of nature/Wittgenstein: (oral communication, Schlick, I 136): "Statement for the formation of statements". |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Natural Laws | Ryle | I 99 Laws of nature/Natural Laws/Ryle: natural laws regulate everything, but they do not evoke anything (likewise, rules). ((s) This is an argument against determinism). >Determinism, >Rules. I 100 Rules prohibit traits and allow everything else. Principles are not reducible to rules. >Principles. I 101 There are two types of "why" and two types of explanation - this is not a contest between principles (e.g. grammar and content). >Explanation, >Why-questions, >Grammar, >Content. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Natural Laws | Schlick | Hacking I 87 Laws of nature/Schlick: do not prescribe what is happening, but rather describe it. Explanation of regularities. >Laws of Nature/Hempel, >Regularities, >Explanation. |
Schlick I Moritz Schlick "Facts and Propositions" Analysis 2 (1935) pp. 65-70 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich 1994 Schlick II M. Schlick General Theory of Knowledge 1985 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Natural Laws | Schurz | I 93 Natural Law/Schurz: Strict spatiotemporally unrestricted all propositions are candidates for natural laws. If they were true, they would express real laws of nature. They are called law-like. I 94 Law-like/Schurz: Spatiotemporally unrestricted Ex All bodies attract each other. Bsp All living beings must die once. Spatiotemporally limited: Bsp Mammals in polar regions have a rounder shape compared to conspecifics in warmer regions (Germann's law). Scientificity/Schurz: depends here on the size of the area. Allsatz/Schurz: In order to avoid gradual differences, one spoke of fundamental and derived Allsätze Def Fundamental All Theorem/Carnap/Hempel: contains no individual constants and no spatiotemporal restrictions. >Individual constants. Def Derived All Theorem/Carnap/Hempel: a derived all theorem can be derived from background knowledge from other all theorems together with singular initial conditions. >Initial conditions. I 95 Ernest NagelVsCarnap/NagelVsHempel: According to this, also an accidental all theorem can be a derived law: Ex "All screws on Smith's car are rusty". Solution/E. Nagel: Only fundamental all propositions can be laws. Hempel: conceded that, thus law-likeness remains gradual! Law-like/statistics/Schurz: also here there is law-likeness: Ex 50 % of all caesium 137 atoms have decayed after 30 years. Example 80 % of all lung cancer patients were heavy smokers. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Natural Laws | Swinburne | Stegmüller IV 420 Laws of nature/Swinburne: are not explainable by themselves. This makes the hypothesis of God’s existence more likely. VsSwinburne: from the inexplicable follows no greater likelihood of any divine instance. >Explanation, >Existence, >Necessity, >Ontology, >Proofs of God's existence, >God. |
Swinburne I R. Swinburne Justification of Induction Oxford 1974 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Natural Laws | Wittgenstein | Hempel I 98ff Law of Nature/Wittgenstein: because they cannot be verified completely, they are not statements but only instructions for the formation of statements. >Statements, >Law statements. --- II 99 Laws of Nature/causal necessity/Wittgenstein: the laws of nature are not outside the phenomena - they belong to the language and to our description of things - when ones discusses them, one cannot ignore how they manifest themselves physically. II 131 Justification/laws of nature/Wittgenstein: laws of nature can be justified, rules of grammar not. >Rules, >Grammar, >Justification. II 163 Law of Nature/law/Wittgenstein: 2. Law of Thermodynamics/Wittgenstein: it is not clear a priori that the world continues to lose its order over time. It is a matter of experience. II 164 However, it is not a matter of experience, that it must come to an equal distribution of nuts and raisins, if one whirls them. That something happens with necessity, there is no experience. That one presupposes another force to explain the separation. (For example, specific weight). Laws of nature/Hertz/Wittgenstein: Hertz has said where something does not comply with his laws, there must be invisible masses, to explain it. WittgensteinVsHertz: this statement is neither right nor wrong, but it can be practical or not. Hypotheses like talking of "invisible masses" and "unconscious mental events" are standards of the expression. >Hypotheses. Laws of Nature/Wittgenstein: we believe it has to do with a law of nature a priori while it is a standard of expression: E.g. So like saying "Actually, everyone is going to Paris, II 165 Although some do not arrive, but all their displacements are preparations for the trip to Paris." --- IV 109 Law of Nature/explanation/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 6,371 laws of nature are not explanations of natural phenomena - Tractatus 6,372 So they stay with the laws of nature, like the older with God. IV 105 Law of Causality/Law of Nature/Tractatus: 632 the law of causality is not a law but the form of a law. >Causal laws. IV 108 Causality/form/show/say/Tractatus: 636 if there were a law of causality, it might be: "There are laws of nature". But one cannot say that, it turns out. >Causality, >Causal explanation. --- Tetens VII 122 Civilization/WittgensteinVsCivilization/WittgensteinVsModernity/Tetens: believes he can explain everything and thinks all important is explained once the facts are scientifically explained in principle. It is an illusion that the world is explained when we know the laws of nature. >Explanation. VII 123 Definition laws of nature/Tractatus/Tetens: are the truth functions of elementary propositions. Therefore, the world as a whole cannot be explained. Neither through logic nor through the laws of nature. The laws of nature also not explain natural phenomena. (> Tractatus 6.317). VII 124 The laws of nature are also not the last. That is the logical space, the space of all possible distributions of truth values to the elementary propositions. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Naturalism | Naturalism, philosophy: The view that we must regard the phenomena which meet us, even those which we consider to be our own states, as processes controlled by laws of nature. Their understandability is not guaranteed. See also nature, naturalized epistemology. |
||
| Nature | Kelly | Morozov I 217 Nature/Technology/Kelly/Morozov: "The dominance of technology ultimately derives from its origin in the same self-organization that has brought galaxies, planets, life and mind into being.(1) >Technology. Kelly: "We tend to isolate the produced technology from nature, to the point that we consider it as anti-nature only because it has grown to compete with the effects and power of its homeland. But in its origins and foundations, a tool is as natural as our lives." (2) MorozovVsKelly: compare this with Nazi propagandist Fritz Todt: Fritz Todt: It would be paradoxical if the works of technology in their outer expression were in contradiction with nature, because the true essence of technology is a consequence of the laws of nature. .... The works of technology must be constructed in harmony with nature...(3) >Fascism. MorozovVsKelly: his laissez-faire attitude comes equally from Ayn Rand, even though he does not mention it. It is rarely mentioned at all in connection with technology. >Technology. 1. Kevin Kelly, What Technology Wants, Kindle ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), p. 70. 2. ibid. p. 22 3. quoted in John C. Guse, “Nazi Technical Thought Revisited,” History and Technology: An International Journal 26, no. 1 (2010): 10. |
Kelly I Kevin Kelly What Technology Wants New York 2011 Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Nature | Prigogine | Gaus I 50 Nature/Prigogine/Bennett: Prigogine articulates a version of natural science congenial to postmodern cultural theory. >Postmodernism, >Cultural Theory. He and his collaborator, the philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers, eschew the model of nature implied in classical dynamics, which presents ‘a silent world … a dead, passive nature, a nature that behaves as an automaton which, once programmed, continues to follow the rules inscribed in the program’ (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984(1): 6). Their own model engages a nature where creativity and novelty abound and ‘where the possible is richer than the real’. >Creativity. They insist, however, that nature retains a kind of intelligibility, even in its most complex and indeterminate states (Prigogine(2), 1997). Nature is neither the static world of classical dynamics nor some random set of fluctuations unrecognizable as a world: ‘a new formulation of the laws of nature is now possible … in which there is room for both the laws of nature and novelty and creativity’ (1997(3). >Natural laws. 1. Prigogine, Ilya and Isabelle, Stengers (1984) Order Out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature. New York: Bantam. 2. Prigogine, Ilya (1997) The End of Certainty: Time, Chaos, and the New Laws of Nature. New York: Free. 3. Ibid. p.16 Jane Bennett, 2004. „Postmodern Approaches to Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Necessity | Genz | II 59 Contingent/necessary/understanding/Genz: contingent: the special elliptical shape of the earth's orbit is contingent and necessary. Necessary: it is necessary that planetary orbits are elliptical. Understanding: the understanding of this necessity is deeper understanding. >Understanding, >Cognition. II 60 Natural Laws/Genz: natural laws are necessary characteristics of systems, but this is tautological. >Systems, >Natural laws. Are the laws of nature themselves necessary or contingent? Solution/Genz: there is a hierarchy of natural laws. World Formula/contingent/Genz: if there were a world formula, it would not be necessary itself, because other worlds are possible. Nevertheless, it could be distinguished by properties that other formulas do not possess. Cf. >Theory of Everything, >Contingency. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Necessity | Kneale | Wright I 31 Natural necessity/necessity/Wright, G. H.: is sometimes assumed as a "medium" domain between empirical generality and logical necessity. >Logical necessity, >Generality, >Empiricism. Both positivism and conventionalism would deny that causal laws received their "explanatory value" from the supposed fact that they ascertained the necessary connections between natural events. >Positivism, >Conventionalism, >Causal laws, >Causal explanation, >Explanation, >Causality. I 157 Natural necessity/Kneale: the concept and understanding of natural laws as principles of necessity have been reintroduced into the modern discussion, mainly by Kneale.(1) >Laws of nature, >Principles. 1. W. Kneale, Probability and Induction, 1949 - W. Kneale,"Universality and Necessity" BJPS 12,1961. |
Kneal I W: Kneale Probability and induction Oxford 1966 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Necessity | Lewis | IV 37 Causally necessary/Lewis: is a sentence if it is true in all possible worlds in which the same laws of nature apply. --- Schwarz I 156 Necessary a posteriori: "Water is H2O" is a posteriori, because first of all you have to find out that the material that fills our streams and lakes is H2O.- necessary: in all possible worlds the substance that fills our streams is H2O - Discovery is contingent (chemical, not modal) - therefore, the H2O truths imply a priori the water truths. --- Rorty II 123 LewisVsWittgenstein: distinctions between essence and accidence or between necessity and contingency are an artificial product that changes with the description. --- Schwarz I 226 A posteriori necessary/Schwarz: e.g. the sentence "Everything is the way it really is" necessarily implies all truths, but only for the actual world - >Quidditism, >Panpsychism. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Necessity | Stalnaker | I 18 Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis: necessity is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It results from optional descriptive semantics that happens to characterize natural languages: a mechanism of establishing references. >Necessity a posteriori, >Reference. StalnakerVsJackson: the reference-defining mechanisms are not optional as part of meta-semantics. They are part of the presentation of why internal states can be representational at all. >Representation, >Mental states. I 53 Necessary proposition/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis, there is only one necessary proposition: the set of all possible worlds. >Necessity/Lewis. In order to know that it is true, i.e. that the real world is within this set. For this, you do not need to know any facts about the modal reality. Necessary truth is not made true by the facts. >Facts, >Truthmakers, >Actual world/Lewis. I 64 Metaphysical necessity/metaphysical possibility/Lewis/Louis/Stalnaker: it means: if you have a range of all possibilities, you can quantify with them. The modal operators are then just the quantifiers. >Metaphysical possibility. Error: one can then still be wrong, but only about how one has to understand a sentence - not about how a possible situation would have to be. >Understanding, >Situations. I 189 Necessary a posteriori/contingent a priori/Stalnaker: assuming the inventor’s name was Judson - then both sentences, both "Judson invented the zipper" and "Julius invented ...", are necessary and both are contingent. >Reference/Stalnaker. Contingent: both are contingent because the statement about Judson is a priori equivalent to the one about Julius. Necessary: both are necessary because the statement "Julius is Judson" is a statement with two rigid designators - although the reference is determined by various causal chains. >Proper names, >Rigidity, >Descriptions, >Contingency. I 201 Necessity/N/Quine/Kripke/Stalnaker: before Quine and Kripke, all N were considered to be verbal or conceptual. >de dicto, >Necessity/Kripke, >Necessity/Quine, >de re. Quine: one must always be skeptical about N, analyticity and a priori. Kripke: he was the first to move empiricism and terminology apart - by finding examples for contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori. Thereby, the separatation epistemic/metaphysical arose. >Epistemic/ontologic, >Metaphysics. I 202 Def nomologically necessary/Stalnaker: (in possible worlds x): nomologically necessary means true in all possible worlds that have the same laws as the possible world x ((s) relative to possible world x). Natural Laws/laws of nature/LoN/Stalnaker: thesis: laws of nature are contingent. They do not apply to possible worlds. >Natural laws, >Possible worlds. Some authors: laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. Logic/Stalnaker/(s): logic cannot show what is metaphysically possible. I 204 Necessity/conceptual/metaphysics/Stalnaker: the entire distinction is based on a confusion of a property of propositions with a property of linguistic and mental representations. Proposition: their contingency or necessity has nothing to do with our terms and their meanings. >Concepts, >Possibility. Possibilities: possibilities would be the same, even if we had never thought of them. >Conceivability/Chalmers. Conceptually possible: simple metaphysical possibilities that we can imagine are conceptually possible. >Metaphysical possibility. I 205 Necessary a posteriori/Kripke/Stalnaker: the need stems from the fact that the secondary intension is necessary - the a posteriori character stems from the fact that the primary intension is a contingent proposition. >Intensions/Stalnaker. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Numbers | Poincaré | Thiel I 18 Numbers/Mathematics/Ontology/Mathematical Entities/Poincaré/Thiel: Definition Conventionalism (Poincaré:) Poincaré considers this concept to be a mistake for his contemporaries, who think that geometric statements, such as that the angular sum of the triangle can be proved via two right angles. >Conventionalism/Poincaré, >Mathematical Entities. The empirical finding about spatial reality cannot clearly prescribe a geometry which characterizes this finding. The N.B. is not the measurement accuracy, but Poincaré says that the geometry remains freely selectable even with results within this measuring accuracy. >Measuring, >Geometry. We could also introduce additional physical laws for a measured triangle with less than 180°, e.g. the effect of "fields". The name "conventionalism" refers to this "free selectability" of the system of geometry. >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Physical laws. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Objective Mind | Habermas | III 124 Objective mind/Habermas: I would like to overcome the term "objective mind" in favour of one concept of cultural knowledge differentiated according to several claims of validity. >Validity claims, >Culture/Habermas, >Society. III 125 However, I would like to insist on the speech of three worlds (Popper: World 1: physical objects, World 2: states of consciousness, World 3: objective thought content). These three worlds are to be distinguished from the lifeworld. >K. Popper. Only one of them, namely the objective world, can be regarded as a correlate... III 126 ...to the totality of true statements. >Consciousness, >States of belief, >Objectivity, >World, >World/thinking, >Life-world, >Thinking, >Thoughts, >Content, >Laws of nature. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Objectivity | Wright | I 139 Subjective/objective/Wright: why do we not simply express all our "opinions about the strange with "I find .."? Answer: it is useful to have the objectified form of community, because often we can quite rightly accept a community response to the strange. ((s) otherwise the strange would not exist in the form in which we know it). >Language community, >Language behavior, >Language use, >Meaning, >Reference. I 139/40 There are terms that are too simple to argue about. E.g. the content of arithmetic assertions like "57 + 65 = 122" does not say anything about consensus and has therefore no logical consequences. >Arithmetics/Wittgenstein. But there would also be no standard of correctness to satisfy if not on every basal level could be a consensus presupposed. >Correctness/Wright. I 216 Representation/Wright: in contrast to that, the representative character of judgments e.g. on the forms of a children's puzzles has to do with: how very different we may be biologically constituted, or which natural laws would be effective, the variety of judgments must be seen as a symptom for cognitive dysfunction. >Cognitive coercion, >Judgments, >Knowledge, >Competence, >Laws of Nature. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Operationalism | Barrow | I 37 Operationalism: Science is a system of rules for the exploration of the world in the laboratory - linguistically: how are the words used? - InstrumentalismVsEmpiricism: useful concepts are not only those which can be traced back to the sense data. >Empiricism, >Instrumentalism, >Sense data. Theories and laws of nature are only instruments to make the environment understandable. True/false do not exist as properties of theories. Idealism: since all knowledge is filtered through our minds, we are never sure if there is a connection to reality. >Idealism. I 42 OperationalismVsEmpiricism: theories may also be invented - therefore, the observer receives a more important role. >Observation, >Ideal observer, >Theories. I 41f VsOperationalism/Barrow: asks what is measurable. Therefore, he must exclude complex and irrational numbers. >Numbers, >Measurements. Fragmentation of science: every time we use a different method of measurement, we need to consider a number as a different variable. Circular reasoning: operationalism presumes that we know what an permissible operation is. Problem: certain concepts may only be used when sensitive devices allow accurate measurements. >Fine-grained/coarse-grained. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Order | Kauffman | Dennett I 306 Self-organization/Kauffman/Dennett: Kauffman's laws are not those of form, but of design, the compulsions of meta technology. >Laws/Kauffman, >Laws, >Laws of nature. Dennett I 308 Self-organization/Kauffman: the ability to evolve, i. e. the ability to search the area of opportunity, is optimal when populations are "melting out" of local regions. >Self-organisation. Local/Global/Self-organization/Technology/Kauffman: Local rules create global order. >Local/global. Dennett: mankind's technology is not governed by this principle. For example, pyramids are organized from top to bottom, but the building activity is of course from bottom to top. >Technology. Until the evolution of rational human technology, the rules run from local to global, then the direction is reversed. --- Kauffman I 9 Order/Human/Kauffman thesis: natural selection has not formed us alone, the original source of order is self-organization. The complex whole can show "emergent" characteristics in a completely unmystic sense, which are legitimate for themselves. >Complexity, >Emergence. Kauffman I 21 The human then no longer appears as a product of random events, but as the result of an inevitable development. >Life, >Humans. Kauffman I 18 Definition Rational Morphologists/Kauffman: (Darwin's predecessor): Thesis: biological species are not the product of random mutation and selection, but of timeless laws of shape formation. (Kauffman goes in a similar direction). Order/Physics/Kauffman: physics knows phenomena of profound spontaneous order, but does not need selection! Cf. >Selection. Kauffman I 30 Self-organization/Kauffman: thesis: certain structures occur at all levels: from ecosystems to economic systems undergoing technological evolution. >Ecosystems, >Economy. Thesis: all complex adaptive systems in the biosphere, from single-celled organisms to economies, strive for a natural state between order and chaos. Great compromise between structure and chance. >Structures, >Random. Kauffman I 38 Order/physics/chemistry/biology: two basic forms: 1. occurs in so-called energy-poor equilibrium systems: For example, a ball rolls into the middle of a bowl. For example, in a suitable aqueous solution, the virus particle composes itself of its molecular DNA (RNA) and protein components, striving for the lowest energy state. 2. type of order: is present when the preservation of the structure requires a constant substance or energy supply. (Dissipative). For example, a whirlpool in the bathtub. For example, the Great Red Spot on Jupiter. It is at least 300 years old, which is longer than the mean residence time of a single gas molecule in the vortex. It is a stable structure of matter and energy through which a constant stream of matter and energy flows. One could call it a living being: it supports itself and gives birth to "baby whirls". >Life/Kauffman. Cells, for example, are not low-energy, but rather complex systems that constantly convert nutrient molecules to maintain their inner structure and multiply. Kauffman I 115 Order/life/emergence/Kauffman: the autocatalytic formations must coordinate the behaviour of several thousand molecules. The potential chaos is beyond imagination. Therefore, another source of molecular order has to be discovered, of the fundamental internal homeostasis (balance). Surprisingly simple boundary conditions are sufficient for this. >Laws/Kauffman. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Ostension | Feynman | I 191 Showing/Evidence/Feynman: what actually means "show that something is true"? We find out directly from Newton's law that the kinetic energy should change when we form its derivative by time, and then apply Newton's law. dT/dt = d/dt(1/2mv²) = 1/2m2v (dv/dt) = mv (dv/dt) From the 2nd Newtonian law, however, follows m(dv/dt) = F such that dT/dt = Fv. in the one-dimensional case, it is force times speed. >Laws of nature, >Empiricism, >Experiments, >Theory, >Evidence, >Confirmation. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Paradoxes | Deutsch | I 235 Zenon: what Achilles can do, can not be discovered by logic, but depends entirely on what the prevailing laws of nature say about his possibilities of action. >Laws of nature, >Actions, >Possibility, >Zeno as author, >About Zeno. |
Deutsch I D. Deutsch Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997 German Edition: Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 |
| Parts | Inwagen | Schwarz I 34 Endurantism/Van Inwagen/Schwarz: e.g. caterpillar/butterfly: thesis: there is no insect, nothing that exists beyond the pupation. Recombination/mereology/Schwarz: the existence of temporal parts follows directly from the mereological universalism together with the rejection of the presentism. Then there are also e.g. aggregates from Socrates and the Eiffel Tower (mereological sum). Socrates is a temporal part of it which at some point ceases to exist, just as e.g. a dried-out lake that fills up again during the rain season. Temporal Parts/van Inwagen: (van Inwagen 1981)(7): van Inwagen basically rejects temporal parts. SchwarzVsvan Inwagen: then he must radically limit the mereological universalism or be a presentist. Perdurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis pleads for its contingency. Question/Schwarz: what should be contingent? Should there be possible worlds where the ordinary things have no temporal parts? Or should specific things be atomic in time and never change their form? Lewis seems to allow only the latter. Schwarz I 34 Temporal Parts/mereology/Schwarz: but if one accepts aggregates from Socrates and the Eiffel Tower, one could still deny that Socrates himself has temporal parts. Lewis: Lewis also does not assert that necessarily everything that exists over time consists of temporal parts (1986f(1),x,1986e(2),205,1994(3) §1) VsStowe: temporal parts are not intended to provide an analysis of the enduring existence. Lewis: (1083d(4), 76, similar Armstrong 1980(5), 76): e.g. a child, Frieda1 suddenly disappears, while another child, Frieda2, suddenly appears. This may contradict the laws of nature, but it is logically possible. Schwarz I 35 Perhaps no one notices anything. And there is nothing to notice. Vs: this is not convincing. EndurantismVs: endurantism cannot accept the premises. Van InwagenVs: Frieda1 and Frieda2 cannot exist strung together, and yet remain different (2000(6), 398). >Mereology, >Part-of-relation, >Temporal parts, >Mereological sum, >Ontology. 1. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 3. David Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 4. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. David Armstrong [1980]: “Identity Through Time”. In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, Dordrecht: Reidel. 6. Peter van Inwagen [2000]: “Temporal Parts and Identity across Time”. The Monist , 83: 437–459. 7. Peter van Inwagen [1981]: “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 123–137. In [van Inwagen 2001]. |
Inwagen I Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Fourth Edition Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Peace | Hobbes | Höffe I 219 Peace/Hobbes/Höffe: The passions for peace alone [the fear of death, the desire for things that are necessary for a pleasant life, and the hope of achieving them through one's own efforts] are certainly not enough to overcome the state of war. Reason: As a further factor, a reason is needed that shows the triple peace drive the necessary way. It is therefore not autonomous, but is in foreign service. Its purpose comes not from within reason, but from outside, from free self-interest. Interest: Because of him, Hobbes' reason has an individual pragmatic character, which helps the individual to succeed in his or her own well-being, but is at the same time merely theoretical. Theoretical Reason: For itself alone without drive, thus incapable of action, it is not a practical but a theoretical reason, which merely contributes an insight to the extra-reasonal drive: The right to everything that prevails in the state of nature proves, upon closer examination, to be a right to nothing. Because this insight in itself lacks any driving force, it needs another factor, both energetic and purposeful, precisely the three passions that promote peace. >Natural State/Hobbes. Hobbes draws up a total of 19 laws of nature. He begins with the commandment to seek peace. (Leviathan, ch. 14-15). Höffe I 220 Background/Höffe: Interestingly, two and a half centuries earlier, around the year 1400, long before the age of the Wars of Religion, a great literary text formulated Hobbes' first natural law. In Ackermann of Bohemia, chap. 32, it says, "Seek peace and do it always." This text is preceded by the occidental theory of peace from >Augustine to Thomas Aquinas and Dante to >Marsilius of Padua. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Phenomena | Armstrong | I 115 Signs/laws of nature: there is no sign for the law of gravity! Phenomena are only circumstantial evidence! ((s) Cf. >Signs, >Symptoms, >Criteria, >Natural Meaning. I 115 Signified: the signified is always a particulate fact as is the sign. There is no sign for the general! ((s) So not for the validity of the laws of nature!) |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Philosophy of History | Habermas | III 218 Philosophy of History/Habermas: Spencer was able to establish a theory of social evolution that removed the unclear idealism of philosophy of history and regarded the progress of civilization as a continuation of natural evolution and thus subsumed it under the laws of nature without all ambiguities. >H. Spencer, >Civilization, >Laws, >Laws of Nature, >Progress. HabermasVsPhilosophy of History: trends such as scientific development; capitalist growth, the establishment of constitutional states, the emergence of modern administrations, etc. could not be treated as empirical phenomena by philosophy of history. Philosophy of history could only interpret this as a sign of rationalization in the sense of philosophy of history. >Abstraction/Habermas, >Historiography, >History. IV 562 Solution/Habermas: a ((s) purified) theory can no longer be based on concrete ideals inherent in traditional forms of life; it must be oriented towards the possibility of learning processes that have been opened up with a learning level already achieved historically. It must renounce the critical assessment and normative classification of totalities, ways of life and cultures, of life contexts and epochs as a whole. >Totality, >Whole, >Criticism, >Critical Theory, >Society, >Sociology. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Physicalism | Davidson | Frank I 629 Davidson per token-physicalism: every mental event is a physical one, but species cannot be identified with species - DavidsonVsType-Physicalism. As far as it is described in the context of physics, it is subject to strict laws of nature, but not when it is described in Mentalese vocabulary. This is the thesis of >anomalous monism. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Physicalism | Mayr | I 23 Physicalism/Descartes/Mayr: all organisms except the human are nothing but machines. >R. Descartes. Camps: Johannes Müller, Justus von Liebig, H.v. Helmholtz, Emil Dubois Reymond I 26 PhysicalismVs "Vitality": proof that work can be completely converted into heat. Ironically, however, the terms "energy", "movements" of the physicalists were just as little clarified as the "vital force" of the vitalists. >Vitalism, >Energy, >Motion. I 27 "Movement"/Dubois Reymond: the understanding of nature is a reduction of the changes in the body world to movements of atoms. A constant sum of kinetic and potential energy, so nothing would remain to be explained. >Explanations, >Physics, >Laws of nature. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Physis | Antiphon the Sophist | Taureck I 30 Physis/Antiphon/Sophist/Taureck: the compliance of natural laws is more useful to the human than the compliance of the nomos, the laws of the state. >Nomos, >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Logos. |
Taureck I B. H.F. Taureck Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995 |
| Physis | Heraclitus | Taureck I 29 Heraclitus: (Before the Sophists): "The Physis likes to hide". I 30 This corresponds more to the notion of "true nature". >Nature. In Heraclitus there is also no opposition between Logos and Physis. For the contrast to the "actual nature" can only be "appearance". >Logos, >Appearance. Physis/Sophists: the Sophists have an entirely different meaning: Physique is here the opposite of Nomos: Law of Nature. >Sophists, >Laws of nature. |
Taureck I B. H.F. Taureck Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995 |
| Positivism | Goethe | Carnap VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Color theory): one should remain in the field of sensory perceptions themselves and determine the laws existing between them in the field of perceptions themselves. >Empiricism, >Theory of Colors. CarnapVsGoethe: so we would have to find the laws there (in the perception). But physical laws do not apply there, of course, but certain other laws do if the constitution of the physical world is to be possible at all. >Perception, >Sensory impressions, >Seeing, >Laws of nature. But these laws are of much more complicated form. Carnap VI 180 Physical world/CarnapVsGoethe: to be distinguished from the world of perception. Mere quadruples of numbers to which state variables are ascribed. VI 181 Only it is accessible to intersubjectivity, not the world of perception. >Nature, >World, >World/Thinking. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Positivism | Popper | I 116f Positivism/Popper: understands the problem of demarcation naturalistic, as fixed border - positivist radicalism: the laws of nature are not traceable to elementary experience sets. >Demarcation. I 117 Wittgenstein: after his criterion of meaning the laws of nature are meaningless, that means no legitimate sentences. PopperVsCarnap: failure to dismiss metaphysics through reviews. Instead, Popper: it has a heuristic value. (E.g. Speculative atomism). >Metaphysics. I 127 Log records/Popper: no preferred position. They appear in science only as psychological statements. >Protocol sentence. PopperVsPositivismus: positivism does not wish that there should still be meaningful problems except the problems of "positive" empirical science. He wants to see the so-called philosophical problems as pseudo-problems. That will be always feasible. There is nothing easier to uncover a problem as a pseudo-problem. One only needs to take the concept of "meaning" narrow enough. >Sense. --- Flor II 473 PopperVsLogical positivism: Science as a process emphasized more than the characterization of formal traits at theories that are regarded as scientific products. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Prediction | Genz | II 18 Theory/physics/Genz: the task of theory is not prediction, but explanation. Predictions are only for review. >Confirmation, >Measurements. II 45 Prediction/description/periodicity/Genz: question: the Babylonians could also predict solar eclipses without even knowing how the solar system was constructed. Solution: this was possible because the operations in the system are periodic. Example: "Saros cycle": after 6585 1/3 days there is another solar eclipse. II 46 Periodicity/prediction/understanding/Genz: due to periodicity, prediction is possible without understanding. That is not a why-explanation. II 56 Prediction/forecasting/Genz: it is not the laws that are needed, but the consequences of these laws. II 299 Prediction/Genz: example: assuming you have a program called "Grail" that predicts the results of all possible experiments, if you have it, you do not need any laws of nature. II 300 Prediction/Genz: for example, my program "Grail" can predict the results of all experiments without knowing anything about natural laws: Assuming we wanted to build a missile shield: Grail can hardly support it, because we need more for a plan: II 301 Plan/Genz: a plan must be more than just predicting results: it must have insight into the possibilities. >Planning. Problem: no program that answers questions can decide which questions make sense. For example "Grail": doubles nature for us. We could ask nature itself instead of the Grail. Grail does not contribute to their understanding (GenzVsInstrumentalism). >Instrumentalism. The program does not explain anything, but calls for an explanation (like nature). >Explanations. Theory/Genz: physical theories have only the task of explaining sensory impressions. They form systems of statements and draw verifiable experimental conclusions from them. ((s) = observation conditional ). >Observation conditional. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Prediction | Mayr | I 85 Prediction/Mayr: a prediction in logic differs significantly from the everyday prediction. >Initial conditions, >Determinism, >World/thinking, >Randomness, >Necessity, >Logic, >Knowledge, >Beliefs, >Laws of nature, >Physics, >Behavior, cf. >Anomalous Monism. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Principles | Principles, philosophy of science: physical principles are not the same as laws of nature. Rather, laws can be gained from principles or traced back to principles. Examples are the principle of the shortest time, the principle of the smallest effect, the uncertainty principle. See also theories, laws of nature, laws, natural constants. |
||
| Principles | Barrow | I 177 Principles/laws/Barrow: special relativity makes statements about invariants of nature. - Its principles are laws about laws. >Principles, >Special Relativity, >Laws, >Laws of Nature. I 330 Cosmological Principle/Barrow: the average non-uniformity shall be the smaller, the larger the space is that is considered in the universe. >Cosmological principle, >Copernican principle, I 485 Principle/quantities/nature/natural constants/Barrow: principles do not reflect the value of the fundamental constants - instead e.g. only the fact that the energy is proportional to the mass - but not the value of the proportionality constant. >Natural constants, >Quantities (Physics). Progress/Barrow: would be the discovery of new constants or the fact that an assumed constant is no constant at all. >Progress. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Principles | Duhem | 285 Principles/Poincaré: asserts with regard to the principles of mechanics: never will a new experiment lead to abandon them. The operation which it is to compare with the facts has no meaning. E.g. principle of inertia. You can only give it a meaning if you consider a certain relationship point to be chosen. Disregarding this definition would deprive the expression of its meaning. There are as many laws as different relationship points! If the principle of inertia were wrong in relation to a certain point, it would become true when another one was chosen. And it would always be free to choose this latter. It is impossible to close this backdoor. >Laws, >Laws of Nature. I 286 E.g. Principle of equality of action and reaction: (also Poincaré): "The focus of an isolated system can only have a straight and uniform motion." Can this be verified by an experiment? No, the only isolated system is the universe. So the question makes no sense. "We are always free to accept that our principle is correct." I 287 E.g. Chemistry: The Law of multiple proportions: Whatever the results of the analysis may be, it is always certain to find three integers, by virtue of which the law is verifiable with more accuracy than the experiments have. I 288 E.g. Law of the rational indices: crystallography. There are always certain errors during measurements. The crystalographer, who wants to correct the law experimentally, certainly did not understand the meaning of the words he uses. Here as in the case of the multiple proportions, these are purely mathematical expressions, which lack any physical sense. >Physics. I 289 Duhem: It would only lead to public places, if one were to say that the conditions were almost commensurable: for everything in the world is almost commensurable. Any kind of incommensurable relationship is always nearly commensurable. It would be absurd to want to subject certain principles of mechanics to the direct control of the experiment. Does it follow that these hypotheses cannot be achieved by experimental contradictions? No! Isolated, these hypotheses have no experimental significance. It cannot be a question of confirming or refuting the experiments. But these hypotheses are used as essential foundations in the construction of theories. These theories (crystallography, mechanics, chemistry) are representations designed to be compared with the facts. The experimental contradiction then always concerns a group as a whole. So it disappears what could have appeared paradoxical in the assertion that certain physical theories are based on hypotheses which cannot be interpreted physically. >Systems, >Models, >Interpretation. Principles/Poincaré: "The experiment can build the principles of mechanics, but not destroy them". I 290 HadamardVs: "Duhem has shown that it is not about isolated hypotheses, but the totality of the hypotheses of mechanics, whose experimental verification can be attempted. I 290 It is up to the physicist's instinct to look for the fault from which the whole system suffers. No absolute principle leads this investigation. If there is a struggle between hypotheses, the healthy commen sense decides after some time. I 292 E.g. According to Foucault's experiment, Biot abandoned the emission hypothesis. Pure logic would not have been enough for this waiver. It was not an experimentum crucis. >Experimentum crucis. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Principles | Genz | II 29 Irrevocability/principle/Genz: evolution explains why some principles seem irrevocable to us without being so. II 118 Understanding/principle/principles/Genz: a deeper understanding is achieved if one can show that a theory can be derived from principles. >Understanding, >Theories, >Derivation, >Derivability. Theory of Relativity/Einstein/Genz: Einstein has done this for the three theories of relativity. >Relativity theory. II 181 Principles/Genz: natural laws or laws of nature can be traced back to principles. >Natural laws. II 182 Principle/principles/explanation/Genz: final objective: is the explanation by principles. God is not a mathematician - but sticks to principles. Principle/Genz: for example, it could be that a successful physical theory defines a measured value which is clearly defined by the theory, but from its definition it follows that it cannot be calculated. >Measurements, >Definitions. II 228 Principle/laws/science/physics/mathematics/relativity theory/Genz: the relativity theories can be founded retrospectively by principles. Einstein himself found it. The most important principle of the general theory of relativity: Definition equivalence principle/Genz: the equivalence principle says that there is an indistinguishability of gravity and acceleration. >Equivalence principle. II 229 1. Principle for the derivation of the Special Theory of Relativity: light is - unlike sound - no vibration of a medium, resulting in the principle of the independence of the speed of light from the movement of the source (based on the physics of electricity and magnetism). 2. Principle for the derivation of special relativity: the laws of nature shall apply to all observers who move in the same direction with constant and equal speed. (Can be traced back to Galileo). >Special Relativity. II 231 Principles/universe/nature/Euan Squires/Genz: thesis: in the universe, principles apply that can be seen and formulated without mathematics. Mathematical laws of nature: are then nothing else but formalizations of these principles by more precise means. Explanation: however, it is the principles themselves that enable explanation and understanding. >Explanations. Description/measure/measurement/Relativity Theory/Squires/Genz: the General Relativity Theory declares it indispensable that we can describe the universe independently of the choice of variables for space and time. Here mathematics is even excluded! Principles/Elementary Particle Theory/Particle Theory/Standard Model/Genz: the standard model follows from the principle that observers can choose their conventions independently of each other without changing the laws at different locations and at different times: the same natural laws should apply everywhere. Framework: in which this demand is formulated: is the relativistic quantum field theory. However, this is mathematical in itself. >Reference systems. II 232 Principles/Genz: thesis: the laws of nature follow from simple, non-mathematical principles. For example, the Dirac equation has been found mathematically, but it is a realization of laws whose form is determined by non-mathematical principles such as symmetry. Mathematics/Genz: mathematics is like a servant here who separates equations that do not satisfy the principles. Principle/Genz: what principles allow seems to be realized, no matter whether it is mathematically simple or not. For example Hadrons: that Hadrons meet the requirements of group SU (3) seemed to follow first from a mathematical principle. Today it is known that hadrons are made up of quarks. II 233 Principle/Genz: for the purpose of application, it may be necessary to formulate a principle mathematically. For understanding, however, we need the non-mathematical principles. Progress/Genz: one can even say that in physics they are accompanied by the substitution of mathematical principles with non-mathematical principles. For example Plato tried to explain the structure of the cosmos with five regular bodies. Kepler recorded this, and later they were replaced by the assumption of random initial conditions. For example, spectrum of the hydrogen atom: was calculated exactly by a formula. Later this was understood by Bohr's atomic model. II 234 Principle/Newton/force/Genz: for example, the force exerted by one body on another is proportional to the reciprocal of the square of the distance between the bodies. That is mathematical. Newton himself could not base this assumption on principles. Only Einstein was able to do that. Principles of quantum mechanics: see >Quantum mechanics/Genz. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Principles | Thorne | I 80 Principle of Relativity/Einstein/Thorne: in physical laws, of whatever kind, all states of motion must be treated as coordinate (equal). >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Relativity theory, >Symmetries, >Conservation laws. |
Thorne I Kip S. Thorne Gekrümmter Raum und verbogene Zeit München 1996 Thorne II Kip S. Thorne Christopher Nolan The Science of Interstellar New York 2014 |
| Proof of God’s Existence | Stegmüller | Stegmüller IV 404 Cosmological proof of God/Stegmüller: Laws of nature do not explain anything. 1. these laws of nature could also have been different. 2. it could also have been that nothing exists. >Existence, >Ontology, >Necessity, >Contingency. Stegmüller IV 406 God/Swinburne: our background knowledge contains all knowledge about the world, but no religious assumptions - then it is more likely that there is God than that there is none. >Background, >Knowledge. Stegmüller IV 408 Proof of God/Swinburne/MackieVsSwinburne/Stegmüller: if you want to explain the order of the natural world by divine plan, you have to explain the order in the divine plan. >Order, >Structures, >Explanation. Stegmüller IV 419 Order/God's proof/Stegmüller: a spiritual order needs no less explanation than a material one. Stegmüller IV 427 Proof of God/Stegmüller: ontological: on reason alone cosmological: with empirical premises teleological: on structures of order, appearance of purposefulness moral proof: not only theoretical knowledge, but also second-order moral assumptions. >Morality, >Ethics , >Levels. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Proof of God’s Existence | Swinburne | Stegmüller IV 404 Cosmological proof of God/Stegmüller: Laws of nature explain nothing: 1st These laws of nature could also have been different. 2nd it could also have been that nothing exists. >Existence, >Ontology, >Necessity, >Contingency. Stegmüller IV 406 God/Swinburne: our background knowledge contains all knowledge about the world, but no religious assumptions - then it is more likely that there is God than that there is none. >Background, >Knowledge. Stegmüller IV 408 Proof of God/Swinburne/MackieVsSwinburne/Stegmüller: if you want to explain the order of the natural world by divine plan, you have to explain the order in the divine plan. >Order, >Structures, >Explanation. Stegmüller IV 419 Order/God's proof/Stegmüller: A spiritual order does not need less explanation than a material one. Stegmüller IV 427 Proof of God/Stegmüller: ontological: on reason alone cosmological: with empirical premises teleological: on structures of order, appearance of purposefulness. Moral proof: not only theoretical knowledge, but also second-order moral assumptions. >Morals, >Ethics, >Levels. |
Swinburne I R. Swinburne Justification of Induction Oxford 1974 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Proofs | Barrow | I 44 Kant/Barrow: although we cannot prove that nature is arranged purposefully, we have to arrange the observational data as if it were. I 88 Proofs/Laws/Barrow: We cannot prove the law of gravity. >Provability, >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Gravitation, >Nature. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Property Dualism | Chalmers | I 125 Property Dualism/Consciousness/Chalmers: from the lack of a logical supervenience of consciousness from the physical follows that conscious experiences imply the properties of an individual that are not implied by the physical properties of that individual. It is not about a separate "substance". >Supervenience, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Consciousness. Consciousness is a feature, a property of the world, beyond the physical facts. Property Dualism: there is a weaker kind of property dualism, according to which biological fitness is not implied by physical facts. Such a property dualism would be compatible with materialism. Vgl. >Materialism. This variety is not to be confused with our present one. Consciousness/Chalmers: consciousness can result, according to our variety, from property dualism of physical properties without being implied by them. Cf. >Emergence, >Emergence/Chalmers. I 126 This view is completely naturalistic and compatible with our scientific knowledge. I 128 Definition Naturalistic Dualism/Chalmers: I call my variety of dualism naturalistic dualism, according to which properties of the phenomenal consciousness supervene on physical facts in a still to be determined manner, although not logically. >Dualism/Chalmers. What could happen in the future would be what happened with Maxwell's equations: known laws could be extended as far as their scope of application is concerned. There could be a psychophysical theory, as there is an electromagnetic theory. Cf. >Laws of nature, >Explanation, >Causal explanation. This dualism is naturalistic because it proceeds from the validity of all known laws. It is closer to materialism than many other forms of dualism by negating any transcendental elements. >Naturalism. I 129 My dualism, by the way, can still turn out as a kind of monism if it should be shown that the phenomenal and the physical are two aspects of an overlapping kind, as it turned out to be the case with matter and energy. >Monism. I have a certain sympathy for this view. But this could not be a materialistic ((s) eliminative) monism. >Elimination, >Reduction, >Reductionism. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Quantities (Physics) | Barrow | I 191 Conserved quantity/physics: the laws of nature are in a sense nothing more than a list of invariant properties of nature. >Conservation laws. I 193 Laws of nature: E.g. (conserved) momentum is invariant under translations in space. Energy: in translations in time angular momentum under rotations in space This follows from the fact that the laws of nature are neither dependent on the place nor the time, nor on the orientation. Symmetry: has higher rank among scientists, as the equations that explain the changes. I 491 Sizes/Independence/System/Barrow: to make sizes independently of a system, we need the basic variables only as ratios of magnitudes of the same kind. >Independence, >Systems. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Quantities (Physics) | Genz | II 156 Quantity/physics/Genz: in the laws of nature, two types of quantities occur: (a) those defining the physical system to which the law of nature applies and (b) the descriptions of the states that the system can accept. State: e.g. law of falling bodies: is the height and speed of the centre of gravity of the body. From the values of these state variables follow their values at all times. Context: the context is the same for all masses. II 157 N.B.: this is both the precondition and consequence of the law. Independence: this independence is one of the most important laws of nature. Relativity Theory: this independence is also the basis and consequence of the general theory of relativity. >Relativity theory, >Independence. Differentiation: there is a differentiation between state variables and system parameters. >Variables, >Parameters, >States. Mathematics/Genz: mathematics means that all future values for a system can be derived from the state values. >Derivation, >Derivability. Open Systems/Genz: if a system is not complete, the requirement that mathematical laws of nature apply does not in itself have any consequences. >Systems. II 326 Continuous/discrete/Genz: in fact, even seemingly continuous quantities such as the angular momentum of a planet can only be expressed discreetly - quantized according to Planck's constant h. But this one is too small to be effective. Discreteness/Genz: discretion is the prerequisite for Wheeler's "Program of 20 questions" (Yes/No decisions). Turing maschine/Genz: for Turing machines too, the discreetness of nature is a prerequisite if everything is to be simulated by Turing machines Cf. >Analog/digital. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Quasi-Universals | Armstrong | III 79/80 Quasi-universals/particulars/Armstrong: you could say, "true" particulars do not have temporal parts - then it is necessary to introduce properties that have a time index: Quasi-U -> partic. without temporal parts: continuant. >Continuants. III 100 Def Quasi-Universals/Armstrong: e.g. fruit in >Smith's garden: apple or banana, then elephant or cherry then nothing ... or ... - must be introduced so that laws of nature can remain relations between universals. Def Quasi-universal/Armstrong: a quasi-universal is no universal because of reference to individual cases. - It is no particular because it is repeatable. - We need a law for quasi-universals. - Quasi-universals would satify Aristotle s "predicable of many things." |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Quidditism | Lewis | Schwarz I 104 Quidditism/Schwarz: Thesis: fundamental properties exist regardless of their causal-nomological role. Nomological-structural identical worlds may differ in what role charge 1 plays in them - if quidditism was wrong, laws of nature would be absolutely necessary - Lewis: but they could be different. > haecceitism. Schwarz I 226 Quidditism/Schwarz: Thesis: physics describes only relations of things and properties and do not explain the intrinsic nature. -> Panpsychism: thesis, that nature is mental. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Wright | Horwich I 110 Horwich: "Snow is white" is true because snow is white. WrightVsHorwich: this is not a sentence about truth, but a sentence about physical laws, laws of nature, and it does not help us here. Cf. >Tarski-scheme. Wright I 85 Tarski/Disquotation scheme/semantic definition of truth, disquotation: it is well known that it is incompatible with it, to accept a failure of bivalence (true/false). >Bivalence. E.g. if "P" is neither true nor false, then the assertion that "P" is true will be probably wrong and its biconditional probably incorrect. Disquotation scheme (DS): is the producer platitude for all other: thus correspondence, negation, distinction between truth and assertibility. >Correspondence, >Truth, >Assertibility, >Negation. It itself is neutral in terms of stability and absoluteness. Wright I 27ff Disquotation/Tarski/Wright: one does not need to understand the content. >Content, >Understanding. I 33 The disquotation scheme does not exclude that there will be a divergence in the extension: the aiming on an object with the property F does not need not be the aiming on a property with G - they only coincide normatively in relation to practice. >Practice, >Norms, >Language community, >Community, >Convention. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Reality | Barrow | I 240 Reality/Quantum Mechanics/Einstein-Podolski-Rosen/EPR/BohrVsEPR: The EPR argument did not make an impression on Bohr because he did not accept their definition of "reality". He claimed that a distinction between reality and observed reality was meaningless. >Quantum mechanics, cf. >Copenhagen interpretation, >Reality, >Objectivity, >Measurement. I 241 Reality/Bohr/Barrow: thesis: there is no unobserved reality. - There are no laws of nature. Cf. >Metaphysical realism. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Reality | Deutsch | I 105 Criterion for reality: something that can hit back exists. But also Dr. Johnson did not directly hit the stone. He just hit some nerves, and so on. Cf. >Reality/Hacking. I 107 Def Reality/Deutsch: if a quantity is complex and autonomous according to the simplest explanation, then it is real. >Simplicity, >Complexity, >Explanation. I 111 Theory: the more fundamental a theory is, the more comprehensive are the observations that play a role in it. Physical reality is therefore self-similar in several ways. >Theory, >Theory/Deutsch, >Self-similarity. After all, not everything that is real must be easy to identify. I 119 Simulation: A reality simulator indirectly conveys both internal and external experiences to the recipient, but it cannot be programmed to simulate a particular internal experience. Roulette example and tennis example: the framework conditions are defined here, the course of the game must be open, which means that the abstract laws themselves and not only their predictive power can be simulated in virtual reality. >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Simulation, >Prediction. I 190 Life = simulation: both are embodiments of theories about the environment; Something that only exists in the laws of classical physics does not exist in reality. Real hurricanes and butterflies obey the laws of quantum theory, not those of classical mechanics! I 225/26 Plato's apparent refutation that the methods of natural science could lead to mathematical truth: we cannot know anything about perfect circles because we only have access to imperfect circles. DeutschVsPlato: then we can also only build inaccurate tool machines, because the first ones are built with inaccurate tools. So there would be no possibility of self-correction. Cf. >Ideas/Plato. |
Deutsch I D. Deutsch Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997 German Edition: Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 |
| Reality | Genz | II 13 Natural Laws/Laws of Nature/Weinberg: natural laws or laws of nature are as real as chairs. WeinbergVsPositivism. Reality/Weinberg: reality is not under our control. >Reality/Hacking, >Prediction. It is not about reality itself,... II 14 ...but about the reality of the laws of nature. Genz pro: this is the central thesis of this book. >Natural laws. II 115 Reality/Genz: a medium that is present everywhere, but has no measurable velocity, is real, but its reality is not a material one, but a summary of observable effects in the concept of a theory. Such a medium is the field. >Fields/Genz. II 116 Field/acceleration/Genz: acceleration in opposition to the field can be observed. Newton had also suspected this from his empty space, but that would not have been true. >Isaac Newton, >Inertial system, >Relativity theory. The accelerated observer is embedded in a heat radiation that increases with increasing acceleration. II 337 Reality/terms/theory/Genz: thesis: it is the theories that give the terms a reality that expresses itself through correlations of basic sentences. For example, bubble chamber: the bubble chamber interprets the electron as the set of properties of a trace of droplets. Theory: the theory indicates the conditions under which an electron is generated. Electron: an electron interpolated in the language of theory between basic sentences that are in an if-then context. Understanding/Genz: understanding may include the existence of the electron. II 338 But we will never understand elementary particles as we understand macroscopic objects. Elementary particles/Genz: elementary particles have properties that macroscopic objects do not have! If electrons were like chairs, they could not have the properties that are characteristic of them. II 339 Reality/Genz: reality is the reality of the laws, not an opinion. This reality is not one of the wordings by certain terms, but the interrelationships between base sentences, which imply the laws. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Reason | Hobbes | Höffe I 219 Reason/Hobbes/Höffe: The passions for peace alone [the fear of death, the desire for things that are necessary for a pleasant life, and the hope of achieving them through one's own efforts] are certainly not enough to overcome the state of war. >War/Hobbes, >Natural State/Hobbes. Reason: As a further factor, a reason is needed that shows the triple peace drive the necessary way. It is therefore not autonomous, but is in foreign service. Its purpose comes not from within reason, but from outside, from free self-interest. Interest: Because of it, Hobbes' reason is individual pragmatic, self-interest succeeding, but merely theoretical. Theoretical Reason: For itself alone without drive, thus incapable of action, it is not a practical but a theoretical reason, which merely contributes an insight to the extra-reasonal drive: The right to everything that prevails in the state of nature proves, upon closer examination, to be a right to nothing. Because this insight in itself lacks any driving force, it needs another factor, both energetic and purposeful, precisely the three passions that promote peace. >Natural State/Hobbes, >Sense/Hobbes, >Happiness/Hobbes. The laws of nature originate from the peace treaty of reason, which here do not consist in laws of natural science, but in principles of a generally valid, in this respect quasi-human legal morality (Leviathan, chap. 14-15). Hobbes presents a total of 19 laws of nature. He begins with the commandment to seek peace. >Morals/Hobbes. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Reasons | McDowell | I 14ff Space (area) of reasons/space of nature/McDowell: next to the space of reasons (normative, (terms). there is the space of the laws of nature: these are not normative relations. Sspace of reasons: justification, knowledge, functional terms, even experience. Space of nature: objects, sensations. That does not correspond to a splitting into "natural and normative". >Reality/McDowell, >Nature/McDowell, >Sensory impression. I 29 Space of reasons: = is an area of freedom, but not unlimited, therefore empirical justification. >Freedom, >Justification/McDowell, >Empiricism/McDowell. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Recognition | Genz | II 158 Laws of nature/natural laws/recognize/knowledge/Genz: even the simplest laws of nature could remain hidden from us forever. This could make it impossible for us to develop our belief in comprehensive mathematical laws of nature. Simplicity/(s): no grasping is guaranteed. >Simplicity. Grasping/Genz: for this purpose, it must be possible to isolate systems in such a way that simple laws apply to them. >Knowledge, >World/thinking, >Reality. II 159 Recognition/natural laws/laws of nature/context/Genz: recognition presupposes that not everything is connected with everything, otherwise it would be impossible to know something, but not everything. >Logical Omniscience. Examination/verification/testing/natural law/Genz: the recognition of natural laws also presupposes that we can determine the consequences of suspected laws and compare them with experience. >Natural laws. Mathematics: we need mathematics to determine experimentally verifiable consequences. >Mathematics. II 169 Natural Laws/laws of nature/knowledge/Genz: if individual systems could not be isolated from each other, we would probably not know the laws of nature. >Systems, >Order, >Levels (order), >Description levels. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Regularities | Regularity, philosophy: regularity. The expression is usually used in connection with considerations of causality. The question is whether the determination of regularities is sufficient for the formulation of laws of nature. Opponents of the regularity theory demand that, in addition to the observation of positive cases, a formal determination is made on cases that have not yet occurred. For this purpose, e.g. a counterfactual conditional is established. E.g. if A were the case, then B would be the case, assuming that case A did not (yet) occur. See also causation, law of nature, laws, counterfactual conditional, unreal conditional clauses, cause, effect, induction. |
||
| Regularities | Armstrong | II (c) 42ff ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstrongVsRegularity: 1) it is impossible to distinguish regularity from coincidence because of laws of nature (LoN): E.g. every ball of uranium is smaller than 1 km, so is every ball of gold, but the latter by coincidence. 2) Laws of nature support counterfactual conditionals - regularities do not. 3) Regularity theory turns induction into an irrational procedure. 4) Probability: Problem: every connection of F"s and G"s can exist due to a merely probable law: although the distribution is manifestation of the law of nature, it is not identical with it. Solution: natural laws: connection of types of states. Solution: ad 1: properties instead of regularities: properties of the gold/Uranium. ad 2: universals make the number of instantiations irrelevant (unequal regularity). ad 3: universals turn induction into abduction (conclusion to the best explanation). ad 4: Relations between properties (universals) can occur in different strength, then deterministic laws of nature are a borderline case. II (c) 45 Regularity/Tooley: regularity is molecular fact: conjunction: This F is a G and this...and... In contrast to that: law of nature as a link between properties (universals): leeds to atomic facts: the number of instances irrelevant. >Armstrong: this is a solution for non-actual situations as truth makers of counterfactual conditionals. >Counterfactual conditionals, >Truthmakers, >Regularity Theory, >Natural Laws, >Facts. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Regularities | Tooley | Armstrong II (c) 42ff ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstrongVsRegularity: 1) it is impossible to distinguish regularity from coincidence because of laws of nature (LoN): E.g. every ball of uranium is smaller than 1 km, so is every ball of gold, but the latter by coincidence. 2) Laws of nature support counterfactual conditionals - regularities do not. 3) Regularity theory turns induction into an irrational procedure. 4) Probability: Problem: every connection of F"s and G"s can exist due to a merely probable law: although the distribution is manifestation of the law of nature, it is not identical with it. Solution: natural laws: connection of types of states. Solution: ad 1: properties instead of regularities: properties of the gold/Uranium. ad 2: universals make the number of instantiations irrelevant (unequal regularity). ad 3: universals turn induction into abduction (conclusion to the best explanation). ad 4: Relations between properties (universals) can occur in different strength, then deterministic laws of nature are a borderline case. Armstrong II (c) 45 Regularity/Tooley: regularity is molecular fact: conjunction: This F is a G and this...and... In contrast to that: law of nature as a link between properties (universals): leeds to atomic facts: the number of instances irrelevant. Armstrong: this is a solution for non-actual situations as truth makers of counterfactual conditionals. >Counterfactual conditionals, >Truthmakers, >Regularity Theory, >Natural Laws, >Facts. |
Tooley I M. Tooley Time, Tense, And Causation Oxford 2000 |
| Relations | Armstrong | III 84f Relations/Order/Stages/Universals/Armstrong: Laws of Nature are a second order relation between universals. If it is a law of nature that Fs are Gs: between F-ness and G-ness: non-logical, contingent necessity Notation: N(F,G) it follows: (x)(Fx>Gx), but not vice versa (also simple regularity without necessity possible). Lewis: if two universals are in relation and this relation is in relation to a regularity, then there is a link to this regularity. - This second link is an entailment. Question: is regularity part of the relation? Then it is a surplus above the regularity. Form: (P&Q)>P(P = regularity). Alternative: P>(PvQ): Armstrong pro. But how can that be forced into the form N(F,G)>(x)(Fx>Gx)? Martin II 128 Logical relations: cannot exist between separate entities - causal relations: only between separate ones. Martin II 133 Armstrong: this principle results, in turn, from the idea that absolute necessity arises only from identity - MartinVs: here you must keep a close eye on the range of the examples. >Natural laws, >Regularities. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Relations | Martin | Armstrong III 84f Relations/Order/Stages/Universals/Armstrong: Laws of Nature are a second order relation between universals. If it is a law of nature that Fs are Gs: between F-ness and G-ness: non-logical, contingent necessity Notation: N(F,G) it follows: (x)(Fx>Gx), but not vice versa (also simple regularity without necessity possible). Lewis: if two universals are in relation and this relation is in relation to a regularity, then there is a link to this regularity. - This second link is an entailment. Question: is regularity part of the relation? Then it is a surplus above the regularity. Form: (P&Q)>P(P = regularity). Alternative: P>(PvQ): Armstrong pro. But how can that be forced into the form N(F,G)>(x)(Fx>Gx)? Martin II 128 Logical relations: cannot exist between separate entities - causal relations: only between separate ones. Martin II 133 Armstrong: this principle results, in turn, from the idea that absolute necessity arises only from identity - MartinVs: here you must keep a close eye on the range of the examples. >Natural laws, >Regularities. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Representation | Pauen | Pauen I 57 Representation/Unit/Wolf Singer/Pauen: representation of unity does not need to be a uniform representation. - Because the connection between different aspects is represented by synchronous firing. I 217 ff Representation/Pauen: Problem: naturalization of intentionality - I do not violate any laws of physics, if I confuse a cat with a dog. >Intentionality, >Naturalism, >Delusions, >Laws of Nature, cf. >Anomalous Monism. Problem: the failure of the explanation would cast doubt on the existence of mental states. >Mental states, >Explanations, >Dependency. Asymmetry: representation stands for an object, but not vice versa, the object for a representation. - Representations are parts of the language of the mind. >Language of thought. Computer analogy: Symbols. >Symbols, >Code, >Computer model, >Computation. Propositional attitudes: relations to symbols. >Propositional attitudes. I 226 Causality problem: representation in the absence of the object. >Causality. I 232 Representation/causal theory/VsDretske/Pauen: E.g. sunburn no representation of the sun. >Causal theory, >Sunburn example, >F. Dretske. I 233 E.g. indigestion no representation of spoiled food. I 235 But a failure of strong naturalization does not result in an argument VsIdentity theory. >Identity theory. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Rules | Wittgenstein | Wright I 287 Addition/arithmetic/Wittgenstein stigmatizes an "ideal-rigid machine" or a "philosophical superlative" of the rules, namely the idea that such a purely conceptual unity and disunity are not based in an ontological way on facts that lie in human nature. Wright: better: we have to allow that such things are fixedly determined in a way that people might in principle not realize but that they still leave room for the idea that their constitution itself is somehow dependent upon the changing circumstances in the context of sub-cognitive abilities of people. --- Newen I 32 Rules/Wittgenstein: (use theory): rules are central, because the use is usually very stable. >Use theory. --- Hintikka I 242 Rules/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: middle period: Problem: rules must not become a "central entity" - Blue Book: Rules are not mere drill - instead: the rule is incorporated in the understanding, obeying, etc. - later Vs: Problem: that leads to regress. - Later: Philosophical Investigations §§ 143-242: to follow a rule is analog to following a command. I 340 Rules/language game/language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: language games take precedence over rules. >Language games. --- II 62 Rule/music/Wittgenstein: the rule neither exists in the result of playing, nor in the result plus score. - But in the intention to play the score - the rule is included in all individual cases - it cannot be isolated, therefore. II 106 Rule/reality/world/Wittgenstein: a rule is not in relation to the reality so that we could see if they match or not - we make the grammar of color words not according to the model of reality - otherwise you could say: "these properties have this kind of grammar" - applicable rules for "red", etc. are not to be justified by anything that can be said about colors. >Grammar, >Colour. II 113 Rule/Wittgenstein: contradictions exist between rules - not between a rule and the reality. II 201 Meaning/rule/ostensive definition/Wittgenstein: a (single) rule is not sufficient to indicate the meaning - such a rule would be given by an ostensive definition - therefore an ostensive definition is not a definition - not sufficient: E.g. "This is soz" - solution:. sufficient: "This color is soz" it must be clear for what kind of thing the word stands - N.B.: differentia/genus: problem: how can we decide what the genus is? II 251 Rule/Law of Natural/Wittgenstein: Rules are not rigid as laws of nature (NG) - natural laws: are independent of us. >Natural laws. II 346 Rule/Wittgenstein: no prohibition or permission - no statement. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Signs | Armstrong | I 112 ff Sign/Laws of Nature/Armstrong: There is no sign for the law of gravity! Phenomena are only clues!. Sign: E.g. Black Clouds: there must be a true inductive generalization, a probability. Sign/Armstrong: it is not necessary for a sign to act as a sign. There are signs that no one can read, and signs that are read by no one. The thing designated: is, like the sign, always a particulate fact. There is no sign for the general! (I.e. neither for the validity of laws of nature!) Vs: there are counter-E.g. against this simple definition of sign, however: Signs/Indications: E.g., a certain disease is almost always fatal. You would not say, however, that the disease is a sign of death. Sign: sings never act as a cause! - But: E.g., black clouds: here it is not quite correct. But still, the fact that the clouds are black has nothing to do with the induction of rain! Those features of the sign due to which the thing in question is designated by the sign are not causally responsible. Also with irregularity (error, deception - irony disregarded here) a statement is still a sign. A sign can say different things in different contexts anyway. E.g. in a very specific meteorological situation, black clouds could also be signs for something other than rain. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Similarity | Bigelow | I 228 Accessibility/Lewis: Accessibility between possible worlds: their degrees should be understood as degrees of similarity. >Accessibility, >Possible worlds. Similarity/possible worlds/Lewis: here we have to recognize the relevant similarity. More important is the one concerning certain laws! This presupposes laws in the explanation. (Lewis 1979(1),1986a(2) - JacksonVsLewis: Jackson 1977a(3): Causality instead of similarity) >Relevance. Accessibility/Bigelow/Pargetter: Example 3 worlds 1. World u: Darwin asks his father for permission to sail away, receives it and writes his book, of which we have all heard 2. World w: Darwin does not get permission, does not sail away and does not write his book. 3. World e v: Darwin does not get permission to sail away, but still sails off... and his father forgot what he said. Accessibility/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to our semantics (and that of Lewis) the corresponding counterfactual conditional is only true in w, if possible worlds like u are the most accessible of w (next world most similar possible world). >Similarity metrics. Lewis: so u has to be more similar than w v is similar. u and w must be closer to each other. If v and w were closer together, the following counterfactual conditional would be true: If Darwin's father had not given permission, Darwin would not have obeyed and his father would have forgotten. And that is not true in w. So u w is closer than v u is close. >Counterfactual conditional. I 229 Similarity/possible worlds/relevance/Bigelow/Pargetter: what kind of similarity is the relevant one? It cannot be about certain facts (as in this story). That would not be enough. Solution/Lewis: Def Similarity/similarity metrics/possible world/Lewis: by fewer exceptions in a possible world with laws that apply in the other possible world. > Miracles. For example, Darwin: "Miracles" would be the false acoustic transmission of the father's statement and the forgetting through the father. >Miracles. Miracles/Lewis: but also world u could contain miracles: the prehistory is the same as in v, but the father's decision is different, but the causal situation would be the same and the miracle of the other decision would perhaps be just as great as that of erasure of memory and mishearing. I 230 Natural Laws/Worlds/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: so it could be that other laws apply there as well. Obey/Laws/Possible Worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: we can also say that a world obeys the laws of another possible world to a certain extent. For example, there might be a possible world z that obeys the laws of w better than u? z: assuming there are laws here that make the refuse of the permission probable. Suppose the father has heard of a conflict with France in the sea area. This does not require any change in the laws. Then we would be forced to assume that the following counterfactual conditional is true in w: (according to our semantics and that of Lewis): If Darwin's father had refused, war would have broken out between England and France or there would have been another factor that would have led to rejection. However, it is wrong in w in at least one way of reading. Similarity metrics/relevance/similarity/Lewis: this shows that similarity of laws is not the only relevant factor. Solution/Lewis: Similarity between worlds must be explained a) by similarity in terms of laws, b) by similarity in relation to certain facts. Weighting/Lewis: For example, the same facts over a long period of time have more weight than obeying the same certain laws. But compliance with laws has more weight than certain consistent facts. I 231 LewisVsBigelow: VsModal theory. Bigelow/Pargetter: we explain laws by accessibility Lewis: explains accessibility by law. Bigelow/Pargetter: if Lewis is right, our theory is circular. >Circular reasoning. Solution/Lewis: see above. BigelowVsVs/BigelowVsLewis: we deny that accessibility must be explained by similarity. The easiest accessible world does not have to be the most similar world! This is shown by the above examples (Darwin's father). But even if it were not the case, it would not refute the modal theory of the laws of nature. Similarity/Possible World/Bigelow/Pargetter: we are challenged to construct a better theory than Lewis. 1. Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76 2. Lewis, D. K. (1986a) On the plurality of worlds,. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 3. Jackson, F. (1977a) A causal theory of counterfactuals. Australasian Journal of Philosphy 55, pp.3-21 |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Similarity | Lewis | IV 42 Similarity/Similarity Metric/Possible World/Lewis: problems: which aspects count, what importance do they have, how far can dissimilarity go? --- V 46 Similarity/Possible World/Counterfactual Dependence/Lewis: the similarity relation between possible worlds should not require that miracles become necessary in differing possible worlds - SR/Similarity relation/Lewis: I do not think that they often guide our explicit judgment, but the overall similarity must be part of the desired similarity relation. - Congruence of local facts not important, but avoiding major violations of laws of nature. - E.g. small miracle: Nixon presses the button, but the signal is suppressed. - Big Miracle: In addition, all traces are blurred, Nixon’s memoirs are falsified, etc., i.e. the worlds become indistinguishable. V 48 Small miracle: allows deviation. - Big Miracle: allows convergence. >Miracles/Lewis. V 49 Divergence is much easier to achieve than convergence - counterfactual asymmetry: exists, because the appropriate standards of similarity in turn are symmetric and in correspondence to the asymmetry of miracles. V 53 This is certainly about the weighting of various similarities. V 163f Similarity/Possible world/Similarity metric/Lewis: actually three-digit relation. - w1 is closer to w than w2. - Similarities of facts balance each other against similarity of laws. - Similarity laws are important for the character of possible worlds - Similarity: We do not make the condition that there should be only one single next possible world or merely a next set. >Similarity metrics/Lewis, >possible worlds/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Similarity Metrics | Lewis | V 10 Similarity metric/Possible worlds/Po.wo./Similarity/Lewis: order assumption: weak order: whenever two worlds can be accessed from the the world i in question, either one or the other is more similar to world i. - Decreasing or increasing similarity is transitive. - In contrast, partial order: not all couples are distinguishable. >Possible world/Lewis. V 11 Compatibility/Possible world/Lewis: B is compatible with A in world i if an A world is closer to i than any non-B-world. - (Reversal of rather true) - then A were>>would C is true if C follows from A together with auxiliary hypotheses B1...Bn. - E.g. natural laws are compatible or completely incompatible with every assumption - thesis: then laws of nature are generalizations of what we consider to be particularly important. - Then conformity with Laws of Nature should be important for the similarity relation between possible worlds - (> Similarity metrics). V 12f Similarity metric/Possible worlds/Lewis: sphere/Similarity sphere: E.g. S sphere around the world i: exists, if any S world is accessible from i and closer than any ~ S world): admitting A: a sphere contains an A world. - Degree: spheres represent degrees (comparative, unlike neighborhood in topology). Compatibility/Compatible/(s): B is compatible with A if there is an A world in the B sphere. - Definition A were>>would C is true if A>C applies in an A permitting sphere around i, if such a sphere exists. >Implication. V 13 Definition Then were A>>would C would be true if AC applied in every A permitting sphere around i ((s) conjunction) - Definition A impossible worlds: >Impossible World. V 42 Similarity metric/Similarity/Possible world/Lewis: It is not about any particular similarity relation that you happen to have in mind. - Problem: if some aspects do not even count, the centering assumption would be violated. - I.e. worlds that differ in an unnoticed aspect, would be identical with the actual world. - Lewis: but such worlds do not exist.- Similarity relations: must be distinguished: a) for explicit judgments - b) for counterfactual judgments. V 150 Revision/Possible world/Similarity metrics/Stalnaker/Lewis: every revision will select the most similar antecedent world. --- Schwarz I 160 Lewis: E.g. a single particle changes its charge: then it behaves differently. - Because a possible world in which not only the charge but also the role were exchanged would be much less similar (> next world). |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Simulation | Genz | II 273 Simulation/computer/errors/rounding/approach/disruption/Genz: rounding errors in a simulation have the same effect as disruptions on real processes. Rounding errors simulate disruptions. >Interferences. II 328 Simulation/natural laws/laws of nature/Genz: it is quite possible to create a simulation that obeys the laws of nature, but shows a world that in turn obeys completely different laws. >Natural laws, >Presentation, >Levels (order). |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Socialism | Marx | Höffe I 366 Scientific Socialism/Marx/Höffe: In contrast to Proudhon's socialism, which is debased as "utopian," "petty-bourgeois", and "doctrinaire," Marx is not satisfied with a "utopian interpretation" of the previous national economy. He does indeed adopt Proudhon's guiding goal, the classless society. According to the Communist Party's Manifesto (1848)(1), written together with Engels, the "history of all previous society consists in the history of class struggles," which recalls Hegel's theorem of >master and slave. Religion/Marx/Höffe: astonishingly, [in the manifesto] (...) the religious opposites that dominate at least modern times are not mentioned. >Religion. Höffe I 367 According to the eleventh Feuerbach thesis, Marx is convinced of the mission and at the same time convinced of the power of a theory (...). With its help he believes he can achieve his goal, - establishing a classless society - and bring about the necessary path, the revolutionary transformation of the existing society. Höffe I 368 VsPolitical Economy: "Capital"(3) [rejects] the previous political economy (economics) (...) and develops an alternative. Labor: In one point Marx (...) agrees with his liberal opponents: As with Locke, wages should be based on the amount of work done. MarxVsSmith, Adam/MarxVsRicardo: Marx accuses his opponents of an unhistorical approach and the extrapolation resulting from it, which is in fact unacceptable: According to Marx, the laws of economic development asserted by Smith and Ricardo are not eternally valid laws of nature. They apply only to the modern, namely capitalist form of economy and society. >Adam Smith, >David Ricardo. He concedes that the traditional national economy has enlightened the mechanism of production relations: the connection of private property with the separation of labor and capital, with the division of labor, competition, etc. But he accuses it of a "fatalistic economy" that does not concern itself with the conditions of the origin of production relations and therefore does not recognize the law of their change. He contrasts this with what is later called historical materialism ("histomat"). Commodity/Money: [Marx] begins with the analysis of commodity and money as the material preconditions and formal elements. He concedes to capital the world-historical task of developing all productive forces of labor. On the other hand, however, it prevents what is indispensable for a truly humane economy: that labor or the worker becomes the subject of social processes. 1. K.Marx und F. Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, 1848 2. K.Marx und F. Engels, Thesen über Feuerbach, 1845 3. K. Marx Das Kapital Vol. I 1867, Vol. II & II 1885 (= MEW 23-25) |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Society | Spencer | Habermas III 218 Society/Progress/Spencer/Habermas: In the 19th century (...) the development theories culminating in H. Spencer interpret the progress of civilization darwinistically as the development of organic systems.(1) Habermas III 219 Thus Spencer was able to establish a theory of social evolution that cleared up the unclear idealism of philosophy of history and regarded the progress of civilization as a continuation of natural evolution and thus subsumed it under the laws of nature without all ambiguities. >Philosophy of history, >Evolution, >Laws of nature, >History, >Historiography. Trends such as scientific development; the capitalist growth, the establishment of constitutional states, the emergence of modern administrations, etc. could thus be treated directly as empirical phenomena and understood as consequences of the structural differentiation of social systems. They no longer needed to be interpreted as empirical indicators for an internal history of the mind, traced back to learning processes and accumulation of knowledge, no longer as signs of rationalisation in the sense of philosophy of history. 1. L. Sklair, The Sociology of Progress, London 1970, p. 56ff. |
Spencer I Herbert Spencer The Man versus the State Indianapolis 2009 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Solipsism | Genz | II 18 Solipsism/GenzVsSolipsism: solipsism explains nothing and makes no predictions. >Predictions, >Sciences, >Physics, >Laws of nature, >Explanations. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Systems | Genz | II 71 Natural Science/Genz: natural science investigates systems, not objects. II 169 Natural laws/laws of nature/recognition/Genz: if individual systems could not be isolated from each other, we would probably not know the laws of nature. >Levels, >Laws of nature, >Knowledge, >Science, >Reality. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Systems | Schurz | I 188 System/Theory/Schurz: System character of theories means that one cannot understand single of their law hypotheses in isolation. >Theories/Schurz, >Concepts/Schurz, >Theorical terms, >Theory language, >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Hypotheses, >Holism. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Terminology | Lewis | Bigelow I 180 Definition Lagadonian Language/Lagadonian/Terminology/Swift/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: by this name Lewis calls such a language, following Gulliver's travels. (1986a(1), p. 145). It is a set theoretical structure on individuals, characteristics, and relations. 1. Lewis, David 1986a. Philosophical Papers, Volume II, Oxford: Oxford University Press Schwarz I 97 Properties/Lewis/Schwarz: Definition intrinsic property: never differ between perfect duplicates. Duplicate: Defined not by sum, but by distribution of the perfectly natural property. Def Perfectly natural property: (PNP) = fundamental property: all qualitative intrinsic differences between things (also possible worlds) are based on their instantiation. - E.g. Fred is the tallest in his family, but his duplicate is not in his family. - that depends on distribution of intrinsic properties: if we duplicate the entire family, the duplicate is sure to be the tallest there as well. IV 58 Relation/individuation/Lewis: Relations are usually individuated through coextension. I-Relation/R-Relation/Lewis: These two relations are identical because they are coextensive. Def R-Relation/Identity/Continuity/Person/Lewis: a certain relation and connection among person states. Question: What conditions will survive the state in which you ask yourself this question? For example, if you walk out of a duplicator, who will you be, who will come out of the right or left door, or both? Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: Which of the permanent persons are identical to the former? But of course there are also I-relations between the individual states! IV 259 Ramsey-sentence/Lewis: wipes out the difference between intensional and extensional language - at the same time it eliminates technical vocabulary by existential quantification. "Ramsification" neutral level: there is a system of categories, S, N, X/Y, there are three relationships of expressions to things: A-tension, B-tension, C-tension. I (b) 27 Theoretical Terms/TT/Lewis: (T terms) are names, not predicates or functions. I (b) 31 They can always be eliminabted by being replaced by their definientia. I (b) 34 Here: the T terms are names of mental states, the A terms are names for stimuli and responses and also for causal relationships. Theoretical terms: (T terms) are names, not predicates or functions. V 11 Compatibility/Possible world/Lewis: B is compatible with A in world i if an A world is closer to i than any non-B-world. - (Reversal of rather true) - then A were>>would C is true if C follows from A together with auxiliary hypotheses B1...Bn. - E.g. natural laws are compatible or completely incompatible with every assumption - thesis: then laws of nature are generalizations of what we consider to be particularly important. - Then conformity with Laws of Nature should be important for the similarity relation between possible worlds V 86 Principal Principle/main principle/probability/opportunity/Lewis: the Principal Principle is to be modeled according to our experience with direct conclusions. Exceptions: 1) it is about opportunity, not frequency. 2) Certainty of probabilities (opportunities) contributes to the resilience (resistance to new information). Schwarz I 99 Relations/Lewis: intrinsic: e.g., greater-relation (concerns only the two sides). Extrinsic: e.g. grandmother-relation (needs a third). Internal relation: (not equal to intrinsic relation): depends only on intrinsic properties and is reducible to them. External relation: is also intrinsic, but just not reducible. E.g., Spatiotemporal relation: "intrinsic with respect to pairs". Identity/partial relation/elementarity/Lewis: These are all no relations! |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Theories | Barrow | I 285ff Gauge Theories/Barrow: modern theories of elementary particles and their interaction. The first gauge theory was Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism. Such theories are entirely based on symmetries. - The descriptions of gravitation, electromagnetism, strong and weak nuclear force are all gauge theories. >Symmetries. The new additional symmetries are called inner symmetries. They correspond to invariants in renaming particle identity. >Invariants. For example, when the identity of all protons in the world is swapped with that of neutrons. The gauge age systematically reduced the laws of the microworld to symmetries. - We are not dependent on observation then. >Proofs, >Provability, >Observation, >Unobservables. Gauge symmetries can also be the key to generating new laws of nature. They describe what kind of particles is allowed, but not how many variants each allowed particle has. It tells us that certain quantities are proportional to others, but it does not determine the values of the proportionality factors. Therefore, gauge theories are not the ultimate descriptions of nature. >Proportions, >Objectivity, cf. >Theory of Everything. I 290 The solutions of symmetric equations do not need to have symmetry! It follows that the true symmetries are hidden, they determine the laws, not their consequences. When a calibration theory is broken in a certain way, the carrier particle necessary to mediate the local calibration invariance assumes a mass. This is probably the origin of the mass. Some calibration theories are not broken (gravitation, electrodynamics) Their carrier particles, graviton and photon, are massless. >Symmetry breaking. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Theories | Chalmers | I 165 Conscious Experience/Consciousness/Theories/Chalmers: three types of theories: A. Consciousness supervenes logically on the physical, for functional and eliminative reasons. I 166 B. Consciousness does not supervene logically, there is no a priori implication from the physical to the phenomenal, but nevertheless materialism is true. C. VsMaterialism and Vs Logical Supervenience. >Materialism, >Supervenience, >Physical/psychic. A. Variants: Eliminativism, Behaviorism, Reductive Functionalism. Cf. >Colour researcher Mary/Frank Jackson, >Elimination, >Behaviorism, >Reductionism, >Functionalism. 1. Physical and functional twins of us without conscious experiences are inconceivable. >Zombies. 2. Mary does not learn anything new when she sees red for the first time. 3. Everything about consciousness can be explained functionally. Representative: Armstrong (1968)(1), Dennett (1991)(2), Lewis (1966)(3), Ryle (1949)(4). Variants: Dretske (1995)(5), Rey (1982)(6), Rosenthal (1996)(7), Smart (1959)(8), White (1986)(9), Wilkes (1984)(10), B: Variants: Nonreductive Materialism. The only non-contradictory variant assumes strong metaphysical necessity as decisive. >Metaphysical necessity. 1. Zombies and inverted spectra are conceivable, but metaphysically impossible. >Conceivability. 2. Mary learns something new when she sees red, but this can be explained with an analysis in the Loar style ((s) semantically). >B. Loar. 3. Consciousness, cannot be explained reductively, but is nevertheless physical. Representatives, not explicit, but approximate: Levine (1983 (11), 1993(12)), Loar (1990)(13). Others who adopt physicalism without logical supervenience: Byrne (1993)(14), Flanagan (1992)(15), Hill (1991)(16), Horgan (1984b)(17), Lycan (1995)(18), Papineau (1993)(19), Tye (1995)(20) van Gulick (1992)(21). C. Different Variations of Property Dualism. Materialism is assumed to be false, certain phenomenal or proto-phenomenal properties are assumed to be irreducible. 1. Zombies and inverted spectra are logically and metaphysically possible. 2. Mary learns something new, namely non-physical facts. 3. Consciousness cannot be explained reductively, but it can be explained non-reductively by additional natural laws. Representatives: Campbell (1970)(22), Honderich (1981)(23), Jackson (1982)(24), H. Robinson (1982)(26), W. Robinson (1988), Sprigge (1994)(27). I 167 The ultimate choice is between the theories of the A type and the rest. I 213 Theory/Chalmers: even if consciousness cannot be explained reductively, there can be a non-reductionist theory of consciousness. Such a theory will be similar to the theories that physics gives us about motion, space, and time. The existence of these entities is not derived from something more basic. Instead, laws are stated about them. >Laws, >Laws of nature. I 216 First Person/Chalmers: Problem: with the perspective of the first person, a number of contradictory theories are possible: e.g. Solipsism, panpsychism, etc. >First person, >Solipsism, >Panpsychism. I 218 If we could only figure out which theory of consciousness is better than its competitors, we would have already gained a lot. >Consciousness/Chalmers. 1. D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London 1968 2. D. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, Boston, 1991 3. D. Lewis, An argument for the identity theory, Journal of Philosophy 63, 1966: pp.17-25 4. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Oondon 1949 5. F. Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge 1995 6. G. Rey, A reason for doubting the existence of consciousness. In. R. Davidson, S. Schwartz and D Shapiro (Eds) Consciousness and Self-Regulation. Vol 3 New York 1982 7. D. M. Rosenthal, A theory of consciousness. In: N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere (Eds) The Natur of Consciousness, Cambridge 1996 8. J. C. Smart, Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 68, 1959: pp.141-56 9. S. L. White, Curse of the qualia. Synthese 68, 1986: pp. 333-68 10. K. V. Wilkes, Is consciousness important? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35, 1984: pp. 223-43 11. J. Levine, Materialism and qualia. The explanatory gap. PhPacific Philosophical Quarterly 64, 1983: pp.354-61 12. J. Levine, On leaving out what it's like. In: M. Davies and G. Humphreys (Eds) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, Oxford 1993. 13. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108 14. A. Byrne, The emergent mind, Ph.D. diss. Princeton University, 1993 15. O. Flanagan, Consciousness reconsidered. Cambridge 1992 16. C. S. Hill, Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge 1991 17. T. Horgan, Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 1984: pp. 147-83 18. W. G. Lycan, A limited defense of phenomenal information. In: T. Metzingwr (ed), Conscious Experience, Paderborn 1995. 19. D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford 1993 20. M. Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge 1995 21. R. van Gulick, Nonreductive materialism and the nature of intertheoretical constraint. IN: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim (Eds) Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin 1992 22. K. K. Campbell, Body and Mind, New York 1970 23. T. Hoderich, Psychological law-like connections and their problems. Inquiry 24, 1981: pp. 277-303 24. F. Jackson, Epiphenomenal qualia, Philosophical Quarterly 32, 1993: pp. 127-36 25. H, Robinson, Matter and Sense, Cambridge 1982 26. W. S. Robinson, Brains and People: An Essay on Mentality and Its Causal Conditions, Philadelphia 1988 27. T. L. S. Sprigge, Final causes. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45, 1971: pp. 149-70 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Theories | Poundstone | I 278 Theory/Poundstone: Newton's law of gravitation could be confirmed even in ancient times, if you had drawn the right conclusions. >Confirmation, >Verification, >Laws of nature, >Laws, >Gravitation, >Physical laws. I 339ff TheoryPoundstone: should make the world readibly like the key to a cryptography. >Understanding, >Explanations, >Causal explanations. Some theories put a lot of information in the theory itself. >Information Theory of the Brains in a vat: assumes a single Hypoothese about everything and encrypted: "iii ...". >Brains in vat/Putnam, >Brains in vat. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Theories | Schurz | I 176 Theory/Science/Schurz: Ex A good scientific theory must have 1. have system character and verification holism, 2. distinction between axioms and the consequences derived from them. 3. within axioms, a gradual distinction between the core of the theory and its periphery. >Holism, >Verification, >Review, >Periphery, >Axioms, >System, >Theorems. I 179 Theory association: physical theories organize themselves in the form of hierarchical theory associations. Core laws: are at the top. >Physics, >Laws of nature, >Assignment. I 184 Theory/Schurz: A theory can be divided into components in three ways: 1. with respect to language: comprise. Theoretical total language, subsystem: empirical (resp. pre-theoretical) which contains only empirical terms of T besides the logical mathematical ones. 2. with respect to the logical nature of the propositions of T: difference: axioms, and logical (resp. probabilistic) consequences. 3. with respect to the conceptual nature of the propositions: Difference: purely theoretical laws (contain only theoretical terms in addition to logically mathematical ones; I 185 Mixed propositions: contain also empirical Empirical consequences: contain empirical and logically mathematical terms. Assignment laws: are a part of mixed propositions. 4. regarding epistemic status of sentences of T: gradual difference core/periphery. Core/core axioms/Schurz: define the historical identity of the theory. If you change them, you get a different theory. Periphery: peripheral hypotheses characterize the current version of the theory. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Time | Genz | II 250 Time/Newton/mechanics/Genz: in Newtonian mechanics, not only the earlier point of time determines the later one, but also vice versa the later point of time determines the earlier one. Deterministic/Genz: we must distinguish between forward deterministic laws and forward and backward deterministic laws. II 251 Question: are there also purely backwards deterministic laws? Definition Time/Genz: as long as we do not know anything else, we can simply define time as the direction in which deterministic laws of nature apply. This is necessarily identical to the direction in which the order cannot increase. >Entropy, >Second law of thermodynamics, >Arrow of time, >Determinism. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Time | Lewis | V 32 Time/Arrow of time/Past/Future/Lewis: future: depends counterfactually (not only causally) on the present. >Causal dependence/Lewis, >Counterfactual dependence/Lewis. Asymmetry: former things do not depend on later ones - we find no counterfactual conditional that explains what would have been different in the past if the presence was different - such a counterfactual conditional would be unclear at most. V 33 Asymmetry: we can use all assumptions about the past, but not about the future - assumptions about the past are not counter factually dependent - therefore they can serve as auxiliary hypotheses. V 35 Time/Asymmetry/Counterfactual conditional/Lewis: Asymmetry: comes about like this: wA>wC assumes that C is later, if C is earlier, the counterfactual conditionals are only true if C is true - the counterfactual conditional tells us, like the way, how things are earlier, not depending on how things are later. V 36 Time Arrow/Epistemic/Asymmetry/Lewis: the asymmetry (that we know more about the past than about the future) is gradual, no difference in kinds. V 37f Time/Asymmetry/Past/Future/Lewis: 1) the epistemic contrast (that we know more about the past) is gradual. - 2) (irrelevant) - 3) Even determinism would allow an asymmetry. - 4) past, present and future are equally unchangeable. - That t is later, is irrelevant. V 38 5) in a sense we can change the future by our present actions, however. - Asymmetry: branch in the future: are the alternatives under counterfactual assumptions. - Past: here the fact remains the same, even in counterfactual assumptions. V 57 Time/Laws of Nature /LoN/Asymmetry/Lewis: if there is an asymmetry (between past and future). - Then it is a property of time, not of the laws. - It makes a difference between possible worlds. >Possible world/Lewis. V 66 Asymmetry/Time/Lewis: my argument for it is empirical. - Too many traces would have to be hidden later on. --- V 94 Time/Asymmetry/Past/Future/Possible world/Lewis: the asymmetry is contingent. - i.e. the properties which justify the distinction between past and future opportunities. They may be different from possible worlds to other possible worlds. >Asymmetry, >Past, >Present, >Future, >Time traveller/Lewis, >Timelessness/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Time | Newton | Genz II 250 Time/Newton/Mechanics/Genz: in the Newtonian mechanics, not only the earlier point in time determines the later one, but also the later one the earlier. Deterministic/Genz: we must distinguish between forward deterministic laws and forward and backward deterministic laws. >Laws of nature, >Physical laws, >Laws, >Determinism. II 251 Question: Are there also purely backward deterministic laws? Cf. >Initial conditions, cf. >Time reversal. |
PhysNewton I Isaac Newton The Principia : Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy Berkeley 1999 Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Time Reversal | Genz | II 254 Time reversal symmetric/Genz: for example, "angle of incidence" = "angle of reflection" is time reversal symmetric, i.e. it would not be possible to determine whether a film with billiard balls runs backwards. II 255 Reflection/time reversal/Genz: the same applies to all reflection processes, forward as well as backward deterministic n. >Symmetries. II 256 If there was a law: "angle of reflection = half angle of incidence", we would have no time reversal symmetry and we could see a film running backwards. II 256 Time inversion invariant/Genz: e.g. Newton's laws of planetary motion: the directions in which the planets move could be reversed. Therefore, a film running backwards would not be recognizable. >Laws/Newton. Quantum mechanics/not time inversion invariant/Genz: the laws for elementary particles are excellent in one direction. >Quantum mechanics. II 259 In the last 200 years, the Earth was 4 hours slow, if one wanted to calculate a solar eclipse. Eventually the moon will stand still for the earth in the sky. N.B.: in a backward running film, the tides would have the opposite effect that the earth rotates faster instead of slower! Thus the time directions have become distinguishable. By comparing the two processes. N.B.: but we cannot tell from them which one is the real one and which one is the manipulated one. Tides: the laws of the tides cannot be fundamental like those of the K mesons. They do not include the origin of deformations. They are not time-reversal symmetric. Time-reversal symmetric: are fundamental laws about the collisions of molecules. Time reversal symmetry/problem: how can symmetric laws of nature lead to processes that are not symmetric themselves? Asymmetry/Genz: it is not the laws that are responsible for them, but the initial conditions or circumstances. Order/Law/Genz: the superordinate law in such cases is that order cannot increase. >Order. II 258 Asymmetry/time reversal/Genz: asymmetry is much more pronounced in macroscopic (tides) than in microscopic (K mesons). Tides: the law that the rotation of the earth slows down is forward deterministic, but not backward deterministic! For example, because it is not possible to tell from a standstill how long ago the rotation came to rest. >Tidal force. There are many ways in which it has come to a standstill, but only one more to rest. The direction of time cannot be inferred from the observation of the standstill. II 260 This does not mean absolute rotation, which is marked by centrifugal forces, but relative to the moon. Friction/Genz: friction leads to time reversal asymmetry. (If you brake until standstill). Then we see in the backward running film a course of events prohibited by the laws of nature. II 261 Statistical fluctuation/Genz: statistical fluctuation does not indicate a time direction. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Time Reversal | Sokal | Sokal I 171 Time Reversal/Baudrillard/Bricmont/Sokal: (J. Baudrillard 1991)(1): Baudrillard speaks here of a reversibility of the causal order... triumph of the effect on the cause... "Floating and blurring of the laws"..."possible reversibility".... >Symmetries, >Equations, >Laws of Nature. >Physical laws, >J. Baudrillard. SokalVsBaudrillard: it is difficult to decide what Baudrillard means by the "reversal" of a physical law. In physics, we speak of the reversibility of laws as an abbreviation for the "invariance to time reversal". This applies to all physical laws except for the weak interaction. Sokal I 172 However, this also applies to Newtonian mechanics. On the contrary, a new discovery is the non-reversibility of weak interactions in 1964. Causality/Sokal: in any case, the reversibility of physical laws has nothing to do with an alleged "reversibility of the causal order". >Causality, >Time, >Causation, >Cause >Effect. 1. J. Baudrillard Die fatalen Strategien, München, 1991. |
Sokal I Alan Sokal Jean Bricmont Fashionabel Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science, New York 1998 German Edition: Eleganter Unsinn. Wie die Denker der Postmoderne die Wissenschaften missbrauchen München 1999 Sokal II Alan Sokal Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science New York 1999 |
| Truth | Maturana | I 349 Laws of nature/truth/Maturana: these terms would only apply to an independent reality (objectivity without parentheses). - I don t use them. >Objectivity/Maturana, >Reality, >Observation. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Truthmakers | Armstrong | Place I 21 Truth Maker/Armstrong: Problem: counterfactual conditionals point to something that does not exist: "counterfactual state" is therefore no truth maker. - There are no counterfactual states - ((s) see below: but there are counterfactual facts (as assumptions). >Counterfactual conditionals. Place II 66 Truth Maker/Counterfactual Conditional/Place: the truthmaker is a special disposition, finite. (Like Goodman, nominalist). ArmstrongVsPlace:the truthmaker is a law, infinite. II (c) 92 Truth Maker/Armstrong: truthmakers are also necessary for the true attribution of unmanifested dispositions - but non-dispositional properties plus laws of nature are sufficient. - E.g., two non-occurring, equally likely events: here there is no fact as truthmaker. Same case: E.g.s distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: no truth maker, no certain way. Nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have behaved idiosyncratic. II (c) 99 Laws/Armstrong: Laws are truth makers for law statements. - Atomic state: higher order relation between universals; the number of instantiation is irrelevant. All are identical, therefore F is deducible from a: a is G. Hume: molecular state: regularity. Armstrong: here, these many cases only extend the law and do not justify deduction from the unobserved. Place III 121 Truth Maker/Armstrong: a single law of nature G makes a universal law statement true and covers all instantiations - PlaceVsArmstrong: individual truth makers necessary. Place IV 156 Truth Maker/Place: it is tempting to assume that the state which makes the counterfactual conditional true is the same which makes the causal law statement true from which it is epistemically derived. - (Vs"counterfactual facts"). PlaceVs, Vs"general facts" - VsArmstrong , VsThought-Independent Laws of Nature as Truth Makers -> II 176 Martin III 175f Truth maker/MartinVsArmstrong: it is still unclear whether his invocation of laws is strong enough to provide the full ontological weight as truth maker for the solvability of salt that was not put in water. Martin III 176 Whatever laws he quotes, they seem to be wrong for the situation, namely solely for the situation of the compound, i.e. the actual manifestation. II 182 f Absence/Lack/Holes/MartinVsLewis: absence actually is a suitable truth maker: a state. Problem: a state is merely "general fact" (Russell) (>general term). David Lewis: "as it is", "how things are" must not simply cover everything that is fulfilled by things, otherwise it is trivial. Solution/Lewis: truth supervenes on what things there are and what properties and relations they instantiate. MartinVsLewis: "The way the universe is" is a general term, but still 1st order! Solution/Martin: reciprocal disposition partnes for mutual manifestation. Existence theorem/Martin: whether positive or negative: the world is at the other end and not in vain. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Truthmakers | Martin | Place I 21 Truth Maker/Armstrong: Problem: counterfactual conditionals point to something that does not exist: "counterfactual state" is therefore no truth maker. - There are no counterfactual states - ((s) see below: but there are counterfactual facts (as assumptions). >Counterfactual conditionals. Place II 66 Truth Maker/Counterfactual Conditional/Place: the truthmaker is a special disposition, finite. (Like Goodman, nominalist). ArmstrongVsPlace:the truthmaker is a law, infinite. Armstrong II (c) 92 Truth Maker/Armstrong: truthmakers are also necessary for the true attribution of unmanifested dispositions - but non-dispositional properties plus laws of nature are sufficient. - E.g., two non-occurring, equally likely events: here there is no fact as truthmaker. Same case: E.g.s distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: no truth maker, no certain way. Nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have behaved idiosyncratic. Armstrong II (c) 99 Laws/Armstrong: Laws are truth makers for law statements. - Atomic state: higher order relation between universals; the number of instantiation is irrelevant. All are identical, therefore F is deducible from a: a is G. Hume: molecular state: regularity. Armstrong: here, these many cases only extend the law and do not justify deduction from the unobserved. Place III 121 Truth Maker/Armstrong: a single law of nature G makes a universal law statement true and covers all instantiations - PlaceVsArmstrong: individual truth makers necessary. Place IV 156 Truth Maker/Place: it is tempting to assume that the state which makes the counterfactual conditional true is the same which makes the causal law statement true from which it is epistemically derived. - (Vs"counterfactual facts"). PlaceVs, Vs"general facts" - VsArmstrong , VsThought-Independent Laws of Nature as Truth Makers -> II 176 Martin III 175f Truth maker/MartinVsArmstrong: it is still unclear whether his invocation of laws is strong enough to provide the full ontological weight as truth maker for the solvability of salt that was not put in water. Martin III 176 Whatever laws he quotes, they seem to be wrong for the situation, namely solely for the situation of the compound, i.e. the actual manifestation. II 182 f Absence/Lack/Holes/MartinVsLewis: absence actually is a suitable truth maker: a state. Problem: a state is merely "general fact" (Russell) (>general term). David Lewis: "as it is", "how things are" must not simply cover everything that is fulfilled by things, otherwise it is trivial. Solution/Lewis: truth supervenes on what things there are and what properties and relations they instantiate. MartinVsLewis: "The way the universe is" is a general term, but still 1st order! Solution/Martin: reciprocal disposition partnes for mutual manifestation. Existence theorem/Martin: whether positive or negative: the world is at the other end and not in vain. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Truthmakers | Place | Place I 21 Truth Maker/Armstrong: Problem: counterfactual conditionals point to something that does not exist: "counterfactual state" is therefore no truth maker. - There are no counterfactual states - ((s) see below: but there are counterfactual facts (as assumptions). >Counterfactual conditionals. Place II 66 Truth Maker/Counterfactual Conditional/Place: the truthmaker is a special disposition, finite. (Like Goodman, nominalist). ArmstrongVsPlace:the truthmaker is a law, infinite. Armstrong II (c) 92 Truth Maker/Armstrong: truthmakers are also necessary for the true attribution of unmanifested dispositions - but non-dispositional properties plus laws of nature are sufficient. - E.g., two non-occurring, equally likely events: here there is no fact as truthmaker. Same case: E.g.s distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: no truth maker, no certain way. Nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have behaved idiosyncratic. II (c) 99 Laws/Armstrong: Laws are truth makers for law statements. - Atomic state: higher order relation between universals; the number of instantiation is irrelevant. All are identical, therefore F is deducible from a: a is G. Hume: molecular state: regularity. Armstrong: here, these many cases only extend the law and do not justify deduction from the unobserved. Place III 121 Truth Maker/Armstrong: a single law of nature G makes a universal law statement true and covers all instantiations - PlaceVsArmstrong: individual truth makers necessary. Place IV 156 Truth Maker/Place: it is tempting to assume that the state which makes the counterfactual conditional true is the same which makes the causal law statement true from which it is epistemically derived. - (Vs"counterfactual facts"). PlaceVs, Vs"general facts" - VsArmstrong , VsThought-Independent Laws of Nature as Truth Makers -> II 176 Martin III 175f Truth maker/MartinVsArmstrong: it is still unclear whether his invocation of laws is strong enough to provide the full ontological weight as truth maker for the solvability of salt that was not put in water. Martin III 176 Whatever laws he quotes, they seem to be wrong for the situation, namely solely for the situation of the compound, i.e. the actual manifestation. Armstrong II 182 f Absence/Lack/Holes/MartinVsLewis: absence actually is a suitable truth maker: a state. Problem: a state is merely "general fact" (Russell) (>general term). David Lewis: "as it is", "how things are" must not simply cover everything that is fulfilled by things, otherwise it is trivial. Solution/Lewis: truth supervenes on what things there are and what properties and relations they instantiate. MartinVsLewis: "The way the universe is" is a general term, but still 1st order! Solution/Martin: reciprocal disposition partnes for mutual manifestation. Existence theorem/Martin: whether positive or negative: the world is at the other end and not in vain. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Understanding | Deutsch | I 149 Understanding: for the reality to be understandable, the laws of nature must be incorporated in another object: the one, that understands - I 240 Understanding: While everything is understandable in physical reality, the intelligible mathematical truths are a tiny minority, which coincidentally corresponds to a physical truth! >Laws of nature, >Reality, >Mathematics, >World/thinking. Brockman I 123 Understanding/Deutsch: In the broadest sense, a person’s quest for understanding is indeed a search problem, in an abstract space of ideas far too large to be searched exhaustively. But there is no predetermined objective of this search. There is, as Popper put it, no criterion of truth, nor of probable truth, especially in regard to explanatory knowledge. Objectives are ideas like any others—created as part of the search and continually modified and improved. >Criteria/Popper, >Artificial General Intelligence/Deutsch. Deutsch, D. “Beyond Reward and Punishment” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Deutsch I D. Deutsch Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997 German Edition: Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Understanding | McDowell | I 98f Understanding/McDowell: the distinction between two types of intelligibility distinguishes two kinds of terms, but not of objects. I 123 Natural laws/Nature/Understanding/Hume: Nature cannot be understood in terms of meaning, nor in terms of a law. >Nature/Hume. Natural laws/Nature/Understanding/KantVsHume: regains the comprehensibility of the natural laws, but not the comprehensibility of the meaning. >Nature/Kant, >Laws of nature/Kant, >Understanding/Kant. Nature is the domain of natural laws, and therefore without any meaning. The empirical world, however, is not outside the concepts. I 136 Natural laws/meaning: mandatory rules do not have to be known. Understanding/McDowell: must also play a role where it is a matter of grasping mere events without all meaning. Understanding/comprehensibility/modernity/today/McDowell: the field of comprehensibility is the realm of natural laws - albeit without meaning. We can, however, refuse to equate this area of comprehensibility with nature, and even more so with what is real. >Nature/McDowell. I 140 Experience/Content/Understanding/McDowell: Empirical content is only understandable in a context that allows us to make the direct rational control of the mind through the world itself insightful. >Experience/McDowell. It is impossible for a fact to exert an impression on a person that perceives. However, the image of openness to the world brings the idea of direct access to the facts. Only that we cannot be certain in any case that it is not a deception. --- II 55 Understanding/McDowell: understanding your own utterances: ability to know what a theoretical description of this ability would do - knowing truths conditions - not truth! - Even in sentences which are not decidable by means of evidence - but this does not mean that the truth condition for each sentence either exists or does not exist, even if we cannot say that it exists or does not exist. >Truth condition. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Unemployment | Government Policy | Landsburg I 40 Unemployment/Government policy/Landsburg: One key lesson that economists and policymakers took to heart was that it makes no sense to ask, for example, "What will happen to employment ifwe increase the money supply this year by 5 percent?" The answer could be anything at all, depending on what people expect. Expectations/ Friedman: (…) a coherent monetary policy must be a long-run policy, one that takes into account how each year's changes affects the following years' expectations. Moreover, it's highly desirable for the authorities to manage expectations, by making clear commitments to policy rules, and developing a reputation for transparency. Natural rate of unemployment/Friedman: Friedman went on to hypothesize that there is a natural rate of unemployment arising from the fact that we live in a changing and uncertain world, where there will always be some people who prefer to be temporarily unemployed in order to search for a better job or go back to school or deal with family emergencies. Any attempt to use inflation to drive unemployment below that natural rate is doomed to fail, at least in the long run, and is probably not doing anyone any favours even during the brief interval in which it appears to succeed.* This natural rate hypothesis is now one of the central tenets of macroeconomics. Problem: The problem with this is that in order to hire people, the government must pay them. In order to pay them, it must either raise taxes or increase borrowing. Either way, there is less income in private hands. One way or another, private employment must fall. Governmen hiring/Problem: Government hiring is not a recipe for increasing employment; it's a recipe for increasing government employment at the expense of reducing private employment. Trying to legislate the natural rate of unemployment is like trying to legislate the force of gravity. The laws of nature are oblivious to the laws of men. Hubert HumphreyVsFriedman: (…) Senator Hubert Humphrey, the principal sponsor of the Humphrey-Hawkins legislation, responded that Friedman had misunderstood him; the goal of this legislation was not to substitute government employment for private employment, it was to increase government employment without affecting private employment. VsHumprey/Landsburg: Humphrey had, in other words, missed the point entirely. FriedmanVsHumphrey: “People hired by government know who is their benefactor. People who lose their jobs or fail to get them because of the government program do not know that that is the source of their problem. The good effects are visible. The bad effects are invisible. The good effects generate votes. The bad effects generate discontent, which is as likely to be directed at private business as at the government. The great political challenge is to overcome this bias, which has been taking us down the slippery slope to ever bigger government and to the destruction of a free society.”(1) >Government policy/Friedman. * The natural rate can change, and will if someone finds a better way to match workers to jobs or if training programs become more effective. Friedman's point is that you can't change the natural rate of unemployment by changing the money supply. >Money supply/Friedman, >Unemployment/Friedman. 1. Friedman’s Newsweek columns were collected in a number of hard cover volumes, but are all available on line at the Hoover Institution’s website: https://miltonfriedman.hoover.org/collections (April 2025) |
Landsburg I Steven E. Landsburg The Essential Milton Friedman Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2019 |
| Universal Sentence | Schurz | 92 Notation: II- : "follows logically". Explanation scheme/logical form/explanation/Schurz: strict all proposition & singular proposition II- singular proposition. All A are K and a is A II- a is K. Falsification scheme/falsification/logical form/Schurz: FS I: singular proposition falsifies strict universal sentence. singular sentence II- negation of strict universal sentence a is A and not K II- not all A are K FS II: existence sentence falsifies strict all proposition There is an A that is not a K II- not all A are K. I 93 Syntax/Semantics/Sentence/Characterization/Schurz: The above characterizations of sentence types are syntactic in nature. They are not always invariant to L equivalent transformations. Ex The singular sentence Fa is L equivalent to the all-sentence (x)(x = a > Fx) (all x that are identical with a are F). All proposition: but this proposition is not an all proposition in the semantic sense, since it only says something about the individual a. Invariance/property/Schurz: for sentences to express genuine properties of the corresponding propositions, they must be invariant to L equivalent sentence transformation. L-equivalent/(s): transformation that yields equivalent sentences within the language L. Thus, not arbitrary transformation. L equivalent sentences express the same proposition. Solution/Hempel/Oppenheim: method of essential sentence types. An all-sentence is genuine only if it is not L equivalent to a singular sentence. >Laws of Nature/Schurz. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Values | Singer | I 87 Values/Death/Killing/Utilitarianism/P. Singer: Assuming we could fix pain and pleasure as objective values, then we have another problem: there are two ways of reducing pleasure in the world, for example: a) Eliminating the pleasure out of a being's life b) To end the life of this being. This means that we cannot automatically move from the higher rating of a pleasant life over a less pleasant one to a higher rating of a pleasant life over the alternative that is not a life. Reason: when we are dead, we do not miss the pleasurable. >Death, >Life, >Morality, >Ethics, >Norms, >Pain, >Suffering. I 88 Utilitarianism: when it comes to the multiplication of pleasure in the world, why should we not have more and more children and breed more and more animals that have a pleasant life? This is what I call the "total view". >Utilitarianism. Vs: one could object that the life of the now existing beings would be restricted for this. And the beings who have not yet been born do not exist and therefore cannot suffer or do without anything. VsVs: on the other hand, one could assume a "prior existence" from the future beings. This means that our current decisions refer to beings that do not yet exist. >Future, >Decisions. I 89 Problem: in this case, one has to deal with asymmetry when deciding, for example, whether a child who is likely to suffer extremely badly and will soon die should be born. >Abortion. Problem: both perspectives, the "overall view" and the "pre-existence" viewpoint lead to contra-intuitive consequences. I 245 Values/Consciousness/knowledge/animals/Singer, P.: are there values beyond the reach of knowing beings? >Absoluteness, >Perspective, >Metaphysical realism. I 246 Intrinsic value: is a value that is desirable in itself, as opposed to a value that something receives as a means to something else. For example, luck is an intrinsic value, money is not. >Intrinsic, >Extrinsic. Environmental destruction/Singer, P.: If a valley is now destroyed by dam construction, one must not only consider the fate of the knowing creatures, but also the fates of the other species, most of which will die. >Animals. I 247 Utilitarianism: will in this case include the fact that the animals that would have lived there would have done so for hundreds of years to come. Ethics/Singer, P.: how far can it be extended beyond the realm of knowing beings? The ethical position I have developed in this book (P. Singer 2011(1)) is limited to knowing beings. I 248 It is difficult to extend ethics beyond this area. Problem: the concept of interest is missing when it comes to weighing up. >Interest. Another problem: without the concept of knowledge, the boundary between animate and inanimate nature is more difficult to defend. >Knowledge, >Nature. I 249 Solving/Albert Schweitzer/Singer, P.: Life/Law/Consciousness/Schweitzer: the most immediate fact of consciousness is: I am life that wants to live and I want to exist in the midst of life that wants to live... and this extends to all life in my environment, even if it cannot express itself. (A. Schweitzer 1929(2)). I 250 P. SingerVsSchweitzer: his language is misleading when he speaks of all forms of life without exception and ascribes them longing, desire, enthusiasm, pleasure and terror. Plants cannot feel any of this. Holmes RolstonVsSinger, P.: If natural selection has given an organism the traits it needs to strive for its survival, then this organism is able to evaluate something on the basis of these traits. (H. Rolston 1999)(3) P. SingerVsRolston: he does not explain why natural selection makes it possible to evaluate organisms, but not human design and creation. Should we say that solar cells, which automatically adjust to the sun, add value to the sun? >Selection, >Evolution. Life without Consciousness/Singer, P.: there is no reason to pay more respect to the physical processes that dominate animated things than to the physical processes that dominate inanimate things. If that is the case, at least it is not obvious why we should have more respect for a tree than for a stalactite. >Laws of nature, >Nature, >Life. 1. P. Singer, Practical Ethics, Cambridge, 2011. 2. A. Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics Part II, The Philosophy of Civilization, London, 1929, pp. 246-7. 3. H. Rolston, Respect for Life: Counting what Singer Finds of no Account“, in: Dale Jamieson (ed.), Singer and Critics, (Oxford, 1999) pp. 247-268. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| World | Barrow | I 136 World/Wittgenstein/Barrow: it says nothing about the world that it can be described by Newtonian mechanics, but rather that it can be described in any way, as it is the case. >Properties, >Reality, >Laws of Nature, >Laws/Newton. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Antireductionism | Lewis Vs Antireductionism | Schwarz I 216 Possible Worlds/poss.w./meaning/conditional theory/Lewis/Schwarz: e.g. objects can only be a possible world if there is a corresponding object for each mode a world could be. This is why possible worlds cannot be sets of common sentences since there is not enough of them. ((s) >Language has not enough sentences to express all the possibilities.) >Ersatz Worlds as sets of sentences. Possible World/LewisVsAnti-Reductionism/Schwarz: interestingly, he is also using the same argument against anti-reductionist theories for which possible worlds are basic metaphysical facts. The name "possible world in which donkeys are able to talk" can only be given to an object if it somehow represents talking donkeys. Schwarz I 217 Possible World/representation/Lewis/Schwarz: for Lewis, possible worlds are nothing else than 1:1 models. How can this work for irreducible abstract entities? This is why it remains open whether proposed candidates actually could be possible worlds (1986e, 184)(1). Problem: some basic entities do not fulfill those conditions (if reduction failed). Not even in Laws of Nature (LoN) and objective probabilities. Objective probability is characterized by the Principal Principle and therefore implies subjective probability. But why should I assume that an event is going to happen only because I learn that an irreducible element, which is logically independent from the event happening, possesses the value 0.9 (1994a,239)(2)?. This is why something should not be called "chance". Reference/Lewis: reference therefore represents a sort of theory of definite description of the reference. Thesis: terms such as "possible world", "meaning", "pain", "objective probability" are associated with roles which describe what they refer to. How those roles are defined is explained by Lewis in "How to define theoretical terms" (1970c)(3). >Theoretical Terms. 1. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 2. D. Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 3. D. Lewis [1970c]: “How to Define Theoretical Terms”. Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–446. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Aristotle | Locke Vs Aristotle | II 182 Essence/Properties/LockeVsAristotle: the qualities of natural things or "substances" cannot be derived conceptually from their essence, as the Aristotelian scholastic tradition thought it possible. II 195 Knowledge/Rationalism/Aristotle/Descartes/Leibniz: assumption of innate knowledge, substantial forms and "entities" as defined and applied to knowledge. Empiricism/LockeVsAristotle: the objectivity of what is to be known and the unity of the consciousness content occurring in a general idea must be justified by the means of knowing itself. II 198 Genus/Species/LockeVsAristotle: purely artificial product is erroneously regarded as order of laws of nature. However, we can hardly escape the view that they are images of something that really exists. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Armstrong, D. | Lewis Vs Armstrong, D. | V 353 "New Work for a Theory of Universals" (Armstrong 1983)(1): Universals/Armstrong: Armstrong's theory of universals is supposed to be the solution for the problem of the One and the Many >Universals/Armstrong, >Universals/Lewis. LewisVsArmstrong: but it allows for either nominalist solutions or for no solution of any kind. --- Schwarz I 71 Combinatorialism/Armstrong: combinatorialism merely consists of several fundamental properties for which - contrary to colours - any combination should be possible (1986(2), §7). LewisVs: 1986a(3), 86, HellerVs (1998)(4): it is unclear whether this is actually possible. LewisVsArmstrong: as such the problem is not solved, it only allows different interpretations of the descriptions: when does a set of sentences represent the fact that there are donkeys if there is no mention of donkeys? It does represent this fact if the sentences imply the existence of donkeys (1986e(5), 150-157). Problem: modality is required. VsVs: it could be stated that the relationship between the distribution of fundamental properties and of all other truths is analytic, and can be characterized without requiring primitive modal vocabulary. (2002b(6), Heller 1996, see below Chapter 11, LewisVs: 1992a(8), 209). Schwarz I 118 Laws of Nature/LoN/DretskeVsLewis/TooleyVsLewis/ArmstrongVsLewis: there is something missing in Lewis’ laws of nature: for Lewis, laws of nature are simple regularities. But they should be more than that. Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong-Theory: thesis: laws of nature are based on fundamental relations between universals, therefore properties. Since regularities are logically independent from local events, possible worlds with precisely the same local events can nicely differ in their laws of nature. For one world, it may be a regularity, for the other, a relation of universals. Relation of universals: is the foundation for everything and cannot be analyzed. To state that there is a relation between F's and G's because all F's are G's is not enough. This would be the regularity theory. SchwarzVs: this leads to problems with not instantiated universals (Mellor 1980(9), §6). Laws of Nature/LewisVsArmstrong/LewisVsTooley/LewisVsDretske: if laws of nature express fundamental relations between universals which are logically independent from observable regularities why do we assume that physics will tell us something about laws of nature? Schwarz I 119 What is the use of universals? Physicists only want to observe regularities. And what is then the relation between universals and regularities? Additional explanations will then be needed! How could a rule-maker exclude that N(F,G) is valid, but some F's are nevertheless not G's. It is not resolved by giving a name to the "rule-maker" like Armstrong does with the term "necessitation". Laws of Nature/LewisVsArmstrong: better: regularities which are justified because of a primitive relation between universals. It is a relationship which also exists in possible worlds in which laws of nature are not valid. It is rather more obscure, but at least not a miracle anymore that all F's are G's if a law of nature demands it. Schwarz I 124 Probability/LewisVsArmstrong: VsFundamental probability property: fundamental properties cannot fulfill the role which we attribute to probability. Schwarz I 139 Cause/causation/Armstrong: absence is not a real cause. LewisVsArmstrong: yes, it is. However, it is so common that is it ignored. Problem: numerous absences in vacuum. Schwarz I 140 Solution/Lewis: absences are absolutely nothing, there is nothing. Problem: if absence is only an empty space-time region, why would oxygen - and not nitrogen- only exist because of absence? Solution/Lewis: "influence", small increase of probability. Schwarz I 141 Counterfactual dependence as well between the how, when and where of the event. Schwarz I 231 Def Principle of truth-maker/to make truth/Armstrong/Martin/Schwarz: all truths must be based on the ontology. Strong form: for each truth, there is something that makes it true. Its existence necessarily implies the truth. LewisVsArmstrong: that is too strong, e.g. the example "no unicorns exist" is true, not because there is something specific, but because unicorns really do not exist (1992a(8), 204, 2001b(10), 611f). Truthmaker: a truthmaker would be an object here which only exists in worlds in which there are no unicorns. Problem: why is it not possible for this object to also exist in worlds in which there are unicorns? Answer: such an object would be a contradiction to the principle of recombination. SchwarzVsLewis: but this is not true: the truth-maker for "no unicorns exist" could be an object which essentially lives in a possible world without unicorns. However, the object could very well have duplicates in the possible worlds with unicorns. The counterpart relation is not a relation of intrinsic resemblance. To make truth/predicate/Armstrong/Schwarz: (Armstrong 1997(11), 205f): if object A has the property F, an object must exist which implies the existence of this fact. LewisVsArmstrong: why can this object not exist, although A is not F (1998b)(12)?. If A is F in one world, but it is not so in the other world, why is it always necessary to have something that exists in one possible world, but is missing in the other world. Two possible worlds are only different on the grounds of the characteristics the objects have in their worlds. ((s) So different characteristics in an area that remains constant). Characteristics/truth-maker/Lewis: a truth-maker is not needed for something that has a (basic) characteristic: the sentence "A is F" is true because A has the characteristic F. That is all (1998b(12), 219). Def principle of truth-maker/LewisVsArmstrong/Schwarz: only the following will then remain: truth supervenes upon the things that exist, and upon perfect natural characteristics which it chooses to instantiate (1992a(8), 207, 1994a(13), 225, Bigelow 1988(14), §25). Whenever two possibilities are different from each other, there are either different objects in them or these objects have different fundamental characteristics (1992a(8), 206, 2001b(10), §4). Schwarz I 232 N.B.: if there are possibilities that are qualitatively indistinguishable, but numerically different (which Lewis neither states nor denies, 1986e(5), 224), the principle must be limited to qualitative truths or characteristics (1992a(8), 206f). If there are none, simplification is possible: no other two possibilities are exactly the same regarding which objects exist as well as the fundamental characteristics are instantiated. ((s) If the distribution of fundamental characteristics sets everything, then the objects are set as well. As such, the possible worlds are only different regarding their characteristics, but these are naturally set.) Schwarz: this can be amplified. 1. D. M. Armstrong [1983]: What is a Law of Nature?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. D. M. Armstrong [1986]: “The Nature of Possibility”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 16: 575–594. 3. D. Lewis [1986a]: “Against Structural Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 25–46. 4. Mark Heller [1998]: “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds”. Journal of Philosophy, 95: 293–316. 5. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 6. D. Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97. 7. Mark Heller [1996]: “Ersatz Worlds and Ontological Disagreement”. Acta Analytica, 40:35–44. 8.D. Lewis [1992a]: “Critical Notice of Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70: 211–224. In [Lewis 1999a] als “Armstrong on Combinatorial Possibility”. 9. David H. Mellor [1980]: “Necessities and universals in natural laws”. In David H. Mellor (Hg.) Science, belief and behaviour, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10. D. Lewis [2001b]: “Truthmaking and Difference-Making”. Noˆus, 35: 602–615. 11. D. M. [1997]: A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 12. D. Lewis [1998b]: “A World of Truthmakers?” Times Literary Supplement , 4950: 30. 13. D. Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 14. John Bigelow [1988]: The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Armstrong, D. | Wittgenstein Vs Armstrong, D. | Arm III 41 WittgensteinVsArmstrong/Tractatus: laws of nature cannot be explaining principles for observed phenomena. (6.371). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Best Explanation | Armstrong Vs Best Explanation | Arm III 105 VsInduction/Vs best explanation/BE: inductive skepticism could doubt that it really would be the best explanation; more fundamental: why should the uniformities of the world have an explanation at all (regularities, reg.)? Regularity/Berkeley: through God. He could also abolish the "laws of nature" tomorrow. Berkeley/Armstrong: answering this already means to concede the possibilities. We have no guarantee that the BE is the best scheme. But it is informative. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Bigelow, J. | Lewis Vs Bigelow, J. | Big I 222 Laws of Nature/LoN/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: cannot be described adequately in a non-modal language. And this because NG is not only a regularity. logical form: i.e. a NG cannot only be represented in this form: (x)(Fx > Gx) logical form : a NG will often be a universal generalization (Gen)[universelle Generalisierung (UG)]. But it may also be a different generalization or a different form of sentence. But we are assuming here that laws of nature involve universal generalizations, and will therefore have the following form: I 223 natL(x)(Fx > Gx). (x) Fx would > would Gx) ((s) If something were an F, it would be a G). LoN/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: this is the view on NG which we defend. LewisVsBigelow (1979): the theory is circular. I 231 LewisVsBigelow: Vsmodal theory. Bigelow/Pargetter: We explain laws through accessibility Lewis: explains accessibility through laws. Bigelow/Pargetter: If Lewis is right, our theory is circular. Lösung/Lewis: s.u. BigelowVsVs/BigelowVsLewis: We deny that accessibility must be explained through similarity. The world that has the easiest access is not necessarily the world which resembles the other one the most. >Similarity metrics. |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Carnap, R. | Carnap Vs Carnap, R. | VI VII Extensionality thesis/Carnap: (1928): all statements are extensional. Self-criticism CarnapVsCarnap: (1961) is not correct in this form. New: weaker form: not every extensional statement is translatable into a logically equivalent statement in an extensional language. Extensional method/Carnap: is basically just to use an extensional language for the whole constitutional system. Self-criticism: (1961) that is not clear: the impression could arise that for the validity of the re-construction of the concept A through a term B it was already sufficient for that B to have the same scope as A. Vs: in reality, the stronger condition must be satisfied that scope equality is not just a coincidence, but a necessity! (Because of logical rules or laws of nature). |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Carnap, R. | Stroud Vs Carnap, R. | I 182 External/internal/Carnap/Quine/Stroud: Quine seems to interpret Carnap this way. That the distinction between "category questions" and "subsets questions" corresponds to the distinction. External/QuineVsCarnap: this is nothing more than two ways of formalizing the language. If we have only one kind of bound variable for all things, it will be an external question: "Is there such and such?" if the variable goes over the whole range. (This is a question of category). Internally: if there is a variable for every kind of thing, it will be a subset question. Then the question does not refer to all the things that can exist. I 183 Philosophy/QuineVsCarnap: differs from the sciences only in the range of its categories. (Quine, Word and Object, p. 275). External/internal/QuineVsCarnap: Category questions differ from internal questions only in their generality from subset questions. We can get to the generality by letting some kind of variable go over all things. I 191 StroudVsCarnap: this introduces a "we", and something that happens to us, called "experience". That we exist and have experience cannot simply be seen as an "internal" truth of the thing language. One cannot then see the meaning of experience as the common goal of all "real alternatives", because then it is assumed that there are external things. Problem: the question of the common goal of all genuine alternatives cannot be regarded as an external question of all reference systems either, because then it becomes meaningless. But if it were "internal", what would be the difference if one were to switch from one reference system to another that does not even contain this goal? Carnap does not answer that. I 192 This makes it difficult to grasp his positive approach. CarnapVsSkepticism: misunderstands the relation between linguistic frame of expression about external objects and the truths expressed within this system of reference. StroudVsCarnap: but what exactly is his own non-sceptical approach to this relation? 1. To which system does Carnap's thesis belong that assertions of existence in the language of things are neither true nor false? 2. What does the thesis express at all then? Knowledge/internal/Carnap: for example the geometer in Africa really comes to knowledge about the mountain. StroudVsCarnap: but what does it mean in addition to the fact that this is not a truth that is independent of a reference system? Suppose for some reason we did not have the thing language and could freely choose another language. Does it follow from this that, for example, the sentence about the mountain in Africa would no longer be true? Surely we would express something completely different in a completely different language without thing expressions. But would the sentence we can make now not be true in this other language? I 193 And could it never be true if we had never accidentally adopted the thing language. Existence/Language/Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: that cannot be right and it leads to an extreme idealism that Carnap just rejects. It is absurd because we already know enough about mountains to see that they are not influenced by a chosen language. Language/object/Stroud: things were there long before language came into being in the world. And that again is something we know "internally" in the thing language. StroudVsCarnap: then his thesis, understood as "internal" to the language, is wrong. It contradicts what we already assume it as knowledge about ourselves and external things. Empirically speaking, it leads to idealism that contradicts the known facts. CarnapVsVs: would say that of course one must not understand his thesis "empirically" and not the thing language "internally". StroudVsCarnap: but within some reference system it must be internal, otherwise it is meaningless. Problem: but this is a statement about the relation between a chosen framework and the internal statements within that framework. And if that implies that these internal statements would have been neither true nor false, if a different frame of reference had been chosen, it is still idealism, whether empirical or non empirical idealism. Truth Value/tr.v./Convention/StroudVsCarnap: the truth value of the internal sentences would depend on the choice of language (of the reference system). I 194 StroudVsCarnap: it is important to see that if this did not follow, Carnap's thesis would not be different from traditional skepticism! There would then be room for the possibility that statements about things would remain true, even if we abandoned the thing language and truth would again be independent of language. Problem: that would again lead to our choice of a linguistic framework being necessary only to formulate or recognize something that would be true anyway ((s) > metaphysical realism) independently of that framework. Theoretically: according to Carnap this would then be a "theoretical" question about the acceptability of the thing language as a whole. But in terms of objectivity, which we then presuppose. CarnapVsTradition: it is precisely the incomprehensibility of such theoretical questions that is important in Carnap. Because Problem: then it could be that even if we carefully apply our best procedures (> Best explanation), things could still be different from what we think they are. This is equivalent to skepticism. "Conditional Correctness"/Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: Carnap accepts what I have called the "conditional correctness" of skepticism: if the skeptic could ask a meaningful question, he would prevail. StroudVsCarnap: if he now would not deny that the "internal" sentences remain true or false when changing the reference system, his approach would be just as tolerant of skepticism as tradition. ((s) So both denial and non-denial would become a problem.) Kant/Stroud: he also accepts the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If Descartes' description of experience and its relation to external things were correct, we could never know anything about these things. Carnap/Stroud: his thesis is a version of Kant's "Copernican Turn". And he obtains it for the same reasons as Kant: without it we would have no explanation, how is it possible that we know anything at all? Reference system/frame/StroudVsCarnap: a gap opens up between the frame and what is true independently of it. ((s) If a choice between different frames is to be possible). StroudVsCarnap: in this respect, Carnap's approach is entirely Kantian. I 196 And he also inherits all the obscurity and idealism of Kant. There are parallels everywhere: for both there can be a kind of distancing from our belief. We can do a philosophical study of everyday life (as far as the conditions of knowledge are concerned). I 197 Reference system/framework/StroudVsCarnap: to which framework does Carnap's thesis belong that no propositions about external objects are true or false regardless of the choice of a reference system (language)? And is this thesis - analytical or not - itself "internal" in any framework? And whether it is or not, is it not merely an expression of Kantian Transcendental Idealism? Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: the basic mistake is to develop any competing theory at all to tradition. I 198 A purely negative approach or deflationary use of the verification principle would simply eliminate skepticism as pointless. If that were possible, scepticism would no longer need to be undermined. But: Verification Principle/StroudVsCarnap: Problem: the status of the verification principle itself, or its acceptability. We can only use it to refute Descartes if we have a good reason to accept it as necessary. But that depends on how it is introduced. It should serve to prevent the excesses of senseless philosophical speculation. StroudVsCarnap: 1. Then we can only watch and see how far the principle can lead to a distinction that we have already made before! The only test would be sentences, which we would have recognized as senseless before! 2. But even assuming that the principle would be adequately proven as extensional and descriptive, i.e. it would distinguish between meaningful and senseless, as we do, I 199 it would not allow us to eliminate something as senseless that we had not already recognized as senseless by other means. Verification Principle/StroudVsCarnap: was incorrectly introduced ((s) with the ulterior motive of producing a result that was already fully known). Early Carnap sketches show that general laws of nature were initially wrongly excluded. Verification principle/VP/StroudVsCarnap: a correct introduction would provide a strong destructive tool that Kant was already looking for: it would have to explain why the verfication principle is correct. This would probably be identical to an explanation of how knowledge of external things is possible. Verification Principle/Hempel/Carnap/Stroud: the early representatives had in mind that 1. a sentence is meaningful only if it expresses an "actual content", 2. that understanding a sentence means knowing what would happen if the sentence were true. Verificationism/Stroud: There is nothing particularly original about this approach. What gives it the verificationist twist is the idea that we cannot even understand anything that cannot be known as true or false, or weaker: at least to believe as more rational than its opposite. StroudVsCarnap: that failed, even as an attempt to extract empirically verifiable sentences. I 205 SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: even if verificationism is true, we still need an explanation of how and why traditional philosophical ((s) non-empirical) inquiry fails. ((s) should correspond here to skepticism). (>Why-question). I 207 StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap/StroudVsHempel: it is more plausible to reject the verification principle ((s) > empiricist sense criterion) than to claim that Descartes never said anything meaningful. StroudVsVerification Principle: it will remain implausible as long as it is not understood why the traditional distinction internal/external should not be correct. I 214 Formal manner of speaking: ""Wombat" applies to (is true of) some living beings in Tasmania". QuineVsCarnap: misunderstands the semantic ascent when he speaks of external issues. But this does not reject Carnap's pragmatic approach to simplicity and fertility of theories. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Carnap, R. | Stegmüller Vs Carnap, R. | Stegmüller IV 342 StegmüllerVsPositivism: because of the laws of nature contained in the statements, statements by natural scientists cannot be verified! IV 343 Planning must also be based on assumptions that are not verifiable at the moment of planning. Criteria/sense criterion/Theology/VsCarnap/Stegmüller: instead of a questionable criterion of meaning, we have to look at the definitions of God and ask whether our intuitive prior understanding is sufficient. Theologians make claims of validity independent of criteria of meaning. Example: an incorporeal person can at least be thought of! Example: likewise that something was created from nothing does not represent mental difficulties! IV 344 For example a problem forms only the concept of the necessary being. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Correspondence Theory | Hume Vs Correspondence Theory | I 234 Human Theories/Laws of Nature/VsCorrespondence Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: theories in the style of Hume (without assuming causlity) are rivals of the correspondence theory. Cf. >Causality/Hume, >Natural laws, >Humean World. Coherence Theory: Humeans are pro coherence theory. Humeans tend to assume coherence (coherence of a system of statements) >Coherence Theory. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Counterfactual Conditional | Fraassen Vs Counterfactual Conditional | I 115 Counterfactual Conditional/Co.co./Causation/Cause/Lewis/Fraassen: Under certain circumstances, after all, it is logically correct to say: whenever "A is the cause of B" is true, it is also true that if A had not existed, B would not have existed either. FraassenVsCounterfactual Conditionals/FraassenVsLewis: Problem: E.g. Assuming, if the alarm had not gone off, David would have not woken up; we will concede that, however: if he had not slept the night before, he would not have woken up! Problem: it should not be the cause of his awakening that he went to sleep. Solution/Lewis: Counterfactual conditional sorts out the nodes in the causal network, while "because" points to specific factors. Relevance: E.g. falling asleep is not relevant for waking up at a certain time, even though it is a necessary condition. Not every necessary condition is relevant. Context-Dependent/Fraassen: every theory of causality must explain what is discarded as unimportant. And this is done in relation to context. This, in turn, is objective. That much context dependency must always be. Problem: there is still much more of it if we are dealing with counterfactual conditionals. FraassenVsCounterfactual Conditionals/FrassenVsLewis: in science, there is nothing that corresponds to counterfactual conditionals with their extreme context dependence: Science is not context-dependent. Ceteris Paribus/Fraassen: the factors that are held fixed are in the mind of the speaker! They are speaker-dependent! And it depends on the broader context, whether what I silently presume collides with the situation or not. E.g. The match is dry. I 118 E.g. Danny is interested in women. Would he be a lesbian if he were a woman? Solution: the content of "ceteris paribus" is not only determined by the one sentence and the specific situation, but also by factors of context. FraassenVsCounterfactual conditionals: they are no solution here: scientific statements are not context-dependent. Therefore science implies no counterfactual conditional (if they are, as I believe, context-dependent). Counterfactual Conditionals/Laws of Nature/LoN/Reichenbach/Goodman/Hempel: Thesis: Counterfactual conditionals provide an objective criterion for what a law is or at least a law-like statement. Because only laws, but not general truths, imply counterfactual conditionals. FraassenVsCounterfactual Conditionals/FraassenVsGoodman: this idea needs to be reversed: if laws imply counterfactual conditionals, then, because they are context-dependent. Law/LoN/Fraassen: the concept of law does not point to any objective distinction in nature. Counterfactual Conditionals/Explanation/Fraassen: nevertheless, I believe that counterfactual conditionals are suitable for explanations, but that means that explanations are crucially context-dependent. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Dennett, D. | Searle Vs Dennett, D. | Dennett I 558 Intentionality/SearleVsDennett: cannot be reached by the composition of equipment or the construction of ever-improving algorithms. DennettVsSearle: this is the belief in sky hook: the Spirit shall not be created, it is not designed, but only (unexplained) source of design. SearleVsDennett: the view that one can look for "floating grounds" for a selection process for the mind, is a caricature of Darwinian thinking. Searle I 179 We can understand the concept of an unconscious mental state only so that it was about a real content of consciousness. Def "compound principle": the idea that all unconscious intentional states in principle consciousness are accessible. 1. SearleVsDennett: there is a difference between intrinsic intentionality and as if intentionality. If one wanted to give up this difference, one would have to accept the fact that everything is about something mental, because relative to any purpose can be anything and everything treated as if it were something intellectual. E.g. Running water could be described as if it had intentionality: it is trying to get down, by visiting clever way the line of least resistance, it processes information, the calculated size of rocks, etc .. (> laws of nature). But if water is something mental, then everything is something mental. 2. Unconscious intentional states are intrinsic. I 180 3. intrinsic intentional states, conscious or unconscious, always have an aspect shape. Someone may want a glass of drinking water without wanting to drink a glass of H2O. There is an indefinite number of true descriptions of the evening star or a glass of water, but if someone wants a glass of water, this will only happen under certain aspects and not others. I 181 4. The aspects feature can not be exhaustively or fully characterized alone with the help of third person predicates. There is always an inference gap gape between the epistemological reasons that we can gain from the behavior that the aspect is present, and the ontology of the aspect itself. A person may well create a behavior of the water searching on the day, but each such conduct will also be a search of H2O. There is no way exclude the second. I 182 E.g. assumed we would have a brain o Skop to look into the skull of a person, and see that she wants water, but no H2O, then still a conclusion would play a part! We then would still have a law-like link that puts us in a position to conclude from our observations of the neural architecture that in this case the desire for water, but not the desire for H2O is realized. The neurophysiological facts are always causally sufficient for any amount of mental facts. 5. But the ontology of unconscious mental states is solely in the existence of purely neurophysiological phenomena. E.g. we imagine someone fast asleep and dreamless. Now it is so that he believes that the capital of Colorado is Denver. Now, the only facts that may exist while he is completely unconscious are neurophysiological facts. I 183 That seems to be a contradiction: the ontology of unconscious intentionality consists entirely of objective, neurophysiological third person phenomena, yet these states have an aspect shape. This contradiction is resolved when we consider the following: 6. The concept of an unconscious intentional state is the concept of a state which is a possible conscious thought. 7. The ontology of the unconscious consists in objective characteristics of the brain that are capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts. I 184 The existence of causal features is compatible therewith that their causal powers may be blocked in each case due to confounding factors. An unconscious intentional state may be such that it could simply not be brought to consciousness by the person concerned. However, it must be a thing of the kind that, in principle, can be brought to consciousness. Mentalism: the naive mentalism leads to a kind of dispositional analysis of unconscious mental phenomena. The idea of a dispositional theory of mind has been introduced precisely for the purpose of getting rid of the appeal to the consciousness. (> Dispositions/Ryle). III 156 Rule/VsSearle: one might say, "is it not simply so, "as if" we followed the rules?" As if/intentionality/Searle: "As if-Intentionality" explains nothing if there is no real intentionality. She has no causal power. SearleVsDennett: it is as empty as the "intentional attitude". |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Derrida, J. | McDowell Vs Derrida, J. | I 123 Meaning/nature/McDowell: it s a good lesson of modernity, that the range of natural laws is of no importance. McDowellVsDerrida: we are not compelled to read the flight of the bird as text. The constitutive elements of the laws of nature are not conceptually connected, as it is in the space of reasons. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Feynman, R. | Cartwright Vs Feynman, R. | I 19 Science/Cartwright: My image of it is not as pure as that of positivism. It is a jumble of unobservable entities, causal processes, and phenomenological laws. Reality/Positivism/Cartwright: pro: we have no better reality apart from the one we have at hand. Cartwright: Thesis: there is no reality behind the things, which would be described by theoretical laws. Explanation/Feynman: fitting the phenomena into the patterns of nature. CartwrightVsFeynman: What patterns? Nature/Cartwright: is a wild abundance that our thinking does not tame. Things that seem to be the same are not if we look at them up close. I 59 Force/Forces/Composition/Cause/Composition/Causality/Physics/Laws of Nature/LoN/Cartwright: E.g. the mix of electromechanics and gravity is an example of the composition of forces. Forces: are composed vectorially. Is that not a solution for all fears? We then obtain from vector addition the "resultant force". Vector Addition/Cartwright: We add numbers here (that represent the forces). These are calculations. It is not nature that "adds" the forces. For the "component forces" do not even exist! Only in a metaphorical sense. And the related laws must be seen metaphorically as well. The story with the vector addition presupposes that Feynman has forgotten something in his version of the law of gravitation, because it sounds as if the law described the results rather than the components. I 60 Law of Gravitation/CartwrightVsFeynman: should be better be written as follows: instead of ’... exercise ... ": "two bodies produce a force between each other.... (the force according to the gravitational)..." I 161 Refraction/Causality/Model/Feynman: (2nd Volume Berkeley Physics lectures: ~ "...we can now solve differential equations better than in the first semester. Previously, we were only able to find the refraction index for materials of low density such as gases, but during this process the physical principles that produced this index became clear. I 162 Now on the other hand (with differential equations) the physical origin is obscured! (This comes from reflected waves that interfere with the original ones. However, the theory is now simpler. CartwrightVsFeynman: I do not understand what it means for a theory to be "telling a causal story". How does he explain in the first volume that the physical principles produce the refraction? Cartwright: I already know what he does and he is successful in extracting a causal representation from his model. Causality/CartwrightVsFeynman: but I have no philosophical theory about how this is done. Causality/Philosophy/Cartwright: we need a new theory for the relation between causal processes and the fundamental laws. Our old theories are not suitable. Here, neither the covering law approach nor my simulacrum view are of any help. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Fine, Kit | Lewis Vs Fine, Kit | V 41 Analysis 2: a counterfactual conditional "If it were the case that A, then it would be the case that C" is true then and only when a (accessible) world where A and C are true is everywhere more similar to our actual world than a world where A is true and C is false. V 43 Kit FineVsLewis/VsAnalysis 2: e.g. the counterfactual conditional "If Richard Nixon had pushed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust" is true or can be imagined as being true. According to Lewis' analysis the co.co. is then probably wrong because by imagining just a slight change in reality, the effects will not exist. >Counterfactual conditional. LewisVsFine: Surely the event or not of an atomic holocaust will strongly contribute to a basing relation or not. But the similarity relation (s.r.) which rules over the counterfactual conditionals is not one of those! Still, s.r. can be a relation for similarity everywhere, but not because it determines explicit judgments, rather because it is a result of many single similarity relations according to particular priorities of evaluation. V 44 w0: e.g. Nixon pushed the button at the time t. w0. This can but does not need to be in our actual world. This world could have deterministic laws, and the world is sufficient for our darkest visions of buttons that are pushed. A nuclear holocaust happens because all connections of the button do work. There are now all possible worlds where Nixon pushes the button, but those worlds are different from our actual world. Which world resembles our the most? Some are simply squib loads or the missile is simply filled with confetti. e.g. w1: w1 is exactly like w0 until shortly before t. In the last moment both worlds diverge: In w1 the deterministic laws of w0 are violated. Lewis: Supposing a minuscule little miracle happens: Maybe some extra neurons in Nixon's brain. As a result, Nixon pushes these extra neurons. The holocaust happens. As such, both worlds are quite different from each other, at least regarding the surface of the planet. ((s) It was only counterfactual in w0 : If he pushes, the holocaust would happen.) Lewis: so w1 is sufficient for analysis 1 (asymetry by postulate.) (We assume that we are in w0.) It should appear that worlds, like w1 in the basing relation, have more resemblance than all the other worlds in which Nixon would have pushed the button. Miracle/Lewis: I simply mean the violation of laws of nature. But the violated laws are not in the same world! This would be impossible! V 45 Miracle: Relation between possible worlds because the laws of a single world are not violated! w2: A second class of candidates of worlds that resemble w0 the most: without any miracle, the deterministic laws of w0 are followed exactly. Difference to w0: Nixon pushes the button. Determinism: After this, both worlds are either always or never the same. This is why both are never exactly the same for any period of time. They are even different in the past of a long time ago. Problem: It cannot be stated what can be done in order to make the difference in recent past disappear. It is difficult to imagine how two deterministic worlds an actually be only slightly different over a long period of time. There is too much probability for small differences, which become a big sum. Naturally, worlds like w2 are not the most similar world for a world w0 in which Nixon pushes the button. This would lead to infinite backwards arguments. Bennett: counterfactual conditionals would also be rendered senseless. We do not know enough to know which of them would be true. To conclude: what we learn by comparing w1 to w2: in the basing relations, a small miracle is needed in order to have a perfect concordance of single facts. w3: begins like w1: w3 is exactly like w0 until shortly before t. Then a small miracle happens, Nixon pushes the button, but there is no war! This is because a second small miracle happens immediately after the push. It can as localized as the first one. The fatal signal is erased. Still, Nixon's action has left its marks: his fingerprints on the button, an empty bottle of gin, etc. V 46 There are numerous differences between w3 and w0, but no one is particularly important. w3: There is more than only small differences, e.g. Nixon's memoirs have no influence on later generations, etc. But even if it is unclear whether the differences will have strong repercussions it is not important. Schwarz I 51 Counterfactual Conditional/co.co./FineVsLewis: His analysis clearly gives wrong results even with our vague intuitive similarity standards, e.g. "If Richard Nixon had pushed the button, there would have been a nuclear war". Problem: A possible world, in which Nixon pushed the button and an atomic war was started, must then resemble our actual world more than a world, in which he pushed the button, the mechanism failed and nothing happened. But an undestroyed world should surely have more similarities with our world? LewisVsFine: Here wrong resemblance criteria were used. The important categories are those in which his analysis is proven correct. We need to find out what we now about truth and wrongness of the co.co. in order to ascertain whether we can find a sort of basing relation.[ (1979b(1),43, 1986f(2),211). Lewis/Schwarz: this is why his theory of counterfactual conditionals is more a frame for such theories. Analysis tells us which sort of facts make co.co. true, but it does not tell us for which specific conditionals in specific contexts they are. 1. D. Lewis [1979b]: “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow”. Nous, 13: 455–476. 2. D. Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Fraassen, B. van | Cartwright Vs Fraassen, B. van | I 10 Asymmetry/Explanation/Causality/Fraassen: (The scientific image): Thesis: the asymmetries (by way of explanation) are not real!. CartwrightVsFraassen: I think he is mistaken. But his question is strong and could cause us to abandon certain explanation strategies. Cartwright Thesis: what we do not give up so easily are our strategies for action in everyday life. E.g. spraying marshes with anti-mosquito agents is effective E.g. burning sheets of malaria patients is not. I 89 FraassenVsTheoretical Entities/Cartwright: why should one believe in them?. CartwrightVsFraassen: theoretical entities exist, because there is no real regularity at the level of phenomena. Regularity/Cartwright: Only exists at the level of theoretical entities, not of phenomena. Law/Laws of Nature/Cartwright: their universal applicability does not only explain why the phenomena behave as regularly as they do, but also why we sometimes see exceptions. Van Fraassen admits that. Explanation/van Fraassen: Problem: but from the fact that a bunch of principles ensures the phenomena it cannot be concluded that they are true!. right: E.g. "I think therefore I am". wrong: E.g. "P explains Q. Q is true, therefore P is true". I 92 Electron/Cartwright: Important argument: is not an entity of any particular theory! (Electrons are not theory-dependent!). That means it is not about Bohr’s electrons in contrast to Rutherford’s electrons. CartwrightVsFraassen: I choose an E.g. of van Fraassen to show how we differ: E.g. Cloud chamber/Fraassen: unlike the contrails in the sky, we cannot see anything at the frond of the cloud chamber trail, no matter how well we look. Therefore, there are no theoretical entities. CartwrightVsFraassen: I agree with the premise, not the conclusion. I 93 Theoretical entities/Cartwright: The special thing about explanations that involve theoretical entities is that they are causal explanations (not inferring the best explanation). And existence assertion is characteristic of causal explanations. Cause/Causality/Fraassen/Cartwright: he does not believe in causes. The whole causality is a fiction. I 160 Theory//Fraassen/Sellars/Cartwright: both have extraordinary respect for the theory. Both expect it to grasp the facts about the observable correctly. For van Fraassen, theoretical assertions (about the unobservable) do not have to do that. CartwrightVsFraassen/CartwrightVsSellars: a good theory does not have either! The observation consequences ((s)> observation conditional) can be broadly what we believe to be true, but they are usually not the best we can expect. CartwrightVsFraassen: 2) For me, it is not only about the observable. I suppose theoretical entities and causal processes. This brings me closer to Sellars. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Hempel, C. | Lewis Vs Hempel, C. | V 232 Probability/Explanation/Hempel/Lewis: is also offered by him for the probabilistic case; but this is different from his deductive-nomological model. LewisVsHempel: two unwelcome consequences: 1. an improbable case cannot be explained at all 2. a necessity of a correct explanation: "maximal specificity" : relative to our knowledge, i.e. not knowing (a case of probability) makes an explanation, which is actually true, not true. Truth is only that not knowing makes the explanation look untrue. I prefer Peter Railton's model: Probability/Explanation/Peter Railton/Lewis: "deductive-nomological model" "probabilistic explanation" (d.n.m.). We must distinguish this model from Fetzer's model: for both covering law/Raiton/Fetzer: universal generalizations about a single case are chances. Explanation/Probability/FetzerVsRailton: as for Hempel: inductive, not deductive. Explanation: as an argument! LewisVsFetzer: but: a good explanation is not necessarily a good argument! LewisVsFetzer/LewisVsRailton: both want an explanation even if the event is very improbable. But in this case a good explanation is a very bad argument. V 233 Probability/Explanation/Covering Law Model/Railton:two parts: 1. one deductive-nomological argument which fulfills some conditions of the non-probabilistic case. Laws of probability may also be a part of its premises. 2. does not belong to the argument: The finding that the event took place. If the premises say that certain events took place, then those are sufficient if taken together - given the laws - for the actual event or for the probability. Problem: a subset - given only a part of the laws- can be sufficient as well in explaining parts of the events, and in creating a number of remains which are still sufficient under the original laws. This is why there must be two conditions for the explanation: 1. certain events are sufficient when taken together for the event of the explanandum (under the prevailing laws) 2. only some of the laws are used to guarantee that the conditions are sufficient LewisVsRailton: If we had covering law for causation, and our covering law for explanation, my approach would be reconciled with the c1-approach. But this cannot be achieved! V 233/234 An element of the d.n.m.'s sufficient reasons will in reality often be one of the causes. But this cannot be! The counterexamples are well-known: 1. an irrelevant reason can be a part of the sufficient subset, the requirement of minimality is not helping: We can create artificial minimality by taking weaker laws and disregarding stronger ones. e.g. Salmon: A man takes the (birth control) pill, and does not end up pregnant! The premise that nobody who takes the pill will not become pregnant cannot be disregarded! 2. An element of sufficient subset could be something that is not an event: e.g. a premise can assess that something as an extrinsic or highly disjunctive characteristic. But no true events can be specified. 3. An effect can be part of the subset if laws state that the effect can only be made to happen in a particular way. I.e.: the set could be conveniently minimal, and also be one of the events, but it would not be sufficient to make the effect the cause of its cause. 4. Such an effect can also be the sufficient subset for another effect, e.g. of a later effect of the same cause. E.g. an ad appearing on my TV is caused because of the same broadcast, like the same appearing on your TV. But one appearance is not the cause of the other ad, rather they happened due to the same cause. 5. an impeded potential cause may belong to a subset because nothing has overridden it. LewisVsRailton: This shows that the combined sufficient subset, presented by d.n.-arguments, is possibly not a set of causes. V 235 LewisVsRailton: It is a problem for my own theory if a d.n. argument does not seem to show causes, but still seems to be an explanation. (see above, paragraph III,I. Three examples VsHempel: refractive index, VsRailton: no non-causal cases in reality. RailtonVsLewis: If the d.n. model presents no causes, and thereby does not look like an explanation, then it makes it a problem for said model. Railton: This is why not every d.n. model is a correct explanation. V 236 Question: Can every causal narration be characterized by the information which is part of a deductive-nomological argument? It would be the case if each cause belongs to a sufficient subset, given the laws. Or for the probabilistic case: given the laws of probability. And is it that causes are included in them? Lewis: It does not follow from the counterfactual analysis of causality. But it could be true. (It will be true in a possible world with sufficiently strict laws.) If explanatory information is information about causal narration, then the informaation is given by deductive-nomological arguments. But there will still be something wrong! The deductive-nomological arguments are presented as being ideal, i.e. they have the right form, neither too much nor not enough. But nobody thinks that daily explanation fulfills this. Normally, the best we can do is to make existence assumptions. "Deshalb" Behauptung/Morton White: We can take it as existence assumptions. LewisVsRailton: correct deductive-nomological arguments as existence assumptions are still not a true explanation. They do not meet the standard on how much information is sufficient, simply because of their form. Lewis: There is always more to know if we collect deductive-nomological arguments, as perfect as they are. Deductive-nomological arguments only offer a profile of the causal narration. Many causes may be omitted. They could be the ones we are currently looking for. Maybe we would like to acquaint ourselves with the mechanism which were involved in particular traces of causal narration. V 238 Explanation/Lewis/VsRailton: a deductive-nomological argument can also be in the wrong form: to not give us enough of too much at the same moment. Explanation/Lewis: But we cannot actually say that we have a different conception of the explanation's unity. We should not demand a unity: An explanation is not a thing that one can have or fail at creating one, but something that one can have to a higher or lesser degree. Problem: The conception to have "enough" of an explanation: It makes us doubt our ancestors' knowledge. They never or rarely had complete knowledge about laws of nature. LewisVsRailton: i.e. so, they never or rarely had complete deductive-nomological arguments. Did they therefore have incomplete explanatory knowledge. I do not think so! They know much about the causes of things. Solution/Railton: (similarly to my picture): together with each explanandum we have a wide and complex structure. V 239 Lewis: For me those structures are linked because of causal dependence. Railton: For him they consist of an "ideal text" of arguments, like in mathematical proofs. |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Hempel, C. | Bigelow Vs Hempel, C. | I 301 Non-statistical explanation/Hempel: thesis: if L (legislation) and C (conditions) explain O (results), then they must logically entail O. Otherwise, we have at best an explanation sketch that requires further assumptions. Bigelow/Pargetter: that does not quite express the idea of explanation by "derivation from laws": The laws must be used. Not just mentioned. That means there must be a reliance on laws. BigelowVsHempel/BigelowVsTradition: Important argument: these are only pseudo-explanations! I 302 Just as quacks and magicians often provide an explanation, citing respected laws of nature, which turns out to be circular on closer inspection. Solution/Hempel: in order to the exclude that, he demands that, in addition, the premises have to be true and O would not have followed if C had been alone without the laws (L). BigelowVsHempel/BigelowVsTradition: very many refinements must be made with that and special cases must be considered. That is what Lewis would call the "One patch per hole" method. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Hume, D. | Kant Vs Hume, D. | Kant I 27 KantVsHume: Causality: Limited to the range of experience. It does not apply to the domain of things themselves. Kant I 98 Hume: Imagination compounds are principally created by association. KantVsHume: Unity of apperception. I’m being conscious that all ideas are my ideas. Therefore, I stick to the unity of consciousness that accompany all my ideas. In addition, I need to bear in mind how I am adding an idea to another one, otherwise I will scatter myself. McDowell I 123 McDowell: Laws of nature/natural/understanding/KantVsHume: wins the intelligibility of natural laws again, but not the clarity of meaning. Nature is the realm of natural laws, and therefore of no importance. However, the empirical world is not outside the terms. Hume I 37 Moral/action/ethics/Hume: A in this way (avoiding wrong) created obligation is artificial however, contrary to the natural obligation arising from the natural interest as the driving force of every action. Moral obligation. It’s in my best interest to let the other have his property, provided that the other acts in the same vein towards me. (KantVsHume:> Categorical imperative). Hume I 122 KantVsHume: The latter erroneously presented mathematics as a system of analytic judgments. DeleuzeVsKant. Relation / HumeVsKant: Every relationship is external in its terms: the equality is not a property of the characters themselves, but only comes through comparison. Hume I 133 Associations / KantVsHume: Although it is merely an empirical law, according to which ideas, which often followed each other, thereby produce a link. This law of reproduction requires that the appearances themselves are indeed subjected to such a rule. Because without this our empirical imagination would never get to do something it is able to, so would lay like dead unknown wealth within us. If a word would be applied one time to this thing, another time to another one, no empirical synthesis of reproduction could happen. So there must be something that makes even this reproduction of phenomenons possible because it is the fact that it is the a priori reason of a necessary synthetic unity of itself. I 138 If we can now show that even our a priori purest intuitions do not provide knowledge, except if they contain such a connection that makes a continuous synthesis possible, this synthesis of imagination is also established on a priori principles prior to all experience. KantVsHume: His dualism forces him to understand the relationship between what is given and the subject as a match of the subject with nature. I 139 But if the given would not align itself and a priori, in accordance with those same principles, which the link of ideas also aligns itself, the subject would only notice this concordance by chance. Therefore, it must be reversed: The given is to refer to the subject, as a concordance of given and subject. Why? Because what is given is not a thing in itself, but an overall context of phenomena that can be only represented by an a priori synthesis. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Hume, D. | Verschiedene Vs Hume, D. | Hacking I 68 Causality/W.C.BroadVsHume: VsRegularity: For example we can see that the siren of Manchester howls every day at the same time, whereupon the workers of Leeds let the work rest for one hour. But no causation. Hacking I 70 CartwrightVsHume: the regularities are characteristics of the procedures with which we establish theories. (>Putnam). Hume I 131 Def Atomism/Hume/Deleuze: is the thesis that relations are external to conceptions. (KantVs). VsHume: Critics accuse him of having "atomized" the given. Theory/DeleuzeVsVs: with this one believes to have pilloried a whole system. As if it were a quirk of Hume. What a philosopher says is presented as if it were done or wanted by him. I 132 What do you think you can explain? A theory must be understood from its conceptual basis. A philosophical theory is an unfolded question. Question and critique of the question are one. I 133 It is not about knowing whether things are one way or the other, but whether the question is a good question or not. Apron I 238 Lawlikeness/lawlike/Schurz: b) in the narrower sense: = physical necessity (to escape the vagueness or graduality of the broad term). Problem: not all laws unlimited in space-time are legal in the narrower sense. Universal, but not physically necessary: Example: "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than one kilometre". Universality: is therefore not a sufficient, but a necessary condition for lawfulness. For example, the universal statement "All apples in this basket are red" is not universal, even if it is replaced by its contraposition: For example "All non-red objects are not apples in this basket". (Hempel 1965, 341). Strong Hume-Thesis/Hume/Schurz: Universality is a sufficient condition for lawlikeness. SchurzVs: that is wrong. Weak Hume-Thesis/Schurz: Universality is a necessary condition for lawfulness. ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): the claim that a condition is sufficient is stronger than the claim that it is necessary.) BhaskarVsWeak Hume-Thesis. BhaskarVsHume. Solution/Carnap/Hempel: Def Maxwell Condition/lawlikeness: Natural laws or nomological predicates must not contain an analytical reference to certain individuals or spacetime points. This is much stronger than the universality condition. (stronger/weaker). Example "All emeralds are grue": is universal in space-time, but does not meet the Maxwell condition. ((s) Because observed emeralds are concrete individuals?). I 239 Natural Law/Law of Nature/Armstrong: are relations of implication between universals. Hence no reference to individuals. (1983) Maxwell condition/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979): it represents a physical principle of symmetry: i.e. laws of nature must be invariant under translation of their time coordinates and translation or rotation of their space coordinates. From this, conservation laws can be obtained. Symmetry Principles/Principle/Principles/Schurz: physical symmetry principles are not a priori, but depend on experience! Maxwell Condition/Schurz: is too weak for lawlikeness: Example "No lump of gold..." also this universal statement fulfills them. Stegmüller IV 243 StegmüllerVsHume: usually proceeds unsystematically and mixes contingent properties of the world with random properties of humans. Ethics/Morality/Hume: 1. In view of scarce resources, people must cooperate in order to survive. 2. HumeVsHobbes: all people have sympathy. If, of course, everything were available in abundance, respect for the property of others would be superfluous: IV 244 People would voluntarily satisfy the needs in the mutual interest according to their urgency. Moral/Ethics/Shaftesbury/ShaftesburyVsHume: wants to build all morality on human sympathy, altruism and charity. (>Positions). HumeVsShaftesbury: illusionary ideal. Ethics/Moral/Hume: 3. Human insight and willpower are limited, therefore sanctions are necessary. 4. Advantageous move: intelligence enables people to calculate long-term interests. IV 245 The decisive driving force is self-interest. It is pointless to ask whether the human is "good by nature" or "bad by nature". It is about the distinction between wisdom and foolishness. 5. The human is vulnerable. 6. Humans are approximately the same. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Hume, D. | Bigelow Vs Hume, D. | I 226 Non-modal theory/Laws of Nature/LoN/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: most non-modal theories of the LON descended from Hume. Then we can assume nomic necessity to be a relative necessity without falling into a circle. Important argument: then we can just assume nomic necessity as a relative necessity and rely on it being based on an independent approach to laws! Explanation: So it makes sense to make use of laws to explain nomic necessity, rather than vice versa. And that’s much less obscure than modal arguments. I 227 BigelowVsVs: modal explanations are not so mysterious. BigelowVsHume: Hume’s theories are unable to explain these non-modal properties of the laws, they have less explanatory power. I 233 "Full generality"/"Pure" generality/Hume/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: may not contain any reference to an individual: This is too weak and too strong: a) too strong: E.g. Kepler’s laws relate to all the planets, but therefore also to an individual, the sun. b) too weak: it is still no law. E.g. that everything moves towards the earth’s center. I 235 LoN/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: in our opinion, it has nothing to do with them, E.g. whether they are useful, or whether they contradict our intuitions. Counterfactual conditional/Co.co/LoN/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: for the Humean, Counterfactual Conditional are circular, if they are to represent LoN. We ourselves only use a Counterfactual Conditional when we have recognized something as a law! When we ask ourselves whether something is a law, we ask ourselves not whether it fulfils a Counterfactual Conditional. I 236 HumeVsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: our modal approach for LoN is circular. BigelowVsVs: it is not! BigelowVsHume: most of Hume’s theories of the LON are circular themselves, with one exception: the theory that Lewis reads out of Ramsey. Ramsey/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: this theory is based on the logical relations of laws among each other (coherence). (Ramsey 1929, 1931, Lewis 1973a, Mellor 1980). I 237 BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: if theories are sets of propositions, propositions must not be sets of possible worlds! For then the best theory for a possible worlds would have to be an axiom: the one-class of this possible worlds All facts of the world are then theorems of the axiom. There would be only one law for each world. No two possible worlds would have a law in common. I 267 BigelowVsHume: went too far in his rejection of necessity in laws. But not far enough in his rejection of the necessity approach to causality. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Humean Supervenience | Verschiedene Vs Humean Supervenience | Schwarz I 114 Vs Humean Supervenienz/HS/VsLewis/Schwarz: more serious: considerations to show that nomological and counterfactual truths do not supervene on the distribution of local properties. Suppose there is a basic law of nature, according to which when X and Y particles meet, there is always a Z particle. Purely by chance, however, X and Y particles never meet. The world w1, in which this law of nature exists, would then look exactly like the world w2, in which it does not exist. Both worlds agree in the distribution of local properties. But they differ in their laws of nature and above all in their counterfactual truths. (In w1 a collision would produce a particle). (Tooley 1977(1), 669 671, 2003,§4,Armstrong(2) 1983, §5.4, Carroll(3) 1994,§3.1) 1. Michael Tooley [1977]: “The Nature of Laws”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 4: 667–698 2. David. M. Armstrong [1983]: What is a Law of Nature?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 3. John Carroll [1994]: Laws of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Indeterminism | Lewis Vs Indeterminism | V 37 Asymmetry/knowledge/past/future/asymmetry of indeterminism/Lewis: Is it because we imagine that our world is ruled by indeterministic laws that we think that the actual past and present have a nomistic link with different future sequels? LewisVs: Well, I believe that it also fails. Determinism/Lewis: a) it is uncertain whether our world is undetermined. Asymmetry is more certain. >Quantum mechanics (QM) is suited best to make us believe in indeterminism, but then QM needs to give us better explanations regarding the >measurement problem. b) Indeterminism/Lewis: a more feeble reason to believe in it would be indeterministic laws of nature in both ways, i.e. that the actual present and future have a nomistic link with different pasts. e.g. Reduction of a wave packet: In which a given superposition is followed by different eigenstates, but it could also be a process in which a given eigenstate is led by many superpositions. Important Argument: we do not have an asymmetry again! LewisVsIndeterminism: Is neither sufficient nor necessary for the asymmetry we are discussing here. We will ignore him here. Thesis: Asymmetry could maybe also happen under deterministic conditions. |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Induction | Armstrong Vs Induction | Arm III 105 VsInduction/Vs Best explanation/BE: inductive skepticism could doubt that it really would be the best explanation; more fundamental: why should the uniformities (unif.) of the world have an explanation at all? Unif./Berkeley: through God. He could also abolish the "laws of nature" tomorrow. Berkeley/Armstrong: answering this already means to concede the possibilities. We have no guarantee that the BE is the best scheme. But it is informative. Arm III 53 Induction/ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: 1) Induction is rational. We use it to cope with lives. The conclusion is formally invalid and it is extremely difficult to formalize it. HumeVsInduction: with his skepticism of induction he has questioned a cornerstone of our life. (Much worse than skepticism when it comes to God). Moore: defended induction because of the common sense. Armstrong pro. III 54 The best thing the skepticsVsInduction can hope is playing off some of our best justified (inductively gained) everyday certainties. VsVs: it is a coherent system that our everyday certainties (beliefs) form a coherent system. Application to itself. Hume: the doubt of this involves a quantum of mauvaise foi. (Armstrong ditto). He is only a skeptic during his studies and rejects the skepticism in everyday life. VsReg th: it is therefore a serious accusation against a philosophical theory, if it is obliged to skepticism VsInduction. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Intrinsic Properties | Lewis Vs Intrinsic Properties | V 205 Causation/Causality/Lewis: e.g. Suppose we had two processes - whether causally linked or not - in two separate spatio-temporal regions, and we do disregard their surroundings. Suppose the laws of nature were the same. Question: Can it be that we have a causal process in one region, but not in the other one? It does not seem so. >Intrinsicness, >Extrinsicness. Causality seems to be an intrinsic characteristic of the process itself and of the relevant laws of nature. LewisVs Intrinsic: Intuitions regarding intrinsic theories should be viewed with a wary eye. They disagree too often with well-validated philosophical theories. Still, there are certain assumptions which bode well for them. intrinsic/causal/Gedankenexperiment/Lewis: Suppose a process in one region maybe does not show his pattern of dependence. But suppose in its intrinsic character the process is like processes in other regions in which the majority of processes really have this pattern. I.e. the intrinsic character of the given process is right, and the laws are right for the actual pattern of dependence - if only the surroundings differ from each other, and are also different in many other ways. Lewis: old: According to my old analysis the process is nevertheless not causal; because of its bad surroundings the process is only an imitation of a true causal process in another place. And this is contrary to our initial assumption. Solution: expanded analysis, "quasi-dependence": Def "Quasi-Dependece"/Expanded Analysis/Lewis: new: Suppose c and e are the first and last event in a process as described above. We then say that e is quasi-dependent on c because the process has the same intrinsic character as processes in other regions where the majority of the processes really show this pattern. We can count this as a sort of causation, derived from counterfactual dependence, even if there is no dependence between both events. [Wir müssen wie oben einen Vorgänger annehmen, damit die Verursachung transitiv wird.] Then mixed causal chains/series with quasi-dependence can exist. New definition of def causal chain: A chain of two or more events with either dependence or quasi-dependence. This solves the problem of a later prevention in daily situations (which gives me headaches) as well as in far-fetched ones. Late Prevention/Causality/Lewis: Problem: We seem to have a causal process which begins with a preventing cause and ends with an effect. But this process nevertheless does not show the actual pattern of counterfactual dependence, not even slightly. Dependence can be seen in states, but we cannot make them to a chain/constitute them to a series. Something external is disrupting them: prevented alternatives! Without them all would be well: We would maintain the laws constant, but change the surroundings, and would have dependence according to the old analysis. But we now need quasi-dependence as a solution. Footnote: John Etchemendy: The predecessor relation must not be omitted. |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Inwagen, P. van | Lewis Vs Inwagen, P. van | V 195 Individuation/Redundant Causation/Peter van Inwagen: Thesis: An event, which actually happens as a product of several causes, could not have happened had if it had not been the product of these causes. The causes could also not have led to another event. Analogy to individuation of objects and humans because of their causal origins. LewisVsInwagen: 1. It would ruin my analysis to analyze causation in terms of counterfactual dependence. ((s) Any deviation would be a different event, not comparable, no counterfactual conditionals applicable.) 2. It is prima facie implausible: I am quite able to legitimately establish alternative hypotheses how an event (or an object or a human being) was caused. But then I postulate that it was one and the same event! Or that one and the same event could have had different effects. >Events/Lewis. (Even Inwagen postulates this.) Plan/LewisVsInwagen: implies even more impossibilities: Either all my plans or hypotheses are hidden impossibilities or they do not even deal with particular event. >Planning. V 296 Vs weak determinism/VsCompatibilism/van InwagenVsLewis: (against wD which I pretend to represent): e.g. Suppose of reductio that I could have lifted my left hand although determinism would be true. Then follows from four premises, which I cannot deny, that I could have created a wrong conjunction HL from a proposition H of a moment in time before my birth, and a certain proposition about a law L. Premise 5: If yes, I could have made L wrong. Premise 6: But I could not have made L wrong. (Contradiction.) LewisVInwagen: 5 and 6 are both not true. Which one of both is true depends on what Inwage calls "could have made wrong". However, not in everyday language, but in Inwagen's artificial language. But it does not matter as well what Inwagen means himself! What matters is whether we can actually give sense to it, which would make all premises valid without circularity. Inwagen: (oral) third meaning for "could have made wrong": only iff the actor could have arranged the things in such a way that both his action and the whole truth about the previous history would have implied the wrongness of the proposition. Then premise 6 states that I could not have arranged the things in such a way to make me predetermined to not arrange them. Lewis: But it is not instructive to see that compatibilism needs to reject premise 6 which is interpreted that way. V 297 Falsification/Action/Free Will/Lewis: provisory definition: An event falsifies a proposition only when it is necessary that the proposition is wrong when an event happens. But my action to throw a stone is not going to falsify the proposition that the window which is on the other end of the trajectory will not be broken. The truth is that my action creates a different event which would falsify the proposition. The action itself does not falsify a law. It would only falsify a conjunction of antecedent history and law. The truth is that my action precedes another action, the miracle, and the latter falsifies the law. feeble: let's say I could make a proposition wrong in a weak sense iff I do something. The proposition would be falsified (but not necessarily because of my action, and not necessarily because of an event which happened because of my action). (Lewis per "Weak Thesis". (Compatibilism)). strong: If the proposition is falsified, either because of my action or because of an event that was caused because of my action. Inwagen/Lewis: The first part of his thesis is strong, regardless of whether we advocate the strong or the weak thesis: Had I been able to lift my hand, although determinism is true and I have not done so, then it is both true - according to the weak and strong sense- that I could have made the conjunctions HL (propositions about the antecedent history and the laws of nature) wrong. But I could have made proposition L wrong in the weak sense, although I could not have done it wrong in the strong sense. Lewis: If we advocate the weak sense, I deny premise 6. If we advocate the strong sense, I deny premise 5. Inwagen: Advocates both position by contemplating analogous cases. LewisVsInwagen: I do believe that the cases are not analogous. They are cases in which the strong and the weak case do not diverge at all. Premise 6/Inwagen: He invites us to reject the idea that a physicist could accelerate a particle faster than light. LewisVsInwagen: But this does not contribute to support premise 6 in the weak sense. V 298 Since the rejected assumption is that the physicist could falsify a law of nature in the strong sense. Premise 5/Inwagen: We should reject the assumption here that a traveller could falsify a conjunction of propositions about the antecedent history and the history of his future travel differently than a falsification of the non-historic part. LewisVsInwagen: Reject the assumption as a whole if you would like to. It does not change anything: premise 5 is not supported in the strong sense. What would follow if a conjunction could be falsified in such a strong sense? Tht the non-historic part could be thus falsified in the strong sense? This is what would support premise 5 in the strong sense. Or would simply follow (what I believe) that the non-historic part can be rejected in the weak sense? The example of the traveller is not helpful here because a proposition of future travels can be falsified in both weak as strong sense. Schwarz I 28 Object/Lewis/Schwarz: Material things are accumulations or aggregates of such points. But not every collection of such points is a material object. Taken together they are neither constituting a cat nor any other object in the customary sense. e.g. The same is valid for the aggregate of parts of which I am constituted of, together with the parts which constituted Hubert Humphrey at the beginning of 1968. Thing: What is the difference between a thing in the normal sense and those aggregates? Sufficient conditions are difficult to find. Paradigmatic objects have no gaps, and holes are delimited from others, and fulfill a function. But not all things are of this nature, e.g. bikes have holes, bikinis and Saturn have disjointed parts. What we accept as a thing depends from our interests in our daily life. It depends on the context: e.g. whether we count the back wall or the stelae of the Holocaust Memorial or the screen or the keyboard as singly. But these things do also not disappear if we do not count them as singly! Object/Thing/van Inwagen: (1990b)(1) Thesis: Parts will constitute themselves to an object if the latter is a living being. So, there are humans, fishes, cats, but not computers, walls and bikinis. Object/Thing/Lewis: better answer: two questions: 1. Under what conditions parts will form themselves to a whole? Under all conditions! For random things there is always a thing which constitutes them. ((s) This is the definition of mereological Universalism). 2. Which of these aggregates do we call a singly thing in daily life? If certain aggregates are not viewed as daily things for us does not mean that they do not exist.(However, they go beyond the normal realms of our normal quantifiers.) But these restrictions vary from culture to culture. As such, it is not reality that is dependent on culture, but the respective observed part of reality (1986e(2), 211 213, 1991(3):79 81). LewisVsInwagen/Schwarz: If only living things can form objects, evolution could not have begun. ((s) But if it is not a problem to say that living beings originated from emergentism, it should also not be a problem to say "objects" instead.) LewisVsInwagen: no criteria for "living being" is so precise that it can clearly define. Schwarz I 30 Lewis: It is not a problem for him: Conventions of the German language do not determine with atomic precision for which aggregates "living being" is accurate. (1986e(2), 212) LewisVsvan Inwagen: This explanation is not at his disposal: For him the distinction between living being and not a living being is the distinction between existence and non-existence. If the definition of living being is vague, the same is valid for existence as well. Existence/Van Inwagen: (1990b(1). Kap.19) Thesis: some things are borderline cases of existence. LewisVsvan Inwagen: (1991(3),80f,1983e(2),212f): If one already said "there is", then one has lost already: if one says that "something exists to a lesser degree". Def Existence/Lewis: Simply means to be one of the things that exist.h Schwarz I 34 Temporal Parts/van Inwagen: (1981)(4) generally rejects temporal parts. SchwarzVsInwagen: Then he must strongly limit the mereological universalims or be a presentist. Schwarz I 227 Modality/LewisVsInwagen: There are no substantial modal facts: The existence of possibilities is not contingent. Information about this cannot be obtained. 1. Peter van Inwagen [1990b]: Material Beings. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press 2. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. D. Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell 4. P. van Inwagen [1981]: “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 123–137. |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Kant | Vollmer Vs Kant | I 25 VollmerVsKant: today people no longer believe that its categories are necessary. Also the laws of nature do not have the general and necessary validity! I 84 Theory/Vollmer: goes further than our mesocosm: But many philosophers do not understand that: VsKant, VsAnalytic Philosphy: Everyday language VsPositivism VsPhenomenalism: e.g. Mach: Sensory perception is everything. VsOperationalism: every term must be defined in mesocosmic operational terms. Vollmer: nevertheless, we cannot avoid connecting every object, every structure of empirical science with human (i.e. mesocosmic) experiences. I 103 Causality/KantVsHume: Instincts can fail, the causal law does not seem to fail. Causality/VollmerVsKant: what Kant describes is at best a normal adult cultural person. Evolutionary epistemology: Biology instead of synthetic a priori - is only mesocosmically appropriate. I 173 Epistemology/VollmerVsKant: he does not see that the field of his traditional epistemology is much too narrow. He does not notice the difference between mesocosmic and theoretical knowledge. He cannot answer the following questions: How are our categories created? Why do we have these forms of viewing and categories? Why are we bound to these a priori judgements and not to others? Kant gives wrong solutions for the following problems: Should we accept the idea of organismic evolution? Why can we understand each other? How is intersubjective knowledge possible? Can the categories be proved complete? (Vollmer: No!) Can they be scientifically justified? I 193 Synthetic judgments a priori/VollmerVsKant: up to today, nobody has supplied a single copy of such judgments. Although they seem logically possible. I 196 Deduction/Categories/Kant/Vollmer: one has to realize that Kant's "deduction" is not even intended to give a justification for special categories. He only shows how they are used. Categories/Kant/Vollmer: as terms they cannot be true or false (true/false). For each category, however, there is a principle of mind which, due to its transcendental character, provides a law of nature. Therefore, a discussion (and possible justification) of the categories can be replaced by one of the corresponding laws. I 197 Principles of the pure mind/Kant/Vollmer: four groups: 1. Axioms of View - applicability of Euclidean geometry to a. Objects, b. states, and c. Processes. 2. Anticipations of Perception a. Consistency of space, b. Consistency of time, c. Consistency of physical processes 3. Analogies of Experience a. Persistence of the substance, b. universal causality, c. universal interaction of the substances. 4. Postulates of empirical thinking at all (here not principles, but definitions). I 199 VollmerVsKant: he does not show anywhere that its reconstruction is the only possible one. His representation of Newton's physics is probably not appropriate. Physics/Kant/VollmerVsKant/Vollmer: Matter: he considers matter infinitely divisible (NewtonVs). Principle of inertia: he did not understand it, he mistakenly thinks that every change of state requires an external cause. Uniform motion, however, needs no cause! Mistakenly thought, bullets only reached their highest speed some time after leaving the barrel. (Principle of inertia Vs). Has never mastered infinitesimal calculation. Never fully understood the nature of the experimental method and underestimated the role of experience. I 202 Intersubjectivity/Kant/Vollmer: with animals intersubjectivity should be impossible. It should be impossible to communicate with chimpanzees. Worse still: we should not understand each other. Because according to Kant, there is no reason why the cognitive structures of other people should be identical to mine. Reason: For Kant, recognition and knowledge are bound to and limited to the transcendental cognitive structures of each individual. Therefore, it could also be completely idiosyncratic. Intersubjectivity/Vollmer: fortunately they exist on Earth. The transcendental philosopher can register this as a fact. He cannot explain them. VollmerVsKant: For Kant, the origin of intersubjectivity remains mysterious, inexplicable, a surprising empirical fact. Vollmer: Intersubjectivity is of course explained by the EE. EE/Vollmer: Our view of space is three-dimensional because space is. It is temporally directed because it is real processes. (PutnamVs). I 208 Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: obviously we have to distinguish between two levels of knowledge: 1. Perception and experience are oriented towards evolutionary success and therefore sufficiently correct. 2. Scientific knowledge is not oriented towards evolutionary success. Kant does not make this distinction. I 210 VollmerVsKant: from the fact that every factual finding is tested with mesocosmic means, he erroneously concludes that it is also limited to the mesocosm. I 304 Thing in itself/measuring/Vollmer: we measure the length of a body with some scale, but we still speak of the length of the body. (sic: reference to "thing in itself" by Vollmer). I 305 Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: although our knowledge is never absolutely certain, it differs considerably from knowledge about phenomena. I 306 Although many things may be unknown, there is no motive to postulate an unrecognisable reality behind the world. I 307 VollmerVsKant: the "naked reality" cannot be seen by us, but it can be recognized! II 48 Def Nature/Kant: the existence of things, if it is determined according to general laws. Nature/VollmerVsKant: unnecessarily narrow and petitio principii: because the generality of the categories thereby becomes an analytical consequence of this definition. (Circular). |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Lewis Vs Leibniz, G.W. | V 293 Weak determinism/weak thesis/Lewis: I am able to do something so that, if I did it, a law of nature would be broken. Strong thesis: I am able to break the laws of nature. For beginners: I am able to do something so that if I did it, a window would be broken. But there is more to say: I am able to do something so that if I did it, my act would create an event of breaking the window. For beginners: I am able to do something so that if I did it, a promise would be broken. But there is more to say: I am able to do something so that if I did it, my act generated an event of breaking the promise. For beginners: I am able to do something so that if I did, a law would be broken. For example, to throw a stone faster than light. But there is more to say: I am able to do something so that if I did it, my act would create an event of breaking the law of nature. For beginners: I am able to do something so that if I did it, a law would be broken. For example, to move my hand faster than light, no matter what the action does. But there is more to say: I am able to do something so that if I did, my act itself would be an event of breaking the law of nature. N.B.: if no act of mine was a window-breaking promise or law of nature or generated one, then it might not be true that I broke a window, a promise or a law of nature. So I am only able to break a window, a promise or a law of nature if I could do something so that if I did it, my act V 294 would have been or would have generated either an event breaking a window, a promise or a law of nature. Keith's teacher: represents a weak thesis (similar to mine, but, LewisVsTeacher: I cannot accept his reason): his reason: Teacher: it is wrong that if the actor had preferred that there should have been a difference in natural laws or history, there would have been such a difference. LewisVsTeacher: 1. this conditional cannot be wrong at all, assuming the actor is predetermined to wish that there should be no such difference, if he had then wished something else, there would have been a difference. 2. if this conditional is not wrong, it is not enough to make the stronger thesis come true. There must be another reason why it's wrong. For example, I am able to raise my hand, although it is intended ((s) according to the soft determinism assumed here) that I will not. I will even concede that a law-breaking event is taking place. (Neutral present, I don't imply anything about a time when something like this should happen). Question: But is it the case that my raising my hand causes a law-breaking event? If not, there is no special ability on my part. If I had raised my hand, a law would have been broken in advance. Then the course of events would have deviated from the actual course. For a while before I had raised my hand. And this divergence point would be the law-breaking event. N.B.: this divergence point (before) would not be caused by my hand raising! If at all, the cause should be reversed. Terminology: we have called the divergence point "miracle" above. My act itself would not have been the miracle! It wasn't here when the miracle happened. There is no other act of mine before. There's also no reason why my act should cause any more lawbreaking events. That would be unfounded. V 295 Lewis: Thesis: I was able to raise my hand (instead of actual lowering). I acknowledge that a law of nature had to be broken for this, but I deny that it would enable me to break natural laws. For soft determinism you don't need supernatural powers. Compatibilism/Lewis: to maintain it, one does not even have to assume that supernatural powers would be possible at all. |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz Vs Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz I 31 Personal identity/SchwarzVsLewis: his criterion is not accurate and provides in interesting cases no answer. E.g. continuity after brain surgery, etc. But Lewis does not want that. Our (vague) everyday term should only be made explicitly. Beaming/Teleportation/Doubling/Lewis: all this is allowed by his theory. Schwarz I 60 Identity/Lewis/Centered world/Possible world/Schwarz: my desire to be someone else, does not refer to the whole world, but only to my position in the world. E.g. Twin Earth/Schwarz: one of the two planets is blown tomorrow, the two options (that we are on the one or the other) do however not correspond to two possible worlds! Detailed knowledge would not help out where we are, because they are equal. ((s) so no "centered world"). Actually, we want to know where we ourselves are in the world. (1979a(1),1983b(2),1986e(3):231 233). SchwarzVsLewis: says too little about these perspective possibilities. It is not enough here to allow multiple counterparts (c.p.) in a world. It should not just be possible that Humphrey is exactly as the actual Nixon, he should also to be allowed to be different. Humphrey may not be a GS of himself. (> Irreflexive counterpart relation,> see below Section 9.2. "Doxastic counterparts". Similarity relation. No matter what aspects you emphasize: Nixon will never be more similar to Humphrey than to himself. Schwarz I 100 Fundamental properties/SchwarzVsLewis: this seems to waver whether he should form the fE to the conceptual basis for the reduction of all predicates and ultimately all truths, or only a metaphysical basis, on which all truths supervene. (>Supervenience, >Reduction). Schwarz I 102 Naturalness/Natural/Property/Content/Lewis: the actual content is then the most natural candidate that matches the behavior. "Toxic" is not a perfectly natural property (p.n.p.), but more natural than "more than 3.78 light years away" and healthy and less removed and toxic". Naturalness/Degree/Lewis: (1986e(3):, 61,63,67 1984b(4):66): the naturalness of a property is determined by the complexity or length of their definition by perfectly natural properties. PnE: are always intrinsically and all their Boolean combinations remain there. Problem: extrinsic own sheep threaten to look unnatural. Also would e.g. "Red or breakfast" be much more complicated to explain than e.g. "has charge -1 or a mass, whose value is a prime number in kg. (Although it seems to be unnatural by definition). Naturalness/Property/Lewis: (1983c(5), 49): a property is, the more natural the more it belongs to surrounding things. Vs: then e.g. "cloud" less natural than e.g. "table in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant or clock showing 7:23". Schw I 103 Naturalness/Properties/Lewis: (1983c(5): 13f): naturalness could be attributed to similarity between characteristics: E.g. a class is more natural, the more the properties of its elements resemble each other. Similarity: Lewis refers to Armstrong: similarity between universals 1978b(6),§16.2,§21, 1989b(7): §5.111997 §4.1). Ultimately LewisVs. Naturalness/Lewis/Schwarz: (2001a(8):§4,§6): proposing test for naturalness, based on similarity between individual things: coordinate system: "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" axis. A property is then the more natural, the more dense and more compact the appropriate region is. Problem: 1. that presupposes gradual similarity and therefore cannot be well used to define gradual naturalness. 2. the pnE come out quite unnatural, because the instances often do not strongly resemble each other. E.g. if a certain mass property is perfect, of course, then all things with this mass build a perfectly natural class, no matter how dissimilar they are today. SchwarzVsLewis: it shows distinctions between natural and less natural properties in different areas, but does not show that the distinction is always the same. Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: could also depend on interests and biological expression. And yet, can in various ways the different types of natural - be determined by perfect naturalness. That is not much, because at Lewis all, by definition, by the distribution of p.n.p. is determined. ((s)>Mosaic). Schwarz I 122 Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: not reasonable to assume that it was objectively, regardless of how naturally it appears to us. Lewis introduced objective naturalness as a metaphysical basis for qualitative, intrinsic similarity and difference, as some things resemble each other like eggs and others do not. (see above 5.2). Intrinsic Similarity: also qualitative character and duplication: these terms are intended to be our familiar terms by Lewis. SchwarzVsLewis: but if objective naturalness is to explain the distinction of our opinions about similarity, one cannot ask with sense the question whether the distinction serves exactly this. So although there are possible beings (or worlds) whose predicates express relatively unnatural properties and therefore are wrong about natural laws, without being able to discover the error. But we can be sure a priori that we do not belong to them. Problem: the other beings may themselves believe a priori to be sure that their physical predicates are relatively natural. Solution: but they (and not we) were subject to this mistake, provided "natural" means in their mouth the same as with us. ((s) but we also could just believe that they are not subject to error. Respectively, we do not know whether we are "we" or "they"). Schwarz: here is a tension in our concept of natural law (NL): a) on the one hand it is clear that we can recognize them empirically. b) on the other hand they should be objective in a strong sense, regardless of our standards and terms. Problem: Being with other standards can come up with the same empirical data to all other judgments of NL. Schwarz I 134 Event/SchwarzVsLewis: perhaps better: events but as the regions themselves or the things in the regions: then we can distinguish e.g. the flight from the rotation of the ball. Lewis appears to be later also inclined to this. (2004d)(9). Lewis: E.g. the death of a man who is thrown into a completely empty space is not caused by something that happens in this room, because there is nothing. But when events are classes of RZ regions, an event could also include an empty region. Def Qua thing/Lewis/Schwarz: later theory: “Qua-things” (2003)(10): E.g. „Russell qua Philosoph“: (1986d(9a),247): classes of counterpieces – versus: LewisVsLewis: (2003)(10) Russell qua Philosoph and Russell qua Politician and Russell are identical. Then the difference in counterfactual contexts is due to the determined by the respective description counterpart relation. These are then intensional contexts. (Similar to 1971(11)). counterfactual asymmetry/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis' analysis assumes similarity between possible worlds. HorwichVsLewis: (1987(15),172) should explain why he is interested in this baroque dependence. Problem/SchwarzVsLewis: so far, the analysis still delivers incorrect results E.g. causation later by earlier events. Schwarz I 139 Conjunctive events/SchwarzVsLewis: he does not see that the same is true for conjunctive events. Examples A, B, C, D are arbitrary events, so that A caused B and C caused D. If there is an event B&C, which exactly occurs when both B and C happen, then A is the cause of D: without A, B would not have happened, neither B&C. Likewise D would not have happened without B&C. Because causation is transitive, thus any cause causes any effect. Note: according to requirement D would not happen without C, but maybe the next possible world, in which B&C are missing, is one in which C is still taking place? According to Lewis the next possible world should however be one where the lack of cause is completely extinguished. Schwarz: you cannot exclude any conjunctive events safely. E.g. a conversation or e.g. a war is made up of many events and may still be as a whole a cause or effect. Lewis (2000a(13), 193) even used quite unnatural conjunctions of events in order to avoid objections: E.g. conjunction from the state of brain of a person and a decision of another person. Absence/Lewis/Schwarz: because Lewis finds no harmless entities that are in line as absences, he denies their existence: they are no events, they are nothing at all, since there is nothing relevant. (200a, 195). SchwarzVsLewis: But how does that fit together with the Moore's facts? How can a relationship be instantiated whose referents do not exist?. Moore's facts/Schwarz: E.g. that absences often are causes and effects. Something to deny that only philosopher comes to mind. I 142 Influence/SchwarzVsLewis: Problem: influence of past events by future. Example had I drunk from the cup already half a minute ago, then now a little less tea would be in the cup, and depending on how much tea I had drunk half a minute ago, how warm the tea was then, where I then had put the cup, depending on it the current situation would be a little different. After Lewis' analysis my future tea drinking is therefore a cause of how the tea now stands before me. (? Because Ai and Bi?). Since the drinking incidents are each likely to be similar, the impact is greater. But he is not the cause, in contrast to the moon. Schwarz I 160 Know how/SchwarzVsLewis: it is not entirely correct, that the phenomenal character must be causal effect if the Mary and Zombie pass arguments. For causal efficacy, it is sufficient if Mary would react differently to a phenomenally different experience ((s) >Counterfactual conditional). Dualism/Schwarz: which can be accepted as a dualist. Then you can understand phenomenal properties like fundamental physical properties. That it then (as above Example charge 1 and charge 1 switch roles in possible worlds: is possible that in different possible worlds the phenomenal properties have their roles changed, does not mean that they are causally irrelevant! On the contrary, a particle with exchanged charge would behave differently. Solution: because a possible world, in which the particle has a different charge and this charge plays a different role, is very unlike to our real world! Because there prevail other laws of nature. ((s) is essential here that besides the amended charge also additionally the roles were reversed? See above: >Quidditism). SchwarzVsLewis: this must only accept that differences in fundamental characteristics do not always find themselves in causal differences. More one must not also accept to concede Mary the acquisition of new information. Schwarz I 178 Content/Individuation/Solution/LewisVsStalnaker: (1983b(2), 375, Fn2, 1986e(3), 34f), a person may sometimes have several different opinion systems! E.g. split brain patients: For an explanation of hand movements to an object which the patient denies to see. Then you can understand arithmetic and logical inference as merging separate conviction fragments. Knowledge/Belief/Necessary truth/Omniscience/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsFragmentation: Problem: even within Lewis' theory fragmentation is not so easy to get, because the folk psychology does not prefer it. Schwarz I 179 E.g. at inconsequent behavior or lie we do not accept a fragmented system of beliefs. We assume rather that someone changes his beliefs or someone wants to mislead intentionally. E.g. if someone does not make their best move, it must not be the result of fragmentation. One would assume real ignorance contingent truths instead of seeming ignorance of necessary truths. Fragmentation does not help with mathematical truths that must be true in each fragment: Frieda learns nothing new when she finally finds out that 34 is the root of the 1156. That they denied the corresponding proposition previously, was due to a limitation of their cognitive architecture. Knowledge/Schwarz: in whatever way our brain works, whether in the form of cards, records or neural networks - it sometimes requires some extra effort to retrieve the stored information. Omniscience/Vs possible world/Content/VsLewis/Schwarz: the objection of logical omniscience is the most common objection to the modeling mental and linguistic content by possible worlds or possible situations. SchwarzVsVs: here only a problem arises particularly, applicable to all other approaches as well. Schwarz I 186 Value/Moral/Ethics/VsLewis/Schwarz: The biggest disadvantage of his theory: its latent relativism. What people want in circumstances is contingent. There are possible beings who do not want happiness. Many authors have the intuition that value judgments should be more objective. Solution/Lewis: not only we, but all sorts of people should value under ideal conditions the same. E.g. then if anyone approves of slavery, it should be because the matter is not really clear in mind. Moral disagreements would then in principle be always solvable. ((s)>Cognitive deficiency/Wright). LewisVsLewis: that meets our intuitions better, but unfortunately there is no such defined values. People with other dispositions are possible. Analogy with the situation at objective probability (see above 6.5): There is nothing that meets all of our assumptions about real values, but there is something close to that, and that's good enough. (1989b(7), 90 94). Value/Actual world/Act.wrld./Lewis: it is completely unclear whether there are people in the actual world with completely different value are dispositions. But that does not mean that we could not convince them. Relativism/Values/Morals/Ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis however welcomes a different kind of relativism: desired content can be in perspective. The fate of my neighbor can be more important to me than the fate of a strangers. (1989b(14), 73f). Schwarz I 232 Truthmaker principle/SchwarzVsLewis: here is something rotten, the truth maker principle has a syntax error from the outset: we do not want "the world as it is", as truth-makers, because that is not an explanation, we want to explain how the world makes the truth such as the present makes propositions about the past true. Schwarz I 233 Explanation/Schwarz: should distinguish necessary implication and analysis. For reductive metaphysics necessary implication is of limited interest. SchwarzVsLewis: he overlooks this when he wrote: "A supervenience thesis is in the broader sense reductionist". (1983,29). Elsewhere he sees the difference: E.g. LewisVsArmstrong: this has an unusual concept of analysis: for him it is not looking for definitions, but for truth-makers ". 1. David Lewis [1979a]: “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”. Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. 2. David Lewis [1983b]: “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”. Philosophical Review, 92: 3–32. 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 5. David Lewis [1983c]: “New Work for a Theory of Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. 6. David M. Armstrong [1978b]: Universals and Scientific Realism II: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 7. David M. Armstrong [1989b]: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press 8. David Lewis [2001a]: “Redefining ‘Intrinsic’ ”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 381-398 9. David Lewis [2004d]: “Void and Object”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 277–291 9a. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 10. David Lewis [2003]: “Things qua Truthmakers”. Mit einem Postscript von David Lewis und Gideon Rosen. In Hallvard Lillehammer und Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Hg.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor, London: Routledge, 25–38. 11. David Lewis [1971]: “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies”. Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. 12. David Lewis [1987]: “The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 12: 81–97. 13. David Lewis [2000a]: “Causation as Influence”. Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–197. Gekürzte Fassung von [Lewis 2004a] 14. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137. 15. Paul Horwich [1987]: Asymmetries in Time. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Davidson Vs Lewis, D. | I (e) 114 Davidson: conventions and rules do not explain the language, the language explains them. >Conventions/Davidson. Fodor/Lepore IV 84 note T-sentence/Davidson: T-sentences have the form and function of laws of nature! 25th Language/DavidsonVsLewis: it is not useful to describe it as a system of conventions. >Language/Davidson. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Fraassen Vs Lewis, D. | Black I 117 Laws of Nature/LoN/Theory/van FrassenVs Lewis: (1989, § 3.3): 1) Lewis does not explain the model force of LoN: E.g. if "all Fs are Gs", then they have to be so in a good sense. Signs for this are counterfactual conditionals, which are connected to LoN (Dretske 1977, 255, Armstrong 1983, §4.4 and 69f). Schw I 118 VsLewis: 2) his analysis does not indicate why LoN play such a large role in explanations (Dretske 1977, 262, van Fraassen 1989 §3,4, Armstrong 1983 §4.2). Is it possible to explain why this F is a G by indicating that all Fs are Gs? LewisVsVs: why should the theorems of the best theories not meet the conditions? Systematic regularities are an important property of the actual world. Therefore, similarity is assigned special weight in the evaluation of counterfactual conditionals. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Mach, E. | Verschiedene Vs Mach, E. | Kanitscheider I 375 Laws of Nature/VsMach's Principle: may the equations of motion of mechanics depend on the random distribution of matter in the universe? Then they are not the same in all possible worlds. I 376 Russell: if the laws of nature of the whole dynamic world can be formulated without regard to existence (and they can) then it cannot be part of their meaning that matter exists. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Mackie, J. L. | Armstrong Vs Mackie, J. L. | Arm III 50 Induction/Counterfactual conditional/Co.co./Regularity theory/Mackie: if it is very likely that all Fs are Gs, and we look at an a of which we believe or know that it is not an F or that it does not exist: Assuming that a is an F, it is nevertheless inductively very likely that a is a G. Therefore we are entitled to the Counterfactual Conditional: if a were an F, it would be a G. Armstrong: that is neutral in itself and can now be used to show that Humeean uniformities could also support counterfactual conditionals. And that is simply because of induction. Then the Counterfactual conditional is justified. III 51 Vs: 1) then it must be possible to solve the problem of induction, even if assuming that the laws of nature (LoN) are mere LoN. But I believe that the reg. th. is committed to skepticism regarding induction (see above). Vs: 2) a) If law statements support Counterfactual Conditional, then they would also have to inherit the uncertainty of induction! E.g. assuming all Fs are Gs, but there are doubts as to whether that is a law. Then the evidence is likely, but not certain. The corresponding Counterfactual Conditional: if a were an F, it would be highly probable that it would be a G. The consequence of this Counterfactual Conditional would be a probability statement. ArmstrongVsMackie: but we would not establish this Counterfactual Conditional Either it is a law that Fs are Gs or it is not. If it is not, the Counterfactual conditional is simply wrong. b) it appears logically possible that a being could know the content of all laws, but this knowledge or belief are not acquired inductively. Couldn’t this being use GA just like us to support Counterfactual Conditional? That seems possible. Nevertheless: how would it be possible if the assertion of Counterfactual Conditional was based on an inductive inference from antecedent to consequent? (As demanded by Mackie). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Mackie, J. L. | Kanitscheider Vs Mackie, J. L. | I 465 God/Creation/John Leslie Mackie: sharp criticism of the conventional doctrine of God: Thesis: to explain the fine tuning of all necessary preconditions for the existence of life by a neo-Platonic assumption of ethical being-demanded instead of the usual many-worlds hypothesis. Theology/KanitscheiderVsMackie: did not distinguish between two concepts of creation: 1. creatio originans 2. creatio continuans, support of the legal structure, permanence. I 467 Laws of Nature/Kanitscheider: there is no point in imagining how to pull the laws out of the corset of the world like fish bone sticks, and then watch them collapse. ((s) According to which laws would the collapse take place?) The conceptual separation between the world and its laws leads to emptiness. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Mellor, D.H. | Armstrong Vs Mellor, D.H. | Arm II (b) 34 Strength/Objective opportunity/ArmstrongVsMellor/ArmstrongVsLewis: I believe that the concept of a prop that can only be described as that which constitutes a chance to have a lower level prop, is incoherent. But even if that is not the case, the postulation is a piece of unwanted metaphysics. Saving the ailing regularity theory with this is a weak motif. It has also greatly veered from the original regularity theory. II (b) 35 MellorVsArmstrong/RamseyVsArmstrong: Mellor follows Ramsey: laws of nature should not be understood as a relation of universals. ArmstrongVsVs: one should not feel too ontologically sure about the introduction of objective opportunities, they are mysterious. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Mereology | Verschiedene Vs Mereology | Schwarz I 34 Temporal Parts/Mereology/Schwarz: but if you accept aggregates from Socrates and the Eiffel Tower, you could still deny that Socrates itself has temporal parts. Lewis: does not even claim that necessarily everything that exists over time consists of temporal parts (1986f(1),x,1986e(2),205,1994(3) §1) VsStowe: temporal parts should not provide an analysis of temporal existence. Lewis: (1083d(4),76,similar to Armstrong 1980(5),76): Example: one child, Frieda1 suddenly disappears, while another child, Frieda2 suddenly appears. This may contradict the laws of nature, but it is logically possible. Schw I 35 Maybe nobody notices anything. And there would be nothing to notice. Vs: that is not convincing. Endurantism Vs: cannot accept the premises at all. van InwagenVs: Frieda1 and Frieda2 cannot exist in such a row and yet remain different. (2000(6),398) Schwarz I 36 Thing/EndurantismVsLewis/VsMereology: the objects are not the mereological sum of their parts, because the sum and the parts exist even if the things themselves do not exist (e.g. if they are disassembled or broken). Vs: then the term "part" is not used exactly. The scattered parts are then no longer parts, because the (disassembled) bicycle does not exist at that time. Solution/Lewis: Part of the bicycle is only a past temporal part of the gearshift. Personal identity, temporal identity: we too are not identical with any aggregate of molecules, because we constantly exchange many of them with the metabolism. (1988b(7), 195). 1. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. David Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 4. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 5. David Armstrong [1980]: “Identity Through Time”. In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, Dordrecht: Reidel 6. Peter van Inwagen [2000]: “Temporal Parts and Identity across Time”. The Monist , 83: 437–459. 7. David Lewis [1988b]: “Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe”. Analysis, 48: 65–72 |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Montague, R. | Lewis Vs Montague, R. | I 10 Experience: not identical to the property that one assigns to someone by saying that they have this experience. >Experience/Lewis. Experience: the state that has a certain defining causal role. >Causal Role/Lewis, >Events/Lewis. Property: the property of being in this state. For example, pain is not the same as the property of having pain! "Pain" is a contingent name, which means it has different denotations in different possible worlds. (Non-rigid). >Rigidity. "The ability to have pain," on the other hand, is a non-contingent name. (Rigid, the same in every possible world).( I 11 + MontagueVsLewis,LewisVsMontague). V 37 Def Determinism/Possible Worlds/Lewis: if two possible worlds obey the laws perfectly, then they are either exactly equal throughout the whole time or in no two periods of time. Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that the laws of nature are deterministic. My definition of determinism stems from Montague, but deviates from him in two points: LewisVsMontague: 1. I avoid his mathematical construction of ersatz worlds ((s) elsewhere: = sets of sentences). 2. I temporarily take equality of worlds as a simple relation. Instead, Montague takes the relation of having the same complete description in a particular language as a basic relation, which he leaves unspecific. My definition assumes that we can identify different periods of time from one world to another. V 246 Def Event/Richard/Montague/Lewis: (1969) certain properties of time. The event occurs at a certain time in a certain possible world if and only if the event belongs to the world and the time. This means that the event is identified by the property of being a time when the event occurs. LewisVsMontague: I think my approach has two minor advantages: 1. in the theory of relativity it is not always clear what time is, 2. Suppose a Montague event happens at a certain time in a certain possible world, then we have to find the place first. With my approach, the region is given immediately. |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Physicalism | Davidson Vs Physicalism | Frank I 629 Token-physicalism/Davidson: (pro): every mental event is also a physical event, even if the kinds of mental events cannot be identified with the kinds of physical events. DavidsonVsType-physicalism. For Davidson, every mental event also has a physical description. As far as it is described in the context of physics, it is subject to strict laws of nature, but not when it is described in Mentalese vocabulary. This is the thesis of >anomalous monism. ((s) Description creates different laws.) I 632 Brain state/Mental state/Davidson: admits that the same brain state can realize different mental states depending on the environment. But from that follows only VsType-physicalism. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Positivism | Stegmüller Vs Positivism | Stegmüller IV 342 StegmüllerVsPositivism: because of the laws of nature contained in the statements, statements by natural scientists cannot be verified! IV 343 Planning must also be based on assumptions that cannot be verified at the planning stage. (>plan, planning). |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Psychologism | Frege Vs Psychologism | Brandom I 47 FregeVspsychologism: here the difference between the reasons which justify a conviction, and the causes that they really evoke disappears. The laws of the real conclusions are not consistently laws of correct reasoning. For then fallacies would be impossible. Psychologism misunderstands the pragmatic significance of semantic content. He can not explain how standards are applied. I 48 Correct decisions are normative terms. No natural. Conflicting judgments are not prohibited by the laws of nature! Frege: Logic is also normative. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Quidditism | Verschiedene Vs Quidditism | Schwarz I 105 Possible Worlds/Roll/VsQuidditism/Laws of Nature/LoN/Lewis/Schwarz: uncomfortable notion, two possible worlds could only differ in that things have changed roles. Isn't the term "charge 0" defined by its role in our theories? Lewis ditto. Lewis/N.B.: but this role only serves to fix the property in the real world: in order to earn the designation "charge 0", a property has to play the appropriate role for us. Nothing is said about the role in other possible worlds. Strictly speaking, not the properties but their instantiations play this or that causal role. From this follows: Lewis Thesis: Membership in a perfectly natural class is not a question of causal nomological roles. Role/Quidditism/Lewis/Schwarz: For example, split roles: (Black, 2000(1),95f): Assuming that two fundamental properties have only partially exchanged their roles: e.g. on odd days the particles with charge -1 behave like those with charge 0 and vice versa: nobody would notice anything! (>"If everything were different"/Davidson, >Skepticism/Davidson). We also do not know if we do not live in such a world ourselves! Schw I 106 This is a consequence of quidditism. To avoid it, one would have to say: Solution: VsQuidditism: some of the causal nomological roles are essential to the fundamental properties. So: For example, if something does not behave like charge, it is not charge. 1. Robert Black [2000]: “Aggainst Quidditism”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78: 87–104 |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Regularity Theory | Armstrong Vs Regularity Theory | Arm III 13 ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: 1) extensional problems: A) Humean Regularity: there seem to be some that are not laws of nature. (H.R. = Humean regularity). That means being an H.R. is not sufficient for being a law of nature (LoN). B) LoN: there might be some that do not universally apply in time and space. There are also laws of probability. Neither of these two would be Humean regularities (H.R.). That means being an H.R. is not necessary for being an LoN. 2) "intensional" problems: Assuming there is a H.R. to which an LoN, corresponds, and the content of this regularity is the same as that of the law. Even then, there are reasons to assume that the law and the regularity are not identical. Arm III 25 TooleyVsArmstrong: (see below): laws of nature which essentially involve individual things must be admitted as logically possible. Then it must be allowed that laws change from one cosmic epoch to the next. TooleyVsRegularity theory: for them it is a problem that only a narrow conceptual gap separates the cosmic epochs (i.e. H.R.) from just very widely extended regularities which are not cosmic anymore. Assuming there were no cosmic regularities (reg.), but extended ones would indeed exist, then it is logically compatible with all our observations. VsRegularity theory: how can it describe the situation in a way that there are a) no laws but extensive regularities? or b) that there are laws, but they do not have cosmic reach? The latter is more in line with the spirit of reg.th. III 27 VsReg. th.: it cannot assert that every local reg. is a law. III 52 ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: makes induction irrational. Arm III 159 ArmstrongVsIdealism: being forced to assume an unspecified absolute because of the requirement of the necessity of existence. There are no principles of deduction from the absolute downwards. There has never been a serious deduction of this kind. Explanation/Armstrong: if the explanation has to stop shortly before coming to the absolute, then idealism must accept contingency. At what point should we accept contingency? ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: it gives up too soon. Universals theory: can the atomic bonds of universals be explained that we have assumed to be molecular uniformities? Necessity/Armstrong: can only ever be asserted, it cannot be demonstrated or even be made plausible. Arm III 53 Induction/ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: 1) Induction is rational. We use it to cope with lives. The conclusion is formally invalid and it is extremely difficult to formalize it. HumeVsInduction: with his skepticism of induction he has questioned a cornerstone of our life. (Much worse than skepticism when it comes to God). Moore: defended induction because of the common sense. Armstrong pro. III 54 The best thing the skepticsVsInduction can hope is playing off some of our best justified (inductively gained) everyday certainties. VsVs: it is a coherent system that our everyday certainties (beliefs) form a coherent system. Application to itself. Hume: the doubt of this involves a quantum of mauvaise foi. (Armstrong ditto). He is only a skeptic during his studies and rejects the skepticism in everyday life. VsReg th: it is therefore a serious accusation against a philosophical theory, if it is obliged to skepticism VsInduction. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Rousseau, J. J. | Cartwright Vs Rousseau, J. J. | I 21 Laws of Nature/Cartwright: There are at least two kinds: a) Laws of association/Association/Hume/Cartwright: they are the ones with which philosophy deals normally. They tell us how many times two qualities or quantities are co-associated. ((s) occur together?). This may be probabilistic or deterministic. This includes the equations of physics: E.g.: whenever the force on an object with the mass m is f, the acceleration is f/m. The laws of association may have a time index. E.g. the probabilistic Mendelian laws. Causality: does not matter here, instead: co-occurrence. b) Causal laws/Cartwright: E.g. Smoking causes cancer, e.g. force causes a change in movement. ((s) different from above!). Russell: Thesis: 1) there are only laws of association. 2) Causal principles cannot be derived from causally symmetric laws of association. Cartwright: Vs 1) pro 2) Causal principles/CartwrightVsRussell: Although they cannot be derived from laws of association, we cannot do without them. This has to do with our strategies. I 74 CartwrightVsRussell: I prefer causes rather than laws in science and explanation. I 111 Law/Cause/Effect/Analogy/Russell: (On the Notion of Cause, NY 1953 p 392): the principle of "same cause, same effect" is pointless. Once the antecedent (which represents the circumstances) is determined accurately enough to allow calculating the consequences, it becomes so complex that it is unlikely that the case ever occurs again! This would make science sterile. Fundamental laws/RussellVsCartwright: with that Russell pleads for fundamental laws. Fundamental laws/CartwrightVsRussell: the fundamental laws represent more the relations between properties than between individuals. But in practice the engineer wants functional laws, albeit only "with a certain accuracy". |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Russell, B. | Gödel Vs Russell, B. | Russell I VI GödelVsRussell: the syntax of formalism is not executed! There is a lack of formal precision (order of elimination of symbols). Relations Calculus: previously carried out by Schrödinger and Peirce. I VII Russell/Gödel: very realistic attitude. The things discussed may exist, but we have no direct perception of them! He compares the axioms of logic and mathematics with the laws of nature. I VIII Meaning/Russell/Gödel: the example "author of Waverley" surprisingly leads to the fact that all true sentences have the same meaning. Author v. Waverley: is not a description of Scott. Description is not equal to assertion. It does not denote an object. StrawsonVs: a sentence with Waverley says nothing about Scott because it does not contain it. Description: means nothing at all outside of a context! "The author of Waverley" claims (strictly speaking) nothing about Scott, (Since he contains no constituents that denotes Scott). Description is not equal to assertion. I XIII GödelVsRussel: the circular error principle in its first form is not sufficient, because the axioms imply the existence of real numbers, which in this formalism are definable only with reference to all real numbers. Circular Error Principle/GödelVsRussell: the principia themselves do not satisfy the principle in their first edition, if "definable" means "definable within the system", and no definition methods outside are known, except those which comprise even more extensive totalities than those which occur in the system. Gödel: I would rather see this as proof that the principle of circular error is wrong than that classical mathematics is wrong. For one can deny with good reasons that the reference to a totality necessarily implies a reference to all its individual elements, or in other words that "all" means the same thing as an infinite logical conjunction. I XII/XIV "All"/solution/Carnap: "all" means analyticity or necessity, or provability. Gödel: besides, the circular error principle (PT) seems to apply only if the entities concerned are constructed by ourselves. In this case, a definition must clearly exist, namely the description of the construction. However, when it comes to independent objects, there is nothing absurd about the existence of totalities that contain members that can only be described (i.e. unambiguously characterized) by reference to totality. Def Description/Russell/Gödel: an object is called Def described by a propositional function φ(x) if φ(x) is true for x = a and for no other object. Second form: "comprise": one cannot even say that an object described with reference to a totality "comprises" this totality, although the description itself does. Third form: "presuppose": just as little would it contradict the third form, if "presupposed" means: "presupposed for existence", not "for perceptibility". |
Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 |
| Russell, B. | Sciama Vs Russell, B. | Kanitscheider I 375 Laws of Nature/VsMach's Principle: may the equations of motion of mechanics depend on the random distribution of matter in the universe? Then they are not the same in all possible worlds. (>Lewis). I 376 Russell: if the laws of nature of the whole dynamic world can be formulated without regard to existence (and they can) then it cannot be part of their meaning that matter exists. SciamaVsRussell: the content has the same meaning as its laws. |
Sciam I D. Sciama The Physical Foundations of General Relativity 1969 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Skepticism | Berkeley Vs Skepticism | Ber I 219 BerkeleyVsSkepticism: it is precisely by adhering to the reality of things that Berkeley encounters skepticism, and beyond that he sees in the fact that not all our perceptions can be arbitrarily produced the possibility of a (physiotheological) Proof of God/Berkeley: each of my feelings, which occurs as a result of the general, known laws of nature and comes from outside, i.e. independently of my will, proves the existence of a God. This is not about the destruction of a real world of objects, but about a new interpretation of existence. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
| Skyrms, B. | Armstrong Vs Skyrms, B. | Arm III 36 Regularity theory/Armstrong: If we vary the accompanying circumstances now, then the limit value of the relative frequency in each class of circumstances is maintained. (Truth conditions/tr.cond./law statements/Resilience: But the resilience throws no light on the truth conditions for law statements, as the text might suggest). Description dependence/Resilience/ArmstrongVsSkyrms/ArmstrongVsMackie: this introduces a considerable element of arbitrariness or convention. The law statement ascribes a precise probability to Fs for being Gs. It conceals that it depends on the decision how the facts are described. Mackie and Skyrms are honest enough not to conceal that: Coincidence/physical coincidence/Skyrms: is not absolute! (Facts are description dependent). Standards for resilience evolve along with physical theories. Resilience/Armstrong: the term is useful when we want to develop objective tests. Laws of Nature/LoN//ArmstrongVsSkyrms: one should never ask more of laws than this: they should be potentially resilient. Fs have the probability of being a G always under all nomically possible circumstances. III 37 But the fact that these circumstances exist is contingent! We expect that some never occur. Skyrms: Follows the reg. th. Arm III 65 Resiliency/Laws of nature/Regularity/Armstrong: E.g. it is assumed to be a Humean Regularity that Fs are Gs. Which additional condition would turn this into a law? We want the Fs to resilientyl be Gs, i.e. under every nomically possible circumstance. Of course, this cannot absolutely be fulfilled. But relative resilience: E.g. there may be Fs that are Hs that are Js that are Ks ... where the class of factors {H, K, J ...} covers a wide range of appropriate circumstances. Then and only then the reg. is a law. How broad must the range be to ensure that the factors are suitable? Intuitively, so that if there are many factors, it is nomically possible in the test to produce an F which is a ~G. E.g. Smith’s Garden (see above). The generalization is highly resilient here, because there is a broad range of circumstances that could falsify it if it is falsifiable. VsResiliency/VsSkyrms: why should there not be laws that are non-resilient?. Law: if it is a law that the Fs are Gs, then s is potentially resilient by definition. It is physically not possible for an F, which is a K, not to be a G. But why should nature be so accommodating as to provide us with reasons to assume that there is no such K? Why should there be Fs which are accompanied by factors that are plausible candidates for Ks, but happen to be not?. E.g. why should Smith’s Garden not exist somewhere, but without fruits, and yet be it a law that it contains nothing but apples? Only a vulgar positivism could prohibit that. ArmstrongVsResilience/ArmstrongVsSkyrms: that is the reason why the refinement of reg.th. must be rejected by resilience. This requires an urgent systematic solution. How can the resilience theorists specify the real factors for a test?. III 66 Only by filtering out the nomically significant factors. He needs a coherent system. Therefore, problems of the systematic approach are also problems of the resilience approach. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Steady State Theory | Barrow Vs Steady State Theory | I 330 Cosmological Principle/Barrow: the average non-uniformity should become smaller the larger the space that is overlooked in outer space. Covariance of the laws of nature. But this is only true on a very large scale, which even surpasses that of the galaxies. The "perfect cosmological principle" of steady-state theory demands that the universe not only looks the same everywhere but also at all times. I 331 VsSteady state theory/SST: if we take the average density as a clock, the past differs radically from the present: it had a high density, the present a low density. Consistency can only be maintained if new matter is constantly created everywhere. (>Kanitscheider, Kosmologie, Stuttgart 1991, pp. 161f, 289f). |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Tichy, P. | Armstrong Vs Tichy, P. | Arm III 90 ArmstrongVsTichy: it seems clear that laws, although they are states of affairs and real, are abstractions. That means they cannot exist independently of other things. Universal: cannot consist only of laws and nothing else. ArmstrongVsPlaton: Universals are abstractions, but not in the sense of Quine and many North American philosophers: III 91 Abstract/Quine: called Platonic universals "abstract". (Different meaning than Armstrong’s universals as abstractions.) Abstraction/Armstrong: A relation between abstractions is itself an abstraction. Laws of nature/LoN/Abstraction/Armstrong: So if they also are abstractions, what kind of A and from what? We get a fairly clear answer: they are abstractions of particulars (P) which instantiate the law (positive). Vs: here one could mention another objection than Tichy’s: we really need the complex formula: ((N (F, G)(a’s being F, a’s being G))? Could we not just represent the instantiation of the laws as follows: N(a’s being F, a’s being G)? The fact that these two states of affairs involve the two U F and G, and only those, seems sufficient to ensure that the necessity exists by virtue of universals. So it is a rel of U. Whether this instantiation would then be an instance of N(F,G), i.e. whether N(F,G) itself is a universal, is less clear, see below: in the next section we see that we might not need the more complex representation. III 97 ArmstrongVsTichy: so in the end we have the right view of the entailment: N(F,G)>(x) Fx>Gx) (s) necessity includes reg. (= universal proposition, universal quantification). Armstrong: if we accept the necessity of individual cases, we can add an intermediate term: N(F,G)>(x) N(Fx,Gx)>(x)(Fx>Gx). In no case shall the inversion is also true!. III 98 Necessity of individual cases/ArmstrongVsTichy: if we introduce them between individual states, we have an intuitively satisfying picture: on the first stage, we have nothing else but states of affairs of the first stage which make another first stage state necessary: be N(a’s bein F, a’s being G). At the second stage, we have a universal 1st stage, a type state 1st stage which makes another Universal 1st stage and a type 1st stage state necessary. E.g. ((N(F,G) (a’s being F, a’s being G)). With this necessity between universals we have laws of nature. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Tooley, M. | Armstrong Vs Tooley, M. | III 104 Tooley: if relations between universals are truthmakers, then these are "atomic facts". Then the standard principles could ascribe a probability of >0 to the confirmation theory. III 105 ArmstrongVsTooley: this is an initial possibility or logical possibility of a tautology. Empiricist should have doubts there. ForrestVsTooley: There could be infinitely many possible universals. Would the attributable initial probabilities not be infinitesimally small then? That would be no justification for the induction. VsInduction/VsBest Explanation: inductive skepticism could doubt that it really would be the best explanation, more fundamentally: why should the regularities in the world ever have an explanation (reg.)?. Regularity/Berkeley: through God. He could abolish the "laws of nature" tomorrow. Berkeley/Armstrong: Answering to this already means to concede the possibility. We have no guarantee that the best explanation is the best scheme. But it is informative. Arm III 120 Then all universals would only be substances in Hume’s sense: i.e. something that logically might have an independent existence. III 121 ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstronVsTooley: it is wrong to think of universals like that. Then there are problems regarding how universals are related with their particulars (part.). E.g. If a rel. between particulars a and b is something that is able to have an independent existence without a and b and any other particulars, would there not have to be at least one other relation to relate it to a and b?. And if this rel. can be uninstantiated itself (e.g. in a universe with monads!), then this rel. is just as questionable, etc. ad infinitum. (Bradley’s regress). One can avoid this only if universals are merely abstract factors of states of affairs (but real). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Tooley, M. | Lewis Vs Tooley, M. | Schwarz I 119 Natural Laws/Law of Nature/Reductionism/LewisVsTooley: this is the price for anti-reductionist intuitions: it sounds nice and good that laws of nature do not supervene on local events, that our concepts of counterfactual truths and causality cannot be reduced to something outside. (Tooley 1987(1), 2003(2)). Problem: the most obvious features of laws of nature become incomprehensible! Lewis: (as a reductionist) can explain why one can empirically discover the laws of nature, why physics is on the way to it, why it is useful to know the laws of nature, and why all Fs are Gs, if "all Fs are Gs" is a law of nature. As an anti-reductionist, one just has to acknowledge all this with humility. Lewis: the assumption of a primitive modal fact which ensures that in every possible world in nature (F,G) exists, also all Fs are Gs, is obscure and almost pointless: if there is no possible world in which nature (F,G) exists, but some Fs are not G, then this must have an explanation, then the idea of such worlds must be somewhat incoherent. Possible worlds cannot simply be missing. Laws of nature/LewisVsArmstrong: perhaps better: regularities that are additionally blessed by a primitive relationship between universals, a relationship that also exists in possible worlds where the law of nature does not apply. That's even more obscure, but then it's at least no wonder that all Fs are Gs if a law of nature demands it. 1. Michael Tooley [1987]: Causation: A Realist Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. Michael Tooley [2003]: “Causation and Supervenience”. In [Loux und Zimmerman 2003] |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Universals | Armstrong Vs Universals | Armstrong II (b) 46 VsUniversals/Armstrong: what if the nominalist (Conceptualism) continues to treat properties as particulars (P) (with respect to laws of probability): its situation is not too bad: Laws of Nature will still need to be regularities that summarize classes of similar prop. But that which bestowes the prop. F on a particular could be an isolated case propensity of acquiring the prop. G. Isolated cases: Place has to deal with isolated case dispositions anyway. But that does not cause additional problems in probabilistic cases. Arm III 82 Nominalism/Armstrong: Naturalists are normally committed to nominalism (i.e. VsUniversals). ArmstrongVs: but both things together have too narrow an ontological base. Many philosophers have therefore called for "extra entities", e.g. "abstract" volumes and/or possible worlds. But if we limited ourselves to instantiated universals, then naturalism can be combined with a rejection of nominalism. With the PI U can be brought into the spatiotemporal world: Def Universals/Armstrong: they are simply the repeatable properties of the spatiotemporal world. III 83 It is wrong to say that any general predicate corresponds to a universal. Namely, because then one would also have to assume uninstantiated universals. It may be ture that some general words cannot be explained without universals, but we should not think that it would be semantically determined which universals exist and which do not. That would be a priori. Instead: a posteriori: it is to be decided a posteriori which repeatable properties particulars have (after the discovery). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Various Authors | Wittgenstein Vs Various Authors | II 164 Laws of nature/LoN/Hertz/Wittgenstein: Hertz has said where something does not comply with its laws, there must be invisible masses, to explain it. WittgensteinVsHertz: this statement is neither right, nor wrong, but it can be feasible or not. Hypotheses like the talk of "invisible masses" and "unconscious mental events" are standards of expression. --- VI 124 WittgensteinVsNecesity/Schulte: the logic "must": only agreement. ((s) logic/Wittgenstein/(s): Convention.) --- VII 98 Ethics/Scheler/Tetens: Z ~ the ethicist is like a signpost, but he does not need to take the same way which he points out. WittgensteinVsScheler/Tetens: such a sentence would have been disgusting for Wittgenstein. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Various Authors | Cartwright Vs Various Authors | I 79 Mathematical explanation/Quantum damping/Agarwal: Important argument: There are six different approaches here with six different equations! (>Redundancy, alternative explanation). I 80 For example, There are various versions of the Schroedinger equation. I 81 Equation/Theoretical explanation/Laws/Cartwright: Thesis: these (alternative, redundant) explanations do not determine any objective laws. Equations/CartwrightVsAgarwal: the alternative equations are in competition with each other. They offer a variety of laws for the same phenomenon. AgarwalVsCartwright: he thinks that different approaches serve different purposes. That means they do not compete. I 94 Laws/Include/Explanation/Laws of Nature/LoN/Grünbaum: ("Science and Ideology", The Scientific Monthly, July 1954, p 13-19): while a more comprehensive law G contains a less comprehensive law L, and thus provides an explanation, it is not the cause of L. Laws are not explained by showing that the regularities which they assert arise from a causation, but that their truth is a special case of a more comprehensive truth. CartwrightVsGrünbaum: In this, it is assumed that the fundamental laws make the same assertions as the concrete ones which explain them. I 95 This then depends on the phenomenological laws being derived from the fundamental ones (>deduction >deductive) if the situation is specified. If the phenomenological laws are right, then the fundamental ones are too, at least in that situation. Problem: there is still a problem of induction: do the fundamental laws make correct generalizations about situations? Explanatory laws/Explanation/Cartwright: the explanatory laws are to explain the phenomenological ones and therefore a variety of other phenomenological laws in other situations. But they are much more economical (because they do not need to specify the special situations). Measuring/Reality/Realistic/Real/Cartwright: if we want to know which properties are real in a theory, we must look for the causal role. I 182 Measuring/Quantum Mechanics/QM/Problem: the static values of dynamic variables have no effect. Only if systems exchange energy, momentum or another conserved quantity, something happens in the QM. E.g. knowing the position of a particle, does not say anything about his future conduct. The detector only responds to a change in energy. Measuring/QM/Henry Margenau/Cartwright: (Margenau, Phil.of Science 4 (1937) p 352-6): Thesis: all measurements in QM are ultimately position measurements. Cartwright: but position measurements themselves are ultimately registrations of interactions at the destruction. This is inelastic, that is, the energy is not conserved in the particles. That means the detector absorbs the energy of the particle. This causes the detector to be ionized. Transitional prob/CartwrightVsMargenau: Solution: So it’s about the prob that the ionization of the detector takes place. Problem: there could be background radiation which causes the ionization without particles. Or, conversely, the disc could be ineffective, so that the energy of the particle is not registered. I 183 Problem/Cartwright: Another problem: the energy must be adequate. This could lead to inconsistencies. Soret effect: here we only need to assume simple linear additivity in our law of action, and we obtain a cross-over effect by adding a thermal diffusion factor to Fick’s law. Unfortunately this does not work for any random influences in the "Transport Theory" (heat transfer, etc.). I 65 Cross-over effect/Cartwright:. There is only one failed attempt to establish general principles for cross-over effects: by Onsager, 1931, further developed in the 1950s. But this was merely a Procrustes-like attempt that explains nothing new. VsOnsager: His principles are empty because they have to be interpreted once in one way and another time in a different way. They may not be followed literally, too much of it is up to the physicist’s imagination. Principle: is empty if it has to be interpreted differently on different occasions. I 174th Schroedinger equation/CartwrightVsSchroedinger equation: Problem: according to it, the electron in the accelerator has neither a particular direction nor a particular energy - SE is refuted daily by reducing the wave packet - not by measurement, but by preparation. I 75 Science/Explanation/Cartwright: the framework of modern physics is mathematical and good explanations will always allow precise calculations. Explanation/Rene Thom: (1972, p 5): Descartes: his vortexes and atom chains explained everything and calculated nothing. Newton: calculated everything and explained nothing. CartwrightVsThom: in modern science we have to keep causal and theoretical explanation apart as well, but they work differently: If we accept Descartes’ causal story, we must accept his assertions of linked atoms and vortexes as true. But we do not assume Newton’s law on the inverse square of the distance to be true or false. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Various Authors | Bunge Vs Various Authors | Kanitscheider I 358 Laws of Nature/BungeVsSST/BungeVsSteady State Theory: the alternative between an unchanging world and unchanging laws on the one hand, and a changing world and changing laws on the other does not exist at all. If an object does not change, the laws remain the same, but not vice versa! The constancy of the laws does not condition the immutability of the linked quantities themselves. Even if for thermodynamic reasons no process returns in the world, this is compatible with the hypothesis that the relations between events of the same class are unchangeable! Where change itself now takes place in a law-like form, it even makes sense to allow a changeability of laws. This is also compatible with actualism: Def Actualism: asserts the unlimited validity of our laws of nature in terms of time and space. |
Bung I M. Bunge Causality and Modern Science: Third Revised Edition New York 1979 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Wittgenstein | Carnap Vs Wittgenstein | II 203 CarnapVsWittgenstein: it is quite possible to express the syntax of a language in this same language without causing inconsistencies (paradoxical) or nonsense. (> Wittgenstein: Picture theory). Hempel I 99/100 Language/Carnap: constructs two symbolic languages. Therein he can give an exact definition of "analytic" and "the logical consequence of", etc.. He then constructs the logical syntax for a group of language systems that only need to fulfill certain conditions. The most important one: the logical essence of the elements of this language system must not be dependent on a non-linguistic factor. This means that relations in natural languages with pronouns like "I" or "this" are not readily determinable. (> BrandomVsCarnap: anaphora). CarnapVsWittgenstein: his significance criterion is too narrow. Carnap characterized empirical laws as general statements that allow many inferences and differ in their form from the so-called singular statements like "At the moment, the temperature in here is twenty degrees". A general statement is checked by examining its singular consequences. But as each general statement determines an infinite class of singular consequences, it cannot be finally and completely verified by them, but only more or less protected. A general statement is not a truth-function of singular statements, but rather has, in relation to them, the character of a hypothesis. Laws of nature: In other words: a general law cannot be formally derived from a finite set of singular statements. Each finite set of statements allows an infinite number of hypotheses. In addition, the singular statements themselves have the character of hypotheses, even when compared to the protocol sentences. What singular statements we accept depends on which of the formally possible systems we choose. CarnapVsWittgenstein: truth: another fundamental principle of the Tractatus should be rejected: truth or falsity of all statements can no longer be defined by reference to the truth of certain basic statements, whether they be atomic statements, protocol sentences or other singular statements. (After all, the singular statements are hypotheses compared to base statements). What follows is a loosening of the concept of truth: in science a statement is accepted as true when it is sufficiently supported by protocol sentences. Carnap II 203 CarnapVsWittgenstein: it is quite possible to express the syntax of a language in this same language, without causing inconsistencies (paradoxical) or nonsense. (> Wittgenstein: picture theory). Language/Carnap: constructs two symbolic languages. Therein he can give an exact definition of "analytic" and "the logical consequence of", etc.. He then constructs the logical syntax for a group of language systems that only need to fulfill certain conditions. The most important one: the logical essence of the elements of this language system must not be dependent on a non-linguistic factor.This means that relations in natural languages with pronouns like "I" or "this" are not readily determinable. - (BrandomVsCarnap: anaphora) |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Natural Laws | Versus | Cartwright I 74 laws of nature / causes / Science: Russell: laws (equations) instead of causes> empiricism) - Vs: Cartwright: Causes instead of laws. |
|
| Natural Laws modifiable | Pro | Stuhlmann-Laeisz: I 46 possible worlds / Stuhlmann-Laeisz: laws of nature may be modified - I 48 Stuhlmann: allows also causality between worlds. |
|
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Natural Laws | Armstrong, D.M. | Lewis V XII Natural Laws/Laws of Nature/LoN/Lewis: I contradict the "non-Humean lawmakers" (e.g. Armstrong): they cannot carry out their own project. Def Laws of Nature/Armstrong: thesis N is a "lawmaker relation", then it is a contingent fact, and one that does not supervene on the AvQ, which universals are in this relation N. But it is nevertheless somehow necessary that if N(F,G) there must be a regularity, that all F"s are G"s. Lewis/Schw I 118 Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong-Theory: Thesis: laws of nature are based on fundamental relations between universals, i.e. properties. Because regularities are logically independent from local events, possible worlds can differ well in their laws of nature with the same local events: what is a mere regularity here may be a "universals" relationship there. Universals-Relationship: is fundamental and unanalyzable. It is not enough to say that there is a relationship between Fs and Gs because all Fs are Gs. That would be the regularity theory. Schurz I 239 Law of Nature/Armstrong: Thesis: are implication relations between universals. Therefore no reference to individuals. (1983, Armstrong, Maxwell conditioning/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979)) |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Functional Laws | Broad, C.D: | Arm III 22 Def Functional Laws/Laws of Nature/Armstrong: (C.D. Broad, 1935) important source for non-instantiated cases. Logical form: Q = f(P) , with Q and P as possible physical quantities. It may very well be that P has no value forever. ((s) which does not mean that P = 0!). (This is the nomic equivalent for e.g. Hume: a certain hue of blue may never be realized). Nevertheless, the functional law gives us the value for the dependent (!) Q for uninstantiated values of P as well as for instantiated values. Question: could all cases of uninstantiated laws of nature be traced back to functional laws? For example Newton's 1st law would then be reduced to an unrealized case of his 2nd law, where the 2nd law turns out to be a functional law. For example the "law" that governs braking in trains, would be derivable from different functional laws over mass under earth-like circumstances. |
|
| Explanation | Cartwright, N. | I 4 Explanation/Cartwright: thesis: is not a signpost to the truth. I 8 Forecast/Prediction/Success/Cartwright: Thesis: is no help when it comes to saying if the theory is true! I 11 Equations/Science/Physics/Cartwright: thesis: is to ask the wrong question: "What are the right equations?". Different models bring different aspects to the fore, some equations give a rough estimate, but are easier to solve. No single model serves all purposes. We apply these and other equations. Causal Explanation/Cartwright: are different from physical practice: we don't tell a causal story first, then another! I 12 Thesis: if we take the evidence seriously, we must say that the physical laws are wrong! One reason is the tension between causal and theoretical explanation. I 44 CartwrightVsTradition: Thesis: truth and explanation are two completely different functions and should be kept apart, which usually does not happen. I 44 Explanation/Deductive-Nomological Model/Hempel: Thesis: one factor explains the other if the occurrence of the second can be deductively deduced from that of the first from the laws of nature. |
|
| Laws | Cartwright, N. | Cartwright: I have three connected arguments. Thesis 1: The obvious explanatory power of fundamental laws does not speak for their truth. Thesis 2: The way in which fundamental laws are used in explanations speaks for their falsity. We explain by ceteris paribus laws by merging causes by approximations that exceed what the fundamental laws dictate. Thesis 3: The appearance of truth comes from a bad explanatory model, I 4 that connects laws directly to reality. Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum-View"/Cartwright: from explanation: Thesis: the path from theory to reality goes like this: theory > model > phenomenological law. Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be). Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are true only of the objects in the model. I 10 Asymmetry: Causal laws are asymmetric: Effect and cause cannot be interchanged. - On the other hand symmetrical: Laws of Association/Hume: e.g. length of shadow/height of mast. - Fraassen: Thesis: The explanatory asymmetries are not real. There is no fact about what explains what. CartwrightVsFraassen - Association/CartwrightVsHume: Association is not sufficient to distinguish between effective and ineffective strategies to fight malaria. I 51 Laws of Nature/Science/Cartwright: Thesis: There are no laws for cases where theories overlap. |
|
| Haecceitism | Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 104 Quidditism/Schwarz: the thesis, that fundamental properties exist regardless of their causal-nomological role. It is like the haecceitism: Schwarz I 104 Haecceitism/Schwarz: is the thesis, that particulars do not differ by qualitative suitability - but by "this-ness" -> qualitatively identical possible worlds can then differ in the fact that Humphrey wins in one, not in another world. Quidditism: Nomological-structural identical worlds may differ in what role charge 1 plays in them - if quidditism was wrong, laws of nature would be absolutely necessary - Lewis: but they could be different! |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Determinism | Lewis, D. | V 291 Def soft Determinism/Lewis: the thesis that one sometimes voluntarily does what one is predestined to do and that in such cases one could also act differently, although prehistory and the laws of nature determine that one will not act differently. Def Compatibilism/Lewis: is the thesis that soft determinism could be true. But a compatibilist could still doubt soft determinism because he doubts that there is a physical basis, that we are predetermined to act as we act. Lewis: Thesis: I myself am a compatibilist, but not a determinist. For the sake of the argument, I will pretend to represent soft determinism. V 293 Weak Thesis/Lewis: I am able to do something so that if I did, a natural law would be broken. Strong Thesis: I am able to break natural laws. V 295 Lewis: Thesis: I was able to raise my hand (instead of actual lowering). I acknowledge that a natural law had to be broken for this, but I deny that I would be able to break natural laws because of it. Soft Determinism does not require supernatural forces. Compatibilism/Lewis: in order to maintain it one does not even have to assume that supernatural powers are possible at all! |
|
| Reasons | McDowell, J. | I 17 Logical space of the reasons/logical space of nature/McDowell: thesis: besides the space of reasons (concepts) there is a logical space of nature: the laws of nature, not normative relations. a) logical space of reasons: justification, knowledge, belief, functional concepts. b) logical space of nature: objects, sensory impressions. This is not a division of "natural and normative". Esfeld I 146~ McDowell/Esfeld: thesis: space of reasons (justifications) further than that of the conceptual. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Natural Laws | Ryle, G. | I 99 Laws of nature / Ryle: Thesis: Natural laws govern everything, but they do not evoke anything! |
|
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unobserved | Bohr, N. | Barrow I 241 Reality / Bohr: thesis: there is no unobserved reality - there are no laws of nature. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Natural Laws | Galilei, G. | Genz VIII 108 Laws of nature/Galileo: they are independent of the speed. E.g. shifts inside of a moving ship. Reason: the movement of the ship applies to all things therein, also to the air. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Mach Principle | Mach, E | Kanitscheider I 376 Mach’s Principle / laws / Kanitscheider: fixed stars instead of "absolute space" - (Berkeley: rotation against absolute space unobservable) - Mach thesis: there can only be relative motion - problem: then the matter has its inertia property just because there is other matter - Russell: the laws of nature can be formulated without taking into account existence of matter - Kanitscheider per - it is not part of their meaning, that matter exists. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| |||