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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
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| Taxonomy | Gould | I 284 Taxonomy/classification/order/Gould: some taxonomists believe that organisms should only be grouped according to their branching patterns. If two groups are diverted from each other and have no successors, such as birds and dinosaurs, they must be grouped in a formal classification before each of them joins another group (such as dinosaurs with other reptiles). Cladist system of taxonomy: in a cladist system, dinosaurs cannot be reptiles unless birds are reptiles. But if birds are not reptiles, dinosaurs and birds must form a new class of their own. Cladistic: is the question of which branch comes first, because a new group is created. The traditional view is that structural differences are decisive. Other taxonomists believe that the branching points should not be the only criterion, and also take into account the degree of adaptive divergence of structures. For example, according to the cladist system, lungfish and cows have a higher degree of relationship than lungfish and salmon. Tradition: according to the traditional system, we take into account both the biological structure and the distribution ratios and are able to keep salmon and lungfish together due to numerous common features. The traditional system recognises an uneven evolutionary speed after branching off as a classification criterion. I 289 Gould: I tend more to the traditional than the cladist system. Bats are also not assigned to a separate class simply because they fly. IV 131 Taxonomy/Gould: variation plays a different role here than in evolution. Evolution: there are probably "islands of form", i.e. there are no smooth transitions from cats to other animals. Type: although species can be discreet, they do not possess unchangeable features! Variations are the raw material of evolutionary change. There are variations from the beginning: features are deceptive. Definition type: species must be defined as chains of non-reducible variations (anti-essentialism). IV 173 Taxonomy/Gould: numerical precision cannot be the principle of taxonomy order, because life unfolds over time. III 23 Taxonomy/classification: when classifying exotic species, we may be able to use "maximum objectivity", but with homo sapiens we stumble. Nothing is more misleading than narrowly limited, formally correct information that has been taken out of context. Prejudice: in our pictures, time before the emergence of vertebrates never excludes more than 10%. In reality, it is almost half of the entire evolutionary period. III 27 Vertebrates: up until today, more than half of all vertebrates are fish. III 60 Classification/Gould: classification does not consist of distributing objectively recognizable categories. Taxonomy includes many human choices that we impose on nature. There is indeed objective nature, but we can communicate with it only through the structure of our taxonomic systems. It is not true that such systems would be free of ambiguity. E. g. "Two Gender Model": the two gender model only exists since Descartes and Newton. From antiquity to the Renaissance, a "one sex model" was preferred: the human bodies are in a continuous spectrum of perfection, from the low-earthly to the highest idealization. III 89 Classification: problem: some systems present successful groups as distant from the main line. >Classification. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Burge, T. | Stalnaker Vs Burge, T. | II 171 Positive assertion/VsExternalism/VsBurge/VsAnti-Individualism/Stalnaker: how can you define an individualistic analogous to a relational term? II 187 Negative approach/Revisionism/VsExternalism/VsAnti-Individualism/VsBurge/Individualism/Stalnaker: the negative approach has different descriptions: (>terminology): methodological solipsism: Putnam 1975, Fodor 1981a Individualism: Burge, also Fodor 1987 Principle of autonomy: Stich 1983. Thesis: all states and properties that are attributed and described in psychology should be intrinsic states. Behavior explanation: should only deal with properties that are relevant to the causal powers of the subjects. Indistinguishability/theory: things that are indistinguishable in terms of causal powers should not be included in the explanation. II 188 Def Individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/Fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically. Important argument: thus it is then not excluded that mental states are individuated because of relational properties. Relational properties/Fodor: are taxonomical when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence StalnakerVsFodor: a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers. But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal forces. Therefore Fodor represents only the weaker thesis. Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger thesis. StalnakerVsFodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (FodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of strong with the weak thesis. Stalnaker: to eliminate that psychological states are individuated by normal wide content, you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. Example Fodor: Individualism/Fodor/Stalnaker: Fodor defends his version of individualism with the example of a causally irrelevant relational property: E.g. h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with the head up, II 189 t-particle: we call this the same particle if the coin shows the tail. Fodor: no reasonable theory will use this differentiation to explain the particle's behavior. StalnakerVsFodor: But from this it does not follow that psychological states have to be purely internal (intrinsic). II 193 Mental state/psychological/internal/head/StalnakerVsBurge: e.g. O’Leary believes that there is water in the basement. Is this state in his head? Of course! ((s) Against: Putnam: refers to the meaning of words such as basements and water). Stalnaker: and in the sense like a mosquito bite on his nose is on his nose. II 194 Narrow content/Stalnaker: is accepted as what is completely internal. Psychology: various authors: say that narrow content is necessary for every psychological explanation. They agree with Burge that normal content is often not narrow. Anti-Individualism/Burge/StalnakerVsBurge: seems to conflict with the everyday understanding that I, when I instead of talking about the world talk about how me things appear that I am then talking about myself. Narrow content/StalnakerVsBurge: it is less clear than it seems what narrow content is at all and II 195 I believed that there is such a great conflict between the individualist and anti-individualist. Narrow content/Stalnaker: 1. in which sense is narrow content at all narrow and in which sense is it in the mind purely internal? 2. Which role shall narrow content play at the explanation of mental phenomena? How is the ascription of narrow content referred to the one of wide content? 3. Do we need narrow content at all for the behavior explanation? Or rather the access that we have to the content of our own thoughts? |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Fodor, J. | Stalnaker Vs Fodor, J. | II 176 Def narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: is a generalization of Kaplan's character in the sense that the context considers any for the speaker external fact that is relevant to the determination of the wide content. Extensional identity criterion/narrow content/Fodor: (1987, 30 – 48)(1): C: be the condition that is fulfilled by the twin-me on twin-earth, C’: by myself in the actual world. Since there is no miracle it must be true that when an organism shares the neurophysiological constitution of my twin and fulfills C it follows that his thoughts and my twin also share the truth conditions (tr.c.). So the extensional identity criterion is that two thought contents (mental content) are the same iff they cause the same mapping of thoughts and context on truth conditions. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: that tells us less than it appears about the mapping that is used here. Nor how the relevant function is determined by what is going on in the mind of the believer. II 177 StalnakerVsFodor: we consider the following parody of his argument: e.g. I have the property of being exactly three miles from a burning stable - my twin is located on twin earth at exactly the same place, but, however, has the property of being exactly three miles from a snowy henhouse. C: then there surely is a property for my twin due to which he is three miles from the henhouse while this property does not exist for me. We call this condition C. C’: is then the property that makes up for me that I am three miles from the burning stable which does not exist for my twin. Since there is no miracle, we know at least this much: both, my twin and I, would in our respective world be three miles from a snowy henhouse when condition C ruled and both three miles from a burning stable if C' ruled. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: which determines no function at all that makes the condition C' to the property to be three miles from a snowy henhouse and at the same time condition C to the property to be three miles from a burning stable - a function that allegedly makes the contribution of the location of the subject to a specific relational property. StalnakerVsFodor: there are such functions and there is no need to identify one of them with the contribution of my intrinsic localization with the special relational property. My twin cannot sensibly say: "I did my part, as I - if condition C had ruled, .... Each localization is in the way that for any external conditions if those conditions rule something in this localizations is three miles away from a burning stable. narrow content/Stalnaker: question: does my cousin have the same narrow content as my conviction that salt is soluble in water but not in something else? StalnakerVsFodor: his theory gives no indication as to how an answer to this question was to be found! Note: however for me it is not about an uncertainty at all, this is also true for wide content but that we do not know at all how to identify narrow content. II 180 Belief/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: his image of faith is decisively motivated by his approach that there is an internal language (Mentalese) which is saved in the internal Belief/Fodor: are saved inner propositions. ((s) not propositions). They are convictions by virtue of their internal functional role. They are also identifiable independent of the environment of the subject. Semantic properties/Fodor: however partly depend on what happens in the environment around it but the way how they depend on it is determined by purely internal states of the subject! StalnakerVsFodor: here strong empirical presuppositions are in play. Def narrow content/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: function of context (in a very wide sense) on truth conditional content. StalnakerVsFodor: this is attractive for his intentions but it does not explain how it ever comes to that. And how to identify any narrow content. Narrow content/Stalnaker: is there any way at all to identify narrow content that is not based on Mentalese? Yes, by Dennett (…+…) II 188 Def individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/Fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically. Important argument: thus it is not excluded that mental states are individuated due to relational properties. Relational properties/Fodor: are taxonomically when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence StalnakerVsFodor: a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers. But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal powers. Therefore Fodor represents only the weaker thesis. Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger. StalnakerVsFodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (FodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of the strong with the weak thesis. Stalnaker: to exclude that psychological states are individuated by normal wide content you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. E.g. Fodor: Individualism/Fodor/Stalnaker: Fodor defends his version of individualism with an example of a causal irrelevant relational property: e.g. h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with heads up, II 189 t-particle: we call that way the same particle if the coin shows tails. Fodor: no reasonable theory will use this distinction to explain the behavior of the particle. StalnakerVsFodor: but from this it does not follow that psychological states must be purely internal (intrinsic). (1) Fodor, J. A. (1987): Explorations in cognitive science, No. 2.Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. British Psychological Society; The MIT Press. |
R.C. Stalnaker I Stalnaker Ways a world may be Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays Clarendon Press Oxford New York 2003 II Stalnaker Context and Content Oxford University Press NY 1999 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Representation | Churchland, P. | Fod/Lep IV 189 Paul Churchland: it also has in mind - thesis: that a kind of representations reflect "contents" of neurological states. However, he is up to his neck in intentionality. IV 189 Churchland: thesis: the brain represents different aspects of reality through a position in an appropriate state space. IV 193 Thesis: what we then retain are random dimensions, depending on the taxonomy inclination of semantics. Churchland/Fodor/Lepore: starts surprisingly with feelings, not with intentionality (like propositional attitudes or terms). Thesis: If we had adequate access to sensations, this could be generalized to a general mental representation. |
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