Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deceptions | Frith | I 30 Waterfall deception/deception/illusion: for example, objects stand still here, but we still see them moving. There is also the reverse deception. I 37 Deception/illusion/Frith: for example, someone who is deaf can be awakened by the illusion of hearing loud music. I 39 False Knowledge/Frith: e.g. epilepsy can lead to false knowledge. >Illusion. I 40 Aura: an aura lets a person hear voices and sounds. Also e.g. experiences from the past. I 41 This can lead to false knowledge. I 47 Schizophrenia/Frith: typical characteristic of schizophrenia: e.g. the people firmly believe that they had had experiences, which they did not have. I 49 Illusion/Schizophrenia/Frith: people hear voices that give them commands and comment on actions. The brain can create a false mental world. It is not about the physical world. >Schizophrenia. Thesis: even the completely normally functioning brain can tell us something wrong. I 51 Brain/world/reality/perception/Frith: thesis: even if our brain works normally, we have no direct access to the world. >World/Thinking. I 83 Movement/perception/deception/illusion/Frith: for example, the hand should draw a straight line that appears on the computer screen - but the hand itself is not visible. The computer itself can produce distortions. N.B.: you do not know what the hand is doing. The border is outside the body and ends at the cursor I move across the screen. E.g. people see a hand in the mirror without knowing that it is the hand of a helper. I 85 Conscious action: self-awareness: here the boundary lies within the body and ends at the point where I intend to draw a vertical line. >Actions. I 89 Deception/optical/illusion: for example, a target in a frame is shown briefly, then again, with the target remaining, but the frame has moved somewhat. The person believes that the target has moved, but not the frame. N.B.: only the visual cortex comes to the conclusion that the frame has remained when the person is supposed to show where he/she presumes the target to be, he/she shows the correct position. The pointing movement is not affected by the movement of the frame. Knowledge: the hand "knows" that the target has not moved. I 90/91 Brain/Frith: our brain does not tell us if our body moves differently than we intend (for normal people). I 209 Definition Schizophrenia/Frith: shizophrenia is not a personality split, but the split runs between the parts of a personality, i.e. between emotion and knowledge. >Emotion, >Knowledge. I 210 Diagnosis: there are no physical signs of schizophrenia. The diagnosis is based on what the patient tells the doctor. The patient believes that his action is controlled by foreign powers. He hallucinates about foreign powers. I 211 Erroneous immunity/immunity/error/misidentification/Frith: erroneous immunity does not appear to exist in the case of schizophrenia. Thought/thinking/Frith: that leads to the question of how we know where our thoughts come from and that they are our own thoughts. >Thought, >Thinking. I 235 Deception/Frith: autists are usually not able to deceive someone. Friendship/society/community: this is the reason why autists are often alone. I 236 The ability to deceive is an important prerequisite to maintain friendships. >Friendship. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| I, Ego, Self | Frith | I 101 I/consciousness/Frith: Problem: we are good at grasping, but we know very little about the distribution of our body parts in space. Knowing what we know about it is sometimes wrong: >false knowledge. Higher level: here, knowledge is stored about the time and type of change. Next level: is the knowledge that I am the acting person. Even here I can be wrong. >Self, >Subject, >Actions, >Authorship, >Intentionality, cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception. I 224 I/self/Frith: I experience myself as an island of stability in a constantly changing world. I 246 I/self/Frith: thesis: the "I" is created by my brain. >Brain, >Brain states, >Brain/Frith. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Knowledge | Frith | I 39 False Knowledge/Frith: e.g. epilepsy: can lead to false knowledge. I 40 Aura: an aura lets a person hear voices and sounds, also e.g. experiences from the past. I 41 This can lead to false knowledge. >Illusion, >Delusion. I 47 Schizophrenia/Frith: typical characteristic of schizophrenia: e.g. the people firmly believe they had had experiences, which they did not have however. I 49 Illusion/schizophrenia/Frith: people hear voices that give them commands and comment on actions. The brain can create a false mental world. It is not about the physical world. Thesis: even the completely normally functioning brain can tell us something wrong. I 51 Brain/world/reality/perception/Frith: thesis: even if our brain works normally, we have no direct access to the world. >World/Thinking, >Reality, >Brain, >Brain states, >Brain/Frith. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Knowledge | Russell | Frank I 654ff Proposition/Knowledge/Russell: one can know propositions, even if one is not familiar with all components. >Proposition, >Statement. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 Russell IV 116 Knowledge/wrong knowledge/false knowledge/Russell: E.g. Someone thinks that the name of the Prime Minister starts with B (Bannerman is correct) - but he thinks Balfour was Prime Minister - no true knowledge. Hintikka 167 Knowledge/who/what/where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze constructions of the form white + W sentence. General: (10) a knows who (e.g., x) is such that A (x) becomes (11) (Ex) a knows that A (x). Hintikka: but this is only possible if we modify Russell's approach: Problem: the existential generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be traced back to the non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed with Russell's theory of descriptions. >Existential Generalization, >Theory of descriptions. Problem: for each person, there are a lot of people whose names the person knows and of whose existence the person knows, but of whom the person does not know who they are. ((s) celebrities, people of whom one has heard, hear-say) not aquaintance, but by description. I 168 Charles Dodgson, for instance, was for Queen Victoria one person she had heard of, but she did not know herself. Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10) it applies: (12) ~ (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x But this is trivially wrong, even according to Russell. The following is certainly true: (13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson Existential Generalization/EG: results then in: (14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x So exactly the negation of (12) is a contradiction. Descriptions/Hintikka: descriptions are not involved here at all. Therefore Russell's theory of descriptions cannot help here. I 170 Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Uniqueness/Russell/Hintikka: What ways Russell could have taken? Knowledge-who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge who did something with the existence of an individual of whom is known that it has done so. >Identification, >Individuation. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Definition Theory | Newen Vs Definition Theory | NS I 159 Predicate/Extension/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "cardioid": set of all creatures with kidneys Intention/Predicate/Carnap: in contrast the property of being a creature with kidneys. Formal: a function of possible worlds on the set of all creatures with kidneys. Intention: is the contribution to the sentence content that makes the difference between the sentences "Peter is a creature with kidneys" and "... with heart". Predicate/Meaning/Concept/Newen/Schrenk: we assume the background assumption that the meanings of predicates are concepts. Concepts/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: are then determined as properties with him. Property/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: for him it is fixed by what extension they have in a possible world. Problem: this is not sufficient for all mathematical predicates. E.g. "equilateral" and "equiangular" applies to the same sets of triangles. However, this is part of the basic question of what the meanings of predicates are. Definition Theory/Concepts/Criteria/Newen/Schrenk: classical theory: thesis: the meaning of a predicate is specified by a definition that provides necessary and sufficient conditions of use. VsDefinition Theory: Problem: 1) for most concepts we do not find such definitions and our everyday concepts do not have limits as sharp as definitions would require. 2) We usually only have partial knowledge or partially false knowledge about what we associate with an expression. NS I 160 3) typicality effects: i.e. some objects are typical examples of things that fall under a concept, others are less typical, even if they are both unambiguously subsumed under the concept. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Katz, J. | Vendler Vs Katz, J. | I 260 Translation/Wittgenstein: was aware of these difficulties: he did not forbid the translation of his works, but insisted that they should only be printed together with the German original. Translation/Philosophy/Language/Vendler: in Hungarian the use of the copula is limited. Should one conclude from this that a Hungarian cannot understand Aristotle's being? Necessary Truth/Translation: For example, "You cannot know anything wrong" is true in all languages, provided it has been well translated! It is a necessary truth. (Vendler: Tautology). ((s) HegelVs: there can be false knowledge, e.g. incorrect gemoetrical figures (Preface of Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes). >Knowledge/Frith, >deception/Frith. One can find necessary truths embedded in individual languages. Thus one can come to necessary conclusions. But that does not give much. The regulative idea of language and thinking in itself gives nothing here. But this does not mean that we are trapped in the conceptual system of our mother tongue. We have already freed ourselves from terms like "magic power" etc. in the past. I 261 The philosopher, of course, makes suggestions for improving the imprecise natural language. But he does it in his natural language! I 262 Katz: Thesis: we may only consider those aspects of a language to be philosophically relevant that are common to all languages. VendlerVsKatz: In view of the above, I see no need for this. |
Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Wittgenstein | Tugendhat Vs Wittgenstein | Pauen I 254 I/TugendhatVsHeidelberger School/Pauen: (1979): has created its own problems with false basic assumptions. Instead: semantic approach: use of the expression "I" in everyday language. What do we mean by the self-attribution of mental states? Tugendhat: "The ego" is a false substantiation of a personal pronoun. An art expression. Tugendhat like Wittgenstein: in reality they are expressive sentences. Wittgenstein: "I feel pain" only replaces "Ouch"! I 255 TugendhatVsWittgenstein: difference between the two: the former expresses knowledge. It can also be denied. The sentence cannot be mistakenly misused. In the case of self-attribution, the possibility of false knowledge is omitted. ((s) Cf. >privileged access, >incorrigibility). I 256 Tugendhat: "Epistemic asymmetry" between self and external attributions. Self-attributions are true exactly when they are also attributed to others. But not vice versa. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
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