Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 16 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Artificial Intelligence | Chalmers | I 185 Artificial Intelligence/Chalmers: Suppose we had an artificial system that rationally reflects what it perceives. Would this system have a concept of consciousness? It would certainly have a concept of the self, it could differ from the rest of the world, and have a more direct access to its own cognitive contents than to that of others. So it would have a certain kind of self-awareness. This system will not say about itself, that it would have no idea how it is to see a red triangle. Nor does it need access to its elements on a deeper level (Hofstadter 1979 1, Winograd 1972 2). N.B.: such a system would have a similar attitude to its inner life as we do to ours. Cf. >Artificial consciousness, >Self-consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Knowing how. I 186 Behavioral explanation/Chalmers: to explain the behavior of such systems, we never need to attribute consciousness. Perhaps such systems have consciousness, or not, but the explanation of their behavior is independent of this. >Behavior, >Explanation. I 313 Artificial Intelligence/VsArtificial Intelligence/Chalmers: DreyfusVsArtificial Intelligence: (Dreyfus 1972 7): Machines cannot achieve the flexible and creative behavior of humans. LucasVsArtificial Intelligence/PenroseVsArtificial Intelligence/Chalmers: (Lucas 1961 3, Penrose, 1989 4): Computers can never reach the mathematical understanding of humans because they are limited by Goedel's Theorem in a way in which humans are not. Chalmers: these are external objections. The internal objections are more interesting: VsArtificial intelligence: internal argument: conscious machines cannot develop a mind. >Mind/Chalmers. SearleVsArtificial Intelligence: > Chinese Room Argument. (Searle 1980 5). According to that, a computer is at best a simulation of consciousness, a zombie. >Chinese Room, >Zombies, >Intentionality/Searle. Artificial Intelligence/ChalmersVsSearle/ChalmersVsPenrose/ChalmersVsDreyfus: it is not obvious that certain physical structures in the computer lead to consciousness, the same applies to the structures in the brain. >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 314 Definition Strong Artificial Intelligence/Searle/Chalmers: Thesis: There is a non-empty class of computations so that the implementation of each operation from this class is sufficient for a mind and especially for conscious experiences. This is only true with natural necessity, because it is logically possible that any compuation can do without consciousness, but this also applies to brains. >Strong Artificial Intelligence. I 315 Implementation/Chalmers: this term is needed as a bridge for the connection between abstract computations and concrete physical systems in the world. We also sometimes say that our brain implements calculations. Cf. >Thinking/World, >World, >Reality, >Computation, >Computer Model. Implementation/Searle: (Searle 1990b 6): Thesis is an observational-relativistic term. If you want, you can consider every system as implementing, for example: a wall. ChalmersVsSearle: one has to specify the implementation, then this problem is avoided. I 318 For example, a combinatorial state machine has quite different implementation conditions than a finite state machine. The causal interaction between the elements is differently fine-grained. >Fine-grained/coarse-grained. In addition, combinatorial automats can reflect various other automats, like... I 319 ...Turing-machines and cellular automats, as opposed to finite or infinite state automats. >Turing-machine, >Vending machine/Dennett. ChalmersVsSearle: each system implements one or the other computation. Only not every type (e.g., a combinational state machine) is implemented by each system. Observational relativity remains, but it does not threaten the possibility of artificial intelligence. I 320 This does not say much about the nature of the causal relations. >Observation, >Observer relativity. 1. D. R. Hofstadter Gödel, Escher Bach, New York 1979 2. T. Winograd, Understanding Natural Language, New York 1972 3. J. R. Lucas, Minds, machines and Gödel, Philosophy 36, 1961, p. 112-27. 4. R. Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind, Oxford 1989 5. J. R. Searle, Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 1980: pp. 417 -24 6. J. R. Searle, Is the brain an digital computer? Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical association, 1990, 64: pp. 21-37 7. H. Dreyfus, What Computers Can't Do. New York 1972. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Consciousness | Nietzsche | Ries II 104 Consciousness/Instinct/Nietzsche: behind the consciousness, there are instincts. >Drives/Nietzsche. --- Danto III 148 Consciousness/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche thesis: Consciousness has little to do with the individual itself. Rather, it has to do with the relationships between individuals. Cf. >Intersubjectivity, >Communication/Nietzsche. NietzscheVsTradition: Consciousness is not the highest form of individual existence, but rather a 'tool and detail of total life'.(1) Danto III 148 Communication/consciousness/Nietzsche/Danto: Consciousness stands for Nietzsche in relation to the ability of a person or animal to communicate and this ability in turn in relation to the need to communicate.(2) It is also about preserving a group. Danto III 149 Consciousness/Nietzsche: is actually only a network of connections between human and human and has developed only in relation to the degree of this usefulness.(3) Danto III 150/151 Consciousness/Nietzsche: Thesis: Consciousness does not really belong to the individual existence of the human being, but rather to what is community and herd nature in him/her. (on page 274). ((s) See also Language/Vygotsky, see also Private Language/Wittgenstein). Danto III 155 Consciousness/Causality/Nietzsche/Danto: Consciousness never provides us with an example of cause and effect.(4) >Cause/Nietzsche, >Effect/Nietzsche; cf. >Causality/Hume. Danto III 218 Consciousness/Internalization/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche calls the phenomenon internalization that a instinct still comes to light when prohibited, but not against an external object, but an internal object, the person itself. This phenomenon plays a role in the further development of consciousness.(5) >Internalisation. 1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 587. 2. F. Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, KGW V, 2. S. 272f. 3. Ibid. 4. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 732. 5. F. Nietzsche Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2, S 338. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Imagination | Tugendhat | I 350 Imagination/TugendhatVsTradition: the assumption of an internal image creates more problems than it solves. >Internal objects, >Mental objects, >Mentalism, >Consciousness, >Mind, >Representation. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Language Acquisition | Quine | V 68 Language Learning/Quine: the success depends on whether the similarity standards match. - What do the episodes have in common? V 71 Approval/learning/Quine: instead of reward: is more general. There are not enough situations for rewards, because not everything is pronounced. - Language learning: is not only done by linguistic statements, but also through non-verbal responses. - Even animals. - Approval: leads to voicing one's own sentences -> Gavagai: if you just wait until the parents say rabbit, you will not find out that everything that is called a rabbit is also referred to as an animal. Radical Interpretation: question and answer game is essential here. - Approval must be obtained. ((s) reward has to be confirmed otherwise). V 75 1) red from the child, yes from the mother - 2) vice versa - generalization: by previously learned expressions - criterion for approval: readiness, to express an observation sentence on one’s own initiative. >Observation Sentences V 77 Good/language learning/QuineVsMoore/QuineVsTradition: two factors: perception similarity and desire. - Distinction between aesthetically good and morally well: the former feels good, the latter announces former. Moral/Quine: as flavor: community thing. V 113 Truth/language learning/Quine: somehow such a connection of meaning and truth is indicative for learning, regardless of the logical particles - we learn the use of declarative sentences by learning the truth conditions - but truth value is learned late. V 121 Compliance/language learning/Quine: in casual conversation - not hidden meanings. - ((s) internal objects). V 147 Set theory/language learning/Quine: set theory/language learning/Quine: by imagining the substitutional quantification as a simulation of the referential quantification, we imagine the general term as a simulation of abstract singular terms, of names of attributes or names of classes. - Class name: is an abstract singular term, not a general term. >Classes/Quine. VI 89f Whole sentence/holophrastic/language learning/Quine: we need whole sentences to define that e.g. a mirrored object is meant - or reflection. - ((s) or mirroring). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Mentalese | Peacocke | I 206 Mentalese/belief/Field/Peacocke: Field Thesis: systems that are sufficiently complex for belief terms, have systems of internal representations in which the sentence-analogues have significant grammatical structure. >Complexity, >Structure, >Systems, >Beliefs, >Thoughts, >Propositional Attitudes, >Thinking, >Representation, >Internal States, >Internal Objects, >Belief Objects, >Thought Objects, cf. >Artificial Intelligence. I 209 Mentalese/Peacocke: a model that works without the assumption of a language of thought would have to explain two things: 1. How can one ascribe propositional content, without referring to syntactic structures? - That means, relatively complex content must be attributed to syntactically unstructured (psychic) states. >Propositional content, >Content. 2. It must be shown, how these states interact with perception and behavior. >Perception, >Behavior. I 215 A simple model (relation instead of language) does not seem to require the instrumentalist conception of a rational actor. - On the contrary, if someone meets the relational model, a realism regarding mechanisms of rational belief-desire psychology would be justified. >Realism, >Rationality. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Mentalism | Quine | ad V 57 Mentalism/Quine/(s): assumption of internal objects as a guarantor of the truth of propositions e.g. about ideas - e.g. word meaning. Quine: Mentalism has strong echoes of introspection. >Introspection. VI 105 Mentalism/Quine: (belief in inner objects). Origin: the perception that others perceive something. Analog: is the belief in final causes for the meaning of life. Purpose: psychological projection. IV 402 QuineVsBritish Empiricism: this is based on the acceptance of ideas (derived from Locke). Uncritical Mentalism: too simple an image of the experience reference of languages and theories. Reference/Quine: Such a reference cannot be defined idea for idea or term for term. >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought, >Mental objects. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Models | Sellars | I XL Model/Sellars: always works in connection with a commentary. Model of sensations: requires internal objects. >Internal objects, >Sensation. I XXIX Theory of sensations: does not speak of inner objects. I 86 Sellars: the basic assumptions of a theory are usually not formed by an uninterpreted calculus, but by a model. Def model/Sellars: the description of a domain of known objects which behave in the usual way. >Domain, >Regularity, >Calculus. I 87 A model is characterized primarily by the fact that gets commentary alongside, which restricts or limits the analogies. The descriptions of the basic behaviors correspond to the postulates of the logistic image of theorizing. >Analogies. Rorty I 261 Sellars: each model has its comment. >Models, >Model theory. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Object | Davidson | I (b) 16 ff Thought/Knowledge/DavidsonVsHume: there are infinitely many properties, so ignorance of the imagined objects is possible Hume/Descartes: ... it is necessary to find objects for which mistakes are impossible. As objects that are necessary what they seem to be. DavidsonVsDescartes: Such objects simply do not exist. Not even appearances are all what they seem to be. Also, the aspects of sense data cannot be protected against misidentification, insofar as they are real objects. We must drop the idea that there are inner objects or mental images in the required sense. No "internal objects", no "uninterpreted given", "no stream" within a schema (VsSchema/content). >Scheme/Content, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mentalism. Frank I 678 Objects/Putnam/Fodor: a) "true inward", "in front of the mind", "conceived" by him - b) those who identify thoughts in the usual way. (external) - Davidson: I agree that there are no objects that serve both purposes - ((s) not an excellent class). - Putnam: the two cannot coincide, because otherwise the mind could not be deceived. Ideas/impressions/Hume: "are as it seems and seem as it is" - DavidsonVsHume: such objects do not exist - neither abstract nor concrete, neither public nor private. Even propositions do not exist - there is no object that would satisfy the dual function to be in front of the mind and also to determine the content of the thought - otherwise one could not be deceived. - meaning depends on the types of objects and events which have caused the person acausally to take the words as applicable. But the agent cannot ask himself/herself whether he/she regularly applies them correctly, because his/her regularity gives them importance. - Thus, authority of the first person and social character go hand in hand. >First Person. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Pain | Malcolm | Cavell I 37 Norman Malcolm: Thesis: Attempt to reject the idea of a private pain, according to which it is impossible for two people to have the same pain. >Internal objects, >Mental objects, >Identification, >Individuation, >Identity, >Equality. Malcolm: Let us first agree that "equal" here means equality of description, and not "equality of place", so we see that it is very possible to share the same pain. CavellVsMalcolm: the argument is questionable, the skeptic can rightly assume here that our knowledge of the other is not enough. Knowledge is more than the presence of criteria. >Criteria, >Knowledge, >Self-knowledge. Cavell I 45 Pain/Numerical Identity/Qualitative Identity/Malcolm: Malcolm disputes the fact that one can reasonably say in (descriptive) identical painful occurrences that it is two. Thesis: with regard to sensory impressions, the concept of "numerical identity" has no application. >Sensations, >Sensory impressions, >Perception. Malcolm: if the description is the same, there cannot be the additional question whether the idea would also be the same! >Description, >Imagination. Example Cavell: one can say our "twin cars" do not differ, yet there are two. Why not in pain then? Because "equals" here means "descriptively equal"? Obviously not! >Distinctions, >Indistinguishability. Cavell I 46 Why should the skeptics not have the feeling that here it is presupposed what is still to be examined? >Skepticism. For example, for cars, the question is answered: there are two, in the case of colors the question is also answered: it is one! But in pain? Pain/Malcolm: Danger to think it is here as in the colors, styles, opinions or sudden ideas. It is a truism that there can be the same shades of color at the same time in many places. >Colour. Pain/CavellVsMalcolm: this seems to show that colors are different from headaches. But I can answer the question whether the pain is numerically identical with its: namely, they are not identical! |
Malcolm I Norman Malcolm "Thoughtless Brutes" in: The Nature of Mind, D. M. Rosenthal (Ed), Oxford 1991, pp. 445-461 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Malcolm II N. Malcom Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein (Harper Essays in Philosophy) 1971 Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Propositional Attitudes | Davidson | I (b) 20 A suggestion boils down to interpret the remainder of the sentence after "believes" as a complex adverb. >That-clauses. DavidsonVs: no human being has any idea how the meanings of the individual words could be derived from them. But we obviously understand the sentences because we understand the contained words. >Meaning (intending), >Meaning, >Sentence meaning, >Word meaning, >Propositions, >Idiolect. I (b) 22 If the "contents" of the propositional attitudes were the meanings, new, very long words would have to be learned, which often occur only once. Since, however, each statement can appear as a content sentence, its number is infinite and therefore cannot be learned. >Propositional content. I (e) 104 Fodor: inner "solipsist" states that determine what is meant. DavidsonVsFodor: But such conditions do not exist at all, which is obvious: the very general characteristics for porcupines, e.g. "Has four paws, and spines," etc. are as dependent on the natural history of the acquisition of these words as the words "porcupine" and "short-beaked echidna". >Other minds. Glüer II 127 Propositional Attitudes are individuated through public objects - beliefs have causes, no private objects (with privileged access, for example). - >Externalism, >Individuation. Avramides I 102f Rationality/Davidson: is what we need to understand propositional attitudes, not for physics - ((s) = reason). Davidson I (b) 22 Propositional Attitude/Content/Meaning/Davidson: if the "contents" of the propositional attitudes were the meanings, we would always have to learn new, very long words, which often occur only once. I (b) 23 Propositional Attitude/Belief/Reference/Content/Davidson: according to that there is no alternative to the concept of belief sentences as relational sentences. Thus, one must consider the content sentence "The diamond Kohinoor is one of the crown jewels" together with "that" as a singular term. >Singular terms. I (b) 39 Propositional Attitudes/Object/Content/Belief/Desire/Brentano: no internal object are different from the outer object - ((s) Davidson, actually, also Vs "inner objects" - but: DavidsonVsBrentano: Problem with objects that do not exist. Solution/Davidson/(s): Learning history secures word meaning without reference - Brentano Thesis: Intentionality is irreducible to brain states. >Intentionality/Brentano. I (e) 97 Propositional Attitudes/Davidson: are not subjective. - Access to other minds is guaranteed by the mechanism of language comprehension. - One must be able to come from the observed behavior to the attitudes, because language and thought are interpretable. Glüer II 127 Propositional Attitudes/Davidson: are individuated via public objects - beliefs have causes, no private objects - (externalism) - no representation - predicate "x believes that p": relation between speaker and an utterance of the interpreter. >Representation, >Speaker's meaning, >Utterances, >Interpretation. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Relation-Theory | Relation-Theory A. Relation-Theory: takes belief to be a relation to internal objects (entities). Virtually all authors are against the assumption of thoughts as internal objects. See also intensional objects, intensions, propositional attitudes, mentalism. B. Relational Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Science and Necessity Cambridge University Press 1990 p55): assumes universals (e.g. sets, numbers, properties) and relations between them in order to explain the problem of quantities. See also change, motion, quantities, universals, Platonism, nominalism. |
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| Representation | Tugendhat | I 86 Representation/transcendental/Tugendhat: newer direction: renounced representations and put clear that consciousness refers to the objects directly rather than through internal representations. >Consciousness, >Intensional objects, >Internal objects, >Imagination, >Mental objects, >Mentalism I 307 Representation/Tugendhat: there are rather signs than representations: understanding means competent use of the signs. Basic: e.g. "and" and "or"; not asserting. >Understanding, >Signs. Instead: verification rules, then use rules. >Verification, >Use, >Logical constants. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Sensations | Reid | Prior I 116 Sensation/Thomas Reid: Sensation is possible without an object (e.g. itching). Perception: with a subject. - A reminder to the subject matter. >Perception. Perception/memory/thinking: Perception, memory, and thinking are relations to something. >Memory. Problem: The object of memory does not have to exist anymore. >Thinking, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Internal objects, >Mental objects. Reid: I can also think of Pegasus. >Fiction, >Thinking, >Non-existence. Act of thought/Reid: cannot be general. >Generality. |
Reid I Th. Reid An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense: A Critical Edition 2000 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Sense Data Theory | Sellars | I XII Sense data/Sellars: sense data cannot be candidates for the foundation of a justification practice. Problem to make them a foundation for justification: the sense data of the empiricists are single objects, but only with respect to facts one can speak of a knowledge. >Knowledge, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Facts, >Facts/Sellars, >Observation sentences. Knowledge: "has the form "this and that is so and so." Known is something about a single object, but not a single object itself. Sense-data theory: is faced with the choice: a) either sense data are individual objects, then the perception of sense data would be no knowledge. b) or the theorist declares the feeling of sense data to a form of knowledge, but then one must admit that there are not individual objects, but facts that are known. >Generality, >Generalization, >cf. >Generality condition/Evans. I XXXVII Sense data/Broad/tradition: internal objects, immediately conscious. SellarsVs: no objects, only causal consequences. N.B.: a red sensation can also occur when the object only appears to be red. >Sensation/Sellars. I 15 Sense data/Sellars: can be used as a code, but not as an analysis or explanation for anything. I 37 Sense-data theory: basic problem of how something can appear, without it being so and without it being perceived. >Appearance, >Perception. I 47 SellarsVsSense Data: it is about public physical objects, not about private objects. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Terminology | Nietzsche | Ries II 11 Crisis/Nietzsche: is to be pushed forward to revaluate all values. Ries II 11 Amor fati/Nietzsche: the highest state a philosopher can attain: to think Dionysian in relation to existence. Ries II 13 Noon/Nietzsche: A mature old tree, embraced by the rich love of a vine and hidden from itself. At the moment of happiness, the course of time seems to stop. Ries II 16 Nietzsche: Seafaring passion for the "unknown", which lies in a direction "where all the suns of mankind have so far gone down". Ries II 17 Zarathustra/Nietzsche: Thesis: the meaning of life is love. Ries II 19 Happiness/Nietzsche: Zarathustra: the happiness of my existence, to express its puzzle form, I have already died as my father, as my mother I am still alive, and I am getting old. Ries II 20 Nietzsche/Biography: Nietzsche met Jacob Burckhardt. During the Franco-German war, he was a voluntary nurse for several months. Ries II 25 "Dark antiquity": The term comes from Jacob Burckhardt. (Not literally!). Ries II 28 Apollonian/Nietzsche: Symbol of the world as an apparition, in the sense of the Schopenhauer concept of imagination. Deceptive liberation from the terrible Dionysian knowledge of "primal pain". Apollonian/Nietzsche: Art medium Dionysian/Nietzsche: Wisdom Apollonian/Dionysian/Nietzsche: in the end, they both speak each other's language. There is no point in a world game circling in itself, which the will in eternal lust plays with itself. Ries II 29 Tragedy: Schopenhauer: Pathos as primal pain - Nietzsche primordial lust. Ries II 30 Nietzsche: Zarathustra: From the smile of Dionysus the Olympic gods were born, from his tears the human was created. Ries II 30 Pessimism/Nietzsche: "Beyond Good and Evil": a philosophy that dares to lower morality itself into the world of appearances, namely appearance as deception, illusion, delusion, error. Ries II 29/30 Nietzsche/Biography/Ries: by the "Birth of the Tragedy" he was scientifically dead as a philologist. Ries II 49 Human/All too human/Nietzsche: 2nd main piece: "The Wanderer and his Shadow": "Shadow philosophy"/Shadow/Nietzsche: in which the "objects" lose their physicality. Noon/Nietzsche: Whosoever had an active and stormy morning, whose soul is overwhelmed by a strange quietness around the noon of life... It is a death with awake eyes. Ries II 50 Jesus/Christianity/Nietzsche: Parable "The Prisoners" (The Gay Science): the son of the guard: I will save you, but only those of you who believe that I am the son (Jesus) of the prison guard. Ries II 55 Gay Science/Nietzsche: Science of the free spirit. Ries II 57 Eternal return/Nietzsche: (Zarathustra) the thought invaded Nietzsche in August 1881 at the lake of Silvaplana. Like when one day or at night a demon in your loneliest solitude stalked you and said: "You will have to live this life as you loved it and love it now, once more and countless times. And there will be nothing new about it, but every pain and every desire and every thought and sigh and all unspeakably small and big things of your life must come back to you and everything in the same order and also this spider and this moonlight between the trees... would you not bow down and grind your teeth and curse the demon who spoke like that? >Eternal return/Nietzsche. The question with everyone and everything: 'Do you want to do this again and again and countless times?' would lie as the heaviest weight on your actions!" Ries II 58/ 59 Zarathustra/Nietzsche: as a classic figure, reversal of history, "overcoming morality". Zarathustra, who once created the most fatal error of morality, himself - he is also the first to recognize him the heavyweight has given way from things. The whole divine horizon has been wiped away. Ries II 60/61 The last human/Nietzsche: Opposite image of the superhuman, vegetating at the end of civilization. The last man smells badly! Ries II 62 Three stages: past, present, future: Camel/Nietzsche: idealistic stage, obedience, theological absolutism "thou shalt". Löwe/Nietzsche: idealism turns against itself, against the thousand-years old "great dragon" of the "thou shalt" dominating it: "I will". Ries II 63 Kind/Nietzsche: but the freedom of this "I want" is still constituted by what it denies: morality, metaphysics, religion. Only the third stage brings the innocence of becoming beyond good and evil. >Morality/Nietzsche, >Metaphysics/Nietzsche, >Religion/Nietzsche. Ries II 64 Self-conquest/Nietzsche: Where I found something alive, I found the will to power... life itself spoke to me: I am what must always overcome itself. The will overcomes itself to its purest form: the will to power. Thus constant repetition, thereby circularity, thus return of the same always! Ries II 65 Dionysian/Nietzsche: Existence in Dionysian immediacy remains subject to appearances. Ries II 70 Redemption of the "higher humans": Figures/Equalities/Zarathustra/Nietzsche/Ries: Schopenhauer: Schopenhauer is caricatured by Nietzsche in the Zarathustra as the fortune teller of great fatigue. The two kings/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: 1. despiser of the false representation of the political 2. the Conscientious of the spirit (the scientist). The old Sorcerer/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: Richard Wagner. The old Pope/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: the pious man mourning for the "dead God" and pious in this grief. The ugliest man/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: "the murderer of God", the great self-loathing and disgusted by humans. The voluntary beggar/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: the selfless human. The shadow of Zarathustra: the free spirit. They are all as the "remnant of God" deeply desperate and failed. They all caricature themselves at the donkey festival. The always same Ries II A of the donkey as the Dionysian saying-yes to the whole of being. Ries II 71 Noon/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: through the "noon abyss" Zarathustra falls "into the well of eternity". The ship is no longer being praised for its departure into the unknown, but for its return to the "quietest bay". --- Danto III 207 Terminology/Blonde Beast/Nietzsche/Danto: the expression blonde beast has no direct reference to Germans or Aryans in Nietzsche. This passage refers to "Roman, Arabic, Germanic, Japanese nobility, Homeric heroes, Scandinavian Vikings".(1) Most likely, the "Blonde Beast" is a literary topos for "Lion", the so-called King of the Animals. Danto III 218 Internalisation/Terminology/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche calls internalisation the phenomenon that a drive still discharges when prohibited, but not against an external object, but rather an internal object, the person himself. This phenomenon plays a role in the further development of consciousness. (2) >Internalization. Danto III 219 Bad conscience: It is possible that people may remain in the state of mere self-aggression or mere self-loathing. That is what Nietzsche calls a guilty conscience. 1. Vgl. F. Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2, p. 289. 2. Ibid. p. 338 |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Thinking | Reid | Prior I 116 Reid: I can also think of Pegasus. >Thinking, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Internal objects, >Mental objects. Act of thought/Reid: an act of thought cannot be general. >Generality. Perception/memory/thinking: Perception, memory and thinking are a relation to something. Problem: The object of memory does not have to exist anymore. >Memory, cf. >Relation theory. Sensation/Thomas Reid: Sensation is possible without an object (e.g. itching). >Sensation. Perception: with a subject. - A reminder to the subject matter. >Perception, cf. >Deception, >Imagination. |
Reid I Th. Reid An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense: A Critical Edition 2000 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Brentano, Fr. | Davidson Vs Brentano, Fr. | I (b) 39 DummettVsBrentano: for him, the problem of thoughts remains (or pseudo-thoughts) about objects that do not exist. But this problem can be easily solved: we must drop the idea that there are internal objects or mental ideas in the required sense. This does not mean that only external objects remain by which we can identify the different states of consciousness. We have resources, even if these states of consciousness, as the saying goes, are directed to non-existent objects. Because we are able to determine them without presupposing that there are any objects at all that are "present to consciousness". Strand: DavidsonVs inner objects (DavidsonVsBrentano). Cf. >Objects of thought, >objects of belief, >mentalism. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Compositionality | Cartwright Vs Compositionality | Horwich I 57 Relations theory/Belief object/Truth/Easy/Russell/Moore/Cartwright: one question remains: should the doctrine that truth is a simple unanalysable property go together with a relation theory of belief? ((s) Adopted relation to internal objects). I 58 Solution/Cartwright: (ultimately not entirely satisfactory): E.g. the complicated proposition: (12) Brown is taller than Smith and Robinson is taller than Smith. ... + ... CartwrightVsCompositionality: but this is not a case of compositionality in the strict sense. And that applies equally to the above case with propositions. Triadic relation: standing in the K (8) and (9) is a function whose arguments are ordered triples and have a value O(p,q). CartwrightVsRussell: but the fact that (12) is such a function of K, p, and q, does not justify to regard these entities as "components". Russell/Moore/Cartwright: would probably have replied that a proposition is in a certain way an entity or a unit that has parts in an indefinable sense. (Principles Ch. 16) They would have said that it’s one thing for (12) to be a function of K, (8) and (9), but another for these entities to be part of (12). Cartwright: with that they would have been right. But we do not need more than functionality. I 60 You might think functionality is too cheap, there is always some function, and that K, (8) and (9) are linked more intimately in (12) than in a function. But the alternative to strong compositionality is not mere functionality, it is rather the determination of what is required to assert the proposition (12)! Thus, a comparison of (12) is prepared with other propositions. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Mentalism | Quine Vs Mentalism | V 57 Definition mentalism/(s): Speech of internal entities that should correspond to words or ideas, or ideas as internal objects themselves. QuineVsMentalism. Quine: mentalism has strong echoes of introspection. Introspection/Quine: one must not confuse mentalist speech with clarity and be lured into a dream world of introspection. --- V 57/58 Imagination/tradition/Quine: Problem: E.g. whether one could imagine a number that would be at the same time even and odd. Imagination/Quine: Solution: If one conceives mental images as hypothetical nerve states there are no such problems. With respect to a nerve state one must not tie oneself down to e.g. the number of spots on a chicken. --- V 96 Timeless sentence/QuineVsMentalism: one has been deceived for a long time about the difficulties with its semantics ((s) Because one adopted internal objects as truth guarantors.) Solution/Quine: one has to retrace language learning. --- VI 105 Language/QuineVsMentalism: their prerequisite is that people perceive that others perceive something. It is now, however, the temptation to overstretch the mentalist speech. Similar to the explanation of the meaning of life by final causes. Purpose is a psychological projection from the introspection, perhaps the modality of possibility is nothing more than a depersonalized projection of a subjective feeling. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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