Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 38 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Acceptability | Habermas | III 400/401 Acceptability/communicative action/Habermas: a speech act should be called "acceptable" if it fulfils the conditions so that a listener can say "yes". These conditions cannot be fulfilled unilaterally, neither speaker nor listener relative. Rather, they are conditions for the intersubjective recognition of a linguistic claim, which constitutes a content-specified agreement on liabilities that are relevant for the consequences of the interaction. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act. Within the theory of communicative action we start from the special case that the speaker literally means his statements. I call this case the standard conditions. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. III 406 A speaker can rationally motivate a listener to accept if, due to an internal connection between validity, validity claim and redemption of the validity claim, he/she can guarantee to give convincing reasons, if necessary, which stand up to criticism of the validity claim. The binding force of illocutionary success does not then stem from the validity of what has been said, but from the coordination effect of the guarantee it offers to redeem the validity claim if necessary. This applies in cases where there is no claim to power but a validity claim. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Agreement | Habermas | III 386 Understanding/agreement/Habermas: in the context of an action theory, understanding cannot be characterized by psychological terms. >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas. It is also not about empirically characterized behavioral dispositions but about the capturing of general structures of communication processes from which conditions of participation can be derived. It is not about the predicates that an observer uses when writing communication processes, but about the pre-theoretical knowledge of competent speakers who themselves can intuitively distinguish when they interact with others and when they communicate with them. The speakers also know when communication attempts fail. It is about finding standards for these distinctions. Although communication is considered to have come about through language, those involved can also feel one in a way that makes it difficult to ascribe a propositional content. Such a collective equality of opinion does not fulfil the conditions of a communicative agreement. Thanks to its linguistic structure, understanding cannot be induced solely by external influence; it must be accepted as valid by those involved. In this respect, understanding differs from mere factual agreement. III 387 An agreement achieved through communication has a rational basis. It cannot be imposed by success-calculated influence. Agreement may be objectively enforced, but what comes evidently about through external influence or violence cannot subjectively count as agreement. Agreement is based on common convictions. All those involved base their decisions on potential reasons. Without reference to language or the model of speech, communication cannot be analysed. However, language and communication do not relate to each other like means and purposes. But we can only explain the concept of communication if we state what it means to use sentences with communicative intent. >Language/Habermas, >Language use, >Intention, >Intentionality. III 394 Since acts of speech are not always teleological, it must be possible to clarify the structures of linguistic communication even without reference to structures of the purpose activity. >Purposes, >Procedural rationality. What we mean by understanding must be clarified solely on the basis of illocutionary acts - acts that are dealt with but do not always have an effect. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act ((s) This makes it possible to speak at all of attempts of communication, even if they fail.) III 412 Understanding/communicative action/Habermas: if the listener accepts an offer of a speech act, an agreement can be reached between a subject capable of speaking and a subject capable of acting. However, this is not based solely on the intersubjective recognition of a single... III 413 ...thematically highlighted claim to validity. >Intersubjectivity. Rather, agreement is achieved simultaneously at three levels: via a) an act of speaking correctly in the normative context, b) a true statement, c) a truly expressed opinion, intention, feeling or conviction. >Norms, >Truthfulness. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Assertions | Habermas | IV 102 Assertions/Statement/Habermas: for a sentence like "This ball is red" there is no meaning-preserving sentence in a non-assertoric mode. There is an asymmetry: the semantic content of any illocutionary or expressive part of a speech act can be expressed by a descriptive sentence - but not by sentences of another mode. >Content, >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act This asymmetry explains why we learn the linguistic expressions that are constitutive for illocutionary or expressive elements in such a way that we can use them simultaneously in the attitudes of the first and third person. >First Person, >Learning, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Communicative Action | Habermas | III 128 Communicative action/Habermas: the concept refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who enter into an interpersonal relationship (by linguistic or non-linguistic means). The actors seek an understanding to coordinate their plans and thus their actions. Language is given a prominent status here. >Agreement, >Language/Habermas. III 143 Problem: there is a danger that social action will be reduced to the interpretive performance of the communication participants, action will be adapted to speech, interaction to conversation. In fact, however, linguistic communication is only the mechanism of action coordination, which brings together the action plans and activities of the ones involved. III 157 In communicative action, the outcome of the interaction itself is dependent on whether the participants can agree among themselves on an intersubjectively valid assessment of their world-relationships. >World/thinking, >Reality. III 158 Interpretation: Problem: for the understanding of communicative actions we have to separate questions of meaning and validity. The interpretation performance of an observer differs from the coordination efforts of the participants. The observer does not seek a consensus interpretation. But perhaps only the functions differed here, not the structures of interpretation. >Observation, >Method, >Interpretation, >Practice. III 385 Communicative Action/Habermas: here the participants are not primarily oriented towards their own success; they pursue their individual goals on the condition that they can coordinate their action plans on the basis of common situation definitions. In this respect, the negotiation of situation definitions is an essential component. >Situations. III 395 Communicative Action/Speech Acts/Perlocution/Illocution/Habermas: Strawson has shown that a speaker achieves his/her illocutionary goal that the listener understands what is being said without revealing his/her perlocutionary goal. This gives perlocutions the asymmetric character of covert strategic actions in which at least one of the participants behaves strategically, while deceiving other participants that he/she does not meet the conditions under which normally illocutionary goals can only be achieved. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act Therefore, perlocutions are not suitable for the analysis of coordination of actions, which are to be explained by illocutionary binding effects. This problem is solved if we understand communicative action as interaction in which all participants coordinate their individual action plans and pursue their illocutionary goals without reservation. III 396 Only such interactions are communicative actions in which all participants pursue illocutionary goals. Otherwise they fall under strategic action. III 397 HabermasVsAustin: he has tended to identify speech acts with acts of communication, i.e. the linguistically mediated interactions. III 400 Definition Understanding/Communication/Habermas: in the context of our theory of communicative action we limit ourselves to acts of speech under standard conditions, i.e. we assume that a speaker means nothing else than the literal meaning of what he/she says. >Meaning/Intending. Understanding a sentence is then defined as knowing what makes that sentence acceptable. >Understanding. III 457 Communicative action/Rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only if we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday actions and the formation of subsystems for procedural rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies. IV 223 Communicative Actions/HabermasVsSystem theory/Habermas: Communicative actions succeed only in the light of cultural traditions - this is what ensures the integration of society, and not systemic mechanisms that are deprived of the intuitive knowledge of their relatives. >Cultural tradition, >Culture. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Deceptions | Strawson | Meggle I 318 Deception/Lie/Strawson: a lie is an exception to the rule. HungerlandVsStrawson: there are deceptions only before a proper background. Strawson: Lies are no correct use of the language. >Background, >Correctness, >Speech act, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act, >Errors. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 |
| Grice | Searle | V 69 Meaning/SearleVsGrice: it is insufficient to bind meaning to intention and its recognition: 1) It is uncertain how much meaning depends on rules or convention. 2) There is no distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Cf- >Illocutionary acts, >perlocutionary acts, >rules, >conventions. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Holiness | Habermas | IV 136 Holiness/Socialisation/Language/Habermas: in the grammatical speech the illocutionary elements are combined with the propositional and expressive elements in such a way that illocutionary forces are connected with all speech acts. This makes it clear to oneself what it means when the sacred institutions not only guide, preform and prejudice through processes of understanding, but also through the intersubjective recognition of the claims to validity raised by acts of speech. The acts of speech thus gain an independent illocutionary force independent of existing normative contexts. The authority of the holy behind the institutions no longer applies per se. Rather, it becomes dependent on the justification achievements of the religious world views. Cultural knowledge takes over functions of coordinating action by entering into the interpretation of the situation (...). >Communicative action, >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas, >Validity claims, >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas, >Institutions. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Illocutionary Acts | Habermas | III 375 Illocutionary Acts/Illocutionary Power/Habermas: Thesis: the illocutionary role of utterances should not be contrasted as an irrational power with the propositional component justifying the validity. III 376 Illocutionary Act/Habermas: indicates what claim of validity (truth, correctness or truthfulness) a speaker raises, how he/she raises it and for what he/she raises it. >Validity claims, >Truth, >Correctness, >Truthfulness. Illocutionary force: with it a speaker can motivate a listener to accept his speech act offer and thus enter into a rational motivated relationship. This concept presupposes that subjects capable of speaking and acting can refer to more than one world and that, by communicating with one another about something in one world, they base their communication on a commonly implied system of worlds. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. III 394 Illocutionary success is achieved at the level of interpersonal relationships, where communication participants communicate with each other about something in the world. In this sense, they are nothing inner-worldly, but extramundane, unlike perlocutionary effects that can be described as states in the world. >Perlocutionary acts. IV 114 Illocutionary Acts/Habermas: ironically, the binding effect of illocutionary forces comes about because the interaction participants can say "no" to offers of speech acts. The critical nature of this saying-no distinguishes such an opinion from a reaction based on mere arbitrariness. The listener can (...) be bound because he/she is not allowed to reject them arbitrarily, but only deny them, i.e. reject them with reasons. >Justification, >Reasons, >Rationality. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Inner World | Habermas | III 131/132 Inner world/Action/Habermas: strategically acting subjects must be cognitively equipped in such a way that not only physical objects but also decision-making systems can occur in the world for them. They need to expand their conceptual apparatus for what may be the case, but they do not need richer ontological premises. With the complexity of the inner world entities, the concept of the objective world itself does not become more complex. >Objectivity, >World, >External world, >Complexity, >Reality. III 376 Inner World/Habermas: Thesis: for the purposes of our sociological investigations we should differentiate the outer world into an objective and a social world and introduce the inner world as a complementary concept to this outer world. The corresponding claims of validity (truth, correctness, truthfulness) can serve as a guideline for the choice of theoretical aspects for the classification of the speech acts. >Validity claims, >Truth, >Correctness, >Truthfulness, >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Language | Habermas | Rorty II 94 Language/Habermas/Rorty: Habermas distinguishes between a strategic and a genuinely communicative use of language. Scale of confidence levels. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas Rorty II 94/95 Rorty: if we cease to interpret reason as a source of authority, the Platonic and Kantian dichotomy dissolves between reason and feeling. >Authority, >Reason, >I. Kant, >Reason/Kant, >Plato. Rorty II 96 RortyVsHabermas: the idea of the "better argument" is only useful if one can find a natural, transcultural relevance relation. >Argumentation, >Ultimate justification. --- Habermas IV 41 Language/Habermas: we have to choose between a) Language as a medium of communication and b) Language as a medium for the coordination of action and socialization of individuals between them. IV 42 The formation of identities and the emergence of institutions can be imagined in such a way that the extra-linguistic context of behavioral dispositions and behavioral schemas is, so to speak, linguistically permeated, i.e. symbolically structured. >Identity/Henrich, >Institutions. IV 43 Language functions as a medium not of understanding and the transmission of cultural knowledge, but of socialisation and social integration. These processes do not sediment themselves, like communication processes, in cultural knowledge, but in the symbolic structures of self and society, in competencies and relationship patterns. >Cultural tradition/Habermas, >Background/Habermas, >Competence, >Capabilities. The signal language develops into a grammatical speech, as the medium of communication simultaneously moves away from the symbolically structured self of the interaction participants and the society condensed into normative reality. >Signal language. IV 100 Language/medium/socialization/Habermas: Speech acts are only a suitable medium of social reproduction if they can simultaneously assume the functions of tradition, social integration and socialization of individuals. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act They can only do this if the propositional, illocutionary and expressive elements are integrated into a grammatical unit in each individual speech action in such a way that the semantic content does not break down into segments but can be freely converted between the components. >Content, >Semantic content. IV 135 Religion/Holy/Language/Habermas: in the grammatical speech the propositional elements are combined with the illocutionary and expressive elements in such a way that the semantic content can fluctuate between them. Everything that can be said can also be represented as a statement. This makes it clear to oneself what a connection of religious world views to communicative action means. The background knowledge goes into the situation definitions (...). >Religion/Habermas, >Holiness/Durkheim. Since the semantic contents of sacred and profane origin fluctuate freely in the medium of language, there is a fusion of meanings: the moral-practical and expressive contents are combined with the cognitive-instrumental in the form of cultural knowledge. This is a) as cultural knowledge - b) as a basis for instrumental action. This latter makes religion a world view that demands totality. >Background/Habermas. IV 273 Language/media/control media/communication media/Habermas: the conversion from language to control media (money, power (influence, reputation)) means a decoupling of the interaction from lifeworld contexts (see Lifeworld/Habermas). Media such as money and power begin with the empirically motivated ties; they code a purpose-rational handling of calculable amounts of value and enable a generalized strategic influence on the decisions of other interaction participants, bypassing linguistic consensus-building processes. >Control media, >Communication media. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Language Behavior | Habermas | III 35 Language Behavior/Expressions/Rationality/Habermas: we even call those who express a desire, emotion or mood sincerely, reveal a secret, confess an act, etc. rational and who can then give a critic certainty about the experience revealed in such a way by drawing practical consequences from it and then behaving consistently. >Truthfulness, >Speech Acts, >Rationality, >Emotion, >Sincerity, >Speech acts, >Illocutionalry acts, >Perlocutionary acts, >Certainty. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Meaning | Habermas | III 412 Def Meaning/Communicative Action/Habermas: within our theory of communicative action, the meaning of an elementary expression consists in the contribution it makes to the meaning of an acceptable speech action. And to understand what a speaker wants to say with such an act, the listener must know the conditions under which he can be accepted. >Acceptability/Habermas, >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act In this respect, the understanding of an elementary expression already goes beyond the minimal meaning of the expression "understanding". >Understanding/Habermas, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Meaning Theory | Wiggins | Avramides I 26 f Meaning Theory/Wiggins: layer model of meaning theory: 1st level: isolates what was said literally - in terms of >truth conditions, level of the sense, > formal theories (Frege, Davidson etc. >"Semantics"). 2nd level: >assertive force; use theories, >"pragmatics". Further levels: >perlocutionary effects, >conversational implicatures. McDowell/Avramides: (McDowell 1998) can be seen as a further development of Wiggins' approach: 1. theory of sense: interacts with theory of force. One way: we start with the core theory, (theory of sense; central concept: truth). Then we develop the theory of force as a supplement. Another way: we start with a picture of the whole containing sense and force and then work our way to the core. Avramides: Question: whether a theory on the first (Wiggin's) level can be worked out in isolation. McDowell: development of Wiggins theories - 1st Theory of sense 2nd Theory of force - force, because we have to pay attention to the speaker. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Negation | Habermas | IV 114 Negation/Illocutionary acts/Habermas: ironically, the binding effect of illocutionary forces comes about because the interaction participants can say "no" to offers of speech acts. The critical nature of this saying-no distinguishes such an opinion from a reaction based on mere arbitrariness. The listener can (...) be bound because he/she is not allowed to reject them arbitrarily, but only deny them, i.e. reject them with reasons.(1) >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act 1. From Herder to Nietzsche to Heidegger and Gehlen, the "ability to say no" has been repeatedly emphasized as an anthropological monopoly. This insight is also the basis of Popper and Adorno's criticist thesis in different versions that reliable knowledge can only be gained through the negation of statements. Negation/Adorno, Falsification/Popper. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Perlocutionary Acts | |||
| Perlocutionary Acts | Habermas | III 394 Perlocutionary Acts/Habermas: perlocutionary effects can be described as states in the world brought about by intervention. Illocutionary success, on the other hand, is achieved at the level of interpersonal relations at which communication participants communicate with each other about something in the world. In this sense, they are nothing inner-worldly, but extramundane. >Speech acts/Strawson, >P.F. Strawson. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas III 395 Strawson has shown that a speaker achieves his illocutionary goal that the listener understands what he/she is saying without revealing his/her perlocutionary goal. This gives perlocutions the asymmetric character of covert strategic actions in which at least one of the participants behaves strategically, while deceiving other participants that he/she does not meet the conditions under which normally illocutionary goals can only be achieved. Cf. >Meaning/intending/Grice, >P. Grice. Therefore, perlocutions are not suitable for the analysis of coordination of actions, which are to be explained by illocutionary binding effects. >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas. This problem is solved if we understand communicative action as interaction in which all participants coordinate their individual action plans and pursue their illocutionary goals without reservation. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Possible Worlds | Habermas | III 376 Possible Worlds/Habermas: Illocutionary power: with it a speaker can motivate a listener to accept his speech act offer and thus enter into a rational motivated relationship. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act, >Assertive force. This concept presupposes that subjects capable of speaking and acting can refer to more than one world and that, by communicating with one another about something in one world, they base their communication on a commonly implied system of worlds. >Possible worlds, cf. >Semantics of possible worlds. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Propositional Content | Tugendhat | I 74 Propositional content/Tugendhat: E.g. that which "he is coming", "he is coming!", "if only he were coming", "is he coming?" have in common. >Propositions, >Meaning, >Translation. Understanding: always has the structure of yes/no statements about the propositional content. >Understanding. No propositional content is: e.g. "hurrah", "thank you", "good day". I 241 Propositional content/Searle/Tugendhat: Searle does not use "p" for assertoric proposition at all, but for propositional content! (Tugendhat: as I have used [p]). - Whoever uses "p" according to Searle wants to say that the fact (SV) that p really exists. >Facts/Searle, >Statements, >John Searle. TugendhatVsSearle: it is unclear what Sac becomes. >Assertions, cf. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act. I 290 Propositional content/Tugendhat. = asserted. Propositional content has no truth conditions. - Propositional content is not the proposition. >Propositions, >Truth conditions. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Religion | Habermas | III 281 Religion/Habermas: World religions develop only in advanced civilizations, i.e. within the framework of state-organized societies, where new forms of production and corresponding forms of economic exploitation emerge that are independent of the kinship system.(1) Cf. >Myth/Habermas, >Magical Thinking. IV 135 Religion/Holy/Language/Habermas: in the grammatical speech the propositional elements are combined with the illocutionary and expressive elements in such a way that the semantic content can fluctuate between them. Everything that can be said can also be represented as a statement. This makes it clear to oneself what a connection of religious world views to communicative action means. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas, >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act The background knowledge goes into the situation definitions (...). >Background. Since the semantic contents of sacred and profane origin fluctuate freely in the medium of language, there is a fusion of meanings: the moral-practical and expressive contents are combined with the cognitive-instrumental in the form of cultural knowledge. This is a) as cultural knowledge b) as a basis for instrumental action. This latter makes religion a world view that demands totality. >Language/Habermas, >Worldviews. 1. K. Eder, (Hrsg.) Die Entstehung von Klassengesellschaften, Frankfurt, 1973. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Sanctions | Parsons | Habermas IV 415 Sanctions/action theory/validity claims/Parsons/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Parsons does not take into account, and he cannot take into account in his action theory, that the concept of sanctions cannot be applied to yes/no statements on criticisable validity claims. The strategy pairs incentive/deterrence and belief/admonition differ: in one case ego is solely oriented towards the consequences of his actions, in the other case he has to talk to alter and inform or convince him about the existence of facts. Habermas IV 416 In the first case it is about success-oriented action, in the second case about communication-oriented action. Cf. >Illocutionary Acts, >Perlocutionary Acts. Habermas: under conditions of sanctioning, the actor cannot take his/her own yes to a validity claim (consent to an assertion, recommendation, etc.) seriously. The sanction scheme can only include modes of interaction that require empirical efforts to continue an interaction. Fpr a solution see Sanctions/Habermas. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Socialization | Habermas | Habermas IV 65 Socialization/Subjectivity/Mead/Habermas: Mead explains the formation of identity from the process of socialization of the growing child in such a way that it learns to follow norms of action and to assume ever more roles. The adolescent can only refer to something in the social world with a communicative act when... Habermas V 66 ...he/she knows how to adopt a norm-compliant attitude and how to orient actions towards normative claims of validity. >G.H. Mead, >Adolescence/Mead, >Developmental Stages/Psychology. IV 136 Socialization/Language/Habermas: in the grammatical speech, the illocutionary elements are combined with the propositional and expressive elements in such a way that illocutionary forces are connected with all acts of speech. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act This makes it clear what it means when the sacred institutions not only guide, preform and prejudge through processes of understanding, but also through the intersubjective recognition of the claims to validity raised by acts of speech. The acts of speech thus gain an independent illocutionary force independent of existing normative contexts. The authority of the holy behind the institutions no longer applies per se. Rather, it becomes dependent on the justification achievements of the religious world views. Cultural knowledge takes over functions of coordinating action by entering into the interpretation of the situation (...). >Worldviews, >Religion/Habermas. IV 143 As language establishes itself as a principle of socialization, the conditions of sociality converge with conditions of communicatively established intersubjectivity. Since the authority of the holy is transformed into the binding power of normative claims to validity, which can only be discursively redeemed, the notion of the validity that has to be achieved is purified from empirical admixtures. In the end, the validity of a norm only means that it could be accepted by all those concerned for good reasons. >Norms, >Validity claims. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Speech Act Theory | Austin | Husted III 240ff Speech Act Theory: expressive function. >Accuracy, >Adequacy. VsRedundancy Theory (p = "it is true that p"). >Redundancy theory. Speech Act/Austin: Def lokutionary act: enunciation - E.g. you give an example of the meaningful sentence "the bull is going". perlocutionary: effect by using the statement - E.g. warning with this sentence. >Perlocutionary acts. illocutionary: you frighten the listener. >Illocutionary acts. III 245 In addition: fulfilling conditions as a "plus" to the statement: the warranty given by the speaker -> Brandom, >Score keeping. II 247 Speech act theory -VsLogical Positivism: more than just the two functions a) description of reality, b) expression of emotions Speech acts belong to neither of these two categories. >Positivism. III 248 AustinVsWittgenstein: per continuous similarity - Speech act theory: shows its strength here. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
| Speech Act Theory | Cohen | Meggle I 418ff CohenVsSpeech Act: fails in complex cases - e.g. questionable formulation in the antecedent of a conditional. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. L.Jonathan Cohen, Die logischen Partikel der natürlichen Sprache. In: Georg Meggle (Hrsg.) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt 1979 |
Cohen I Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Some Remarks on Grice’s Views about the Logical Particals of Natural Languages", in: Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed), Pragmatics of Natural Languages, Dordrecht 1971, pp. 50-68 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen II Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Mr. Strawson’s Analysis of Truth", Analysis 10 (1950) pp. 136-140 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 |
| Speech Act Theory | Cresswell | I 12 CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsSearle/CresswellVsSpeech Act Theory: Speech Act Theory is more of a theory of semantic performance than of semantic competence. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Speech Act Theory | Davidson | Dummett I 26ff DavidsonVsFrege/DavidsonVsSearle: the theory of force is unnecessary - description of speech acts are not necessary either. - (a concept of truth is required). >Theory of force, >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Speech Act Theory | Dummett | III (e) 204 Speech act/Dummett: Problem: you can not divide all the words into categories according to question, command, contention. Solution: not all words in a sentence are bearers of the force. >Force/Dummett, >Sense/Dummett. III (e) 207 WittgensteinVsSpeech Act Theory: No list of uniform categories such as question, command. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Speech Act Theory | Foucault | II 115ff Speech act/Foucault: the illocutionary act is not that, what has been processed before the moment of the statement itself. There is more than one statement to make a "speech act": E.g. oath, request, contract, promise, demonstration. >Illocutionary act. Foucault: This is about series. Statement: a statement cannot have its own character, it is inappropriate for an adequate definition. Sign: means "existence of signs" that must exist. What does it mean "there are" signs? Language/Discourse/Foucault: is never given in itself and in its totality. If there were no statements, the language did not exist. But no statement is essential for the language to exist. It exists only as a construction system for possible statements. On the other hand, it exists only as a description of how to get real statements from a set. Language and statement are not on the same level of existence. One cannot say that there are statements, as one says, that there is language. >Language, >Signs, >Statements, >Discourse/Foucault. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Speech Act Theory | Grice | IV 243f The speech act, not the sign, is the carrier of meaning. Cohen I 415f CohenVsSpeech Act (> Grice): the speech act fails in complex cases, e.g. in a questionable turn in the antecedent of a conditional. Cf. >Implication paradox. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen I Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Some Remarks on Grice’s Views about the Logical Particals of Natural Languages", in: Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed), Pragmatics of Natural Languages, Dordrecht 1971, pp. 50-68 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen II Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Mr. Strawson’s Analysis of Truth", Analysis 10 (1950) pp. 136-140 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Speech Act Theory | Habermas | III 374 Speech Act Theory/Habermas: means the first step towards formal pragmatics that extends to non-cognitive uses of linguistic expressions. >Pragmatics, >Language use, >Language behavior. III 375 HabermasVsSpeech Act Theory: however, it remains bound to the narrow ontological prerequisites of truth semantics. >Truth, >Truth Theory, >Semantics. Solution/Habermas: the inclusion of Karl Bühler's language model together with appeal and expression functions (possibly also Roman Jakobson's emphasis on the "poetic" function related to the means of representation themselves) of language.(1) III 395 Speech Acts/HabermasVsAustin/Habermas: Austin's merit is to have worked out the interaction context of institutionally bound speech acts such as betting, baptism, appointment etc.. But he confuses the picture, III 396 that he does not characterize such acts of speech as of any type other than perlocutionary acts. Perlocutionary acts themselves are not communicative. >Language/Bühler. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. 1.J. Habermas, Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus, Frankfurt 1976. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Speech Act Theory | Hare | Searle V 207 SearleVsTraditional Speech Act Analysis: (SearleVsAustin, SearleVsHare): thesis: "good" and "true" mean the same in different acts. They are not taken into account by traditional speech act theory. Good/true/speech act theory/tradition: Hare: e.g. "Good" is used to recommend something. Strawson: "true" is used to reaffirm or acknowledge statements. >Strawson. Austin: "knowledge" is needed to give guarantees (SearleVs). >J.R. Searle. In principle: "the word W is used to perform the speech act A". >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Speech Act Theory | Luhmann | AU Cass 12 Speech act Theory/Language/Communication/LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory: Language use is not an act. - You always need understanding, so it goes on. Action: would only be a release without understanding. LuhmannVsHabermas: therefore, no theory of communicative action is possible. >Communicative action, >Communication theory. Speech: here the receiver is initially excluded. He comes only later as a disciplining moment in the theory. - And as a subject. >Communication/Luhmann, >Language/Luhmann, >Subject/Luhmann. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Speech Act Theory | Quine | II 111 ff Speech act/Quine: specifies circumstances, without presupposing meaning. (VsLinguistics). >Circumstances, >Meaning, >Presupposition, >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Speech Act Theory | Searle | II 25 Sincerity condition: the sincerity condition is internal to the speech acts. --- Husted IV 251 Speech act/Searle: speech acts are rule-determined actions. They always have constitutive (not regulatory) rules. Searle: the speech act is key to the meaning. VsSearle: this is controversial because language rules for e.g. singular term have a fundamentally different nature than for actions. J. Husted "Searle" in: Hügli/Lübke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993S. 251 --- V 68 The speech act is an unequal game. An explanation must presuppose rules. Rules are not equal. Convention: speaking rules are governed by behavior. For rules, behavior is not crucial. >Language game, >Convention. V 207 Traditional Speech Act Theory/Austin/Strawson/Hare: the word W is needed to perform speech act A, then e.g. "good" recommends, "true" reaffirms, "knowledge" guarantees something. SearleVs: this only works with performative verbs such as "promise" but not with judgmental ones. This does not satisfy the adequacy condition for semantic analysis: a word must mean in all grammatically different sentences the same; it cannot, if the meaning is supposed to be the execution of various acts. V 213 Wrong: to assume that the conditions for the execution of a speech act follow from the meanings of the words ( "fallacy of assertiveness"). --- IV 27 Speech Act Theory/SearleVsAustin: Austin accepts verbs for acts but one has to differentiate this, e.g. the announcement of a command is not the command. IV 78 Speech Act Theory/Searle: the speech act theory differs from other philosophical approaches in that it gives no set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the explicable phenomenon (e.g. linguistics: structural rules). >Structural rules. IV 86 The illocutionary act is the function of the meaning of the sentence. IV 86 Fiction/speech acts/Searle: fiction has no other speech acts but is a predetermined act, e.g. in literature it is no other act than in the newspaper. No semantic or syntactic property proves a text as fictional. IV 204 Speech Act TheoryVsChomsky, VsRules, instead of semantics/pragmatics. --- VII 99 Speech Act/proposition/Searle: difference: from the propositional content does not follow that the assertion conditions are satisfied - the proposition rather implies that the speaker implies within the act that they are satisfied. --- VIII 435 Speech Act/Searle: the speech act is hold together by the semantic intentions of the speaker. VsChomsky: Chomsky does not see the essential connection of meaning and speech acts. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
| Speech Act Theory | Strawson | II 272 StrawsonVsSpeech Act / StrawsonVsAustin: error: that we assert that the conditions are fulfilled by using the word "true". "True" does not show some type of communication. >Objects/Strawson, >Particulars/Strawson, >Individuation/Strawson, >Identification/Strawson. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Speech Act Theory | Tugendhat | ~ passim TugendhatVsSpeech Act Theory. I 137 TugendhatVsSpeech Acts: unsatisfactory, assumed modes, because they are just like propositional content abstract moments of sentences that we can hardly believe. - Because they are moments and not components, they are also not independent. I 239 Speech Act/Austin/Tugendhat: his merit is to have lifted the illocutionary act (meaning, claiming) as an independent, semantically relevant way. >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act, >Meaning (Intending), >Assertions, >J.L. Austin. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Truthfulness | Habermas | III 42 Truthfulness/Habermas: in many situations an actor has good reasons to hide his experiences from others or to deceive the interaction partner about his "true" experiences. Then he/she does not claim to be truthful, at best he/she simulates it by acting strategically. Such statements cannot be objectively criticized because of their untruthfulness, but rather because of their intended success. >Success, >Truth, >Expressions, >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Use Theory | Habermas | III 374 Use Theory/Habermas: goes beyond the limitation to assertoric sentences and also makes the pragmatic aspects of a linguistic expression accessible to conceptual analysis. >Analysis, >Assertions, >Language behavior, >Pragmatics, >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Validity Claims | Parsons | Habermas IV 415 Validity Claims/Parsons/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Parsons does not take into account, and he cannot take into account in his theory of action, that the concept of sanctions cannot be applied to yes/no statements on criticizable validity claims. The strategy pairs incentive/deterrence and belief/admonition differ: in one case ego is solely oriented towards the consequences of his actions, in the other case he has to talk to alter and inform or convince him about the existence of facts. Habermas IV 416 In the first case it is about success-oriented action, in the second case about communication-oriented action. >Illocutionary Acts, >Perlocutionary Acts. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Grice, P.H. | Black Vs Grice, P.H. | I 52 Max Black: Causal theory (also Stevenson, Morris) - BlackVsIntentionality theories (Grice, Searle, Strawson?). I 58 BlackVsGrice: The conditions of Grice are neither necessary nor sufficient. a) Not sufficient: there are situations in which it is not true that someone "says that...", although the conditions are met, b) not necessary: someone says something, although the conditions are not met. I 60 The whole theory becomes suspicious when it is so complicated. I 65 BlackVsGrice: he must constantly make modifications (negative conjunctions or corresponding positive disjunctions). This defensive strategy is too flexible on the one hand, while being too rigid on the other hand. (Sticking to the intended effect). I 67 BlackVsGrice: Insufficient: 1) His reference to standard effects - 2) his confidence that the speaker’s intention brings about such effects. I 68 BlackVsGrice: Every concrete manifestation usually has numerous effects. One would have to be "semantically relevant". The one that is necessary and sufficient to be communicated successfully. ((s) VsBlack: this is trivial and does not explain what is going on in successful communication or what is meant by an utterance). I 70 BlackVsGrice: a belief of the listener or a prop. att. induced in the listener are apparently perlocutionary. They are of practical importance, but irrelevant for a philosophical analysis of the concept of communication or the derived concept of speaker meaning. I 74 This applies mutatis mutandis also to the imperative case. When I have understood the request, my role as a listener and interpreter ends!. BlackVsGrice: he does not discuss how according to the principles of the basic model it can be expected of the listener that he discovers the speaker meaning. E.g. a beggar in a foreign country gestures to me that he is hungry. I 76 BlackVsGrice: no interposition of "discovering". - (The theory must cover as many cases as possible.) BlackVsGrice Thesis: not detecting the speaker’s intention to elicit an effect in the listener allows the listener to determine the meaning, but rather the reverse: the discovery of the speaker meaning allows the listener to infer the speaker’s intention. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Grice, P.H. | Searle Vs Grice, P.H. | Bennett I 186 SearleVsGrice: Convention not the same as circumstances! Grice I 31 Searle E.g. An American Soldier in World War II is captured by Italian troops. He wants to believe the Italians do it was a German officer and expresses the single German sentence which he has kept from school yet, "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühn?" ((s) Do you know the land where the lemon trees bloom?, Goethe). - His captors do not understand any German at all. Searle: It would nevertheless be wrong to say that he meant by "Do you know the land...": "I am a German officer." SearleVsGrice: wants to show with by this example that something missing in Grice s explication: H should recognize that the uttered sentence is expressed conventionally to bring about a certain effect. Searle II 204 Grice : a speaker intends with an utterance, to achieve certain effects. SearleVsGrice: he then uses intention, wish and conviction unanalyzed. Searle V 68 Meaning/Grice: connects meaning to intention and recognizing the intention. V 69 SearleVsGrice: insufficient: 1., it is not determined to what extent the meaning depends on rules or conventions. 2. does not differentiate this definition between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. E.g. Searle. Lemons Example V 70 ... + ... An American soldier gets into Italian war captivity... Searle IV 53 SearleVsConversational postulates/SearleVsGrice. A shared background is sufficient. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Ordinary Language | Dummett Vs Ordinary Language | Dummett (e) III 185 Oxford Philosophy/Dummett: strongest influence: by Ryle. RyleVsCarnap: false methodology VsHeidegger: Laughing stock - Ryle: influence of Husserl. III (e) 196 Particularism/Utility Theory/Oxford/Dummett: supposedly, the UT could only explain each sentence. The philosopher should not want to discover a pattern where there is none. DummettVs: we do not learn language sentence by sentence, either! However, right: It is the sentences and not the words which have a "use" in the general sense. III (e) 196/197 Everyday language: here the Oxford philosophy could not contribute anything (because of their anti systematic approach) to the better understanding of those principles on the basis of which we obviously learn the language so quickly. (> Chomsky). DummettVsOxford: continuously used psychological and semantic terms that a theory of meaning must not assume but explain! E.g. "Express an attitude" "reject a question", etc. (DummettVsAustin). Likewise "truth" and "falsehood" were constantly used unexplained. III (e) 198 DummettVsParticularism: disregarded the distinction semantic/pragmatic. Anyone who is not in the claws of theory would initially tend to distinguish what a sentence literally says from what one might try to communicate with it in special circumstances. According to the "philosophy of everyday language" only the latter term is considered to be legitimate. "literal meaning" was considered an illegitimate byproduct. III (e) 199 DummettVsOxford, DummettVsStrawson: artificially introduced new concepts such as "presupposition" or "conversation implicature" or DummettvsAustin: the distinction between "illocutionary" and "perlocutionary" acts (DummettVsSpeech act theory) took the place of the general semantic concepts, and without anyone noticing the "normal language" (everyday language) ceased to exist. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
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