Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 70 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Field | II 164 Analytical/Field: e.g. "teacher of Alexander" only refers on something, if the person was a teacher of Alexander - this is not an empirical accident. >Reference, >Descriptions, >Meaning, >Sense. These are analytical facts of our language. >Semantic facts, >Language use, >Language community, >Conventions. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Strawson | Wright I 198 Strawson/Grice: E.g. our daily talk of analyticity is a sociological fact and therefore has enough discipline to be considered minimally capable of truth. >Minimalism, >Convention. StrawsonVsQuine/GriceVsQuine: it is hopeless to deny that a distinction exists, if it is not used within linguistic practice in a pre-arranged way that is capable of mutual agreement. >Analyticity/Quine, >Language use, >Language behavior, >Language community. QuineVsStrawson/QuineVsGrice: this is fully consistent with a cognitive psychology of the practical use of the distinction, which does not assume that we respond to exemplifications of the distinctions. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Artificial Consciousness | Birnbacher | Metzinger II 719 Consciousness/Machine/Birnbacher: why should one not "be able to say" that a machine has consciousness? >Consciousness, >cf. >Artificial Intelligence, >Strong Artificial Intelligence, >Artificial General Intelligence, >Human Level AI. That a chair "thinks" would simply be empty due to a lack of empirical criteria. >Criterion/Birnbacher. II 720 Concept/Wittgenstein/Birnbacher: Wittgenstein attributes the attribution criteria of a thing, to the concept of the thing, therefore he has an extended concept of the term. >Attribution. For example, the concept of pain is characterized not only by what pain in itself is, but also by its specific function in our lives. >Pain, >Language game, >Language community. Consciousness/Machine/Wittgenstein/Birnbacher: it follows that for Wittgenstein an artificial consciousness is logically impossible, since in our linguistic usage we only attribute it to humans. We would have no conditions according to which we would describe the behavior of machines as conscious. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 360) Truth/Assertiveness/Consciousness/Machine/Wittgenstein/Birnbacher: The conditions of truth may be fulfilled, but the conditions of assertiveness may never be fulfilled. >Truth conditions, >Assertability conditions, >Assertability. I.e. even if it were true that the machine had consciousness, it would be conceptually impossible for us to claim it, because our concept of consciousness would not fit on it. Cf. >Machine Learning. The factually valid criteria are made for the factually applicable and not for any conceivable application situations. >Zombies, >Intentionality, >Thinking. II 722 Consciousness/Machine/Nomological Impossibility/Julian Huxley: in a BBC broadcast: "real" emotions and intentions are only possible in biotic matter. Also Paul Ziff, end of the 50s. II 724 Zombie/Robot/"Imitation Man"/Birnbacher: current discussion (early nineties): Phenomena of consciousness occur when a certain threshold of activation rate is exceeded. An "imitation man" might not feel anything, but he might think, mean, or expect something. (Intention). He could also think of himself, without actual self-consciousness. II 725 Consciousness/Man/Birnbacher: the nomological conditions for human consciousness are not only necessary, but also sufficient. I.e. they force consciousness in humans! >Sufficiency, >Conditions, >Necessity. II 726 Criteria/Consciousness/Human/Wittgenstein: behaviour as a criterion for attributing consciousness. >Behavior. Consciousness/Machine/Birnbacher: behaviour cannot be a criterion for attributing consciousness to machines. Here neurophysiological criteria are important, which Wittgenstein attributes to the symptoms. >Symptoms. Consciousness/Behaviour/Animals/Rollin/BirnbacherVsWittgenstein: even in animals, behaviour is an unreliable criterion for consciousness! For example, cows eat immediately after an operation. Reason: their food is so low in nutrients that they would be weakened too much if they took long breaks. Longer periods of fasting are possible in humans. >Consciousness, >Self-consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Speaking, >Robots. |
Birn I D. Birnbacher Analytische Einführung in die Ethik Berlin 2013 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Assertibility | Strawson | Nagel I 71 Crispin Wright: considers the view that truth could range further than assertibility to be too extreme: how can a sentence be unrecognizably true? (VsRealism) >Realism, >Assertibility, >Truth. StrawsonVs this draws the image of what Wittgenstein has reportedly asserted: it simply does not correspond with our most evident experience. We understand the meaning of what we say and hear well enough to at least occasionally recognize inconsistencies and conclusions in what was said which are attributable solely to the sense or the meaning of what was said. >Sense, >Meaning, >Understanding, >Language community. Wright I 77 Wright: Assertibility/Strawson: the assertibility-conditional conception has "no explanation for what a speaker actually does when he utters the sentence". >Language behavior, >Behavior, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. StrawsonVsSemantic Anti-Realists: it only makes sense to consider an assertion to be justified if this assertion supports the commitment to something that lies beyond its justification. ((s) "background", single, isolated sentences are not assertible but neither are they sensibly debatable.) cf. >Background. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Assertibility | Wright | I 26ff It is not the case that P is T iff it is not the case that P is T. This is not valid for justified assertibility from right to left. Assertibility is naturally weaker. >Asymmetry, >Equivalence, >Implication. I 26 Justified Assertibility/Negation: Ignorance: P is not justifiably assertible, but neither is its negation. >Negation, >Justification. Truth/Ignorance: something may very well be true, even though nothing is known about it. >Realism, >Metaphysical realism. Truth/Justified Assertibility: E.g. snow is white: the decision about truth and assertibility may diverge here. I 51 Deflationism: "true" only means of affirmation, therefore not a standard different from assertibility. >Truth, cf. >Redundancy theory. A statement can be justified without being true and vice versa. >Conventions, cf. >Language use, >Language community. --- Field II 120 Assertibility/Wright/Putnam: is the only substantial property. - Because truth is not a property. - Field: both do go next to each other, because they diverge - truth goes deeper. Wright I 35 Justified Assertibility/Assertibility/Negation: E.g. it is not the case that P is T iff. it is not the case that P is T - This is not valid for justified assertibility from right to left - in case of ignorance, the negation is not assertible either. I 52ff Truth: timeless - justified assertibility: not timeless. >Timelessness. I 68ff Def Super-Assertibility: a statement is super-assertible if it is justified or can be justified and if its justification survived both any scrutiny of its descent and arbitrarily extensive additions and improvements to the information. Cf. >Justified assertibility. Ideal Circumstances/Putnam: are timeless. Super-Assertibility is no external standard, but our own practice. It is metaphysically neutral. I 81ff Super-Assertibility/Wright: Thesis: comic and moral truths can be considered as varieties of super-assertibility. - ((s) Because everything we can learn in the future comes from our own practice, we are immune to fundamental surprises.) I 102f Super-Assertibility/Wright: suitable for discourses whose standards are made by us: morals, humor. >Morals. I 115ff Super-Assertibility/Field/Mackie: the T predicates for mathematics or morality cannot be interpreted in terms of the superassertibility. - Therefore, the super-assertible need not be true in discourse. - The difference Ssuperassertibility/truth goes back to this. >Mathematics, >Truth, >Discourse. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Cognition | Quine | II 67 Cognitive: means without consideration of the circumstances. II 70f Cognitive synonymy: are different time points, individual. In the community there is an interchangeability of words with equal verdicts. This does not hold for translation. Same verdicts cannot be reached with translation! Def cognitive synonymy: is the relationship of equality with respect to the overall stimulus of the individual at different points in time. (= equality of excited receptors). There is cognitive equivalence of occasional sentences with respect to the individual. (Disposition for verdicts) There is cognitive equivalence for the language community (cognitive equivalence with reference to each individual) There is cognitive synonymy of a word with another word or complex expression. (interchangeability in occasional sentences salva veritate). If we want, we can also take the next step: Def Cognitive meaning of a word: is the set of its cognitive synonyms. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Communication | Schiffer | Avramides I 70 Communication/Schiffer/Avramides: E.g. the original "Grr" loses resemblance to animal sound and becomes a conventional sign for trouble - (that is common knowledge). >Signs, >Gestures, >Language community, >Convention. Convention/Hume: there is no "intermediate promise" - instead it stems from interest alone. >David Hume. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Community | Blackburn | Esfeld I 119 Community/Individual/Simon Blackburn(1): Thesis: Members of a community behave to each other like temporal phases of an individual. (Corrections are possible). Private language/rule order/BlackburnVsKripke/BlackburnVsWittgenstein: Therefore, when viewed in isolation, an individual can follow rules in the same way as a community. >Private language, >Rule following, >Language community, >Language use. KripkeVs: Someone could have followed the addition yesterday and today follow the quaddition. In the light of the rule she is now trying to follow, she can judge previous actions as correct/incorrect, but whatever you now seem to be correct/incorrect in these judgments is correct or incorrect. >Addition, >Quaddition, >Kripke's Wittgenstein. I 120 EsfeldVsBlackburn: a social solution is not available for the isolated skeptic (>sanctions). Convergence cannot be negotiated. The present dispositions always have a privileged position! >Dispositions. The same applies to the simulation of another person: they cannot give feedback. I 121 Private language/rule sequence/field: second reason why an individual in isolation cannot determine a disagreement: I may not be scheduled to predetermine a property F now, but earlier but already (although the thing in question has not changed). Problem: why is this not a case of disagreement with myself? Pointe: what counts as a change of a thing is not independent of the fact that conceptual content is determined. To determine the change, conceptual content must be defined. >Change, >Temporal identity, >Conceptual content. 1. S. Blackburn,"The Indivdual strikes back", Synthesis, vol 58, No. 3,1984 pp. 281-301. |
Blckbu I S. Blackburn Spreading the Word : Groundings in the Philosophy of Language Oxford 1984 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Community | Gadamer | I 450 Community/Gadamer: All forms of human community are forms of language community, even more: they form language. In a true linguistic community (...) we do not first agree, but have always agreed, as Aristotle showed(1). It is the world that presents itself to us in common life, that embraces everything on which understanding is reached, and the linguistic means are not the object of it for themselves. >Language community, >Language use, >Culture, >Hermeneutics, >Understanding, >Interpretation, >Cultural transmission. 1.Aristoteles, Polit. A 2 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Computer Model | Weizenbaum | I 234 Computer Model/General Problem Solver/GPS/Artificial Intelligence/Newell/Simon/Weizenbaum: (described in A. Newell und H. A. Simon 1972(1)). General Problem Solver/Weizenbaum: is basically nothing more than a programming language in which you can write programs for certain highly specialized tasks. >Computer languages, >Problem solving. I 236 The General Problem Solver (GPS) is a frame within which the logical theory program runs. To solve problems, you have to work with very general symbolic structures that represent objects, operators, properties of objects and differences between objects, and one also has to create a method catalog. But even then, GPS does not allow you to draw conclusions from such "principles". >Principles. WeizenbaumVsSimon/WeizenbaumVsNewell: the statement that the General Problem Solver (GPS) is in every sense an embodiment of human problem solving is tantamount to the statement that the algebra of the secondary school is also such an embodiment. I 237 Problem: that says nothing about the psychology of human problem solving. Outside world/Newell/Simon: Particular attention should be paid to the restrictions on GPS access to the outside world. The initial part of the explicit commands to GPS has been acquired by humans long before this when building up their vocabulary. >Language, >Language use, >Language community, >Knowledge, >World/Thinking. I 238 WeizenbaumVsSimon/WeizenbaumVsNewell: this is where the true facts are bypassed. In reality, the question is what happens to the whole person as he or she builds up his or her vocabulary. >Language acquisition. How is his/her understanding of what a "problem" is shaped by the experiences that are an inseparable part of his/her vocabulary acquisition? >Problems, >H.A. Simon, >A. Newell. 1. A. Newell und H. A. Simon, Human Problem Solving, Englewood Cliffs(N. J. 1972, Kap 9: Logic, GPS and Human Behavior, S. 455-554 |
Weizenbaum I Joseph Weizenbaum Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation, W. H. Freeman & Comp. 1976 German Edition: Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft Frankfurt/M. 1978 |
| Concepts | Nagel | I 50ff Conceptual scheme/NagelVs alternative conceptual schemes: There are such schemes, from which we could not even then get out when we look at ourselves from the outside as thinking beings. Therefore, the idea of a different kind of consciousness or conceptual scheme contributes nothing to distance ourselves from such thoughts. >Conceptual scheme, >Scheme/content, >Language community. I 61 ff The type of match does not make the whole concept. Just as sensory perception, through which one detects a physical object, does not make the whole concept of this detected object. (Vsuse theory of meaning). >Use theory, >Correspondence. Meaning is not simply the same as use, unless one understands "use" in a normative sense, which already implies meaning. >Language use. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Conceptual Role | Field | II 75 Def "Wide Conceptual Role"/Harman/Field: (Harman 1982)(1): includes causal connections with the environment. It may be part of the conceptual role of "There is a rabbit" that this is typically triggered by rabbits being around. Problem: this is also true then for e.g. "phlogiston is leaking from the cylinder." This could typically be caused by oxygen entering into the cylinder. Field: this shows that this does not introduce any representational properties (reference, truth conditions). >Truth conditions, >Reference, >Truth, >Observation, >Observation sentences, >Theoretical entities, >Theory language. II 76 Conceptual Role/"Not"/Truth Function/Representation/Field: a representational semantics will regard e.g. "not" as a function which reflects the truth on falsehood, and vice versa. Negation/Conceptual Role/Not/Field: but that is not a fact about the conceptual or functional role of "not". >Negation. Conceptual role: is easy to specify here: it is largely given in the inference rules. - But the specification of the conceptual role says nothing about the truth functions. >Truth functions. While there is a sort of supervenience of the representational properties (truth conditions, reference, etc.) on the property of the conceptual role in the logic connections. - But conceptual role and representation cannot be equated. >Representation. II 93 Conceptual Role/Negation/Fact/Field: the fact by virtue of which "it is not the case that" obeys the truth tables, are facts about its conceptual role. II 108 Conceptual Role/Field: includes the verification conditions, but even more, e.g. rules for probability and conceptual consequences that arise from a belief. - But the conceptual role is not enough: it is internalistic and individualistic. - I.e. it does not refer to the outside world and the language community. - We have no "externalist" and no "social" aspects. >Language community. Solution/Field: we could make the (hopefully harmless) assumption that a language user believes something in his own language. Or at least internal analogues thereof without ambiguities. And we assume that this belief relation is possible without a presupposed concept of content. >Content, >Beliefs, >Relation-theory. Deflationism: can agree with that. - Also computational role: describes how beliefs, desires, etc. arise in time. >Computation/Field. II 112 We can say that the conceptual role and the indication relations of the beliefs of other people are relevant to the content of my belief state. - The conceptual role of logic connections is not explained by the truth table. Solution: Reliability: is higher if "or" has the role that corresponds to the truth table. >Reliability theory. Conceptual Role/Logical Operators/Connections: the conceptual role semantics (CRS) can here assume facts or the absence of facts, deflationism cannot. >Deflationism 1. Harman, Gilbert. 1982. "Conceptual Role Semantics". In: Notre dame Journal of Formal Logic, 23, pp. 242-56 |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Content | Sellars | I XXXVII Content/Sellars: There is a difference of descriptive and propositional content of experience. >Propositional content. Def Descriptive content/Sellars: what is responsible for ensuring that anyone who sees something red, or something that just seems red, will respond with the same words. Common content/Sellars: The common descriptive content of experiences could be determined, by saying that both were experiences of seeing a red object when their common propositional content were true. >Language community. I 20 Data: data are empirical. Content/Sellars: consists in the theoretical entities. ((s) "Theoretical entities" here are not as in most other contexts unobservables like elementary particles. For Sellars' Psychological Nominalism objects are not perceivable as objects unless our concepts are formed.) >Consciousness/Sellars, >Concepts/Sellars, cf. >Theoretical entities. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Content | Wright | I 45 Content/"Deep Content"/"Deep Reference"/Wright: can be masked or simulated by syntax. (negations, conditionals). >Expression Theory. ((s) For the expression theory the question is: do the sentences have content or is it only simulated syntactically?) >Syntax, >Signs, >Meaning, >Reference. Common basis of realism and anti-realism: that this is not the case! >Realism, >Anti-realism. E.g. with Frege's numbers, there is no deep reference. The suitability of an expression to refer to one object depends on its syntax. It ensures that it can function as a singular term. >Singular terms, >Numbers/Frege. Then no more questions can be asked whether the object reference is successful. However, it is conceded that the appropriate contexts in which this is the case are true. (No "deep reference",or "deep content".) I 44 Syntactic Surface Characteristics: it must be ensured that a sentence that contains a truth predicate can be embedded in conditionals and has significant negations. >Negation, >Truth-predicate. Content/Wright: must satisfy discipline and surface syntax (e.g. conditional, negation) of a discourse. The thus secured content is enough to qualify a truth predicate (by platitudes). >Discourse, >Platitudes. I 157 Content/Wright: in conditions: is needed to prevent expressions like "whatever it takes" (> role/Wright, > circularity). - Solution: independence condition: fulfillment must be logically independent of the details of the extension of the terms (projectivistic terms such as color, morality, humor ) - then only terms within intensional operators - WrightVs provisional equations for moral discourse. I 242f Def wide cosmological role: (I 250) a content has a wide cosmological role iff the mention of facts of which it consists can occur at least in certain types of explanations of contingencies; explanations whose possibility is not only guaranteed by the minimum capacity for truth of the discourse. >Minimalism. ((s) Truth evaluability: this is about the question whether a truth value (true/false) can be attributed at all in some cases as e.g. moral judgments or assertions about the comical.) E.g. thesis: morality has no wide cosmological role. Wide cosmological role of content: we want to measure its reach for a discourse on the extent to which the provision of the various facts can potentially contribute to the explanation of all those things that have nothing or not directly something to do with our attitudes by which we conceive such facts as objects. I 248 Cosmological role: explanation of meaning/content not from our attitudes. >Meaning, >Content, >Conventions, >Language community. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Conventions | Bennett | I 155 Convention/Lewis: convention is more than mere behavior regularity - no agreement necessary - not even implied agreement. 170 Conventional meaning is more than the usual meaning, because it contains common knowledge about a regularity. >Regularity, >Intersubjectivity, >Community, >Language community, >Actions. I 167f Convention/Lewis: conventions are mutual knowledge. Cargile: this is useful only up to fourth reflection. David Lewis: only actions are coordinated. BennettVsLewis: do not imparting any action on a meaning I 189 Searle: there is no "conventional meaning"; instead: rules that apply for an expression. >Rules, >Language Rules, >Utterances, >Utterances/Searle, >Meaning/Searle. I 191 Convention/Meaning/Bennett: a speaker can only ever give an expression a conventional meaning if it already has a meaning. >Lemons example, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. Wittgenstein: I cannot say "hot" while I mean "cold". >Meaning/intending, >Meaning/intending/Wittgenstein. SearleVsWittgenstein: the meaning exceeds the intention, it is sometimes also a matter of convention. Bennett: conventional meaning effective circumstance. >Circumstances. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Conventions | Loar | II 160 Convention/Loar: conventions will not do for individual word meanings, but only for what makes L to be the language of a particular community. >Language community, >Word meaning, >Language use, Cf. >Idiolect, |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Correspondence Theory | Sellars | II 22 Correspondence/Sellars: the relation of linguistic and non-linguistic entities is an activity. It is reflecting projection. All true statements are true in the same sense (like Frege). They differ in that they construct in different ways a projection of the world in the subjects. >World/thinking, >Reality, >World, >Truth, >Statements, >Correspondence relation. Projection/Sellars: but the projection belongs more to the realm of thought acts than to the statements. >Thinking/Sellars, >Language and thought. --- II 334 Summary 1) The correspondence that we were looking for is limited to elementary statements. 2) It is about the fundamental role that actual statements (or thought acts) play. Like the pawns in chess: e.g. "Chicago is big." 3) All true statements are "true" in the same sense, but they differ in their roles: 2 + 2 = 4 plays a different role than "this is red". The role consists in constituting a projection in the language users of the world they live in. >Language use, >Language game, >Language community, >Meaning, >Truth value, >Fregean meaning. Sellars: pro redundancy theory: if the picture corresponds, you are convinced that "this is green" is true, so you are convinced: this is green. >Redundancy theory. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Criteria | Birnbacher | Metzinger II 719 "Thinking stones"/Birnbacher: for them we have no criterion. >Consciousness, >Thinking, >Brain. Metzinger II 720 Def Criterion/Wittgenstein: "good reasons" to support a hypothesis. Separated from "symptoms". >Symptoms. Birnbacher: Criteria are not strictly logically linked to the term whose fullfilment they indicate, but in the weaker sense of the language game community. >Language game, >Language community. According to Wittgenstein, criteria are not necessary conditions for existence, but they are necessary conditions for attributability. >Attribution. For example, conduct is not a necessary condition of the occurrence of certain internal states, but nevertheless a necessary condition of the attributability of such states. >Behavior, cf. >Supervenience, >Sufficiency. Metzinger II 720 Def Symptom/Wittgenstein: empirical correlate to the criteria. |
Birn I D. Birnbacher Analytische Einführung in die Ethik Berlin 2013 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Criteria | Wittgenstein | Metzinger II 720 Criterion/Wittgenstein: good reasons for a hypothesis - not logically linked to the concept in question - only in the weaker sense of the language community - Symptom: empirical correlate to the criterion" behavior: not necessary for the presence of internal states - but for their attribution. >Attribution, >Symptoms. Metzinger II 726 Criterion: can be behavior - but symptom: must be something physiological. >Behavior. Metzinger II 720 Concept/Attribution Criteria/Wittgenstein: belong to the concept - E.g. pain: not only what it is in itself, but also function in our lives. - N.B.: then artificial intelligence is logically impossible for Wittgenstein, because we only attribute the concept to humans. >Concepts, >Pain. --- Hintikka I 262 Criterion/Criteria/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: middle period: rule and criterion come together here - the concept of the criterion becomes important in late Wittgenstein. - At the same time, the rules stand back - middle period: rule and criterion come together here. - N.B.: criteria are nothing more than conventions - e.g. that someone with a toothache cups his cheek. - They are the hard rock of the expression toothache. - I do not identify my sensations by criteria, though. >Rules. Hintikka I 266 Criterion/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: late: new meaning of criterion: the entire language game is the only criterion for the use of the word - the criterion depends on the language game. - Just as there is no independent calculus of language - "there is no criterion for pain" - new: therefore also no longer the conventional cheek-cupping when you have a toothache - rule-following is not based on criteria. >Rule following. I 269 Late: behavior is not a criterion. I 269 We do not detect whether someone made a slip of the tongue by rules, but this is a separate language game. I 370 Belief/Criterion/Propositional Attitudes/Private Experiences/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: when Wittgenstein says: "an internal process requires external criteria", he does not refer to any internal processes or private experiences - but propositional attitudes such as beliefs, etc. - they need not be identified by a special feeling. - E.g. "I hope he'll come" is not a report on a state of mind - quite unlike sensations - different: "I always think of his coming": state of mind. - Propositional attitudes need criteria, because they do not include private experiences. >Propositional attitudes, >States of mind. --- Wittgenstein II 115 Understanding/Criterion/Wittgenstein: the criterion of understanding is that we can explain the sentence before we know whether it is true or false. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Cultural Tools | Vygotsky | Upton I 14 Cultural tools/human history/Vygotsky/Upton: Vygotsky thesis: human history is created through the construction and use of cultural tools (Vygotsky 1930/1978)(1). It is this inventive use of tools that makes humans unique. A hammer is a physical example of a cultural tool. It is a means of knocking sharp objects such as nails into surfaces, in order to create a new structure. The form and function of the hammer are Upton I 15 the result of generations of cultural evolution and adaptation. The meaning and use of a hammer are not immediately obvious to someone who has never come across one before, or who has never needed to knock nails in. The information about how to use tools is also culturally transmitted. >Use, >Understanding, >Actions, >Explanations. Each generation may adapt the hammer for its own needs or use it in new ways. Vygotsky calls this ‘appropriation’. >Culture. Upton I 16 Language/Vygotsky: One of the most important cultural tools people use is language. Like the hammer, the language we use today is the result of long-term cultural development, adaptation, transmission and appropriation. >Language, >Language use, >Language community. 1. Vygotsky, LS (1930/1978) Mind in Society: The development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. |
Vygotsky I L. S. Vygotsky Thought and Language Cambridge, MA 1986 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Empiricism | Sellars | I XXI/XXII SellarsVsLogical empiricism: the special wit in his criticism is that the experiences of the protocol leading people, that should constitute the basis of the theory in logical empiricism, are reconstructed by him as quasi-theoretical, postulated entities of an everyday world view. >Content/Sellars, >Concepts/Sellars, >Consciousness/Sellars, >Description/Sellars. I 54 Elementary word-world connections exist between "red" and red, physical objects and not between "red" and a presumable class of private red single objects. (SellarsVsEmpirism). This does not mean that private feelings are not perhaps an essential part of the development of these associative connections. >Language community, >Language use, >Observation language, |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Evidence | Loar | Avr I106 Def "normal evidence"/Loar: only non-verbal behavior. - This is not sufficient for attribution of beliefs about Martians - but we have more. >Belief attribution, >Beliefs, >Behavior. Solution: knowledge of the internal organization of the Martians - which claims a deep epistemic asymmetry. >Mental states, >Other minds. Normal level of evidence: superficial epistemic symmetry: strong dependence on belief and meaning. >Language behavior, >Language community. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Exaptation | Deacon | I 351 Exaptation/Deacon: Because evolution is a historical process, it cannot be analyzed backwards. I.e. it cannot be traced back like the path of a logical conclusion. Many parallel progressions are interwoven in the network of natural selection as if they belonged together from the very beginning. In the beginning, however, they had been created coincidentally at the same time. Gould/Vrba: St. J. Gould and E. Verba called the biological version of this process exaptation(1). Function/Exaptation/Deacon: neither in the field of biology nor that of technology, the original adaptive function is completely abandoned during exaptation and not replaced by a single new function. >Adaption. When the adaptive elements of a new structure diversify, the influence of selection is distributed over the parallel useful consequences and this increases the likelihood that these characteristics will reappear in future generations, with or without this function. The possible functions are, generally speaking, extended. Springs (feathers), which were originally developed for temperature regulation, can be used for bird flight later on. Brain: it is very likely that in this way many functions have been distributed in the brain instead of concentrating on one place. And instead of using only one area, these functions can serve different purposes. I 352 Language evolution/language use/evolution: in this way, all characteristics - anatomical of the brain as well as social characteristics of the communication - facilitating the development of language and language acquisition have been favored. >Language emergence, >Language acquisition, >Communication, >Language community, >Brain/Deacon. 1. Gould, St. J and Vrba, E. (1982): Exaptation: A missing term in evolutionary theory. Paleobiology 8, 4-15. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Experience | Husserl | Gadamer I 71 Experience/"Erlebnis"/Husserl/Gadamer: Life is productivity par excellence for Dilthey. As life objectifies itself in sense formations, all understanding of meaning is "a retranslation of the objectivations of life into the spiritual vitality from which they have emerged". Thus the concept of experience forms the epistemological basis for all knowledge of the objective. Husserl/Gadamer: Similarly universal is the epistemological function which is part of the term of the experience in Husserl's phenomenology. In the 5th logical Gadamer I 72 investigation (second chapter), the phenomenological concept of experience is explicitly distinguished from the popular one. The unit of experience is not understood as a part of the real stream of experience of an "I", but as an intentional relationship. The sensory unit is also here a teleological one. There are only experiences as long as something is experienced and meant in them. Husserl also acknowledges non-intentional experiences but these enter into the sense unit of intentional experiences as material moments. In this respect, Husserl uses the concept of experience as a comprehensive title for all acts of consciousness whose essential constitution is intentionality.(1) >Experience/Natorp. Gadamer I 249 Experience/Husserl/Gadamer: (...) the detail of the experience - as much as it retains its methodological significance as an intentional correlate of a constituted meaning - [is] not a final phenomenological date (...). Every such intentional experience rather always implies a two-sided empty horizon of such an experience that is not actually meant in it, but to which a current mine can be directed at any time, and in the end it is evident that the unity of the stream of experience encompasses the whole of all such thematizable experiences. Gadamer I 250 Therefore the constitution underlies the temporality of consciousness of all constitutional problems. The stream of experience has the character of a universal horizon consciousness, from which only details are really given - as experiences. >Horizon/Husserl, >Stream of Consciousness/Husserl. Gadamer I 353 Experience/Husserl/Gadamer: [Husserl] has undertaken to elucidate the one-sidedness of the idealization of experience that is present in the sciences in always newly beginning investigations(2). [He] provides in this intention a genealogy of experience, which as experience of the life-world is still ahead of the idealization by the sciences. GadamerVsHusserl: However, it seems to me that he himself is still dominated by the one-sidedness that he criticizes. For he still projects the idealized world of exact scientific experience into the original experience of the world to the extent that he lets perception as an external, purely physical experience be the foundation for all further experience. Husserl: "Even if this sensual presence immediately attracts our practical or emotional interest, even if it is immediately present for us as something useful, attractive or repulsive - but all of this is based precisely on the fact that it is a substrate with simply sensual qualities that can be grasped by the senses, to which a path of possible interpretation leads at any time"(3). GadamerVsHusserl: Husserl's attempt to go back to the origin of experience in terms of sense and genetics and to overcome the idealization through science obviously has to struggle to a special degree with the difficulty that the pure transcendental subjectivity of the ego is not really given as such, but always in the idealization of language, which is already inherent in all acquisition of experience and in which the affiliation of the individual ego to a language community has an effect. 1. Cf. E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen II, 365 Note.; Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, I, 65. 2. Cf. for instance the representation in „Erfahrung und Urteil“, p. 42, and in the work on the „Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie“ p. 48ff.; 130ff. — (GadamerVsHusserl: It is a very different concept of foundation that is used here. Phenomenologically, perception seems to me to be a mere construction that corresponds to the derived concept of existence - and thus appears as a residual position of its scientific-theoretical idealization.) 3. Husserliana VI. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Explanation | Wright | I 182 Best Opinion/ethics/morality/Wright: we will see in Chapter 5 that moral issues do not occur in the best explanations of our moral beliefs. >Best Explanation/Wright. I 196f Best explanation/Wright: an explanation cannot be the best if it does not contain certain details. (But this is not supposed to be any naturalistic or scientific reductionist kind of explanation). An explanation will not be considered the best, as long as there is a competing equally good explanation, but which does not use the cognitive susceptibility. If such a declaration is actually equally good, it will explain why the (different) person in his community does not stand out. >Community, >Language community, >Convention. But then, the entire community can be considered deficient. The specific cognitive ability, thus becomes a fifth wheel. >D. Wiggins, >Cognitive Coercion, >Causal Role. I 240 Best explanation/Physics: should the best explanation not always be the same? Finally, the causal antecedents are, so to say, already in place, whatever the fate of the theory will be later. Why should the best explanation go beyond the statement of reasons and laws that precisely explain the forces that generate our beliefs? Wright: There is no reason why the best explanation should refer to any state of affairs which actually conveys truth to the theory, as we assume. Best explanation/Physics/Wright: should consist in scientific heritage, as well as in observations and certain psychological laws. >Explanation/Harman. ((s) So there is no mentioning of the facts.) Could the best explanation not always be "done better" , by always searching for a more fundamental level (for example: subatomic, etc.) If explanations are only best if they are valid, then they will always "overtake" their content. >Assertibility, >Superassertibility, >Ideal assertibility. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Expressions | Schiffer | I 215f Expression potential/Schiffer: (in a community): what can be expressed with a (whole, complete) sentence makes compositional semantics superfluous. >Compositionality, >Sentence meaning, >Word meaning, >Frege principle, >Language community. I 216 This also applies to verbs for propositional attitudes. ((s) E.g. "believes..", "imagines..") >Verbs, >Propositional attitudes. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Externalism | Externalism, philosophy: the thesis that the meanings of the words partially depend on our environment; a) by the influence of the language community (use theory), b) the possibility or impossibility to ever come into contact with objects to refer to them (reference, acquaintance). See also twin earth, anti-individualism, circumstances. |
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| Folk Psychology | Burge | Shiffer I 37 BurgeVsFolk Psychology/Intention-Based Semantics//IBS/BurgeVsIBS/BurgeVsGrice/Schiffer: Burge's counter-examples are more interesting. They differ from the twin-earth examples in two points: (I) at first sight they also make a strong objection VsIBS by seemingly demonstrating that the content of belief is sometimes a function of the meaning of the word in the linguistic community. >Intentions. I 38 (II) Def "Environment-Dependent"/Role/Terminology/Burge/Schiffer/: let's say: a functional role is dependent on the environment if we cannot know whether a system is in a state that has the role F without knowing what the environment looks like. >Circumstances, >Environment. Dependent on the Environment: e.g. "every token of x is caused in y when he sees a cat": this is environment-dependent. ((s)> Putnam: "cat-single-sign-trigger"). CSF: common-sense functionalism Twin EarthVsCSF/Schiffer: the arguments work there, because they are environment-independent. This may spur a hope for a scientific functionalism, for a theory with T-correlated functional roles that are environment-dependent. BurgeVsFunctionalism: (Burge 1979(3), example turned classic, also Burge 1982a(1), 1982b(2)): E.g. Alfred's use of "arthritis" involves more than the correct use limited to inflammation of the joints. He thinks it is similar to rheumatism and says "I have arthritis in the thigh". Burge: Alfred has a wrong belief. Shiffer dito. w: World where Alfred has the belief that he has arthritis in the thigh. In w, Alfred has the belief that he has arthritis in the thigh w' is a possible world that is different from the other only in that Alfred's use of "arthritis" is correct there. It is accepted by the language community. (s) The language community mistakenly believes that it is possible to have arthritis in the thigh. The community as a whole is wrong (except for the doctors)). Then, Alfred's belief there is also true. Important Point/Burge: In w', Alfred does not have the belief that he has arthritis in the thigh. For this belief is false (because arthritis is only an inflammation of the joints. But the belief he has is true on its own!) ((s) He has the belief that he has a disease of which it is generally believed that he could have in the thigh. His word "arthritis" then has a different content than in w). BurgeVsCSF: in w , Alfred is in exactly the same T* -correlated states as we are in w. Therefore, if CSF were correct, he would express the same belief in both. But he does not. Therefore, CSF must be incorrect. ((s) Alfred does not assert in w' to believe this (and does not believe it), but then there are two differences between w and w'?). >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought. 1. Tyler Burge: 1982a. “Two Thought Experiments Reviewed.” In: Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23.2 : 284–293. 2. Tyler Burge: 1982b. "Other Bodies" In: Andrew Woodfield (Hg.): Thought and Object. New York: Oxford. 3. Tyler Burge: 1979. Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73–121. |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Grammar | Schiffer | I 253 Grammar/Lewis/Schiffer: (simplified) for language in a community: (for subsentential expressions): Def propositional determinant/Schiffer: for words: E.g. property, relation, particular, etc. ((s) instead of semantic value). Def Grammar/Lewis/Schiffer: is then an ordered pair, the 1st element of which is a set of correlations of words and propositional details 2nd element a set of such combination operations. Operation: is stipulated, not found in language. Meaning is then the propositional determinant that is correlated with the word by the grammar. >Language community, >Convention/Lewis, >Semantic value, >Ordered pairs, >Grammar/Lewis. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Grice | Avramides | I 26 Grice/Avramidis: Grice view should be understood as a conceptual analysis, not as reductionism. - Not as physicalism. - Grice wants a reconciliation with Frege and Davidson. >Philosophy of mind, >Gottlob Frege, >Donald Davidson, >Paul Grice. I 42f Grice/Avramides: Thesis: the problem of sentence meaning (meaning of the whole utterance) takes precedence over the meaning of partial statements. >Sentence meaning, >Word meaning, >Clauses, >Compositionality, >Frege-Principle, >Subsententials. Statement/Grice: is understood broadly, also signals etc. Important argument: thus, the analysis ranges in a situation meaning before the timeless meaning (the standard meaning). >Situation, >Situation/Psychology, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. Only so can he equate"x means something" with "S means something (in a situation) with x". 1st Version; ... A response from the listener is induced ... 2nd Version: ... in addition: the listener must recognize the intention of the speaker. I 44 3rd Version: in addition: the recognition of the speaker's intention must act as a reason for the belief of the listener. Vs: there are still many counterexamples. I 45 GriceVsGrice: counter-E.g. it is a difference whether I spontaneously frown in a situation or in order to express my displeasure to a person. Important argument: exactly the same information is transmitted, no matter if the speaker has the intention to communicate or not. Then there is no reason to distinguish between natural and non-natural meaning. >Natural meaning/non-natural meaning. The difference has to do with what the frowning person can expect the listener to believe - but without intention no meaning - non-natural meaning (without intention) never sufficient for response. I 46 E.g. thumbscrews mean nothing. I 67 Grice/Avramides: so far, the analysis is not sufficient for timeless (linguistic meaning. - Only for speaker-meaning. Meaning/Grice: meaning is to be found both outside language and within. I 68 Timeless meaning/Grice: disjunction of findings and about what people want to achieve with x. - This is also an effect etc. but not a practice. It is not sufficient (because it may have a second meaning), and not necessary (it may have alternatives). - But it is a "procedure in the repertoire". >Practise, >Language behavior, >Language community, >Convention. I 111 Reductionist Gricean/Loar: This position risks to accept thinking without language. >Thinking without language. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Grice | Schiffer | Avramides I 114 Grice/Schiffer: (= intention-based approach) Grice is obliged to deny logical functions of meanings. - Instead: dependence on a (causal) fact (which is non-semantically specified). >Intention-based semantics, >Facts, >Situations, cf. >Situation semantics. --- Schiffer I 13 Grice/Schiffer: Problem: the meaning must not determine the content. - Because semantic vocabulary must be avoided - therefore VsRelation Theory. The belief objects would have to be language independent. >Relation theory, >Objects of belief. I 241 Intention-based approach/Grice/Schiffer: works without Relation Theory and without compositional semantics. - Extrinsic explanation is about non-semantically describable facts of use. SchifferVsGrice: his theory has not enough to say about the semantic properties of linguistic units. I 242 Grice/Schiffer: (Grice 1957)(1): attempts to define semantic concepts of public language in terms of propositional attitudes (belief, wishing, wanting). With that nothing is assumed about the meaning itself. Def speaker-meaning/Grice: (1957)(1) Is non-circular definable as a kind of behavior with the intention to trigger a belief or an action in someone else. Def expression meaning/Grice: (1957)(1) that means the semantic features of expressions of natural language. - Is non-circular definable as certain types of correlations between characters and types of exercise of speaker-meaning. - Statement/extended: every act, that means something. >Speaker intention, >Speaker meaning. Schiffer: thus questions of meaning are reduced to questions about propositional attitudes. I 243 A character string has to have a particular feature, so that the intention is detected. >Intentions. I 245 Grice/Schiffer: Problem: Falsifying evidence is not a meaning-problem. Common knowledge is necessary, but always to refute by counter-examples. >Language community. Solution: to define common knowledge by counterfactual conditions. >Counterfactual conditional. Problem: not even two people have common knowledge. SchifferVsGrice: no one has set up a lot of reasonable conditions for speaker-meaning. Problem: a person can satisfy the conditions of (S) when he merely says that A intended to cause it, that A believes that p ((S) = lies). SchifferVsGrice: this approach is hyper-intellectual, presupposes too much intentions and expectations, that will never be divided. - The normal speaker knows too little to understand the expression-meaning by Grice. >Utterance meaning. I 247 E.g. I hope you believe me, but not on the basis of my intention. - A necessary condition to tell something is not a necessary condition to mean it as well. >Meaning/Intending. 1. H. Paul Grice (1957). Meaning. Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388 |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Identification | Strawson | I 57 Identification/Strawson: if directly due to localization then without mentioning of other particulars - E.g. death depends on living things - e.g. but flash not from something flashing. >Dependence. I 64 Identification/Strawson: observable particulars can also be identified without mentioning their causes or the things on which they depend, - conceptual dependency does not matter - but one cannot always identify births without identifying them as the birth of a living being. I 65 Asymmetry: we do not need necessarily a term in language for births as particulars - but for living beings, because we are living beings ourselves. >Continuant, >Person, >Subject. I 66 Identifiability/particular/Strawson: minimum condition: they must be neither private nor unobservable. >Particulars/Strawson, >Language community, cf. >Private language, >Understanding, >Communication. I 87 Identificaion/Strawson: we cannot talk about private things when we cannot talk about public things. I 153 Identification/StrawsonVsLeibniz: identification requires a demonstrative element: that contradicts Leibniz monads for which there should be descriptions alone in general term. >General terms. Then, according to Leibniz, identification (individuation) is only possible for God: the "complete term" of an individual. That is at the same time a description of the entire universe (from a certain point, which guarantees the uniqueness). >Complete concept. I 245 Identification/Universal/names/particulars/Strawson: speaker/listener each must know a distinctive fact about Socrates. But it must not be the same - E.g. "That man there can lead you". Crucial: that someone stands there - N.B.: no part introduces a single thing, but the statement as a whole presents it. >Particulars/Strawson, >Introduction/Strawson. VII 124 Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel by swimming through it twice" - it has the (wrong!) appearances, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or b) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same error as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression. E.g. "Scott is Scott". >Waverley example. --- Tugendhat I 400-403 Identification/Strawson: a) pointing b) description, spacetime points. TugendhatVsStrawson: because he had accepted Russell's theory of direct relation unconsciously, he did not see that there are no two orders. Tugendhat like Brandom: demonstrative identification presupposes the spatiotemporal, non-demonstrative - (deixis presupposes anaphora). >Deixis/Brandom. Difference: specification/Tugendhat: "which of them all?" Identification: only kind: by spacetime points. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Idiolect | Idiolect: An idiolect is a language spoken in a particular subgroup of a language community. In extreme cases this can be a single subject. One problem is the clarification of the word meanings and thus the possible determination of truth values (true, false) of statements. |
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| Intersubjectivity | Wright | I 139 Subjective/objective/Wright: Why don’t we just express all our opinions about the comic with "I find ..?" - Answer: It is useful to have the objectified form of community, because often we can quite legitimately take a common response to the comic. ((s) otherwise there would not be the comic in the form in which we know it.) >Objectivity, >Subjectivity, >Community, >Language community. I 139 There are terms that are too simple to argue about (> Wittgenstein, arithmetic): e.g. the content of arithmetic assertions as 57 + 65 = 122 says nothing about consensus and has no logical consequences. There could be no standard of correctness if no consensus could be assumed on the basal level. >Certainty. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Kripke’s Wittgenstein | Stegmüller | Stegmüller IV 15 Skeptical Solution/Kripke's Wittgenstein/KW/Kripkenstein/Stegmüller: Reference to common language use and rule following instead of "facts" and truth conditions. >Language use, >Language community, >Rule following, >Facts, >Truth conditions. IV 19f "Bizarre Skepticism" KW/Stegmüller: Example "Quus": in additions of larger numbers 7 could always come out, only that such numbers have never been added in the past. - Therefore we ourselves do not know whether we apply the addition or the "Quaddition". - So far only finitely many cases have been followed. An extension to infinitely many cases allows infinitely many different interpretations of the previous practice, which explain the previous cases, but predict deviations for the future. N.B.: then in the past I meant something different than I thought I meant. >Meaning/Intending, >Beliefs. IV 23 Kripke's Wittgenstein: wrong solutions: 1. "Do what you did in the past": that's what he does! 2. algorithm (calculation method): one must have learned this somehow! I just cannot know that in the past I meant the "standard interpretation". 3. Exclusion of wrong rules: could only be done by further rules: Return of the old problem. IV 27 N.B.: that the current use is the right one is not doubted at all! IV 35ff Kripke's Wittgenstein/Disposition/KripkeVsRyle: the crucial dispositions were acquired in the past - the difference already existed in the past. >Dispositions. KripkeVsRyle: 1. Dispositions are irrelevant at all. a) If I have a hypothesis about my dispositions, I still do not know if it is the right one instead of another. IV 37 b) If we wanted to let "the past rest" and just ask what seems right to me now, we lose the term "right". IV 38 Kripke: N.B.: I have always had the same dispositions! IV 47 Kripke's Wittgenstein/KripkeVsDisposition Theory: If one understands mine in such a way that what I mean now determines what I should mean in the future, then that is normative, not descriptive. IV 50 KW: no fact: even an "omniscient being" could not know what we mean - the fact of thinking does not exist. IV 63 Kripke's Wittgenstein/VsIntrospection/Stegmüller: two people can agree completely in their inner experiences, and yet one can mean "plus" and the other "Quus". Experience content: can also tell us nothing about the treatment of new cases - grasping a meaning is not an experience. >Content. IV 65 Example experience: the beginner has another experience than the advanced one, e.g. when reading aloud. - But: the feeling "I can read" is not a sufficient condition for real reading. IV 72 Kripke's Wittgenstein: for Platonism, facts exist, yet there is a problem of access to these entities: it is not clear whether I grasp the right sense. >Private Language, >Rule Following. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Language | Black | II 13 Languages/Black: different if speakers do not understand each other. >Understanding. II 16 Talk/Black: prevalence over writing. >Speaking, >Writing. II 20 New: no fully articulated thought possible without symbolic representation. >Representation. Words/Malinowski: the same part and equivalents of the action. >Actions, >Words. II 31 Language/Black: Text linear - thinking nonlinear. >Texts, >Thinking. II 30 Linguistics/Black: the tradition boasts about not considering the "impure meaning". II 63 BloomfieldVsTradition: phonemes must be compared with respect to meaning - only if the examiner finds out which statements are similar and which different in their meaning, he can learn to recognize the phonemic differences. Nevertheless, Bloomfiled per purely formal linguistics/per Ockham: meanings should not be used without need. One should rather rely on differences in meaning than on substantive meaning details. II 74f Language/Black: an infinite number of sentences is possible. - Therefore language is an open system like e.g., chess, chemical compositions, tunes. ((s) For the discussion whether there are infinitely many possible sentences, see >Researchgate.) II 87 Def Language/Black: too complex to be definable - Features: anchored in speech - speech act is targeted and self-regulating. Language is an institution (language community) - system built on units - meaning supporting, effect triggering, pliable II 130 Language/Locke/Black: for transmission of thoughts - (ideas). >Thoughts, >Imagination. II 161 VsLanguage/Berkeley: knowledge is confused and obscured through abuse. Locke: ditto. Whitehead: incomplete, only a transitional stage. Risk: false confidence in them. Wittgenstein: all philosophy is criticism of language. Examples from literature: Swift: Gulliver: abolition of all words ... II 166 Sartre: disgust: Roquentin wants to withdraw into silence. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Language | Eco | I 66 Language/Eco: language is not one of many means of communication, it is what justifies any communication. It is the actual foundation of culture. I 115 Language/Eco: language is a system that explains itself in successive systems of conventions that explain each other. >Convention, >Explanation, >Meaning, >Interpretation, >Communication, >Community, >Culture, >Language community. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Language | Loar | Avramides I 75 Def possible language/Loar: abstract entity, which must still be based on a speaker. Loar II 146 Language/Loar: Community based. - Therefore intensions are important -> quantification into the semantic content of sentences. >Language community, >Language use, >Intensions, >Content. Problem: the p-position in the Tarski scheme only allows extensions. >Tarski scheme. Loar thesis: the semantic properties of the sentence components are a function of the propositional attitudes of the speakers. >Propositional attitudes, >Semantic properties, >Sentences, >Compositionality. II 149 Language/Loar: maybe a function of sentences on sentence-like intentions (which in turn are functions of possible worlds on truth values). >Truth values, >Possible worlds, >Intentions. Loar: Language is always relative to a community - not reducible to logical and syntactic terms. - Factual use is decisive, so psychological terms come into play. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Language | Peacocke | II 166 Psychologizing of language/Peacocke: Problem: there may be an infinite number of types of situations that are specified psychologically, in which a given semantic predicate is applicable, and which have nothing in common, that is specifiable with psychological vocabulary. >Situations, >Behavior, >Vocabulary. ((s) Question: can you identify these infinitely psychological predicates as psychologically?) PeacockeVsVs: it is not about reduction - the fine propositional adjustments do not have to be attributed before translation. Vgl. >Reduction, >Reductionism. II 168 Interpreted language/Peacocke: we get an interpreted language by using the T-scheme T(s) ↔ p plus performance relation 'sats' (uninterpreted itself) between rows of objects, and sentences. >Interpretation, >Disquotational scheme, >Satisfaction. II 171 Variant: a variant of this is an ordered pair whose first component is an interpreted language in the sense of the previous section and whose second component is a function of sentences of the first components to propositional adjustments. Then the listener takes the utterence as prima facie evidence. >Prima facie, >Evidence. II 168 Language/Community/Peacocke: we get a language community by the convention that the speaker only utters the sentence when he intends to (Schiffer ditto). >Language community, >Language behavior, >Intention, >Meaning/intending, >Language/Schiffer. Problem: the attribution of a criterion presupposes already a theory by the speaker. II 175 Language/Community/Convention/Peacocke: Problem: 'common knowledge': E.g. assuming English *: as English, except that the truth conditions are changed for an easy conjunction: T (Susan is blond and Jane is small) ↔ Susan is blond. >Truth conditions, >Conjunction. Problem: if English is the actual language, then also English* would be the actual language at the same time - because it could be common knowledge that each member that believes p & q therefore believes also p. >Conventions. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Language | Rorty | I 16ff Mirror: Language is a tool and not a mirror (Rorty like Wittgenstein). I 206 Language: the particularity of the language is not that it "changes the quality of our experience" or "opens new perspectives to the consciousness". Its acquisition rather gives us access to a community whose members justify their assertions before each other. >Language community, >Community, >Justification. I 228 Rorty: we can pursue Quine’s goals without useing his resources: we admit that the world can be fully described in a truth-functional language, but at the same time we also admit that parts of it can be described in an intensional language as well. >Truth functions, Intensions. If we were not able to refer to intentions, we would still be able to describe any section of the world. III 25 Vocabularies: the world does not prefer one vocabulary over others. Newton’s vocabulary makes it easier for us to describe the world than that of Aristotle, but it does not prefer it! The human self is created by vocabularies. >Vocabulary, >Self, >World. III 41 Rorty’s thesis: seeing the history of the language and thus of the arts, sciences and the history of morality as a metaphor is to abolish the image in which consciousness or language are always better suited for purposes that God or nature have imposed. Consciousness just happened in evolution, it’s not something at which the whole process was aimed. >Teleology, >Consciousness. III 156 Language: people want to be described in their own terms. III 190 Language/noise/sound/Heidegger/Rorty: for him, philosophical truth depended on the choice of phonemes, the sound of the words themselves. >Phonemes, >Language/Heidegger, >Truth/Heidegger, >Heidegger. III 197 Primordial words/RortyVsHeidegger: such words would be completely useless for people who do not share Heidegger’s associations. III 190 Writing/speech/DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: Derrida puts Heidegger upside down: insists on the "priority of the written word". Writing instead of sounds - Thought should become poet-like. "The language speaks". >Writing, >Derrida |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Language | Wright | I 280 Language is not a mere clothing of thought. We have no contact to the wordless thought that P. Thoughts have to be mediated symbolically. >Thinking and language, >Thinking without language, >Thinking, >Thoughts, >World/thinking, >Symbols, >Communication, >Language use, >Language community, >Understanding. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Language Games | Rorty | III 221 Rules/language game/ Derrida/Rorty: Derrida does not want to make a move in the language game. - He does not want to play. - He does not wants to refute anyone. >Derrida. VI 210f RortyVsMcDowell: one should not speak of forms of comprehensibility. McDowell: logical space of reasons and logical space of the laws are sui generis respectively. >Logical Space, >Space of Reason, >Space of Nature. RortyVsMcDowell: They are not so strictly separate areas (the reason and the law). All language games are sui generis. They can not be reduced to one another. e.g. Football and biology. But that is philosophically sterile question. With Wittgenstein: we should not over-dramatize the contrasts. It is simply banal: different tools serve different purposes. >Language/Rorty, >Meaning, >Use theory, >Language behavior, >Language use, >Language community, >Idiolect, >Private language. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Language Games | Wright | I 260 Life forms/Wittgenstein/Cavell: orientations of the interests and feelings, sense of humor, for significance, for similarity for the decision if an utterance is a statement, an explanation ... >Life, >Community, >Language Community, >Discourses, >Understanding, >Similarity, >Assertion, >Explanation, >Truth evaluability. ((s) Truth evaluability: this is about the question whether a truth value (true/false) can be attributed at all in some cases as e.g. moral judgments or assertions about the comical.) |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Meaning | Loar | II 144 Meaning/Loar: a sentence in a community is a function of psychological and social role. - Other sentences in other languages do not belong to the point. - (Davidson ditto). Whatever is important, it is not something that is generally available in translation relative to the sentence. >Translation, >Language community, >Language use, II 144 Meaningfulness/significance/Loar: regardless of language: e.g. unstructured signals have conventional meaning in a community. >Conventions. Problem: the equivalence of "Snow is white" and "Grass is green". >Tarski scheme, >Quote/Disoquotation, >Truth definition, >Equivalence, >Convention T. Accidental equivalences cannot be ruled out. II 149 Meaning/sentence meaning/Loar: what a sentence means is always relative to a language - ((s) it is not a language-independent proposition). >Propositions, >Sentences. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Meaning Change | Nagel | I 61 Meaning change/Language community/Nagel: however, the practice of the community can not be beaten by the objectivity: language changes. >Objectivity, >Language use, >Meaning, >Language community. But this is not true for the content of thought - in contrast to the meaning of the words, the content of thoghts does not change. >Propositional content. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Meaning Theory | Loar | Avramides I 27 Meaning Theory/Loar: a meaning theory cannot be drawn as a purely extensional truth theory. >Extensionality, >Extensions. Problem: 1st The equivalence of "Snow is white" and "Grass is green" 2nd Hesperus is bright iff Phosphorus is bright, 3rd "Snow ist white and 2+ 2 = 4" is true iff snow is white. Solution/Fodor/Lepore :the right hand side must be a translation from the left. Cf. >Convention T. Meaning Theory/Avramides: Thesis: the problems disappear when it comes to the big picture: how sounds turn to speech acts? >Speech acts. Only then the truth conditions will come up, because the meaning theory must fit into a theory of power. Lewis: sounds have truth conditions only relative to a language. >Phonemes. Psychology comes into play only when it comes to favoring one language in a population. >Language community, >Conventions, >Language use. Loar II 139f Meaning Theory/Loar: a) extensional (Quine, Davidson ) b) Loar: intensional: semantic concepts are located within a larger framework of propositional attitudes. Davidson: intermediate position. >Intensionality, >Propositional attitudes. II 141 Meaning Theory/Davidson: main problem: how to avoid: "Snow is white " is true iff grass is green. If one accepts this as extensionally right hand side (correct), then there is not more than that in the idea of the meaning. II 142 Meaning Theory/Loar: a list does not work: "x is camel1 , or camel2 ... ": there is no understanding of a sentence. Wrong solution: simplicity: "x is a camel " is only satisfied by y, if y is a camel. Vs: this solution is too strong and too vague. For someone who knows nothing of a language that meaning theory does not work that way. The Tarski schema " S is true ... " ( equivalence scheme) does not give the meaning. >Tarski scheme. We also need at least "an expression x is S and ... " Problem: we then have a metametalanguage. >Metalanguage. II 143 Solution/Loar: when entities were meanings they could distinguish sentence meaning from anything else what is true in the sentence. >Sentence meaning, >Meaning. II 149 Meaning Theory/Loar: Thesis: a meaning theory is a theory of mind, not vice versa. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Nominalism | Sellars | I 53f Def Psychological Nominalism: every consciousness of species, resemblances, facts, i.e. abstract entities, is a linguistic matter. The perception of similarities and also of facts presupposes the process of acquisition of language use. >Language acquisition, >Language use, >Language, >Meaning, >Language community, >Concepts/Sellars. I 56 Psychological nominalism/Sellars: Thesis: there is no consciousness of a logical space that precedes the acquisition of language and would be independent of it. >Logical space, >Consciousness/Sellars. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Objectivity | Habermas | III 27 Objectivity/Habermas: an assessment can be objective if it is made on the basis of a trans-subjective claim to validity which has the same meaning for any observer and addressee as for the subject itself. >Validity claims, >Truth, >Correctness, >Truthfulness, >Intersubjectivity. Validity: Claims of this kind are truth and efficiency. >Efficiency. III 30 Objectivity/Realism: for the "realistic" approach, the world as the epitome of what is the case, is objective. >Facts, >Facts/Wittgenstein, >World/Wittgenstein, >Tractatus. III 31 Objectivity/Phenomenology: for the "phenomenological" approach, it is first necessary to determine the conditions under which the unity of an objective world is constituted for the members of a communication community. >Phenomenology, >Community, >Language Community, >Objectivity, >Objectivism/Husserl. Rorty I 417 (According to Rorty) Habermas' thesis: scientific research is both, limited and allowed by inevitably subjective conditions. >Subjectivity, >Science. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Objectivity | Wright | I 139 Subjective/objective/Wright: why do we not simply express all our "opinions about the strange with "I find .."? Answer: it is useful to have the objectified form of community, because often we can quite rightly accept a community response to the strange. ((s) otherwise the strange would not exist in the form in which we know it). >Language community, >Language behavior, >Language use, >Meaning, >Reference. I 139/40 There are terms that are too simple to argue about. E.g. the content of arithmetic assertions like "57 + 65 = 122" does not say anything about consensus and has therefore no logical consequences. >Arithmetics/Wittgenstein. But there would also be no standard of correctness to satisfy if not on every basal level could be a consensus presupposed. >Correctness/Wright. I 216 Representation/Wright: in contrast to that, the representative character of judgments e.g. on the forms of a children's puzzles has to do with: how very different we may be biologically constituted, or which natural laws would be effective, the variety of judgments must be seen as a symptom for cognitive dysfunction. >Cognitive coercion, >Judgments, >Knowledge, >Competence, >Laws of Nature. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Perception | Sellars | I XL Perception/Sellars: includes thoughts - but is not cognitive as such. >Consciousness/Sellars, >Thinking/Sellars, >Concepts/Sellars, >Cognition, >Knowledge, >World/Thinking. Clarity: needs something non-cognitive. >Mapping, >Presentation. I 43 Perception/Sellars: might be explained by molecular behavior, but not by analyzing the speech behavior - and therefore not by sense data as an intermediate instance between being and appearance. >Sense data, >Language behavior, >Behavior, >Appearance. I 99: Impression/Sellars: that there is something. - Thought: that something will appear. Perception: as if there would be something. I 103 Perception/Sellars: right question: what would correspond, for example, with electromagnetic concepts in a micro theory of sentient organisms. Not: how do impressions and electro mechanics fit together. There is not only behavior, but also inner episodes. Impressions need to be inter-subjective, not completely dissolvable symptoms in behavior. >Intersubjectivity, >Language community, >Observation language. Impressions: are states. But not physiological. >Physical/psychic. Impressions are not objects. --- Graeser I 46 Perception/Sellars/Graeser: adverbial: he preceives reddish. >Cf. >Adverbial analysis. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Personality Traits | Odbert | Corr II 29 Trait-names/personality traits/lexicon/study background/ Allport/Odbert/Saucier: The essence of [Allport’s and Odbert’s article ‘Trait-names: A psycho-lexical study’] was a classification of (…) English ‘trait-name’ words (terms distinguishing the behavior of one human being from another) into four categories. >Lexical hypothesis, >Lexical studies. (…) from a scientific standpoint, some of the most basic personality attributes might be discovered from studying conceptions implicit in use of the natural language. >Everyday language, >Concepts, >Language use, >Language community, >Personality, >Character traits. If a distinction is highly represented in the lexicon – and found in any dictionary – it can be presumed to have practical importance. This is because the degree of representation of an attribute in language has some correspondence with the general importance of the attribute in real-world transactions. Therefore, when a scientist identifies personality attributes that are strongly represented in the natural language, that scientist is simultaneously identifying what may be the most important attributes. >Relevance. II 30 Study Design/Allport/Odbert: Allport and Odbert turned to Webster’s New International Dictionary (1925)(1), a compendium of approximately 400,000 separate terms. Combining judgments of three investigators (themselves plus a person designated only as ‘AL’, (…)), they built a list of 17,953 trait-names in the English language that drew on the following criterion for inclusion: ‘the capacity of any term to distinguish the behavior of one human being from that of another’ (p. 24) (1). Allport and Odbert went further and differentiated terms into four categories or columns. The (…) terms in Column I were ‘neutral terms designating possible II 31 personal traits’ (p. 38)(1), more specifically defined as ‘generalized and personalized determining tendencies – consistent and stable modes of an individual’s adjustment’ to his/her environment (p. 26)(1). The (…) terms in Column II were ‘terms primarily descriptive of temporary moods or activities’ (…). The (…) terms in Column III were ‘weighted terms conveying social and characterial judgments of personal conduct, or designated influence on others’ (p. 27)(1) (…).The other (…) terms fell into the miscellaneous category in Column IV, labeled as ‘metaphorical and doubtful terms’ (p. 38)(1). This last grab-bag category included terms describing physical characteristics and various abilities (…). II 33 Findings/Allport/Odbert: 1. Allport and Odbert cogently argue that, basically, normal human life cannot proceed without some reference to personality dispositions. There is no better argument than their trenchant words from the monograph: “Even the psychologist who inveighs against traits, and denies that their symbolic existence conforms to ‘real existence’ will nevertheless write a convincing letter of recommendation to prove that one of his favorite students is ‘trustworthy, self-reliant, and keenly critical’” (pp. 4–5)(1). 2. Allport and Odbert indicate that the dispositions to which trait-names refer are more than conversational artifact, a form of everyday error (though in part they may be that). They are to some degree useful for understanding and prediction, as confirmed by later research (Roberts et al., 2007)(3). [The follow-on assertion constitutes that] the degree of representation of an attribute in language has some correspondence with the general importance of the attribute in real-world transactions. >Dispositions, >Representation. II 34 3. (…) science can lean on and build on the body of commonsense concepts in language. Rather than relying exclusively on the top-down gambits of theorists, there is opportunity for a generative bottom-up approach. II 35 4. (…) Allport and Odbert recognized a difficulty inherent in personality language: trait-names mean different things to different people. To a degree, these meanings are contingent on one’s ‘habits of thought’ (p. 4)(1). One reason builds on the polysemy (multiple distinct meanings) that many words have. >Conventions, >Language use, >Language community, >Meaning, >Reference. 5. Within science, the difficulty might be even further resolved by explicit communication and consensus. For Allport and Odbert, this meant naming traits in a careful and logical way, and not merely codifying but also ‘purifying’ natural-language terminology (p. vi)(1). II 36 6. Allport and Odbert’s prime interest was in tendencies that are ‘consistent and stable modes of an individual’s adjustment to his environment’ rather than ‘merely temporary and specific behavior’ (p. 26)(1). 7. (…) trait-names reflect a combination of the biophysical influences and something more cultural (perhaps historically varying). (…) characterizations of human qualities are determined partly by ‘standards and interests peculiar to the times’ (p. 2)(1) in a particular social epoch. [In this way] culture, trait-names are partly ‘invented in accordance with cultural demands’ (p. 3)(1). II 37 VsAllport/VsOdbert: 1. (…) they ignore and give short-shrift to culture, both with regard to issues of cross-cultural generalizability and of how traits themselves may reflect culture-relevant contents. 2. According to their distinctive ‘trait hypothesis’ (p. 12), no two persons ‘possess precisely the same trait’ (p. 14)(1) and each ‘individual differs in every one of his traits from every other individual’ (p. 18)(1). The problem is not that individualism is wrong; rather, it may be ethnocentric to impose an individualistic filter throughout personality psychology, and in fact such idiothetic approaches are outside the mainstream of current and recent personality psychology. II 38 3. Another aspect of the thinking (…) that might appear odd, in retrospect, is the notion of a single, cardinal trait that provides determining tendencies in an individual life. (…) a particular attribute becomes so pervasive in a person that it becomes a distinct focus of organization. Seventy years later, there seems still to be a lack of evidence for cardinal traits that perform a more or less hostile take-over, coming to determine and structure the remainder of the personality system. II 39 4. Allport and Odbert argue for the desirability of neutral terminology in science. Unfortunately, it appears that they extend the desire for unweighted emotion-free vocabulary into the very attribute-contents evident in the trait-names in language, with confusing consequences. On this view, the trait-names in language that are judgmental and ‘emotionally toned’ (p. v)(1), having affective polarity, are suspect and less worthy of study than the neutral ones. But affectively toned concepts like evil and virtue are particularly worthy of study particularly because of their extreme affective tone (…). II 40 5. (…) the numerically largest category of trait-names was social evaluation. However, they offer no account for why the third column – reflecting social judgments likely unconnected with biophysical traits – would be the biggest component in person perception. 6. (…) the notion that censorial and moral terms – and virtues, II 41 vices, whatever is associated with blame or praise, not to mention social effects – have no use for a psychologist seems now obsolete. 7. To accept at face value the particular Allport and Odbert classification of trait-names into four categories is to take on the assumptions of a specialized theory of traits, whose main propositions can be construed based on the classification itself. (…) attention to emotions and morality would distract us from the central aspects of personality which reflect enduring consistencies operating intrinsically in the person, and outside the influence of society (…). 1. Webster’s new international dictionary of the English language (1925). Springfield, MA: Merriam. 2. Allport, G. W., & Odbert, H. S. (1936). Trait-names: A psycho-lexical study. Psychological Monographs, 47 (1, Whole No. 211). 3. Roberts, B. W., Kuncel, N. R., Shiner, R., Caspi, A., & Goldberg, L. R. (2007). The power of personality: The comparative validity of personality traits, socioeconomic status, and cognitive ability for predicting important life outcomes. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2, 313–345. Saucier, Gerard: “Classification of Trait-Names Revisiting Allport and Odbert (1936)”, In: Philip Corr (Ed.), 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 29-45. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Private Language | Wright | I 180/81 Private Language/Wittgenstein/Wright: does not have the discipline required, since there is no distinction between seeming right and being right. >Rule following, >Objectivity, >Meaning, >Humpty-Dumpty theory, cf. >Speaker meaning, >Language community, >Conventions. Wright: But of course, for example, sensation is not epistemically private. (Frequent misunderstanding). >Sensation, >Epistemic/ontologic, >First Person, >Intentionality. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Privileged Access | Sellars | I 80 Consciousness/Sellars: To each of us belongs a stream of episodes that are not direct experiences themselves and to which we have privileged, but by no means immutable or infallible, access. They can occur without open language behavior. >Stream of consciousness/Husserl. The word ideas are not the thinking itself. Nor is the open speech behavior thinking itself. We do not need to have word ideas, we do not need to have an idea at all when we know what we are thinking. It is wrong to construct the privileged access according to the model of perception. I 95ff Privileged access/Sellars: self-ascription is due to observation by others. Only after that the speech of privileged access starts. >Self-knowledge, >Self-consciousness, >Self-identification, >Self-ascription, >Attribution, >Community, >Language community, >Psychological Nominalism, >Introspection. I 97 Private: there is no "absolute privacy". Open behavior is an indispensable part of the logic of these terms, such as the observable behavior of gases is evidence of molecular processes. Report: (still) requires privileged access. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Wright | Horwich I 110 Horwich: "Snow is white" is true because snow is white. WrightVsHorwich: this is not a sentence about truth, but a sentence about physical laws, laws of nature, and it does not help us here. Cf. >Tarski-scheme. Wright I 85 Tarski/Disquotation scheme/semantic definition of truth, disquotation: it is well known that it is incompatible with it, to accept a failure of bivalence (true/false). >Bivalence. E.g. if "P" is neither true nor false, then the assertion that "P" is true will be probably wrong and its biconditional probably incorrect. Disquotation scheme (DS): is the producer platitude for all other: thus correspondence, negation, distinction between truth and assertibility. >Correspondence, >Truth, >Assertibility, >Negation. It itself is neutral in terms of stability and absoluteness. Wright I 27ff Disquotation/Tarski/Wright: one does not need to understand the content. >Content, >Understanding. I 33 The disquotation scheme does not exclude that there will be a divergence in the extension: the aiming on an object with the property F does not need not be the aiming on a property with G - they only coincide normatively in relation to practice. >Practice, >Norms, >Language community, >Community, >Convention. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Reality | Sellars | I 5 Given/givenness/reality/Sellars: key point: that the empirical knowledge has its basis in a non-inferential knowledge of facts. (Non-inferentially: = immediately). Even when non-inferential knowledge is about facts, not about objects. It seems, therefore, that sensation cannot determine knowledge. >Facts, >Knowledge, >Sensation, >Objects, >Concepts/Sellars, >Psychological Nominalism, >Myth of the given. Rorty I 112 SellarsVs "myth of the given": we imagine incorrigibility simply as a function of social practice. Sellars: "It may turn out that there are no colored objects at all." RortyVs: this holistic statements sound senseless and paradox because the questioned accuracy requires a theory of privileged representations. Pro Sellars: Justification is not a function of special relations between ideas (or words) and objects, but a function of social practice. The justification of a conversation is, so to speak, holistic by nature. >Language community, >Holism. --- McDowell I 164 Given/Sellars: nothing is given what does not lie within the evolving system of beliefs. Myth: the supposedly rational reference of experiences on beliefs. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Relation-Theory | Schiffer | I 8 Relation Theory/Schiffer: "There is something that he believes" - can only be inferred with referential quantification (not with substitutional quantification) . Substitutional Quantification: is true if a substitution instance of "Elmer believes that S" is true. Referential Quantification: "..believes x" whereby an x must exist. Substitutional Quantification: allows no relation theory because the substitutional quantification is consistent with every representation of the logical form of substitution instances that make the quantification true. I 15 Relation Theory/Schiffer: Relation to sentences: Davidson (1969)(1): to the public language of the attributing. Carnap (1947)(2): to the public language of the believer. Loar: public language of the attributing, but the semantic attributes (which determine the content) are in the Tarski-style (non-public). -Then there is nothing about the role of expressions or use in population. >Language use, >Language community. Problem: then beliefs must be individuated by interpersonal functional states - that does not work with Tarski. >Truth definition/Tarski. 1. Donald Davidson (1969). "The individuation of events". In: In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Reidel. pp. 216-34 2. Rudolf carnap (1947). Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press --- I 70 SchifferVsPropositionalism/VsRelation Theory with proposition as an object: if true, the proposition would include as content either dog property itself (this does not work because of shmog) or way of givenness of it. Way of givenness: We have no clue what it should be. >Way of givenness. I 73 Relation Theory/Schiffer: here for representation (= sentences) in mentalese (instead of propositions). >Sentences, >Propositions. Meaning in mentalese determines meaning in public language, not vice versa. (+) >Mentalese (Laguage of thought), >Everyday language. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Relativism | Rorty | I 304 Relativism: The assertion that truth and reference are "relative to a conceptual system" sounds as if it said more. But that is not the case as long as our system of concepts simply stands for the things which we currently believe. >Convention, >Language community. II (b) 36 RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism". >HabermasVsFoucault, >Habermas, >Foucault. II (g) 152 Cultural relativism: is not relativistic as long as relativism amounts to the assertion that every moral view is as good as any other. >Cultural relativism. Rorty: our moral conception is much better than any competing view. It’s one thing to make the false assertion that there is no difference between us and the Nazis. A very different thing is to represent the correct assertion that there is no neutral common ground on which a Nazi and I can retreat to discuss. III 87 Schumpeter: "the insight that the validity of one’s own beliefs is only relative, and yet stand up for them fearlessly, distinguishes a civilized man from a barbarian". Isaiah Berlin: one must not ask for more. >Isaiah Berlin, >Joseph A. Schumpeter. IV 11 Relativism/cultural relativism/RortyVsPutnam: false solution: a transcultural point of view. - That would be just another God point of view: ideal truth as limiting concept. >Relativism/Putnam, >Truth/Putnam. V 20 Cultures have no axiomatic structures. The fact that they have institutionalized norms actually says the same thing as Foucault’s thesis: that knowledge and power can never be separated. If you do not believe in certain things at a certain place at a certain time, you probably have to atone for it. >Culture, >Norms. VI 74 Relativism/Realism/PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsRelativism/Rorty: both assume that one could simultaneously be both inside and outside language. VI 77f Fascism/relativism/truth/Sartre/Rorty: E.g. tomorrow, after my death, people can decide to introduce fascism - then fascism will be the human truth. RortyVsSartre: not the truth - the truth would have been forgotten. Putnam: Truth is a third instance between the camps. RortyVsPutnam: correctness instead of truth - namely, according to our standards. According to what other standards, the ones of the fascists?. >Norms/Rorty, >Correctness. VI 79 Justification of the standards/Rorty: from our self-improvement. VI 246 Cultural relativism/Rorty: I am of the opinion that our Western culture is more than others. But this kind of relativism is not irrationalism. One does not have to be an irrationalist if one abstains from making one’s own network of beliefs as coherent and transparent as possible. >Cultural Relativism, cf. >Western Rationalism. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Religious Belief | Durkheim | Habermas IV 73 Religious Belief/Durkheim/Habermas: Durkheim does not analyze religious belief and patriotism like G. GH. Mead, as out-of-the-ordinary attitudes of modern contemporaries, but as an expression of a collective consciousness deeply rooted in phylogenetic history, which is constitutive for the identity of groups. Habermas IV 74 HabermasVsDurkheim: Durkheim does not sufficiently distinguish between the commonality of ritual practice created by religious symbolism and a linguistically generated inter-subjectivity. >Language community, >Intersubjectivity. Habermas IV 83 Religious Belief/Durkheim/Habermas: Religious belief is always belief of a collective. It emerges from a practice that he interprets at the same time. Religious beliefs are already formulated linguistically, they are the common possession of a religious community, whose members assure themselves of their commonness in ritual actions.(1) Habermas IV 84 Durkheim/Habermas: religion is no longer presented in a positivist manner, in the manner of a theory that (...) represents society as a whole. Instead, there is now a dynamic view. Once ritual practice is recognized as the more original phenomenon, religious symbolism can be understood as a means for a special form of symbolically mediated interaction. This, the ritual practice, serves a communicative communion. >Religion, >Practise. 1. E. Durkheim, Les formes élementaires de la vie religieuse, Paris, 1968, German: Frankfurt 1981 p. 28. |
Durkheim I E. Durkheim The Rules of Sociological Method - French: Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, Paris 1895 German Edition: Die Regeln der soziologischen Methode Frankfurt/M. 1984 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Representation | Field | II 55 Representations/Field: if they were only related to public language, why then internal? - Solution: distinction type/token. - Question: why then referring to public language: because one can only speak with respect to types of tokens. >Type/Token, >Everyday language, >Observation language, cf. >Theory language. II 58 Representations: their syntax can be determined without regard to the meanings - if we have laws for body movements from wishes, etc. (narrow psychological theory). >Syntax, >Meaning, >Behavior, >Desire, >Explanation. II 58 Semantics/Representation: We can make truth superfluous: if we have 1. laws of beliefs from stimuli 2. laws for body movements from beliefs and desires. That would be the "narrow psychological theory": then we do not need to assume meanings in representation. II 59 But if representation should be true, it must be correlated with meanings. >Presentation. II 60 Representation without meaning: E.g. for all sentences S1 and S2 in a system: if a person believes [S1 > S2] and desires S2, then he also wants S1. Field: Meanings is not needed because the believed sentences can all be wrong. - E.g. Radical Interpretation: the native raises his rifle: a reason to believe that a rabbit is nearby - (even if he is deceived). >Gavagai, >Radical interpretation. II 61 Representation/semantics/psychology: for their psychological explanations, we do not need the semantic notions like "true" and "refers to", which usually sets sentences in relation to the world. Belief/truth: nothing compels me to assume of a person that she has believes that are true of rabbits. - ((s) It is enough when he lifts his rifle.) Truth (of internal representations): we only need this if we assume that they are reliable indicators about the world. - E.g. a child behaves guiltily - For example, if a mathematician believes in a theory, it is a reason for me to believe it, too. >Reliability. II 66 Language/representation/Schiffer: early: (Schiffer, 1972)(1): The meaning of a sentence can be explained only by the notions of believe and desire. For example, to know the meaning of "Caesar was egoistic," one must know that the proposition is conventionally correlated with believe that Caesar was egoistic. >Representation/Schiffer. Everything goes through inner representations and these can be explained without further reference to language. FieldVsSchiffer: the symbols in my representation system have gained their role by appropriation of e.g. a name in the public language. >Language use, >Language community. Animals/Field: although they are likely to have representations, meanings and therefore truth cannot be applied to them. >Animal language, >Animals. II 69 Representation/Field: one could also assume this as neither linguistic nor pictoral: E.g. "light bulb model" - that would be uninterpreted and could not explain behavior. II 77f Representation: representative terms can replace properties. - Most psychology can do without them. Advantages: Intentional terms are projective. E.g.: "He raised his rifle ...". - The truth conditions do not matter then. - The advantage of representations lies in the combination of explanation and predictions. >Truth conditions, >Predictions. II 94 Representation/StalnakerVsField: the basic relation is between words rather than between sentences or "morphemes". Not even between whole states. >Words, cf. >Word meaning. Field: that could be correct. II 154 Representation/truth conditions/translation: one can accept representation without translation and without truth conditions: solution: one accepts reactions to his believe and a corresponding threshold for his reaction. Crazy cases: e.g. the person believes that something quite different is represented . Solution: the role cannot be specified exactly, but the objective core is that there is a role. Explanation 2nd order: "sufficient similarity to our own representation" E.g. "Khrushchev blinked" as an explanation for Kennedy's action. Problem: our own representations are not objective. Deflationism: for it this is not a problem. >Deflationism. Truth conditions: we only need them if we do not know how the details of the explanation are. 1. Schiffer, St. 1972. Meaning. New York, NY, USA: Oxford, Clarendon Press |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Representation | Hacking | I 220 Hacking: thesis: the human is an illustrative nature. (A tribe without images is not a human tribe for me). I 223 Representation/Hacking: representation is something public. By this I do not mean that all representations can be touched. >Language use, >Language community, >Understanding, >Communication. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Rules | Wright | I 260f Rules only exist within a practice, which is maintained by the fact that the parties are in agreement. >Convention, >Community, >Language community. Rules/Wittgenstein/Wright: whatever Wittgenstein's dialectic exactly achieves it forces in any case some kind of restriction for a realistic idea of rules and meaning. >Realism. And therefore also for truth, because truth is a function of meaning. >Truth, >Meaning. Rule-following/Wright: shows that judgments about meanings and that what corresponds to these conditionally, are withdrawn from cognitive coercion. And then the same must also apply to claims about the truth of sentences. >Cognitive coercion, >Rule following. This intuitive reasoning is therefore not a trivial solipsism and the ghost of a global minimalism (Boghossian) is still among us. >Nonfactualism, >Minimalism/Wright. I 288 Rule-following/Wright: in the three other areas of discourse (without evidence transcendence as in mathematics) however, it appears that they are biased by considerations to rule consequences. These considerations may 1. prevent the formulation itself, and prevent that the problem appears solvable at all 2. discover misconceptions, presented jointly by the opponents, 3. affect the result from the outset in favor of minimalism. 4. Difficulty: how can we achieve the desired realism of objectivity, if our response to a problem will never be able to free itself from a dependence on skills and aptitudes to spontaneous reactions whose own state is drawn into doubt with respect to objectivity. >Objectivity. --- Rorty VI 55ff WrightVsDavidson: Cognitive bid, language, meaning, truth and knowledge would collapse if there is no offense in relation to what we call "addition". >Nonfactualism, >Cognitive coercion, >Quaddition, >Facts, >D. Davidson. --- II 225 Rules/Wright: not in the same language. >Metalanguage, >Object language. Exception: an expression of what someone understands when he understands "red": can be formulated in the same language. >Understanding. Chess: not from the inside/(s) otherwise learnable by observation - then never certain whether these are all rules, or if not in reality quite different rules. >Chess. Prevailing view/Wright: the prevailing view is that rules can be recognized from the inside out. WrightVs: that would demand that language use can be explained as an application of rules. - That excludes to see it at the same time as a game (as actually desired). II 226 Rules/vagueness/Wright: problem when applying predicates which should be guided by rules: then in the case of vagueness simultaneous application and non-application prescribed when overlapping. >Vagueness, >Predication, >Attribution. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Rylean Ancestors | Sellars | I 81ff Def Rylean ancestors/Sellars: language community with a primitive language, vocabulary for public properties of public objects, conjunction, disjunction, negation and quantification and especially the subjunctive conditional. Moreover, there is vagueness and openness. Intersubjectivity/SellarsVs: thesis: that an intersubjective language must be a Rylean language. >Intersubjectivity. Carnap: the resources for an intersubjective language can be known from the formal logic. SellarsVsCarnap. Sellars pro Ryle: thoughts are a short form for hypothetical and mixed categorical-hypothetical statements about behavior. >Terminology/Ryle. I 93 Def Rylean Language/Sellars: a behaviorist language that is limited to the non-theoretical vocabulary of a behaviorist psychology. - (s) So nothing unobservable). >Behaviorism. I 105f Rylean Language/Rylean ancestors/Sellars: actual declaration, new language - more than just code: conceptual framework of public objects in space and time. - Language of impressions: embodies the discovery that there are such things, but it is not specifically tailored to them. (Individual things have no antecedent objects of thought). Cf. >Thought objects. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Speaker Meaning | Loar | II 152 Speaker meaning/Loar: a) what speaker means, b) what language means in the community. - The intension (sentence meaning) determines which intentions the speaker can have. >Language community, >Intensions, >Intentions, cf. >Externalism. II 153 Definition referential qualifier/Loar: that what is connoted by the referential expressions. E.g. the cat that chased the mouse, that stole the cheese - with it the communicative intentions are within reach, which is formed by the meanings of the terms. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Stimuli | Rorty | I 192 Stimulus/Quine/Rorty: also stimuli are "Settlements" like all the rest according to Quine. I 250 Def Observation sentence/Quine: a sentence that all speakers judge in the same way when exposed to the same accompanying stimuli. A sentence that is not sensitive within a language community to differences in past experiences. >Obseration sentences, >Observation language, >Observation. RortyVsQuine: Quine excludes blind, insane, and occasional dissenters. (s)VsRorty: It is precisely Quine's view that makes it possible to identify deviance. This is not discrimination against otherness. Cf. the discrimination abilities of infants, which is lost after a few months: >Phonetics/Eimas.) VI 29 "Internal Representation"/Rorty: Representatives: Ruth Millikan, Fred Dretske, David Papineau. >Dretske, >Papineau. Biological interpretation. Evolution. >Searle. The ability of organisms to react differently to different stimuli. Rorty, Armstrong, Dennett, SellarsVs: Perceptions are not "experiences" or "raw sensations", but dispositions for the appropriation of convictions and desires. >Armstrong, >Dennett, >Wilfrid Sellars. VI 170 Reality/Rorty: a statement like "The theory is successful because it advances to something real" is as useless as Dennett's example "We laugh because of the merriment of the stimulus". |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| That-Clauses | Field | II 157 That-clause/Field: does not require a literal representation - e.g. "that snow is white" can be expressed in every language; it is speech-independent. Then a language (Ms) with ""p" means that p" is a special case of the language (M) with ""e" (whereby e is a subsentential expression and means, for example, "dog." That is, "<>" is a formal representation of our normal means of meaning attribution. ((s) the expression in tip brackets is our own.) Scheme characters: "p" and "e" here in relation to an individual, i.e. idiolect. >Idiolect, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. II 158 Then "that p as I understand it now" must not be a literal representation. Tip bracket: it cannot be shown that "metacompact" does not mean II 159 ...that it means the same as "rabbit" as I understand it in the actual moment. - ((s) In the actual world, in my idiolect). >Possible worlds, >Actual world, >Language community. II 160 Tip brackets: instead, for sentences, we can also assume that-clauses. II 171 Understanding: For example, if I do not understand "grug", I will not accept the following: "grug" means |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth Theory | Peacocke | II 162ff Truth theory/PeacockeVsDavidson/VsTarski: actually empirical - relativise a T-sentence to persons and times - a criterion of acceptance of a truth theory for arbitrary languages already presupposes a general concept of truth. >Truth, >Truth definition, >Language use, >Acceptability. Vice versa, we do not know which interpreted language the community uses, if we only know the truth conditions of the sentences. >Truth conditions, >Language community. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Twin Earth | Putnam | V 42 ff Twin Earth/mental state/Putnam: a twin earth has a different reference but not a significantly different mental state. >Mental state, >Belief state/Perry. Thesis: reference is not determined by individual mental states but by the overall mental state of all members of a language community. >Reference/Putnam, >Convention, >Externalism. The reference does not change with each new discovery. Discovery does not mean fixing the reference. >Discoveries, >Natural kinds. V 44 Twin Earth: reference is formed by the use of the local objects. Expert knowledge explains neither difference in meaning nor reference, e.g. a 3rd Twin Earth with even more extensively modified water but the same expert knowledge. --- I (h) 208 Twin Earth/Putnam: a twin earth does not change our water. It only shows that you cannot do concept analysis in an armchair. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Use Theory | Nagel | I 57 Nagel: the validity of thoughts does not depend on how they are used! >Use theory. Meaning/validity: Meaning as such is not validity. >Validity, >Thoughts, >Meaning. However, the practice of the community cannot be beaten by the objectivity: the language changes. >Language use, >Practise, >Community, >Language community, >Meaning change. This does not apply for the content of thoughts. - In contrast to the meaning of words! >Content, >Word meaning. I 61 The type of match characterizes the whole concept no more than the sensory perception through which one recognizes a physical object captures the whole concept of this detected object. (Versus use theory of meaning). Meaning is not simply the same as use, unless one understands "use" in a normative sense that already implies meaning. I 63 NagelVsUse theory: meaning is not simply the same as use, unless one understands "use" in a normative sense that already implies meaning |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Use Theory | Schiffer | I 187 Thinking/talking/meaning/use theory/Schiffer: language use in thinking is one thing, language use in speaking another - therefore, we need different theories. >Speaking, >Language use, >Thinking, >Language of thought. I 187 Use theory/reference/meaning/compositionality/Schiffer: new trend: (Putnam 1978)(1) thesis: we can have use theories of language comprehension (not the meaning) which do not require truth-theoretic semantics. - The theories of understanding and reference do not have so much to do with truth than most people think. Solution: if we start from the conceptual role (use) nothing is required by a "correspondence" of words and things. 1. Hilary Putnam (1978). Meaning and the Moral Sciences. Routledge I 260 Use/Use theory/Schiffer: no problem for simple signals: meaning = use. Problem: composite utterance type: s could mean p, even if never uttered. Solution/Schiffer: that is the reason why the practice should belong to language and not to the individual sentence. >Language use, >Situation semantics. Problem: we need an approach that requires no knowledge of the meaning in the community. - Otherwise everyone would have to understand every sentence. >Language community, >Understanding. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Words | Sapir | Lyons I 201 Word/Language/Culture/Discovery/Sapir/Lyons: Sapir tells us that illiterate native speakers were very well able to dictate sentences of their language word by word, and also to extract words from utterances and repeat them as units. >Sapir-Whorf thesis, >Words, >Word meaning, >Sentence meaning, >Language, >Language use, >Language community, >Language development. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analyticity | Quine Vs Analyticity | Danto I 239 QuineVsAnalyticity: we do not anticipate at which time we have to change the conditions under which we use a word. There is simply no clue. Lanz in Metz I 272 The lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and science are on one and the same continuum. McDowell I 158 QuineVsFirst Dogma: (distinction analytic/synthetic) against the notion that the truth of a synthetic sentence depended on two things: the meaning and the world. ((s) you cannot have meaning before you have the world). Quine, however, preserves duality: Apparently, the truth depends both on the language and on extra-linguistic facts. McDowell: Quine does not claim that these two factors do not exist, we simply cannot distinguish them sentence by sentence. Quine IV 407 QuineVsAnalyticity: reflects a failed notion of scientific theories and their reference to experience. There is no strict separation analytic/synthetic. "Roots of Reference": if you consistently proceed empirically, you gain an epistemologically harmless notion of analyticity. Analytic/Kant: does not even mention the meaning of concepts in this context! II 407/408 Analytic/Quine: Kant should rather have said that a statement is analytic if it is true because of meanings and regardless of of facts. This explicitly draws a connection between analyticity and meaning. QuineVsAnalyticity: considerable difficulties exist with sentences like: Ex "No bachelor is married", "cats are animals." Obviously, these are not logical truths, their negation would be no formal objection. (IV 410) Ex Quine: "I do not know whether the statement 'Everything green is extended' is analytic or not. This is not because of the ambiguity of "green" and "extended", but because of the ambiguity of "analytical". Artificial languages: semantic rules for determining analyticity are only interesting if we already understand analyticity. False notion: the idea that with the truth of a statement it is generally possible to distinguish between a linguistic and a fact component. The whole difficulty is perhaps only a symptom of a false notion of the relationship between language and the world. V 113 Logic/Frege/Carnap: the laws of logic apply because of language. I.e. its sentences are analytic. QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsFrege/QuineVsCarnap: the concept of meaning has not been given empirical meaning. Thus neither this linguistic theory of logic. Solution/Quine: through our observation of language learning: we learn truth functions by finding connections between dispositions. Alternation/Language Learning: the law that an alternation is implied by each of its components is learned with the word "or" itself. Something similar applies to the other laws. (>logical particles >logical constants). Analyticity/Analytical/Language Learning/Quine: Ex we learn "bachelor" by learning that our parents agreed under precisely the circumstances under which they agreed to "unmarried man". QuineVsAnalyticity: Important Argument: there are even disagreements about logical truths: Ex between classical logicians and intuitionists. Maybe we think that some truths are analytic and others are not? Law of the Excluded Middle/SaD/Language Learning/Quine: the law of the excluded middle rejected by intuitionism is not linked in such a way with learning "or"! It is rather due to the blind spot of alternation. Important Argument: perhaps the law of the excluded middle (Quine "law") which is true only in our point of view should only be seen as synthetic. V 116 Analytic/Analyticity/Quine: the analytic propositions are a subclass of stimulus analytic propositions agreeing to which is a disposition of any speaker of a language community. QuineVsCarnap: but even now we do not have such strict contrast to the synthetic propositions. Solution/Quine: Thesis: sentences that have been learned by many first are closer to analyticity than sentences that have only been learned by a few. The analytic propositions are those which are learned by all like that. These extreme cases, however, do not differ significantly from the neighboring ones. One cannot always specify which ones they are. >Two Dogmas/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Burge, T. | Davidson Vs Burge, T. | I (d) 74 Burge: Two types externalism: a) Social: Meaning depends on social practices (community - b) on the causal history of the person. DavidsonVsBurge: a) our intuition does not suggest that the meaning of a speaker is determined by other speakers. b) Which group should be outstanding? c) an unconscious elite in the background is problematic. Cf. >externalism, >internalism. Burge: in order to have a thought about water, you just have to be in contact with water, you don’t have to prove anything. DavidsonVsBurge: even a false thought about water is one about water. - VsBurge: Community not causally involved Burge: radiation patterns or physically described stimuli make everything infinitely complicated. DavidsonVs: Complicated for whom? It is us humans who make all these classifications and groupings! We group according to similarities that are obvious to ourselves. I (e) 116 DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsBurge: The fact that he focuses so strongly on the everyday situation through the triangulation sets him apart from the externalism of Putnam and Burge. Glüer II 53 DavidsonVsSocial character of meaning: even idiolect interpretable in principle (via causal hypotheses). Glüer II 167 Burge and Dummett think that what speakers mean by their words depended very much on how the community used those words. DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsBurge: Complete nonsense, because it has nothing to do with successful communication! If you speak differently than the community, and someone finds out, then you can communicate all day long. And that happens all the time. Frank I 665 Contents/Thoughts/Externalism/Burge/Davidson: Content is not determined by what is happening in the person, or by what is easily accessible for them through careful reflection. (E.g. incorrectly used terms, information gaps). DavidsonVsBurge: I’m not sure how these assertions are to be understood, because I’m not sure how serious talk of a "direct acquaintance" with a content is to be taken. But the first person authority is seriously compromised by that. Therefore, I must reject one of the premises of Burge. 1) I agree that content is not only determined or "fixed" by what is going on inside me. 2) VsBurge: Vs representation of the way in which social and other external factors control the contents. Fra I 665/666 DavidsonVsBurge: His characteristics are not as relevant as he makes them look: E.g. Suppose I believe that "arthritis" is only used for calcium-induced arthritis. My friend Arthur knows better. We both say honestly to Smith: "Carl has arthritis’. Burge: Then our words mean the same thing, we mean the same and express the same belief. My mistake is irrelevant for what I thought on this occasion. Reason: that’s what everyone (who is not tainted by philosophy) would say about Arthur and me. DavidsonVsBurge: I doubt that he is right, but even if he were right, it would not prove his point: Ordinary attributions of meanings and attitudes are based on far-reaching and vague assumptions about what speaker and listener have in common. If some assumptions are not confirmed, we can change the words we used often change drastically. We usually choose the easy way: we take a speaker by his word, even if that does not fully account for one aspect of his thought. E.g. if Smith informs a third party about what Arthur and I both believe about arthritis, then he may mislead its listeners! Fra I 667 If he is careful, he would add, "But Davidson thinks arthritis is calcium-induced". The fact that this addition is necessary shows that the simple attribution was not right. BurgeVs: could reply that the report is literally correct ((s) because also the wrong-believer sincerely believes that it is arthritis). DavidsonVsBurge: That overlooks the extent to which the contents of a belief depend on of the contents of other beliefs. Therefore, there can be no simple rigid rule for the attribution of a single thought. Burge: social determination of contents also leads to the fact that we usually mean what others mean in the community. "certain responsibility towards the group practice". DavidsonVsBurge: I do not deny it, but that does not show what is supposed to show: a) It is often reasonable to make people responsible for ensuring that they know the meaning of their words. But this has nothing to do with what they want to say! b) As a good citizens, we want to increase the opportunities for communication, but that only explains our "legalistic" attribution of meanings and beliefs. ((s) that the meanings are not so). c) A speaker who wants to be understood, must have the intention that his words are interpreted in a certain way, and consequently the way others do. And vice versa, the listener wants to interpret the words as the speaker does. This has moral weight, but it has no necessary connection with the determination of what anyone thinks. I 667/668 Externalism/Social community/Meaning/Meaning/DavidsonVsBurge: We are not forced to give the words of a person the meanings that they have in their language community. It is also not true that we cannot help but to interpret their propositional attitudes on the same basis. Donald Davidson (1987) : Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441 -4 58 Frank I 710 Self-knowledge/Burge: Error excluded (immune), because reflection in the same act. DavidsonVsBurge: that only shows that you cannot make a mistake in identifying the contents. It does not show why you cannot be wrong about the existence of the attitude. Worse: Burge cannot show that the two kinds of knowledge (1st and 2nd order) have the same subject. As long as the asymmetry is not explained by recourse to the social situation (relationships between the speakers), I doubt that a non-skeptical solution is possible. I 711 Representation/Perceptual knowledge/Burge: It cannot generally be wrong that the representations represent that from which they usually originate and to which they are applied. DavidsonVsBurge: I have long been of this view, but I do not understand why Burge is of this view. How do we decide where representations usually originate? Circular: "from what they represent." But which of the many possible causes is the right one? Incidents in the nervous system, stimulation patterns of nerve endings, or a little further out? (proximal/distal). Burge: We should be watch out for the relation of different observers: they have similar perceptions. Perception is "impersonal". DavidsonVsBurge: But that is exactly what should be proved! We need not only causal interaction between different observers and the same objects, but the right kind of causal interaction. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Burge, T. | Newen Vs Burge, T. | NS I 129 VsBurge/VsExternalism/Newen/Schrenk: if supervenience, i.e. a close relation between thoughts and brain states, exists, there cannot be an equally close relation between the thoughts and the community. This is because brain states (in contrast to thought content) are determined regardless of the surroundings and the language community. Namely with view to the activation of brain areas. Supervenience/Newen/Schrenk: no difference in content without difference in the brain states, but not vice versa: the same thought can be implemented through different brain states. I.e. one-sided dependence of thought content on the brain states. Terminology: then they say: thought contents supervene on brain states. Burge's thesis is inconsistent with supervenience. Or rather, the following three statements cannot be simultaneously true: 1) thought contents are determined depending on community and surroundings. 2) brain states independent from... 3) Thought contents supervene on brain states. NS I 130 But if thought contents do not supervene on brain states, it becomes difficult to understand how thought contents can be causally effective. VsBurge: E.g. Twin Earth/TE: if Karl was transported to Twin Earth without even noticing anything, he would have other thought contents. Because the objective content of expressions of thoughts would be different. But that would not cause any difference to the behavioral dispositions of Karl. The content change would be causally irrelevant. Externalism/Newen/Schrenk: Two varieties: 1) for the dependence of the content of statements from the surroundings (Putnam) 2) for the dependence of the thought contents from the surroundings (Burge). VsBurge: if he were to be right, we need a second concept of thought contents, namely a subjective content. (Narrow/Wide) narrow content: only considered in the way it is perceived by the subject. Only it is relevant for behavior explanations. Wide content: as the content is usually interpreted in the language community. It is decisive for what I have fixed myself on by utterances. Externalism: Frege: can there be a wide (objective) content of a thought so that you can understand the causal relevance of this entire content or is the causal relevance only to be understood for narrow (subjective) contents? |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Davidson, D. | Avramides Vs Davidson, D. | Avra I 119 Antireductionism/Avramidis: the anti-reductionist does not need to deny thought without language (Thw/oL). But at least one anti-reductionist makes this position incompatible with ontological asymmetry: Davidson: a conceptual symmetry between the semantic and the psychological involves an ontological symmetry. (compare Dav. 1984e and 1982). AvramidisVsDavidson: that does not work: Beliefs/Convictions/Davidson: is essential for all types of thinking. The system (of endlessly interlinked) beliefs identifies a thought by locating it in a logical and epistemic space. (94). ((s)> holism). Avramidis: with that he says that there can be no Thw/oL. 1) a being can only have a belief if it has a concept of belief, 2) a being can only have a concept of belief if it is part of a linguistic community. Davidson: more precisely: it does not need to have a concept of a particular belief, only a general one. In order to have a general concept of belief the being must be able to imagine what it is like to be wrong. (Dav 1984e, p. 157) I 120 That requires the idea of an objective public truth (to set up a context of interpretation). (Dav 1984e, p. 157). AvramidisVsDavidson: this can be can denied either by 1) arguing that one does not need the concept of belief to believe or 2) that being a member of a language community is not the only way to obtain the concept of belief. Detecting/Instantiation/Term/Davidson: because of the need of detecting the intersubjective truth we cannot instantiate the concept of belief without grasping itself and having it. I 122 AvramidisVsDavidson: there is a different way to be aware of the distinction subjective/objective I 123 a way which is also open to speechless beings (animals) (106): learning ability in animals. This applies to Bennett’s thesis. Bennett/Avramidis: the awareness of the distinction subjective/objective is sufficient for learning. (correcting things). To do that, speechless beings only have to be able to interact with their environment. VsDavidson; his strict requirement could be interpreted as anthropomorphism. DavidsonVsVs: it comes down to properties of certain concepts, not properties of people. (Dav 1982 S.319). Semantics/Psychology/Davidson: are interdependent. ((s) So no asymmetry but symmetry?). DavidsonVsontological asymmetry. Avramidis: for us, this is a rejection of conceptual asymmetry. (For Davidson as well). I 124 Davidson: rejection of the ontological asymmetry is a consequence of the rejection of conceptual asymmetry. AvramidisVsDavidson: it does not follow. (For the anti-reductionists). |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Externalism | Newen Vs Externalism | I 174 Natural Species/Putnam/Newen: E.g. water, oil, tiger: in doing so, we single out individual specimens, even if we I 175 are unaware of the essential conditions for the existence of the natural species. I 176 Meaning/Putnam: is therefore dependent on the surroundings. >Externalism. Externalism/Burge: Transfers Putnam's knowledge to the contents of beliefs. Twin Earth: shows that beliefs cannot be fully characterized by the internal states. Arthritis/Shmarthritis/Burge/Newen: Alfred's belief that he had arthritis in the thigh becomes a true statement when changing to a language community in which this is common. I 177 Point: in this, however, we still assume that the use is determined by experts. I.e. we still can make mistakes! We may use it correctly sometimes, even though we connect false beliefs with it! VsExternalism/Newen: Problem: Supervenience! E.g. 1) beliefs depend on the surroundings 2) brain states are independent of the surroundings 3) beliefs supervene on brain states. That is impossible, if some are dependent and the others are independent. I 178 It might so happen that different beliefs are present in the same brain states. VsExternalism/Knowledge/Belief/Newen: 2) argument VsExternalism: it is inconsistent with our self-knowledge. In general, we know what we believe. It might be, however, that the surroundings have such an influence that the content is changed. There are two positions a) incompatibility thesis: either the externalism or the everyday intuition is true b) compatibility thesis: both are compatible at the price that our everyday intuition is significantly attenuated. NS I 139 VsExternalism: simply saying that you need causal chains for successful reference is not enough. You must also say what kind they need to be. E.g. direct visual contact, hearsay, instrument monitoring, etc. E.g. phlogiston: it was believed to be responsible for combustion processes. Question: Why does "phlogiston" not refer to oxygen? Why did this reference not succeed? VsExternalism: Problem: it cannot give the following answer, because it brings out the thesis rejected by him: "Intention determines the extension". Externalism has to say that the theory is so fundamentally wrong that it is not satisfied by any substance. Therefore, "phlogiston" does not reference. VsExternalism: thus it cannot show how the causal chains are linked and owes us a theory of causal chains in general. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Rorty Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 191 Instrumentalism/RortyVsQuine: Quine's concept of science is still remarkably instrumentalist: I 192 "Stimuli" and "settlements". Nevertheless, Quine transcends both distinctions by acknowledging that stimuli of the sensory organs are "settlements" in equal measure as all the rest. >Instrumentalism. RortyVsQuine: But he is not quite able to dispense with the distinction between what is given and what is postulated. I 222 Reference/Rorty: if we can do without reference, then we can do without an ontology as well. Quine would agree to that. >Reference, >Ontology. I 223 Clarity/Quine: eliminate any ambiguities (indirect speech, propositional attitudes, etc.). RortyVsQuine: there's a catch: how do we know what "darkness" and "clarity" consist in? I 225 RortyVsQuine: if conventionality depends on a special indeterminacy of translation, we cannot - as Quine earlier - say that physical theory is a "conventional matter that is not dictated to us by reality." RortyVsQuine: Differences: 1) There is such a thing as an ontology. 2) No sentence has a special, independent epistemological status. 3) There is no such thing as direct acquaintance with sense-data or meaning. 4) Accordingly, epistemology and ontology do not touch at any point. 5) Nevertheless a distinction can be made between the parts of our opinion network, expressing the facts to those who do not. And ontology ensures that we are able to uncover this difference. RortyVsQuine: if Quine wanted to represent also (5) together with (1) to (4), he must give sense to the distinction between the "Actual" and the "Conventional". >Holism. I 226 Quine can only do this by picking out the elementary particles as the paradigmatic "Actual" and explaining that different opinions do not change the movement of the particles. RortyVsQuine: his decision for physics and against psychology is purely aesthetic. Moreover, it does not even work, since various biochemical theories will be compatible with the movement pattern of the same elementary particles. I 231 RortyVsQuine his conviction that symbolic logic would need to have some "ontological implications" repeatedly makes him make more of "the idea of the idea" than necessary. I 250 Def Observation Statement/Quine: a sentence about which all speakers judge in the same way if they are exposed to the same accompanying stimuli. A sentence that is not sensitive to differences in past experiences within a language community. RortyVsQuine: excludes blind, insane and occasional deviants. IV 24 RortyVsQuine: if we undermine the Platonic distinction between episteme and doxa with Kuhn, we also turn against the holism of Quine. We will no longer try to delineate "the whole of science" against "the whole of the culture". Rather all our beliefs and desires belong to the same Quinean network. VI 212 RortyVsQuine: the problems are not posed by dichotomies of being, but by cultural imperialists, by people like Quine and Fichte who suffer from monotheistic megalomania. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Saussure, F. de | Verschiedene Vs Saussure, F. de | Saussure I 66 VsSaussure: he has often been misinterpreted by his critics: functionalism without the participation of subjects. But this is not true, for Saussure it is always about the communication structure of at least two individuals. The step to structuring results from the needs of a language community. |
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| Stalnaker, R. | Lewis Vs Stalnaker, R. | Read III 101/102 Stalnaker equates the probability of the conditional clauses with the conditional probability. LewisVsStalnaker: there is no statement whose probability is measured by the conditional probability! (+ III 102) According to Lewis, based on Stalnaker's assumption, the odds of drawing cards are independent. But this is obviously wrong (as opposed to throwing dice). Thus, the probability of the conditional clause cannot be measured by the conditional probability. III 108 Example from Lewis If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian. and If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet wouldn't be Italian. Stalnaker: one or the other must be true. Lewis: both are wrong. (Because only subjunctive conditional sentences are not truth functional). The indicative pieces would be entirely acceptable to those who do not know their nationality. Lewis IV 149 Action/Rationality/Stalnaker: Propositions are the suitable objects of settings here. LewisVsStalnaker: it turns out that he actually needs a theory of attitudes de se. Stalnaker: the rationally acting is someone who accepts various possible rational futures. The function of the wish is simple to subdivide these different event progressions into the desired and the rejected ones. Or to provide an order or measure of alternative possibilities in terms of desirability. Belief/Stalnaker: its function is simple to determine which the relevant alternative situations may be, or to arrange them in terms of their probability under different conditions. Objects of attitude/Objects of belief/Stalnaker: are identical if and only if they are functionally equivalent, and they are only if they do not differ in any alternative possible situation. Lewis: if these alternative situations are always alternative possible worlds, as Stalnaker assumes, then this is indeed an argument for propositions. ((s) Differentiation Situation/Possible world). Situation/Possible world/Possibility/LewisVsStalnaker: I think there can also be alternatives within a single possible world! For example, Lingens now knows almost enough to identify himself. He's reduced his options to two: a) he's on the 6th floor of the Stanford Library, then he'll have to go downstairs, or b) he is in the basement of the Widener College library and must go upstairs. The books tell him that there is exactly one person with memory loss in each of these places. And he found out that he must be one of them. His consideration provides 8 possibilities: The eight cases are spread over only four types of worlds! For example, 1 and 3 do not belong to different worlds but are 3000 miles away in the same world. In order to distinguish these you need qualities again, ((s) the propositions apply equally to both memory artists.) V 145 Conditionals/Probability/Stalnaker: (1968)(1) Notation: ">" (pointed, not horseshoe!) Def Stalnaker Conditional: a conditional A > C is true if and only if the least possible change that makes A true, also makes C true. (Revision). Stalnaker: assumes that P(A > C) and P(C I A) are adjusted if A is positive. The sentences, which are true however under Stalnaker's conditions, are then exactly those that have positive probabilities under his hypothesis about probabilities of conditionals. LewisVsStalnaker: this is probably true mostly, but not in certain modal contexts, where different interpretations of a language evaluate the same sentences differently. V 148 Conditional/Stalnaker: to decide whether to believe a conditional: 1. add the antecedent to your set of beliefs, 2. make the necessary corrections for the consistency 3. decide if the consequence is true. Lewis: that's right for a Stalnaker conditional if the fake revision is done by mapping. V 148/149 LewisVsStalnaker: the passage suggests that one should pretend the kind of revision that would take place if the antecedens were actually added to the belief attitudes. But that is wrong: then conditionalisation was needed. Schwarz I 60 Counterpart/c.p./counterpart theory/c.p.th./counterpart relation/c.p.r./StalnakerVsLewis: if you allow almost arbitrary relations as counterpart relations anyway, you could not use qualitative relations. (Stalnaker 1987a)(2): then you can reconcile counterpart with Haecceitism: if you come across the fact that Lewis (x)(y)(x = y > N(x = y) is wrong, (Lewis pro contingent identity, see above) you can also determine that a thing always has only one counter part per world. Stalnaker/Schwarz: this is not possible with qualitative counterpart relations, since it is always conceivable that several things - for example in a completely symmetrical world - are exactly the same as a third thing in another possible world. LewisVsStalnaker: VsNon qualitative counter part relation: all truths including modal truths should be based on what things exist (in the real world and possible worlds) and what (qualitative) properties they have (>"mosaic": >Humean World). Schwarz I 62 Mathematics/Truthmaking/Fact/Lewis/Schwarz: as with possible worlds, there is no real information: for example, that 34 is the root of 1156, tells us nothing about the world. ((s) That it applies in every possible world. Rules are not truthmakers). Schwarz: For example, that there is no one who shaves those who do not shave themselves is analogously no information about the world. ((s) So not that the world is qualitatively structured). Schwarz: maybe we'll learn more about sentences here. But it is a contingent truth (!) that sentences like "there is someone who shaves those who do not shave themselves" are inconsistent. Solution/Schwarz: the sentence could have meant something else and thus be consistent. Schwarz I 63 Seemingly analytical truth/Lewis/Schwarz: e.g. what do we learn when we learn that ophthalmologists are eye specialists? We already knew that ophthalmologists are ophthalmologists. We have experienced a contingent semantic fact. Modal logic/Modality/Modal knowledge/Stalnaker/Schwarz: Thesis: Modal knowledge could always be understood as semantic knowledge. For example, when we ask if cats are necessary animals, we ask how the terms "cat" and "animal" are to be used. (Stalnaker 1991(3),1996(4), Lewis 1986e(5):36). Knowledge/SchwarzVsStalnaker: that's not enough: to acquire contingent information, you always have to examine the world. (Contingent/Schwarz: empirical, non-semantic knowledge). Modal Truth/Schwarz: the joke about logical, mathematical and modal truths is that they can be known without contact with the world. Here we do not acquire any information. ((s) >making true: no empirical fact "in the world" makes that 2+2 = 4; Cf. >Nonfactualism; >Truthmakers). Schwarz I 207 "Secondary truth conditions"/truth conditions/tr.cond./semantic value/Lewis/Schwarz: contributing to the confusion is that the simple (see above, context-dependent, ((s) "indexical") and variable functions of worlds on truth values are often not only called "semantic values" but also as truth conditions. Important: these truth conditions (tr.cond.) must be distinguished from the normal truth conditions. Lewis: use truth conditions like this. 1986e(5),42 48: for primary, 1969(6), Chapter V: for secondary). Def Primary truth conditions/Schwarz: the conditions under which the sentence should be pronounced according to the conventions of the respective language community. Truth Conditions/Lewis/Schwarz: are the link between language use and formal semantics, their purpose is the purpose of grammar. Note: Def Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, i.e. by using world parameters for the world of the respective situation (correspondingly as time parameter the point of time of the situation etc.). Def "diagonal proposition"/Terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(7)): primary truth conditions Def horizontal proposition/Lewis: secondary truth condition (1980a(8),38, 1994b(9),296f). Newer terminology: Def A-Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for primary truth conditions Def C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for secondary truth conditions Def A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Propsition/Terminology/Schwarz: correspondingly. (Jackson 1998a(10),2004(11), Lewis 2002b(12),Chalmers 1996b(13), 56,65) Def meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(14),173): secondary truth conditions. Def meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intention". Schwarz: Problem: this means very different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization like Stalnaker's diagonal proposition. Not even about a priori implication as with Chalmer's primary propositions. Schwarz I 227 A posteriori necessity/Metaphysics/Lewis/Schwarz: normal cases are not cases of strong necessity. One can find out for example that Blair is premier or e.g. evening star = morning star. LewisVsInwagen/LewisVsStalnaker: there are no other cases (which cannot be empirically determined). LewisVs Strong Need: has no place in its modal logic. LewisVs telescope theory: possible worlds are not like distant planets where you can find out which ones exist. 1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1968]: “A Theory of Conditionals”. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112 2.Robert C. Stalnaker [1987a]: “Counterparts and Identity”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 121–140. In [Stalnaker 2003] 3. Robert C. Stalnaker [1991]: “The Problem of Logical Omniscience I”. Synthese, 89. In [Stalnaker 1999a] 4. Robert C. Stalnaker — [1996]: “On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be”. In Adam Morton und Stephen P. Stich (Hg.) Benacerraf and his Critics, Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell. In [Stalnaker 2003] 5. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 6. David Lewis[1969a]: Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press 7. Robert C. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 8. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 9. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a] 10. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 11. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 12. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 13. David Chalmers [1996b]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press 14. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Supervaluation | Quine Vs Supervaluation | Field II IX Supervaluation/Semantics/Lewis/Fine/Field: (Lewis 1970a), (Kit Fine 1975): both propagate supervaluationist semantics for vague languages. Field: both are right: indeterminacy is not a big problem for the correspondence theory. Indeterminacy: seems to be a bigger problem for deflationism at first. Because it does not seem clear how indeterminacy can be solved within their own language. Quine/Field: had a big problem with that (see section 7). SomeVsQuine: Indeterminacy within their own language would simply be incoherent. II 24 Propositional Conditions/Truth/T-Theory/Quine: (1953b, p 138) Propositional conditions are all it takes to make the term "true" clear. (Field ditto). Reference/Field: then we may wonder why we ever need causal theories of reference? "Denoted" and "true" become sufficiently clear through scheme (T). If we want more to pin language to reality, we overlook that we are on Neurath's ship! Quine/Field: has hinted at something like that in § 6 of W + O (Quine 1960). FieldVsQuine: but that is not due to the inscrutability of reference, to the under-determinacy of theories or to the ontological relativity. In a T theory or a theory of primitive reference we try to explain a connection between language and the world. We do not try to put ourselves outside of theories. Reference/Field: here, psychological and neurophysiological models will be important. Conceptual Scheme/Field: but we do not need to stick our conceptual scheme to the outside of reality, but without access via psychological models our conceptual scheme collapses from the inside. According to our theory, it would be extremely unlikely in any case that there should be non-physical connections between the word and the world. II 63 Synonymy/Quine/Field: intralinguistic synonymy is much easier than inter-linguistic. Quine e.g. Everest/Gaurisankar/Field: (1960, W + O, § 9, 11): (designed as a one-word sentences): here, the fact that the stimulus is different was to make the speaker prefer one over the other. The different meaning is revealed by the fact that the sentences are not intra-subjectively synonymous for most members of the language community. FieldVsQuine: "consent initiative" is too behavioristic. That causes Quine to unnecessary concern about the second intention. Second Intention/Quine/Field: verbal stimulation as e.g. "Agree to one-word sentences beginning with "E" or I'll beat the brains out of you." (W + O § 48-9). Field: nevertheless Quine's argumentation seems to be generally correct: we can explain intra-linguistic differences by evidence considerations. Advantage: that explains meaning differences where they are suspected, but without referring to possible worlds. |
Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Meaning | Loar, B. | EMD II 150 Meaning / language / Loar: should always be relativized to a language community. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Twin Earth | Quine, W.V.O. | V 42ff Twin Earth / mental state / Putnam: different reference but not essentially different mind states - reference is not determined by individual mind states - but by the mental overall state of all members of the language community. |
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