Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mimicry | Dawkins | I 68 Mimicry/Dawkins: Does not know any intermediates: every representative (of an itermediate state) would be eaten immediately. I 69 Question: How can a single gene be responsible for all the various aspects of mimicry - color, shape, spots, flight rhythm? Answer: A single gene in the sense of a Cistron certainly not. An entire gene group can behave like a single gene! It has an "allele" which in reality is a different gene group. |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adaptionism | Dennett Vs Adaptionism | I 382 DennettVsAdaptionism / mimicry: there is a temptation to say, when the forest floor looked different, the butterfly had a different color. But that is not justified. It does not have to be true too! (Dennett otherwise pro) The Adaptionist would ask: why do all the doors in this village have the hinges on the left? Answer: there is no reason for it, it s just a historical accident. (Dennett pro). Theory /Dennett: adaptionism and mentalism are not theories in the traditional sense! They are attitudes and strategies to organize data to explain relationships and nature to ask questions. Münch III 375ff DennettVsAdaptionism: is in danger to construe the entire building out of nothing, like mentalism does. III 376 Pangloss/Dennett: you can use this position to open up the completeness of a list of conditions. DobzhanskyVsAdaptionism: 1956 (in the spirit of Gould and Lewontin): The usefulness of a feature cannot be taken for granted. CainVsDobzhansky: 1964. Also, the uselessness cannot be taken for granted. III 379 Explanation/DennettVsPutnam: an explanation on a micro-physical level is not inconsistent with an explanation on rational grounds. Adaptionism/Dennett: the more complex the condition, the less likely appears the rational reason. But the truth of a non-adaptionist story does not require the falsehood of all adaptationist stories. We should accept Pangloss’ assumption. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Armstrong, D. | Verschiedene Vs Armstrong, D. | Arm III 90 Natural Laws/universalities/Armstrong: the state, the law N(F,G) is a two-digit U, i.e. a relation between states. Pavel TichyVsArmstrong: N(F,G) cannot be a two-digit attribute and a () digit attribute (its expression for states) at the same time. ArmstrongVsVs: why not be a two-digit attribute and a state at the same time? Certainly not a two-digit and zero-digit attribute at the same time (same level). A zero-digit attribute would be a second order universal, a second order state. Wright I 176 Disposition/JohnstonVsArmstrong: the simple conditional formulation of dispositional properties fails because it does not take seriously enough that essential properties are attributed here. Problem cases: Change, mimicry, masking. (So ceteris paribus condition) E.g. Masking: an angel prevents the falling object from breaking, E.g. Strong current deflects the compass needle I 177 Mimicry: even if an object is not subject to disposition, additional conditions may nevertheless occur: For example, although the spark plug is defective, a random gas mixture provides the ignition. WrightVs: these are nice considerations, which certainly correspond to our intuitive thinking. But can we expect them to be developed with sufficient precision? ((s) To replace the expected disposition). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| |||