Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Communitarianism | Barber | Brocker I 690 Communitarianism/Barber: Barber is not considered communitarian by all authors, but he does represent the typical topoi of communitarian politics: - rejection of a political philosophy based on abstract principles ((s) CommunitarianismVsKant), - the accusation of the separation of the individual from social ties ("atomism") and - dissatisfaction with a purely instrumental view of political institutions. BarberVsCommunitarianism: in contrast to the chief theorists of communitarianism, Barber participated in the communitarian reform movement around Amitai Etzioni. Variants of communitarianism: a) substantialistic: here the community is seen as a given, against it: b) procedural: this is about the common practice of counselling and decision-making. Barber is to be attributed to the latter variant. (1)(2) BarberVsMacIntyre, BarberVsWalzer, BarberVsTaylor: Considering theorists like Michael Walzer, Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor as sceptics of a national policy of democratic society and as supporters of a civil society perspective (3), Barber's programme of a strong democracy had to appear as a quite radical and reasonable position because it ultimately gave a high rank to the national political community and participation in political decisions. (BarberVsTaylor, BarberVsWalzer, BarberVsMacIntyre). >A. MacIntyre, >M. Walzer, >Ch. Taylor. 1. Hartmut Rosa, „Fremde zu Nachbarn: die Vision einer demokratischen Bürgerschaft. Rezension zu Benjamin Barber, „Starke Demokratie“, in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 43/6, 1995 S. 1066-169. 2. W. Jay Reedy, „The relevance of Rousseau to Contemporary Communitarism. The Example of Benjamin Barber”, in: Philosophy and Social Criticism 21/2, 1995 3. Michael Haus, Kommunitarismus. Einführung und Analyse, Wiesbaden 2003 Michael Haus, „Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolBarb I Benjamin Barber The Truth of Power. Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House New York 2001 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Democracy | Johnson | Morozov I 107 Democracy/Politics/Steven Johnson/Morozov: Steven Johnson celebrates in his Future Perfect(1) the advantages of switching to what he calls "liquid democracy": In a traditional democracy, citizens elect representatives to legislate on their behalf; in a liquid democracy, citizens do not have to vote for representatives - they can simply transfer their votes to those who, in their opinion, know better about the issue. I 108 Morozov: the idea is not new. Lewis Carroll already suggested something similar.(2) MorozovVsJohnson: this does not take into account the fact that the legislative process also includes discussion, negotiations, compromises and reflection. I 109 The model of Johnson and Miller (3) assumes that politics is only a kind of referendum. But such referendums only paralyze democracy (4). I 110 MorozovVsJohnson: he seems to think, just as we ask our friends where best to eat, we would do the same with political decisions. How strange! 1. St. Johnson, Future Perfect: The Case for Progress in a Networked Age (New York: Penguin, 2012), 170 2. Lewis Carroll, The Principles of Parliamentary Representation (London: Harrison and Sons, 1884). 3. James C. Miller, “A Program for Direct and Proxy Voting in the Legislative Process,” Public Choice 7, no. 1 (1969): 107– 113. 4. see Yannis Papadopoulos, “Analysis of Functions and Dysfunctions of Direct Democracy: Top-Down and Bottom-Up Perspectives,” Politics & Society 23 (December 1995): 421– 448. |
JohnsonSt I Steven Johnson Future Perfect: The Case For Progress In A Networked Age New York 2012 Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Democracy | Pettit | Brocker I 856 Democracy/Pettit: Pettit thesis: Democracy is more to be understood as "contestatory" ((s) competitive) than as "consensual" ((s) being in accordance with).(1) This means that all political decisions, in particular decisions on state directives and state regulation, must be justified by a critical public and must in principle be considered contestable. Procedure: According to Pettit, the basis for this should be laid in a "deliberative republic" ((s) advisory republic). (2) The aim is always to make the arguments of others heard. Democracy thus has an "inclusive" effect with regard to minorities. >Deliberative Democracy. PettitVsPettit: his later work "Just Freedom", however, contains statements that take back this deliberative dynamic of democracy and emphasize that above all the prevention of state coercive power marks the core of the republican understanding of democracy.(3) >Republic, >Republicanism. So it is less about civil disputes and more about consensus on the assessment of state intervention rights. See State/Pettit. 1. Philip Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford 1997, p. 185 2. Ibid. p. 187 3. Philip Pettit 2015, Gerechte Freiheit. Ein moralischer Kompass für eine komplexe Welt, Berlin 2015. p. 157, vgl. Pettit On the People’s Terms. A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy, Cambridge 2012, p. 22. Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Democracy | Posner | Surowiecki I 331 Democracy/Richard Posner/Surowiecki: Posner turns against the civil assemblies called to life by James S. Fishkin, among others, at which a representative cross-section of all social classes come together to discuss political issues: PosnerVsFishkin: "Citizens have little taste in abstraction, little time and even less inclination to spend a considerable part of their free time training themselves to be informed and responsible voters". And further: "It is much more difficult to get a solid idea of what is necessary for the whole society than to be aware of one's own interests".(1) >S. Fishkin, >Deliberative Democracy, >Democracy. Democracy/Surowiecki: the dispute between Posner and Fishkin is about the question of what we mean by democracy at all: do we have a democracy, because it... a) gives people a feeling of being involved in everything and being able to determine their own lives, I 332 ...and that is why it contributes to political stability? Or b) because citizens have the right to govern themselves, even if they use this right in a ridiculous way? Or c) Because democracy is an excellent instrument for making intelligent decisions and discovering the truth? >Decisions, >Political decisions. 1. Richard Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2003), S. 131 f., 164. |
LawPosn I Richard A. Posner Economic Analysis of Law, Ninth Edition New York 2014 Surowi I James Surowiecki Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005 |
| Democracy | Schumpeter | Brocker I 260 Democracy/Schumpeter: For Schumpeter, the defining feature of democracy consists in placing a "competition for political leadership" (1) at the centre of attention. The core idea is: similar to the way companies compete for the favour of consumers, Brocker I 261 politicians and parties are in competition for the favour of voters (2) - with the important difference that people are usually well informed in economic matters, but usually rationally ignorant in political matters (3). What both systems have in common is the striving for one's own individual advantage. Thesis: Modern democracy is a product of the capitalist process (4); however, two important prerequisites for the functioning of democracy in contemporary capitalism are no longer fulfilled: a) the ideal of the economical state (5) b) the basic social consensus.(6) Because of the expectation of large parts of the electorate to live at the expense of the state.(7) >Free riders, >State, >Economy, >Society. 1. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York 1942. Dt.: Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie, Tübingen/Basel 2005 (zuerst: Bern 1946), p. 427. 2. Ibid p. 427-433 3. Ibid p. 407 – 420. 4. Ibid p. 471. 5. Ibid p.. 471f. 6. Ibid p. 473. 7. Ibid p. 472. Ingo Pies, „Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie (1942)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. Gaus I 148 Democracy/Schumpeter/Dryzek: The model of democracy most popular among comparative politics scholars, especially those in the burgeoning field of democratic transition and consolidation, expects far less from democracy than do the deliberative democrats. >Deliberative democracy This model is essentially that proposed long ago by Schumpeter (1942)(1): democracy is no more than competition among elites for popular approval that confers the right to rule. In the 1950s this idea became the foundation for 'empirical' theories of democracy happy with the generally apathetic role of the ignorant and potentially authoritarian masses (Berelson, 1952(2); Sartori, 1962(3)). Competition models of democracy: Such competitive elitist models have Gaus I 149 long been discredited among democratic theorists - not least those such as Dahl (1989)(4) who had earlier believed in them as both accurate descriptions of United States politics and desirable states of affairs. Yet they live on among transitologists and consolidologists, who see the hallmark of a consolidated democracy as a set of well-behaved parties representing material interests engaged in electoral competition regulated by constitutional rules (see, for example, Di Palma, 1990(5); Huntington, 1991(6); Mueller, 1996(7); Schedler, 1998(8)). The deliberative democrat's concern with authenticity is nowhere to be seen. Active citizens play no role in such models. 1. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1942) Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper. 2. Berelson, Bernard (1952) 'Democratic theory and public opinion'. Public Opinion Quarterly, 16: 313—30. 3. Sartori, Giovanni (1962) Democratic Theory. Detroit: Wayne State Umversity Press. 4. Dahl, Robert A. (1989) Democracy and its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 5. Di Palma, Giuseppe (1990) To Craft Democracies. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 6. Huntington, Samuel (1991) The Third Wave. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. 7. Mueller, John (1996) 'Democracy, capitalism and the end of transition'. In Michael Mandelbaum, ed. Postcommunism: Four Perspectives. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 8. Schedler, A. (1998) 'What is democratic consolidation?' Journal of Democracy, 9: 91-107. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications Sobel I 28 Democracy/Schumpeter/Sobel/Clemens: „Nothing is easier than to compile an impressive list offailures of the democratic method, especially if we include not only cases in which there was actual breakdown or national discomfiture but also those in which, though the nation led a healthy and prosperous life, the performance in the political sector was clearly substandard relative to the performance in others.“ Joseph A. Schumpeter (1942), Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy(1): 289. Sobel/Clemens: Joseph Schumpeter is largely known for his seminal contributions to our understanding of the role of entrepreneurs, innovation, and creative destruction in economic growth and development. >Business cycle/Schumpeter, >Innovation/Schumpeter, >Competition/Schumpeter, >Creative destruction/Schumpeter, >Entrepreneurship/Schumpeter. However, Schumpeter's economic insights extend far beyond just his most well-known work on innovation. Another area where Schumpeter was well ahead of the economics profession and provided real insights is the nature of politics and the democratic process of collective decision making. The economic analysis of the process of politics and collective decision making is the focus of a modern field of economics known as public choice. While Schumpeter wrote prior to the formal origins of this field in economics, early scholars such as Anthony Downs did cite and attribute some of his ideas to Schumpeter's writings in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (CSD)(1).* >Government policy/Schumpeter. Democracy: Schumpeter understood that democracy was merely an alternative process for producing social and economic outcomes, and "it would not necessarily follow that the political decisions produced by that process from the raw material of those individual volitions would represent anything that could in any convincing sense be called the will of the people" (CSD(1): 254). Regarding the idea that government pursues some common good, Schumpeter argues: „There is, first, no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all People could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument. This is due not primarily to the fact that some people may want things other than the common good but to the much more fundamental fact that to different individuals and groups the common good is bound to mean different things ... as a consequence ... the particular concept of the will of the people ... vanishes into thin air.“ (CSD(1): 251-252) Sobel/Clemens: Schumpeter recognized that to understand democratic outcomes one must look to understand the motivations and different desires of the individuals involved in the process, be they the voters, elected politicians, or administrators and bureaucrats running government agencies. That is, to understand democratic outcomes one must understand the role of what he termed "Human Nature in Politics". Thus, Schumpeter shared a common insight with the founders of the field of public choice, such as Nobel Laureate James Buchanan, who recognized that just because individuals step into the public sphere, they do not suddenly start acting for the common good - instead they continue to be self-interested actors concerned with their own goals and desires. >James M. Buchanan. Democracy/Schumpeter: According to Schumpeter, democracy is best understood as follows: "it may be put into the nutshell of a definition ... the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people's vote." (CSD(1): 269). According to Schumpeter, as far as there are genuine group-wise volitions ... we are now able to insert them in exactly the role they actually play…called to life by some political leader who turns them into political factors …by working them up and by including eventually appropriate items in his competitive offering ... The incessant competitive struggle to get into offce or to Stay in it imparts to every consideration of policies and measures the bias so admirably expressed by the phrase about "dealing in votes". (CSD(1): 270, 287). * In The Economic Theory of Democracy, Downs writes: "Schumpeter's profound analysis of democracy forms the inspiration and foundation for our whole thesis, and our debt and gratitude to him are great indeed" (1957(2):29). 1. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy [CSD]. Harper & Brothers. 2. Downs, Anthony (1957). The Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper & Row. |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Sobel I Russell S. Sobel Jason Clemens The Essential Joseph Schumpeter Vancouver 2020 |
| Economics | Buchanan | Boudreaux I 79 Economics/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: In one of his earlier papers, “Economics, Welfare, and Political Economy,” published in 1959, Buchanan identified two distinct yet related roles that the economist can legitimately play. The first is that of the “economist” as such; the second is that of the “political economist.” The sole role of the economist per se is to improve humankind’s understanding of the workings of the economy, including how economic activity is likely to be altered when changes in the economic environment occur. Boudreaux I 80 Politics: These might be policy changes, such as changes in tax rates or new regulations, but these might instead be changes in other factors, such as adverse weather that cuts crop yields. Economists pursue this goal through research and analyses that permit them to make predictions about the effects of such changes in the economic environment. Political economics: In contrast, when the economist steps into the role of political economist, the reason for doing so is to help citizens choose better rules under which they live. Nevertheless, like the economist, the political economist’s task is not to impose his or her own values or preferences on others. Political decisions: It is not the job of either the economist or the political economist to recommend, much less insist upon, this policy or that. Such a role, Buchanan believed, is reserved for individuals only in their capacity as citizens. The political economist’s function is merely to propose changes in rules and institutions to which individual citizens can either agree or disagree - accept or reject. Ideally, in Buchanan’s view, agreement would require unanimity, or something very close to it. Politics as exchange: if all, or nearly all, people must agree to a change in rules, then any proposed rule change that is approved by such a vote can confidently be assumed to be one that is truly socially beneficial rather than one that benefits some individuals at the expense of others. >Agreement/Buchanan. That is the essence of the idea of politics as exchange. likely to be altered when changes in the economic environment occur. These might be policy changes, such as changes in tax rates or new regulations, but these might instead be changes in other factors, such as adverse weather that cuts crop yields. Economists pursue this goal through research and analyses that permit them to make predictions about the effects of such changes in the economic environment. Political economics: In contrast, when the economist steps into the role of political economist, the reason for doing so is to help citizens choose better rules under which they live. Nevertheless, like the economist, the political economist’s task is not to impose his or her own values or preferences on others. It is not the job of either the economist or the political economist to recommend, much less insist upon, this policy or that. Such a role, Buchanan believed, is reserved for individuals only in their capacity as citizens. The political economist’s function is merely to propose changes in rules and institutions to which individual citizens can either agree or disagree - accept or reject. Ideally, in Buchanan’s view, agreement would require unanimity, or something very close to it. If all, or nearly all, people must agree to a change in rules, then any proposed rule change that is approved by such a vote can confidently be assumed to be one that is truly socially beneficial rather than one that benefits some individuals at the expense of others. That is the essence of the idea of politics as exchange. >Social Contract/Buchanan, >Society/Buchanan. Boudreaux I 96 Economics/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: Def Economics/Samuelson: „Economics is the study of how men and society end up choosing, with or without the use of money, to employ scarce productive resources that could have alternative uses, to produce various commodities and distribute them for consumption, now or in the future, among various people and groups in society” (Samuelson, 1973)(2). Def Economics/Robbins: “Economics is a science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses” (Robbins, 1932)(3). BuchananVsSamuelson/BuchananVsRobbins: Buchanan saw two problems with this approach to economics. 1) The first problem is that in the twentieth century economists came to assume that each individual has a set of preferences, what economists call a “utility function,” that is fixed and fully known to him or her. Choices: But, Buchanan noted, if this assumption accurately describes reality, then individuals would not truly choose. If you know with 100 percent certainty that eating the peach will give you greater satisfaction than eating the pear, “choosing” the peach over the pear is a purely mechanical act. Popular language recognizes this fact with the phrase, “It’s not much of a choice,” as in, for example, saying “It’s not much of a choice” when confronted with the “choice” to pay $5 for a glass of beer or $6 for that same glass of beer. For Buchanan, the act of human choice necessarily involves some uncertainty about the merits of one option over another. As he concluded: “If I know what I want, a computer can make all of my choices for me. If I do not know what I want, no possible computer can derive my utility function since it does not really exist” (Buchanan, 1964(4): 217). Buchanan emphasized the open-endedness of choice even further by insisting that human preferences do not exist independently of the very choices that individuals make. >Rational Choice/Buchanan. Boudreaux I 97 2) A second problem with the standard textbook approach to economics is more serious. It judges how well or poorly resources are being used as if society itself is a sentient creature with its own preferences. That is, economists treat society as an individual with preferences, and then they ask if society uses (“allocates”) its resources in ways that best satisfy its preferences. >Society/Buchanan, >Agreement/Buchanan, >Decision-making/Buchanan, >Unamity/Buchanan. 1. James M. Buchanan. (1959). “ Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy ” The Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 2 (Oct., 1959), pp. 124-138. 2. Samuelson, Paul A. (1973). Economics, 9th ed. McGraw-Hill. Smith, Adam. (1776/1937). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Modern Library Edition. 3. Robbins, Lionel (1932). The Nature and Significance of Economic Science. Macmillan. 4. Buchanan, James M. (1964). “What Should Economists Do?” Sothern Economic Journal (January). |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 |
| Government Policy | Schumpeter | Sobel I 28 Government policy/Schumpeter/Sobel/Clemens: Schumpeter's ideas about the functioning of government were likely informed by his first-hand experience as the minister of finance of Austria. At the time, and even today, much of the economic analysis of government intervention relied on a set ofimplicit (sometimes explicit) assumptions about the actors in the political sphere - that they are selfless, benevolent, leaders and bureaucrats worried only about the public interest, untouched by influence from interest groups. Indeed, much of the interventionist approach to macroeconomic policy championed by John Maynard Keynes implicitly relies on the wise actions of benevolent government actors who selflessly worry about the common good. SchumpeterVsKeynes: Schumpeter knew from his own experience that these assumptions were incorrect. >John Maynard Keynes, >Keynesianism. Democracy: Schumpeter understood that democracy was merely an alternative process for producing social and economic outcomes, and "it would not necessarily follow that the political decisions produced by that process from the raw material of those individual volitions would represent anything that could in any convincing sense be called the will of the people" (CSD(1): 254). Regarding the idea that government pursues some common good, Schumpeter argues: „There is, first, no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all People could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument. This is due not primarily to the fact that some people may want things other than the common good but to the much more fundamental fact that to different individuals and groups the common good is bound to mean different things ... as a consequence ... the particular concept of the will of the people ... vanishes into thin air.“ (CSD(1): 251-252) Sobel/Clemens: Schumpeter recognized that to understand democratic outcomes one must look to understand the motivations and different desires of the individuals involved in the process, be they the voters, elected politicians, or administrators and bureaucrats running government agencies. That is, to understand democratic outcomes one must understand the role of what he termed "Human Nature in Politics". Thus, Schumpeter shared a common insight With the founders of the field of public choice, such as Nobel Laureate James Buchanan, who recognized that just because individuals step into the public sphere, they do not suddenly start acting for the common good - instead they continue to be self-interested actors concerned With their own goals and desires. >James M. Buchanan, >Public Choice Theory, >Public Choice. Democracy/Schumpeter: According to Schumpeter, democracy is best understood as follows: "it may be put into the nutshell of a definition ... the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people's vote" (CSD(1): 269). According to Schumpeter, as far as there are genuine group-wise volitions ... we are now able to insert them in exactly the role they actually play … called to life by some political leader who turns them into political factors ... by working them up and by including eventually appropriate items in his competitive offering ... The incessant competitive struggle to get into offce or to Stay in it imparts to every consideration of policies and measures the bias so admirably expressed by the phrase about "dealing in votes". (CSD(1): 270, 287). |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Sobel I Russell S. Sobel Jason Clemens The Essential Joseph Schumpeter Vancouver 2020 |
| Interest | Surowiecki | I 341 Interests/Politics/Surowiecki: in the case of conflicting political decisions, where every actor claims to be acting in the public interest, it is impossible to prove that either or both of them have acted against the public interest. >Method, >Proofs, >Provability. I 342 Problem: political decisions in a democracy do not pose cognition problems, so we cannot expect them to be accessible to the wisdom of the masses. Cf. >Collective intelligence, >Democracy. Nevertheless, answers to cooperation and coordination tasks represent real solutions in the sense that they work on the whole. They are not dictated from above, they come from below. >Cooperation. |
Surowi I James Surowiecki Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005 |
| Liberty | Pettit | Brocker I 851 Liberty/PettitVsLiberalism/Pettit: Pettit criticizes the liberal fixation on a "negative freedom": this is all too one-sidedly aimed at maintaining the distance between the individual and the state. Here there are two shortcomings: a) The necessary protective functions of the state for the free self-development of the individual and b) to recognize and appreciate the benefits of the participation of individuals in political decisions. >Liberalism/Pettit. With liberalism, Pettit shares concerns about a dominant state that restricts individual choices and ultimately denies political participation. His model-theoretical and programmatic key goal derived from this is therefore: freedom without dominance, but certainly state support for the attainment of individual freedom. Forms of freedom/Pettit: in addition to the traditional understanding of freedom "to" or "of" something, Pettit introduces a third form: a form of "non-domination": bringing: freedom from domination, compulsion and arbitrariness, from "domination" and "mastery", which however does not stand in the way of freedom for political participation. (1) Problem: An arbitrary ruling position of persons or institutions restricts an individual's freedom of choice through open or covert power of disposal, through the impairment of freedom of will or through manipulation of individual behavior. Non-domination/Pettit: Solution: to distance oneself from arbitrary rule- (2) The state is primarily understood as a political agency with the task of promoting the freedom of the individual and protecting it from foreign domination. >State/Pettit, Republicanism/Pettit. Brocker I 853 Pettit polemicizes against those republican variants that consider "bourgeois-humanist" freedom of political participation as the most important characteristic of the political sphere. In his opinion, they underestimate the notorious tendency of the state to dominate, to which the individuals, as participants in public life, suddenly surrendered themselves. Pettit calls this republicanism, rather unusual and in the expression of contempt, "populist" or "communitarian".(3) PettitVsCommunitarianism. >Governance/Pettit, State/Pettit, >Communitarianism, >Republicanism. 1. Philip Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford 1997, p. 22 2. Ibid. p. 66 3. Ibid. p. 8 Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Neutrality | Dworkin | Gaus I 92 Political neutrality/liberalism/Dworkin/Waldron: Problem: It does not seem to have occurred to Locke, Kant, and Mill that [the] foundational positions would pose a problem for the politics of liberalism in a society whose members disagreed about the existence of God, the nature of reason, and the destiny of the human individual. The difficulty (...) came to the fore in discussions of ‘liberal neutrality’ in the 1970s and 1980s. A number of theorists attempted to sum up the essence of liberalism in terms of a principle requiring the state to refrain from taking sides on disputed ethical and religious questions. Dworkin: Ronald Dworkin suggested the liberal commitment to treating people as equals meant that political decisions must be, so far as possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life or of what gives value to life. Since the citizens of a society differ in their conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to another, either because the officials believe that one is intrinsically superior, or because one is held by the more numerous or more powerful group. (1985(1): 191) Waldron: Dworkin did not suppose that neutrality was a general moral requirement, one that everyone should strive to satisfy. Neutrality was proposed as a principle of specifically political morality. It is not wrong for someone to favour a particular conception of what gives value to life, but it is wrong for him to do so in his capacity as a legislator or as a judge. >Neutrality/Larmore. 1. Dworkin, Ronald (1985) A Matter of Principle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Dworkin I Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously Cambridge, MA 1978 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Path Dependence | Political Philosophy | Mause I 583 Path Dependence/Political Theories: according to comparative welfare research, political maneuverability in social policy (...) is limited by past decisions. This is described by the term path dependency (Pierson 1996 (1), 2004 (2) Seal 2002 (3)). Example: Statutory pension insurance schemes financed by social security contributions give reasons for ownership on the part of the insured. The longer such a system exists, the stronger the restrictions on possible changes to this system will be. >Social policy, >Politics, >Political decisions. 1. Pierson, Paul. 1996. The new politics of the welfare state. World Politics 48: 143– 179. 2. Pierson, Paul. Politics in time. History, institutions, and social analysis. Princeton 2004 3. Siegel, Nico A. Baustelle Sozialpolitik. Konsolidierung und Rückbau im internationalen Vergleich. Frankfurt a. M. 2002. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Social Goods | Ostrom | Brocker I 727 Social Goods/Ostrom: Ostrom thesis: Common goods (jointly used goods, social goods) can often be managed successfully and sustainably by their users themselves without the mandatory need for state supervision or individually shared private property. Brocker I 728 OstromVsTradition/OstromVsHardin: the conditions under which the actors in Garrett Hardin's contribution decide (see Social Goods/Hardin) are very restrictive and are by no means directly transferred to the reality of many common situations. OstromVsHardin/OstromVsOlson: (see Social Goods/Olson): The pessimistic findings of Hardin and Olson lead either to direct attention away from individual decisions and towards state solutions or to question the millennia-old institution of community property in principle or to ignore it in political decisions. (1) Solution/Ostrom: more attention must be paid to the problem-solving potential of local individuals. In traditional approaches, individuals are regarded as "prisoners" (2) Nor do they produce "relentless tragedies"(3) (OstromVsHardin). Brocker I 729 Questions: 1. How and by whom does it come to the provision of the common good management system, i.e. the organisational performance and the rules of the game? 2. how do users ("owners") and providers manage mutual credible commitments of participation and self-restraint? 3. How and by whom is the monitoring and sanctioning of compliance with such restrictions and rules of use? Brocker I 730 Ostrom thesis: Unlike in business theory or state theory, in a theory of the self-organisation of common goods we must assume that expenditure is the result of collective action and complex distributional tasks. See Collective Action/Ostrom, Self-Organization/Ostrom. Brocker I 737 Problems: Ostrom shows through examples of failed common management (coastal fishing cooperatives, forest management) that at least one of her 8 building principles of self-organization does not apply. (4) (See Self-Organization/Ostrom). Core elements of an analysis of collective actions are for Ostrom: institutional analysis, multi-level consideration and rational election actions. OstromVsTradition: the common problem can also be self-organized and solved sustainably. It does not necessarily require the division and entrepreneurial use of the common good through the individual allocation of private property rights or state paternalism or regulation. VsOstrom: she was criticised for her broad use of the term and for the fact that its methodological individualistic approach largely ignores the effect of structural elements such as social power relations. OstromVsVs: Ostrom showed that its research results could be made fruitful across disciplines, e.g. in resource economics, experimental economics and behavioral research. 1. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge 1990. Dt.: Elinor Ostrom, Die Verfassung der Allmende. Jenseits von Staat und Merkt, Tübingen 1999, p. 18 2. Ibid. p. 8 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. chap 5. Markus Hanisch, „Elinor Ostrom Die Verfassung der Allmende“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOstr I Elinor Ostrom Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action Cambridge 1990 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Utilitarianism | Chapman | Gaus I 105 Utilitarianism/Chapman/Gaus: While it is perfectly consistent with liberalism for an individual to sacrifice some parts of his life for more good in other parts, this seems illiberal in political decisions about the distribution of benefits between people. Thus the complaint that the principle of utility treats society ‘as a sort of single great person’ (Chapman, 1964(1): 163). >Utilitarian liberalism/Gaus. 1. Chapman, John W. (1964) ‘Justice and fairness’. In Carl J. Friedrich and John W. Chapman, eds, NOMOS VI: Justice. New York: Atherton. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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