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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Action Theory | Weber | Habermas III 378 Action Theory/Communicative Action/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: since Weber assumes a monological model of action, "social action" cannot be explained by the concept of meaning. It is based on the concept of purposive action and must extend it by two provisions to explain social interaction: a) Orientation towards the behaviour of other subjects b) The reflective relationship between the orientations of several interaction participants. >Purposive action, >Purpose rationality, >Action, >Interaction, >Cooperation. Habermas III 379 Act/Action/Weber/Habermas: Weber distinguishes between procedural rational value rational emotional and traditional action. Weber therefore does not start with the social relationship. >Value rationality, >Rationality, cf. >Rationalization. Habermas III 380 Purpose rational action/Weber: the subjective sense here extends to: Means, purposes, values, consequences Value rational action: on means, purposes, values Emotional action: on means and purposes Traditional action: only on the means. Cf. >Purpose-means-rationality, >Purposes, >Goals, >Values, cf. >Consequentialism. Habermas III 381 Habermas: "Inofficial version" of Weber's theory of action ((s) this is a position not explicitly represented by Weber, which could, however, be deduced from his texts): here mechanisms of coordination of action are distinguished, depending on whether only interests or also social agreement are taken as a basis. (1) >Action Theory/Habermas. 1.Vgl. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, S.246f. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Consciousness | Sterelny | I 378 Mind/Animal/Consciousness/Representation/Sterelny: what would show that an animal has a "theory of mind"? >Theory of mind, >Animals, >Animal language. Heyes/Whiten: Maybe the ability for a role exchange? Later Vs. I 379 Premack/Woodruff: E.g. Chimpanzee Sarah sorted out photos that showed the solution of problems! HeyesVs: every single case can be clarified. Method/Heyes/Sterelny: however, it is little economical to "explain away" every single performance. One can see that there is no uniform "spoilsport theory". >Method, >Theories, >Explanations. Gorillas/Byrnes: gorillas do not learn by learning individual "chunks" of movement, but they capture a behavioral program. >Learning, >Behavior. Imitation/Sterelny: although there is a lot of anecdotal evidence about imitation in human beings, the experimental evidence for imitation is astonishingly narrow. >Imitation. I 380 But in the positive cases, it is impressive because it shows the ability of an observer to extract a program of motoric movements. >Observation, >Generality, >Generalization. HeyesVs: it doubts that the concept of a behavioral program is unclear. Delimitation to a series of movements or behavioral sequences are not clear. Sterelny: but we should be able to distinguish something empirically: 1. If social learning consists in imprecisely imitating, different individuals should not commit the same errors. The errors would have to happen at random. 2. Imitation could be distinguished from other types of social learning if a result could be achieved in more than one way. If a model is needed, it should not only contain something about the objectives but also about the means. >Models, >Goals, >Purpose-means-rationality. |
Sterelny I Kim Sterelny "Primate Worlds", in: The Evolution of Cognition, C. Heyes/L. Huber (Eds.) Cambridge/MA 2000 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Sterelny II Kim Sterelny Dawkins vs. Gould: Survival of the Fittest Cambridge/UK 2007 |
| Magical Thinking | Lévi-Strauss | I 23 Magical Thinking/Lévi-Strauss: one could consider the rigour and precision of magical thinking and ritual practices as the expression of an unconscious notion of the truth of determinism. I 22 Magic/Witchcraft/Evans-Pritchard: seen as a system of natural philosophy, it contains a theory of causes: misfortune arises from the magic that cooperates with the forces of nature. (E.E. Evans-Pritchard 1955(1)) I 34 The mythical thinking, although trapped in images, is already generalizing, i.e. scientific, because it works with analogies and comparisons. .... However, reconstructions with the same materials are always related to past purposes and play in this the role of means. The signifiers become significants and vice versa. >Determinism, >Nature, >Causes, >Effect, >Generalization, >Analogies, >Purpose-means-rationality, >Pathetic fallacy. 1. E.E. Evans-Pritchard, "Witchcraft", Africa, vol. 8, Number 4, London 1955, S. 418f. |
LevSt I Claude Lévi-Strauss La pensée sauvage, Paris 1962 German Edition: Das Wilde Denken Frankfurt/M. 1973 LevSt II C. Levi-Strauss The Savage Mind (The Nature of Human Society Series) Chicago 1966 |
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