Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 18 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Description Levels | Geach | I 202 Order/levels/GeachVsStrawson: statements about variables are not always of "higher order". "p" entails "q" could be only an assertion that the variable "p" entails the variable "q", which is certainly nonsense. We must provide the name of statements by quotes. >Levels/Order, >Quotation marks, >Name of a sentence, cf. >Equivalence/Geach. Negation "~" forms a sentence out of a sentence or a name of a sentence out of a name of a sentence if the name is preceded by: E.g. "~ Q". >Negation, cf. >interior/exterior/Carnap. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Designation | Cresswell | II 119 Naming/Denotation/Cresswell: E.g. the predicate "was so called" is a property of pairs so that it consists, when a is the name of a. - (> inserting). ((s) Name not as a property, but "naming"as a feature of a word-object-pair). See also >denoting position/Quine, >Names of expressions, >Name of a sentence, >Names, >Naming, >Denotation, cf. >Predication. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Facts | Sellars | I 28 Def minimal fact/Sellars: facts about which can be reported reliably, because here errors are less likely. The fact that the tie seems to be on a certain occasion green. (SellarsVs). With seeing, one provides more than a description of the experience. One affirms a claim. >Evidence/Sellars. I 44 Fact: the fact that something seems to be red over there, is not experiencing. (Although it is a fact, of course.) But that does not mean that the common descriptive core might be perhaps experiencing. Facts: are experienced but are not experiencing. And also no experience. >Experience. --- II 315/16 Subject: is named and not uttered - fact: is uttered and not named. (Although the name of an utterance can be made). >Description levels, >Level/Order, >Metalanguage, >Name of a sentence. II 320 SellarsVsWittgenstein: we must avoid to join his equating of complex objects with facts. >Facts/Wittgenstein, >Complex/Wittgenstein. The claim that the complex object K, wold be the fact aRb is logical nonsense. Fact: you can say in two different ways something "about a fact": a) The statement includes a statement that expresses a true proposition. In this sense every truth function of a true statement is a statement "about a fact". b) it contains a fact expression, that means the name of a fact rather than a statement. II 323 Natural-linguistic objects: (> Searles background): Solution: natural-language objects are seen as linguistic counterparts of non-linguistic objects (not facts!). One can speak of them as "proper names". That coincides with Wittgenstein's view that elementary statements must be constructed as proper names occurring in a particular way. Cf. >Atomic sentences, >Atomism. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Mention | Geach | I 74 Mention/Use/Geach: for each x: either x is white or x is not white. Mention: for each object x: either the predicate is "white" or its negation is true of x. "True-of": is a simpler term. Therefore, Tarski begins his defintion of truth with it: >Satisfaction. E.g.,"Proxy": at use - quote: at mention. Mention: "... its negation is true of ..". Negation is mentioned. Use of the negation: "x is ~ F" - ((s) Mention/(s): about the negation: "it is true" - likewise: "has a true negation".) ad I 84 Mention/Use/Quote/Geach/(s) E.g. "is an obscene expression" is not an obscene expression. I 195 Meta-language/mention/use/Geach: if p and q are meta-linguistical variables, then "~ p" means: "the negation of p" and not "it is not the case that p". >Meta language, >Variables, >Object language, >Levels/Order, >Use. I 202 Mention/use/names/sentence/Geach: names of expressions are formed by quotation marks - then at the same time mention and use. - Mentioned by the combination of its own with the quotes - used as part of a complex expression. >Quotation marks, >Name of a sentence, >Quote. Mention/Use: both are no contrasting pair. I 225 Mention/Use: E.g. a class or number is specified by mention (not use) of a property. >Classes, >Properties. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Object | Sellars | II 315/16 Object/Sellars: an object is named and not predicated. >Predication, >Naming, >Objects. Fact/Sellars: a fact is predicated and not named. (Although the name of a statement can be made). >Facts, >Name of a sentence, >Description levels. --- II 319f Def "natural language object"/Sellars: linguistic objects with abstracted background. >Bracketing. We abstract from our knowledge in order to think of the objects as natural objects. II 324 Natural language objects: Solution: natural linguistic objects as linguistic counterparts are non-linguistic objects (not facts!). >Searle’s background) One can speak of them as "proper names". This adopts Wittgenstein's idea that basic statements must be construed as proper names, occurring in a certain way. >Names/Wittgenstein, >Wittgenstein, |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Ontological Commitment | Schiffer | I 236f Properties/attributes/existence/"there are"/quantification/2nd order logic/Schiffer: (Quine 1966(1), p 164 (German)): even in Quine: e.g. "Is valid" is a verb that can be added to the name of a sentence, and an attribute of the named sentence. >Names of sentences. Schiffer: no one would say that Quine thus enters into an ontological commitment. Solution: it is understood as substitutional quantification. >Substitutional quantification. 1.W.V.O. Quine (1966). Ways of paradox. New York: Random. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Proper Names | Sellars | II 335/36 >Statemens/Sellars: when statements seem to occur in non-truth-functional contexts, the language patterns are in fact names. They are simply illustrative names. >Truth functions. ((s) Non-truth functional: Intensional contexts.) >Intensions, >Intensionality, >Observation language, >Observation sentences, >Name of a sentence, >Word meaning. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Prosentential Theory | Brandom | I 436 Definition pro-sententional theory of truth/Camp/Grover/Belnap/Brandom: is the result if you consider "is true" to be a syncategorematic part of pro-sentences. Analogy to pronouns. Savings - has the same semantic content as its anaphoric predecessor - recognizes its predecessor - e.g. "She stopped." Predecessor: Maria stopped. E.g. "for all you can say is true: if the policeman said it, then it is true". Cf. >Anaphora, >Truth theory. Four Conditions for pro-sentences (analog to pronouns): 1) They must occupy all the grammatical positions (embedded and freestanding) 2) They are generic: every clause of statement may be the predecessor of a pro-sentence, e.g. He is standing, he is his F. 3) They can be used quantificatorily 4) The class of the admissible substituent determines the significance of the pro-sentence - the anaphora is a relation between Tokenings. "This is true" is a response to a Tokening of "I am hungry". - E.g. "everything he said is true" is not accessible for simpler redundancy and quote redemption approaches. I 438 Per: it can explain complicated sentences: E.g. "Something that Hans said is either true, or it was said by Fritz". Cf. >Everything he said... I 441 Prosentential Theory/Brandom: "refers to" is a pro-sentence forming operator. - E.g. "The one Kissinger referred to as "almost third-rated mind" understood as a pronoun whose anaphoric predecessor is a particular quote by Kissinger - nominalization of sentences - ((s) Instead of describing a sentence: the name of a sentence). >Quote/Quotation. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Quotation Marks | Quine | VII (f) 112 Quotes/Quine: square quotation marks: notation [] only upper half: is an expression marked as a noun m- variables are nouns if they occupy the place of names of sentences (Greek letters). See also Quote/Disquotation, Second Intention. X 33 Quotation Marks/Quine: it depends on them whether we are talking about words or the world. Quotation Marks/Quine: create the name of a sentence containing a name of snow, namely "snow". Truth-Predicate/Quine: by calling the sentence true, we call the snow white. Truth-Predicate: cancels the quotes. Sentence: we can say it simply by pronouncing it. Therefore we can dispense with quotation marks and truth-predicates. Truth-Predicate/Quine: we need it if we want to claim an infinite set of sentences that we can only define by talking about the sentences. Example: "All sentences of the form 'p or not p' are true". We need it to restore the reference to an object when we have used semantic ascension for generalization. >Truth Predicate/Quine Quotation Marks/Quine: the Tarski example cannot be generalized as follows: p' is true iff p because if you write the schema letter 'p' in quotation marks, you get the name of the 16th letter of the alphabet and not a general expression for sentences. III 67 Quotation Marks/Quine: form names (designations) e.g. we write "lies close to" not between Mannheim and Heidelberg, but between their designations (names). III 68 Rhyme/Quine: "Erden" (earth) rhymes with "werden" (become). Without quotation marks it would not only be wrong but ungrammatic and pointless. See also >Implication/Quine, >Conditional/Quine, >Mention/Quine, >Use. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Goodman | I 59 f Quote/Goodman: a quote is the name of a sentence, not a sentence itself (SearleVs). I 60 A quote must designate and include something (a that-phrase does not name). >That-clause, >Designation, >Proper names, >Sentences, >Quotation marks, >Denotation, >Naming. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Relative Clauses | Cresswell | I 172 Relative clause/if-clause/Cresswell: clauses are restrictions of predicates. >Predicates, >Predication, >Clauses, >Name of a sentence, >Reference. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Sentences | Frege | II 48 Truth Value/Frege: a truth value cannot be part of a thought any more than the sun, because it is not a sense but an object (truth value = object). II 51 Sentence/Frege/(s): a sentence consists of sense components, not of objects. (>FregeVsRussell) Subordinate clauses that begin with "that" (>that-sentence, >opaque contexts, >propositional attitudes) have a thought as meaning, not a truth value. II 74 Sentence: the idea itself does not yet determine what is to be regarded as the subject (>Ramsey). We must never forget that different sentences can express the same idea. Neither is it impossible that the same thought appears in a decomposition as a singular one, in another one as a particular one, and in a third one as general one. II 77 Sentence: the three proper names: "the number 2", "the concept prime number", "the relation of the falling of an object under a concept" behave as brittle to each other as the first two alone: no matter how we group them together, we do not get a sentence. >Propositions, >Clauses, >Truth conditions. I 7 Sentence/Frege: a sentence does not represent a proposition (only a that-sentence does that, a subset) but for a truth value. There is a sentence for each proposition that expresses it and that states the truth conditions. Vs: there is a problem with sentences without truth value (neither true nor false, not an object, etc.). Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 68 Sentence/Frege: except for the idea (what can be true/false) there are two other aspects: a) "content" b) "imagination". >Content, >Imagination. Tugendhat II 243 Oblique Meaning/German Original: "odd"/Frege: the oblique meaning is the name of a sentence. Complex sentences: have truth functions of their subsets - where that is not the case, subsets appear as names (oblique ("odd") meaning, Quote). Nominalized Subset/Frege: a nominalized subset is only part of a thought. TugendhatVsFrege: such a subset cannot be replaced, so the truth-value potential cannot consist in its truth value. Tugendhat II 245 Sentence/Frege/Tugendhat: since all sentences are derived from the subject-predicate form, subsets must sometimes be nominalized. Exception: causal and conditional clauses. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Sentences | Geach | I 204 Sentence/name/abbreviation/substitute/proxy/Geach: e.g. if "P" and "Q" are abbreviations of sentences and "A" and "B", the respective names of these sentences, then we could have a convention, by which "A > B" is the name (abbreviation) of the sentence "P > Q". >Name of a sentence, >Level/Order, >Names, >Descriptions. Autonymous/Carnap: the symbol ">" in "A > B", is used as a sign of itself, autonymous. - (Geach per) >Logical constants, >Logical connectives, >Sign, >Symbol. I 258 Conjunction/Sentence/Frege: "P u Q" is a phrase that is different from "p" and "q" individually. Mill: ditto: otherwise "a group of horses" would be the same as "a kind of horse" - but not: E.g. "Jim is convinced and his wife is unfaithful". Solution: "the fact that ..." is always to be split into a pair of statements. >Facts. I 291 Sentence/GeachVsAristotle: it is a mistake to analyze complex sentences as a combination of atomic sentences. >Atomic sentence, >Complex, cf. >Compositionality. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Sentences | Sellars | II 307 Sentence/name: SellarsVsSearle: sentences (clauses) can be names (like Frege): Carnap: S (inL) means Chicago is great: ("Chicago is great" = name). >Name of a sentence, >Description levels, >Metalanguage, >Levels/Order, >Clauses, >Clause/Frege, >Clause/Searle. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Sentences | Tarski | Horwich I 136 Sentence/Tarski: here: classes of inscriptions of the same shape - not physical things. >Inscriptions. Tarski does not work with Propositions. Horwich I 109/110 Senetence/name of sentence/Tarski: "X is true" is not grammatically correct, if we replace "X" with a sentence. It must be the name of a sentence. - It must be because at this position in the sentence there is a noun.(1) >Names of sentences, >Description levels, >Levels. 1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Signs | Geach | I 204 Sentence/name/abbreviation/substitute/proxy/Geach: e.g. if "P" and "Q" are abbreviations of sentences and "A" and "B", the respective names of these sentences, then we could have a convention, by which "A > B" is the name (abbreviation) of the sentence "P > Q". >Name of a sentence, >Level/Order, >Names, >Descriptions. Autonymous/Carnap: the symbol ">" in "A > B", is used as a sign of itself, autonymous. - (Geach per) >Logical constants, >Logical connectives, >Sign, >Symbol. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Truth Values | Tugendhat | II 233ff Def Truth value potential/Tugendhat: two names that denote the same object, have the same truth value potential. Solution for the conflict: Frege: subsets, quotes: names of sentences- Searle: sentences are never names. Tugendhat then truth value potential quasi transmission of the characteristics of sentences to names. II 237 Truth Value/sentence/object/Frege: by substitutability it is proved that the truth values of sentences correspond to the object of the names - TugendhatVsFrege: it can be proved only in reverse that the objects of the names correspond to the truth values. II 243 Odd meaning/Frege: name of a sentence. >Odd Meaning, >Names of sentences. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Variables | Quine | V 129 Variables/Quine: Their archetype are the pronouns - in the relative clause the relative pronoun stands for the name of the object. --- VI 37/38 Variable/Quine: allows us to manoeuvre every occurrence of "a" into a context of "a =" and to treat the resulting context as an unanalysable predicate "A" that absorbes the singular term - singular term: can be re-introduced later as a description. --- VII (a) 13 Bound variable/Quine: instead of it, we can say that something is in the range of a pronoun. --- VII (f) 107ff Variables/Quine: "F": not bindable - Only apparent predicates, vacancies in the sentence chart - "p", "q", etc. stand for whole expressions, they are sometimes viewed as if they needed entities whose names are these expressions (these are called propositions) - "p" "q", etc. are never bound variables! - "p>q" not a sentence, but a scheme. --- VII (f) 110 Not bindable variable/Quine: E.g. "p". If it were considered to be the name of some entity, it would have to be a bindable variable, which is not the case - e.g. "F" on a par with "p": if predicates are to be the names of some entity, they would have to be regarded as bindable variables, which they are not. VII (f) 110 Variables/Numbers/Quine: in "x + 3 > 7" "x" should be regarded as a pseudo-number - "x + 3> 7" should be considered a pseudo-sentence or scheme. It cannot be quantified. VII (f) 111 Variables/Quine: Greek letters: completely different status: they occur in a language about language: E.g. (3) (∃a)(φ v ψ) is on a semantically higher level than "x + 3> 7". (3) is a name of a sentence or expression - Greek letters are standing for sentences here - they are quantifiable - "φ": grammatically substantival, occupies the place of names of sentences. - "p": grammatically sentential (sentence form): has the place of complete sentences. --- IX 194f Universal variable/Systematic ambiguity/Quine: possibly at the expense of adding new and unreduced predicates "T0", "T1", "T2",... that are added to "ε", we can get rid of the special, indexed variables in favor of the universal variables x, y.... - in fact, "Tnx" can easily be expressed with help of "ε" and the logic: "∃z(x,y ε z)" ensures compliance of the type in x and y and vice versa ensures compliance of the type with x and y that xn, yn ε ϑ n + 1, that ∃z(x,y, ε z). - Thus disappears Russell’s grammatical constraint, that declared "xm ε y n" meaningless if m + 1 unequal n - "m ε y n" now becomes useful for all m and n - if m + 1 unequal n, so "xm ε y n" simply becomes wrong. --- X 95 Variables/Quine: quantifiable variables should never be in predicate places, but always in name places. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Frege, G. | Tugendhat Vs Frege, G. | II 237 Replaceability/Frege: he was of the opinion that the principle of replaceability could prove that the truth values of the sentences correspond to the objects of the names. TugendhatVsFrege: with this principle it can only be proved that conversely, the objects of the names correspond to the truth values of the propositions. II 238 Sentence/Proprietary Name/Tugendhat: names and sentences have something in common: the ability to have a meaning. II 243 Def indirect meaning/Frege: name of a sentence. Complex Sentences/Frege/Tugendhat: Truth functions of their subordinate clauses! Where this is not the case, partial sentences appear as names (indirect meaning, quotation). TugendhatVsFrege: the thought that the meaning of a sentence (in a technical sense) is only the truth value is mistaken. When a clause is nominalized, it expresses, according to Frege, only a part of a "thought". II 244 Tugendhat: the truth-value potential of such a proposition (which cannot stand for itself) cannot consist in a truth value. (Because the replacement cannot be performed). Meaning/Frege/Tugendhat: this shows once again that Frege's concept of meaning is functional: the meaning of an expression differs depending on whether he expresses his independent thought or only part of it. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Schiffer Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 137 Paul and Elmer/SchifferVsQuine: Quine: there are no countable belief objects. E.g. If John believes that snow is white, and Mary believes that snow is white, there must be something that both believe. Schiffer: this conditional is wrong: I 138 either that or the alleged quantification for belief objects is not what it appears to be in the Quine's eye. I 144 SchifferVsQuine: harmless apparent quantification. I 235 Substitutional Quantification/Schiffer. E.g. (c) There is something that Mother Teresa, (namely modesty) is true because a substitution instance of "Mother Teresa X" is true, namely (b): Mother Teresa has the property to be modest. ontological commitment: at substitutional quantification: are only those of the true substitution instances. Universals/Quine: (On what there is, 1953, 10): it is misleading to say that red houses, red roses and red sunsets have something in common. SchifferVsQuine: for whom these everyday speech would it misleading? One can therefore say something true, assuming substitutional quantification. Similarly E.g. "there is a chance that you will win". there are/exist/substitutional quantification/substitutional quantification/Lycan: (1979): Allowed e.g. "There are many things that do not exist". E.g. Loch Ness monster, etc. Properties/Schiffer: in most books of Non-Platonists there is quantification over properties. ((s)> Second order Logic). Quine himself gives an e.g. Properties/Attribute/Existence/"There is"/quantification/second order logic/Schiffer: Quine 1966, p 164): "is valid" is a verb that can be appended to the name of a sentence, and expresses an attribute of the designated sentence. I 237 Schiffer: nobody would assume here that Quine hereby makes an ontological commitment to the existence of attributes. Solution: It is "apparent" quantification that is true, if it is understood as a substitutional quantification. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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