Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bank Reserve | Mises | Rothbard III 1010 Bank reserve/credit expansion/Mises/Rothbard: How does the narrow range of a bank's clientele limit its potentiality for credit expansion? The newly issued money-substitutes are, of course, Ioaned to a bank's clients. The client then spends the new money on goods and services. The new money begins to be diffused throughout the society. Eventually - usually very quickly - it is spent on the goods or services of people who use a different bank. Money-substitutes: Thus, while gold or silver is acceptable throughout the market, a bank's money-substitutes are acceptable only to its own clientele. Clearly, a single bank's credit expansion is limited, and this limitation is stronger (a) the narrower the range of its clientele, and (b) the greater its issue of money-substitutes in relation to that of competing banks. Rothbard III 1011 Bankruptcy: (…), the greater the degree of relative credit expansion by any one bank, the sooner will the day of redemption - and potential bankruptcy - be at hand and they are impelled to spend a great proportion of the new money. (…) clients are impelled to buy more from nonclients and less from one another; while nonclients buy less from clients and more from one another. The result is an "unfavorable" balance of trade from clients to nonclients.(1) Bank reserve: The purpose of banks' keeping any specie reserves in their vaults (assuming no legal reserve requirements) now becomes manifest. It is not to meet bank runs - since no fractional-reserve bank can be equipped to withstand a run. It is to meet the demands for redemption which will inevitably come from nonclients. Mises/Rothbard: Mises has brilliantly shown that a subdivision of this process was discovered by the British Currency School and by the classical "international trade" theorists of the nineteenth century. These older economists assumed that all the banks in a certain region or country expanded credit together. Prices: The result was a rise in the prices of goods produced in that country. Balance of trade: A further result was an "unfavorable" balance of trade, i.e., an outflow of standard specie to other countries. Currency drain: Since other countries did not patronize the expanding country's banks, the consequence was a "specie drain" from the expanding country and increased pressure for redemption on its banks. International trade: Like all parts of the overstressed and overelaborated theory of "international trade," this analysis is simply a special subdivision of "general" economic theory. And cataloging it as "international trade" theory, as Mises has shown, underestimates its true significance.(2)(3) Free banking: Thus, the more freely competitive and numerous are the banks, the less they will be able to expand fiduciary media, even ifthey are left free to do so. (…) such a system is known as "free banking“.(4) VsMises: A major objection to this analysis of free banking has been the problem ofbank "cartels." If banks get together and agree to expand their credits simultaneously, the clientele limitation vis-ä-vis competing banks will be removed, and the clientele of each bank will, in effect, increase to include all bank users. MisesVsVs: Mises points out, however, that the sounder banks with higher fractional reserves will not wish to lose the goodwill of their own clients and risk bank runs by entering into collusive agreements with weaker banks.(5) Banks/Rothbard: This consideration, while placing limits on such agreements, does not rule them out altogether. For, after all, no fractional-reserve banks are really sound, and if the public can be led to believe that, say, an 80-percent-specie reserve is sound, it can believe the same about 60-percent- or even 10-percent-reserve banks. Indeed, the fact that the weaker banks are allowed by the public to exist at all demonstrates that the more conservative banks may not lose much good will by agreeing to expand with them. >Central banks/Rothbard. 1. In the consolidated balance ofpayments of the clients, money income from sales to nonclients (exports) will decline, and money expenditures on the goods and services of nonclients (imports) will increase. The excess cash balances of the clients are transferred to non-clients. 2. Older economists also distinguished an "internal drain" as well as the "external drain," but included in the former only the drain from bank users to those Who insist on standard money. 3. See Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 434-35. 4. For various views on free and central banking, see Vera C. Smith, The Rationale of Central Banking (London: P.S. King and Son, 1936). 5. Mises, Human Action, p. 444. |
EconMises I Ludwig von Mises Die Gemeinwirtschaft Jena 1922 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Content | Boer | I XIII Definition Thought/Boer: can be common to different states of mind. Proposition/Boer: I do not call it thought content, because this expression brings too much ballast with it. --- Note I XVIII Intensional transitive verbs: have three conditions, each of which is sufficient for itself: (i) failure of the principle of the substitutability of identity (ii) quantification permits a specific "narrow range" (iii) there is no existential (ontological) commitment. --- I XIV Direct objects/direct object/propositional settings/Boer: it is controversial whether the relation to direct thought objects can be analyzed as propositional attitudes. E.g. "search": here it is certainly the case, e.g. "worship": seems to contradict this analysis. Fulfillment conditions/EB/proopositional attitudes/individuation/Boer: N.B.: The fulfillment conditions do not appear to be sufficient to individuate a propositional attitude. On the other hand: Thought content/GI: seems to be sufficient for the individuation of a propositional attitude. Truth conditions: (and hence also the fulfillment conditions) can be the same for two beliefs, while the subject is not sure whether it is the same object. E.g. woodchucks/groundhogs. Propositional attitudes/Individuation/Lewis: (1969)(1): the mere existence of a convention of this kind presupposes that speakers from a community have certain propositional attitudes with certain fulfillment conditions. Abstract objects/propositional attitudes/Boer: in order to believe that patience is a virtue, one must think of patience. Definition mental reference/Terminology/Boer: Thinking of: be a mental analogue to speaker reference. Speaker reference/some authors: thesis: never exists in isolation, but is only a partial aspect of a speech act (utterance). --- I XV Mental reference: should then only be a partial aspect of thinking-of-something. Probably, there is also predication. Definition mental reference/Boer: be in a state of thought with a content of thought which defines a fulfillment condition of which the object is a constituent. Problem: non-existent objects. --- I XV Thought content/GI/Boer: must be carefully distinguished from any objects that it might contain. Definition object of thought/object/GO/Boer: "object of the propositional attitudes ψ" is clearly only the item/s to which a subject by the power of having ψ refers to. (s) So not the propositional attitudes themselves. Individuation/identification/Boer: should be identified by a that-sentence (in a canonical attribution of ψ). That-sentence/Boer: is the content (thought content). Content/thought content/Boer: is the that-sentence. Thinking about/Boer: what you think of something is the object itself. 1. David Lewis 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
| Credit Expansion | Rothbard | Rothbard III 991 Credit expansion/Rothbard: If inflation is any increase in the supply of money not matched by an increase in the gold or silver stock available, the method of inflation just depicted is called credit expansion - the creation of new money-substitutes, entering the economy on the credit market. As will be seen below, while credit expansion by a bank seems far more sober and respectable than outright spending of new money, it actually has far graver consequences for the economic system, consequences which most people would find especially undesirable. This inflationary credit is called circulating credit, as distinguished from the lending of saved funds - called commodity credit. Inflation/Rothbard: Credit expansion has, of course, the same effect as any sort of inflation: prices tend to rise as the money supply increases. Like any inflation, it is a process of redistribution, whereby the inflators, and the part of the economy selling to them, gain at the expense of those who come last in line in the spending process. Inflation: This is the charm of inflation - for the beneficiaries - and the reason why it has been so popular, particularly since modern banking processes have camouflaged its significance for those losers who are far removed from banking operations. The gains to the inflators are visible and dramatic; the losses to others hidden and unseen, (…). >Inflation/Rothbard. Rothbard III 992 Investment/consumption: Inflation also changes the market's consumption/investment ratio. Superficially, it seems that credit expansion greatly increases capital, for the new money enters the market as equivalent to new savings for lending. Since the new "bank money" is apparently added to the supply of savings on the credit market, businesses can now borrow at a Iower rate of interest; hence inflationary credit expansion seems to offer the ideal escape from time preference, as well as an inexhaustible fount of added capital. Actually, this effect is illusory. On the contrary, inflation reduces saving and investment, thus Iowering society's standard of living. It may even cause large-scale capital consumption. 1) In the first place, as we just have seen, existing creditors are injured. This will tend to discourage lending in the future and thereby discourage saving-investment. 2) Secondly (…) the inflationary process inherently yields a purchasing-power profit to the businessman, since he purchases factors and sells them at a later time when all prices are higher. Rothbard III 994 Market Interest rates: The credit expansion reduces the market rate of interest. This means that price differentials are Iowered, and, (…), Iower price differentials raise prices in the highest stages of production, shifting resources to these stages and also increasing the number of stages. >Production structure/Rothbard. As a result, the production structure is lengthened. The borrowing firms are led to believe that enough funds are available to permit them to embark on projects formerly unprofitable. Free market: On the free market, investment will always take place first in those projects that satisfy the most urgent wants of the consumers. Then the next most urgent wants are satisfied, etc. The interest rate regulates the temporal order of choice of projects in accordance with their urgency. A Iower rate of interest on the market is a signal that more projects can be undertaken profitably. Equilibrium: Increased saving on the free market leads to a stable equilibrium of production at a Iower rate of interest. Credit expansion: But not so with credit expansion: for the original factors now receive increased money income. In the free-market example, total money incomes remained the same. The increased expenditure on higher stages was offset by decreased expenditure in the Iower stages. The "increased length" o fthe production structure was compensated by the "reduced width." But credit expansion pumps new money into the production structure: aggregate money incomes increase instead of remaining the same. The production structure has lengthened, but it has also remained as wide, without contraction of consumption expenditure. Rothbard III 995 Production structure/inflation/Rothbard: The owners of the original factors, with their increased money income, naturally hasten to spend their new money. >Factors of production/Rothbard. They allocate this spending between consumption and investment in accordance with their time preferences. Let us assume that the time-preference schedules of the people remain unchanged. >Time preference/Rothbard. This is a proper assumption, since there is no reason to assume that they have changed because of the inflation. Production now no longer reflects voluntary time preferences. Business has been led by credit expansion to invest in higher stages, as ifmore savings were available. Since they are not, business has overinvested in the higher stages and underinvested in the Iower. Consumers act promptly to re-establish their time preferences – their preferred investment/consumption proportions and price differentials. The differentials will be re-established at the old, higher amount, i.e., the rate of interest will return to its free-market magnitude. As a result, the prices at the higher stages of production will fall drastically, the prices at the Iower stages will rise again, and the entire new investment at the higher stages will have to be abandoned or sacrificed. Rothbard III 997 Investments: (…) bank credit expansion cannot increase capital investment by one iota. Investment can still come only from savings. >Money supply/Rothbard, >Saving/Rothbard, >Interest rate/Rothbard. Rothbard III 998 Money supply: an increase in the supply of money does Iower the rate of interest when it enters the market as credit expansion, but only temporarily. In the long run (and this long run is not very "long"), the market re-establishes the free-market time-preference interest rate and eliminates the change. In the long run a change in the money stock affects only the value of the monetary unit. Business cycle/Rothbard: This process - by which the market reverts to its preferred interest rate and eliminates the distortion caused by credit expansion - is, moreover, the business cycle! Rothbard III 1010 Credit expansion/Rothbard: Limitations: How does the narrow range of a bank's clientele limit its potentiality for credit expansion? The newly issued money-substitutes are, of course, Ioaned to a bank's clients. The client then spends the new money on goods and services. The new money begins to be diffused throughout the society. Eventually - usually very quickly - it is spent on the goods or services of people who use a different bank. Example: Suppose that the Star Bank has expanded credit; the newly issued Star Bank's notes or deposits find their way into the hands of Mr. Jones, who uses the City Bank. Two alternatives may occur, either of which has the same economic effect: (a) Jones accepts the Star Bank's notes or deposits, and deposits them in the City Bank, which calls on the Star Bank for redemption; or (b) Jones refuses to accept the Star Bank's notes and insists that the Star client - say Mr. Smith - who bought something from Jones, redeem the note himself and pay Jones in acceptable standard money. Money-substitutes: Thus, while gold or silver is acceptable throughout the market, a bank's money-substitutes are acceptable only to its own clientele. Clearly, a single bank's credit expansion is limited, and this limitation is stronger (a) the narrower the range of its clientele, and (b) the greater its issue of money-substitutes in relation to that of competing banks. Rothbard III 1011 Bankruptcy: (…), the greater the degree of relative credit expansion by any one bank, the sooner will the day of redemption - and potential bankruptcy - be at hand and they are impelled to spend a great proportion of the new money. Some of this increased spending will be on one another's goods and services, but it is clear that the greater the credit expansion, the greater will be the tendency for their spending to "spill over" onto the goods and services of nonclients. This tendency to spill over, or "drain," is greatly enhanced when increased spending by clients on the goods and services of other clients raises their prices. In the meanwhile, the prices of the goods sold by non-clients remain the same. As a consequence, clients are impelled to buy more from nonclients and less from one another; while nonclients buy less from clients and more from one another. The result is an "unfavorable" balance of trade from clients to nonclients.(1) Bank reserve: The purpose of banks' keeping any specie reserves in their vaults (assuming no legal reserve requirements) now becomes manifest. It is not to meet bank runs - since no fractional-reserve bank can be equipped to withstand a run. It is to meet the demands for redemption which will inevitably come from nonclients. 1. In the consolidated balance ofpayments of the clients, money income from sales to nonclients (exports) will decline, and money expenditures on the goods and services of nonclients (imports) will increase. The excess cash balances of the clients are transferred to non-clients. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Description Theory | Russell | Hintikka I 165 Descriptions/Russell/Hintikka: Definition primary description: for them, the substitutability of identity (SI) applies. Definition secondary description: for them the substitutability of identity (SI) fails. I 166 E.g. Russell: two readings: (1) George IV did not know whether Scott was the author of Waverley. Description/Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: "The Author of Waverley": (ix) A (x) Primary: the description has the following force: (2) (Ex)[A(x)&(y)A(y) > y = x) & George IV knew that (Scott = x). ((s) notation: the quantifier is here always a normal existence quantifier, mirrored E). That is, the quantifier has maximum range in the primary description. More likely, however, is the second reading: Secondary: (3) ~ George IV knew that (Ex)[A(x) & (y) > y = x & (Scott = x)]. ((s) narrow range) Range/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is a third possibility for the range of a quantifier ((s) "medium range"/Kripke). (4) ~ (Ex) [A(x) & (y)(A (y)> y = x) & George IV knew that (Scott = x)]. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Descriptions | Cresswell | I 184 Description/Quantification/Cresswell: definite and indefinite descriptions are not quantifiers - the bond is in the depth structure. >Quantifiers, Deep structure, E.g. if you offer each boy a job, some boy will refuse it - "it" signals no variable bound by "a job", however quantification in depth. >Quantification. II 47f Theory of descriptions/Russell/Cresswell: according to Russell e.g. (24) BELIEVE (a, x) u x e . β . L) is possible, because "The planet which is called "Phosphorus"" can occur outside the range of the modal operator. >Scope, >Modal operator, >Names, >Morning star/Evening star, >Theory of descriptions/Russell. II 48 N.B: this allows us to talk about the thing that is actually called "Phosphorus" and ask what happens when it is not called like this. ((s) Out of reach of the modal operator: allows unambiguous reference to the thing). II 140 Theory of descriptions/Russell/Cresswell: Thesis: a particular description is in the same syntactic category as a quantifier, e.g. "Someone" problem: E.g. "Someone does not come" does not mean the same as "It is not the case that someone comes". >Someone/Geach. Solution/Russell: different ranges in modal and doxastic contexts - A) (narrow range) "the person next door lives next door" is logically equivalent with "exactly one person lives next door" and therefore it is in a sense necessarily true. B) (wide range) it is true that the person next door could also have lived somewhere else (so it is contingent). >Narrow/wide, >Exactly one, >Necessity, >Contingency. II 149 Theory of descriptions/Russell/Kripke/Cresswell: Kripke per Russell with regard to descriptions - not only with regard to names. >Descriptions/Kripke, >Names/Kripke. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Proper Names | Logic Texts | Read III 133 f If a description has a Def narrow range: we take it to describe various objects in different worlds. Def wide range: means that they refer to the same object in all the worlds, regardless of how many planets there are in that world. This gives the >planets-example a different hue. Real names always have a long range (rigid designators, for all the worlds). >Rigidity, >Descriptions, >Singular Terms. descriptions: are therefore not always rigid, depending on theory. (Not rigid, just for the actual world). III 138 Names/Mill: have no sense, they are purely denotative (also Kripke: no sense, because non-modal statements can have different truth values). - FregeVsKripke/FregeVsMill: names do have a sense. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Superintelligence | Tallinn | Brockman I 97 Superintelligence/Tallinn: Thesis: the central point of the AI risk is that superintelligent AI is an environmental risk. (…) the universe was not made for us; instead, we are fine-tuned by evolution to a very narrow range of environmental parameters. Any disturbance, even temporary, of this precarious equilibrium and we die in a matter of minutes. Silicon-based intelligence does not share such concerns about the environment. That’s why it’s much cheaper to explore space using machine probes rather than “cans of meat.” Moreover, Earth’s current environment is almost certainly suboptimal for what a superintelligent AI will greatly care about: efficient computation. Hence, we might find our planet suddenly going from anthropogenic global warming to machinogenic global cooling. One big challenge that AI safety research needs to deal with is how to constrain a potentially superintelligent AI - an AI with a much larger footprint than our own - from rendering our environment uninhabitable for biological life-forms. It’s hard to overemphasize how tiny and parochial the future of our planet is, compared with the full potential of humanity. On astronomical timescales, our planet will be gone soon (unless we tame the sun, also a distinct possibility) and almost all the resources - atoms and free energy - to sustain civilization in the long run are in deep space. >Artificial Intelligence, >Artificial General Intelligence, >Strong Artificial Intelligence. “Pareto-topia”/Eric Drexler: the idea that AI, if done right, can bring about a future in which everyone’s lives are hugely improved, a future where there are no losers. A key realization here is that what chiefly prevents humanity from achieving its full potential might be our instinctive sense that we’re in a zero-sum game—a game in which players are supposed to eke out small wins at the expense of others. ((s) No source indicated for “pareto-topia”; cf. (1)). 1. https://www.effectivealtruism.org/articles/ea-global-2018-paretotopian-goal-alignment/ Tallinn, J. “Dissident Messages” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Tariffs | Feenstra | Feenstra I 7-1 Tariffs/Feenstra: There are various reasons why countries use import tariffs and other types of trade policies. Nearly all countries have used these instruments in early stages of their development to foster the growth of domestic industries, in what is called import substitution. Such policies have been heavily criticized for protecting inefficient domestic industries from international competition. Many countries have later switched to an export promotion regime, under which industries are expected to meet international competition through exports, albeit with subsidies (hopefully temporary) given to exporters. The more than 140 members of the WTO have all committed to abandon such heavily regulated trade regimes, and move towards substantially freer trade. One question, then, is whether the use of import tariffs and other trade policies at early stages of the development process has any rationale at all, especially when other markets (such as for capital) might not be functioning well. A second question concerns the welfare cost of tariffs and quotas in situations where other markets are working well. Even under the GATT/WTO, countries are permitted to apply tariffs in a number of cases, including: (i) “escape clause” tariffs, under which countries temporarily escape from their promise to keep tariffs low, due to injury in an import-competing industry; (ii) antidumping duties, under which tariffs are applied to offset import prices that are “too low.” For theoretical purposes, we can think of escape clause tariffs as exogenously imposed on exporting firm (…). >Dumping. Feenstra I 8-60 Tariffs/Feenstra: (…) we identified three effects of a tariff on welfare: (i) a deadweight loss; (ii) a terms of trade effect; (iii) a reduction in the monopoly distortion if the output of home firms increase (without leading to inefficient entry). While we have not derived again the welfare criterion for an import quota, a similar decomposition would apply. >Import quotas. However, any potential terms of trade gain becomes a loss if the importing country gives up the quota rents to the exporter, as under a VER [Voluntary Export Restraints]. >Voluntary Export Restraints (VER). In that case, the only possible source of gain for the importing country would be under effect (iii), if the import quota led to a significant increase in home output and offset a monopoly distortion. But we have found that the reverse case is more likely to hold: with either a home monopoly or Bertrand duopoly, the quota (say, at the free trade level of imports) will lead to an increase in price and reduction in home quantity, so that the monopoly distortion is worsened rather than offset. >Bertrand competition, >Monopolies. For export subsidies under perfect competition, the welfare criterion becomes: (i) a deadweight loss; (ii) a terms of trade effect. Whereas the terms of trade will improve due to a tariff for a large country, it will instead worsen due to the export subsidy in a two-good model. Feenstra I 8-61 (…) with more goods there is the possibility that a subsidy on some goods will raise the terms of trade for others. The Ricardian model with a continuum of goods provides a good illustration of this, and allowed for welfare-improving export subsidies when they are targeted on a narrow range of goods. Imperfect competition: Under imperfect competition, the welfare criterion is simplified by considering sales to a third market. In that case the home firm earns profits from its export sales, and welfare is simply the difference between these and the revenue cost of the subsidy. This provides the clearest example of a potential role for “strategic” trade policy in shifting profits towards the home firm. Subsidies: (…) subsidies may or may not be desirable: under Cournot competition export subsidies raise welfare, but under Bertrand competition they do not. >Cournot competition, >Bertrand competition. Since it is very difficult to know the type of competition being used by firms, it becomes impossible for the government to implement this policy in a welfare-improving manner. Empirically, the analysis of import quotas and export subsidies are linked because the industries involved are often producing discrete products, with multi-product firms. (…) [there are] empirical techniques that can be used on such industries, including hedonic regressions and the estimation of demand and prices as in Berry (1994)(1). 1. Berry, Steven T., 1994, “Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation,” Rand Journal of Economics, 25(2), Summer, 242-6. |
Feenstra I Robert C. Feenstra Advanced International Trade University of California, Davis and National Bureau of Economic Research 2002 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Montague, R. | Stechow Vs Montague, R. | I 44 Types/Stechow: Definition/Linguistics/Stechow: Example for definition of a definition using the semantic ranges defined by types: e.g. for an adjective and a prepositional phrase: "in". Logical Type/Linguistics/Stechow: is a semantic feature of a category symbol. Montague/Stechow: acts as if each syntactic category has exactly one logical type and therefore writes only the categories. He has made this popular. StechowVsMontague: but this is not possible, because a syntactic category does not only correspond to a logical type. Problem: for example, the nomina Fritz, student, father these probably have different meanings: Fritz: designates something of type e, student: type ep, father: Tap e(ep). Then there must also be three different noun categories for Montague. Since we only accept one noun category, we must already write the types in the lexicon. I 104 Intensional Functional Application/IFA/Intensor/Heim/KratzerVsMontague: the intensor can be replaced by the composition principle of the intesional functional application. (Intensional Functional Application): in the metalanguage it does what the interpretation of the intensor does. This makes the calculations simpler: for example Since Montague places a node before each argument, this saves a lot of money. 105 Extensional Functional Application/FA/Montague: with him you first have to dismantle the Intensor and then the FA Intensional Functional Application/Heim/Kratzer: merges both steps. 150 Lambda Abstraction/Stechow: can already be found in Frege (1884)! 151 Quantifying in/Montague/Stechow: Example Each rule consists of a syntactic and a semantic operation. Syntactic operation/Stechow: has always been very simple: just write side by side. Montagues syntactic operation f14,2 is much more complicated: take the first argument of the function (here "every linguist") and replace the first occurrence of the pronoun "him" in the second argument by this expression. The semantics of this rule is of course exactly the semantics of our quantifier relation. I.e. we apply the meaning of the quantifier to the meaning of the λ-abstract that we form from the second expression. VsMontague: Problem: there are infinitely many rules of quantifying in, one for each natural number. This is because we can choose any index for a pronoun. Lambda Calculus/Stechow: you can do almost anything with it. The original work does not contain semantics. (Lit: Lambek, 1958). 152 Type/Not/Stechow: cannot have the type (st)t, then it is a sentence adverb. Or (s(et)(et), then it is a VP modifier. ((s) > narrow range/>wide range). |
A. von Stechow I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006) |
| Russell, B. | Hintikka Vs Russell, B. | II 165 On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: with phrases that stand for genuine constituents of propositions. Problem/Frege: failure of substitutivity of identity (SI) in intensional contexts. Informative Identity/Frege: the fact that identity can even sometimes be informative is connected to this. EG/Existential Generalization/Russell: it, too, may fail in in intensional contexts, (problem of empty terms). HintikkaVsRussell: he does not recognize the depth of the problem and rather circumvents the problems of denoting terms. E.g. The bald king of France/Russell: Problem: we cannot prove by existential generalization that there is a present king of France. HintikkaVsRussell: But there are also other problems. (see below for ambiguity of cross world identificaiton). Description/Russell/Hintikka: Def Primary Description: the substitutivity of identity applies to them (SI) Def secondary description: for them, substitutivity of identity (SI) fails. II 166 Existential Generalization/Russell: two readings: (1) George IV did not know whether Scott was the author of Waverley. Description/Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: "the author of Waverley": (ix)A(x) primarily: the description has the following power: (2) (Ex)[A(x) & (y) A(y) > y = x) & ~ George IV knew that (Scott = x)]. ((s) notation: quantifier here always normal existential quantifier, mirrored E). I.e. the quantifier has the maximum range in the primary identification. The second reading is more likely, however: Secondary: (3) ~George IV knew that (Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x & (Scott = x)]. ((s) narrow range): Range/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is also a third option for the range of a quantifier ((s) >"medium range"/Kripke). (4) ~(Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x ) & George IV knew that (Scott = x)]. II 166 Existential Generalization/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not see that there was a reason for the failure of the existential generalization, which is not caused by the non-existence of the object. E.g. (5) George IV knew that the author of Waverley is the author of Waverley. a) trivial interpretation: I 167 (6) George IV knew that (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x)) everyday language translation: he knew that one and only one person wrote Waverley. I 166 b) non-trivial interpretation: (7) (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x) & George IV knew that (A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x))). ((s) no quantifier after "knew that everyday language translation: George knew of the only person who actually wrote Waverley, that they did. Because knowledge implies truth, (7) is equivalent to (8) (Ex) George IV knew that (Ez)(A(z) & (y)(A(y) > y = z) & x = z). this is equivalent to. (9) (Ex) George IV knew that (the author of Waverley = x) Here, the description has secondary (narrow) range. Everyday language translation: George knew who the author of Waverley is. I 167 Knowledge/Who/What/Where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze structures of the form knows + W-sentence. General: (10) a knows, who (Ex x) is so that A(x) becomes (11) (Ex) a knows that A(x). Hintikka: this is only possible if we modify Russell’s approach: Problem: the existential generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be attributed to non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed by Russell’s Theory of Descriptions (ThoD). Problem: for every person, there are a lot of people whose names they know and of whose existence they know, but of who they do not know who they are. II 168 E.g. Charles Dodgson was for Queen Victoria someone of whom she had heard, but whom she did not know. Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10), the following applies. (12) ~(Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x) But that’s trivially false, even according to Russell. Because the following is certainly true: (13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson) Existential Generalization/EG: then yields (14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x) So exactly the negation of (12) contradiction. II 168 Descriptions/Hintikka: are not involved here. Therefore, Russell’s description theory cannot help here, either. E.g. we can also assume that Victoria knew of the existence of Dodgson. Empty Terms/Empty Names: are therefore not the problem, either. Ontology/Hintikka: so our problem gets an ontological aspect. Existential Generalization/EG/Being/Quine/Ontology/Hintikka: the question of whether existential generalization may be applied on a singular term "b", E.g. in a context "F(b)", is the same as whether b may be value of a bound variable. Existential Generalization/Hintikka: does not fail here because of non-existence. II 169 We are dealing with the following problems here: Manifestation used by a) no SI Frege, Russell b) no EG (i) due to non-existence Russell (ii) because of ambiguity Hintikka Ambiguity/Solution/Hintikka: possible worlds semantics. E.g. (12) - (14) the problem is not that Dodgson did not exist in the actual world or not in one of Victoria’s worlds of knowledge, but that the name Dodgson singles out different individuals in different possible worlds. Hence (14) does not follow from (13). II 170 Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Clarity/Russell/Hintikka: Which way would have been open to Russell?. Knowing-Who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself very often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge, who did something with the existence of another individual, which is known to have done... + ... II 173 Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: Important argument: an ingenious feature of Russell’s theory of denotation from 1905 is that it is the quantifiers that denote! Theory of Denotation/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") includes the reduction of descriptions to objects of acquaintance. II 174 Hintikka: this relation is amazing, it also seems to be circular to allow only objects of acquaintance. Solution: We need to see what successfully denoting expressions (phrases) actually denote: they precisely denote objects of acquaintance. Ambiguity/Clarity/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization. Existential Generalization/Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: his own example shows that only objects of acquaintance are allowed: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is in fact a primary incident i.e. his example (2). "Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "if" instead of "did not know". (secondary?). Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed like this: that George wanted to know of the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott. II 175 That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (in the distance) and had asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell select an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not usually deal with beings of flesh and blood whose identity is known to us, instead of only with objects of perception?. Knowing Who/Knowing What/Perception Object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely with perception objects it seems as if the kind of clarity that we need for a knowing-who, is not just given. Identifcation/Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in my approach Dodgson is a bona fide individual iff. he is one and the same individual in all worlds of knowledge of Victoria. I.e. identifiable iff. (15) (E.g.) in all relevant possible worlds it is true that (Dodgson = x). Problem: What are the relevant possible worlds?. II 178 Quantifier/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell systematically confuses two types of quantifiers. (a) of acquaintance, b) of description). Problem: Russell has not realized that the difference cannot be defined solely in terms of the actual world!. Solution/Hintikka: we need a relativization to sets of possible worlds that change with the different propositional attitudes. II 179 RussellVsHintikka: he would not have accepted my representation of his position like this. HintikkaVsRussell: but the reason for this merely lies in a further error of Russell’s: I have not attributed to him what he believed, but what he should have believed. Quantification/Russell/Hintikka: he should have reduced to objects of acquaintance. Russell believed, however, it was sufficient to eliminate expressions that seemingly denote objects that are not such of acquaintance. Important argument: in that his quantifiers do not enter any ontological commitment. Only denoting expressions do that. Variable/Russell/Hintikka: are only notational patterns in Russell. Ontological Commitment/Quine/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell did not recognize the ontological commitment that 1st order languages bring with them. Being/Ontology/Quine: "Being means being value of a bound variable". HintikkaVsRussell: he has realized that. II 180 Elimination/Eliminability/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in order to eliminate merely seemingly denoting descriptions one must assume that the quantifiers and bound variables go over individuals that are identified by way of description. ((s) Object of the >Description). Otherwise, the real Bismarck would not be a permissible value of the variables with which we express that there is an individual of a certain species. Problem: then these quantifiers may not be constituents of propositions, because their value ranges do not only consist of objects of acquaintance. Therefore, Russell’s mistake was twofold. Quantifier/Variable/Russell/Hintikka, 1905, he had already stopped thinking that quantifiers and bound variables are real constituents of propositions. Def Pseudo Variable/Russell/Hintikka: = bound variable. Acquaintance/Russell: values of the variable should only be objects of acquaintance. (HintikkaVsRussell). Quantifiers/HintikkaVsRussell: now we can see why Russell did not differentiate between different quantifiers (acquaintance/description): For him quantifiers were only notational patterns, and for them the range of possible interpretations need not be determined, therefore it makes no difference if the rage changes!. Quantification/Russell: for him, it was implicitly objectional (referential), and in any event not substitutional. Peacocke I 190 Possible Worlds/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: R. is unable to explain the cases in which we quantify in belief contexts (!) where (according to Hintikka) the quantifier over "publicly descriptively identified" particulars is sufficient. Hintikka: compares with a "roman à clef". Peacocke: it is not clear that (whether) this could not be explained by Russell as cases of general ideas, so that the person with such and such characteristics is so and so. Universals/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: we are familiar with universals and they are constituents of our thoughts. HintikkaVsRussell: this is a desperate remedy to save the principle of acquaintance. PeacockeVsRussell: his arguments are also very weak. Russell: E.g. we cannot understand the transitivity of "before" if we are not acquainted with "before", and even less what it means that one thing is before another. While the judgment depends on a consciousness of a complex, whose analysis we do not understand if we do not understand the terms used. I 191 PeacockeVsRussell: what kind of relationship should exist between subject and universal?. Solution: the reformulated PB: Here we can see to which conditions a term is subject, similar to the principle of sensitivity in relational givenness. I 192 HintikkaVsRussell: ("On denoting what?", 1981, p.167 ff): the elimination of objects with which the subject is not familiar from the singular term position is not sufficient for the irreducibility of acquaintance that Russell had in mind. Quantification/Hintikka: the quantifiers will still reach over objects with which the subject is not familiar. But such quantifiers cannot be constituents of propositions, if that is to be compatible with the PB. Because they would certainly occur through their value range Occur and these do not consist of particulars with which one is familiar. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| |||