Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appearance | Adorno | Grenz I 74 Appearance/Adorno/Grenz: Appearance is only really taken seriously if it is recognized as wrong and still recognized as a regulative idea. Only then it is made true. >Regulative idea. Ideology/Adorno: the idea of the right life can arise only in the wrong ideological. >Negation/Adorno, >Truth/Adorno, >Truth content/Adorno, >History/Adorno, >Progress/Adorno, >Appearance/Hegel. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Behavior | Sellars | I 91 Theoretical Terms/observation/Sellars: theoretical terms are defined in behaviorist psychology not only not in terms of open behavior, but neither in terms of nerves, synapses, neuron irritations, etc. A behaviorist theory of behavior is not as such already a physiological explanation of behavior. For a structure of theoretical concepts to be suitable to provide explanations for behavior, it must be impossible to identify the theoretical concepts with the concepts of neurophysiology. >Neuroscience, >Theoretical terms, >Behaviorism, >Observation sentences, >Observation language. However, you operate under a certain regulative ideal, the ideal of a coherent system. The behavioral theory is not fixed from the outset to a physiological identification of all its concepts. >Physical/psychic. --- II 325 Action>Sellars: fundamental beliefs are expressed in uniformity of behavior. >Regularities. This does not mean that no deviations are possible, but only that the representation of a principle is in any case also characterized by uniformity of behavior. >Principles. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Consensus | Deliberative Democracy | Gaus I 160 Consensus/Deliberative democracy/Bohman: for some proponents of deliberative democracy, a strong distinction between reasoned argumentation and mere discussion provides the basis for the claim that deliberation must be oriented to consensus (Habermas, 1996(1); Cohen, 1997(2)). Deliberation is not merely discourse or dialogue, Cohen argues, because it must be 'reasoned', that is based on 'public argument and reasoning among equal citizens' that yield the single best answer (1997(2): 74). VsHabermas/VsCohen: Critics often charge that both of these claims are exclusionary and lead to undemocratic consequences under the Gaus I 161 circumstance of background injustice and pervasive inequalities. It might seem that an orientation to consensus is not a requirement of deliberation, even if it may function as a regulative ideal. Deliberation must at least resemble argumentation to the extent that it is a matter of giving and asking for reasons. The reasons that make a decision acceptable ought to be distinguished from modes by which they are communicated. Democratic standards demanded for decisions need not apply to the medium of communication as such, and not all formal public spheres need to be ideally inclusive. This means that formal theories of communication and rationality cannot decide in advance precisely what modes and forms of communication are empirically appropriate in various settings. >Deliberative democracy/Dryzek, cf. >Argumentation/Crosswhite. Gaus I 161 Bohman: (...) disagreement is precisely what makes democratic deliberation not only necessary, but also fruitful and productive when tested through the variety of perspectives typical of a diverse and pluralistic audience. Argumentative discourse need not presuppose unanimity, or seek consensus, but rather places conflicts within a mutually constructed space of reasons. >Argumentation/Crosswhite. This fact of disagreement raises the issue of whether or not public deliberation is 'oriented to con- sensus'. Consensus is meant here to contrast with mere aggregation of preferences in voting and with bargaining or compromise. Certainly, if democracy were only voting and bargaining, it would lack the self-critical testing and responsiveness of reason giving and discourse; the problems of the tyranny of the majority and aggregation problems of social choice would undermine the effectiveness of Gaus I 162 Democracy and its claims to ligitimacy. >Consensus/Discourse theories. 1. Habermas, Jürgen (1996) Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2. Cohen, Joshua (1997) 'Deliberation and democratic legitimacy'. In J. Bohman and W. Rehg, eds, Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Bohman, James 2004. „Discourse Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Consensus | Discourse Theories | Gaus I 160 Consensus/deliberative democracy/Discourse theories/Bohman: for some proponents of deliberative democracy, a strong distinction between reasoned argumentation and mere discussion provides the basis for the claim that deliberation must be oriented to consensus (Habermas, 1996(1); Cohen, 1997(2)). Deliberation is not merely discourse or dialogue, Cohen argues, because it must be 'reasoned', that is based on 'public argument and reasoning among equal citizens' that yield the single best answer (1997(2): 74). VsHabermas/VsCohen: Critics often charge that both of these claims are exclusionary and lead to undemocratic consequences under the Gaus I 161 circumstance of background injustice and pervasive inequalities. It might seem that an orientation to consensus is not a requirement of deliberation, even if it may function as a regulative ideal. Deliberation must at least resemble argumentation to the extent that it is a matter of giving and asking for reasons. The reasons that make a decision acceptable ought to be distinguished from modes by which they are communicated. Democratic standards demanded for decisions need not apply to the medium of communication as such, and not all formal public spheres need to be ideally inclusive. This means that formal theories of communication and rationality cannot decide in advance precisely what modes and forms of communication are empirically appropriate in various settings. >Deliberative democracy/Dryzek. Gaus I 162 Habermas: Habermas thinks that participants in argumentation must be guided by the ideal of a single right answer to which all agree 'for the same reasons' (1996(1): ch. 8; Bohman and Rehg, 1996)(3). VsHabermas: He may well be correct that an overly agonistic conception of public discourse would undermine the epistemic basis for claims to democratic legitimacy, that is, that democratic deliberation is legitimate and not only is a fair process, but is more likely to find the most equitable and true outcome (Estlund, 1997)(4). For all its attractions to critics of deliberation, agonistic debate is no less open to the charge of elitism (Benhabib, 1991)(5), and even less based on the sort of co-operation needed to resolve conflict mutually. >Argumentation/Crosswhite. 1. Habermas, Jürgen (1996) Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2. Cohen, Joshua (1997) 'Deliberation and democratic legitimacy'. In J. Bohman and W. Rehg, eds, Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 3. Bohman, James and William Rehg (1996) 'Discourse and democracy: the formal and informal bases of democratic legitimacy'. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 4 (l): 79_99. 4. Estlund, David (1997) 'Beyond fairness and deliberation: the epistemic dimension of democratic authority'. In J. Bohman and W. Rehg, eds, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 5. Benhabib, Seyla (1991) Situating the Self London: Routledge. Bohman, James 2004. „Discourse Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Foundation | Kant | Adorno XIII 65 Foundation/Kant/Adorno: Kant, as a critical thinker, denied the use of the forms of consciousness beyond the possibility of experience, constitutive meaning. I cannot extract absolute things, being, absolute truth, existential judgment, above all the category of being itself from (...) pure forms of thought insofar as they are not related to an experience material. Solution/Kant: Regulative Ideas. Ideas, regulative/Kant/Adorno: regulative ideas are the regulative principles of our reason, which we cannot claim as valid, but which we must demand or postulate. >Ideas/Kant, >Principles/Kant, >Regulative idea/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Ideas | Kant | Strawson V 190 Dynamic idea/Kant: E.g. un-caused cause - Ideal of pure reason. V 191 Ideas of Reason/Kant: are projection of goals, wise author, final unit - prerequisite of knowledge, not knowledge. --- Vaihinger I 269 Ideas/Kant/Vaihinger: are "regulative principles of pure reason" - neither inside nor outside the experience - they are "just rules" for the mind - they show it imaginary points of reference. Vaihinger I 273 Ideas (e.g. God) are not inscrutable - because they are in the nature of reason. Vaihinger I 275 Idea/Kant/Vaihinger: not merely deception - but expedient - proof of expediency: the deduction. Vaihinger I 280 Causality/Idea/God/Kant/Vaihinger: I only take the idea of such a (highest) being as a basis, to consider the phenomena to be systematically linked to each other according to the analogy of a causal determination. >Apprehension/Kant. Vaihinger I 281 Rational idea/Kant/Vaihinger: rational ideas are not hypotheses - otherwise I would pledge myself thereby already to know about the nature of a cause of the world and another world, than I could really proof. Ideas/Kant: reason terms without object. Vaihinger I 301 Ideas/Kant/Vaihinger: E.g. people - e.g. God - (mere ideas) - (s.o.) things in themselves - freedom. >God/Kant, >Freedom/Kant. --- Vendler I 251 Regulative ideas/Kant: (E.g. language and thought themselves) can never lead to synthetic propositions a priori. --- Adorno XIII 66 Ideas/Kant/Adorno: Ideas such as God, freedom, and immortality are not only regulative ideas to which our thinking is directed, but terms which are necessary because, without them, something like proper action cannot be conceived. >Regulative ideas. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Vaihinger I H. Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924 Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Unity | Historism | Gadamer I 212 Unity/History/Historicism/Gadamer: If the reality of history is conceived as a game of forces, this thought is obviously not enough to make its unity necessary. Even what Herder and Humboldt were led by - the ideal of the richness of phenomena of the human, does not as such establish true unity. It must be something that, in the continuity of events, turns out to be a guiding goal. In fact, the place occupied in the historical-philosophical eschatologies of religious origin and in their secularized variations is here at first empty(1). No pre-opinion about the meaning of history is to be formed before the exploration of it. Nevertheless, the self-evident precondition of its exploration is that it forms a unity. Thus Droysen can explicitly recognize the idea of the unity of world history itself - even if it is not a substantive idea of Providence's plan - as a regulative idea. Meanwhile there is a further precondition included in this postulate, which determines its content. The idea of the unity of world history includes the uninterrupted continuity of the development of world history. This idea of continuity is also initially formal in nature and does not imply any concrete content. It too is like an a priori of research, inviting us to delve deeper and deeper into the intertwining of the world-historical context. In this respect it is only to be judged as a methodological naivety of Ranke when he speaks of the "admirable continuity" of historical development(2). What he really means by this is not at all this structure of continuity itself, but rather the content-related things that are formed in this continuous development. >Unity/Ranke, >Continuity/Ranke. Gadamer I 214 HistoricismVsHegel: (...) the historical school was not able to accept Hegel's justification of the unity of world history by the concept of the spirit. That in the completed self-consciousness of the historical present the path of the spirit to itself is completed, which constitutes the meaning of history - that is an eschatological self-interpretation, which basically abolishes history in the speculative concept. Instead, the historical school saw itself forced into a theological understanding of itself. If it did not want to suspend its own nature of thinking of itself as progressive research, it had to relate its own finite and limited knowledge to a divine spirit, to whom things are known in their perfection. Ranke/Gadamer: It is the old ideal of infinite understanding, which is still applied here even to the knowledge of history. Thus Ranke writes: "The God - if I may dare to make this remark - I think to myself in such a way that, since no time lies ahead of him, he overlooks the entire historical humanity in its entirety and finds it equally worthy everywhere"(3). Gadamer: Here the idea of the infinite mind (intellectus infinitus), for whom everything is at once (omnia simul) transformed into the archetype of historical justice. The historian who knows all epochs and all historical phenomena equally before God comes close to him. Thus the consciousness of the historian represents the perfection of human self-consciousness. The more he succeeds in recognizing the own indestructible value of every phenomenon, and that is to say: to think historically, the more godlike he thinks(4). For this very reason Ranke has compared the office of a historian with that of a priest. "Directness to God" is for the Lutheran Ranke the actual content of the Christian message. 1. Cf. K. Löwith, Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen (Stuttgart 1953), and my article „Geschichtsphilosophie“ in RGG3. 2. Ranke, Weltgeschichte IX, 2 Xlll. 3. Ranke, Weltgeschichte IX, 2, p. 5, p. 7. 4. »Denn das ist gleichsam ein Teil des göttlichen Wissens« (Ranke, ed. Rothacker p. 43, similar to p. 52). |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Behaviorism | Sellars Vs Behaviorism | I 89 Behaviorism/Sellars: does not analyze existing psychological concepts but constructs new concepts. Also does not deny the privileged access. Also does not deny that these mental states can be adequately described with everyday words such as "Belief", "Doubt", "Desires" and so on. It also does not deny that there is such a thing as introspection, nor that it is at least halfway reliable. (However, not according to the image of perception). It works on the basis of everyday mental concepts. I 90 Besides that behaviorism recommends to start all over again with the conceptualization. The scientific behaviorism does not defend the thesis that folk psychological concepts can be attributed to behavioral concepts ("Philosophical" behaviorism). It rather says: maybe not mentalistic concepts, but the concepts used by me can be attributed to behavior. SellarsVsBehaviorism: e.g. just as little as chemistry was calculated on the basis of concepts that can be explicitly defined by recourse to the observable properties and behavior of chemical substances. I 91 That concludes that some behaviorist concepts must be introduced as theoretical concepts! Theoretical Termini/Sellars: are not only not defined in behaviorist psychology in terms of open behavior but also just as little in terms of nerves, synapses, neurons irritation, etc.! A behaviorist theory of behavior is not already as such a physiological explanation of behavior. So that a structure of theoretical concepts is suitable to provide explanations for behavior, the theoretical concepts do not have to be identified with the concepts of neurophysiology. However, it operates under a certain regulative ideal, the ideal of a coherent system. The behavioral theory is not fixed from the start to a physiological identification of all their concepts. I XXIX Methodological Behaviorism/Sellars: VsLogical Behaviorism. I XXX Logical Behaviorism/Sellars: is essentially a thesis on the importance of mental terms. Carnap, Hempel: they concentrated mainly on "pain" as a psychological predicate. PutnamVsLogical Behaviorism: e.g. "Superspartans" who never express their pain in any form. I XXXI Ryle: tried to analyze all mental predicates as the expressions of behavioral dispositions. However, as theoretical concepts disposition expressions cannot easily be identified with the conditions for verification of a disposition. Carnap: intelligence test: someone may fail without us denying him at once any intelligence. Carnap here VsLogical Behaviorism: otherwise you would indeed be forced to define the intelligence through test conditions as the logical behaviorism had assumed. Def Methodological Behaviorism/SellarsVsRyle/Sellars: admittedly introduces mental terms in reference to the observable behavior but does not hold onto the fact that these terms should be defined in reference to the behavior. (Or, what is the same: that psychological statements must be fully translated into statements about observable behavior). |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Kant | Strawson Vs Kant | Rorty VI 359 StrawsonVskKant/Rorty: shows that thanks to the progress since Kant some concepts are no longer that attractive: e.g. "in the mind", "created by the mind" (Wittgenstein, Ryle have dissuaded us from this). --- Strawson V 9 StrawsonVsKant: appears to violate his own principles by attempting to set sense limits from a point which is outside of them, and that, if they are properly marked, cannot exist. --- V 16 Continuous determination/Kant/Strawson: everywhere through the mind guaranteed applicability of the concepts. StrawsonVsKant: seed for the disastrous model of determination of the whole universe. --- V 19 StrawsonVsKant: this one had unlimited confidence in a certain complicated and symmetrical scheme, which he freely adopted from the formal logic as he understood it, and forced upon this the whole extent of his material. --- V 23 StrawsonVsKant: this one is constantly trying to squeeze out more of the arguments in the analogies than there is. --- V 25 StrawsonVsKant: the whole deduction is logically incorrect. The connection to the analysis is thin and is, if at all, brought about by the concept of "synthesis". --- V 37 Dialectic/Kant: primary goal: exposing the metaphysical illusion. Instrument: the principle of sense. Certain ideas that do not have any empirical application, are sources of appearance, yet they can have a useful or even necessary function for the extension of empirical knowledge. E.g. we think of internal states of affair, as if they were states of affair of an immaterial substance. ("regulative ideas"). StrawsonVsKant: which is obviously quite implausible. But why did he represent it? --- V 29 StrawsonVsKant: It is not clear that there is no empirical mediation of antinomies. --- V 32 Kant: I really appear to myself in the time but I do not really appear to myself in time. StrawsonVsKant: incomprehensible what "to appear" means here. It is no defense of an incomprehensible doctrine to say that its incomprehensibility is guaranteed by a product obtained from its principle. --- V 33/34 Space/time/StrawsonVsKant: Kant: things themselves not in space and time. Strawson: thereby the whole doctrine becomes incomprehensible. --- V 35 Synthetically a priori/StrawsonVsKant: Kant himself has no clear conception of what he means with it. The whole theory is not necessary. Instead, we should focus on an exploration and refining of our knowledge and social forms. --- V 36 Limit/StrawsonVsKant: to set the coherent thinking limits it is not necessary to think from both sides of these limits as Kant tried despite his denials. --- V 49 Space/Kant: our idea of space is not recovered from the experience, because the experience already presupposes the space. StrawsonVsKant: that is simply tautological. If "to presuppose" means more than a simple tautology, then the argument is not enlightening. --- V 50 StrawsonVsKant: he himself admits that it is contradictory to represent a relational view of space and time and to deny its transcendental ideality at the same time. --- V 58 StrawsonVsKant: there are the old debates about "inherent" ideas of space and time. They are unclear. There is the argument that the acquisition of skills presupposes the ability to acquire skills. Experience/space/time/properties/Kant/Strawson: problem: the manifestation of the corresponding trait in experience, his appearance in the world, can be ascribed only to our cognitive abilities, the nature of our skills, not to the things themselves. StrawsonVsKant: problem: then these ideas must themselves be prior to all experience in us. --- V 66 Categories/Strawson: we have to understand them here in the way that to the forms of logic the thought of their application is added in judgments. StrawsonVsKant: his subdivision of the categories puts quite a bit on the same level, which certainly cannot be regarded as equivalent as e.g. affirmative, negative, infinite. --- V 73 StrawsonVsKant: he thinks it is due to the (failed) metaphysical deduction (see above) entitled to identify "pure" concepts. --- V 75 StrawsonVsKant: why should the objects of consciousness not be understood as realities that are distinguished from the experiences of consciousness existence, even if sequence and arrangement coincide point by point with the experiences of consciousness? --- V 83 StrawsonVsKant: unity of the different experiences requires experience of objects. Can his thesis withstand the challenge? Why should not objects (accusatives) form such a sequence that no differentiation between their order and the corresponding experiences has to be made? E.g. Such items may be sensory data: red, round spots, tickling, smells, lightning, rectangles. --- V 84 Why should the terms not simply be such sensory quality concepts? StrawsonVsKant: it is very easy to imagine that experience exactly has this sort of unrelated impressions as its content. Impressions that neither require nor permit, to become "united in the concept of an object". StrawsonVsKant: the problem with the objects of experience is that their ESSE is at the same time entirely their percipi how their percipi nothing but their ESSE. That is, there is no real reason for distinguishing between the two. --- V 106 Room/persistence/Kant: The space alone is persistent. Any time determination presupposes something persistent. StrawsonVsKant: unclear. For the concept of self-consciousness the internal temporal relations of the sequence are completely insufficient. We need at least the idea of a system of temporal relations, which includes more than these experiences themselves. But there is no access for the subject itself to this broader system than by its own experiences. --- V 107 StrawsonVsKant: there is no independent argument that the objective order must be a spatial order. --- V 116 Causality/StrawsonVsKant: its concept is too rough. Kant is under the impression that he is dealing with a single application of a single concept of "necessity", but he shifts in his application, the meaning of this concept. The required sequence of perceptions is a conceptual, but the necessary sequence of changes is a causal one. --- V 118 Analogies/StrawsonVsKant: fundamental problem: the conditions of the possibility of objective determination of time. Possible objects/Kant: Problem: whether there should be a "at the same time" or "not at the same time" of possible and actually perceived objects. If there is no "at the same time", there can be no distinction made between possible and real objects. --- V 124 Pure space/Kant: is itself not an object of empirical perception. StrawsonVsKant: element of deceptive logic: Kant seems to think that certain formal properties of the uniform spatiotemporal frame must have direct correlates in the objects themselves. --- V 128 StrawsonVsKant: its entire treatment of objectivity is under considerable restriction, he relies nowhere on the factor onto which, for example, Wittgenstein strongly insists: the social nature of our concepts. --- V 157 StrawsonVsKant: but assuming that the physical space is euclidic, the world could be finite in an otherwise infinite empty space. And that would be no meaningless question. --- V 163 Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: from the fact that it seems to be the case that there are things which are ordered in time or space in a certain way, it does not follow that it either seems that all things appear as members of a limited series, neither that it seems that all things exist as members of an infinite series. In fact, neither of the two members of the disjunction is true. --- V 164 Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: certainly the notion of a sequential order is justified, but it does not follow that the concept for the "whole series" of things must apply. --- V 178 Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: he was mistaken that the antinomies are the field, on which the decisive battles are fought. --- V 184 Existence/Kant: "necessity of existence can only be recognized from the connection with what is perceived according to general laws of experience." StrawsonVsKant: this is a deviation from the critical resolution of antinomies and has to do with the interests of "pure practical reason": that is, with morality and the possibility of free action. --- V 194 StrawsonVsKant: we can draw the conclusion from the assertion that when a being of endless reality exists, it does not exists contingently, not reverse in that way that if something exists contingently, it is a character of endless reality. --- V 222 Transcendental idealism/Kant: claims, he is an empirical realism. Confidence must include an awareness of certain states of consciousness independent of objects. StrawsonVsKant: this is certainly a dualistic realism. This dualism questions the "our". --- V 249 StrawsonVsKant: to say that a physical object has the appearance, a kind of appearance of a physical character, means, trying to brighten an unclear term by another dubious, namely the one of the visual image. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Katz, J. | Vendler Vs Katz, J. | I 260 Translation/Wittgenstein: was aware of these difficulties: he did not forbid the translation of his works, but insisted that they should only be printed together with the German original. Translation/Philosophy/Language/Vendler: in Hungarian the use of the copula is limited. Should one conclude from this that a Hungarian cannot understand Aristotle's being? Necessary Truth/Translation: For example, "You cannot know anything wrong" is true in all languages, provided it has been well translated! It is a necessary truth. (Vendler: Tautology). ((s) HegelVs: there can be false knowledge, e.g. incorrect gemoetrical figures (Preface of Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes). >Knowledge/Frith, >deception/Frith. One can find necessary truths embedded in individual languages. Thus one can come to necessary conclusions. But that does not give much. The regulative idea of language and thinking in itself gives nothing here. But this does not mean that we are trapped in the conceptual system of our mother tongue. We have already freed ourselves from terms like "magic power" etc. in the past. I 261 The philosopher, of course, makes suggestions for improving the imprecise natural language. But he does it in his natural language! I 262 Katz: Thesis: we may only consider those aspects of a language to be philosophically relevant that are common to all languages. VendlerVsKatz: In view of the above, I see no need for this. |
Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Metaphysical Realism | Putnam Vs Metaphysical Realism | VI 390 Truth/metaphysical realism/Putnam: thesis: truth is not radically epistemic. Because we could all be brains in a vat, even the most beautiful and most ideal, simplest and most conservative theory could be wrong. Verification/metaphysical realism: then "verified" implies not "true". Peircean Realism/Putnam: thesis: there is an ideal theory (weaker: than a regulative idea that is presupposed by the terms "true" and "objective"). PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: I criticize precisely the characteristic that distinguishes it from Peirce's realism. E.g. T1: is an ideal theory as we understand it. We imagine that it has any property except for objective truth; e.g. it is complete, consistent, predicts observations accurately (as we see and meets all "operational restrictions", it is "beautiful", "simple", etc. Putnam: thesis: T1 may still be wrong. E.g. WORLD/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Suppose, it can be divided into an infinite number of parts. And T1 says that there are infinitely many parts in it, so that it is "objectively correct" in this regard. T1: is consistent (by hypothesis) and has only finite models. Completeness Theorem: according to it, T1 has a model for every infinite cardinality. M: is a model with the same cardinality as the WORLD. (This is finite.) The particulars of M are mapped one to one to the parts of the WORLD. We use this mapping to define the relations of M directly in the WORLD. SAT: is then the result of it: a fulfillment relationship, a "correspondence" between the terms of L and sets of parts of the WORLD. ((s) sets because of the predicates). Truth: the theory results then in "true" when we interpret "true" as "TRUE(SAT)". (I 403 thereby SAT is of the same logical type as "satisfied" and TRUE(SAT) is defined in terms of SAT like "true" is defined in terms of "satisfied" with Tarski). VI 391 TRUE(SAT): is then the property of the truth, determined by the relation SAT. ideal theory: Question: what becomes of the claim that even the ideal theory could be wrong" in reality"? Solution: It may be that SAT is not the intended correspondence relation (unintended model). "Intended"/Putnam: what does it mean in this case? T1 meets all operational limitations. E.g. if "there is a cow in front of me at this and this point of time" belongs to T1, VI 392 then that will naturally appear true when there is a cow in front of me. But SAT is a true interpretation of T. Definition operational conditions/Putnam/(s): that a sentence can be falsified if the object does not have the properties that the sentence attributes to it. T1 is TRUE(SAT). Thus, the sentence is "true" in this sense, in the sense of TRUE(SAT). On the other hand: if "there is a cow in front of me at this and this point of time" is operationally "wrong" (falsified), then the sentence is FALSE(/ SAT). Reference: thus, it meets the "operational conditions". theoretical conditions: the interpretation of "reference" as SAT meets all theoretical conditions for reference. N.B.: so the "ideal" theory T1 becomes true. ((s) Problem: We wanted to ask how it can be wrong according to the metaphysical realism). unintended: question: what additional conditions are there for reference, that could SAT pick out as "unintended" and a different interpretation as intended? Putnam: thesis, the assumption that even an "ideal" theory could be wrong "in reality", should then be incomprehensible. Causal theory/reference/metaphysical realism/Putnam: a causal theory of reference would not help here, because how "cause" should clearly refer, is, according to the metaphysical realism, as much a mystery as "cow" can clearly refer. VI 393 Reference/anti-realism/verificationism/Dummett/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Understanding/anti-realism/Dummett: thesis, the theory of understanding should be operated in terms of verification and falsification. DummettVsPhenomenalism/Putnam: new: is that there is no "base" of "hard facts" (for example, sense-data) with respect to which one ultimately uses truth-conditional semantics, logic and realistic terms of truth and falsehood. Understanding/Dummett: understanding a sentence is to know what would be its verification. Analogy: for the intuitionism: knowing the constructive proof, is to understand a mathematical proposition. Assertibility condition/assertibility/Dummett: then E.g. "I see a cow" is only assertible if it is verified. Verification/Dummett/Putnam. N.B.: we say the sentence is verified when it is pronounced > Firth: Definition self-affirmation/Roderick Firth/Putnam: E.g. "I see a cow" is self-affirmative. It is thus verified when it is pronounced. This does not mean that it is incorrigible. It also does not have to be completely determined (bivalent). Facts/Dummett/Putnam: thesis: in this sense (the "self-affirmation of observation sentences" (Firth)) all facts are "soft". VI 394 N.B.: thereby, the realistic terms of truth and falsity are not used. N.B.: the problem how the "only correct" reference ratio is identified, does not arise. Because the term "reference" is not used. Reference: can we introduce it à la Tarski, but then ""cow" refers to cows" becomes a tautology and understanding this sentence needs no metaphysical realism. Facts/verificationism/Dummett/Putnam: one should not operate the verificationist semantics in terms of "hard facts". (Neither the one of sense data). Otherwise you could repeat all objections VsMetaphysical Realism on the level that the meta language gets incomprehensible (which would be an equivalent to Wittgenstein's private language argument). (?). Solution/Dummett: we need to apply the verificationism also in the meta language and the meta-meta language etc. Understanding/truth condition/Dummett/Putnam: Dummett and I both agree that you cannot treat understanding as knowledge of the truth conditions. Problem: then it gets incomprehensible vice-versa in what this knowledge should be. Meaning/meaning theory/PutnamVsDummett: but I do not think that a theory of understanding could be the entire meaning theory. VI 395 VsMetaphysical realism: thus, we can refute it with Dummett. (with a theory of reference, not meaning theory). Realism/Putnam: then it is not wrong per se, but only the metaphysical, which was just a picture anyway. (So you could say at least). Solution: Internal realism is all we need. Problem: that is not the whole story: Peirce: the metaphysical realism collapses at a certain point, and this point tells us something, because it is precisely this point at which the metaphysical realism claims to be distinguishable from Peirce's realism . (That is, from the proposition that there is an ideal theory). PeirceVsMetaphysical realism/PutnamVsPeirce: is mistaken when he says that the metaphysical realism collapses at this exact spot. And I, myself, was already wrong in this point. > E.g. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism/PutnamVsPeirce: the metaphysical realism is incoherent elsewhere: E.g. Suppose, the WORLD is merely a straight line. Then you can tell 2 stories about the WORLD: Story 1: there are points. That is, the line has segments which can be infinitely small. The same relation "part of" is valid between points and segments that contain it VI 396 and between segments and large segments. Story 2: there are no points. Line and all segments have expansion. Thus, it is not claimed that story 1 would be wrong, points are simple logical constructions of segments. Speech about points is derived from speech about segments. VI 397 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Problem: when you cannot say how the WORLD theory is independent, the speech of all these descriptions will be empty. Putnam: Quine says that in "Ontological Relativity". E.g. Theory: if we have a complete theory, we can define an equivalence relation (AER): "provable co-extensiveness", with the property that if two terms belong to different equivalence classes (Aeki), no model of the theory refers to the referent, while, if they belong to the same equivalence class, they have the same referent in each model. We take advantage of that. Now, if our view is correct, VI 399 then there is a unique reference maintaining "translation", which connects the two languages. Problem: it is known that there are often not equivalent interpretations of a theory within another theory. Story 1 can be interpreted in Story 2, namely in many different ways. E.g. "points" can be understood as sets of segments with negative power of two. Or sets of segments whose lengths are negative powers of 3. VsMetaphysical Realism/problem: if that was so, there ought to be a fact about which translation "really" contains the reference. Putnam: now we can make the picture again more complicated in order to also address the second objection: we allow that the language has more than one way, how it can be applied to the WORLD. (> way of use). Problem: we can no longer hold onto the image itself. If that, what is a unique set of things within a correct theory, could be "in reality" no definite set, then we have no picture anymore. Internal realism/Putnam: why is it not refuted by all of these? VsInternal Realism: E.g. he might ask, "how do you know that "cow" refers to cows"? After all, there are other interpretations of the language as a whole, which would make an ideal theory true (in your language). VsVs: E.g. Suppose, God gave us the set of all true propositions. That would be the "perfect" theory. Problem: there would still be infinitely many possible interpretations of this perfect theory, which would meet all operational and theoretical conditions. Even the sentence ""cow" refers to cows" would be true in all these interpretations. How do you know then, that it is true in this sense of "true" that there is a unique "intended" interpretation? "How do you know that "cow" refers to cows in the sense of reference to a certain set of things as opposed to a certain set of things in each accessible interpretation?" Putnam: that is precisely the objection of Internal RealismVsMetaphysical Realism, but now in the reverse direction. Reference/internal RealismVsVs: that "cow" refers to cows, follows directly from the definition of reference. It would even be true if the internal realism would be wrong. Relative to the theory, it is a logical truth. not revisable: but it is not absolutely unrevisable that "cow" refers to cows, but to revise it you would have to reject the whole theory. Metaphysical RealismVs: The question is therefore not answered: ""cow" refers to cows" is certainly analytically relative to the theory, but it is about how the theory is understood. That "cow" refers to cows is true in all accessible interpretations, but that was not the question. VI 401 Internal RealismVsMetaphysical Realism/Putnam: the metaphysical realism makes it a mystery how there can be truths a priori, even in the contextual sense, even as a limiting case. An a priori truth must be given by a mysterious intuition. Even E.g. "bachelors are unmarried" would only be a priori due to an intuition. But if it is a "verbal" truth ((s)> "analytical", true because of the meaning of the words) then this is an abbreviation for E.g. "All unmarried men are unmarried. And that is an instance of "all AB are A". And why is that true? VI 404 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism is doomed to a) consider the logic either empirically (i.e. not merely revisable, as I believed, myself) but in the sense that it has no conventional component at all, or b) he must see the logic as a priori in the sense, which cannot be explained by the term of convention. --- Field IV 414 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: (Reason, Truth and History pp 135f, 142f, 210f): Thesis metaphysical realism leads to a dichotomy facts/values. And this leads to relativism and the relativism refutes itself. --- VII 440 Theory Change/truth value/Putnam: not every sentence changes the truth value when it changes from an acceptable theory in another acceptable theory. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: but to set off an image, it suffices to show that his project of a complete description of the world without such sentences that change truth values, is impracticable. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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