Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 22 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstractness | Tugendhat | I 499 Abstract singular terms/Tugendhat: cannot be identified in space and time. - They are a collective terms, which break up into different subject areas with different identity criteria. >Singular terms, >Identity criteria, >Identity, >cf >General terms. I 500 Example 1. attributes 2. states of affairs 3. types 4. institutions and their parts 5. classes 6. numbers >Attributes, >States of affairs, >Type/Token, >Institutions, >Classes. II 97 Abstract terms/Tugendhat: events occur in space and time, but not abstract objects. >Events, >Space, >Time. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Atomism | Simons | I 44 VsAtomism/atomless mereology/Simons: here we need a basis instead: i.e. the objects that fall under the basic predicate. E.g. in the atom-free system, which consists of all regular subsets of real numbers, the open intervals with rational endpoints form a base. Several bases are possible. E.g. the open regular sets in the Euclidean plane can have open circular disks with rational centers and rational radii as base or e.g. open squares, etc. Practically every predicate is possible. This provides a simpler identity criterion and even works in atomism. Basis: e.g. cells are basis for organisms, e.g. functional parts form the basis of a machine. I 341 Monism/Simons: it is not a coincidence that he emphasizes interconnectedness and dependence more. This leads to the "Absolute", the "One True Substance". (>Substance/Hegel). Atomism: atomism stresses disconnectedness and independence and leads to a mere sum ("total") of small independent objects (>World/Leibniz, >World/Wittgenstein). |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Criteria | Henrich | Habermas IV 158 Criteria/Identity/Conditions of Identity/Henrich/Geach/Habermas: Peter Geach argues that identity predicates can only be used meaningfully in connection with the general characterization of a class of objects. (1) HenrichVsGeach: Henrich distinguishes between identity conditions and identity criteria: "It makes no sense to say that an object appears under one description as (the same) number, under another as (different) lines. The black line on the paper, which denotes the number 8, is not this number itself (...). Definition Identity conditions/Henrich: types of objects are fundamentally different from each other. >Identity conditions. Def Identity criteria/Henrich: Identity criteria can individualize [(s)objects] in the area of an object type in different ways.(2) Person/Identification/Habermas: Persons cannot be identified under the same conditions as observable objects. In the case of persons, spatiotemporal identification is not sufficient. The additional conditions depend on it, Habermas IV 159 how the person can even be identified as a person. >Person, >Individuation, >Identification, >Particulars, >Specification, >Objects, >Subjects. 1.P. Geach, Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity, in: K. Munitz, Logic and Ontology, NY. 1973 2. D. Henrich, Identität, in: O. Marquard, K. Stierle, Identität, Poetik und Hermeneutik, Bd. VIII, München, 1979, S. 382 |
Henr I Dieter Henrich Denken und Selbstsein: Vorlesungen über Subjektivität Frankfurt/M. 2016 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Extensionality | Simons | Chisholm II 185 Extensionality/Quine: we assume space time points instead of "durable goods". SimonsVsQuine: language without continuants (permanent object) cannot be learned. Chisholm: probably time and modality, but not temporal or modal components: either a) accept phenomena, refuse extensionality or b) reject phenomena, demand extensionality for real lasting objects. >Entia Sukzessiva. SimonsVsChisholm: it is better to accept Aristotle things with unnecessary parts: trees simply consist of matter. This is more evidence than Wittgenstein's atoms. --- Simons I 3 Extensionality/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore more than one object can be at the same time in the same place. Then we are dealing with continuants. Continuant/Simons: everything which is not an event is a continuant (see below) or everything that can have mass. >Continuants, >Parts. I 11 Extensional Mereology/CEM/extensionality/Simons: a characteristic property of extensional mereology is the relationship "part-of-or-identical-with". This corresponds with "less-than-or-equal" relationship. Overlapping: overlapping can be used as the only fundamental concept. Limiting case: separateness and identity. I 105f Part/VsExtensional Mereology/Simons: 1. A whole is sometimes not one of its own parts. 2. Sometimes it is not transitive. 3. The existence of "sum-individuals" is not always guaranteed. That means, that the axioms, for individuals who obey any predicate, are wrong. 4. Identity criteria for individuals who have all parts in common, are wrong. I 106 5. Provides a materialist ontology of four-dimensional objects. Part/Simons: thesis: there is no uniform meaning of "part". I 117 Extensionality/Simons: extensionality is left with the rejection of the proper parts principle: I 28 Proper Parts Principle/strong/strong supporting principle: if x is not part of y, then there is a z which is part of x and which is separated from y. Solution for distinguishing sum (Tib + Tail) and whole (process) Tibbles (cat). >Tibbles-expample. Simons: the coincidence of individuals is temporarily indistinguishable (perceptually). >Superposition: superposition means being at the same time in the same place. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Identity | Kripke | I 53 Identity: identity is given by arbitrary criteria (only math is required). Identity is not for objects or people. >Criteria. Identity over time: is it still the same object if several parts of a table have been replaced? There is a certain vagueness. Where the identity relation is vague, it might appear intransitive. I 62 A kind of "counterpart" concept could be useful here. (However, without Lewis worlds that are like foreign countries, etc.) You could say that strict identities only apply to individual things (molecules) and the counterpart relation to those individual things that are composed of them, the tables. I 116 Our concept of identity, which we are using here, deals with identity criteria of individual objects in concepts of other individual objects, and not in concepts of qualities. Identity: through the use of descriptions one can make contingent identity statements. >Counterparts, >Counterpart relation, >Counterpart theory, >Possible world/Kripke, >Possible world/Lewis, >Identity across worlds. I 63f Kripke (VsTradition): molecular motion: is necessarily identical with heat. We have discovered it, but it could not be otherwise. Physical truths are necessary: e.g. heat equals molecular motion - but there is no analogy to mind-brain identities. >Identity theory/Kripke. I 117 Ruth Barcan Markus: thesis: identities between names are necessary ("mere tag"). QuineVsMarkus: we could label the planet Venus with the proper name "Hesperus" on a beautiful evening. We could label the same planet again on a day before sunrise, this time with the proper name "Phosphorus". If we discover that it was the same planet twice, our discovery is an empirical one. And not because the proper names have been descriptions. I 120f Designation does not create identity: the same epistemic situation, Phospherus/Hesperus named as different celestial bodies is quite possible and therefore contingent, but does not affect the actual identity. We use them as names in all possible worlds. >Possible world, >Naming/Kripke. I 124 Identity: a mathematician writes that x = y are only identical if they are names for the same object. Kripke: those are not names at all, but rather variables. >Names/Kripke, >Variables. I 125 Definition "Schmidentity": this artificial relation can only exist between an object and itself. Kripke: it is quite okay and useful. I 175 Does the mere creation of molecular motion still leaves the additional task for God to turn this motion into heat? This feeling is actually based on an illusion, what God really has to do is to turn this molecular motion into something that is perceived as heat. >Sensation/Kripke, >Pain/Kripke, >Contingency/Kripke. --- Frank I 114 Identity/Kripke: if an identity statement is true, it is always necessarily true. E.g. heat/motion of molecules, Cicero/Tullius, Water/H20 - these are compatible with the fact that they are truths a posteriori. But according to Leibniz it is not conceivable that one occurs without the other. Frank I 125 Identity/body/Kripke: "A" is the (rigid) name for the body of Descartes - it survived the body, i.e.: M (Descartes unequal A). This is not a modal fallacy, because A is rigid. Analogue: a statue is dissimilar to molecule collection. >Rigidity/Kripke. Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), pp. 253-355. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Individuation | Buridan | Geach I 134 Individuation/identification/Buridan/Geach: E.g. a horse dealer has exactly three horses: Brownie, Blackie and Fallow. The customer accepts the dealer's statement: "I will give you one of my horses". But the dealer does not deliver and denies that he owes the customer anything. His argument: "I should owe you either Brownie, or Blackie or Fallow. I 135 But what I said did not refer to Blackie any more as on Fallow or the other way around and just as little on Brownie. I owe you none of the three." GeachVsBuridan: a part of the difficulties that Buridan has himself comes from the fact that he allows the conclusion of "I owe you a horse" to "There is a horse I owe you"! But even if we cannot do it in general, it seems plausible in this particular case to allow "I owe you something", so "there is something ..." We can even accept this without accepting Buridan's invalid rule. Geach: many authors believe that any case of an invalid conclusion procedure is an invalid conclusion, but that is a great logical error! Horse dealer: "If I owe you a horse, I owe you something, and that can only be a horse of mine, you will not say because of my words that it is something else I owe you! Well then: Tell me which of my horses I owe you. Solution/Buridan: One can say that x owes me y, if and only if I am even with him by giving y! Whichever of the three horses should be y, by handing out the two they will be even! So: whichever x will be, the dealer owes the customer x. I 136 It is true of Brownie, it is true of Blackie and it is true of Fallow that it is a horse that the dealer owes the customer. If we now consider e.g. only Brownie and Blackie, we could say that the dealer owes these two. But Buridan himself warns us not to confuse collective and distributive use. >Distribution. Solution: it is not the case that "there are two horses ..." But "it is true of everyone that he owes it"! Buridan: according to his own principle, we cannot conclude from "there are two .." to "The dealer owes two ..". For that would be the wrong "ratio" (aspect), namely that the dealer would have had to say, in a sentence, that he owes the two. Similarly, we cannot conclude from "Brownie is a horse that the dealer owes" (Buridan: true) to "The dealer owes Brownie". To do so, the dealer would have had to explicitly express the sentence. >Aspects, >Propositions, >Sentences. GeachVsBuridan: that cannot be allowed! I cannot conclude from "I owe you something" to "There is something that I owe you"! Cf. >Someone. E.g. The bank has stored somewhere the money of people. From this I cannot conclude: some of it is mine! But this is anything but trivial. The problem is not limited to this example. E.g. From "b F't one or another A" I cannot conclude: "There is one or another identifiable thing that b F't". That is why we must rebuild Buridan's whole theory. I 137 E.g. Geach is looking for a detective story: according to Buridan it turns out: For an x, Geach searches for x under the aspect ("ratio") "detective story". Problem: even if I was looking exactly for a detective story, there was an identifiable x not necessarily a detective story I was looking for. (?). We rather need a dyadic relation between Geach and an aspect (ratio)! Geach sought something under the ratio "detective story". The bound words are an indivisible relative term. Clearer: Geach sought something under the ratio which is evoked (appellata) by the term "detective story" Then "search ... of" is a singular relative term. We can abbreviate it: "S'te" Then we have a quote rather than a "ratio". Then we do not need to quantify via "ratio". We can say: "There is a detective story that Geach seeks" as "For an x, x is a detective story, and for a w, w is a description which is true of x, and Geach S'te w ("sought something under the ratio evoked by the particular identifier w"). Here we quantify via forms of words whose identity criteria, if not quite clear, are clearer than those of rationes. >Identity criteria, >Description, >Identification. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Inverted Spectra | Shoemaker | Stalnaker I 19 Qualia/exchanged spectra/Shoemaker/Stalnaker: Shoemaker tried to reconcile the visibility of reversed spectra with a functionalist and materialist theory of the mind. >Functionalism, >Materialism. StalnakerVsShoemaker : per old-fashioned view that comparisons of the qualitative character of experience are possible. Cf. >Hetero-phenomenology. Stalnaker I 233f Inverted spectra/Shoemaker/Paradox/Stalnaker: E.g., four people, partly differently wired/without backup system. Paradox: it follows that in a person two qualia would be the same and different at the same time. >Qualia. Solution/Stalnaker:we need two different identity criteria. >Criteria, >Identity, >Identity criterion, >Identity conditions. Functional Theory: provides intrapersonal criteria. >Personal identity. Identity of the physical realization: provides criteria for interpersonal identity. Problem : the two equivalence relations can not go together. I 236 The addition of the back-up system changes the qualitative character because it changes the memory mechanisms. >Memory. Problem: subsequent changes in the system, but also unrealized possibilities change the qualitative character. >Qualities. I 237/8 The paradox can be solved by the asymmetry. - But only if we allow that intentionality plays a role in the individuation of qualia. >Intentionality, >Individuation. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Numbers | Geach | I, 215ff Numbers/Geach: numbers do not name anything. Not: E.g.: "There are two Daimon and Phobos". How often a concept is realized is not a feature of the term. ((s) GeachVsMeixner). Unity/Multiplicity/Geach: cannot be attributed to an object. >Unity and Multiplicity. Solution/Frege: Numbers are attributed to the terms under which the objects fall. >Numbers/Frege, >Concept/Frege, >Object/Frege. Numbers/Geach: in mathematics sometimes as objects with properties E.g. Divisibility. Geach: then we need an identity criterion. >Identity criterion. Frege: Equality in numbers: "There is a one-to-one correspondence of Fs and Gs". - N.B.: this does not mean that the Fs or the Gs refer to a single object - a class. Solution: Relation instead of class - E.g. Frege: One puts next to each plate a knife: no class but a relation. >Equality, >Classes, >Sets, >Relation. --- I 220 Numbers/Frege: Self-critique: Classes must not be used to explain what numbers are, otherwise contradiction: "one and the same object is both, the class of the M's and the class of the G's, although an object (this object, e.g. number(!)) can be an M without being a G. " - (+) - >Sets/Frege, >Classes/Frege. This shows that the original concept of a class contained contradictions. Numbers can be objects (with properties such as divisibility), classes cannot. - Not contradictory: "one and the same object: the number (not class!) of the F's and the number of K's". I 221f Numbers/GeachVsFrege: Number is not "number of objects". - With this he rejects his own concerns to say that "the object of a number belongs to a class" (wrong). "The number of the A's" is to mean: "the number of the class of all A's" (wrong). Solution/Geach: (as Frege elsewhere): the empty place in "the number of ..." and "how many ...are there?" Can only be filled with a keyword in the plural, not with the name of an object or a list of objects. - A conceptual word instead of a class. I 225 Numbers/Classes/Geach: Numbers are not classes of classes. If we connect a number (falsely) to a class a, we actually combine it with the property expressed by "___ is an element of a". This is not trivial because when we associate a number with a property, the property is usually not expressed in that form. I 225 Numbers/Classes/Geach: false: "The number of F's is 0" - correct: "The class of F's is 0". Class as number are equally specified by the mention of a property. >Mention. I 235 Numbers/Frege/Geach: not classes of classes (Frege does not say this either). - The error stems from the idea that one could start with concrete objects and then group them into groups and supergroups. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Pain | Cavell | I (a) 44 Pain/CavellVsMalcolm: different objects require very different identity criteria. E.g. in the case of sensations, style, colors, diseases, for example, it may be a description, in the case of material objects it may be a place. >Identity, >Identity conditions, >Criteria. I (a) 45 Pain/Identity/Cavell: it seems as if we could say of pain and of cars, but not of colors: in a certain way there are two, but in a certain way only one. >Colors. Pain/Numerical Identity/Qualitative Identity/Malcolm: Malcolm disputes the fact that one can reasonably say in (descriptive) identical painful occurrences that it is two. Thesis: with regard to sence perceptions, the concept of "numerical identity" has no application. Malcolm: if the description is the same, there cannot be the additional question whether the idea would be the same! E.g. Cavell: one can say our "twin cars" do not differ, yet there are two. Why not with pain then? Because here "equals" means "descriptively equal"? Obviously not! >Description, >Imagination, >Equality. I (a) 46 Why should not the skeptics have the feeling that here it is presupposed what is still to be examined? For example, in cars, the question is answered: there are two, in the case of colors, the question is also answered: it is one! But with pain? Pain/Malcolm: there is a danger to think it is here as in the colors, styles, opinions or sudden ideas. It is a truism that there can be the same shades of color at the same time in many places. Pain/CavellVsMalcolm: this seems to show that colors of headaches are different. But I can answer the question whether the pain is numerically identical with its: namely, not! However, we have the same insidious pain which Dr. Eternity describes as part of the eternity syndrome! I (a) 47 Malcom only shows, by adjusting the pain to the colors, how both are counted or identified by means of descriptions. Only in this respect they then behave like cars! Colors cannot be counted differently, but this does not show that pain cannot be counted differently! If I were put under pressure here, I would even say that pain in this respect is more like objects than colors. I (a) 48 Pain/Cavell: Thesis: in pain it is important that the other needs our attention! This makes it so important to know how strong the pain is. This seems to make a standard description necessary. Physical identity (i.e., empirical indistinguishability) is not sufficient: for example, two peas in a pod can be indistinguishable, but we do not say it is one pea! >Indiscernibility, >Indistinguishability, >Countability, >Similarity, >Classification, >Identification. I (a) 49 However, it is not necessary either, because if there is a standard description that secures the application of "(descriptive) equal", then we can tolerate an unlimited discrepancy. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Person | Habermas | IV 158 Person/Identification/Habermas: Persons cannot be identified under the same conditions as observable objects. In the case of persons, spatiotemporal identification is not sufficient. >Identification, >Individuation, >Individuals, cf. >Individuation/Strawson, >Person/Strawson, cf. >Continuants, >Personal identity. IV 159 While entities are generally determined by the fact that a speaker can make a statement of them, persons belong to the class of entities who can take on the role of a speaker themselves. For categorization as a person, it is not enough that a person can say "I", but how they do it. >I, Ego, Self, >Self-identification, >Self-reference, >Subjects. The expression "I" not only has the deictic meaning of the reference to an object, it also indicates the pragmatic attitude or perspective from which the speaker expresses himself/herself. >Reference, >Perspective. In the communicative role of the speaker, someone addresses at least one listener. >Speaking, >Communication. IV 160 The peculiarity of the person is explained by the fact that persons do not have to acquire the identity conditions first and even the criteria by which they can be identified under these conditions (...) until they can be identified at all as a person and, if necessary, as this particular person. >Person/Locke, >Person/Kant, >Person/Strawson. IV 161 Identity/Person/Habermas: since persons acquire their identity through linguistically mediated interaction, they fulfil the identity conditions for persons and the basic identity criteria for a certain person not only for others but also for themselves. They see themselves as people who have learned to participate in social interactions. Cf. >Identity/Henrich. The person can answer the question of what kind of person he/she is, not just one of all. Identity criteria/conditions of identity/Habermas: are only fulfilled by the person when he/she is able to attribute the corresponding predicates to himself/herself. >Identity criteria, >Identity conditions, >Criteria. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Person | Mead | Habermas IV 161 Person/Mead/Habermas: Identity/Person/Habermas: since persons acquire their identity through linguistically mediated interaction, they fulfil the identity conditions for persons and the basic identity criteria for a certain person not only for others but also for themselves. They see themselves as people who have learned to participate in social interactions. The person can answer the question of what kind of person he/she is, not just one of all. >Socialization/Habermas. Identity criteria/identity conditions/Habermas: are only fulfilled by the person when he/she is able to attribute the corresponding predicates to himself/herself. Mead: distinguishes two stages in the acquisition of identity conditions: Habermas IV 162 a) The acquisition of an ascribed identity through learning, the assumption of a role in a social group, ultimately orientation towards the past. b) The identity asserted under one's own direction: here it is about who one wants to be; orientation towards the future. |
Mead I George Herbert Mead Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967 German Edition: Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Predicates | Geach | I 110 Predicate/Geach: "predicables": spurious predicates are: e.g.m, "--- smoked a pipe" - "5 is dividable by 5 and by one", as well as for "3...". Predicate: real predicates are: e.g.,"Russell smoked a pipe" - the identity of predicates with reflexive pronouns is not assured. I 216 Predicate/Geach: a predicate must never be confused with names. - The term does not denote the object. >Name/Geach, >Objects, >Denotation/Geach. I 224 Predicates/Geach: more common property of sentences - but not an actual expression in the sentence. >Sentences/Geach, >Syntax/Geach. I 224 "Stand for"/Geach: there is no difference whether I say a predicate "stands for" a property or it is its name. >Proxy. I 224 Predicate/Geach: a predicate does not appear as an actual expression in the sentence. Geach: there is no identity criterion for predicates. >Identity criterion. One cannot know whether two predicates stand for the same property. Equality of use is necessary condition for same reference. - ((s) That is, the extension but not the intension is equal.) >Intension, >Extension, >Language use, >Speaker meaning. GeachVsQuine: therefore one should not identify properties with classes. >Properties/Quine. I 239 Predicate/Terminology/Geach: I call predicates only like this if they are used as the principal functor in a proposition, otherwise "predicables". I-predicables/I-predicate/Geach/(s): those predicates in which regard the two objects are indistinguishable in a given theory. If distinctions can be made in an extended theory, then the I-predicate does not change its meaning - E.g. "uniform" for (different but not at all differentiated) tokens of words, later the tokens are distinguished, but are still "uniform". I 301 GeachVs two-name theory: error: that if two names denote the same thing, that they then allow the same predicates. >Denotation/Geach, for "two-name-theory" see >Designation/Geach. I 301 Predicate/Geach: Predicates such as "become" can only be assigned to concrete terms. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Proper Names | Frege | I 54 Proper name/Frege: for a proper name the extension is presumed. Otherwise, the negation would be: "Kepler did not die in misery or the name is meaningless". >Extension. II 69 The "meaning" of a name is never a concept (predicate), but always only an object. >Concept, >Object, >Predicate. II 72f Proper name/Frege: a proper name (saturated) can never be a predicate (but part of a predicate). Names/understanding/Frege: understanding a name means to know what object it denotes. Problem: are names without a carriers (e.g. unicorn). Problem: e.g. different names with the same carrier. >Unicorn-example, >Non-existence. Husted V 99/100 The fact that a name stands for an object is a consequence rather than part of the fact that it has a certain sense. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, Chisholm II 144f Names/Frege: "mixed proper name": contains linguistic and non-linguistic parts: the circumstances. Circumstances: are part of the meaning of an expression. >Circumstances. ChisholmVsFrege: he neglects ostension. Dummett III 68f Names/FregeVsRussell: names may well have the same sense as a specific description - what is actually considered to be a representation of an object: Valencia from the air, from the ground, within a specific buildind, or on the map? Recognition: necessary: is the awareness that the object falls under the concept that determines the proper identity criterion (here: "city"). This is the ability for recognition instead of the method of picking out ("red": is recognition, not a method for red). >Recognition. Frege II 69 Name/Frege: a name can never be a predicate - but certainly part of a predicate. >Predicate. Stalnaker I 183 Names/proper names/Frege/Stalnaker: for him there is a mental representation, i.e. we only have ideas about something that presents itself to us in a certain way. ((s) This can be reconciled with Donnellan’s attributive use). >Attributive/referential. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Proper Names | Geach | I 46f Name/Aristotle/Geach: direct reference, no parts (Aristotle: syntactically simple) (Geach ditto) - description: indirect reference, mediation of other characters. I 143 Calculus of Natural Deduction/Gentzen/Geach: here there are "possible names" (> "introduction of existence"). But not quantification over it. GeachVsQuine: so he can no longer regard names as "hidden descriptions". >Names/Quine, >Descriptions/Quine, >Theory of decriptions/Russell. I 155 Names/Geach: knowing the causal chain is not important, but its existence. - The right to use a name can exist, even if one does not know that. >Causal theory of names. Russell: a proper name must name something (Geach dito). >Names/Russell. GeachVsRussell: but then he makes a wrong conclusion: "only a name that has to name something is a name". Just as wrong: fallacy of "what one knows, must be" to "only what must be like this, can be known". >Knowledge, >Truth. I 162 Quasi-names/Geach: appear in encyclopedias, for foreign gods. - (Geach pro). Quasi-names appear only in object position after intentional verbs. - This is no "second order existence". - There is no identy criterion to decide whether different peoples worship the same God. >Identity criteria, >Objects of belief. I 208 Names/Geach: whether something is a proper name does not depend on who it is given to. Quasi quotation: is not a name. >Quasi quotation. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Propositions | Geach | I 168 Proposition/GeachVs: a proposition is no abstract entity. - Propositions are here only used under protest: the following is generally accepted about propositions: (i) any unambiguous statement expresses exactly one proposition (ii) synonymous propositions have the same meaning (iii) a "that-clause" denotes what is expressed by "p" (iv) "The proposition that p" and the "that-clause" "that p" are synonymous terms of the proposition (v) "The proposition expressed by Qp", whereby Qp is a quotation of p, denotes - the same proposition as "the proposition that p". One does not need (iv) to understand that "that p" can always be replaced by "the proposition that p" From the above theses follows that every oratio obliqua is always translatable into oratio recta - James considers the proposition that is expressed by "There are Marsmen ...", with dread. GeachVs: but this cannot stop us to simply abbreviate: "has this fear". But this is not a criterion for synonymy. >Synonymy, >Criteria. l 174/5 Necessary/Proposition/Geach: if the that-clauses are designations of abstract entities, then these abstract entities cannot be propositions. >That-clauses. Reason: reciprocal strict implication is not an identity criterion for propositions. >Opacity. But: it is a sufficient condition in the modal logic for the replaceability salva veritate of subsets. We would therefore have a criterion for the identity of such entities, which are designated by such subsets. - But there is no need for such "designata". I 176 Proposition/Geach: cheap metaphysics: easy to ask: "But what are propositions" like "But what are numbers?" The reference e.g. to know the identity of a number means to be able to identify numbers and to keep them apart - and that means, vice versa, to know the truth conditions of a sentence. >Metaphysics. We could make a theory of propositions without knowing what propositions actually are - but reciprocal entailment for propositional equality does not work as a criterion for identity. ((s) Because it is intensional). >Intensionality, >Extensionality, >Identity. I 255 Definition Proposition/Terminology/Geach: something that is put forward to be considered - (no assertion, a suggestion!) - "sentence" is actually grammatical. I prefer "Proposition". - Propositions need not be asserted. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Qualia | Churchland | Fodor IV 197 Sensation/Representation/Qualia/Semantics/Meaning/Fodor/Lepore: the question arises by itself: when are S1 and S2 the same state (in the semantic state space)? But with the frequencies the old problem simply comes back. --- IV 198 If we do not know what it is for two words to mean "marriageable", then we also do not know, for the same reason, how it is for two semantic spaces, if both have the dimension of marriageability. Empiricism Tradition: has explained the semantic network by reference to what is fixed there. The dimensions should express observation characteristics and an externalistic (e.g. causal) theory should explain the relation. This is independent from the interpretation of the rest of the vocabulary. Churchland: his suggestion is that the dimensions of the semantic space do not generally correspond to the observation properties. They can correspond to whatever the brain may represent. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: but then again the question arises as to how the identity of the state spaces is fixed. We have no other identity criterion than observation properties. Suppose we had one, the question of the semantic identity would be there again. State spaces: we have a criterion for their identity only if we have one for the identity of their dimensions. And we have a non-empirical criterion for the dimensions only if we have one for "the property expressed by a dimension of the state space" which applies to arbitrary properties, not only for observational properties. --- IV 199 But that would be a criterion for equality of meaning. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: already assumes an interpersonal concept for the identity of state spaces before it can reach its goal of explaining the concept of "content equality" (similarity). He has presupposed the designations of the dimensions without permission. The label of a dimension tells how to interpret it, e.g. Degree of F-ness. Why should a dimension then express F-ness and not rather G-ness? What makes it that the dimension in my state space expresses the same property as in yours? > Connectivity. Fodor IV 205 --- Note 11. IV 205 Empiricism/Tradition: our concepts are functions of our sensory concepts. We have seen that Churchland's treatment of Qualia depends on mixing sensory and psychophysical terms. (s) Sensory: (one aspect - but as a "sensory concept" again two aspects, but with the claim of providing the psychological explanation). --- IV 248 Note 13 IV 205 But it does not follow from this that organisms with the same sensory equipment must also have the same concepts. They would only have to do so if their concepts occupied the same or similar positions in the semantic space. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Recognition | Dummett | III (b) 68ff Recognition/Dummett: It is (...) not absurd to assume that one can have the ability to recognize something without being able to explain this ability. Even if there is no explanation, there must be a description: Object/Knowledge/Dummett: Question: what does the presentation of an object actually mean? Example Valencia: should you be able to pick out the city on the map? from the ground?, from the plane, or only when you are in it, or only in a specific building? In other words, there is no single concept of the presentation of an object. Object/recognition/Frege/Dummett: Important: The ability to recognize includes the awareness that this object falls under the term that determines the appropriate identity criterion (here: "city"). >Descriptions. III (c) 135 Attribution/reference/way of givenness/Frege: Attribution of pure object knowledge without further marking of the meaning is incomprehensible! An object must somehow be given. There can be no "mere knowledge of the reference". Cf. >Description Theory/Dummett. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Singular Terms | Brandom | I 407 Singular Term/Predicate/Subsentential Expressions/Brandom: this is about objective referencing (reference), not about believed propositions - non-propositional, conceptual contents. >Reference. I 527ff Singular Terms - substitution inferences are always symmetrical: equivalence classes. >Substitution, >Equivalence classes. Predicate substitution inferences may be asymmetric: Families (reflexive, transitive). I 512f Singular Term/Frege: the concept particular cannot be explained independently from the concept singular term. Brandom: not clear what singular terms are, cannot be explained by successful reference. Quine: singular terms include reference, error is possible. Brandom: not everything can be recognized as a singular term: E.g. "√2", "natural satellite of the Earth" may be more than one thing. Problem: if omniscience of the speaker should be required. I 517 Because sentences are fundamental, it is not clear why there should be any subsentential expressions at all. - They cannot have a semantic content in the same respectas sentences. - Subsentential expressions are necessary for the formation of potentially infinite number of sentences. >Subsententials. I 528 Singular Term/Brandom: its introduction does not only require application criteria but also identity criteria (for substitutability). I 533 Singular Term/Brandom: are those expressions which play a dual syntactic and semantic substitutional role: 1) SIS: substitution-inferential significance - 2) SSR - substitution-structural role. I 533 Definition singular term/Brandom: an expression that is substituted and whose occurrence is symmetrically inferentially significant - the substitutable (singular term): symmetric - substitution frame (predicates) asymmetrical. I 535 Inversion: Substitutions are not always right: the conclusions are often inferentially weaker than the premises - from "something is a dog" follows "it is a mammal", but not vice versa - singular term: exists, because expressive power of the language would be lost if they were allowed to be asymmetric - Example/(s): if substitution led to weakening of the determination of the object. I 546 Singular term/Brandom: Frames can be regarded as derived singular terms: e.g. "the father of a" may then be substituted into her (FregeVs). Brandom: they are still subsitutable and therefore they differ from sentences. I 548 There are exceptions in the singular terms that behave differently, but they can only exist, because there are normal singular terms. I 561 They play both the syntactic and semantic substitutional role. I 569 Singular Term/Predicate/Brandom: indispensable in all languages with conditionals. - Why are objects needed: for the same reason as singular terms: you need something that means what conditionals mean. --- II 162 Singular Term/Brandom: 1) Obtain - 2) Designate - 3) Name --- Newen I 165 Singular Term/Brandom: Problem: because it does not have reference as a basic concept, it creates 1) equivalenz classes of syntactically identical terms (substitutability) 2) inferential role: helps to isolate the grammatical entities and identify their role as subject, verb , etc. >Inferential role. Subject Term/Singular Term: here the implications are symmetrical and reversible. - E.g. Franklin/Postmaster. Verb: here the reversal is not symmetrical - E.g. goes for a walk/exercises. - At the same time transcendental argument for the splittedness of the world - (predecessor: Strawson). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Synonymy | Cresswell | II 59 Synonymy/Reality/World/Language/Cresswell: the knowledge of some synonyms does not tell us anything about the relation between language and the world - and it is about that when we study meaning. >Language, >World, >World/thinking, >Reality, >Foundation, >Observation, >Observation language, >Observation sentence. Equality of meaning is not suitable for definition. >Meaning. II 106 Synonymy/Cresswell: is language-relative - therefore, we cannot say for the attribution of propostional attitudes: "He expressed a sentence that is synonymous with ...". >Language dependence. II 161 Synonymy/Cresswell: is attractive for people who do not want any language-independent meanings - But that would not be a real semantic relation. No one has hitherto attempted a recursive specification of a synonymy relation. Synonymy: is always relative to a particular language - ((s) That means you cannot assume any more propositions.) >Propositions. QuineVsSynonymy: you cannot create identity criteria for language. >Synonymy/Quine. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Synonymy | Geach | 169/70 Synonymy/Criteria/propositional identity/Geach: we know that strict reciprocal implication is not a sufficient criterion for synonymy. E.g. "Necessarily either both, p and q, or neither p nor q" usually does not suffice: that does not justify the conclusion: Everyone believes that p if and only if he believes that q". ((s) because of lack of identity criteria for intensional objects.) >Identity criteria, >Intensional objects. Geach: entailment as a substitute for strict implication is complicated, but does not help. >Entailment/Geach. Transitivity must be abolished - even from reciprocal entailment, the identity of propositions does not follow. >Transitivity. Geach: no one knows what he says when he says that two propositions are identical. >Propositions, >Intensions, >Objects of thought. If the difference between two propositions is not an obstacle, that both are believed at the same time, why should it be an obstacle being expressed simultaneously by one and the same proposition? - Problem: then the whole apparatus of synonymy and non-ambiguity threatens to collapse. On the other hand, if we cannot recognize the same meaning (sense) in different linguistic disguises, there is also little purpose in postulating propositions. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Thoughts | Frege | Dummett I 62 Consciousness Content/Frege/Dummett: the content of consciousness are sensations but not meaning. Thoughts: thoughts are the grasping of external things. Dummett I 19 Thought/Thinking/Frege: thought is not identical with the meaning of the sentence - beings with identical thoughts are possible without linguistic cover. Frege II 47 Frege: a sentence about a non-existent unicorn is without truth value, predicates cannot be attributed or denied - the thought is the same, whether there is reference ("meaning") or not. Thought: is a sentence without truth value (because "meaning" (reference) is unresolved) - the same thought in an actor without meaning - judgment: is progress from thought to its truth value. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. II 71 Truth Value: a truth value cannot be one part of a thought, as little as the sun can, because it is not a sense, but an object (truth value = object). >Truth value, >Object. II 76 Thought: one part must be unsaturated, as a binding agent, e.g. "falls under". Thought: not all parts of the thought may be complete, at least one should be unsaturated (predicative), otherwise they would not stick together. Dummett I 32 Frege: grasping the thought: is psychic act. The thought is not the content of consciousness. Consciousness is subjective, the thought is objective - WittgensteinVs. >">Objectivity. Frege IV 52 Thought/Frege: there is not a complete thought without a time determination. But then it is timelessly true or false. Expression/assertion/Frege: there is a difference: time determination belongs to the expression whereas truth belongs to assertion and is timeless. Timeless things are not part of the external world. >Truth, >Timelessness. --- Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 47 ff Thought/Frege: a thought is not the sentence meaning (reference), because it is possible common property of many thinkers (content, objective). Sense of the sentence: is the expressed thought (abstract). Unequal content: sense can be grasped without knowing whether the sentence has a meaning (reference, existing object). Thought/Frege: a thought is abstract. Contradiction: content, idea. Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 57ff Odd Meaning/Frege: odd meaning refers to the expressed thoughts - (thought: abstract, unequal content). Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 66ff Thought/identity criterion for thoughts/Frege/St: sentence A contains the same idea as sentence B, if (i) the assumption that A and B lead to a contradiction - (ii) vice versa - that allows us to conceive thoughts as invariant abstractions - (>partial identity: identity of thoughts) Invariant: is the thought. The thought contained in a sentence is what element A has in common with all the propositions which are logically equivalent to A, and that changes when we move on to a proposition B which is not logically equivalent to A. Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 68 Thought/Frege/St: a thought is that element of an assertion that can be true or false, and which is the object of the believing-to-be-true of epistemic subjects. >Propositions. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 |
| Understanding | Tugendhat | I 289 Understanding/Tugendhat: Understanding the usage rule of an assertoric sentence: not knowing the circumstances, but know in what capacity it is used. >Language use, >Circumstances. ((s) This is not use theory, because this refers to word meanings). >Use theory. I 308 Understanding/TugendhatVsMeta Language: Understanding is not expressed in a meta language - but in mastering the sign rules. >Metalanguage/Tugendhat, >Metalanguage. I 489 Understanding/singular Term/Tugendhat: we understand a singular term only if we know to which other types it refers - but not a circle, but complementary. >Singular Terms, >General terms, >Predicates. I 495 Understanding/Tugendhat: by Leibniz law of identity, the equal sign is not defined - one can say that his understanding is demonstrated when one can infer from the truth of "Fa" to the one of "Fb" - but with that the circumstances are not shown. >Leibniz principle, >Equal sign. Criteria/identity criterion/Tugendhat: shift to object area. >Criteria, >Identity criteria, >Identity conditions. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Davidson, D. | Quine Vs Davidson, D. | Davidson I 42 QuineVsDavidson: answered in "Der Kerngedanke des dritten Dogmas" (Th. and things): Davidson's account of his dualism of scheme and content involved a separation of conceptual schemes and language, but he did not think of separation but the concept of uninterpreted content is necessary to make conceptual relativism comprehensible. Davidson II 92 Quine: privileged access - Davidson Action/QuineVsDavidson: "well-swept ontology": not more than physical objects and classes. ((s) I.e. act not an object, but event) (>ontology). II 97 An identity statement "a = b" for events is true iff. a and b have identical causes and consequences. II 98 Idea: that the causal nexus of all events opens up a kind of system of coordinates similar to that of material things in space and time in which each event is unique. QuineVsDavidson: the criterion presupposes already that we know what it is yet to tell us. Causes and consequences are in turn events, and each event has exactly one place in the network. Infinite recourse. Thereupon Davidson rejects his idea. He takes over Quine's identity criterion for material objects: An identity statement "a = b" for material objects is only true if a and b have the same space-time coordinates. Quine II 56 Empiricism/Quine: stimuli do not make true, but lead to securitized beliefs. Quine: Davidson is right in that there is nothing to be added to Tarski when it comes to the concept of truth. QuineVsDavidson: However what I feel to be a fusion of truth and belief is that Davidson, when he speaks of "the totality of experience" and "surface irritation", makes no difference between these and the "facts" and the "world". Quine: Experience and surface irritation should not be the basis of truth, but the foundation of the securitized conviction. Empiricism: If empiricism is interpreted as a theory of truth, it is right that Davidson claims the third dogma to him and rejects it, fortunately this causes empiricism to go overboard as a truth theory. Empiricism: Empiricism remains a theory of evidence. However, minus the two old dogmas. Quine: the Third Dogma remains untouched: now, however, with respect to securitized beliefs! It has both a descriptive and a normative aspect. And in none of these aspects it seems to me like a dogma. This is what partially makes scientific theory empirical, not merely a quest for inner coherence. VI 57 Proximal/Distal/DavidsonVsQuine: the stimulus should rather be localized in the common world than at the private external surfaces of the object. The world should be the common cause. Rather a common situation than a rabbit or any object. We should make an ontology of situations our own. VI 58 Proximal/Distal/QuineVsDavidson: I prefer to stick to determining our stimuli by neural input. I#m particularly interested in the issue of transport of perception evidence from the nerve endings to the proclamation of the sciences. My naturalism would allow me (if not the interpreted individual) to relate freely to nerve endings, rabbits or any other physical objects. VI 59 "Common situations" are too vague for me. VI 62 Private Stimulus Meaning/QuineVsDavidson: I locate them still on the outer surfaces of the individual (proximal): hence its stimulus meanings also remain private. I would be completely indifferent if they turned out to be as idiosyncratic as the internal nervous structures of the individuals themselves! VI 63 In any case, outside in the open air we are dealing with our generally accessible language which each of us internalizes neurally in our own way. VI 136 Theory/Empirical Equivalence/Empirically Equivalent/Quine: we now restrict our consideration to global world systems to avoid the question of the integration of both theories in a general context. Ex So we imagine an alternative global system that is empirically equivalent to ours, but is based on exotic terms. VI 137 If this theory is as simple as ours, we eliminate all the exotic terms like "phlogiston" or "entelechy", since they have no predictive power. Here, then, in fact coherence considerations materialize! (>Coherence Theory). In fact, there are cases where we have recourse to elements foreign to the theory: Ex computers to solve the four-color problem, e.g. additional truths of the numbers, theory by digressions into analysis. Assuming the alternative theory is just as simple. But the exotic terms do not cover any newly added observable facts. VI 138 Quine: recommends the "secessionist" position: we should reject all the contexts in which exotic terms are used. With this unequal treatment we do not justify that our own theory is the more elegant one, but we can claim that we have no access to the truth beyond our own theory. The reverse position would be ecumenical: both theories would thus be simultaneously true. VI 139 Davidson: Variant: let both theories apply and understand the truth predicate so that it operates in an encompassing and theory-neutral language in which both theories are formulated quote-redeemingly. QuineVsDavidson: which raises questions with regard to the comprehensive language. The variables would have to extend further, but how much further? How about the truth? We must stop this at some point. We did not want a third theory. The secessionist position may as well recognize the same right of the competing global theories. It can still award the label of entitlement, if not the truth, impartially. VI 140 It can also switch between the two theories, and declare the terms of the other theory pointless for the time being while declaring their own to be true. XI 156 Event/Identity/QuineVsDavidson/Lauener: the identity of events is a pseudo-problem. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Extensionality | Verschiedene Vs Extensionality | Simons I 105 VsCEM/VsExtensional Mereology/Simons: Criticisms in ascending importance: 1. That there are different meanings of "part" where a whole does not count as one of its own parts. 2. That there are meanings of "part" for which the part-whole relation is not transitive. 3. That the existence of "sum-individuals" is not guaranteed or (equivalently) that the axioms for individuals who obey any predicate are wrong. 4. That the identity criteria for individuals of the axioms that identify individuals who have all parts in common are wrong. I 106 5. That the ontology imposed by extensional part-whole theory is a materialistic ontology of four-dimensional objects. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Fodor, J. | Stalnaker Vs Fodor, J. | II 176 Def narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: is a generalization of Kaplan's character in the sense that the context considers any for the speaker external fact that is relevant to the determination of the wide content. Extensional identity criterion/narrow content/Fodor: (1987, 30 – 48)(1): C: be the condition that is fulfilled by the twin-me on twin-earth, C’: by myself in the actual world. Since there is no miracle it must be true that when an organism shares the neurophysiological constitution of my twin and fulfills C it follows that his thoughts and my twin also share the truth conditions (tr.c.). So the extensional identity criterion is that two thought contents (mental content) are the same iff they cause the same mapping of thoughts and context on truth conditions. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: that tells us less than it appears about the mapping that is used here. Nor how the relevant function is determined by what is going on in the mind of the believer. II 177 StalnakerVsFodor: we consider the following parody of his argument: e.g. I have the property of being exactly three miles from a burning stable - my twin is located on twin earth at exactly the same place, but, however, has the property of being exactly three miles from a snowy henhouse. C: then there surely is a property for my twin due to which he is three miles from the henhouse while this property does not exist for me. We call this condition C. C’: is then the property that makes up for me that I am three miles from the burning stable which does not exist for my twin. Since there is no miracle, we know at least this much: both, my twin and I, would in our respective world be three miles from a snowy henhouse when condition C ruled and both three miles from a burning stable if C' ruled. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: which determines no function at all that makes the condition C' to the property to be three miles from a snowy henhouse and at the same time condition C to the property to be three miles from a burning stable - a function that allegedly makes the contribution of the location of the subject to a specific relational property. StalnakerVsFodor: there are such functions and there is no need to identify one of them with the contribution of my intrinsic localization with the special relational property. My twin cannot sensibly say: "I did my part, as I - if condition C had ruled, .... Each localization is in the way that for any external conditions if those conditions rule something in this localizations is three miles away from a burning stable. narrow content/Stalnaker: question: does my cousin have the same narrow content as my conviction that salt is soluble in water but not in something else? StalnakerVsFodor: his theory gives no indication as to how an answer to this question was to be found! Note: however for me it is not about an uncertainty at all, this is also true for wide content but that we do not know at all how to identify narrow content. II 180 Belief/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: his image of faith is decisively motivated by his approach that there is an internal language (Mentalese) which is saved in the internal Belief/Fodor: are saved inner propositions. ((s) not propositions). They are convictions by virtue of their internal functional role. They are also identifiable independent of the environment of the subject. Semantic properties/Fodor: however partly depend on what happens in the environment around it but the way how they depend on it is determined by purely internal states of the subject! StalnakerVsFodor: here strong empirical presuppositions are in play. Def narrow content/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: function of context (in a very wide sense) on truth conditional content. StalnakerVsFodor: this is attractive for his intentions but it does not explain how it ever comes to that. And how to identify any narrow content. Narrow content/Stalnaker: is there any way at all to identify narrow content that is not based on Mentalese? Yes, by Dennett (…+…) II 188 Def individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/Fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically. Important argument: thus it is not excluded that mental states are individuated due to relational properties. Relational properties/Fodor: are taxonomically when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence StalnakerVsFodor: a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers. But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal powers. Therefore Fodor represents only the weaker thesis. Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger. StalnakerVsFodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (FodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of the strong with the weak thesis. Stalnaker: to exclude that psychological states are individuated by normal wide content you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. E.g. Fodor: Individualism/Fodor/Stalnaker: Fodor defends his version of individualism with an example of a causal irrelevant relational property: e.g. h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with heads up, II 189 t-particle: we call that way the same particle if the coin shows tails. Fodor: no reasonable theory will use this distinction to explain the behavior of the particle. StalnakerVsFodor: but from this it does not follow that psychological states must be purely internal (intrinsic). (1) Fodor, J. A. (1987): Explorations in cognitive science, No. 2.Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. British Psychological Society; The MIT Press. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Lewis Vs Quine, W.V.O. | IV IX LewisVsQuine: Realism in relation to unrealized possibilities. IV 27 Possibility/Quine: Vs unrealized possibilities: the identity criteria are not clear. LewisVsQuine: But identity is not a particular problem for us. Individuation/possible worlds: in every world, things in every category are as individual as in the actual world. Identity/Possible World: Things in different worlds are never identical. (Because of P2) The counterpart relation is the correspondence of identity across worlds (cross world identity). Lewis: while some authors say they can do different things in different worlds and have different properties, I prefer to say that they are only in the actual world and in no other worlds but that they have counterparts in other worlds. IV 32 Essentialism/LewisVsQuine: we actually have the ability to say which properties are essential regardless of description. And also regardless of whether the attribute follows analytically from any other descriptions of the thing. For example, the single-digit sentence φ and an object that is designated by the singular term ζ To say that this attribute is essential means to claim the translation of N φ ζ (N = necessary). IV 147 Centered possible worlds/de re/de se/Quine/Lewis: (Ontological Relativity, "Propositional Objects"): For example, a cat that is chased by a dog wants to go to the roof to be safe. de dicto: the cat wants a state of affairs, which is the class of all possible worlds in which it is on the roof. It fears the class of all possible worlds where the dog catches her. Problem: Crossworld Identity. Question: which of the many similar cats in the many possible worlds (with many dogs and roofs) is it? Some cats are on roofs, some in the dog's claws. Does the cat belong to both the desired and the feared conditions? Solution: centered possible world: pairs consisting of a world and a designated time in space, the desired state is then a class of centered worlds. In fact, the gravitational center is the cat's pineal gland. No centered world belongs to two classes (desired and feared). It would be problematic if the wish were fulfilled under one centering and not fulfilled under another. Quine: does not accept this solution in the end. He prefers the shared theory that the objects of "simple settings" are classes of stimulus patterns, while the more complex settings are linguistic. LewisVsQuine: the benefits of unified objects (properties only) should not be given away. Property/Lewis: corresponds to a class of centered worlds, more precisely a property of space-time points, but also a property of cats. Let X be a class of centered worlds, Y be a property. Then the class corresponds exactly to the centered worlds that are centered on a cat with the property Y. It cannot be centered on two different cats. To rule that out, we can redefine centered worlds as pairs of a world and a designated inhabitant in it. Quine/Lewis: he has actually replaced propositions by properties through centering. IV 148 I'm not sure what his reasons are. They are not the same in relation to Catilina and the Great Pyramid (> ontological relativity) (here he wants to avoid the counterpart relation) but certainly in the cat example. Possible World/LewisVsQuine: big difference: by possible world I simply mean big individual things, of which our actual world is one. Possible Worlds/Quine: means certain abstract entities, certain classes of classes of quadruples of real numbers. ((s) space-time points). Quine/Lewis: I suspect that he at least distinguishes our concrete world from the abstract "replacement world" that it represents! Let's call it "updated ersatz world" to distinguish it from the world itself. Lewis: Variety of concrete worlds. Quine: Variety of abstract ersatz worlds, one of which represents our special one. Stalnaker: pro Quine: corresponds better to everyday language than "how it could have been". Lewis: the actual ersatz world is special only because it represents our concrete real world. And it is special not only from its own point of view, but from every world. One could assume the following now: therefore it is not contingent special, because contingency is variation from one possible world to another. LewisVs: in this way it looks like it is a non-contingent fact, which is updated by the many possible worlds. And that is wrong! ((s) Then every fact in the actual world would be necessary, every movement. >Determinism.) Schwarz I 46 Possibility/LewisVsQuine: there must be a theory of what would be true under these or other conditions. But not only because they are needed for the analysis of dispositions and causality. Schwarz I 132 Def Event/Quine/Schwarz: (1960b(1),171): Suggestion: to identify them with the space-time region in which they occur. Vs: this is too coarse-grained for effects and causes. For example, if a ball flies through the air and rotates, then flight and rotation occupy the same region, but only flight causes the window to break. Counterfactual analysis/counterfactual conditional/CoCo/Possible World/Similarity/Lewis: the next possible world in which rotation does not take place are not the next possible worlds in which flight does not take place. The two events correspond to the same space-time region in the real world, but not in all possible worlds. ((s) "Next" is not decisive here). Event/Identity/LewisVsQuine: Modification: Events are identical if they occupy the same space-time region in all possible worlds. Def Event/Lewis: is then the class of all regions (in all possible worlds) in which it happens. (1986d(2)). Schwarz I 220 Def Analytical Truth/LewisVsQuine/Schwarz: a sentence is analytical when its primary truth conditions cover all situations. Schwarz: More interesting is his thesis that practically every sentence can empirically prove to be wrong. Our theories cannot be divided into a revisable empirical and an unrevisable analytical component. 1. Willard Van Orman Quine [1960b]: Word and Object. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press 2. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Ryle, G. | Kripke Vs Ryle, G. | I 53 KripkeVsRyle: The usual argument doubts that the essentialism makes sense, and says that the answer to the question whether a property of an object is accidental or essential depends on how the subject is described. This argument is therefore not of the opinion that all the properties are accidental. If you have a identity criterion, then the question whether Nixon has specific characteristics in another possible world is a well-defined question. Sometimes, in the case of numbers, it might seem easier (but even here it is argued that identity criteria are given completely arbitrary). |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Searle, J.R. | Zink Vs Searle, J.R. | Wolf II 15 Names/ZinkVsSearle: Example Assuming that most of Aristotle's descriptions proved to be false and correct in relation to another person, then we should not say that "Aristotle" is the name of that other person, it is sufficient, "was born in 384 B.C., in Stagira". Meaning of the proper name/Zink: "The person who is actually called E.N.". (Certain identification, like Burks). ZinkVsBurks: not any property, but a predicate such as "person" with identity criteria must be included. Wolf II 167 Name/Meaning/Searle: ("Proper Names", Mind 67) no set of descriptions can indicate the meaning! The use presupposes the truth of a certain set of descriptions. But neither this set is exactly defined, nor is the meaning in the set. For then every true description of the thing would be analytically true! No discovery about it would be an empirical discovery! Possible Solution/Searle: the necessary and sufficient conditions for the meaning of the name: that it is identical to an object originally baptized in that way. II 168 SearleVs: "Aristotle" can be applied to any individual baptized this way. ZinkVsSearle: this can be eliminated by localization. |
Zink I Sidney ZInk "The Meaning of Proper Names", in: Mind 72 (1963) S. 481-499 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Synonymy | Davidson Vs Synonymy | Cresswell II 161 Synonymy/Cresswell: Problem: it involves a relativation on languages. That’s the reason for DavidsonVsSynonymy: (Davidson 1969, 161-167). QuineVsSynonymy: (1960): it is impossible to establish identity criteria for languages. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| |||