Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Continuants | Chisholm | II 176 ff Continuant/Chisholm/Simons: E.g. people, trees, cars, water waves: precisely not mereologically constant. >Mereology. Continuants are subject to flow of their parts - most parts are not necessary - no mereological essentialism. >Parts. Solution: ens sukzessivum/E.S.: not itself permanent, itself constituted from continuants E.g. ens sukzessivum: President of the United States - (Simons:this is ontologically dubious). - ens sukzessivum is modally analogous to non-negative situations. >Situations: For the terminology of mereology cf. >Peter Simons. II 178 Problem: entia sukzessiva must not have any negative parts. II 179 Solution: by adding parts an object can stop to exist. E.g. egg in fertilization. Also see >Perdurantism, >Endurantism. Simons, Peter. Tractatus Mereologico-Philosophicus? In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| de re | Wiggins | II 293 de re must/Wiggins: thesis: in order to keep (4)(x)(y)[(x = y)> N(y = x)] away from opaque contexts, we have to presume must de re: E.g. "the number of planets that is 9, must be greater than 7." If we apply this on the relation of the identity (lx)(ly)(x = y) we get necessarily [(lx)(ly)(x = y)] or the relation which has all r and all s if they are necessarily identical. Then variant of (4): (4l)(x)(y)(x = y) > (y has(Iz)[[necessary[(lr)(ls)[s = r]]],[x, z]])). That needs the contingency theory: then the definition of "is necessarily identical with" depends no longer on the possible world. >Possible worlds, >Necessity. Problem: this might not exist in English. II 309f Necessity de re/Wiggins: Problem: E.g. certainly Caesar can be essentially a person, without being essentially in that way so that each sequence with Caesar satisfies in second place: (Human(x2)) Reason: it could be that "human" would not have meant "human". --- II 310 General problem: asymmetry, de re. E.g. Kripke: Elizabeth II is necessarily (de re), the daughter of George VI. But George VI does not necessarily have to have a daughter. E.g. Chisholm: if a table T has a leg L, then T must have L de re as part. But, to say of the table, that it necessarily consists of substructure and board, is not the same as to say that substructure and board are necessarily parts of the table - and also not that the board is necessarily connected to the substructure. Wiggins: nevertheless, if anything is certain, it is this: [(lx)(ly)[xRy] = [(ly)(lx)[y converse-Rx] It would be a perverse extreme in the other direction, if one wanted to banish the corresponding biconditional from the truth theory for L. Wiggins: no matter what one thinks of this mereological essentialism, it means that when the legs exist, the rest of the table needs not to exist. >Essentialism, >Mereology, >Mereological essentialism. Solution: more specific description of the essential properties, e.g. trough points in time: (t)(table exists at t)> (leg is part of table at t)) then necessary[(ly)(lw)[(t)((y exists at t) > (w is part of y at t)))], [table, leg]. II 311 That secures the desired asymmetry. Problem: There is a problem because the existential generalization does not work for the necessity-of-origin doctrine. More general solution: distinction: wrong: [Necessary[(lx) (ly)(x consists of y], [leg, table] There are undesirable consequences for existence that would be proven through it. And [Necessary [(lx) (x consists of table], [leg] this is also wrong. And finally: [Necessary (ly)(leg consists of y], [table] What is right or false depending on whether Kripke or Chisholm is right. >Necessity, >Necessity/Kripke. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Essentialism | Chisholm | Simons I 272 Mereological Essentialism/Chisholm/Simons: results from his commitment to mereological constancy - SimonsVsChisholm. >Mereology, >Parts. Chisholm: E.g. table stump + plate - a particular table can only be built from this stump and this plate. I 273 Superposition/Simons: superposition of the parts guarantees not the existence of the table (or the identity of the table with the sum - which also leads to interrupted existence. ChisholmVsSimons: this interrupted exististence sees Chisholm as a problem. But he is only committed to the adoption of essential parts - e.g. not to glue instead of nails, etc. Simons thesis: there must be an essential part. Cf. >Essence. For the terminology of mereology see >Peter Simons. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Essentialism | Simons | Chisholm II 173ff Mereological Essentialism/Simons: a thing must be founded in all its necessary parts. Part/whole relationship: the part-whole relationship is modal rigid (Chisholm pro). >Mereology, >Parts, >Wholes, >Part-of-relation. Vs: most things are in flux, e.g. people, water waves. Ens sukzessivum: for Chisholm any permanent thing ("continuant") obeys a particularly strict temporal version of mereological essentialism: if another permanent thing in any world at any time is part of it, this part has to be a part of it at all times and in all the worlds in which there exists the whole thing. Solution: entia sukzessiva: things in flux: are themselves not permanent but constituted from permanent things (continuants). >Continuants, >Ens successivum. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Necessity de re | Wiggins | II 309f Necessity de re/Wiggins: Problem: E.g. certainly Caesar can be essentially a person, without being in that way so that each sequence with Caesar satisfies in second place: (Human (x2)). Reason: it could be that "human" did not mean human. >Possible worlds, >Meaning. General problem: asymmetry, de re. E.g. Kripke: Elizabeth II is necessarily (de re), the daughter of George VI. But George VI does not necessarily have to have a daughter. E.g. Chisholm: if a table T has a leg L, then T must have L de re as part. But, to say of the table, that it necessarily consists of substructure and board, is not the same as to say that substructure and board are necessarily parts of the table - and also not that the board is necessarily connected to the substructure. Wiggins: nevertheless, if anything is certain, it is this: [(λx)(λy)[xRy] = [(λy)(λx)[y converse-Rx] It would be a perverse extreme in the other direction, if one wanted to banish the corresponding biconditional from the truth theory for L. Wiggins: no matter what one thinks of this mereological essentialism, it means that when the legs exist, the rest of the table needs not to exist. >Essentialism, >Mereology, >Mereological essentialism. Solution: more specific description of the essential properties, e.g. trough points in time: (t)(table exists at t)> (leg is part of table at t)) then necessary[(λy)(λw)[(t)((y exists at t) > (w is part of y at t)))], [table, leg]. II 311 That secures the desired asymmetry. Problem: There is a problem because the existential generalization does not work for the necessity-of-origin doctrine. More general solution: distinction: wrong: [Necessary[(λx)(λy)(x consists of y], [leg, table] There are undesirable consequences for existence that would be proven through it. And [Necessary [(λx) (x consists of table], [leg] this is also wrong. And finally: [Necessary (λy)(leg consists of y], [table] What is right or false depending on whether Kripke or Chisholm is right. >Necessity, >Necessity/Kripke. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Objects (Material Things) | Chisholm | I 257 Res/Aquinas/Duns Scotus: "thing", transcendental, convertible with the beings (ens). Brentano: Reism (late): abstractions, universals, negations, facts, forms, fictions: are not things. >Ontology/Brentano. Hedwig, Klaus. Brentano und Kopernikus. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 --- Simons I 2 Chisholm: Thesis: (appearing) things (appearances) are logical constructions of objects for which the mereological essentialism applies. - Flux: Problem: changing objects cannot be regarded as identical with themselves according to the extensional mereology - Solution/Chisholm: thesis the actual are mereologically constant and the phenomena again logical constructions from immutable objects - VsChisholm: other solution: processes (with temporal parts ) instead of objects (continuants). >Continuants. Simons I 120 Object/Thing/Object/Chisholm: Thesis: "Mereological constancy": objects in the original sense: - entia per se: cannot change - in the derived sense: entia per alio: subject to the flux, but only by being consulted successively through different entia per se, which differ in their parts. >Mereology/Simons, >Terminology/Simons. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Set Theory | Simons | I 12 Set Theory: seperate quantities have one element in common: the empty set. Mereology: here, mereology does not exist. >Mereology. Partial order: here, partial order is the common part of the lower bound. >Partial order. Product: a product is the greatest lower barrier: i.e. the individual, that x and y have in common (= average of the set theory, lens in Venndiagram). Stronger: binary sum: the binary sum is the individual who overlaps iff. it at least overlaps one of x or y (Venndiagram: both circles with lens), e.g. a broom is the sum of handle and head. Any two individuals always have a sum. >Mereological sum. I 279 Set Theory/modality/necessity/Simons: there is rigidity of the element relationship: a class can have in no possible world other elements, as it has in the actual world. This is analog to the mereological essentialism for subsets. >Element relation. I 332 Set Theory/mereology/elements/(s): elements are not interchangeable but parts are. >Parts. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chisholm, R.M. | Simons Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Chisholm II 166 SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsBrentano: thesis: Chisholm inherited a mereological essentialism by Brentano with which I do not agree. But I will use these ideas to give a slightly different interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Wittgenstein himself was not so clear with respect to facts as it seems. Self-Criticism: self-criticism is a mess of facts and complexes. There are worlds between the later Wittgenstein and Brentano, but there are contacts between Brentano and the Tractatus. --- Simons I 1 Extensional Mereology/Simons: extensional mereology is a classical theory. Spelling: CEM. Individuals Calculus/Leonard/Goodman: (40s): another name for the CEM is an individual calculus. This is intended to express that the objects of the part-whole relation belong to the lowest logical type (so they are all individuals, both a whole and a part are individuals). VsCEM: 1. The CEM claims the existence of sums as individuals for whose existence we have no evidence beyond the theory. Vs: 2. The whole theory is not applicable to most things in our lives. Vs: 3. The logic of the CEM has not the resources to deal with temporal and modal terms: e.g. temporal part, substantial part, etc. Simons: these are all external critiques but there is an internal critique: that comes from the extensional mereology. Extensional Mereology: thesis: objects with the same parts are identical (analogous to set theory). Problem: 1. Flux: e.g. people have different parts at different times. I 2 2. Modality/extensional mereology: problem: e.g. a man could have other parts than he actually has and still be the same person. (s) The extensionality would then demand together with the Leibniz identity that all parts are essential. This leads to mereological essentialism. Chisholm/mereological essentialism/Simons: Chisholm represents the mereological essentialism. Thesis: no object can have different parts than it actually has. Vs: it is a problem to explain why normal objects are not modally rigid (all parts are essential). Solution/Chisholm: thesis: (appearing) things (appearances) ((s) everyday things) are logical structures made of objects for which the mereological essentialism applies. Flux/mereology/Simons: problem/(s): according to the CEM changing objects may not be regarded as identical with themselves. 1. Solution/Chisholm: thesis: the actual objects are mereologically constant and the appearances again logical constructions of unchanging objects. SimonsVsChisholm: the price is too high. 2. Common solution: the common solution is to replace the normal things (continuants) through processes that themselves have temporal parts. SimonsVs: hence, the extensionality cannot be maintained. Such four-dimensional objects fail on the modal argument. CEM/event/Simons: in the case of events the extensional mereology is applicable. It is also applicable in classes and masses. Classes/masses/Simons: these are non-singular objects for which the extensionality applies. Part/Simons: a part is ambiguous, depending on whether used in connection with individuals, classes or masses. Extensionality/mereology/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, we are dealing with continuants. I 3 Continuants/Simons: continuants may be in flux. Extensionality/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore several different objects can be at the same time in the same place. I 175 Temporal Part/continuants/mereology/SimonsVsAll/SimonsVsChisholm: thesis: continuants can also have temporal parts! That means that they are not mereologically constant but mereologically variable. Continuants/Simons: thesis: continuants do not have to exist continuously. This provides us with a surprising solution to the problem of the Ship of Theseus. I 187 SimonsVsChisholm: if Chisholm is right, most everyday things, including our organism, are only logical constructions. I 188 Strict Connection/separateness/SimonsVsChisholm: the criterion for strict connection is unfortunately so that it implies that if x and y are strictly connected, but not in contact, they can be separated by the fact that a third object passes between them what per se is not a change, also not in their direct relations to each other. Problem: when this passing is only very short, the question is whether the separated sum of the two which was extinguished by the third object is the same that exists again when the third object has disappeared. If it is the same, we have a discontinued existing sum. Chisholm: Chisholm himself asks this question with the following example: a castle of toy bricks will be demolished and built again with the same bricks. I 189 Chisholm: thesis: it is a reason to be dissatisfied with the normal ontology, because it just allows such examples. SimonsVsChisholm: but Chisholm's own concepts just allowed us the previous example. Topology/Simons: yet there is no doubt that it is useful to add topological concepts such as touching or to be inside of something to the mereology. I 192 Def succession/Chisholm: 1. x is a direct a-successor of y to t ' = Def (i) t does not start before t’ (ii) x is an a to t and y is a y to t’ (iii) there is a z so that z is part of x to t and a part of y to t’ and in every moment between t’ and t including, z is itself an a. Simons: while there will be in general several such parts. We always choose the largest. w: is the common part in it, e.g. in altering a table. SimonsVsChisholm: problem: w is not always a table. ChisholmVsVs: claims that w is indeed a table: if we cut away a small part of the table, what remains is still a table. Problem: but if the thing that remains is a table because it was already previously there then it was a table that was a real part of a table! I 193 SimonsVsChisholm: the argument is not valid! E.g.: Shakespeare, Henry IV, Act IV Scene V: Prince Hal considers: if the king dies, we will still have a king, (namely myself, the heir). But if that person is a king, then, because he had previously been there, then he was a king who was the eldest son of a king. ((s) This is a contradiction because then there would have been two kings simultaneously.) Simons: this point is not new and was already highlighted by Wiggins and Quine (not VsChisholm). I 194 Change/transformation/part/succession/SimonsVsChisholm: it seems, however, that they are not compatible with the simple case where a at the same time wins and loses parts. E.g. then a+b should be an A-predecessor of a+c and a+c an A-successor of a+b. But that is not allowed by the definition, unless we know that a is an A all the time, so that it connects a+b and a+c in a chain. But this will not usually be the case. And if it is not the case, a will never ever be an A! SimonsVsChisholm: so Chisholm's definitions only work if he assumes a wrong principle! Succession/entia successiva/SimonsVsChisholm: problem: that each of the things that shall "stand in" (for a constant ens per se to explain the transformation) should themselves be an a in the original sense (e.g. table, cat, etc.) is counterintuitive. Solution/Simons: the "is" is here an "is" of predication and not of constitution (>Wiggins 1980, 30ff). Mereological Constancy/Simons: thesis: most things, of which we predict things like e.g. "is a man" or "is a table" are mereologically constant. The rest is easy loose speech and a play with identity. E.g. if we say that the man in front of us lost a lot of hair in the last year we use "man" very loosely. Chisholm: we should say, strictly speaking, that the man of today (stands for) who today stands for the same successive man has less hair than the man who stood for him last year. SimonsVsChisholm/WigginsVsChisholm: with that he is dangerously close to the four-dimensionalism. And especially because of the following thesis: I 195 To stand in for/stand for/entia successiva/Chisholm: thesis: "to stand in for" is not a relation of an aggregate to its parts. Sortal Concept/Simons: the question is whether sortal concepts that are subject to the conditions that determine what should count at one time or over time as a thing or several things of one kind are applicable rather to mereologically constant objects (Chisholm) or variable objects (Simons, Wiggins). SimonsVsChisholm: Chisholm's thesis has the consequence that most people mostly use their most used terms wrongly, if this is not always the case at all. I 208 Person/body/interrupted existence/identity/mereology/Chisholm/Simons: our theory is not so different in the end from Chisholm's, except that we do not accept matter-constancy as "strictly and philosophically" and oppose it to a everyday use of constancy. SimonsVsChisholm: advantage: we can show how the actual use of "ship" is related to hidden tendencies to use it in the sense of "matter-constant ship". Ship of Theseus/SimonsVsChisholm: we are not obligated to mereological essentialism. A matter-constant ship is ultimately a ship! That means that it is ready for use! Interrupted Existence/substrate/Simons: there must be a substrate that allows the identification across the gap. I 274 SimonsVsChisholm: according to Chisholm's principle, there is no real object, which is a table, because it can constantly change its microstructure ((s) win or lose atoms). Chisholm/Simons: but by this not the slightest contradiction for Chisholm is demonstrated. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Essentialism | Simons Vs Essentialism | I 272 Mereological Essentialism/Chisholm/Simons: there is a disarmingly simple example by Chisholm (1976, 146): E.g. a table is formed out of a stub and a plate. It is only the same table, if both remain the same. Chisholm: so it should seem that a certain table is necessarily built of this plate and this stub. Simons: this is the only example of "person and object". I 273 As it stands, it is indeed convincing. a: stub, b: plate, c: the restulting table: N(E!c > (t)[Ext c > a ≤≤t c u b ≤≤t c]) Everyday language translation/logical form/(s) : "(t)[E Ext a...": "at all times in which", "always if a c exists.. " – "N(E!c > …”:a c has to....”… - "N(E!c > (t)[Ext c ..." "a c always has to...". Simons: this is different than the sum that also would exist if plate and stub would not be connected, the table can only exist if both are connected. Superposition/Simons: so the parts do not guarantee the existence of the table (or the identity of the table with the sum)! I 275 SimonsVsEssentialism: that e.g. the engine of a car must be a specific engine is not so clear. Here there is room for vagueness and convention. Pro essentialism: clear case: e.g. an atom must have these particular protons, otherwise it is a different atom. I 276 (...) Chisholm pro Essentialism: >Sorites, Sorites/Chisholm. SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsEssentialism: our everyday linguistic concept scheme provides no such identity conditions and living conditions for ordinary objects (things, objects) so that they could not continue to exist at the slightest change. I 278 Most of the objects of science, e.g. stars, planets, organisms or volcanoes are such that they are both: natural objects or whole while mereologically variable so that there is a middle path. Middle path: there is a middle path between Chisholm's extreme essentialism and the position that the parts of an object would be merely determined arbitrarily or conventionally. Simons: thesis: one could assume a "naturally unified object". (see below: "normal style", "normal thing", "normal piece of music"). I 338 Connection/Whitehead: (see above WD5’) individuals are connected if they have a binary sum. Together with Tiles' definition then in Whitehead's system each individual is self-connected, which corresponds to his intentions. SimonsVsExtensionality: all this does not refute the arguments VsCEM: systems that limit the existence of sums and smallest upper bounds, but nevertheless remain extensional, are still too strong to be able to act as a general theory of part and whole. (However, they are still useful.) Characteristic relation/whole/Simons: continuity is only one characteristic relationship among many. Some may not be important, but one should not exclude any a priori. E.g. the political relations between Alaska and the rest of the United States outweigh the spatial continuity with Canada. Continuity: continuity helps to exclude discontinuous sums, e.g. sums of chemicals of several organisms. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Simons Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Chisholm II 186 SimonsVsLeibniz: we do not have a trace of evidence for his Monads. --- Simons I 319 Substance/Simons: we still do not know what substances are. Descartes' large rationalist successors differed in this as far as possible: Substance/Spinoza: there is only one substance that includes everything. Substance/Leibniz: there are infinitely many substances, each is perfectly atomistic (monads). Solution/Simons: actually the two are already distinguished in the concept of dependence: Dependence/Spinoza: strong rigid dependence (notation here: "7"). Dependence/Leibniz: weak rigid dependence (notation "7"). This has severe consequences: Monads/evidence/Leibniz: (Monadology §2): there must be simple substances because there is composite (masses). A mass is nothing more than an aggregate of simplicity. Simons: problem: is the mass then an individual with the monads as parts or a class with the monads as elements? If they are considered a class the monads are essential elements. Fortunately, we do not need to decide it because Leibniz accepted mereological essentialism for individuals: Whole/Leibniz: the whole ceases to exist if a part is lost. Weak rigid dependence/Simons: everything depends on its essential parts. Together with the essentialism of Leibniz this means that every thing depends on all real parts. Part/Leibniz/terminology/Simons: with him, "always" means "real part". Foundedness/ontology/Leibniz/Simons: the second assumption is that everything that is dependent from everything else, depends on something that is itself independent. That means that the chain of dependencies x 7 y 7 z ... has a last (or first?) member. Monad/Leibniz/Simons: with that we can reconstruct Leibniz's argument like this: (1) there are composites (that means objects with real parts) (2) every part is essential (3) therefore each composite depends on its parts (4) if every object has real parts, then it is the beginning of an unfounded chain of parts (5) but each chain of dependencies is founded (6) therefore; if something is a composite, it has simple parts (7) therefore, there are simple monads, atoms. SimonsVsLeibniz: 1. VsMereological Essentialism: 2. VsFoundedness-Principle: why should we believe it? Atomism: we find it in Leibniz and in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Continualism: we find it in Aristotle's theory of prima materia. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Plantinga, A. | Chisholm Vs Plantinga, A. | I 85 Names/Essence/Plantinga/Chisholm: ... if I know a proposition like the one that this person is smartly dressed, I know a proposition which contains the essence of someone. I 86 Proposition/Properties/Facts/ChisholmVsPlantinga: but if we want to assume that all properties are pure or high-quality and if all the facts or propositions are abstract or eternal objects, then there is no fact and no proposition that is expressed through "this man is smartly dressed". Possible World/Po.wo./Existence/Plantinga: Question: "Does ’Socrates is wise’ exist in worlds in which Socrates does not exist?". Possible world/ChisholmVsPlantinga: such a proposition does not even exist in worlds where Socrates exists. Sentence/Chisholm: declarative sentences express an attribution, not an acceptance of propositions. Simons I 275 Mereological Essentialism/Middle Path/Intermediate Position/Plantinga: Thesis: 1. for each x and y: if x is ever a part of y, then y is necessary so that x is a part of it at one time or another. ChisholmVsPlantinga. Simons: this is nothing but WME: WME (N)(x N(E!y > (Et)[x ≤≤t y])) 2. For each x. y and t, if x has y as part to t, then x necessarily has y as part to t. New: this is temporally rigid mereological essentialism: TRME (N)((t)(y ≤≤t x > N(E!y > y ≤≤t x)]). This allows mereological variation, but with the limitation that an object at no time could miss any part it updated at the time. It can only have additional parts. SimonsVs: 1. that seems too one-sided. 2. The time should not be essential for an object. Simons: it should be allowed for objects to start and end at other times than when they do actual. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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| mereol. Essentialism | Pro | Simons I 208 mereological essentialism: Pro: Chisholm - Vs: Simons: e.g. Ship of Theseus: initial coincidence of matter-constancy and functional constancy. I 275 mereological essentialism / Chisholm: all parts necessary - SimonsVsChisholm: some essential, others not. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| mereol. Essentialism | Versus | Simons I 272 mereological essentialism: Chisholm per - SimonsVs I 275 mereological essentialism / Chisholm: all parts necessary - SimonsVsChisholm: some are essential, others are not. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
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| Essentialism | Chisholm, R. | II 166 SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsBrentano: Thesis: Chisholm has inherited from Brentano a mereological essentialism with which I disagree. But I will use these ideas to give a slightly different interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Wittgenstein himself was not as clear about facts as it seems. Self-criticism: confusion of facts and complexes. There are worlds between the later Wittgenstein and Brentano, but there are overlaps between Brentano and the Tractatus. Simons I 2 Chisholm/Mereological Essentialism/Simons: Chisholm represents mereological essentialism: thesis: no object can have other parts than it has actual. Vs: Problem: to explain why normal objects are not modally rigid (all parts essential). Solution/Chisholm: Thesis: (appearing) things are logical constructions of objects to which mereological essentialism applies. Solution/Chisholm: Thesis: the actual ones are mereologically constant and the phenomena again logical constructions from unchangeable objects. SimonsVsChisholm: the price is too high. Simons I 275 Mereological Essentialism/Intermediate Position/Chisholm/Simons: there is another one that Chisholm rejects: that some parts are essential and others are not. That is my position. ChisholmVsSimons: all parts are necessary. Simons: Thesis: some parts are essential (not necessary!). |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| mereolog. Essentia | Plantinga, A. | Simons I 275 Mereological Essentialism/Middle Way/Intermediate Position/Plantinga: Thesis 1. for each x and y: if x is ever a part of y, then y is necessary so that x is a part of it at one time or another. ChisholmVsPlantinga. Simons: this is nothing but WME: WME (N)(x ‹‹ y › N(E!y › (Et)[x ‹‹t y])) Thesis 2. For each x. y and t, if x has y as part to t, then x necessarily has y as part to t. New: this is temporally rigid mereological essentialism: Mereological Essentialism/intermediate position/Chisholm/Simons: there is another one that Chisholm rejects: that some parts are essential and others are not. That's my position. ChisholmVsSimons: all parts are necessary. Simons: thesis: some parts are essential (not necessary!). |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Theseus Ship | Salmon, N. | Staln I 115 For example, a complex artifact, e.g. a bicycle to which a part has been exchanged, is still the same bicycle, only slightly different. But when most parts have been replaced, you would say it's similar, but different. Hugh Chandler: (1975) Variant split between two possible worlds. w1: as in the original story w2: like w2, except that the old parts are removed but not replaced. The ship is dismantled and later reconstructed. 2. Example Statue/Clay/Allan Gibbard: (1975) Example a lump of clay called "Klumpi" (lumpl) and a statue called "Goliath". The statue is made of the lump and the lump and the statue come to existence or cease to exist at the same moment. Then both are identical. ((s) the formulation disguises that they are detached). Identity/statue/clay/Gibbard/Stalnaker: but it is clear that this identity is not a necessary identity, but a contingent identity. In another possible world, the statue before the lump could have been destroyed. Then both are different. I 117 Cross-world Identity/Stalnaker: it looks as if we have to give it up, or accept an extreme mereological essentialism that requires the identity of all parts. Chandler/Nathan Salmon: thesis: the bicycles are all identical, but those from the more distant worlds are not accessible to each other. |
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| Essentialism | Simons, P. | I 253 mereological essentialism / Simons: each part of each object is essential for it. The reasoning is questionable, but they must apply to mereological constancy and extensionality. I 281 Simons per essentialism for events: - E.g. the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, by principle contains both essentially. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Theseus Ship | Chandler, H. | Stalnaker I 115 E.g. a complex artifact, as a bicycle, to which a part has been replaced, is still the same cycle, only slightly different. But if most of the parts have been replaced, you would say it is similar, but a different one. Hugh Chandler: (1975) variant, divided into two worlds w1: as in the original story W2: equal, except that the old parts are removed but not replaced. The ship will be dismantled and reconstructed later. I 117 Cross world identity/Stalnaker: it looks like, as we would have to give them up or accept an extreme mereological essentialism, which requires the identity of all parts. Chandler/Nathan Salmon: the bikes are all identical, but they are not accessible for each other from the distant worlds. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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