Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identity Theory | Quine | II 209f KripkeVsIdentity Theory: imaginable: pain without a brain condition - this is difficult to exclude for materialists. - QuineVsKripke: that is only difficult if the materialist believes in metaphysical necessity. X 88 Identity Theory of Logic: Identity/Logic/Quine: Truths of Identity Theory Example "x = x", "Ey((x = y)" or "~(x = y . ~(y = x)))" ((s) symmetry of identity) are not suitable as logical truths according to our definitions of logical truth. Reason: they can be wrong if "=" is replaced by other predicates. Consequence: So should we not count identity to logic, but to mathematics? Together with ">" and "ε"? See >Equal sign. Identity/Logic/Quine: because of the logical truth you do not want to count identity to logic, but there are also reasons to associate it with logic: X 89 The identity theory is complete, there are complete proof procedures for the quantifier logic with identity. Identity Theory/Axioms/Goedel: if you add the axiom (1) x = x and the axiom scheme (2) ~(x = y . Fx . ~Fy) to a complete evidence procedure for the qunatum logic, this results in a complete evidence procedure for the quantifier logic with identity. Universality: this characteristic of identity theory also makes it closer to logic than to mathematics: it treats all objects without bias. This suggests that identity theory and quantifier logic are particularly fundamental. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Language | Bigelow | I 131 Language/Bigelow/Pargetter: the sentences of the language can be divided into two parts: a) Theorems (logically necessary). b) Non-theorems. (These can also be wrong). Non-theorems: even they may be necessary true. For example, that electrons have a negative charge. Metaphysically necessary/Bigelow/Pargetter: such sentences can be called "metaphysically necessary". Because its truth is not guaranteed by theorems. (Or does not follow from logic alone). >Metaphysical necessity, >Logical truth, >Truth, >Necessity. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Logical Necessity | Logical necessity: property of statements, of which it is impossible that they are false. There are different types of necessity that differ in their strength: e.g. physical, logical, metaphysical necessity, necessity de dicto and necessity de re. |
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| Metaphysics | Jackson | Stalnaker I 201 Metaphysics/Episteme/Kripke/Stalnaker: the separation of metaphysical and epistemological distinctions made it possible to agree with the empiricists that substantial truths about the world are knowable only on the basis of empirical evidence, while one allows at the same time nontrivial metaphysical truths about the essential nature of the things. Kripke/Stalnaker: it remains controversial, what Kripke actually showed. Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Sidelle 1989(1), Jackson 1998(2), Chalmers 1996(3)) Thesis: Kripke's theses can be reconciled with this,... I 202 ...that all necessity has its root in language and our ideas. However, in a more complex way than empiricism assumed. >Necessity, >Necessity de re. Then there is no irreducible necessity a posteriori. Necessary a posteriori: is then divisible into necessary truth which is knowable a priori by conceptual analysis, and a part that is only a posteriori knowable, but this is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. >Necessity a posteriori, >Two-dimensional semantics. I 203 Metaphysics/metaphysical laws/logic/analysis/Stalnaker: conceptual analysis and deduction (logic) are sufficient to show what is conceptually necessary. But they cannot reveal any metaphysical laws that exclude possibilities that are conceptually coherent, but metaphysically impossible. Metaphysical possibility/Jackson/Chalmers: ditto, no different terms of necessity (Jackson 1998(2), 67-84, Chalmers 1996(3), 136-8). I 204 Metaphysical necessity/Jackson/Chalmers/Kripke/Lewis/Stalnaker: metaphysical necessity is therefore necessity in the broadest sense. E.g. It is not exactly the case that there are no metaphysical laws that might have excluded gold from being something else, but if there are such metaphysical laws, there is no such possibility for them to exclude it. Namely, in the light of empirical facts. >Facts. 1. Alan Sidelle. [1989] Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism. Cornell University Press 2. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 3. David J. Chalmers [1996]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Metaphysics | Leibniz | Holz I 13 Metaphysics/Leibniz/Holz: the inner unity of Leibniz's work can only be understood from metaphysics. His position lies between Kant and Hegel: he shows LeibnizVsKant: the alternative of metaphysics as a science, by showing his method. >Metaphysics/Kant. LeibnizVsHegel: he shows the possibility of metaphysics, which is not based on an absolutely idealistic way. I 24 Metaphysics/Holz: with Leibniz, it receives the scientific theory form of a non-empirically verifiable theory of the general connexion of the world. They are no longer "ideas" of the whole, but trans-empirical construction of the most plausible and most explanatory form. I 81 Metaphysics/Leibniz: since that looks like a circle, Descartes, for example, sought a justification in God. But metaphysically, the circle cannot be dissolved, for metaphysics rests precisely on an unbroken link! >Chain/Leibniz. The circle is also preserved logically. The system has to be interrupted somewhere: Solution/Leibniz: an ineluctable function of sensory perception - not as a "first reason," but as an extra-logical material beginning of the reflexion ratio, as a quasi "Archimedean point" (outside). >Sensory impresssion/Leibniz. Leibniz is well aware of this break. For its part, the metaphysical necessity can no longer be deduced from reasons. I 82 Metaphysics/Leibniz/Holz: in the realm of reasons of truths (for example, mathematics) the reduction is real possible to the identity principle. >Identity/Leibniz. I 119 Leibniz thesis: the structural character of the monad causes that something is happening. The structure guarantees the unity of being and is the being of unity. Metaphysics/Unity/World/Ultimate justification/Leibniz: the concept of the individual is a world concept. For this reason, the inner-world scientific justification given to the particular in its particularity is dependent on a metaphysical (underlying) principle which makes the being of the world intelligible. >Unity/Leibniz, >World/Leibniz, >Ultimate justification/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Necessity | Necessity, philosophy: different kinds of necessity are distinguished, differing in their strength. For example, physical, logical or metaphysical necessity. See also necessity de dicto, necessity de re. |
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| Necessity | Chalmers | Schwarz I 27 Definition strong necessity/Chalmers: Thesis: In addition to substantial contingent truths, there are also substantial modal truths: For example, Kripke is essentially a human being, e.g. that pain is essentially identical to XY. N.B.: knowledge of contingent facts is not sufficient to recognize these modal facts. How do we recognize them, perhaps we cannot do this (van Inwagen 1998)(1) or only hypothetically through methodological considerations (Block/Stalnaker 1999(2)). >Modality, >Modal truth, >Possible worlds, >Essentialism, >Pain, >Identity, >Identity theory, >Contingency. Schwarz I 208 A posteriori/Necessity/Lewis/Schwarz: here the secondary truth conditions are generally fulfilled, but not the primary ones! The first circumstance makes the sentences necessary - secondary truths reflect the behavior in modal embeddings - the second makes them a posteriori. But not because primary conditions of truth would be determined by embedding in epistemic operators (as in (Chalmers, 2003)(3)), but because, according to our language conventions, e.g. "The Morning Star is the Evening Star" may not always be expressed, but only when certain conditions are available about which we must first inform ourselves. >Truth conditions. Schwarz I 209 E.g. if the astronomers announce tomorrow that the Morning Star is not the Evening Star, then they have real news, but they do not violate our language conventions. This has something to do with Lewis' description theory of the reference. >Reference/Lewis, >Conventions/Lewis, >Language use, >Morning star/Evening star. 1. [1998]: “Modal Epistemology”. Philosophical Studies, 92: 67–84. In [van Inwagen 2001] 2. Ned Block und Robert Stalnaker [1999]: “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap”. The Philosophical Review, 108: 1–46 3. [2003]: “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics”. Manuskript. Online verf¨ugbar unter http://www.consc.net/papers/foundations.html --- Chalmers I 63 Necessary Truth/Gareth Evans/Chalmers: (Evans 1979 (1)): Definition "superficial necessity"/Evans: E..g "Water is H2O" when the modal operator is "actually fixed", i.e. related to the actual world (The world of the speaker). (Davies and Humberstone, 1980 (2)). It may turn out that the reference is different. (I.e., that it was different all the time). >Reference, >Actuality, >Actual World. Def "deep necessity"/Evans: this is not influenced by a posteriori considerations. These types of necessity and possibility refer to statements, not to worlds. Truths conditions/Evans/Chalmers: Thus, two sets of truth conditions are associated with each statement (primary and secondary,> Intensions/Chalmers). I 13 Strong metaphysical necessity/Chalmers: would be one that assumes that it would be metaphysically impossible for a world to be identical with ours in regard to the physical facts, but not for all positive facts. I 137 This is stronger than Kripke's metaphysical necessity, which we may call weak metaphysical necessity. >Metaphysical necessity. Conceivability/Chalmers: then worlds are conceivable that are not possible at all. Strong metaphysical necessity goes beyond the limitations we have described as "wrongly described worlds". Then "Zombie world" could correctly describe a world that we imagine, even with regard to a secondary intension. It is only the case that such a world would not be metaphysically possible. >Zombies, >Secondary Intension/Chalmers, >Intensions, >Terminology/Chalmers. 1. Vs: there is no reason to believe that there is such a modality of metaphysical necessity. There are no analogies to this of how they are provided by examples such as water/H2O or Hesperus/Phosphorus, since they require only one possible world. A posteriori Information: always affects only our own world! This can help to locate our world in the space of possible worlds. 2. Vs: If we allow this kind of metaphysical necessity, we open the door for further ad hoc modalities. I 138 Zombie World: someone who believes that a zombie world is logically possible but metaphysically impossible, cannot answer the key question: Why could not God have created a Zombie world? If he had created it, it would still be metaphysically impossible. This is too arbitrary. >Metaphysics. 1. G. Evans, Reference and contingency. The Monist 62, 1979: pp. 161-89. 2. M. K. Davies and I. L. Humberstone, Two notions of necessity. Philosophical Studies 38, 1980: pp. 1-30. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Necessity | Sidelle | Stalnaker I 201/2 Necessity/Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: one can still assume that necessity has its root in the language. Solution: two-dimensional semantics: shares e.g. necessary a posteriori on in necessary truth that is a priori knowable (through conceptual analysis) and a part which is only a posteriori knowable. >Two-dimensional semantics, >Semantics, >Knowledge, >a priori, >a posteriori, >Analysis, >Concepts, >Language, >Meaning, >Word Meaning. Metaphysical necessity/all authors: Metaphysical necessity is in any case no special kind of necessity. >Metaphysical necessity. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Necessity | Stalnaker | I 18 Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis: necessity is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It results from optional descriptive semantics that happens to characterize natural languages: a mechanism of establishing references. >Necessity a posteriori, >Reference. StalnakerVsJackson: the reference-defining mechanisms are not optional as part of meta-semantics. They are part of the presentation of why internal states can be representational at all. >Representation, >Mental states. I 53 Necessary proposition/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis, there is only one necessary proposition: the set of all possible worlds. >Necessity/Lewis. In order to know that it is true, i.e. that the real world is within this set. For this, you do not need to know any facts about the modal reality. Necessary truth is not made true by the facts. >Facts, >Truthmakers, >Actual world/Lewis. I 64 Metaphysical necessity/metaphysical possibility/Lewis/Louis/Stalnaker: it means: if you have a range of all possibilities, you can quantify with them. The modal operators are then just the quantifiers. >Metaphysical possibility. Error: one can then still be wrong, but only about how one has to understand a sentence - not about how a possible situation would have to be. >Understanding, >Situations. I 189 Necessary a posteriori/contingent a priori/Stalnaker: assuming the inventor’s name was Judson - then both sentences, both "Judson invented the zipper" and "Julius invented ...", are necessary and both are contingent. >Reference/Stalnaker. Contingent: both are contingent because the statement about Judson is a priori equivalent to the one about Julius. Necessary: both are necessary because the statement "Julius is Judson" is a statement with two rigid designators - although the reference is determined by various causal chains. >Proper names, >Rigidity, >Descriptions, >Contingency. I 201 Necessity/N/Quine/Kripke/Stalnaker: before Quine and Kripke, all N were considered to be verbal or conceptual. >de dicto, >Necessity/Kripke, >Necessity/Quine, >de re. Quine: one must always be skeptical about N, analyticity and a priori. Kripke: he was the first to move empiricism and terminology apart - by finding examples for contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori. Thereby, the separatation epistemic/metaphysical arose. >Epistemic/ontologic, >Metaphysics. I 202 Def nomologically necessary/Stalnaker: (in possible worlds x): nomologically necessary means true in all possible worlds that have the same laws as the possible world x ((s) relative to possible world x). Natural Laws/laws of nature/LoN/Stalnaker: thesis: laws of nature are contingent. They do not apply to possible worlds. >Natural laws, >Possible worlds. Some authors: laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. Logic/Stalnaker/(s): logic cannot show what is metaphysically possible. I 204 Necessity/conceptual/metaphysics/Stalnaker: the entire distinction is based on a confusion of a property of propositions with a property of linguistic and mental representations. Proposition: their contingency or necessity has nothing to do with our terms and their meanings. >Concepts, >Possibility. Possibilities: possibilities would be the same, even if we had never thought of them. >Conceivability/Chalmers. Conceptually possible: simple metaphysical possibilities that we can imagine are conceptually possible. >Metaphysical possibility. I 205 Necessary a posteriori/Kripke/Stalnaker: the need stems from the fact that the secondary intension is necessary - the a posteriori character stems from the fact that the primary intension is a contingent proposition. >Intensions/Stalnaker. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Review | Schurz | I 128 Verification/strict case/Mill/Schurz: (not statistical): consists of two activities: 1. method of agreement: truth/falsity, verification/falsification. 2. method of difference: relevance/irrelevance. >Relevance, >Truth, >Verification, >Falsification. 1st Method of matching/Mill: A sample, "experimental group". I 129 This is a selection of individuals from a range for which just the property A is valid and not an arbitrary property, Ex "All ravens are black" should not be compared with nails, flowers, and gorillas. 2nd Method of difference/mill: to check the relevance, one chooses an A control sample (control group) to which also A applies. Representativeness/strict case/Mill/Schurz: the A sample should represent the A individuals in the population as well as possible. I 130 Falsifying individuals should differ from verifying ones in some qualitative property. Now, if we vary the accompanying circumstances as much as possible, we maximize our chance of finding falsifying individuals in the A sample (sufficient reason). >Sufficiency. Principle of sufficient reason/Leibniz: had considered this as metaphysical necessity. >Necessity, >Essence, >Essentialism. Principle of sufficient reason/SchurzVsLeibniz: but it is generally valid only in deterministic universes. In indeterministic universes there are also random exceptions without any reason. However, the principle is heuristically useful. Representativity/Popper: the representativity requirement belongs to the strict scrutiny so called by Popper: one should not examine the expansion under heat only on metals. I 131 Methodical induction/law hypotheses//Schurz: a) when testing a given strict hypothesis, one first tests for truth and then for relevance. b) if one searches for an unknown cause or law hypothesis for a given effect, one proceeds in reverse. I 134 Statistical case: Check for presumptive truth/Statistics/Schurz: method of Acceptance intervals: Ex law hypothesis: p(Kx I Ax) = 80 %.AG out of 100 trees examined, 75 were diseased. How do you infer the plausibility of the population frequency hypothesis p(K I A) from the sampling frequency hn(K I A)? According to Fisher (1956)(1), one can calculate the statistical probability that the sampling frequency has a certain size, or lies in a certain size interval, given the hypothesis is true. This is based on the binomial distribution. (...). I 137 Check for presumptive relevance/statistical/Schurz: A control group: in the simplest case, consists of individuals who do not have trait A. I 141 Statistical representativeness/criterion/definition/Schurz: difference from strict case: now the representativeness requirement says not only that the accompanying circumstances should vary as much as possible, but more specifically that all other relevant factors in the A sample should be distributed as equally as possible in frequency. Bsp factors other than car exhaust that make trees sick, e.g., pest infestations. Representativeness/definition: if all relevant characteristics in the sample are equally distributed as in the population. The assumption that this is the case is of course based on induction and cannot be guaranteed by any method. Criterion: to make this possible at all, it must be ensured that the criterion of representativeness is obtained independently of the definition of representativeness. Or rather, its fulfillment must be able to be guaranteed independently of the inductive generalization step. Solution: the criteria are derived from the method of sample generation. Method: most important: random sampling. The probability distribution of deviation from the population is then statistically calculable. Random selection implies universal accessibility. narrow random selection: completely blind. wide: with equal chances of getting into the selection. I 175 Testing/Schurz: a theoretical hypothesis can be tested against not just one, but as many as possible equally plausible indicators. I 176 Indicator: for each one, it is necessary to check whether and which hidden variables are introduced by it. 1. Fisher, R.A. (1956). Statistical Methods and Scientific Inference. New York: Hafner Press, (New edition Oxford Univ. Press, 1995). |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Theories | Chalmers | I 165 Conscious Experience/Consciousness/Theories/Chalmers: three types of theories: A. Consciousness supervenes logically on the physical, for functional and eliminative reasons. I 166 B. Consciousness does not supervene logically, there is no a priori implication from the physical to the phenomenal, but nevertheless materialism is true. C. VsMaterialism and Vs Logical Supervenience. >Materialism, >Supervenience, >Physical/psychic. A. Variants: Eliminativism, Behaviorism, Reductive Functionalism. Cf. >Colour researcher Mary/Frank Jackson, >Elimination, >Behaviorism, >Reductionism, >Functionalism. 1. Physical and functional twins of us without conscious experiences are inconceivable. >Zombies. 2. Mary does not learn anything new when she sees red for the first time. 3. Everything about consciousness can be explained functionally. Representative: Armstrong (1968)(1), Dennett (1991)(2), Lewis (1966)(3), Ryle (1949)(4). Variants: Dretske (1995)(5), Rey (1982)(6), Rosenthal (1996)(7), Smart (1959)(8), White (1986)(9), Wilkes (1984)(10), B: Variants: Nonreductive Materialism. The only non-contradictory variant assumes strong metaphysical necessity as decisive. >Metaphysical necessity. 1. Zombies and inverted spectra are conceivable, but metaphysically impossible. >Conceivability. 2. Mary learns something new when she sees red, but this can be explained with an analysis in the Loar style ((s) semantically). >B. Loar. 3. Consciousness, cannot be explained reductively, but is nevertheless physical. Representatives, not explicit, but approximate: Levine (1983 (11), 1993(12)), Loar (1990)(13). Others who adopt physicalism without logical supervenience: Byrne (1993)(14), Flanagan (1992)(15), Hill (1991)(16), Horgan (1984b)(17), Lycan (1995)(18), Papineau (1993)(19), Tye (1995)(20) van Gulick (1992)(21). C. Different Variations of Property Dualism. Materialism is assumed to be false, certain phenomenal or proto-phenomenal properties are assumed to be irreducible. 1. Zombies and inverted spectra are logically and metaphysically possible. 2. Mary learns something new, namely non-physical facts. 3. Consciousness cannot be explained reductively, but it can be explained non-reductively by additional natural laws. Representatives: Campbell (1970)(22), Honderich (1981)(23), Jackson (1982)(24), H. Robinson (1982)(26), W. Robinson (1988), Sprigge (1994)(27). I 167 The ultimate choice is between the theories of the A type and the rest. I 213 Theory/Chalmers: even if consciousness cannot be explained reductively, there can be a non-reductionist theory of consciousness. Such a theory will be similar to the theories that physics gives us about motion, space, and time. The existence of these entities is not derived from something more basic. Instead, laws are stated about them. >Laws, >Laws of nature. I 216 First Person/Chalmers: Problem: with the perspective of the first person, a number of contradictory theories are possible: e.g. Solipsism, panpsychism, etc. >First person, >Solipsism, >Panpsychism. I 218 If we could only figure out which theory of consciousness is better than its competitors, we would have already gained a lot. >Consciousness/Chalmers. 1. D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London 1968 2. D. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, Boston, 1991 3. D. Lewis, An argument for the identity theory, Journal of Philosophy 63, 1966: pp.17-25 4. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Oondon 1949 5. F. Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge 1995 6. G. Rey, A reason for doubting the existence of consciousness. In. R. Davidson, S. Schwartz and D Shapiro (Eds) Consciousness and Self-Regulation. Vol 3 New York 1982 7. D. M. Rosenthal, A theory of consciousness. In: N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere (Eds) The Natur of Consciousness, Cambridge 1996 8. J. C. Smart, Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 68, 1959: pp.141-56 9. S. L. White, Curse of the qualia. Synthese 68, 1986: pp. 333-68 10. K. V. Wilkes, Is consciousness important? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35, 1984: pp. 223-43 11. J. Levine, Materialism and qualia. The explanatory gap. PhPacific Philosophical Quarterly 64, 1983: pp.354-61 12. J. Levine, On leaving out what it's like. In: M. Davies and G. Humphreys (Eds) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, Oxford 1993. 13. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108 14. A. Byrne, The emergent mind, Ph.D. diss. Princeton University, 1993 15. O. Flanagan, Consciousness reconsidered. Cambridge 1992 16. C. S. Hill, Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge 1991 17. T. Horgan, Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 1984: pp. 147-83 18. W. G. Lycan, A limited defense of phenomenal information. In: T. Metzingwr (ed), Conscious Experience, Paderborn 1995. 19. D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford 1993 20. M. Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge 1995 21. R. van Gulick, Nonreductive materialism and the nature of intertheoretical constraint. IN: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim (Eds) Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin 1992 22. K. K. Campbell, Body and Mind, New York 1970 23. T. Hoderich, Psychological law-like connections and their problems. Inquiry 24, 1981: pp. 277-303 24. F. Jackson, Epiphenomenal qualia, Philosophical Quarterly 32, 1993: pp. 127-36 25. H, Robinson, Matter and Sense, Cambridge 1982 26. W. S. Robinson, Brains and People: An Essay on Mentality and Its Causal Conditions, Philadelphia 1988 27. T. L. S. Sprigge, Final causes. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45, 1971: pp. 149-70 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Kripke, S. A. | Quine Vs Kripke, S. A. | Putnam I 247 Def "Small Realism"/Putnam: ( "realism with a lower case r"): here, to say what we say and do what we do means being a "realist". But that brings problems with realism and "reality": Reality/Realism/Wittgenstein: (trees and chairs), "the this and that to which we can point" are paradigms for what we call real. (1971, Lecture 25). Realism/Reality/Objects/Space-Time Points/Putnam: here Kripke, Quine, Lewis disagree: what is the relationship between the chair and the space-time region it occupies? Quine: the chair and the electromagnetic and other fields that constitute it are one and the same. The chair is the spacetime region. KripkeVsQuine: both are numerically different objects, but have the same mass (e.g. statue/clay). The chair could have occupied a different space-time region! QuineVsKripke: this proof is worthless, because modal predicates are hopelessly vague. Lewis: Quine is right as far as the chair is concerned, but wrong in terms of the modal predicates. LewisVsKripke: not the chair but a counterpart to this chair could have been somewhere else. (Not "exactly this chair" within the meaning of the logical concept of identity (=).). Putnam: so there are three questions: 1) is the chair identical with the matter or does the chair somehow coexist with the matter in the space-time region? 2) Is the matter identical to the fields? 3) Are the fields identical with the space-time regions? Putnam: these questions are probably all three nonsense, but at least the first one is! Quine II 209 ff Replica on Saul Kripke The concept of possible worlds contributed to the semantics of modal logic. Kripke: meaningful model theory of modal logic. Def Models/Quine: allow for proof consistency. They also have heuristic value, but they do not offer an explanation. >Models. II 210 They can as clear as they want, nevertheless they can leave us completely in the dark regarding the primary, intended interpretation. QuineVsKripke: following questions regarding possible worlds: 1) When can objects between different worlds be equated 2) When is a designation expression rigid, 3) where is metaphysical necessity to testify? The way in which Kripke refers to Bishop Butler is startling: "As Bishop Butler said," Everything is what it is and not another thing." I.e. " heat is molecular motion" will not be contingent, but necessary." (Kripke p. 160) QuineVsKripke: I can also interpret the bishop according to my own purposes: Everything is what it is, do not ask what it may be or must be. Possible World/QuineVsKripke: allow proofs of consistency, but no unambiguous interpretation when objects are equal? Bishop Butler ("no other thing"): identity does not necessarily follow. Kripke on the identity of mind and body: The identity theorist who thinks pain is a brain state ... has to claim that we are mistaken if we think it is conceivable that pain could have existed without brain states. ... The materialist therefore faces a very tricky objection: he has to prove that something whose possibility we deem to imagine is not possible in reality. QuineVsKripke: the materialist will only feel the intricacy of Kripke's objection as far as he believes in metaphysical necessity. I can gratefully read Kripke in a way that he supports me in my desire to show what an intricate network the representative of the modality concept is spinning. II 210f KripkeVsIdentity Theory: imagine: Pain without a brain state - for materialists difficult to exclude. QuineVsKripke: only difficult if materialist believes in metaphysical necessity. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Schurz Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 129 Representativity/strict case/Mill/Schurz: the A sample should represent the A individuals in the population as well as possible. I 130 Falsifying individuals should differ from verifying ones in a qualitative property. If we now vary the accompanying circumstances as much as possible, we maximize our chance to find falsifying individuals in the A sample. (> sufficient reason). Principle of sufficient reason/Leibniz: had regarded this as a metaphysical necessity. SchurzVsLeibniz: but it is generally valid only in deterministic universes. In indeterministic universes there are also random exceptions without any reason. However, the principle is heuristically useful. Representativity/Popper: the representativity requirement belongs to Popper's so-called strict verification: the expansion during heat should not only be investigated on metals. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Lewis, D. | Field Vs Lewis, D. | I 233 Knowledge/Belief/Explanation/Mathematics/Lewis: consequently, since mathematics consists of necessary truths, there can be no explanation problem. FieldVsLewis: at least 4 points, why this does not exclude the epistemic concerns: 1) not all the facts about the realm of mathematical antities apply necessarily. But suppose it were so, then there are still facts about the mathematical and non-mathematical realm together! E.g. (A) 2 = the number of planets closer to the Sun than the Earth. (B) for a natural number n there is a function that depicts the natural numbers smaller than n on the set of all particles in the universe ((s) = there is a finite number of particles). (C) beyond all sp.t. points there is an open region, for which there is a 1: 1 differentiable representation. I 234 of this region on an open subset of R4 (space, quadruples of real numbers). (D) there is a differentiable function y of spatial points on real numbers, so that the gradient of y indicates the gravitational force on each object, as measured by the unit mass of that object. Field: these facts are all contingent. But they are partly about the mathematical realm (mathematical entities). Explanation/FieldVsLewis: There remains the problem of the explanation of such "mixed" statements. (Or the correlation of these with our beliefs). Solution: You can divide these statements: an a) purely mathematical component (without reference to physical theories, but rather on non-mathematical entities, E.g. quantities with basic elements, otherwise the condition would be too strong). Important argument: this component can then be regarded as "necessarily true". b) purely non-mathematical component (without reference to mathematics). I 235 2) FieldVsLewis: even with regard to purely mathematical facts, Lewis’ answer is too simple. Necessary Facts/Mathematics: to what extent should they be necessary in the realm of mathematics? They are not logically necessary! And they cannot be reduced to logical truths by definition. Of course they are mathematically necessary in the sense that they follow from the laws of mathematics. E.g. Similarly, the existence of electrons is physically necessary, because it follows from the laws of physics. FieldVsLewis: but in this physical case, Lewis would not speak of a pseudo-problem! But why should the fact that numbers exist mathematically necessary be a pseudo-problem?. Mathematical Necessity/Field: false solution: you could try to object that mathematical necessity is absolute necessity, while physical necessity is only a limited necessity. Metaphysical Necessity/Field: or you could say that mathematical statements. I 236 Are metaphysically necessary, but physical statements are not. FieldVs: It is impossible to give content to that. I 237 3) FieldVsLewis: he assumes a controversial relation between Counterfactual Conditional and necessity. It is certainly true that nothing meaningful can be said about E.g. what would be different if the number 17 did not exist. And that is so precisely because the antecedent gives us no indication of what alternative mathematics should be considered to be true in this case. I 238 4) FieldVsLewis: there is no reason to formulate the problem of the explanation of the reliability of our mathematical belief in modal or counterfactual expressions. II 197 Theoretical Terms/TT/Introduction/Field: TT are normally not introduced individually, but in a whole package. But that is no problem as long as the correlative indeterminacy is taken into account. One can say that the TT are introduced together as one "atom". E.g. "belief" and "desire" are introduced together. Assuming both are realized multiply in an organism: Belief: because of the relations B1 and B2 (between the organism and internal representations). Desired: because of D1 and D2. Now, while the pairs (B1, D1) and (B2, D2) have to realize the (term-introductory) theory. II 198 The pairs (B1, D2) and (B2, D1) do not have to do that. ((s) exchange of belief and desire: the subject believes that something else will fulfill its desire). FieldVsLewis: for this reason we cannot accept its solution. Partial Denotation/Solution/Field: we take the TT together as the "atom" which denotes partially as a whole. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Modalities | Lewis Vs Modalities | Schwarz I 228 Modalities/Strong necessity/Metaphysics/Chalmers/VsLewis/Schwarz: Supporters of strong necessities separate between metaphysical possibilities and "epistemic" or "doxastic" modalities. Possible Worlds/Lewis: for the tasks that Lewis assigns to the possible world, there must be a possible world for every way we know things could be. But only some of these modalities are really possible metaphysically. Metaphysical Modality/Schwarz: is a limited one compared to Lewis modality. LewisVsStrong Necessity/Schwarz: their supporters do not explain where the dividing line should run. For example, if someone wanted to defend the metaphysical necessity of the existence of egg cups by applying "metaphysically possible" only to possible worlds with egg cups, that would not be interesting. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Platonism | Benacerraf Vs Platonism | Field II 324 BenacerrafVsPlatonism/Field: standard argument: if there are objects as Platonism accepts them, how should we have an epistemic access to them? (Benacerraf 1973). Benacerraf/Field: used an argument against the causal theory of knowledge at the time. PlatonismVsBenacerraf: therefore attacked causal theory. Field: but Benacerraf's objection goes much deeper and is independent of causal theory. Benacerraf: Thesis: a theory can be rejected if it is dependent on the assumption of a massive chance. For example the two statements:´ II 325 (1) John and Judy met every Sunday afternoon last year at different places by chance, (2) they have no interest in each other and would never plan to meet, nor is there any other hypothesis for explanation. ad (2): should make an explanation by some "correlation" impossible. Even if (1) and (2) do not contradict each other directly, they are in strong tension with each other. A belief system that represents both would be highly suspicious. N.B.: but then Platonism is also highly suspicious! Because it postulates an explanation for the correlation between our mathematical beliefs and mathematical facts. (>Access, > Accessibility) For example, why do we only tend to believe that p, if p (for a mathematical p). And for this we must in turn postulate a mysterious causal relationship between belief and mathematical objects. PlatonismVsVs/Field: can claim that there are strong logical connections between our mathematical beliefs. And in fact, in modern times, we can say that we a) tend to conclude reliably and that the existence of mathematical objects serves that purpose; or b) that we accept p as an axiom only if p. FieldVsPlatonism: but this explains reliability again only by some non-natural mental forces. VsBenacerraf/Field: 1. he "proves too much": if his argument were valid, it would undermine all a priori knowledge (VsKant). And in particular undermine logical knowledge. ("Proves too much"). BenacerrafVsVs/FieldVsVs: Solution: there is a fundamental separation between logical and mathematical cases. Moreover, "metaphysical necessity" of mathematics cannot be used to block Benacerraf's argument. FieldVsBenacerraf: although his argument is convincing VsPlatonism, it does not seem to be convincing VsBalaguer. II 326 BenacerrafVsPlatonismus/Field: (Benacerraf 1965): other approach, (influential argument): 1. For example, there are several ways to reduce the natural numbers to sets: Def natural numbers/Zermelo/Benacerraf/Field: 0 is the empty set and each natural number >0 is the set that contains the set that is n-1 as the only element. Def natural numbers/von Neumann/Benacerraf/Field: every natural number n is the set that has as elements the sets that are the predecessors of n. Fact/Nonfactualism/Field: it is clear that there is no fact about whether Zermelo's or Neumann's approach "presents things correctly". There is no fact that determines whether numbers are sets. That is what I call the Def Structuralist Insight/Terminology/Field: Thesis: it makes no difference what the objects of a given mathematical theory are, as long as they are in the right relations to each other. I.e. there is no reasonable choice between isomorphic models of a mathematical theory. …+… |
Bena I P. Benacerraf Philosophy of Mathematics 2ed: Selected Readings Cambridge 1984 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Theism | Mackie Vs Theism | Stegmüller IV 466 Theodicy/popular version: (i) logical necessity: God cannot create e.g. quadrangular circles. Since evil is logically a part of the good, one cannot exist without the others. Vs: firstly: this is not a conclusion from the premise! further: a) The principle is not compellent. 1. if there were a common property that each and every thing possessed automatically, there would be no need for a predicate for it in any language. 2. It could be that this property would not be noticed by anyone! However, one could not assert: if everything possessed this property, this property didn't exist at all. b) The argument would explain at most the occurrence of very few evils. (As a side effect, not as e.g. planned genocide). IV 467 Theodicy/popular version: (ii) frequently, the argument of "necessary means" is brought forward: The evil as a means for the good. Ex. children must learn from mistakes. StegmüllerVs: However, many children do not learn from the mistakes of the world, but perish from them! Ex. pain as a warning function. Stegmüller: all these truisms are irrelevant to the problem. They are relevant only for limited beings, but God is attributed omnipotence. IV 468 (iii) principle of the organic whole: like an aesthetic principle: evil is part of the "organic whole". Such a world were even better than a purely good world. It were not static, but dynamic. Gradual overcoming of evil by the good. Def. evil of 1st order: suffering, pain, illness Def. values of 1st order: joy, happiness Def. values of 2nd order: moral values, responses to evil of 1st order: compassion, assistance, kindness, heroism. Theism must then support the thesis that evils of 1st order are satisfactorily explained and justified by values of 2nd order. Stegmüller IV 469 Theism/Mackie: Question: can the theist rightly claim that there is only absorbed evil in this world? Only then can he defend his position, otherwise there is unnecessary evils that God in his omnipotence could have avoided. VsTheism: 1. there is much more unabsorbed evils of 1st order (suffering, pain, etc.) as can fit in a valuable whole. 2. the game would be repeated at the next level! The values of 2nd order are accompanied by evils of 2nd order: Ex. wickedness, callousness, gloating, cruelty, cowardice etc. IV 470 Oly possibility: Values of 3rd order: only candidate: free will. It need not be such a value itself, but is logically necessary for realization. IV 471 Theism/Theodicy/R. Gruner: the theist should not only concede the evils, but empasize them as particularly important. The most faithful people have always been those who were most convinced of the reality of evil. Paradox: that faith depends precisely on that fact of which one claims it refuted it. This position is taken in the dialogues of Hume of the Demea. IV 479 Theodicy/free will: in defense of theism the concept of free will could be modified: freedom as a high value, such that God did not know at creation, how people would make use of it. Therefore God is not omniscient. Vs: 1. If God is not omniscient, he is no longer omnipotent, because a limitation of information is a limitation of power. Vs: 2. God would have to be thought of in a timely manner. This renounces an essential element of monotheistic religion. Vs 3. If God did not know what people would do, he still had to know what they could do! IV 481 MackieVsTheism: canot be explained without contradiction, without changing major points. Hume: would say: our boundless ignorance prevents us from claiming to have conclusively refuted theism. IV 516 MackieVsTheism: the competing naturalism always has the better arguments and lower improbability on its side. IV 517 Religion/Theism/R. Robinson: Thesis: the main contradiction between religion and reason is that religion prefers the consolation of truth. God/Spinoza/Stegmüller: (relatively strong modification of the traditional concept of God): no creator God, but infinite. Metaphysical necessity is part of him and thus the universe itself. Theodicy/Spinoza: Thesis: God knows no mercy! It is not a person, even not an infinite one, but a being who does not care about human concerns. IV 518 Religion/theology/Mackie: the monotheistic religions rely on a for them indispensable assumption of existence that is probably wrong. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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